Notes Chapter 1 1.Joint Chiefs of Staff were inter-service, but of one nationality. 2. Harrison, 10 March 1943, FO 371/38839. 3. SHAEF to G5, AFHQ, 3 September 1944, WO 204/3031. 4. COS, 17 August 1944, CAB 66, WP (44) 449. 5. AFHQ, February 1945, WO 193/368. 6. ‘Military Government exists to keep the civil population from under the feet of the Army.’ Eisenhower, quoted in B.N. Reckitt, Diary of Military Government in Germany 1945 (Ilfracombe, 1989), frontispiece. The War Office Manual of Military Law defined this as ‘the principle that a belliger- ent is justified in applying compulsion and force … [for] the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least pos- sible expenditure of men, resources and money.’ Quoted in C.V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning (London, 1966), p. 119. 7.SACMED’s designation covered all three services and a wide range of responsibilities. 8. AFHQ to SHAEF, 26 August 1944, WO 204/3031. 9. Ibid. 10.FO 371/40734. 11.Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 132. 12. It had two branches. The object of the Operations Committee was to enable the Prime Minister, with his essential advisers, to consider the current mili- tary situation and future operations. The Defence Committee (Supply) laid down the main features of the supply programme for the armed forces, and reviewed their progress. 13. J. Erhman, Grand Strategy 6 (London, 1956), p. 326. According to Ismay, Churchill ‘never overrode the Chiefs of Staff. He may sometimes have over- borne them, by the weight of his personality or the pertinacity of his argu- ments – indeed I think he certainly did – but he always tried (by every means) to carry them along with him.’ Ismay to Norman Brooke, 27 January 1959, Ismay papers, 1/14/8. 14.Jebb, Memoirs, p. 57. Chapter 2 1. Campbell, 15 September 1943, FO 371/34466. The communiqué containing the declaration was released on 11 November 1943. 2. The Nazis had their forerunners in the German Workers Party founded in the Sudetenland in 1904. In 1918, the movement had split, the Vienna group choosing the name later adopted by the Nazis – the German National 200 Notes 201 Socialist Workers Party. In 1920, the leader of this group, Walter Riehl, introduced the swastika as the party emblem. Hitler himself was born in Upper Austria, and Vienna was the scene of his early humiliation and failure. ‘Vienna’, he admitted, ‘taught me the most profound lessons of my life.’ A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (London, 1939), p. 33. 3. M. Balfour and J. Mair, Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946: Four Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945–46 (London, 1956), p. 274. 4. HC Deb. 5th ser, 423, 1861. 5. K. Schuschnigg, The Brutal Takeover (London, 1969), p. 29. However, in the German Peace Treaty of 28 June 1919, Anschluss was forbidden, and Germany undertook to recognise Austrian independence as inviolable unless the League of Nations unanimously agreed otherwise. This ban was not included in the original draft of the Austrian peace treaty, the Treaty of Saint-Germain, of June and July 1919. But, in the final draft it appeared, on French insistence, as Article 88. K. Waldheim, The Austrian Example (London, 1973), p. 24. 6. HC Deb. 5th ser, 313, 1228. 7. This produced a disastrous effect in all Western capitals. Eden was requested by Baron von Franckenstein (Austrian envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in London) to reply to a parliamentary question on the matter along the lines that the meeting had enabled Austria to settle her problems with Germany ‘without the slightest disturbance’. In 1938 Franckenstein became a naturalised British subject and was knighted. 8. M. Gilbert and R. Gott, The Appeasers (London, 1963), p. 75; Sir N. Henderson, Failure of a Mission (London, 1940), p. 102. 9.J. Harvey, The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937–40 (London, 1970), p. 91. 10. Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, pp. 90, 91. 11. He was not given office until 1940. He made his name as British Minister Resident in North Africa, despite being removed from mainstream policy- making in London. 12. HC Deb. 5th ser, 333, 45. 13. HL Deb. 5th ser, 108, 77. 14. Allen, 19 February 1943, FO 371/34464. Lord Cranbourne replied for the Government along the above lines. He said that whereas Austrians had been in the USA for many years, in Britain they were recent arrivals. 15. Harrison, 4 July 1944, FO 371/38839. 16.E. Barker, Austria, 1918–1972 (London, 1973), p. 135. 17. Harrison to Eden, 28 November 1943, FO 371/34467. 18. They are listed in Eden to HMG representatives abroad, FO 371/34467. 19.Roberts, 1 May 1943, FO 371/34464. 20. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader (London, 1952), p. 51. 21. In 1934, when police raids on Social Democrat offices led to bloodshed and the barricades. 22.K. Stadler, ‘Austrian Resistance to German Rule and the Development of Austrian National Aspiration 1938–45’ unpublished thesis (Nottingham, 1969), p. 133. 23. Stadler, Austrian Resistance, p. 133. 202 Notes 24. He was hanged in 1946 for his record as the wartime Reichskommissar of the Netherlands. 25. Resistance groups ranged from youthful idealists (such as the so-called student group, the Grey Free Troops) in the early years of the war, to regular partisan bands operating in areas such as the Leitha Hills of the Burgenland, and to the group of Austrian officers serving on Wehrmacht staffs in Vienna who plotted to liberate the capital for the advancing Allies to occupy in 1945. The O5 organisation, which was constructed in the last six months of the war, was the best known resistance group. O5 was a code abbreviation for Oesterreich, O being the first letter of the symbol, and E the fifth letter of the alphabet. To begin with, O5 was little more than symbol, but by the end this fact probably outweighed any physical results it might achieve. Like the V-sign it was a dramatic success. Many commentators put the total number of Austrians killed or impris- oned for opposition to Hitler at between 80,000 and 100,000. But it is impossible to estimate precise figures because, apart from suffering from lack of publicity in the West, Austrian resistance activities lacked a central authority. There was no dramatic martyrdom to act as a rallying point, and Austria’s most likely candidates for leadership had either fled abroad, been arrested or sent to concentration camps. Hitler always hated and distrusted Vienna, the scene of his earlier humiliation and failure. And Vienna was the only city in the Reich where the Generals’ coup of 20 July 1944 succeeded (even though its failure in Berlin prevented any advantage being taken of its success). But the first cases of sabotage were not known in the West until 1942, and the first important strikes were not heard of until 1943. C. T. Grayson, Austria’s International Position, 1938–1953 (Geneva, 1953), p. 39. 26.A. Brissaud, The Biography of Admiral Canaris, Chief of German Military Intelligence in the Second World War (London, 1973), p. 86. 27. On 20 June 1944, O’Neil asked, ‘Is any serious sabotage being undertaken?’ FO 371/38839. 28. HC Deb. 5th ser, 408, 1665–6. 29. Harrison, 10 February 1945, FO 371/46609. Archduke Robert repeatedly contacted the Foreign Office with reports of resistance activity but was never regarded as a reliable witness. 30. Harrison, 16 June 1945, FO 371/38839. 31.Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary, 7, 17 August 1945, FO 371/46612. 32. Red-White-Red Book: Justice for Austria. Descriptions, Documents and Proofs to the Antecedents and History of the Occupation of Austria (from Official Sources) (Vienna, 1947), p. 147; G. Shepherd, The Austrian Odyssey (London, 1957). 33. The city on the Oder which was still fighting the Red Army when Berlin surrendered. 34.Eden, 11 March 1944, FO 371/38839. 35. Wilson to Harrison, 13 June 1944, FO 371/38839. 36. 16 February 1944, FO 371/38839. 37.A. Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The War of Words (London, 1970), pp. 111, 431. The British press contained few references to resistance activity in Austria. It was different in the USA where, in late 1944, Notes 203 the New York Times carried a number of articles dealing with anti-Nazi action. 38. 20 October 1944, FO 371/38839. 39. That Anschluss was tacitly recognised was made clear when Britain entered into agreements with Germany in 1938 and 1939; the inclusion of Austria in Germany was implicit because agreements covered Austria as well as Germany. The USA accepted the Anschluss de facto, but did not recognise it de jure. 40. HC Deb. 5th ser, 383, 123–4. 41. Red-White-Red Book, pp. 1, 207. 42.Grey, 11 January 1941, FO 371/26537. 43. Avon, the Earl of, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London, 1963), p. 289. 44. HL Deb. 5th ser, 125, 800–1. 45. Makins, 3 February 1942, FO 371/30910. 46.Makins (later Lord Sherfield) went with Macmillan when the latter’s office moved to Greece in late 1944, but was soon recalled to London, where he stayed for the rest of the war. In London he was the Foreign Office contact with Military Intelligence (Research), which worked under the auspices of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Macmillan wrote of his ‘rapier-like brain’. 47.Eden, 10 June 1942, PREM 4, 33/7. 48. Eden, 9 September 1942, FO 371/30943. Chapter 3 1.Scarlett, 5 January 1943, FO 371/34464.