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Scholars Crossing SOR Faculty Publications and Presentations Spring 2002 In Defense of Reason in Religion Michael S. Jones Liberty University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/sor_fac_pubs Recommended Citation Jones, Michael S., "In Defense of Reason in Religion" (2002). SOR Faculty Publications and Presentations. 113. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/sor_fac_pubs/113 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in SOR Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MICHAEL S. JONES In Defence of Reason in Religion Introduction he religions of humanity are a multi- T splendored thing. The diversity of human cul ture both in history and at this present time has produced a correspondingly diverse array of reli- In his article, «In Defense of Reason in Religion,» Jones gious beliefs. Some beliefs are ubiquitous among the reacts to current trends to minimize the role of reason in worlds religions. Many beliefs supplied by one religion religion by attempting to show that if religionists desire are complimentary to the beliefs of other religions, sup- their religious beliefs to correspond to knowledge, the noetic tool most likely to achieve this goal is reason. This plying theological information which may be missing or he does by reviewing the leading epistemological ap- overlooked by the latter religions. At times even the be- proaches to metaphysical knowledge, and showing that liefs of different religions which seem to contradict each relies to some extent on reason. He further argues each other may be shown to be merely different per- that all of them must utilize reason if they wish to at- tempt to critically verify their findings. Then he argues ceptions of the same reality, brought about by differing that religious knowledge is a type of metaphysical knowl- cultural contexts.1 edge. He shows that the leading approaches to obtaining At other times theologians and philosophers of reli- religious knowledge parallel the various approaches to metaphysical knowledge, and have similar reliance on gion are unable to achieve reconciliation between con- reason. Even in the case of supernatural revelation, rea- flicting truth claims of different religions. There are son is used in identifying and interpreting the revelation. times when the acceptance of conflicting truth claims MICHAEL S. JONES Therefore, Jones concludes, «reason is the primary from two religious systems would constitute a violation mechanism for obtaining religious knowledge.» www.geocities.com/ s_i_c_r_i/mjones.htm JSRI No. 1/Spring 2002 123 of the principle of non-contradiction. In such cases A. Belief only one of the competing claims can be true. Further- Antony Flew defines belief as, The epistemic atti- more, many thinkers openly oppose the truth claims of tude of holding a proposition p to be true... and all religion, positing various doctrines of irreligion as makes the important observation that ...while knowing truth. p would generally be considered to entail, among The dilemma of how one determines which truth other things, that p is true, believing p is consistent claim is in fact true is the subject of this paper. Various with the actual falsity of p.2 A persons beliefs may mechanisms for obtaining religious knowledge have be held on a variety of psychological basis. One might been suggested and applied during the long history of believe a proposition without the slightest evidence for religion. The thesis of this paper is that reason is the the truthfulness of that proposition. primary mechanism for obtaining religious knowledge\theological truth. Furthermore, this paper B. Faith will support the belief that reason is the most reliable Discussions of religious knowledge often assume mechanism for obtaining religious knowledge; that is, the form of a contrast between faith and reason. Rea- religious beliefs acquired using reason are the religious son has been defined as ...the natural ability of the hu- beliefs which are the most likely to be true. man mind to discover truth.3 This definition seems Every thinker has epistemological assumptions, this adequate. Crafting a definition of faith is more difficult. writer included. These assumptions include some very Voltaire used two definitions for faith, one for belief in important beliefs about the proper nature of a noetic things which he (Voltaire) personally believed and an- structure. While this paper is not intended as an essay other for belief in things which he deemed incredible.4 on epistemology, the subject at hand is very epistemo- This definitional dichotomy points toward the tension logical. The writer believes that the mechanism of ac- that underlies the faith/reason contrast. This tension quiring knowledge which is recommended in this paper arises from an important question regarding religious is compatible with a variety of noetic structures, includ- knowledge: is it possible to obtain knowledge of the ing varieties of foundationalism and coherentism. metaphysical without utilizing reason? The Reformation view of faith seems to adequately describe the necessary components of faith; under- Discussion standing, assent, and trust.5 Thus faith is trust in some- thing (or someone) which is believed (believed in).6 If, I. The concept of knowledge distinguished from the as Flew pointed out (above), beliefs can be held regard- concepts of belief and faith. less of the truthfulness of the proposition believed, JSRI No. 1/Spring 2002 124 there is a strong possibility that a person of faith may But not all methods are created equal. Because be trusting something which is not, in fact, true. knowledge acquisition involves belief formation, the in- tent of this paper is to defend a mechanism of belief C. Knowledge formation which is designed to maximize objectivity Knowledge may be defined as apprehension of and therefore increase the likelihood that ones beliefs truth.7 When taken in this sense, knowledge is that set will qualify as knowledge. of beliefs in which the propositions which are believed are in fact true. A person may not be able to distinguish between those of his beliefs which constitute knowl- II. Reason is the principle mechanism for obtaining edge and those which are erroneous, but this distinc- knowledge of the metaphysical.9 tion is of great theoretical importance. If a persons faith is based upon knowledge it will not be the case A. The Many Ways of Obtaining Knowledge that person is trusting something which is not, in fact, Many methods of acquiring knowledge have been true. suggested in the course of philosophical history. The most significant are discussed below, with the excep- D. Significance tion of scepticism, which is more a method of ques- Much of the discussion concerning faith and reason tioning beliefs. Each method emphasizes one mecha- has centered around the justifiability (or rationality) of nism of knowledge acquisition. Often, the competing beliefs. But, as George Mavrodes points out, ...claim- methods have been portrayed by their advocates as mu- ing a belief to be rational...isnt really claiming much.... tually exclusive. More recently the trend has been to- A belief can be rationally justifiable and the proposition ward combining approaches. The sixth method dis- believed still be false.8 What most people want to know cussed, rational empiricism, is an example of this. The is whether a proposition is true; whether their beliefs phenomenon of combining approaches is due to the constitute knowledge; whether their faith is grounded fact that each method is uniquely suited to obtaining in truth. This paper is not concerned with how people knowledge in a specific field.10 form the subjective opinions which are commonly 1. authoritarianism (faith) called beliefs. This paper is concerned with what is the Authoritarianism is, perhaps, responsible for more most reliable mechanism for acquiring knowledge. human beliefs than any other means of attaining knowl- People utilize many methods of belief formation, often edge. One tends to believe what one is told unless one without intentionally patronizing one method or an- has reason to do otherwise. This is especially true when other. the authority is one who has some special claim to JSRI No. 1/Spring 2002 125 credibility, such as expertise in the field in question or a 3. pragmatism reputation for reliability. Authority is an important According to pragmatism, ideas are instruments to source of beliefs because the knowledge that each indi- help a person adjust to his environment. In a constantly vidual is able to attain through other methods is limited changing environment there are no final solutions. by the limitations on human experience, including the Ideas must change as the problems they address brevity of life. Authority is the primary source for change. As long as an idea works, it is considered true; knowledge about the past. if it ceases to work it will be considered false and dis- There are limitations to authoritarianism. As a carded.14 The workability of an idea both tests and ul- method, it is limited to bringing new knowledge to indi- timately constitutes its truth.15 Pragmatism is a very viduals. It cannot bring new knowledge to humanity. It useful test of validity, especially in areas where universal has no way of resolving conflicts between authorities or normative principles due not apply. Pragmatism fac- without going outside the system. And the testimony of tors heavily in the makeup of American mentality. But any authority must eventually be grounded in some pragmatism has some very evident weaknesses. Prag- more direct source of knowledge.11 matism fosters a very narrow view of knowledge: only 2. mysticism (intuition) practical knowledge is considered true knowledge. And Reality consists of more than just the physical world there are many examples of things which work which and the world of reason.
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