TOWARDS a CRITIQUE of the SUBJECT by EDWARD J
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TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF THE SUBJECT by .. EDWARD J. ECHEVERRIA I. Introduction: Some central elements of the problem-situation 1. Nicholas Wolterstorff has written a small book entitled, Reason within the bounds of Religion. 1 The title is a reversal of Immanuel Kant's famous book, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Ver nunft. Kant employed a transcendental-critical project in his attempt to specify the boundaries of practical and theoretical reason. He entrusted reason with the capacity to reflect on its own limitations and positive possibilities. A central interest in specifying these boundaries was Kant's search for certainty and universal validity; a status required for these boundaries to possess the title of scientific. Kant wanted a critical reason that would steer a course through the domgatism of the ratio nalist and the skepticism of the empiricist. Yet, strangely enough, the inability of reason to recognize its limitations was not something that reason could easily shed. Reason was naturally clothed in dialectical illusions. Hence, a critique of these illusions was demanded in the form of what Kant called transcendental dialectic. The latter formed the second part of a transcendental logic. The brief sketch I have just given forms only a small part of what is involved in Kant's project. Of particular importance for our study of Wolterstorff's book is Kant's demand that reason be self-critical. Wolterstorff also asks reason (more specifically, science) to be self critical. It is in his case with reference to the dogmatism of religion and science. 2 Yet Wolterstorff's demand, in distinction to Kant's, is limited in one very crucial respect: it is a critique of science and not of thought as such. (Though Wolterstorff's own solution to the problem he articulates is not a purely methodological one, his critique is even further narrow- I Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids: Wm.B. Eerdmans Co., 1976) For the most part reviewers of Wolterstorff's small book have not given it a fair hearing. cf. L. De Koster, The Banner, April 29,1977, p. 24 and N. van Til, Pro Rege, Vol. VI No.2, Dec. 1977, pp. 8-15. 2 I say religion and science because Wolterstorff's specific example of how the two have related to themselves in the last decennia was especially exemplified by the debates surrounding the problem of falsification and the immunity granted to faith as a so-called "blik" by R.M. Hare and the opposite position taken by Anthony Flew. 86 ed by its subsequent restriction to those "modes of access" empowered to reach foundational propositions; in effect limiting his criticism to questions of "method" which, I hope to show, hides his substantiven objections, to so-called foundationalism, behind the objections he actually lets out of the bag). Kant still upheld the distinction between epistemology and a theory of scientific method. Transcendental-critical reflection was interpreted by Kant as a form of epistemology. It is only with the Positivist critique of knowledge and the concomitant import ance singularly attributed to the natural scientific mode of knowing that the scope of critical reflection was consequently limited to a theory of scientific method. Reflection was bound to an exploration of the (scientific) nature of the objects of science. Wolterstorff's criticism reflects, in its own way, this shift to method. Within the history of Kant interpretation a retrieval of the critical exigency demanded by the transcendental project has been attempted more than once.3 This is not the place to trace the history of this exigency. I only wish to single out the historical fact that with the history of this retrieval the demand for CRITICISM specifically meant that the human subject, armed with his interpretations and understand ings of the world, reason, history and morality, was asked to submit his point of departure, i.e., his so-called "pre-suppositions," to questioning. With reference to this position the claim has been made that Immanuel Kant's transcendental critique had in actuality brought to fulfillment Rene Descartes method of radical doubt.4 In my opinion it could also be said that Kant was continuing, with his transcendental method, a Socratic line of questioning, i.e., a systematic self-examination. 5 Is it 3 In the context of Christian philosophical studies it is important, for an inter pretation of transcendental-critical philosophy, to consult (and study!) the works of Herman Dooyeweerd (from the side of Protestant Calvinism) and the works of Father Bernard J.F. Lonergan (from the side of Roman Catholicism). Confer for the former, Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935) Vol. 1 Part I, Prolegomena, p. 5-33; Vol. II Part II, Het Kennisprobleem in Het Licht Der Wets idee, Chapter 4, p. 475-534; and A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1953), Vol. I, Part I, p. 3-165. For a programmatic statement confer, Philosophia Reformata, 1 Jrg., 1936, "Het Dilemma voor Het Christelijk Wijsgeerig Denken en Het Critisch Karakter van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee," p. 3-16. Confer for the latter, Insight. A Study of Human Understanding (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1978 3rd edition); A Second Collection (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1974) especially the essay, "The Subject" p. 69-86; Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) especially Part I Chapter 1, p. 3-26, Part II, Chapter 10, p. 235-266; Philosophy of God and Theology (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1973) especially Chapter 1, p. 11-14 and all of Chapter 3. 4 In recent history Jiirg~n Habermas has made this claim, Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann, 1972) part one, chapter 1. This book is an English translation from the German 1968 edition of Erkenntnis und Interesse published by SUhrkamp Verlag. 5 Wolterstorff employs this term systematic self-examination in Reason, p. 104. For an interpretation of Kant along these Socratic lines cf. Leonard Nelson, Socra tic Method and Critical Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1965) pp. 1-43 esp. 4-7 as well as Richard Kroner, Culture and Faith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) p. 2. 87 .