Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Comments

Supporting Stabilization in WP The Challenges of Finalizing and Implementing the Skhirat Agreement

Wolfram Lacher S

Representatives of Libya’s warring parties are close to reaching a UN-mediated power- sharing agreement that would establish a Government of National Accord (GNA). As- suming it is finalized, the deal will be fragile. Its implementation will be fraught with tensions and can collapse at any moment under pressure from spoilers. Reaching a final agreement and implementing it will require yet stronger political and diplomatic efforts from external actors. This includes intensive engagement with the parties to the agreement and those who oppose the deal or have been left out of it; carefully wielding the instrument of targeted sanctions; and containing regional rivalries that have fueled Libya’s conflicts. International support for implementation should take into account not only the formal demands of a unity government but also wider Libyan sensitivities over external interference. A foreign military presence would undermine the agree- ment.

The UN-mediated agreement, negotiated in the conflict, Libyan territory fragmented Skhirat (Morocco), seeks to end a yearlong into a patchwork of local zones of influ- civil war that caused state institutions to ence, with neither side being able to split into two. The government of Abdallah cement its hold over entire regions. The al-Thinni – in the eastern city of Bayda attempts of both governments to seize and recognized internationally – had been control of the Central Bank, the National formed by the Tobruk-based House of Repre- Oil Corporation (NOC) and state-owned sentatives (HoR) elected in June 2014. In investment vehicles have been in vain, August 2014 the HoR’s adversaries had res- due to Western insistence on a negotiated urrected the HoR’s predecessor, the General solution and a refusal to recognize newly National Congress (GNC), elected in July appointed officials or bank accounts. As a 2012, and installed a rival government in result, support for the war has faded. Since . Neither government has exercised spring 2015, some of the conflicting parties control over the military forces in the loose have come under pressure from war-weary alliances each of them has represented. communities, and escalation has given way Nor has either side been able to gain the to the negotiation of local ceasefire agree- upper hand militarily or politically. During ments and tentative reconciliation initia-

Wolfram Lacher is an Associate in SWP’s Middle East and SWP Comments 36 July 2015

1 tives in western and southern Libya. This A fragile deal dynamic has been crucial for the progress The complexity of Libya’s conflicts is of the UN-mediated negotiations. such that few observers expected the UN The agreement, initialed on July 11 by mediation efforts to succeed. Even in its all parties except the GNC, reestablishes a current stage, the agreement therefore single government headed by a Presidency represents a major achievement. Neverthe- Council including a prime minister and less, its foundation is fragile: some of its two deputies, who take their decisions in core stakeholders have a narrow support unanimity. The HoR remains the main base, while many parties to the conflict legislative body but should facilitate the are only loosely associated with the deal, return of the forty-odd parliamentarians or are opposed to it. who have been boycotting sessions in How to ensure effective representation Tobruk, including by considering moving of the conflicting parties was a question its location and reexamining decisions that had dogged UN mediators from the taken in Tobruk. Major decisions in the HoR beginning. Neither of the two legislatures require a majority of 150 out of 192 mem- vying for legitimacy – the GNC and HoR – bers, making it impossible for the current had broad public support. The GNC was majority in the HoR to control the body. In widely seen as being responsible for the addition, the parties to the agreement are political deadlock that had led to the crisis, to select 90 GNC members and 30 inde- and during the war it was reduced to just pendent figures to form a State Council. over half of its 200 members. The HoR Through joint committees with the HoR, had been elected by a mere fifth of Libya’s the State Council can weigh in on key electorate, then alienated large constituen- appointments – such as the Central Bank cies with provocative decisions and was Governor – and help draft the laws for a boycotted by around 40 to 50 of its 192 referendum on the draft constitution, as members. The two governments, deprived well as for new elections. With these elec- of access to budgets and contested within tions, which are to take place within a year their own political camps, had even less of the agreement’s adoption – or a maxi- support. Moreover, both legislatures and mum of two years, if the draft constitution governments lacked direct control over has not been adopted within the first year – the military alliances with which they were the return to constitutional government associated. On the one hand, Operation would be complete. Dignity – launched by General Khalifa Finalizing the deal will require bringing Haftar in May 2014 as a campaign against the GNC back on board and negotiating Islamist militias in – started out crucial annexes to the agreement, includ- in explicit rebellion to the army leadership. ing on the composition of the Presidency Following the June 2014 elections, the HoR Council and the government, as well as backed Operation Dignity and its leaders, the mode of selecting the members of the though chains of military command have State Council. For the GNA to take office in remained disjointed and outside the con- Tripoli, ceasefire and security arrangements trol of the HoR or its government. On the also still need to be negotiated and will be other hand, Libya Dawn was a coalition of overseen by the Presidency Council. Finally, militias from mostly western Libyan cities, the agreement defers many contentious including some Islamist-leaning forces, issues, including disputes over top posi- which took control of Tripoli in mid-2014, tions in the administration, to be resolved claiming to be defending the 2011 revolu- by the power-sharing institutions at a later tion against the return of former regime stage. elements. Dawn lacked a clearly identifia- ble leadership and was only nominally loyal to the GNC and its government.

SWP Comments 36 July 2015

2 Compounding these difficulties, alli- GNC; HoR boycotters – though broadly in ances on both sides have turned out to be the same camp as the GNC delegation – fractious and fluid. As the conflict has worn have pursued their own interests and have on, both camps have witnessed increasing not acted as one group either. internal tensions and differentiation – to Dawn’s adversaries have also been in- the extent that now the struggle is not be- creasingly divided. Despite becoming top tween two camps but between dozens of military commander in March 2015, Haftar rival political interests. The UN-led process never succeeded in bringing the military has contributed to the splintering of alli- forces in the HoR camp under his control. ances by forcing political actors to position His self-styled “” (LNA) themselves toward the negotiations and derives its clout from its air force, as well encouraging representatives of local coun- as Haftar’s access to backing from regional cils and armed groups to speak for them- states, particularly . However, key selves, rather than have the two legislatures army units in Benghazi and eastern Libya represent them. have escaped Haftar’s sway, and their Libya Dawn no longer exists. Many of its leaders have fiercely and openly opposed local constituencies have opted to support Haftar. In Tripolitania, only some factions the negotiations and have sought to nego- within the alliance fighting against Dawn tiate ceasefires with forces from other have adhered to the LNA; most forces in cities. ’s leading political represent- Zintan and Warshafana – and particularly atives and armed groups – previously the those that have negotiated ceasefires with heavyweights within the Dawn alliance – their adversaries – submit to local decision- have distanced themselves from the Islam- making structures. The same goes for arm- ist militia leaders and revolutionary hard- ed groups of the Tubu ethnic minority, liners at the core of Libya Dawn. When the principal HoR-aligned constituency in Misratan forces began confronting the southern Libya. Leading political figures Islamic State (IS) in in February 2015, in the HoR camp have engaged in serious they diverged with Dawn strategists over rivalries, even leading to an attack on Prime military priorities and began negotiating Minister al-Thinni in Tobruk, in May 2015. ceasefires with their adversaries in War- The UN-led mediation has responded to shafana and Zintan. Other cities previously the fragmentation of Libya’s political scene backing Dawn, such as , have en- by convening multiple “tracks” of dialogue. tered into similar agreements. The Amazigh The agreement is the outcome of negotia- towns in the Nafusa mountains had ini- tions in the political track that included tially contributed to Dawn firepower, but representatives of the HoR, the GNC and starting in early 2015 they became increas- parliamentarians boycotting either body, ingly disengaged from the conflict and posi- as well as several independent figures. In tioned themselves as neutral. There now parallel, another track has brought togeth- remains the core group of former Dawn er representatives of municipal councils, ringleaders who are holding out in Tripoli: and yet another forum convened represent- Islamist politicians associated with the atives of political parties and civil society, Mufti and the former Libyan Islamic Fight- chiefly to gain their support for the process ing Group, as well as a handful of militia without according them formal influence leaders from Misrata, Zawiya and Tripoli, on the outcome of negotiations. Attempts who have formed the so-called Steadfast- to organize meetings of tribal leaders were ness Front. This core group also exercises unsuccessful. The crucial track assembling disproportionate influence in the GNC and representatives of armed groups for talks was decisive in dissuading the GNC from on security arrangements has yet to gather initialing the agreement. During the nego- momentum. According to the agreement, tiations, divisions appeared not only in the this track is to serve as the forum for nego-

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3 tiating security arrangements until the commander-in-chief and is likely to dismiss GNA takes office. him. With almost half of active HoR mem- Yet, despite the mediators’ attempts to bers having opposed Haftar’s appointment assemble a broad array of stakeholders, as top army commander, the majority in a support for the agreement rests on a nar- reunited HoR would back his removal. row foundation. Several of the parliamen- In opposing the agreement, Haftar could tarians most strongly espousing the agree- align himself with two other disgruntled ment have alienated their bases, as they groups. First, senior figures in the former appeared to pursue above all their personal regime and its security apparatus had ambitions in negotiating the government worked in tandem with Haftar, hoping for lineup. The independent figures backing a comeback if Dawn were defeated. The the deal were picked arbitrarily by the agreement will now close the political scene mediators, and in many cases they lack a again to former core regime elements, who political power base. Representatives of po- could try to provoke the collapse of cease- litical parties and municipalities have lent fires in Tripolitania by activating local fac- their weight to the process, even signing tions in Haftar’s LNA. Second, proponents the agreement as witnesses to compensate of eastern Libyan autonomy had subdued for the GNC’s absence, but have gained few their activism while the HoR was based in tangible benefits from the deal. A range of Tobruk and its government resided in military leaders have engaged in the track Bayda, as eastern politicians exerted dis- on security arrangements, but they have proportionate influence in both bodies. In often done so separately and in rivalry – a unity government in Tripoli, their sway rather than coordination – with their con- will be greatly diminished. Eastern parlia- stituencies’ political representatives. Given mentarians had generally adopted a hard the multitude of competing interest groups line toward the negotiations. Taken togeth- and the absence of organized political er, this raises the risk of tenacious opposi- forces, a power-sharing agreement that is tion to the GNA from eastern Libya. A group centered on the distribution of government of eastern HoR members may even reject portfolios will produce much discontent. the deal and throw in their lot with the autonomy movement and Haftar to estab- lish a parallel administration in the east. Potential spoilers and the risk Hardliners on the other side of the divide of backlash will also pose an obstacle. This includes po- Although Libya’s silent majority undoubt- liticians and militia leaders who had been edly welcomes the agreement, there is a prominent in Libya Dawn’s operations and long list of political actors who have a clear who have consistently rejected all compro- interest in its collapse, or at least have felt mise. Even if a majority in the GNC ends up insufficiently included in the negotiations. signing the agreement, such hardliners are As the two alliances have disintegrated, likely to remain adamant. They have to fear the emergence of a centrist coalition in sup- not only political marginalization but also port of the deal has isolated hardliners on possible prosecution if a unity government both sides, who are now potential spoilers. cements its authority. Their nuisance po- In the HoR camp, this applies most promi- tential is greatest in and around Tripoli, nently to Haftar and the forces directly where they could pose a direct threat to associated with him. With his controversial the security arrangements required for the track record and barely veiled ambitions to unity government to operate. Meanwhile, rule the country, Haftar is unacceptable the conflict in Benghazi is set to continue to the former Dawn supporters. The Presi- despite the deal. Compared to western dency Council is set to enter into conflict Libya, the lines of conflict in Benghazi are with Haftar as it exercises its capacity as much more clearly delineated by ideology,

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4 and the prospects for a negotiated solution potential spoilers, a relapse into open are slim. The local warring factions include conflict will remain a serious risk. Islamist and jihadi groups that had been The most immediate challenge for im- loosely allied with Dawn but are not party plementation will be the negotiation and to the agreement. establishment of security arrangements – In addition to forces with a direct inter- first in the capital, and then for vital infra- est in the agreement’s collapse, there are structure across Libyan territory. A major important groups with insufficient stakes shortcoming of the agreement is that it has in the deal. The Amazigh and Tubu minor- left the terms of the ceasefire and security ities, both of which can field substantial arrangements almost completely open. military forces, have repeatedly complained As the negotiations over security arrange- about inadequate representation at the ne- ments are set to take place within the gotiations, and support for the agreement framework of the track bringing together is weak among both groups. Communities representatives of armed groups, the par- that are militarily weak and had sought to ties to the security arrangements will not keep out of the conflicts of the past year, have formal influence over the outcome of most notably Bani Walid, are frustrated the political track. This raises the difficulty over what they see as a deal rewarding the of how to ensure their commitment to the warlords. These groups would be unlikely political agreement. to protect the agreement if spoilers were to The security arrangements need to fit try and force its failure. two seemingly contradictory constraints. Finally, the group most clearly opposed On the one hand, they require a deal be- to this or any other agreement between tween key military players in and around Libya’s political forces – and firmly situated the capital that will almost certainly in- outside all political camps – is the Islamic clude carving up Tripoli into spheres of State. IS affiliates in Darna, Benghazi and influence by previously warring parties. Sirte have rapidly expanded over the past This would notably entail the return of year of civil war. In Sirte, IS has been able to Zintani forces to southern Tripoli – after mobilize in a city where a sense of humilia- having been driven out by Libya Dawn in tion and defeat has been widespread since mid-2014 – but possibly also a confronta- the 2011 revolution. IS will likely seek to tion with Tripoli-based forces that reject replicate this model in similar communi- such an arrangement. On the other hand, ties across Libya – such as Bani Walid – that the GNA and other state institutions in have not been stakeholders in the UN-led Tripoli would urgently require protection negotiations and may perceive the agree- from loyal forces to prevent a recurrence of ment as excluding them yet again from the the constant extortion by armed factions political scene. A continued expansion of IS that haunted transitional governments in would severely undermine the credibility of the 2012–2014 period. Therefore, security the unity government, which many Libyans arrangements need to provide for a rapid will measure first and foremost by its prog- move away from a militia oligopoly toward ress in dealing with security challenges. the establishment of an integrated and neu- tral force, into which parts of these militias would be dissolved. A neutral force in the Implementing the agreement capital could then become the nucleus of a If the agreement is finalized, the power regular army whose reach would expand struggles that gave rise to the war will play gradually as local factions agree to disband out within the new power-sharing institu- and join. In the process, another difficulty tions. This means that implementation will will be preventing the reestablishment be difficult and volatile. Given the range of of competing chains of command, as in 2013/14, when senior figures in the govern-

SWP Comments 36 July 2015

5 ment and the GNC used their prerogatives the plunge of the Libyan dinar, as well to sponsor rival units that eventually be- as the need to accommodate political and came warring parties. Even in the best case, military factions with government budgets however, armed groups representing par- and salaries to cement the agreement. The ticular political interests are so entrenched GNA would urgently need oil production to that they are certain to pose a challenge to recover, which further increases the lever- state authority, even after the GNA hands age of armed groups that are able to shut over to an elected government. down oilfields or export terminals to pro- An instant obstacle to implementation mote their demands. Therefore, the GNA will be resistance from actors who fear would not only risk emulating past govern- prosecution for crimes committed during ments in their failure to revive public in- the 2014/15 civil war. The thorny issue of vestment, but it could also face a fatal whether and when such figures should be socioeconomic and political crisis if it is held accountable for their actions will be forced to make cuts in salary or subsidy high on the political agenda. In the medi- budgets. um term, the prosecution of war crimes will be crucial to permit reconciliation. In the short term, it is not realistic – Libya’s What role for international judicial system has collapsed – nor would it support? facilitate the implementation of the agree- To recapitulate: a unity government, if ment. Indeed, negotiating safe conduct and formed under a final agreement, will rely offering suspects a way out, such as through on a fragile agreement and a narrow sup- postings to embassies abroad, may be un- port base. It will be besieged by potential avoidable in order to defuse their nuisance spoilers and face tight limits to its author- potential. ity. Can international support salvage it? A litmus test is whether the HoR will Among Western governments, the EU reconsider its location and the decisions it and the UN, there is an understandable passed while meeting in Tobruk, thereby tendency to plan for a substantial interna- allowing HoR boycotters to join. A reuni- tional role in Libya to support the agree- fication would produce a parliament with ment’s implementation. Many now con- a more centrist majority, reducing the risk sider the discreet approach adopted after that the HoR will provoke confrontations, the 2011 war to have been a mistake. How- or refuse to cooperate, with the Presidency ever, Libya’s transition did not fail because Council or the State Council. Ultimately, of the lack of Western support. Such sup- such cooperation will be essential to permit port was offered but proved ineffective the constitutional referendum and new because of the power struggles paralyzing elections to proceed. the transitional government. The Libyan If the GNA surmounts the obstacles authorities at the time rejected any talk of posed by armed groups and power strug- a foreign peacekeeping presence. Foreign gles, the economy could turn out to be a policy-makers recognized that a prominent stumbling block. In 2014 alone, Libya external role would be perceived in Libya burned through a quarter of its foreign as intrusive and end up undermining the exchange reserves, which by January 2015 transition process. stood at $76 billion. With oil production Much the same is true today. Although remaining low due to insecurity and con- there is a clear need for an external role in flict, and with international oil prices plum- guaranteeing the agreement and arbitrat- meting, the GNA could face state bankrupt- ing between its parties, external actors cy by mid-2016. These unprecedented fiscal should be acutely alert to the risk that their constraints come at a time of heightened well-meant support could become a liabil- demands on government spending due to ity. Though any international assistance

SWP Comments 36 July 2015

6 would respond to a formal request by the Consequently, neither a full-blown GNA, it could nevertheless backfire. peacekeeping operation nor an interna- In the domain of security, two main tional force to protect the diplomatic types of foreign support are conceivable. presence are advisable – even if the GNA First, there is a clear need for a neutral – agreed to the deployment of such a force, and therefore external – party to help which is unlikely. The absence of such a monitor the implementation of ceasefire force will restrain external actors in their and security arrangements. Second, Wes- ability to provide support to the GNA, due tern governments and the UN could push to security concerns. It will also complicate for an international force to guarantee the task of international monitoring. The security arrangements in Tripoli, intervene GNA could request external support in in the event of a ceasefire breakdown and monitoring ceasefire and security arrange- protect diplomatic missions. This second ments but will be reluctant to agree to any option would be risky and counterproduc- kind of an international protection force. tive under most circumstances. Without external protection, however, it Suspicion of foreign conspiracies runs would be difficult for unarmed military high in Libya and can easily be harnessed observers to carry out their mission. In by opponents of the agreement. Any pres- any case, such a force should be kept at an ence of foreign troops, even if based outside absolute minimum and would not remove Libyan territory as a rapid intervention international observers’ reliance on Libyan force, would open the door to allegations structures. that the agreement is the first step toward Since external actors will have limited Libya’s occupation by foreign powers and ability to back up security arrangements allow spoilers to deride the government as under these circumstances, such arrange- a Western puppet. A foreign military pres- ments need to be based on a balance of ence would therefore quickly become the power between the Libyan parties. This subject of political controversy, damaging entails creating structures led by military both the GNA’s standing and the imple- figures who are respected by all sides, in mentation of the agreement as a whole. It which formerly warring forces are closely would also become a target for extremist integrated. This can only work if neutral groups and rogue militias, meaning that an units act as guarantors. External actors’ international presence could not be a mere interlocutors for security arrangements peacekeeping force but would have to be have to date been largely confined to the equipped to engage in heavy fighting, former conflicting parties. Much stronger which, in turn, could trigger unintended engagement is needed with neutral forces – consequences. An additional challenge units that were not involved in the war, would be identifying suitable troop-con- including certain units from Tripoli or tributing countries for such an operation. from Amazigh towns. Troops from European states with interests Western governments will be particular- in Libya would be perceived as evidence of ly eager to provide support in the areas of a neocolonial project. Within the region, counter-terrorism and the control of irreg- Morocco is the only supplier of interna- ular migrant flows. After all, much of the tional peacekeepers that is not perceived to diplomatic momentum in support of the be meddling in Libya’s conflicts. Among negotiations developed as European policy- the large contributors to UN peacekeeping makers were desperately looking for ap- contingents, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis proaches and Libyan partners in both are known to Libyans as migrant laborers domains. However, external actors should and unlikely to be greeted with respect. The tread particularly cautiously in pursuing same goes for sub-Saharan African soldiers. these interests. Establishing centralized command structures and overcoming fac-

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7 tionalism in the security sector will take ultimate object of the past year’s conflicts, time, but they are crucial prerequisites for namely state finances and assets. Embez- supporting operations against extremist zlement of state funds by political actors groups. External actors need to be certain became systemic even before the most that the units conducting such operations recent war, when it acquired yet greater are not partisan and will not become en- importance to fund the war effort. Support- tangled in local conflicts. Contrary to ing the Central Bank with an independent fighting the Islamic State and other jihadi monitoring mechanism could help reunify groups, control of migratory flows will not and reestablish trust in the institution, be a GNA priority. Should Europeans push provided the GNA requests such a mecha- the GNA to move against migrant smug- nism. glers – or even act on Libyan territory them- selves – this risks undermining the GNA and the agreement on which it is based. In case of failure

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und In sum, though external assistance in Should the agreement collapse and Libya Politik, 2014 the domain of security is sorely needed, slide back into chaos or another war, there All rights reserved it faces tight constraints if it is to avoid is no Plan B. An international military oper- These Comments reflect damaging the fragile deal. It is even more ation to prop up the GNA or separate the solely the author’s views. important for European governments and warring parties would be certain to fail, SWP the EU to maintain their political commit- given the multitude of armed factions and Stiftung Wissenschaft und ment to reach a final agreement and sup- the negative reaction that foreign forces Politik German Institute for port its implementation, in close coordina- would trigger. The international focus International and tion with the UN. This includes constant should then shift to a containment strate- Security Affairs and intensive engagement with the parties gy, including increased efforts to enforce Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 to the agreement, as well as potential spoi- the arms embargo and dissuade regional 10719 Berlin lers, particularly communities that have to powers from fueling the conflict. Even so, Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 date been insufficiently taken into account pressure on Western and regional govern- www.swp-berlin.org by the mediators. Targeted sanctions – ments to act on perceived threats from [email protected] travel bans and asset freezes – are among Libya, such as the jihadist presence, would ISSN 1861-1761 the few instruments available to foreign increase in such a scenario, making tar- policy-makers to exert direct influence. In geted or temporary military operations order to remain effective, the threat needs likely. The prospects for reestablishing a to be realized at some point, possibly at the political basis for conflict resolution would EU and US level if consensus at the UN then be even slimmer, as neither the GNC Security Council is lacking. Nevertheless, nor the HoR could credibly act as negotiat- there can be no illusions over the limited ing parties in the event of another break- (and possibly counterproductive) impact down. This grim outlook only underlines that targeted sanctions would have on the imperative of finding the best possible many players in the conflict. approaches to support the implementation Persistent diplomatic efforts are also of the Skhirat agreement. needed to prevent regional rivalries from spoiling the deal. Any evidence that re- gional governments are continuing to sup- port spoilers in Libya should trigger high- level diplomatic activity and, if need be, open naming and shaming of violators of the UN arms embargo on Libya. Finally, external actors could have a role to play in building trust between political interests by attenuating rivalries over the

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8 Map: Libya

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9