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August 2019 Political Situation and Prospects

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August 2019 Political Situation and Prospects [Monthly Prospects] August 2019 Political Situation and Prospects ❏ General Review of Government in July 2019 - Japan's export curbs work favorably for President Moon - Support of political parties remain similar, but LKP’s approval rating drops slightly - Neutral party support decreases while progressive base expands - Japan's export curbs outweighed the disadvantages that the ruling party experienced in July ❏ Analysis of Public Sentiment on Japan’s Export Restrictions - Anti-Japan sentiment grows stronger following South Korea and Japan’s Trade War - Supporters of LKP go against public sentiment - Koreans are dissatisfied with the government's response to current issues - Public sentiment may shift if Korea incurs further damages ❏ Main Events and Prospective Trends of August - Main events and other notable matters in August - Concerns on Korea’s elimination from the whitelist ❏ Three Main Points in Politics for August ① How will President Moon respond to the strengthened export curbs? ② Would the Korea-Japan feud spread to a conflict between the people? ③ Will the LKP choose to follow public opinion or go against it? 1 [Monthly Prospects] August 2019 Political Situation and Prospects ￭ Review of Government in July 2019 ❏ Japan's export curbs work in President Moon’s favor ❍ While there have been mixed reviews about President Moon’s administration since March, the administration ended July with a positive evaluation (source: Korea Gallup) ❍ The export curbs imposed by Japan aroused patriotism in many Koreans, leading to general support of President Moon. - Foreign affairs that motivate strong patriotism usually lead to consequent public support for the government. - President Moon will continue to gain support as the export curb issue is unlikely to be resolved soon. - The positive increase seen in the first week of July is likely due to the aftermath of the North Korea- South Korea-US meeting at Panmunjom. July Week 2, Major Incidents - 07/08 Yoon Seok-youl’s confirmation hearing as Prosecutor- General nominee July Week 1, Major Incidents - 07/10 President Moon meets with heads of major - 07/04 Japan tightens regulations on exports that apply to Korea conglomerates in the Blue House (3 materials) - 07/12 Officials of Korea and Japan meet to discuss export curbs / Minimum wage confirmed to be 8,590 KRW - 07/14 President Moon issues an apology for not achieving his presidential campaign promise of raising the minimum wage to 10,000 KRW by 2020 July Week 3, Major Incidents July Week 4, Major Incidents - 07/15 President Moon warns Japan about export curbs - 07/23 Chinese and Russian jets enter airspace over Dokdo - 07/18 President Moon meets with the leaders of 5 political Island parties - 07/25 North Korea fires a short-distance missile ❏ Support of political parties remain similar, but LKP’s approval rating drops slightly 2 ❍ Although the significance of Japan’s export curbs is currently overshadowing all other issues and increasing support for the President, the ruling party is failing to see a corresponding increase in support. - Ratings for the DPK (Democratic Party of Korea, the ruling party) did not fluctuate in July as the party did not stand out during the crisis of the export curbs. - In terms of President Moon’s administration specifically, Cho Kuk (the former Presidential Secretary) made a strong statement about the export regulations. However, the DPK did not issue any distinct messages about the crisis. ❍ While President Moon’s administration is gaining support from the public, the LKP (Liberty Korea Party, a major opposition party) is seeing a slight decrease in ratings. - Despite the external crisis, the LKP continued to focus on domestic issues and appeared to be uninvolved with important foreign affairs. - Although the decision of Hwang Gyo-ahn (leader of the LKP) to hold a meeting with the President to discuss foreign and economic affairs was positively received as a timely move, the party failed to emphasize the proceedings of this meeting. Approval Rating of Government Parties (4th week of July, 2019) (source : Korea Gallup / unit:%) 50 40 40 40 40 40 38 39 39 38 39 38 39 39 38 39 39 39 37 37 36 36 37 40 35 35 26 26 26 26 26 27 26 26 30 24 24 25 26 25 25 25 24 24 25 24 24 24 22 24 23 20 23 24 24 24 24 23 22 21 22 21 22 22 21 21 21 19 19 20 20 20 20 19 2019 10 8 - 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 4 5 5 4 5 4 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 DPK LKP Bareunmirae Nonpartisan ❍ The decrease in support for the LKP led to a consequent increase of nonpartisan support. - Approval ratings for the LKP and nonpartisan independent politicians continue to have an inverse relationship. ❍ Meanwhile, the Bareunmirae Party is maintaining a similar approval rate despite internal conflicts. 3 - Unless major issues arise from the party—such as political fission—support for the party will continue. ❏ Neutral base shrinks while progressive base expands ❍ The distribution of subjective political ideology for the fourth week of July shows that conservative base is 24%, neutral base is 27%, and progressive base is 31%. (source: Korea Gallup) ❍ As the dispute between Korea and Japan has led to heightened conflicts between political parties, the ideological attitude of the public is becoming clearer. - The presidential secretary delivered a strong message about the current issue with Japan, thus revealing the dichotomy of different political ideologies. - The neutral base started to decrease from the third week of July and ended the month at 27%. ❍ The influence of the progressive base strengthened as neutral supporters leaned toward the progressive side. - Support for the administration also affected the ideological attitude of the people. - The proportion of conservative supporters remained at around 24% without noticeable change. 4 ❏ Japan's export curbs outweighed the disadvantages that the ruling party experienced in July ❍ Major agenda/issues in July are categorized as below according to the level of influence on the current administration. (* newly added agenda/issues) Positive Agenda/Issues Medium Agenda/Issues Negative Agenda/Issues - Government announces - Temporary workers’ strike - NK and US launch negotiations economic policy plans for the - Postal Workers’ Union plans - Investigation of parliament second half of 2019 national strike members pertaining to ‘fast- - National Assembly is - Investigation of North track’ normalized Korea’s undetected fishing - Final verdict of former president - Yoon Seok-youl’s confirmation boat in Samcheok port Park hearing as Prosecutor-General - Decision of next year’s - Monetary Policy Board lowers nominee minimum wage interest rate - Passage of budget bill and - Decision of political and reform bill judicial reform committee - Presidential cabinet reshuffle chairs *Japan announces export curbs *Chinese and Russian jets invade *Jeong Kyeong-doo plans to on Korea the airspace of Dokdo Island resign *Korea carries out quick response ➡ *Budget bill and reform bill are to export curbs not processed *Arrest of North Korean spy *North Korea fires ballistic missile ❍ Although the ruling party faced many negative issues and agenda during the month of July, the massive issue of Japan’s export curbs dominated all other matters. - President Moon and former presidential secretary Cho Kuk publicly condemned Japan, thus invoking patriotism and national pride amongst the Korean public. - Swift diplomatic responses to the export curbs emphasized the severity of the situation as a national crisis. For instance, the second deputy head of the presidential National Security Office visited the United States to raise the issue to the WTO. 5 - Korean consumers voluntarily participated in a widespread boycott of Japanese products, which also served as an advantage for the ruling party. ❍ Despite public attention on the current Korea-Japan feud, the LKP failed to recognize the sentiment and continued to instead criticize the administration. - LKP’s criticism of President Moon can be seen as a justified response to his lack of preparation for Japan’s imminent retaliation to the Korean Supreme Court ruling that demanded Japanese payment for wartime labor. - However, as the LKP issued one-sided criticism toward the administration without acknowledging the actions of Japan, the Korean public dismissed the party as being pro-Japan. ￭ Analysis of Public Sentiment on Japan’s Export Curbs ❏ Anti-Japan sentiment grows stronger following Japan’s export curbs ❍ The issue of Japan's export regulations on Korea is unlikely to be solved in a short period of time. ❍ On August 2, Japan held a cabinet meeting to discuss the proposal of removing Korea from the whitelist. - The revision was consequently passed as a result of this meeting, and the change will take effect as early as August 23rd. - With Korea’s elimination from the whitelist, Japan is expected to expand export curbs on a wider range of products, thus imposing further damage on Korean industries. ❍ Anti-Japanese sentiment will continue to escalate after Japan finalizes the removal of Korea from the whitelist. It is expected to hit its peak on National Liberation Day (August 15th), which commemorates the liberation of Korea from Japanese imperial rule. ❍ A survey conducted in Korea revealed that approximately 80% of Korean citizens are “unwilling” to purchase Japanese products, thus revealing heightened anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the Korean public. (source: Korea Gallup, survey results from the fourth week of July, 2019) - Anti-Japanese sentiment is similarly felt for all Koreans; the ratio of respondents who expressed “unwillingness” to purchase Japanese products is constant regardless of political ideology, age, and occupation. 6 ❏ Supporters of LKP go against public opinion ❍ In a survey that asked whether Korea or Japan was more responsible for the conflict between the two countries, 61% of Koreans responded that the Japanese government is responsible. (source: Korea Gallup, survey results from the second week of July, 2019) - This sentiment is similarly observed throughout all ages and occupations.
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