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Bibliography Mark S Digital Commons @ George Fox University Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on College of Christian Studies Reformed Epistemology 1993 Bibliography Mark S. McLeod Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation McLeod, Mark S., "Bibliography" (1993). Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology. Paper 16. http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality/16 This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. Rationality and Theistic Belief introduce a new parity thesis that does not fa ll prey to the difficulty of the others. I have sketched some of the parallels between CP and unique person practice and attempted to argue that PTN does � not fa ll prey to the background belief challenge. To defend PTN fu lly would require a complete and general account of holist epi­ stemic justification. I cannot embark on that discussion here. Per­ haps, however, we have now before us a fe w places fr om which to Bibliography launch the raft. Alston, William P. "Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. -- . "Concepts of Epistemic Justification." In Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1989. Originally in Monist 68 (1985): 57-89. -- . "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification." In Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer­ sity Press, 1989. Originally in Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 257-99. -- . "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology." In Knowledge and Skepticism. Edited by Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. -- . "Epistemic Circularity. " In Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. Originally in Phi­ losophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1986): 1-30. -- . "Experience of God: A Perceptual Model." Paper delivered at the Wheaton Philosophy Conference, Wheaton, Ill., October 1989. -- . "lnternalism and Externalism in Epistemology." In Epistemic Justifica­ tion: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. Originally in Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 179-221. -- . "An lnternalist Externalism." In Epistemic Justification: Essays in the The­ ory of Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1989. Originally in Synthese 74 (1988): 265-83. -- . "J ustification and Knowledge." In Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. -- . "Level Confusions in Epistemology." In Epistemic Justification: Essays in 2 54] Bibliography Bibliography [ 2 55 the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, I989. Origi­ Kenny, Anthony. Faith and Reason. New York: Columbia University Press, nally in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (I980): I35-50. I983. --. Perceiving God: Th e Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, N.Y.: Kvanvig, Jonathan L. "The Evidentialist Objection. " American Ph ilosophical Cornell University Press, I99I. Quarterly 20 (I983): 47-55. -- . "The Perception of God." Philosophical To pics I6 (I988): 23-52. Langtry, Bruce. "Properly Unargued Belief in God." InternationalJournal fo r -- . "Plantinga's Epistemology of Religion. " In Alvin Plantinga. Edited by Philosophy of Religion 26 (I989): I29-54· James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen. Boston: D. Reidel, I985. Losin, Peter. "Experience of God and the Principle of Credulity: A Reply to -- . "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God." Faith and Ph i­ Rowe," Faith and Philosophy 4 (I987): 59-70. losophy 5 (I988): 433-48. McKim, Robert. "Theism and Proper Basicality." InternationalJournal fo r Phi­ -- . "Religious Experience and Religious Belief. " Nous I6 (I982): 3-I4. losophy of Religion 22 (I989): 29-56. Appleby, Peter C. "Reformed Epistemology, Rationality, and Belief in God." MCLeod, Mark S. "The Analogy Argument fo r the Proper Basicality of Belief InternationalJournal fo r Philosophy of Religion 24 (I988): I29-4I. in God." InternationalJournal fo r Ph ilosophy of Religion 2I (I987): 3-20. Boyle, Joseph, Jr., J. Hubbard, and Thomas D. Sullivan. "The Reformed -- . "Can Belief in God Be Confirmed?" Religious Studies 24 (I988): 3II-23. Objection to Natural Theology: A Catholic Perspective." Christian Scholar's -- . "Passionate Religion: Toward a Theory of Epistemic Commitment fo r Review I I (I982): I99-2I I. Theistic Belief. " In The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays. Edited Chisholm, Roderick. Th eory of Knowledge. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: by William Lane Craig and Mark S. MCLeod. Lewiston, N.Y. : Edwin Prentice-Hall, I977- Mellen Press, I990. Firth, Roderick. "The Anatomy of Certainty." Ph ilosophical Review 76 (I967): Mavrodes, George. ''Jerusalem and Athens Revisited." In Faith and Rationality: 3-27. Reason and Belief in God. Edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolter­ Flew, Antony, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell. "Theology and Falsification." storff. Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame Press, I 98 3. In New Essays in Philosophical Theology. Edited by Antony Flew and Al­ -- . "Rationality and Religious Belief-a Perverse Question." In Rationality asdair Macintyre. New York: Macmillan, I955· and Religious Belief Edited by C. Delaney. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Foley, Richard. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, Mass: Har­ Notre Dame Press, I979- vard University Press, I987. -- . "Self-Referential Incoherence." American Philosophical Quarterly 22 Forgie, J. William. "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical Ex­ (I985): 65-72. perience. " Religious Studies 2I (I985): 205-I8. -- . "The Stranger." In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Edited -- . "Theistic Experience and the Doctrine of Unanimity." InternationalJour­ by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Notre Dame, Ind.: Univer­ nal fo r Philosophy of Religion I5 (I984): I3-30. sity of Notre Dame Press, I983. Goetz, Stewart C. "Belief in God Is Not Properly Basic." Religious Studies I9 Otto, Rudolph. The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in (I983): 475-84. the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. Translated by John W. Gowen, Julie. "Foundationalism and the Justification of Religious Belief. " Re­ Harvey, I923. Reprint. Oxford: Oxford University Press, I978. ligious Studies I9 (I983): 393-406. Pargetter, Robert. "Experience, Proper Basicality, and Belief in God. " Interna­ Griffiths, Paul J. "An Apology fo r Apologetics." Faith and Philosophy 5 (I988): tional Journalfo r Philosophy of Religion 27 (I990): I4I-99- 399-420. Penelhum, Terence. God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism. Grigg, Richard. "The Crucial Disanalogies between Properly Basic Belief and Boston: D. Reidel, I983. Belief in God. " Religious Studies 26 (I990): 389-401. Plantinga, Alvin. "Chisholmian lnternalism." In Philosophical Analysis: A De­ -- . "Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga." International fense by Example. Edited by David Austin. Boston: D. Reidel, I987. Journalfo r Philosophy of Religion I4 (I983): I23-27. --. "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God." In Ra­ Gutting, Gary. "The Catholic and the Calvinist: A Dialogue on Faith and tionality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy Reason." Faith and Philosophy 2 (I985): 236-56. of Religion. Edited by Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright. Ithaca, --. Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986. Notre Dame Press, I982. --. "The Foundations of Theism: A Reply." Faith and Philosophy 3 (I986): Hasker, William. "On Justifying the Christian Practice." New Scholasticism 6o 298-3I3. (I989): I29-40. --.God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational Justification of Belief in God. Hudson, W. D. Modern Moral Philosophy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, I967. I970. --. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, I974- Bibliography --. "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" Nous IS (I98I): 41-51. --. "Is Belief in God Rational?" In Rationality and Religious Belief Edited by C. Delaney. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979. --. 'Justification and Theism." Faith and Philosophy 4 (I987): 403-26. --. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, I974· --. "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function." Philosophical Perspec- tives 2 (I988): I-so. --. "Reason and Belief in God." In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Notre Dame, Index Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, I983. --. "The Reformed Objection Revisited." Christian Scholar's Review 12 (1983): 57-61. --. "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology. " Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 (I98o): 49-62. --. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press,
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