DOCSLIB.ORG

Chapter 1 Chapter 2

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Notes Chapter 1 1.Joint Chiefs of Staff were inter-service, but of one nationality. 2. Harrison, 10 March 1943, FO 371/38839. 3. SHAEF to G5, AFHQ, 3 September 1944, WO 204/3031. 4. COS, 17 August 1944, CAB 66, WP (44) 449. 5. AFHQ, February 1945, WO 193/368. 6. ‘Military Government exists to keep the civil population from under the feet of the Army.’ Eisenhower, quoted in B.N. Reckitt, Diary of Military Government in Germany 1945 (Ilfracombe, 1989), frontispiece. The War Office Manual of Military Law defined this as ‘the principle that a belliger- ent is justified in applying compulsion and force … [for] the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least pos- sible expenditure of men, resources and money.’ Quoted in C.V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning (London, 1966), p. 119. 7.SACMED’s designation covered all three services and a wide range of responsibilities. 8. AFHQ to SHAEF, 26 August 1944, WO 204/3031. 9. Ibid. 10.FO 371/40734. 11.Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 132. 12. It had two branches. The object of the Operations Committee was to enable the Prime Minister, with his essential advisers, to consider the current mili- tary situation and future operations. The Defence Committee (Supply) laid down the main features of the supply programme for the armed forces, and reviewed their progress. 13. J. Erhman, Grand Strategy 6 (London, 1956), p. 326. According to Ismay, Churchill ‘never overrode the Chiefs of Staff. He may sometimes have over- borne them, by the weight of his personality or the pertinacity of his argu- ments – indeed I think he certainly did – but he always tried (by every means) to carry them along with him.’ Ismay to Norman Brooke, 27 January 1959, Ismay papers, 1/14/8. 14.Jebb, Memoirs, p. 57. Chapter 2 1. Campbell, 15 September 1943, FO 371/34466. The communiqué containing the declaration was released on 11 November 1943. 2. The Nazis had their forerunners in the German Workers Party founded in the Sudetenland in 1904. In 1918, the movement had split, the Vienna group choosing the name later adopted by the Nazis – the German National 200 Notes 201 Socialist Workers Party. In 1920, the leader of this group, Walter Riehl, introduced the swastika as the party emblem. Hitler himself was born in Upper Austria, and Vienna was the scene of his early humiliation and failure. ‘Vienna’, he admitted, ‘taught me the most profound lessons of my life.’ A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (London, 1939), p. 33. 3. M. Balfour and J. Mair, Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946: Four Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945–46 (London, 1956), p. 274. 4. HC Deb. 5th ser, 423, 1861. 5. K. Schuschnigg, The Brutal Takeover (London, 1969), p. 29. However, in the German Peace Treaty of 28 June 1919, Anschluss was forbidden, and Germany undertook to recognise Austrian independence as inviolable unless the League of Nations unanimously agreed otherwise. This ban was not included in the original draft of the Austrian peace treaty, the Treaty of Saint-Germain, of June and July 1919. But, in the final draft it appeared, on French insistence, as Article 88. K. Waldheim, The Austrian Example (London, 1973), p. 24. 6. HC Deb. 5th ser, 313, 1228. 7. This produced a disastrous effect in all Western capitals. Eden was requested by Baron von Franckenstein (Austrian envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in London) to reply to a parliamentary question on the matter along the lines that the meeting had enabled Austria to settle her problems with Germany ‘without the slightest disturbance’. In 1938 Franckenstein became a naturalised British subject and was knighted. 8. M. Gilbert and R. Gott, The Appeasers (London, 1963), p. 75; Sir N. Henderson, Failure of a Mission (London, 1940), p. 102. 9.J. Harvey, The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937–40 (London, 1970), p. 91. 10. Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, pp. 90, 91. 11. He was not given office until 1940. He made his name as British Minister Resident in North Africa, despite being removed from mainstream policy- making in London. 12. HC Deb. 5th ser, 333, 45. 13. HL Deb. 5th ser, 108, 77. 14. Allen, 19 February 1943, FO 371/34464. Lord Cranbourne replied for the Government along the above lines. He said that whereas Austrians had been in the USA for many years, in Britain they were recent arrivals. 15. Harrison, 4 July 1944, FO 371/38839. 16.E. Barker, Austria, 1918–1972 (London, 1973), p. 135. 17. Harrison to Eden, 28 November 1943, FO 371/34467. 18. They are listed in Eden to HMG representatives abroad, FO 371/34467. 19.Roberts, 1 May 1943, FO 371/34464. 20. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader (London, 1952), p. 51. 21. In 1934, when police raids on Social Democrat offices led to bloodshed and the barricades. 22.K. Stadler, ‘Austrian Resistance to German Rule and the Development of Austrian National Aspiration 1938–45’ unpublished thesis (Nottingham, 1969), p. 133. 23. Stadler, Austrian Resistance, p. 133. 202 Notes 24. He was hanged in 1946 for his record as the wartime Reichskommissar of the Netherlands. 25. Resistance groups ranged from youthful idealists (such as the so-called student group, the Grey Free Troops) in the early years of the war, to regular partisan bands operating in areas such as the Leitha Hills of the Burgenland, and to the group of Austrian officers serving on Wehrmacht staffs in Vienna who plotted to liberate the capital for the advancing Allies to occupy in 1945. The O5 organisation, which was constructed in the last six months of the war, was the best known resistance group. O5 was a code abbreviation for Oesterreich, O being the first letter of the symbol, and E the fifth letter of the alphabet. To begin with, O5 was little more than symbol, but by the end this fact probably outweighed any physical results it might achieve. Like the V-sign it was a dramatic success. Many commentators put the total number of Austrians killed or impris- oned for opposition to Hitler at between 80,000 and 100,000. But it is impossible to estimate precise figures because, apart from suffering from lack of publicity in the West, Austrian resistance activities lacked a central authority. There was no dramatic martyrdom to act as a rallying point, and Austria’s most likely candidates for leadership had either fled abroad, been arrested or sent to concentration camps. Hitler always hated and distrusted Vienna, the scene of his earlier humiliation and failure. And Vienna was the only city in the Reich where the Generals’ coup of 20 July 1944 succeeded (even though its failure in Berlin prevented any advantage being taken of its success). But the first cases of sabotage were not known in the West until 1942, and the first important strikes were not heard of until 1943. C. T. Grayson, Austria’s International Position, 1938–1953 (Geneva, 1953), p. 39. 26.A. Brissaud, The Biography of Admiral Canaris, Chief of German Military Intelligence in the Second World War (London, 1973), p. 86. 27. On 20 June 1944, O’Neil asked, ‘Is any serious sabotage being undertaken?’ FO 371/38839. 28. HC Deb. 5th ser, 408, 1665–6. 29. Harrison, 10 February 1945, FO 371/46609. Archduke Robert repeatedly contacted the Foreign Office with reports of resistance activity but was never regarded as a reliable witness. 30. Harrison, 16 June 1945, FO 371/38839. 31.Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary, 7, 17 August 1945, FO 371/46612. 32. Red-White-Red Book: Justice for Austria. Descriptions, Documents and Proofs to the Antecedents and History of the Occupation of Austria (from Official Sources) (Vienna, 1947), p. 147; G. Shepherd, The Austrian Odyssey (London, 1957). 33. The city on the Oder which was still fighting the Red Army when Berlin surrendered. 34.Eden, 11 March 1944, FO 371/38839. 35. Wilson to Harrison, 13 June 1944, FO 371/38839. 36. 16 February 1944, FO 371/38839. 37.A. Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The War of Words (London, 1970), pp. 111, 431. The British press contained few references to resistance activity in Austria. It was different in the USA where, in late 1944, Notes 203 the New York Times carried a number of articles dealing with anti-Nazi action. 38. 20 October 1944, FO 371/38839. 39. That Anschluss was tacitly recognised was made clear when Britain entered into agreements with Germany in 1938 and 1939; the inclusion of Austria in Germany was implicit because agreements covered Austria as well as Germany. The USA accepted the Anschluss de facto, but did not recognise it de jure. 40. HC Deb. 5th ser, 383, 123–4. 41. Red-White-Red Book, pp. 1, 207. 42.Grey, 11 January 1941, FO 371/26537. 43. Avon, the Earl of, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London, 1963), p. 289. 44. HL Deb. 5th ser, 125, 800–1. 45. Makins, 3 February 1942, FO 371/30910. 46.Makins (later Lord Sherfield) went with Macmillan when the latter’s office moved to Greece in late 1944, but was soon recalled to London, where he stayed for the rest of the war. In London he was the Foreign Office contact with Military Intelligence (Research), which worked under the auspices of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Macmillan wrote of his ‘rapier-like brain’. 47.Eden, 10 June 1942, PREM 4, 33/7. 48. Eden, 9 September 1942, FO 371/30943. Chapter 3 1.Scarlett, 5 January 1943, FO 371/34464.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Neville Chamberlain's Announcement of the Introduction of Conscription To
    FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF CONSCRIPTION IN BRITAIN, 1938-1939 ABSTRACT - This article examines the relationship interaction between the French campaign for the introduction of British conscription during 1938-39 and the ebbs and flows of British public opinion on the same issue. In particular, it will demonstrate how French pressure for conscription varied in intensity depending on their perceptions of British opinion on the subject. It was this interaction between diplomatic and domestic pressures that ultimately compelled the British government to introduce conscription in April 1939. Furthermore, the issue of conscription also sheds light on the wider issue of Franco-British relations, revealing how French foreign policy was neither dictated by an ‘English Governess’ nor pursued independently of Great Britain. When Neville Chamberlain announced the introduction of conscription to the House of Commons on 26 April 1939 he not only reneged on previous promises but deviated from the traditional British aversion to peacetime compulsory service. Chamberlain defended himself by arguing that current international tensions could not be described as ‘peace-time in any sense in which the term could fairly be used’.1 Nonetheless, introducing conscription – albeit in a limited form2 – was alien to British tradition. How, therefore, can the decision be explained? What motivated the government to take such a step? This article sheds new light on the British decision to implement conscription in April 1939, moving beyond existing analyses by showing that the decision was motivated not only by a fusion of domestic and international pressures but by the interaction of the two. More specifically, contends that French pressure for British conscription ebbed and flowed in direct correlation to the French government’s perceptions of the British public’s attitude towards compulsory military service.
    [Show full text]
  • OLD COMRADES ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER Dear Old
    OLD COMRADES ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER Dear Old Comrade The events planned for 2015 are summarised below: THURSDAY, 26 TH FEB - Officers’ Dinner - Drapers Hall, London FRIDAY, 6 TH MAR - Grand Military Race Day - Sandown Park FRIDAY, 6 TH MAR - Leicester & Derbyshire Yeomanry Cup - Leicester Race Course FRIDAY, 27 TH MAR - Pr-Derby Reunion Drinks - Aston Court Hotel, Midland Rd Derby SATURDAY, 28 TH MAR - Derby Reunion & Museum Day - Derby SATURDAY, 11 TH APRIL - Wessex Reunion - Sherborne SATURDAY, 25 TH APRIL - Derbyshire Yeomanry Dinner - Derby 17 TH , 18 TH , 19 TH APRIL - QRL Balaklava North West Branch - Blackpool Reunion Dinner THE ROYAL LANCERS SATURDAY, 2 ND MAY - Amalgamation Parade - Richmond, Yorkshire SUNDAY, 10 TH MAY - Combined Cavalry Parade - Hyde Park SUNDAY, 10 TH MAY - Officers’ Luncheon - London TUESDAY, 2 ND JUNE - Dress rehearsal Founders Day - Royal Hospital Chelsea 25 TH , 26 TH JULY - Tercentenary - Catterick SUNDAY, 6 TH SEPT - Memorial Service/Luncheon - Canterbury 11 TH , 12 TH , 13 TH SEPT - 9th Lancer Band Reunion - York TUESDAY, 3 RD NOV - OCA gathering at Regimental Memorial - National Arboretum THURSDAY, 5 TH NOV - Field of Remembrance Poppy Planting - Westminster Ceremony/Luncheon THURSDAY, 3 RD DEC - Officers’ Dinner - London FRIDAY, 4 TH DEC - OCA Christmas Luncheon - London 1 OLD COMRADES ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER Dear Old Comrade, This will be the last Newsletter in this current format for the 9 th /12 th Lancers OCA with a new Royal Lancers Newsletter to be distributed after the Tercentenary Parade. A proforma is included for return with your subscriptions to the Regimental Journal, the 200 Club and the OCA 150+ Club.
    [Show full text]
  • Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
    YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Sir Horace Wilson and Appeasement*
    The Historical Journal, 53, 4 (2010), pp. 983–1014 f Cambridge University Press 2010 doi:10.1017/S0018246X10000270 SIR HORACE WILSON AND APPEASEMENT* G. C. P E D E N University of Stirling ABSTRACT. Sir Horace Wilson was Neville Chamberlain’s confidential adviser while the latter was prime minister. The article addresses three questions. First, what was Wilson’s role in Whitehall in connection with rearmament and foreign policy? Second, did he diminish the influence of the Foreign Office? Third, what contribution does his defence of appeasement make to understanding of a subject that continues to divide historians? The article concludes that Wilson played an important role in enabling Chamberlain to pursue his foreign policy goals. However, when there was outright disagreement between Wilson and the Foreign Office, it was the Foreign Office view that prevailed. Finally, the evidence of Wilson’s words and actions, both in 1937–9 and later, broadly supports R. A. C. Parker’s post-revisionist interpretation of appeasement, particularly as regards Munich, but Wilson was a good deal firmer in 1939 about Britain’s will to fight, if necessary, than his critics then or later allowed. No history of British appeasement is complete without some reference to Sir Horace Wilson’s role as Neville Chamberlain’s confidential adviser, and in particular to Wilson’s meetings with Hitler as the prime minister’s emissary im- mediately prior to the Munich conference in September 1938. Yet there has been no serious study of Wilson himself in relation to appeasement since Martin Gilbert published a short article in History Today in 1982.1 To date, archival work on Wilson’s career has been confined to his years at the Ministry of Labour and the Board of Trade.2 This neglect would have surprised Wilson’s contemporaries.
    [Show full text]
  • H-Diplo Roundtable XXII-1 on Gabriel Gorodetsky, Ed. the Complete Maisky Diaries, Volumes I-III
    H-Diplo H-Diplo Roundtable XXII-1 on Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed. The Complete Maisky Diaries, Volumes I-III Discussion published by George Fujii on Monday, September 7, 2020 H-Diplo Roundtable XXII-1 Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed. The Complete Maisky Diaries, Volumes I-III. Translated by Tatiana Sorokina and Oliver Ready. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. ISBN: 9780300117820 (hardcover, $300.00). 7 September 2020 | https://hdiplo.org/to/RT22-1 Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii Contents Introduction by Warren Kimball, Rutgers University. 2 Review by Anne Deighton, University of Oxford. 7 Review by Norman Naimark, Stanford University. 10 Review by Vladimir Pechatnov, Moscow State Institute of International Relations. 13 Review by Alexis Peri, Boston University. 16 Review by Sergey Radchenko, Cardiff University. 21 Response by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Tel Aviv University and All Souls College, University of Oxford. 26 Introduction by Warren Kimball, Rutgers University As a friend once commented about a review of edited documents: “An incise, pithy review that highlights what everyone wishes to know about the collection, and can take away from the texts. Little nuggets about the drafts of history that never really blow in the conference window are the big story here.”[1] What is This Genre? In books like this, attaching ‘editor (ed.)’ after the name of the ‘author’ is misleading since the author is the one who wrote the diaries; in this case, Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky (Jan Lachowiecki), a Soviet- era diplomat who spent eleven years (1932-1943) in London as Joseph Stalin’s Ambassador to Great Britain. But gathering or compiling documents is not the same as what Gabriel Gorodetsky has done Citation: George Fujii.
    [Show full text]
  • A History of Global Governance
    2 A History of Global Governance It is the sense of Congress that it should be a fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the United States to support and strengthen the United Nations and to seek its development into a world federation open to all nations with definite and limited powers adequate to preserve peace and prevent aggression through the enactment, interpretation and enforcement of world law. House Concurrent Resolution 64, 1949, with 111 co-sponsors There are causes, but only a very few, for which it is worthwhile to fight; but whatever the cause, and however justifiable the war, war brings about such great evils that it is of immense importance to find ways short of war in which the things worth fighting for can be secured. I think it is worthwhile to fight to prevent England and America being conquered by the Nazis, but it would be far better if this end could be secured without war. For this, two things are necessary. First, the creation of an international government, possessing a monopoly of armed force, and guaranteeing freedom from aggression to every country; second, that wars (other than civil wars) are justified when, and only when, they are fought in defense of the international law established by the international authority. Wars will cease when, and only when, it becomes evident beyond reasonable doubt that in any war the aggressor will be defeated. 1 Bertrand Russell, “The Future of Pacifism” By the end of the 20th century, if not well before, humankind had come to accept the need for and the importance of various national institutions to secure political stability and economic prosperity.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Battle Weariness and the 2Nd New Zealand Division During the Italian Campaign, 1943-45
    ‘As a matter of fact I’ve just about had enough’;1 Battle weariness and the 2nd New Zealand Division during the Italian Campaign, 1943-45. A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University New Zealand. Ian Clive Appleton 2015 1 Unknown private, 24 Battalion, 2nd New Zealand Division. Censorship summaries, DA 508/2 - DA 508/3, (ANZ), Censorship Report No 6/45, 4 Feb to 10 Feb 45, part 2, p.1. Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. Abstract By the time that the 2nd New Zealand Division reached Italy in late 1943, many of the soldiers within it had been overseas since early 1941. Most had fought across North Africa during 1942/43 – some had even seen combat earlier, in Greece and Crete in 1941. The strain of combat was beginning to show, a fact recognised by the division’s commanding officer, Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg. Freyberg used the term ‘battle weary’ to describe both the division and the men within it on a number of occasions throughout 1944, suggesting at one stage the New Zealanders be withdrawn from operations completely. This study examines key factors that drove battle weariness within the division: issues around manpower, the operational difficulties faced by the division in Italy, the skill and tenacity of their German opponent, and the realities of modern combat.
    [Show full text]
  • HISTORY of the 87Th MOUNTAIN INFANTRY in ITALY
    HISTORY of the 87th MOUNTAIN INFANTRY in ITALY George F. Earle Captain, 87th Mountain Infantry 1945 HISTORY of the 87th MOUNTAIN INFANTRY in ITALY 3 JANUARY 1945 — 14 AUGUST 1945 Digitized and edited by Barbara Imbrie, 2004 CONTENTS PREFACE: THE 87TH REGIMENT FROM DECEMBER 1941 TO JANUARY 1945....................i - iii INTRODUCTION TO ITALY .....................................................................................................................1 (4 Jan — 16 Feb) BELVEDERE OFFENSIVE.........................................................................................................................10 (16 Feb — 28 Feb) MARCH OFFENSIVE AND CONSOLIDATION ..................................................................................24 (3 Mar — 31 Mar) SPRING OFFENSIVE TO PO VALLEY...................................................................................................43 (1 Apr — 20 Apr) Preparation: 1 Apr—13 Apr 43 First day: 14 April 48 Second day: 15 April 61 Third day: 16 April 75 Fourth day: 17 April 86 Fifth day: 18 April 96 Sixth day: 19 April 99 Seventh day: 20 April 113 PO VALLEY TO LAKE GARDA ............................................................................................................120 (21 Apr — 2 May) Eighth day: 21 April 120 Ninth day: 22 April 130 Tenth day: 23 April 132 Eleventh and Twelfth days: 24-25 April 149 Thirteenth day: 26 April 150 Fourteenth day: 27 April 152 Fifteenth day: 28 April 155 Sixteenth day: 29 April 157 End of the Campaign: 30 April-2 May 161 OCCUPATION DUTY AND
    [Show full text]
  • Churchill's Diplomatic Eavesdropping and Secret Signals Intelligence As
    CHURCHILL’S DIPLOMATIC EAVESDROPPING AND SECRET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1941-1944: THE CASE OF TURKEY Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. Department of History University College London by ROBIN DENNISTON M.A. (Oxon) M.Sc. (Edin) ProQuest Number: 10106668 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10106668 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 2 ABSTRACT Churchill's interest in secret signals intelligence (sigint) is now common knowledge, but his use of intercepted diplomatic telegrams (bjs) in World War Two has only become apparent with the release in 1994 of his regular supply of Ultra, the DIR/C Archive. Churchill proves to have been a voracious reader of diplomatic intercepts from 1941-44, and used them as part of his communication with the Foreign Office. This thesis establishes the value of these intercepts (particularly those Turkey- sourced) in supplying Churchill and the Foreign Office with authentic information on neutrals' response to the war in Europe, and analyses the way Churchill used them.
    [Show full text]
  • The London Gazette of TUESDAY, 6Th JUNE, 1950
    jRtttnb, 38937 2879 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF TUESDAY, 6th JUNE, 1950 Registered as a newspaper MONDAY, 12 JUNE, 1950 The War Office, June, 1950. THE ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY FROM SRD SEPTEMBER, 1943, TO DECEMBER; 1944. PREFACE BY THE WAR OFFICE. PART I. This Despatch was written by Field-Marshal PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND THE Lord Alexander in his capacity as former ASSAULT. Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy. It therefore concentrates primarily upon Strategic Basis of the Campaign. the development of the land campaign and the The invasion of Italy followed closely in time conduct of the land battles. The wider aspects on the conquest of Sicily and may be therefore of the Italian Campaign are dealt with in treated, both historically and strategically, as reports by the Supreme Allied Commander a sequel to it; but when regarded from the (Field-Marshal Lord Wilson) which have point of view of the Grand Strategy of the already been published. It was during this- war there is a great cleavage between the two period that the very close integration of the operations. The conquest of Sicily marks the Naval, Military and Air Forces of the Allied closing stage of that period of strategy which Nations, which had been built up during the began with the invasion of North Africa in North African Campaigns, was firmly con- November, 1942, or which might, on a longer solidated, so that the Italian Campaign was view, be considered as beginning when the first British armoured cars crossed the frontier wire essentially a combined operation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Anschluss Movement and British Policy
    THE ANSCHLUSS MOVEMENT AND BRITISH POLICY: MAY 1937 - MARCH 1938 by Elizabeth A. Tarte, A.B. A 'l11esis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Part ial Fulfillment of the Re­ quirements f or the Degree of Master of Arts Milwaukee, Wisconsin May, 1967 i1 PREFACE For many centuri.es Austria. bad been closely eom'lect E!d \'lieh the German states. 111 language and eulture. Austri.a and Germany had always looked to each other. AS late as the t~tentieth century. Austria .st111 clung to her traditional leadership in Germany . In the perlod following the First World War, Austria continued to lo(!)k to Germany for leadership. Aus tria, beset by numerous economic and social problems. made many pleas for uni on with her German neighbor. From 1919 to 1933 all ;novas on the part of Austria and Germany for union, -v.71\ether political oreeon01;n1c. were th"larted by the signatories of the pea.ce treaties. Wl ,th the entrance of Adolf Hitler onto the European political stage, the movement fQr the Anschluss .. - the union of Germany and Austria .- t ook on a different light. Austrians no longer sought \.Ulion with a Germany v.ilich was dominated by Hitler. The net"l National $Gclalist Gertna,n Reich aimed at: the early acq'U1Si ,tiQn of Austria. The latter "(vas i mportant to the lteich fGr its agricultural and Batural reSources and would i mprove its geopolitical and military position in Europe. In 1934 the National Soci aU.sts assaSSinated Dr .. U.:. £tlto1bot''t Pollfuas, the Aust~i ..\n Cbaneellot'l in ,an 8.'ttcmp't to tillkltl c:ronet:Ql or his: eountry.
    [Show full text]
  • Summit Diplomacy: Some Lessons from History for 21St Century Leaders Transcript
    Summit Diplomacy: Some Lessons from History for 21st Century Leaders Transcript Date: Tuesday, 4 June 2013 - 6:00PM Location: Barnard's Inn Hall 4 June 2013 Summit Diplomacy: Some Lessons From History For 21st Century Leaders David Reynolds This is the first of a series of three lectures about history and policy, about the ways in which historians might be able to contribute to current policy debates. Tonight, I am talking about diplomacy; next week, there will be something about environmental policy; and then, thirdly, about development policy, and that is an example of what history and policy is trying to do: link up academic research with issues of current concern in the political arena. Some lessons from history, “lessons” in quotation marks because, as you will see, I am wary about the use of the term “lessons” or I think at least we have to be clear what history can teach and what it cannot teach… Here we are, statesmen on the world stage. There is Winston Churchill in Washington in 1941, and there is David Cameron and Barack Obama at the G20 Summit in Toronto, a year or so ago I think – example, the G20, of how summitry has become institutionalised in the last 60 years, and that is something I will get onto in a moment. The idea of a summit meeting is now very much very familiar to us. There is Time magazine from the 1980s, from 1985, “Let’s Talk”, Reagan and Gorbachev. This summitry is about top level meetings for high stakes. What I want to suggest to you is that, despite all that media attention about something special to do with summitry, it is rooted in daily life.
    [Show full text]