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Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 1, Metaphysics, 1987 Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 1, Metaphysics, 1987 Front Matter (7 pp.) Preface (1 p.) James E. Tomberlin Entities Without Identity, pp. 1-19 Terence Parsons When Are Objects Parts?, pp. 21-47 Peter van Inwagen Existence, pp. 49-108 Nathan Salmon How To Build a Person: The Physical Basis for Mentality, pp. 109-154 John L. Pollock Subjects Among Other Things, pp. 155-187 Ernest Sosa Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism, pp. 189-231 Alvin Plantinga Are Concept-Users World-Makers?, pp. 233-267 Nicholas Wolterstorff Conceptual Relativism, pp. 269-288 Bruce Aune The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism, pp. 289-365 George Bealer Event Causation: The Counterfactual Analysis, pp. 367-386 Jonathan Bennett Phenomenological Ontology Revisited: A Bergmannian Retrospective, pp. 387-404 Jay F. Rosenberg Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, pp. 405-454 Hector-Neri Castaneda The `Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief, pp. 455-480 Stephen Schiffer Objects of Consciousness: The Non-Relational Theory of Sensing, pp. 481-500 Romane Clark An Argument for a Modified Russellian Principle of Acquaintance, pp. 501-512 Felicia Ackerman Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense, pp. 513-526 William G. Lycan Back Matter (1 p.) Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology, 1988 Front Matter (7 pp.) Preface (1 p.) James E. Tomberlin Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, pp. 1-50 Alvin Plantinga Strong and Weak Justification, pp. 51-69 Alvin I. Goldman The Evidence of the Senses, pp. 71-90 Roderick M. Chisholm How to be a Fallibilist, pp. 91-123 Stewart Cohen Coherence, Justification, and Chisholm, pp. 125-138 Keith Lehrer Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt: The Virtue of Our Faculties, pp. 139-155 Ernest Sosa Knowledge and Conditionals, pp. 157-182 Risto Hilpinen On Knowing One's Own Mind, pp. 183-209 Sydney Shoemaker Knowledge and Epistemic Obligation, pp. 211-233 Hector-Neri Castaneda Epistemic Obligations, pp. 235-256 Richard Feldman The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification, pp. 257-299 William P. Alston On Accepting First Principles, pp. 301-314 Wilfrid Sellars The Building of Oscar, pp. 315-344 John L. Pollock Deliberational Dynamics and The Foundations of Bayesian Game Theory, pp. 345-367 Brian Skyrms Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments, pp. 369-380 Romane Clark What Is "Naturalized Epistemology?", pp. 381-405 Jaegwon Kim Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism, pp. 407-442 Robert Audi The Internalism/Externalism Controversy, pp. 443-459 Richard Fumerton Alston's Internalistic Externalism, pp. 461-473 Marshall Swain Back Matter (1 p.) Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, 1989 Front Matter (6 pp.) Preface (1 p.) James E. Tomberlin Reasons and Causes, pp. 1-15 Fred Dretske Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account, pp. 17-46 Carl Ginet Mental Quausation, pp. 47-76 Terence Horgan Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion, pp. 77-108 Jaegwon Kim Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical, pp. 109-135 Brian P. McLaughlin Functional Explanations and Reasons as Causes, pp. 137-164 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord On a Causal Theory of Content, pp. 165-186 Lynne Rudder Baker Neo-Fregean Thoughts, pp. 187-224 Steven E. Boer Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior, pp. 225-241 Paul M. Churchland Illogical Belief, pp. 243-285 Nathan Salmon On What's In the Head, pp. 287-316 Robert Stalnaker Turning the Tables on Frege or How is it that "Hesperus is Hesperus" is Trivial?, pp. 317-339 Howard Wettstein The Reverse Frege Puzzle, pp. 341-367 Takashi Yagisawa Fission and the Facts, pp. 369-397 Mark Johnston When is the Will Free?, pp. 399-422 Peter van Inwagen Proximate Causation of Action, pp. 423-442 Myles Brand Intention and Personal Policies, pp. 443-469 Michael E. Bratman Actions by Collectives, pp. 471-496 Raimo Tuomela Linguistics: What's Wrong with "The Right View", pp. 497-531 Michael Devitt; Kim Sterelny Biosemantics and the Normative Properties of Thought, pp. 533-547 Graeme Forbes Semantic Innocence and Psychological Understanding, pp. 549-574 Jennifer Hornsby Semantics and Semantic Competence, pp. 575-596 Scott Soames Back Matter (1 p.) Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, 1990 Front Matter (7 pp.) Preface (1 p.) James E. Tomberlin What Emotions Are About, pp. 1-29 Annette Baier The Intrinsic Quality of Experience, pp. 31-52 Gilbert Harman Inverted Earth, pp. 53-79 Ned Block Phenomenal States, pp. 81-108 Brian Loar What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental, pp. 109-130 William G. Lycan The Appearance of A Material Object, pp. 131-151 Brian O'Shaughnessy Physicalism, pp. 153-185 Stephen Schiffer First-Person Access, pp. 187-214 Sydney Shoemaker Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence, pp. 215-226 James Van Cleve An Internalist Conception of Rational Action, pp. 227-245 Robert Audi Action, Inference, Belief, and Intention, pp. 247-271 Bruce Aune Practical Thinking, Reasons for Doing, and Intentional Action: The Thinking of Doing and The Doing of Thinking, pp. 273-308 Hector-Neri Castaneda A Simpler Solution to the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic, pp. 309-341 Fred Feldman Neural Representation and Neural Computation, pp. 343-382 Patricia Smith Churchland; Terrence J. Sejnowski The Intentionality All-Stars, pp. 383-427 John Haugeland Individualism and Artificial Intelligence, pp. 429-459 Bernard W. Kobes Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, pp. 461-498 John Pollock Connectionism, Eliminativism and The Future of Folk Psychology, pp. 499-533 William Ramsey; Stephen Stich; Joseph Garon Analysis, Language, and Concepts: The Second Paradox of Analysis, pp. 535-543 Felicia Ackerman Referring to Things That No Longer Exist, pp. 545-556 Roderick M. Chisholm Understanding and the Principle of Compositionality, pp. 557-572 Richard E. Grandy Belief, Nominalism, and Quantification, pp. 573-579 James E. Tomberlin Back Matter (1 p.) Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion, 1991 Front Matter (6 pp.) Preface (1 p.) James E. Tomberlin Sin as Uncleanness, pp. 1-27 Marilyn McCord Adams The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition, pp. 29-67 William P. Alston Ruminations About Evil, pp. 69-88 William L. Rowe The Argument From Evil, pp. 89-134 Michael Tooley The Problem of Evil, The Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence, pp. 135-165 Peter van Inwagen On the Simplicity of the Soul, pp. 167-181 Roderick M. Chisholm Are Souls Unintelligible?, pp. 183-212 Joshua Hoffman; Gary Rosenkrantz Faith, Belief, and Rationality, pp. 213-239 Robert Audi Pragmatism Versus Mysticism: The Divided Self of William James, pp. 241-286 Richard M. Gale The Prospects for Natural Theology, pp. 287-315 Alvin Plantinga Epistemic Parity and Religious Argument, pp. 317-341 Philip L. Quinn An Anti-Molinist Argument, pp. 343-353 Robert Merrihew Adams Shapshot Ockhamism, pp. 355-371 John Martin Fischer Middle Knowledge and the Doctrine of Infallibility, pp. 373-393 Thomas P. Flint Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity, pp. 395-424 Eleonore Stump; Norman Kretzmann Prophecy, Freedom, and the Necessity of the Past, pp. 425-445 Edward Wierenga The Possibility of Power Beyond Possibility, pp. 447-473 Earl Conee Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge, pp. 475-507 Christopher Menzel On the Logic of the Ontological Argument, pp. 509-529 Paul E. Oppenheimer; Edward N. Zalta Divine Simplicity, pp. 531-552 Nicholas Wolterstorff God's General Concurrence With Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough, pp. 553-585 Alfred J. Freddoso The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism, pp. 587-615 Hugh J. McCann; Jonathan L. Kvanvig Jephthah's Plight: Moral Dilemmas and Theism, pp. 617-647 William E. Mann Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics, 1992 Front Matter (7 pp.) Preface (1 p.) James E. Tomberlin A Puzzle About the Rational Authority of Morality, pp. 1-26 David O. Brink Some Questions About the Justification of Morality, pp. 27-53 Peter Railton Normative Explanations, pp. 55-71 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Whose Body Is It, Anyway?, pp. 73-96 Holly M. Smith Nonmoral Explanations, pp. 97-117 Nicholas L. Sturgeon Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality, pp. 119-136 Julia Annas Trusting People, pp. 137-153 Annette C. Baier Internalism and Agency, pp. 155-174 Stephen L. Darwall The Social Importance of Moral Rights, pp. 175-198 Joel Feinberg Moral Concepts: Substance and Sentiment, pp. 199-221 Allan Gibbard The Structure of Normative Ethics, pp. 223-242 Shelly Kagan Morality and Partiality, pp. 243-259 Susan Wolf The "Possibility" of a Categorical Imperative: Kant's Groundwork, Part III, pp. 261-284 David Copp A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules, pp. 285-304 Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations, pp. 305- 332 Christine M. Korsgaard Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism, pp. 333-353 Jean Hampton Ethics Naturalized, pp. 355-376 Michael Slote Prerogatives Without Restrictions, pp. 377-397 Samuel Scheffler An Argument for Consequentialism, pp. 399-421 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong When the Will Is Free, pp. 423-451 John Martin Fischer; Mark Ravizza Who Discovered the Will?, pp. 453-473 T. H. Irwin God's Obligations, pp. 475-491 Eleonore Stump The Primacy of God's Will in Christian Ethics, pp. 493-513 Philip L. Quinn Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 7, Language and Logic, 1993 Front Matter (7 pp.) Preface (1 p.) James E. Tomberlin Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, pp. 1-16 Ernest Sosa A Solution to Frege's Puzzle, pp. 17-60 George Bealer The Proper Treatment of Predication in Fine-Grained Intensional Logic, pp. 61-87 Christopher Menzel Term Limits, pp. 89-123 Stephen Neale Analyticity and Apriority, pp. 125-133 Nathan Salmon A Semantic Solution to Frege's Puzzle, pp. 135-154 Takashi Yagisawa There Is a Word for that Kind of Thing: An Investigation of Two Thought Experiments, pp.
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