A Counterfactual Analysis of the Regime of Permanent Neutrality, 1839–1914

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chapter 2 A Counterfactual Analysis of the Regime of Permanent Neutrality, 1839–1914

Let us first look briefly at permanently neutral Belgium. Virtually all studies that I have read agree that Belgian public and official opinion came to accept obligatory neutrality as Belgium’s normal international condition by 1914. Within a decade of the signing of the treaties of 1839, Belgian diplomats and international lawyers, moreover, came to understand the great-power guarantee as one that was both “joint and several”—i.e., requiring the intervention of guarantors individually and not just collectively in the event Belgian neutrality were violated.1 Indeed, from the very beginning, Belgium’s kings, following the example of Leopold I of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (b. 1790, r. 1831–1865), 2 who, in

1 The British did not finally agree on the legally binding nature of the 1839 guarantee until the crisis of July-August 1914. For a thorough discussion, see Thomas (1984), pp. 44–56, 198–209, 241–248, 275–323, 368–383, 507–529. According to Sir Harold Nicolson, 3rd ed. (1963), Chap- ter 10: “Diplomatic Language,” pp. 122–136, p. 132: “Guarantee, Treaties of. Certain treaties con- tain clauses under which the signatories guarantee their execution and maintenance. Thus under the Treaty of London of 1839 {Great Britain} guaranteed the integrity of Belgium and it was in execution of this pledge that {London} made war in 1914. A great difference exists between a ‘collective guarantee’ and a ‘joint and several guarantee.’ In the former case (as in the case of {Britain’s} guarantee under the 1867 Treaty of Luxemburg integrity) a signatory is only obliged to take action if all the other signatories do the same. Conversely, a ‘joint and several’ guarantee (as, it was contended, had been given to Belgium in 1839) obliges every signatory to take action even if the other signatories evade or violate their obligations.” See also Henri Haag (2009); and William E. Lingelbach (1933). 2 As King of the Belgians, Leopold I was the uncle of Queen Victoria (1837–1901) by virtue of the fact that her mother, Victoire of Saxe-Coburg (1786–1861), was his sister. See Theo Aron- son (1968). The most recent biography of Belgium’s first king is Gita Deneckere (2011). See also Olivier Defrance (2004). In his counterfactual look at the events of 1830–31 (2014), Tom Verschaffel speculates as to what would have happened had King Willem I of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1772–1843, r. 1815–40) been assassinated after attending an opera in Brussels on 25 August 1830. According to Verschaffel’s rewrite, the dead king’s eldest son Willem (1792–1849) is then elected by the States General to succeed him, a choice that has the approval of the Catholic and Liberal reformers in Brussels, who hope that the new monarch, a Free Mason, would protect freedom of the press, lower taxes, agree to the concept of ministerial responsibili- ty, and increase the number of Belgians in the administration. Conservatives in the North, however, seeing King Willem ii as too liberal, throw their support to the new king’s younger brother, Frederick (1797–1881), who, after a short civil war that leads to the separation of the two countries, is elected King Frederick I of the Netherlands on 28 August 1831. The great

Brussels on 21 July 1831, took the oath to uphold the constitution and protect the territorial integrity of the county, considered Belgian independence as in- separable from neutrality and therefore they pressed continually for military reforms, such as eliminating the system of purchased replacements, and im- proved fortifications to defend both neutrality and independence.3 It was an uphill battle since the forces of antimilitarism in the country were strong, es- pecially on the Catholic right. But, in the end, as the war clouds in Europe gath- ered and efforts to influence opinion by pro-militarisation lobbying groups gained momentum, as Nel de Mûelenaere so effectively demonstrates, the Belgian parliament voted in favour of general conscription by a comfortable majority in late May 1913. The military law of 1913 raised the annual contin- gent to 33,000 and would have provided Belgium with an overall armed force of 340,000 men by 1920 had war not broken out in August 1914.4 It may have been too little too late, but the Belgian decision to resist the German ultima- tum demonstrated that the country’s independence and neutrality would be

powers recognise the result, which sees Antwerp remain part of the northern kingdom, while Limburg with Maastricht and the entire Grand Duchy of Luxemburg become part of Belgium. Though the brothers reconcile their differences by 1843, the Netherlands goes on to be governed in an authoritarian manner, while Belgium becomes a stable constitutional monarchy with a strong parliament. Unfortunately, the author does not deal with the con- sequences of Dutch control of the port of Antwerp for the industrialising and trade-based Belgian economy. 3 See Thomas (1984), pp. 389–423. See also Lieutenant-Général Albert E. Crahay (1987), pp. 25– 115; Nadine Lubelski-Bernard (1981); and Lode Wils (1981). The extent to which Belgian mon- archs, military officials, and governments were conscious of the necessity for robust defences and aware of the geostrategic role that canals, rivers, and railways played in military planning has been analysed in the enormously informative doctoral dissertation by Christophe Bêchet (5 vols., 2012), a work that also examines French and Prussian (German) war-planning and the problem of crossing Belgium, if necessary, before the First World War. 4 On Belgian antimilitarism, see F. Lehouck (1958). Recent research by Nel de Mûelenaere shows (2012) that the militarisation lobby of ex-soldiers and mainly Liberal publicists was not a negligible force in Belgian society after 1870, though it was relatively impotent until the campaign between 1908 and 1913, which culminated in the passage of the law to introduce universal conscription. See also idem (2016); as well as Bram Dierckx and Josephine Hoe- gaerts (2016); Josephine Hoegaerts (2014); and Nel de Mûelenaere and Josephine Hoegaerts (2016). Michael Auwers (2016b) examines the growing tendency towards accepting imperial expansion and general conscription within the Belgian diplomatic corps in the two decades before the outbreak of war in 1914. In their recent analysis (2016, Chapter 6: “Small European Buffer States in Two World Wars,” pp. 91–104), Neal G. Jesse and John R. Dreyer, citing David Stevenson (2007), mention (p. 93) the military law of 1902 and quote him (Stevenson, p. 478) as calling it the “high water of Belgian anti-militarism.” Unmentioned are the facts that the law of 1909 imposed the principle of one son per family and eliminated the system of pur- chasing replacements and that the law of 1913 introduced general conscription.