Versailles: the Offensive Begins

CHAPTER 6 Versailles: The Offensive Begins

At first glance, the opportunity seemed solid. The logic looked overwhelming. Belgium had been created through 1830s treaties that had failed to pro- tect it, hence that treaty system ought to be revised. With the Netherlands diplomatically isolated for the moment, the timing looked perfect. Small won- der that most of the Belgian government supported annexation—but with varying degrees of enthusiasm, something that would prove troubling later.1 Developing the arguments absorbed a great deal of energy, but more important would be whether they could be sold to the allies. This depended both on the ability of the sellers and the receptivity of the buyers. No matter how overwhelming the logic looked, making the argument was tricky. As a neutral the Netherlands was not part of or subject to the Versailles negotiations. But if Belgium attempted to negotiate only with the Dutch, its territorial hopes were foredoomed. Therefore, the claims had to be made within the framework of the 1839 treaty, of which the warring powers had been guarantors. In that way, the Dutch could be forced to the table at Versailles. The next step would be to make those negotiations focus on territorial adjust- ments. In order for that to happen, the Belgians would have to secure advance agreement from the allies that borders would be changed. This was because without guaranteed allied pressure on the Netherlands there was no chance that border changes would happen. But the Belgians needed this advance agreement without actually asking for it publicly. If the Belgian government publicly demanded territories from a neutral, it would lose its unsullied image of war victim and look more like an imperialist power attempting a Vienna- style annexation. (The Congress of Vienna had divided post-Napoleonic Europe mostly according to the desires of the great powers.) It would also alert the Netherlands, although the Dutch had had suspicions about such a claim since 1914. The differing views of the allies had to be balanced. The situation called for a solid argument, backed up with clever diplomacy. The argument had three foundations; the unity of the 1839 treaty system, the resulting military insecurity of Belgium, and the need to compensate Holland with German territory. The Treaty of London of 1839 was the legal foundation of Belgian independence but it had long left Belgians aggrieved because of what might have been. The Belgian revolt in 1830 was followed by international

1 Frey, Der Erste Weltkrieg, 331–32; Miller, Belgian Foreign Policy, 72.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��7 | doi ��.��63/9789004331563_007 VERSAILLES: THE OFFENSIVE BEGINS 125 recognition by treaty in 1831. The Dutch successfully invaded, yielding only when French forces intervened. While the latter action guaranteed Belgium’s survival, the invasion had protected Dutch interests in Limburg, Luxembourg, and the strip of Flanders on the south bank of the Schelde. The latter was espe- cially a sore point because so long as the Dutch controlled both sides of the Schelde, Belgium’s international trade lay at the mercy of the Dutch. The latter had cut it off mercilessly in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Treaty of London did rectify that particular problem, keeping Antwerp open2—but as a com- mercial port only.3 The Treaty of London made Belgium a mandatory neutral with all great powers acting as guarantors. That turned out to be one of the most important treaty provisions ever written. The German violation of the guarantee justified Britain’s entry into the war and gave the Entente the moral high ground, which played no small role in the eventual American entry. But it had not saved Belgium from invasion. Belgian leaders were nearly unanimous that neutrality had to go, and in this they received unqualified allied support. That gave the Belgians the “hook” to attack the territorial issue. Neutrality being a product of the 1839 treaty, its abolition provided an argument for revisiting the entire treaty. In other words, the treaty should be treated as a seamless whole, not just as a document from which one item (neutrality) could be excised. The territorial arrangements, it was argued, were directly related to neutrality. Whatever weaknesses were created by the borders, neutrality was supposed to compensate for them, Hence, if neutrality were abolished, the borders should also be revisited. Belgium, the idea was, would regain in 1919 what it had lost in 1839.4 That was certainly the view of Belgium’s most important foreign supporter. André Tardieu was a close Clemenceau confidante who strongly supported the Belgian view that negotiating the revision of the 1839 treaty should include signatories Britain and France. These were the guarantors who had honored their duties and assisted Belgium. But this line of thought alone would not carry the day. The foreign ministry secretary-general pointed out that of the

2 When the two countries were combined in 1814 the previous disabilities imposed on Antwerp lapsed. 3 Memorandum by Prof. Charles Terlinden, January 1919, DB30/I, 1916–Feb. 1919, Dossier Délegation Belge a Versailles; Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatieke documenten betreffende de herziening der verdragen van 1839 (Brussels: M Weissenbruch, 1929), 6. 4 Hymans, Mémoires, 291; Thomas. The Guarantee of Belgian Independence, 546; Barnouw, Holland under Queen Wilhelmina, 215; van Vollenhoven to van Karnebeek, 14 December 1918, Smit, Bescheiden . . . 1917–1919, 799–800, ## 818–819; Orts memorandum, DB30/I, 1916– Feb. 1919, Dossier Délegation Belge a Versailles.