Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies
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University of California Los Angeles Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies Adissertationsubmittedinpartialsatisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So 2012 c Copyright by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So 2012 Abstract of the Dissertation Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2012 Professor Kathleen Bawn, Chair My doctoral dissertation begins with this puzzle: why do large, moderate parties sometimes select leaders who seem to help improve their parties’ electoral performances, but other times choose unpopular leaders with more extreme policy positions, in expense of votes? I argue that leadership selection is dependent on both the electoral institution that a party finds itself in and the intra-party dynamics that constrain the party. Due to a high degree of seat- vote elasticity that is characteristic of majoritarian systems, replacing unpopular leaders is a feasible strategy for opposition parties in these systems to increase their seat shares. In contrast, in proportional systems, due to low seat-vote elasticity, on average opposition parties that replace their leaders su↵er from vote loss. My model of party leadership selection shows that since party members can provide valuable election campaign e↵ort, they can coerce those who select the party leader (the selectorate) into choosing their preferred leader. When selectorate members are moderate, extreme leaders may emerge if non-selectorate members credibly threaten to withhold campaign e↵ort. The more that the extreme non- selectorate members value issue advocacy over the party’s electoral welfare, the more extreme the chosen party leader is. Two original datasets on 12 parliamentary democracies of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), one comprised of the dates of party leadership tenure, and the other on leadership election results, highlight my research question’s empirical ii relevance. These data reveal that on average, new opposition party leaders in single-member district (SMD) systems increase their parties’ vote share, but the reverse occurs in multi- member district (MMD) systems. Through field research in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, I interviewed 72 members of parliament (MPs), 7 former party leaders and party leadership candidates, and 18 senior party officers. These interviews serve to support my model’s predictions. My dissertation o↵ers an explanation for why parties sometimes seem to injure themselves in the electoral arena by choosing unpopular leaders. It underscores the importance of electoral systems in understanding the dynamics of intra-party politics and the feasibility of di↵erent electoral strategies. In addition, intra-party policy conflict influences election outcomes. Moreover, it highlights how, paradoxically, large parties that prioritize their parties’ electoral welfare sometimes sacrifice voter representation in order to mobilize party activists. iii The dissertation of Florence Grace Hoi Yin So is approved. James F. Adams Je↵rey B. Lewis Michael F. Thies Kathleen Bawn, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2012 iv Table of Contents 1 Introduction ...................................... 1 2 Electoral Systems and Party Leadership Replacement in Parliamentary Democracies ....................................... 8 2.1 Introduction . 8 2.2 The Importance of Party Leaders . 9 2.3 Electoral Systems and Party Leaders . 10 2.4 Empirical Testing . 16 2.4.1 Electoral Systems and Party Leadership Exit . 17 2.4.2 Leadership Replacement and Election Outcomes . 18 2.5 Discussion . 26 2.6 Conclusion . 27 2.7 AppendixA:DataandVariableCoding. 28 2.7.1 Cases . 28 2.7.2 Coding of Control Variables . 30 2.8 AppendixB:DescriptiveStatistics . 34 2.9 Appendix C: Table for Regression Results by Government Type . 37 2.10 References . 38 3 A Theory of Party Leadership Selection: Why Moderate Parties Some- times Choose Extreme Leaders ............................ 43 3.1 Introduction . 43 3.2 The Dilemma of Party Leadership Choice . 44 v 3.3 A Model of Party Leadership Selection . 46 3.3.1 The Electoral Welfare, Advocacy, and Leverage Model . 48 3.4 Discussion . 62 3.5 Concluding Remarks . 65 3.6 AppendixA:TablesfortheSimulatedExamples . 67 3.7 AppendixB:Proofs................................ 69 3.7.1 Proof of Equilibrium Strategies . 69 3.7.2 Why XPL,S⇤ Lies between XS andXNS .................. 71 3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 1 . 72 3.7.4 Proof that e⇤ is increasing in ↵NS ................... 73 3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 2 . 74 3.7.6 Proof of Proposition 3 . 74 3.8 References . 77 4 Advocacy Reigns Supreme? British Conservative Party Leaders ..... 81 4.1 Introduction . 81 4.2 Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Tests . 82 4.3 RivalExplanationsforLeadershipSelection . 84 4.4 Policy Preferences and Conservative Leaders . 86 4.4.1 The Conservative Party and Europe . 86 4.4.2 Europe Reigned Supreme: the 1997 Leadership Election . 88 4.4.3 Did Europe Still Reign Supreme in 2001? . 94 4.4.4 Liberal Conservatism and Electoral Welfare in 2005 . 100 4.5 Conclusion . 109 4.6 AppendixA:UKPartiesandPartyLeaders . 111 vi 4.7 AppendixB:TrendsinLeadershipContests . 114 4.8 AppendixC:TablesfortheRivalExplanations. 120 4.9 AppendixD:ListofMPsandLordsInterviewed . 122 4.10 References . 123 5 Activism and Family Strife: British Labour Party Leaders ........ 126 5.1 Introduction . 126 5.2 Empirical Testing with the Labour Party . 127 5.3 Factionalism and Labour Leadership Elections . 128 5.3.1 The Election of Michael Foot as the Labour Leader in 1980 . 129 5.3.2 Ideological Changes in the Labour Party, 1983-2010 . 131 5.4 The 2010 Labour Leadership Election . 132 5.4.1 Rival Explanations . 134 5.4.2 DidAdvocacyPlayaRole? . 136 5.4.3 Constituency Concerns and Electoral Welfare . 138 5.5 Conclusion . 144 5.6 AppendixA:TrendsinLeadershipContests . 146 5.7 AppendixB:ListofMPsandLordsInterviewed . 152 5.8 References . 153 6 Stay Close to Your Base(?) Party Leadership Elections in the Netherlands156 6.1 Introduction . 156 6.2 EmpiricalTestingintheNetherlands . 157 6.3 Rival Explanations and Methodology . 159 6.4 The 2006 VVD lijsttrekker Election . 161 vii 6.4.1 Candidates’ Valence Qualities . 162 6.4.2 PolicyFactionsandCandidates’Positions . 164 6.4.3 Selectorate and Non-Selectorate’s Candidate Preferences . 165 6.5 The 2012 PvdA Party Leadership Election . 167 6.5.1 Candidates’ Valence Qualities . 169 6.5.2 PolicyFactionsandCandidates’Positions . 171 6.5.3 Selectorate and Non-Selectorate’s Candidate Preferences . 173 6.6 Conclusion . 174 6.7 AppendixA:ListofDutchTermsandPartyNames . 178 6.8 AppendixB:TablesonDutchPolitics. 178 6.9 AppendixC:ListofInterviewees . 184 6.10 References . 185 7 Electoral Welfare Versus Advocacy: Selecting Swedish Social Democratic Party Leaders ....................................... 192 7.1 Introduction . 192 7.2 Empirical Testing with the Social Democrats . 194 7.3 Party Organization, Regional Influences, and Policy Divisions . 196 7.4 The Selection of Mona Sahlin in 2007 . 199 7.4.1 Potential Candidates . 200 7.4.2 Selectorate’sConcerns . 202 7.4.3 Non-Selectorate’sPreferences . 203 7.5 TheSelectionofH˚akanJuholtin2011 . 207 7.5.1 Potential Candidates . 208 7.5.2 Selectorate’sConcerns . 209 viii 7.5.3 Non-Selectorate’sPreferences . 211 7.6 Conclusion . 216 7.7 AppendixA:ListofSwedishTermsandPartyNames . 219 7.8 Appendix B: Supporting Tables for the History of Social Democrats . 220 7.9 AppendixC:ListofInterviewees . 222 7.10 References . 223 8 Conclusion ....................................... 226 8.1 Leadership Choices in British Dutch, and Swedish Parties . 226 8.2 Policy and Valence in Leadership (De)-Selection . 230 8.3 Future Research on Party Leadership Selection . 232 8.4 Broader Implications on Parties and Elections . 233 ix List of Figures 3.1 Timeline of the game between the selectorate and the non-selectorate. .......... 51 3.2 Leader’s Policy Position, Campaign E↵ort, and Electoral Welfare ............ 52 3.3 E↵ort and policy di↵erence on campaigning cost .................... 54 3.4 How the party leader’s policy position a↵ects campaign e↵ort .............. 58 3.5 E↵ect of XS on XPL,S⇤ ................................ 59 3.6 E↵ect of ↵S on XPL,S⇤ , Moderate Selectorate ..................... 61 3.7 E↵ect of ↵S on XPL,S⇤ , Extreme Selectorate ...................... 61 3.8 E↵ect of ↵NS on XPL,S⇤ , Moderate Selectorate ..................... 61 3.9 E↵ect of ↵NS on XPL,S⇤ , Extreme Selectorate ..................... 61 5.1 Correlation between an MP’s win margin and CLP’s % turnout ............. 140 5.2 Comparison of MPs’ win margins (as a % Majority). AB = Andy Burham. DA = Diane Abbott. DM = David Miliband. EB = Ed Balls. EM = Ed Miliband .......... 142 6.1 PvdA Leadership Vote Intentions, All Respondents .................. 170 6.2 PvdA Leadership Vote Intentions, Potential PvdA ................... 170 6.3 PvdA Leadership Vote Intentions, Current PvdA ................... 170 x Acknowledgments This work is the product of generosity found within the political science community. I am truly fortunate to have an incredibly hands-on dissertation committee. Each of them has been honest with me when I needed a dose of humility, but also immensely encouraging when Ineededaboostofconfidence.Inthebeginningstagesofwritingmydissertationprospectus, my chair and advisor, Kathy Bawn, candidly told