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Philosophical Review

Metaphysics. by Peter van Inwagen Review by: Timothy O'Connor The Philosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 314-317 Published by: Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185999 . Accessed: 25/06/2014 03:49

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This content downloaded from 185.44.77.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 03:49:57 AM All use to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOOK REVIEWS such issues as the completeness of quantum mechanics and whetherit is a local theory.Part of the problem has been in figuringout what is meant by 'completeness' and 'locality'.A lot of hard work has also been done in designing and performingexperiments to test quantum mechanics and compare it to rival theories. Shimony has made importantcontributions to all aspects of this endeavor-for example, his proof that quantum mechanical nonlocality,what he refersto as passion-at-a-distance,cannot be exploited for the purposes of sending signals at velocitiesgreater than the velocityof light (2:134-36). Of course, I have not done justice to Shimony'swork on any of the topics I have considered, and there are manyothers I have not even mentioned. This collection of papers is an admirable contributionto the study of and of how we acquire knowledge of it. Shimony's work is an importantmodel for how these investigationsought to be carried out.

DAVID MACCALLUM CarletonCollege

ThePhilosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (April 1995)

METAPHYSICS.By PETER VAN INWAGEN. Boulder: WestviewPress, 1993. Pp. xiii, 222.

Van Inwagen's book is a surveyof several basic metaphysicalissues and is intended foruse as a textbookin an undergraduatecourse. It is lucid and engaging throughout,reminiscent of Richard Taylor's widely used text, though the discussion of each topic is more developed and incorporates fromthe contemporaryphilosophical scene. There is also a pleasing combination of sensitivityto the bearing of empirical informationon traditional questions (sometimes transforming them) with; a clear recognition of the persistentneed for distinctivelyphilosophical analysis and assessment.In a few places, the author advances argumentsthat will provoke new thoughteven in the professionalstudent. The book is divided into three parts.In the firstof these ("The Way the World Is"), van Inwagen treatsvery general issues, withseparate chapters on the and nature of individualthings, Berkeleyan , and metaphysicalrealism. The chapter on individualitylays out various forms of (the thesis that there are no individual things) and (,the thesis that there is exactly one individual thing) in a readily understandable way. He manages, in particular,to give a concise and plausible-soundingaccount of Bradley'sargument for monism, although it would have been helpful to distinguish the "-maker"kind of explanation Bradley seeks for the holding of an external relation from a

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causal explanation, and indeed to discuss explicitlythe issue of factsas a fundamentalontological category. The exposition of Berkeley'scase for idealism is also nicely done, but there is an abrupt change in tone when van Inwagen then takes up the defense of the "Common WesternMetaphysic." For example, he saysthat by raisingquestions about the nature of an in itself,apart fromits properties,Berkeley is simplymisdirecting one's attention away from a trivialtruth, because "it is in the verynature of properties... to be had" (51). Puttingthis together with its implied corollarythat it is "in the nature of' an object to have properties,the student is likelyto regard this as a dogmatic response. Perhaps van Inwagen is rightto thinkthat, at the end of the day,this will have to be the fundamentalposition of one who wants to avoid a bundle theoryconception of physical objects, but one would like the author to foster,rather than summarilydismiss, the natural sense of puzzlement that this position raises on firstencountering Berkeley. In any case, it is recommended that the beginning student read Berkeley himselfin conjunctionwith this chapter. The final chapter on general ontologyis van Inwagen's own attemptto come up with the most plausible version of what is going on in various argumentsfor metaphysical antirealism. He candidlyacknowledges that he has difficultymaking sense out of such arguments,and the argumenthe gives does indeed sound implausible. So why include this chapter at all? One certainlycould motivateit as a head-clearing exercise for students who have been subjected to trulynonsensical antirealistarguments in courses in other humanist disciplines. (Van Inwagen's remarkscertainly providean effectiveantidote to thattype of antirealistargument.) However, systematictreatments of universals,causation, and were sacrificedin the interestsof economy. Forced to choose, one would much preferthat van Inwagen had taken up one or more of these other issues instead. (And not only because of theirimportance in their own right,but also because of their importance for considering the subsequent topics of the relationshipof the mental to the physical,the freedom of the will, and personal ,respectively.) Part 2 ("Why the World Is") discusses two versions of the -Descartes's and Plantinga's-and a few variations on the from the contingencyof the natural world. Van Inwagen also discusses (over two chaptersin part 3) a contemporaryform of from recent cosmological evidence of "fine- tuning" (for the development of intelligentlife) in the initial conditions and laws of the physicaluniverse. All of these argumentsare exposited and criticizedin a fair manner, although there is plentyof room for reply to some of those criticisms.(The discussion of the teleological argumentis particularlyfascinating, especially his alternative"Darwinian" hypothesis,

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This content downloaded from 185.44.77.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 03:49:57 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOOK REVIEWS applied to the cosmic scale.) This is clearlya place, though,where a bit of pruning for the sake of including another topic would have been wise. Finally,in part 3 ("The Inhabitantsof the World") the author takes up the nature of and personal identityand the freedom of the will. In the two chapters devoted to the nature of human , van Inwagen limits the alternatives to a strong form of substance dualism and .His development of various argumentson both sides is, for the most part, ratherbrief and simplified.It is preferable,on the whole, to followvan Inwagen's route of making available the broad outlines of a whole range of arguments,but the criticaldiscussion does get a littlethin at importantplaces as a result. For example, the critique of Descartes's conceivabilityargument is too compressed for the typical undergraduate. On van Inwagen's reading, Descartes notes thatI can conceive mybody's non-existence,here and now, while I cannot conceive mynon-existence, and infersthat my body has a propertythat I lack-can be conceivedby me not to exist-implyingtheir non- identity.But, says van Inwagen, if this were right,I could argue for the false conclusion that I am not identical to the author of this review,since I can conceive of the author's non-existence(it's conceivable that all my relevantmemories and beliefs be false), but not that I do not exist. The moral is thatthe alleged propertyis no propertyat all. Can I reallyconceive the author's non-existence,though, given thatI am the author? Of course, I can conceive that the phrase "the author of this review" applies to someone else or has no application at all, but that'snot the same thing,is it? One senses that there is more behind the objection than van Inwagen explicitlysays, but the discussion is too briefto provide a clear clue as to what that somethingmight be. The author's argumentthat Leibniz's "mill" thoughtexperiment brings out a mysteryin the of a thinkingthing independentlyof the issue of physicalismis very intriguingbut also heavy going. (The mysteryis a resultof our inability"to form anysort of representationthat displaysthe generation of and sensation by the workingsof an underlying " (161).) But what of the intended reading of the argument as raisinga problem exclusivelyfor physicalist conceptions of the mind,owing to their apparent inability to capture the subjectivityof ? According to van Inwagen, thisform of the argument wronglyfails to distinguisha mental event from the first-personawareness of that event. What is the theoryof introspectiveawareness presupposed by this reply? Is it a plausible one? Such questions are not addressed. In the final chapter,on freewill, van Inwagen does an admirablejob of laying out the modal argument for the incompatibilityof and determinismsimply and clearly.But one would like more detail in the subsequent discussion of the problem of givingan indeterministicmodel of

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free action. No distinctionis drawn between an event's uncaused and its being nondeterministicallycaused. And the discussion of agent causation is exceedinglybrief; in the absence of any sustained treatment of causation generally, a student will be hard-pressed to assess the coherence of this . Although I have criticizeda fewaspects of the structureand content of van Inwagen's book, it is easilythe best textbookin metaphysicswith which I am acquainted, a welcome and long overdue successorto Taylor'ssmaller book. The author is up frontabout his own viewson where the truthlies in these matters,while generallybeing veryfair to the viewsand arguments he rejects. In most instances,it is not difficultfor a moderatelycapable student to spot what is attractiveabout rejected alternativesand to make a starton developing them in the lightof the author's criticisms.And the writingstyle is wonderfullyclear and elegant. Van Inwagen thus provides an ideal model for students of what we would like them to do for themselves.'

TIMOTHY O'CONNOR Indiana University

11 have benefitedfrom correspondence withJan Cover and Peter van Inwagen in preparing this review.

ThePhilosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (April 1995)

A MIND OF ONE'S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY Edited by LOUISE ANTONY and CHARLOTTE WITT. Boulder: WestviewPress, 1993. Pp. xvii,302.

The goal of thisvolume of thirteennew essaysis to examine the of mainstreamphilosophical accounts of reason and objectivityfor feminist theorizing.Each of the essaysaddresses at least one of the followingtwo related questions: (a) Is there a need for a distinctivelyfeminist (or ), differing in content from those currentlyavailable in the Westernphilosophical tradition?and (b) Are the of reason and objectivity"masculine" or male-biased? Louise Antony, Margaret Atherton, Annette Baier, Jean Hampton, Barbara Herman, and Marcia Homiack offer spirited defenses of the usefulness, for feminist purposes, of Quine, Descartes, Hume, Contractarianism,Kant (his viewson marriage), and ,respectively. Relatedly, Charlotte Witt argues that there are no good reasons for feministsto abandon the enterpriseof metaphysics.The opposite side is taken by Helen Longino, who presentsa briefexplanation and defense of

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