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Issue Report Issue Report [Monthly Prospects] Political Climate and Prospects for February 2020 ￭ General Review of Government in January 2020 • President Moon’s approval rating decreases due to the coronavirus • The coronavirus outbreak impacts the approval rating of the DPK • The size of the progressive group decreases. whereas that of the centrist and conservative groups increases • The coronavirus pushes President Moon’s administration and the ruling party to respond to the health crisis ￭ An Analysis of Approval Ratings in Relation to Infectious Diseases During Previous Administrations • Cases of previous infectious diseases • An analysis of approval ratings during the MERS outbreak ￭ Main Events and Prospective Trends of February 2020 • Main events and notable matters in February 2020 • Expectations for the upcoming general elections amidst growing fears regarding the coronavirus outbreak ￭ 3 Main Points of the Political Climate in February 2020 1. Will fears regarding the coronavirus subside? 2. Who will act on the health crisis amidst the rise of conflicting interests regarding the recent reshuffling of state personnel? 3. What will be the decisions of those who are ‘cut-off’? Ipsos Korea Homepage: http://www.ipsos.com/ko-kr Ipsos Naver Blog: https://blog.naver.com/ipsos_korea 12th Fl., Korea Economic Daily News Bldg., 463 Cheongpa-ro, Jung-gu, Seoul 04505 [Monthly Prospects] Political Climate and Prospects for February 2020 ￭ General Review of Government in January 2020 ❏ President Moon’s Approval Rating Decreases Due to the Coronavirus ❍ President Moon’s approval rating was expected to increase following the passage of the prosecution reform bill in January that called for the further adjustment of investigative authority. - Such expectations became a reality during the second week of January, in which President Moon’s approval rating began showing signs of an upward trend. ❍ However, President Moon’s approval rating fell once again due to the controversy over the reshuffling of senior prosecutors and the outbreak of the coronavirus. (Source : Gallup Korea) - The outbreak of the coronavirus had a larger impact on President Moon’s approval rating as it is directly related to the lives of citizens. ❍ Approval ratings are expected to fluctuate due to the continuous spread of the coronavirus. - Approval ratings will inevitably decrease with the rise of issues regarding the quarantine measures against the coronavirus. Positive Performance Evaluation of President Moon's Administration (5th Week of January, 2020) Negative (Source : Gallup Korea / Unit : %) 53 54 53 53 51 50 52 50 50 49 49 49 49 49 50 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 48 46 46 46 46 45 45 46 44 43 43 46 44 42 46 45 41 44 45 45 45 45 42 44 40 41 44 43 39 43 43 40 40 42 41 41 38 January Week 1, Major Incidents January Week 3, Major Incidents - 12/30 Passage of prosecution reform bill at the plenary session of the - 01/13 Passage of bills on the readjustment of investigative authorities National Assembly and kindergartens at the plenary session of the National Assembly - 01/02 President Moon appoints Choo Mi-ae as justice minister - 01/14 President Moon’s New Year’s Press Conference / Inauguration of - 01/05 Establishment of the New Conservative Party Prime Minister Chung Sye-kyun - 01/16 Announcement of real estate measures regarding loans and property taxes - 01/19 Former Bareunmirae Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo arrives in South Korea January Week 2, Major Incidents - 01/05 LKP withdraws filibuster January Week 4, Major Incidents President Moon reshuffles staff of the presidential office - 01/20 First confirmed case of coronavirus in South Korea - 01/06 President Moon’s New Year’s Address - 01/21 South Korea decides to send troops to Hormuz Strait - 01/08 Ministry of Justice reshuffles senior prosecutors January Week 5, Major Incidents - 01/09 Establishment of the ‘Innovation and Integration Committee - 01/29 Indictment of prosecutors involved in the prosecutorial (IIC)’ by the LKP and the New Conservative Party investigations of former Ulsan City Mayor Kim Gi-hyeon - 01/12 Establishment of the New Alternative Party - 01/30 WHO declares coronavirus outbreak a public health emergency of international concern - 01/31 First evacuation plane carrying South Koreans arrives in Seoul from Wuhan - 02/01 Second evacuation plane carrying South Koreans arrives in Seoul from Wuhan _ The coronavirus ❏ The Coronavirus Outbreak Impacts the Approval Rating of the DPK outbreak is viewed to have had a ❍ Fears against the global spread of the coronavirus negatively impacts the approval rating significant impact of the DPK in January. on President - The DPK’s approval rating hits a record low of 34% in recent years. (Source : Gallup Moon’s approval Korea) rating as it is directly related to ❍ the lives of citizens. The LKP’s approval rating fails to rise despite the negative evaluations toward President _ The LKP’s approval Moon’s administration and the DPK. rating fails to rise - The LKP’s approval rating halts at 21% even while public opinion toward President despite the Moon’s administration and the ruling party remain negative. negative - The Non-Partisan Party experiences a rapid increase in its approval rating, which evaluations toward President Moon’s shows that supporters of the DPK have shifted to the Non-Partisan Party instead administration and of the LKP. the DPK. - Whereas, the Bareunmirae Party’s approval rating falls from 5% to 2%, after its former leader, Yoo Seong-min, moved to the New Conservative Party. Party Approval Ratings (5th Week of January, 2020) (Source : Gallup Korea / Unit : %) 50 40 40 40 41 41 40 40 41 40 40 40 42 40 39 39 38 38 37 37 37 37 38 37 39 40 36 34 26 26 26 27 27 27 26 27 30 24 24 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 33 23 23 23 24 21 23 24 20 23 24 23 21 21 21 22 22 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 23 22 20 19 20 19 20 18 20 20 21 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 6 5 7 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 10 4 3 3 2 - DPK LKP Bareunmirae Non-Partisan ❍ Fears against the coronavirus are expected to remain throughout February, which raises possibilities for the approval rating of the DPK to decrease or remain stagnant. ❍ Although the LKP’s approval rating is failing to rise despite the growing negative sentiments toward the DPK, the integrated conservative bloc is expected to secure an increase in approval rating depending on its performance. - However, it can be predicted that the integrated conservative bloc will only consist of the LKP and the New Conservative Party, limiting the chances for an increase in its approval rating due to well- established public opinions of the two parties. _ As a result of the ❏ The Size of the Progressive Group Decreases, Whereas that of the progressives switching to the Centrist and Conservative Groups Increases centrist group, the ❍ The number of progressives that remained stable at 30% after the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ is size of the centrist disrupted by the outbreak of the coronavirus. group increased to - As of the 5th week of January, the size of the progressive group reduced to 26% 31%. - This has been (Source: Gallup Korea) analyzed to have been caused by the ❍ As a result of the progressives switching to the centrist group, the size of the centrist failure of early group increased to 31%. prevention of - This has been analyzed to have been caused by the failure of early prevention of Chinese citizens Chinese citizens from entering the Korean peninsula in addition to the spread of from entering the Korean peninsula in the coronavirus. addition to the spread of the ❍ The number of conservatives slightly increased, which is seen as a result of individuals coronavirus. uncertain of their political ideologies, joining the conservative group. - It has been analyzed that the oppositions toward the reshuffling of senior prosecutors have prompted the creation of an integrated conservative bloc. - However, it should be noted that the integration of conservative parties (28%) is not leading to a greater level of support for the LKP (21%). - Attention will be given to whether the integration of the LKP and the New Conservative Party into the conservative bloc will receive support due to the existing differences between the two parties. Subjective Political Ideologies (5th Week of January, 2020) (Source : Gallup Korea / Unit : %) 34 33 31 31 32 31 32 31 32 31 30 30 3131 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 30 29 29 28 29 31 28 28 27 27 30 28 28 29 30 27 26 27 29 28 29 27 28 28 28 28 28 26 28 27 27 26 26 24 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 25 25 25 25 25 24 24 24 24 25 24 22 23 24 24 23 23 20 22 Conservatives Centrists Progressives ❍ The trends experienced by the centrist group are likely to continue as fears against the coronavirus will remain prevalent throughout February. - Establishment of the integrated conservative bloc amidst growing national concerns toward the coronavirus is expected to have limited influence on the conservatives. ❏ The Coronavirus Pushes President Moon’s Administration and the Ruling Party to Respond to the Health Crisis ❍ The main agenda/issues of January 2020 have been categorized based on their degree of influence on state administration as shown below. - The content in the second row includes the agenda/issues that changed compared to what was initially expected. - The content in the third row and next to the asterisk includes additional agenda/issues. Positive Agenda/Issue Neutral Agenda/Issue Negative Agenda/Issue Passage of investigative authority Trends regarding integrated Trial of former Justice Minister Cho revision bill at the National conservative bloc Kuk and
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