Number 34 September/October 2005

October 4, 2005 I NSIDE T HIS I SSUE “UNITED MARINER” SPEAKS FOR Dear Congressman: East Coast Mariners – ANGRY EAST COAST MARINERS As the Towing Safety Advisory 1 United & Angry Committee (TSAC) prepares to submit Tugboat Mate Imprisoned In the past, “United Mariner” was its recommendations on section 415 of 4 For Oil Spill most prominent in its attempt to improve the Coast Guard and Maritime Breakaway Barge Destroys conditions at the Coast Guard’s Regional Transportation Act of 2004 regarding the 4 Residential Area Exam Center in New York. Countless “Inspection of Towing Vessels” to the mariners faced delays caused by United States Coast Guard, the members Thumbs up for USCG of our organization want to clarify our 6 Katrina Response incredible bureaucratic incompetence that delayed their opportunities for continuing objections about the Elk River Collision Drowns advancement. In a number of cases, operation of this federal advisory 7 Four Mariners these delays, lost paperwork, and lack of committee. 11 Liftboat Cuts Gas Pipeline accountability cost lower-level mariners To ensure an unbiased committee, jobs and pay when the Coast Guard did Congress directed the Secretary in 1980 13 Potable Water not process their credentials in a timely to select a diverse membership. We manner. believe that the spirit of that directive GCMA-The Voice for was not followed because the Secretary 14 Mariners Reflecting the opinions of mariners on the East Coast, Captain Joe Dady allowed the committee to be loaded with USCG Responds to Our joined Gulf Coast Mariners representatives of member companies of 16 Questions on TSAC Association’s Board of Directors last the Coast Guard’s partner, the American Liftboat Sinks in Gulf summer. Joe followed the progress of Waterways Operators (AWO), an 19 the TSAC Towing Vessel Licensing industry-lobbying group located within USCG Seeks Licensing working group’s progress over the past the “beltway.” AWO claims to represent 20 Changes few months, contributed to the a vast majority of the tug and barge The Apprentice preparation of the “123 suggestions” to industry and is funded by towing vessel 23 Mate/Steersman Situation TSAC contained in GCMA Report #R- and barge owners. AWO’s dominant 419. position on the TSAC committee paints Admiralty Lawyer a rosy picture of the industry’s safety 28 Comments on HR 899 Captain Dady prepared the following comments for delivery at the next record while actual Coast Guard data 30 AWO Hijacks TSAC Agenda Towing Safety Advisory Committee in documents a record that is nothing less Washington, DC on October 11-12, than deplorable. We will provide a 34 Mariner Credentials 2005. Joe plans to share these report showing just how deplorable the comments with a number of members of safety record of one towing company 35 “VJ” Rejoins Board Congress as well. really is. We see a crass pro-industry bias UNITED MARINER within this advisory committee. TSAC 3616 HARTLAND DRIVE is manipulated by the AWO and clearly, NEW PORT RICHEY FL, 34655 predictably, and consistently discriminates [email protected] against the interests of all working www.geocities.com/unitedmariner mariners. We do not believe that an Phone: 727-534-4081 advisory committee that does not include a well-rounded group from all parties

Newsletter 1 and ramrods its recommendations to federal regulators Although the Responsible Carrier Program (RCP) reflects the intent of Congress. While the Coast Guard can already implemented by AWO can promote and improve accept or reject advisory committee recommendations, the safety aboard a towing vessel if it is followed, it lacks existence of a signed and formal “partnership” between the the teeth that only an inspection program enforced by the Coast Guard and AWO skews the balance. This works Coast Guard can offer. Based on reports from mariner’s against “Labor” (and its approximately 30,000 mariners) presently involved in the RCP, the system fails whenever that plays an important role in the industry. The workers time factors and pressure from the company front office aboard the nation’s 5,200 towing vessels are on the first get in the way of making money. Not only our mariners, line of defense in protecting the environment, public but also the general public, need protection that can only health, and public safety – yet they have been come from adequate enforcement. Based on those systematically are effectively denied a voice. reports, our mariners request in the strongest terms that The Coast Guard’s refusal to provide travel and per- Congress require physical inspection of every towing diem to support TSAC over the years also discouraged vessel by Coast Guard personnel backed by civil licensed mariners within the industry who could not afford penalties that are stiff enough to force compliance – not the cost of participation from attending and actively so small that they can be shrugged off “as business as engaging the advisory process. Our organization has, at its usual.” This suggestion clearly would serve safety but own expense, attempted to work with the committee in a does not serve the AWO’s agenda. positive manner with our concerns on towing vessel Years of service by lower-level mariner’s are safety, manning, and work hours. As working mariners, documented with death, injury, and hardship. We we are not funded by our employers in the towing witness these incidents first hand while TSAC and AWO industry. Our overall experience leaves a bad taste in our read about them on white sheets of paper. The law mouth about the true workings of the system. requiring the inspection of towing vessels (§415) is our Although the committee acknowledges reports by mariners’ last hope to gain a safe working environment. working mariners and logs their attendance at the Many additional mariners will leave the industry if meetings, the Committee has a well documented history of AWO and its member companies sabotage the inspection destroying, delaying, or dismantling any and all proposals process. We believe that if USCG structures the new made by working mariners. Mariner concerns that could towing vessel inspection regulations based on cost money, or that do not serve the towing industry as recommendation of the current TSAC working group determined by the AWO received no consideration. This report the results will be devastating to our mariners. is true even when there are obvious contradictions and the We are particularly concerned that TSAC’s committee’s working group recommendations and basic recommendations, if implemented by the Coast Guard, International Maritime Organization requirements for ten will burden working mariners with an extensive safety hours rest each 24 hours, six of which must be management system that is an even greater burden than uninterrupted sleep. A footnote to the TSAC report states: the Responsible Carrier Program. Mariners will not be “The working group considered but did not adopt, a able to comply with it because their watchstanding recommendation that all crewmembers receive a minimum mariners are already overworked and their boats lack of six hours of uninterrupted rest in every 24-hour period.” sufficient manning to perform all these tasks of an The AWO advocates a 15-hour workday for unlicensed administrative nature. mariners. We put our foot down on such abuse and We believe that the towing industry’s deplorable urgently ask for help from Congress to address this matter. safety record stems from a lack of qualified and trained Our mariners, working with the Gulf Coast Mariners mariners who are overworked as they serve on Association (GCMA), documented our objections to the undermanned and often sub-standard equipment. We Committee on their recommendation to the Coast Guard feel the self-serving TSAC report sidesteps the obvious that virtually substitutes a “Safety Management System” and proven solution of Coast Guard inspection in favor for a thorough physical inspection of towing vessels of creating a more easily managed and profitable envisioned by Congress in §415 last year. Earlier this year environment for the large corporate boat owners. Their the Coast Guard docket posted a clear and informative report will burden up to one thousand unrepresented letter from Congressman James Oberstar explaining small owner-operators with regulations they do not Congress’ intent to require a physical inspection of towing understand and cannot afford to comply with. These vessels. Although §415 authorizes the Secretary to small owner-operators are not AWO members, do not implement a safety management system (SMS), the TSAC participate in TSAC, and may be forced out of business licensing working group continues to ramrod a Safety with complex paper programs they may not understand. Management System that AWO can control and We suggest a real solution to these problems would manipulate and downplays Coast Guard physical be to license each company to do business the same way inspection of their vessels as “old ideas” about the nature the Coast Guard licenses its towing officers. “Civil and scope of Coast Guard inspection. These so-called penalties” have become just another “cost of doing “old ideas” were successful for the last 50 years and are business.” They are no longer effective in promoting constantly updated. safety and deterring accidents. It is clear from the

Newsletter 2 attached report that covers only one towing company’s spills, such benign neglect casts a blind eye to the injury misdeeds that safety management systems like the and death of our mariners rather then a protector of their existing Responsible Carrier Program and civil penalties workplace. simply do not work. The ineffectiveness of this process It is for all the foregoing reasons that we object to the has made the Coast Guard more of a partner then an TSAC towing vessel inspection report as much as we enforcer. question the very validity of the Committee. We urge Bouchard Transportation Company (henceforth: you to impress on your colleagues in Congress to Bouchard) demonstrates an abject failure of the AWO’s consider our objections, investigate our claims, draw fair Responsible Carrier Program. The attached report conclusions, and take appropriate action. provided by the Coast Guard under the Freedom of It is clear from the Coast Guard activity report that Information Act demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the since the explosion of the Bouchard tank barge 125 in existing safety management system known as the Staten Island, where two lower-level mariners were Responsible Carrier Program as well as the Coast blown to oblivion, and Bouchard’s Buzzards Bay Oil Guard’s Civil Penalty process. But first, some Spill that this rogue company continues to spill oil and background from a mariner’s perspective. burn mariners in fires. It also appears from the In 1988, Bouchard’s response to a union strike was a conditions that our mariners describe to us that lockout of its employees. In May 1988, a federal court Bouchard’s nearly ten million dollar fine for the injunction ordered the company to take its striking Buzzards Bay oil spill will have no lasting impact. workers back. For a short time, the collisions and oil The court sentenced the mariner involved in the spills ended as qualified union workers returned to their Buzzards Bay oil spill to five months in jail. Bouchard vessels. However, Bouchard rushed to an impasse and officials, who knowingly shipped an unqualified officer then removed union workers from their vessels several against the advice of their own employees, received no weeks later replacing them with unqualified and jail time for his crime. Bouchard continues to operate unskilled labor. Many of these licensed replacements their vessels with unqualified workers on the oily waters did not have any recent service in the waters they were of our harbors, bays, and rivers. Our mariners report to expected to navigate and oil spills and collisions us that during recent USCG vessel examinations, the returned. This blatant disregard by Bouchard for Federal Coast Guard boarding parties never checked upon law, public safety, and the environment took place under pilotage recency requirements or other evidence of the nose of the Coast Guard who stood by and did proper manning. nothing. With no enforcement of federal regulations by In closing, and in a broader perspective, we also want the Coast Guard, Bouchard continued to employ and to encourage you and your colleagues in Congress to ask over-burden its unqualified work force while forcing the question as to why towing industry barges were left them to work fatiguing schedules. The same hiring in critical areas in hurricanes Katrina and Rita that practices continue today. allowed the hurricane to blow their barges over or Although we were unable to obtain the records of through levee systems flooding entire communities and Bouchard dating back to 1988, under a Freedom of drowning citizens. Even the existing safety management Information Act request, at least we obtained the system (RCP) should include a hurricane response plan company’s incident and activity records from the Coast based on geographical areas, time, distance, intensity, Guard starting in 1991. During this period, Bouchard and probability of strike. Safe and prudent companies joined the American Waterways Operators and would direct their dispatchers to move the equipment up implemented its Responsible Carrier Program. It is clear river. In addition, why were over 20,000 innocent by examining the 392 separate line entries of tug and victims of hurricane Katrina left to swelter for days at barge accident data that the Responsible Carrier the New Orleans Convention Center three blocks from 1 Program had no positive impact. Bouchard’s problem the ferry landing? Why was all the towing industry’s was and continues to be manning its vessels with equipment not made available to move these people to a qualified personnel. The problem is evident in the article place of safety as happened in New York on September that recently appeared in the Boston Globe. 11, 2001? This is a good question to ask the American Some interesting points that jump out of the activity Waterways Operators! report is that AWO membership, Coast Guard civil Very truly yours, penalties, and even criminal fines had no impact on the s/Captain Joseph Dady number of oil spills, collisions, allisions, or injuries and United Mariner deaths that occurred at Bouchard from 1991 onward. When we first read the report it seemed that the Coast (1) A copy of the activity report compiled by the Coast Guard was more of partner in pollution by depositing Guard mentioned in this letter can be found at: the fines and penalties in the federal treasury. Since they are [email protected] the collector and custodian of these facts, it is amazing www.geocities.com/unitedmariner that the Coast Guard did not pinpoint this company’s record for greatly enhanced enforcement. Aside from ±

Newsletter 3

TUGBOAT MATE GOES TO PRISON confinement for Hill, argued that the first mate had been FOR 2003 BUZZARDS BAY OIL SPILL involved in several mishaps in the weeks before the oil spill Source: The Boston Globe, Sept. 21, 2005 and was "an accident waiting to happen." According to Mitchell, Hill slammed another Bouchard A tugboat operator was sentenced yesterday to five months tugboat into a Philadelphia dock the month before the oil spill; in prison for causing a massive oil spill in Buzzards Bay two nearly steered the EVENING TIDE into rocks near Hell's years ago that killed hundreds of migratory birds, closed Gate in New York two days before the spill; and caused shellfish beds, and contaminated 90 miles of shoreline. $15,000 in damage to part of the EVENING TIDE's towing "This was extremely serious negligent conduct, rising to system the night before the spill. the level of recklessness," said U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert Bouchard was "on notice that Mr. Hill was a problem," B. Collings, adding that he had to send Franklin Robert Hill to said Mitchell, telling the court that at least three captains had prison to send a message to others who navigate oil barges. reported to the corporation that they believed Hill needed Hill, 54, of Jacksonville, Fla., had pleaded guilty to more training. violating the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Act. He Hill's lawyer, Peter Ball, argued that Hill had an exemplary admitted that while serving as first mate aboard the career as a seaman, was never involved in any major accident, EVENING TIDE on April 27, 2003, he left the helm and wasn't completely responsible for the oil spill. unattended for 15 minutes to secure a towline connected to a "Although the government questions his competence barge carrying 4.1 million gallons of fuel oil. because Mr. Hill bumped into a dock and had a tow wire foul An alert from a nearby tugboat, warning that the barge had on his watch, these are fairly routine incidents in the rough- strayed outside the channel and was headed for rocks, went and-tumble world of tugboating, which is a contact sport," unheeded because Hill left behind his hand-held radio, Ball wrote in a sentencing memorandum to the court. according to federal prosecutors. Ball urged the magistrate to sentence Hill to probation, noting Bouchard Transportation Co., which owned the barge, that Hill had been fired from his job and forced to declare pleaded guilty last year to violating environmental laws, paid bankruptcy, and will undoubtedly lose his seaman's license. a $9 million fine, and agreed to pay cleanup costs, which have The captain of the EVENING TIDE was on board but off already exceeded $38 million, according to federal duty at the time of the spill. Hill says the captain plotted an prosecutors. errant course, which had the tugboat approach the channel in During his sentencing hearing yesterday, Hill declined an Buzzards Bay from the wrong angle, according to Ball's offer from the magistrate to speak, but in a letter to the court sentencing memorandum. he apologized for his actions and asked to be allowed to continue working. [GCMA Comment: We requested a complete Coast "I was remiss in my duties as Officer of the Watch in not Guard accident report on this accident over 2 ½ years ago insuring that the barge was in safe water," Hill wrote, adding, and are still awaiting its release. We present this "I will be forever sorry and ashamed for this negligence." newspaper account and withhold further comment.] But Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Mitchell, who had recommended five months in prison and five months of home

37202 and indicates their ownership of the barge. [A GCMA ASKS ABOUT BARGE THAT MAY HAVE photograph of the barge later appeared on the cover of DESTROYED RESIDENTIAL AREA WorkBoat magazine’s October 2005 edition and appears to be “ING 4127”.] [Source: GCMA File #M-601. GCMA FOIA request to G- We would expect the final report to contain: CIM of Sept. 28, 2005. GCMA frequently submits FOIA • A completed copy of the Coast Guard Accident Report requests to the Coast Guard for accident reports.] form CG-2692. Freedom Of Information Act Request • Notations as to whether the barge was loaded or empty at the time of the allision. Dear Sir or Madam, • A report by investigators from U.S. Coast Guard Sector On Monday, August 29, 2005, barge #ING „„„„ New Orleans including a detailing of how the barge was apparently passed through or over the levee of the Industrial secured (e.g., by wire or soft line and the condition of Canal in New Orleans, LA, as shown in the attached picture those lines and wires). from the September 12, 2005 issue of U.S. News and World • A report of the barge’s fleeting activity showing which Report. As the picture shows, the barge currently rests in a towing vessel last moved it and whose custody it was residential area of New Orleans’ Ninth Ward. under at the time of the accident. This should clarify The breaching of the levee by this barge may or may not whether the barge was moored inside the confines of the have been the proximate cause of the loss of hundreds of lives Industrial Canal at the time of the accident. and millions of dollars worth of property. We expect that a • A salvage report for the removal or scrapping of the barge. formal investigation will undertake to determine the cause of • A report from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers relative this accident. to the barge’s role in the destruction of the levee. Unfortunately, this picture and viewing numerous brief • Report of any administrative, civil, or criminal action glimpses of television footage did not allow us to obtain the taken by the Coast Guard as a result of the accident. number of the errant barge. However, the “ING” prefix is We respectfully request a copy of the report when the used by Ingram Barge Company, Box 23049, Nashville, TN, Coast Guard releases it to the public. Please notify us if

Newsletter 4 the cost of this report will exceed $50.00. Letters to Congress • M/V Crosby Spirit (Crosby Tugs) • M/V Lugger Tug (Collins Marine) [GCMA asked local U.S. Representatives and Senators to • M/V Mr. Wayne (Central Boat Rentals.) inform themselves on this matter.] • M/V Miss Enola (Jefferson Marine) Mariners in our Association have asked us to ascertain • M/V Aaron Joseph (Crosby Tugs) whether the 195 ft by 35 ft uninspected dry cargo barge that These boats awaited the arrival of the storm’s fury for the currently rests below the broken Industrial Canal levee was better part of twenty-hours. the proximate cause of the loss of life and property in that area At that time (at least) two barges were also tied off at this of New Orleans. closed dry bulk facility including the barge ING 4127. In the opinion of our informant, the barge was empty and was not in [GCMA Comment: If this is the case, it unquestionably the process of loading or unloading as the dry bulk facility would be the most catastrophic loss of life and property was closed and apparently abandoned. As he entered the slip, associated with the nation’s tug and barge industry. It he noted that the barge was pulled alongside another covered might convince Congress to reconsider the limitation of dry cargo barge and tied with two “soft” lines, presumably liability that protects the marine industry and leaves the polypropylene. taxpayer to pick up the tab.] [GCMA Comment: The lines left on barges often are of To do this, we filed a routine FOIA request with Coast questionable quality and are sometimes called “Mardi Gras” Guard Headquarters (attached) in hopes that they will lines to indicate that they were of “throw-away” quality.] investigate the accident. If not, we believe the National Transportation Safety Board should investigate this as a He observed no spring lines on the barge, nor were the “transportation accident” in light of the magnitude of the lines doubled up in preparation for the storm. The two barges calamity. We believe that you may want to follow this matter were not hard-wired together. Our informant chose not to tie because of the impact of this catastrophe on the entire New alongside the barge because he did not feel it safe to do so. Orleans metropolitan area. It seems as if the American The first strong blasts of wind reportedly struck at 0500 taxpayer must continually pay to remediate accidents the next day (Monday). By that time, the boats and barges associated with the towing industry – Webbers Falls, Bayou were confined to a canal segment between the west end of the Canot, Queen Isabella Causeway Buzzards Bay and now this! Industrial Locks and the new Florida Avenue Bridge that was Although Congress passed the §415 of the Coast Guard also closed to marine traffic. One of the other towboats was and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 that will bring equipped with an anemometer that stopped functioning when towing vessels under inspection in the next few years, the the wind reached 120 mph. towing industry utilizes thousands of uninspected barges like Our informant indicates that he saw barge ING 4127 the one in the picture that the Coast Guard never inspects almost immediately part its two lines and race diagonally since they fall under the purview of OSHA. Although OSHA across the canal toward the levee on the far side of the canal. regulations are supposed to govern “workplace safety” on By that time, he estimated that swells within the Industrial these barges, we find their oversight lax and ineffective since Canal reached 8 to 9 feet in height. It was far too dangerous this agency has no way even to visit these barges unless they and there was no time to attempt to corral the barge that he are tied to the dock. We believe these dry cargo barges must last sighted on the other side of the levee in the residential be brought under the Coast Guard’s regulatory umbrella. neighborhood. It is clear in the mind of our informant that this barge either went through or over the levee. Our informant rode out the storm safely at the abandoned GCMA Member Comes Forward With dry bulk facility though not unscathed by the storm. He stated New Information of Barge Breakaway that the tidal surge arrived swiftly. He also stated that he measured the tidal surge as being 12 feet high at that location. On October 4, 2005 a member of our Association („„) came to the GCMA office and presented us with these facts. MR GO, Go(es) to Hell We, in turn, passed them along to Coast Guard investigators. „„ was working in an area to the east of the Industrial The Industrial Canal is the site of a very expensive and Locks when his boat was released from the job it was on and controversial engineering project to expand the size of the headed toward the Industrial Locks with the intent of passing Industrial Locks and deepen that section of the waterway so through them. However, upon arriving at the locks in mid- large ships can reach the industrial area behind New Orleans. morning on Sunday before the storm, „„ found that the That would provide a deep-draft connection between the locks had been closed to marine traffic several hours earlier at Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet channel and the Mississippi 0700 Sunday. Left with few options, he sought shelter in the River. Although construction has started, the nagging area between the Industrial Locks and the Florida Avenue question remained as to whether this connection really was Bridge at an inoperative dry-bulk facility. The location they necessary. Hurricane Katrina and the devastation that it chose was diagonally opposite the breach that would occur in brought should put reconsideration at the top of the list. the levee protecting the Lower Ninth Ward of the City of New Several years ago, a delegation from St. Bernard Parish Orleans. appeared at a Corps of Engineers public meeting held aboard His boat was tied off at the facility along with five other the M/V Mississippi in New Orleans that GCMA attended. towing vessels, to wit: These civic leaders pleaded with the Corps of Engineers to put • M/V Miss Erin (Central Boat Rentals.) an end to dredging the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet channel

Newsletter 5 because it was a 32-foot deep dagger pointed at the heart of St. After Hurricane Katrina, the controlling depth of “MR Bernard Parish. “MR GO” connects directly with the GO” was broadcast as being only 9 feet. Perhaps the Industrial Canal. It seems that the waters from “MR GO” did hurricane obviates the need for maintaining a ship channel exactly what these civic leaders said it would do – it destroyed behind New Orleans. The question of whether we need locks St. Bernard Parish so that almost the entire Parish is that are over 30 feet deep would be moot since barge traffic “unrecoverable.” calls for much less. Perhaps closing “MR GO,” erecting a They also mentioned at the time that very few deep-draft floodgate closing off the Industrial Canal near the Florida ships used the channel and that those ships were bound for only Avenue Bridge, and raising the twice-breached levee would one or two sites. One estimate was that the cost of dredging cost protect this area from the tidal surge and the 8 to 9-foot swells over $10,000 per ship visit. But, this was the tip of the iceberg! experienced by our mariners during Katrina. But, this will be Closing “MR GO” has been discussed dozen of other times in up to engineers, hydrologists, and the taxpayers to decide. other places. The citizens’ pleading fell on deaf ears. After all, the Corps of Engineers does what it is told to do.

boarding and inspecting incoming ships and taking the lead in "THE COAST GUARD'S RESPONSE planning for the region's maritime security. IS ALL WE HOPED FOR" These days, homeland security dominates the Coast Guard's mission, along with search and rescue, huge [Source: Editorial from the Hampton Roads Daily Press, responsibilities that must be shouldered with resources Wednesday, September 14, 2005 regarding the Coast Guard’s stretched thin. Without, of course, relinquishing its traditional response to Hurricane Katrina.] jobs, involving boating safety, drug interdiction, pollution, fisheries, navigation and illegal immigration. Well done. The Coast Guard's response is all we hoped The Coast Guard has been busy not only in New Orleans for. Amid all the finger-pointing in Hurricane Katrina's wake, but along the battered Gulf Coast. A cutter is providing a one group must be singled out for a hearty thumbs up: the command, control and communications center off the Coast Guard. Mississippi coast. Amid the disorganization and despair, the Coast Guard's Personnel are assessing environmental damage, discipline and devotion stood out. The men and women of the transporting hospital patients, evacuating survivors and service's search and rescue teams were on duty almost from delivering supplies. the beginning, it seems. They have not been alone, of course: Countless individuals These are the images that stand out: Coast Guard have served valiantly at their posts or volunteered to aid helicopters hovering over buildings surrounded by neighbors and strangers. floodwaters, Coast Guard rescue swimmers rappelling down But the images have been inescapable. The Coast Guard on cables or hauling in baskets, plucking men, women and showed, in Katrina's wake, that it can get the job done, quickly children – and sometimes pets – from rooftops, balconies and and effectively. It has been a bright spot in a sometimes all- other precarious perches. too-grim picture. Some had to chop their way through roofs and rafters to find survivors. Some searched in boats. They delivered their human cargo to safety and went back for more, mission after mission, day after day, saving thousands of lives. The Coast Guard's swing into action was swift, certain and skilled. It was everything citizens hope for in their government's response to a disaster, but saw too little of after Katrina struck. It was the approach that led, undoubtedly, to the decision to put a Coast Guard veteran – Vice Adm. Thad W. Allen – in charge of FEMA's Gulf Coast recovery operations when it became clear that embattled FEMA Director Michael Brown had to be replaced with an effective leader. This kind of response is what the nation expects from the Coast Guard: It also moved quickly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, taking on critical jobs with trademark competence. Nowhere is this more reassuring than in Hampton Roads, for this region depends on the Coast Guard not in rare emergencies but on a day-to-day basis. The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for the security of the deepwater harbor that is, between the international port and the navy installations, both the region's economic engine and the reason it must constantly be alert to the threat of terrorism. The Coast Guard is vigilant, patrolling, monitoring traffic – of vessels, cargo and people –

Newsletter 6

the entrance to the Canal. The voyage range of 2.8 N. Miles. I acquired the DROWNSELK RIVER FOUR COLLISION MARINERS through the Canal was uneventful, winds target on the ARPA. I took this to be the were light and variable with good tug and tow to which the Pilot had visibility. At 0545 hours we changed communicated. The Pilot came over to The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal is Pilots off Chesapeake City where the observe the target on the starboard side a sea-level waterway that extends from the Delaware Pilot disembarked. radar which I was monitoring. I switched Delaware River at Reedy Point, DE, to On the bridge, I was I charge of the back and forth between the 0.75 and 1.5 Back Creek at Chesapeake City, MD, watch, together with a seaman at the wheel N. Mile ranges. thence down Back Creek to Elk River and and another seamen on lookout duty. The At 0634 hours we altered course to the northern end of Chesapeake Bay. The lookout was inside the wheelhouse. The 226° true and gyro around Old Town Point canal provides a protected inland route bosun was on standby forward to let go the Wharf. The Pilot contacted the tow between Delaware Bay on the North to the anchor if required. The Pilot. and the requesting the tug Master to keep closer to Virginia Capes several hundred miles to the Master were on the bridge. the red side of the channel as it appeared to south. The canal is maintained by the U.S. During the voyage through the Canal the pilot that the tug and tow were almost Army Corps of Engineers with a project the Pilot handled all communications with in the center of the channel. The tug depth of 35 feet. Elk River is located at the the Canal Control on the ship's VHF Master responded that he would comply. southern entrance to the C&D Canal. radio. As far as I can recall, the Pilot did When we had settled on the new [Source: NOS Coast Pilot #3.] communicate with the Canal Control but course the radar was on the 1.5 N. Mile On February 25, 2002, at he did not make me aware of the subject range. The target was on our port bow and approximately 0644 local time, the 520- of the communication. appeared to be moving parallel to our foot long bulk carrier M/V A.V. At 0611 hours the vessel passed heading line. I monitored the approach of KASTNER, collided with a multiple between 31/32 buoys, 0625 hours buoys the target until it was between 2.0/3.0 vessel flotilla of dredging equipment 23/24, and at 0634 Old Town Point Wharf cables distant, still on the port side moving being pulled by the uninspected towing was abeam to port. As the vessel parallel to the heading line. At this point I vessel BUCHANAN 14 and pushed by approached Old Town Point Wharf moved to the control stand at the center of the M/V SWIFT. The collision occurred steaming fog was observed just above the the wheelhouse. I expected to see the tug in the vicinity of buoys G15 and R16 on surface of the water, maximum height and tow visually at any moment. the Elk River off Town Point, MD, near about 2 meters; it was not up to deck level. At this point I heard a transmission on the southern entrance of the C&D Canal. In accordance with our established the VHF radio "I fucked up all, do Following the collision, the tug SWIFT procedure, I dismissed the bosun from something."(1) Almost immediately the capsized resulting in the death of four of standby forward at Old Town Point Wharf. Pilot and I observed the lights of the the eight crewmen on board at the time. Referring back to the time at which approaching tow. I saw white The estimated property damage was the vessel left the Canal proper, I superstructure of a tug with its deck lights $500,000 and the C&D Canal was closed overheard a conversation between the and mast light on approximately 7 for one week pending the salvage of the pilot and an approaching tug and tow. degrees on our starboard bow. I also saw tug and barges. [Source: USCG Report, The Pilot asked the tug for his position large object on our port bow which Misle Activity #1493713; Misle Case and after a minute delay the tug replied appeared to be unlit. [(1)This comment #84843; GCMA File #M-269] that he was at Turkey Point. The Pilot succinctly and unequivocally summarizes replied that there was plenty time for us to the responsibility for the accident.] Statement of the Chief Mate, M/V A.V. clear the Canal and a PORT TO PORT My impression was that the tug and KASTNER passing was agreed; also the Pilot made a the tow were angled approximately 60 comment on the tugboat's captain delay to degrees across our bow. The Pilot I am Chief Mate of M/V "A.V. reply regarding his position that looks like ordered FULL ASTERN immediately KASTNER." I hold a Canadian Home he doesn't know where he is. Soon after and I put the engine control handle to the Trade Master, First Mate Foreign Going - this conversation, the Master said he was FULL ASTERN position. The tug boat no limitation Certificate of Competency h going below to the toilet and he departed. passed down our starboard side but I did issued on 07` October 1996. I had Soon after the bosun was dismissed not see the large object which I had previously held a Chief Mate certificate of from the focsle, we encountered dense observed on the port side. I felt the vessel Competency issued by the Government of fog. It was just before sunrise. It was shake and almost immediately heard the Soviet Union in 1987. I have sailed as difficult to determine the exact visibility, "Mayday, Mayday" on VHF Channel 13, a Chief mate since 1987, and I have sailed but I could see the focsle at all times. I probably from the tug. as a Chief Mate on this vessel since April switched on the automatic fog signal. I The pilot ordered FULL ASTERN, 2001. This vessel trades between Canada tried to contact the Bosun to get him to LET GO STARBOARD ANCHOR. I and either Baltimore or Jacksonville, with return to the focsle. There was no repeated the order to let go the anchor on voyages approximately equally divided answer, possibly because he had switched the hand held VHF radio. This was between the two ports. On voyages to off his radio. I sent the lookout to tell the acknowledged by bosun; and then I heard Baltimore the vessel transits the Bosun to resume watch on the focsle. the anchor chain running out. The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. Referring back to the time the vessel lookout returned to the bridge as did the On 24 February 2002, we embarked a was between Oldfield Point and Old Master. The Master inquired what had pilot in Delaware Bay at 23:34 hours. I Town Point Wharf I switched the radar happened, and I told him we had collided took over the watch at 0400 hours on 25 from 0.75 N. Miles range to the 3.0 N. with tow. I sent the lookout forward to February 2002 as the vessel approached Miles range. I observed a large target at a assist the bosun and the general alarm

Newsletter 7 was sounded. back to recovery davits where boat was adjustments. The flotilla was underway to The Master instructed me to lower the recovered. [Affidavit: Senior Nautical Delaware City, DE, to do a dredging job. rescue boat and it was in the water at Surveyor Registry of Shipping Bermuda: I A crashing sound awoke me as I was 0715 hours, and we began to search for give this solemn statement consisting of 3 thrown out of my bunk at about 0645. I survivors. The fog was still dense but the pages, believing it to be true and I have kicked the door open and got out of the Master gave me a course to steer to reach read it over. s/Chief Mate A.V. Kastner.] stateroom. The boat was laying on its the closest target. There was some debris side and sinking. in the water which I checked but found no Statement of Master of Tug I grabbed a lifering and handed it to one. The first target was a barge with BUCHANAN 14 the Master and Justin Bryant and told pontoons on deck. It was listing and them, “Don’t panic, hold onto this and trimmed heavily. Some of the pontoons At watch change, (my) mate told me keep your head above the water. We’re had broken loose and were floating of the outbound ship coming down from going in!.” nearby. There was no one on the barge C&D Canal. Understood port-to-port The tug SWIFT rolled bottom-up. I and I requested direction to second object passage. I talked to ship KASTNER, swam to a location so that I could get up from the Master. confirmed port-to-port passage. My on the bottom of the tug and help the As I proceeded to the second target vessel was towing deck barge 811 and other men. Before I got to the bottom of there were small pieces of debris in the Dredge Jekyll Island on short wire the tug, I lost sight of them. Pusher-10 water. The second target was a dredge inbound at buoy “14.” Talked to ship came and picked me up and took me to unit which appeared to have a crane on between “14” and “16.” He told me he BUCHANAN 14. I was shaking deck. I saw one person on board and then was as far over to the green side as he violently, so I went to the shower and got observed the tug with white could get. I responded we were over on warm water running on me to stop the superstructure secured alongside the the red side almost to buoy “16” and was hypothermia. Someone gave me clothes, dredge on the side opposite to our rescue close, just trying to get past buoy “16” then I insisted the other men do the same. boat. The dredge was upright and (in) zero visibility. My mate and engineer appeared not to have suffered damage. I were in the wheelhouse with me keeping Conclusions of the Coast Guard went around the dredge and came watch. JJJJ said “I see it” thinking Investigation alongside to the tugboat to enquire if they buoy “16” had broken out of the fog and I Of the Elk River Collision required assistance. There was a number said, “The buoy?” He responded, “Oh, of persons on the tug and they advised God, it’s the ship.” [Source: USCG accident report. Black that two persons on board were injured. At that time, the ship was just off marks indicate USCG redactions from the They also told me there were four persons center of my starboard bow and closing text of the report furnished to us. in the water, and I reported this fast. My instant reaction was to turn hard Underlining for emphasis is ours. GCMA information to the Master. I observed one to port to clear the KASTNER because if Comment: This provides an excellent post- person standing on deck holding his neck, I had gone to starboard we would have accident view of the application of various and another person who came to the been hit broadside on our port side. “Rules of the Road.”] accommodation was shaking severely. At that moment we slid down the They told me a Coast Guard helicopter starboard side of the KASTNER and once 1. The proximate cause of this was on its way to them. I advised them to he cleared my stern, the tow wire started casualty was the apparent loss of put the person who was shaking in a paying off the winch. After that, which situational awareness on the part of stretcher and cover him up to keep him was only a split second, the KASTNER Captain JJJJ, Master of the warm. His clothing did not appear to be hit the deck barge I was towing and then BUCHANAN-14, while operating in wet. The Master instructed me to the tug SWIFT. restricted visibility following an continue the search. I searched in a unexpected encounter with heavy fog and circular pattern and encountered some Statement of the Mate of the Tug his failure to adequately assess the risk of debris but no survivors. The visibility SWIFT collision under the prevailing began to improve, and I observed a few circumstances. Evidence suggests Coast Guard and fire department boats on On February 25, as the flotilla was Captain JJJJ failed to adequately the scene. I took the rescue boat proceeding up the Elk River, MD, under monitor the A.V. KASTNER’s alongside one of the fireboats and tow of the tug BUCHANAN 14, I (was) movement as well as his own vessel’s enquired of the Coast Guard officer on acting as mate of the Tug SWIFT. The movement and position relative to board whether they required us to flotilla (was) made up as follows: Tug oncoming traffic which resulted in his continue searching. He replied that we BUCHANAN, pipe barge 811, Dredge vessel and associated tow being placed in were relieved of our obligations and that Jekyll Island, Tug SWIFT, Derrick Barge the path of, and colliding with the M/V we could return to the ship. I advised the and dredge pipeline. Each vessel was tied A.V. KASTNER. master accordingly, and he instructed me to the vessel in front of it. Evidence suggests that the crew of the to investigate the damage to our ship. I was on the midnight to 0600 watch BUCHANAN-14 was unaware of their I observed one circular opening on the at the time I was relieved at about 0545. vessels exact position within the Elk port side of the stem and a lengthwise The visibility was good. The tug SWIFT River leading up to and at the time of opening slightly further aft on the port was locked in by a double soft line to the collision. Both Captain JJJJ and bow. In addition there were several ladder of the dredge Jekyll Island. The Mate JJJJ assert that the collision indents and a long scratch on the starboard rudder was midship, and because the tug occurred in a position just southwest of bow running aft for about 20 meters. I BUCHANAN 14 was navigating the buoys G15 and R16, on the “red” side of reported to the Master and then returned flotilla, I did not make any steering the channel. JJJJ indicated in a

Newsletter 8 statement that the BUCHANAN- 14 was tow or when approaching a vessel at observance of good seamanship and “below a quarter of a mile from buoy 16 close range. (e) if necessary to avoid collision or to and were trying to get make a visual on allow more time to assess the buoy 16 when KASTNER appeared 50 to Evidence suggests Captain JJJJ situation, a vessel shall slacken her 100 ft off our starboard quarter.” Based navigated by, and relied upon scanty speed or take all way off by stopping on the physical evidence recovered on radar information only during the final or reversing her means of propulsion. scene, their assertion is deemed not moments leading up to the collision. believable. A thirty foot long by twenty- JJJJ indicated he had his radar set There is no evidence that Captain four inch diameter spud constructed of on the one-eighth mile scale, “heads-up” JJJJ took any action in ample time one inch steel that was ejected from the display with his own vessel off-set to the to avoid collision or to allow more time to deck of the RC-811 upon impact, and bottom of the scope. In this assess his situation. Captain JJJJ located during a post-casualty survey configuration, he could only view out to a indicated during an interview that he did conducted by ACOE (U.S. Army Corps quarter of a mile directly in front of his not adjust the power settings of the of Engineers) supports the conclusion that vessel and to his beam on either side. At BUCHANAN-l4 in any way until after the proximate location of the collision this range he could not see any land the collision and after the A.V. between the A.V. KASTNER and the masses or other reference points such as KASTNER had passed his position. RC-811 occurred approximately 400 feet nearby ranges (only buoys), that may Captain JJJJ indicated that when he northeast of buoys Gl5 and R16 and 75 have aided in determining his vessel’s first saw the A.V. KASTNER, he feet north of the centerline of the channel position within the channel and relative immediately went hard to port with the on the green side. Based on this evidence bearing with the oncoming A.V. rudders but did not push the throttles up it is highly unlikely that the A.V. KASTNER. Once the BUCHANAN-14 as they were already at “full ahead”. KASTNER was transiting on the wrong encountered fog, Captain JJJJ Given that the engine settings were at full side of the channel as JJJJ and indicated that he operated solely by his ahead from the time Captain JJJJ JJJJ asserted. In all likelihood, the radar-heading flasher and was not aware encountered restricted visibility to the actual point of impact probably occurred of his compass heading. JJJJ time of collision, it is apparent that no at a point further north and east of the indicated that he was concerned about effort was made to slacken or take way off location of the recovered spud as the avoiding buoy “R16” and therefore set his to avoid collision or allow more time to barge was driven backwards as a result of heading flasher to the left of the target assess the situation as required by Rule 8: the impact. which he assumed was R16. However, in one-eighth mile radar setting, Captain 4. Evidence suggests Captain JJJJ 2. Evidence suggests that Captain JJJJ would not have sighted the violated Rule 19 (Conduct of Vessels’ in JJJJ violated Rule 7 (Risk of A.V. KASTNER on radar until he was Restricted Visibility’), of the Inland Collision), of the Inland Regulations for abeam of buoys G15 and R16. With his Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1972 radar heading flasher set to the left of the Sea 1972 COLREGS. Rule 19 states in part: (COLREGS), which contributed to this target displayed in front of him and his (d) A vessel which detects by radar alone casualty. Rule 7 states: determination to keep his vessel to the left the presence of another vessel shall (a) Every vessel shall use all available of the target, it is highly likely that from determine if a close-quarters situation means appropriate to the prevailing that point forward, Captain JJJJ, is developing or risk of collision circumstances and conditions to unknowingly steered his vessel and tow exists. If so, she shall take avoiding determine if risk of collision exists. If directly toward, and into the path of the action in ample time, provided that there is any doubt such risk shall be A.V. KASTNER. when such action consists of an deemed to exist. There is no evidence that Captain alteration of course, so far as possible (b) Proper use shall be made of radar JJJJ or the crew of the the following shall be avoided: equipment if fitted and operational, BUCHANAN-14 employed any long- (i) an alteration of course to port for a including long-rang scanning to range scanning to obtain early warning of vessel forward of’ the beam other obtain early warning of risk of risk of collision, or any systematic than for a vessel being overtaken collision and radar plotting or observation of detected objects. Such (ii) An alteration of course toward a equivalent systematic observation of observation may have enabled an vessel abeam or abaft the beam. detected objects. appropriate and timely determination as to (e) Except where it has been determined (c) Assumptions shall not be made on the the risk of collision and allowed time for that a risk of collision does not exist, basis of scanty information, especially necessary actions to avoid collision every vessel which hears apparently scanty radar information. altogether. forward of her beam the fog signal of (d) in determining if risk of collision exists another vessel, or which cannot avoid the following considerations shall be 3. Evidence suggests Captain JJJJ a close quarters situation with another among those taken into account: violated Rule 8 (Action to Avoid vessel forward of her beam, shall (i) such risk shall be deemed to exist if Collision), of the Inland Regulations for reduce her speed to the minimum at the compass bearing of an Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1972 which she can he kept on course. She approaching vessel does not (COLREGS), which contributed to this shall if necessary take all her way off appreciably change; and casualty. Rule 8 states in part: and, in any event, navigate with (ii) such risk may sometimes exist even (a) Any action taken to avoid collision extreme caution until the danger of when an appreciable bearing change shall, if the circumstances of the case collision is over. is evident, particularly when admit, be positive, made in ample approaching a very large vessel or a time and with due regard to the From the time Captain JJJJ

Newsletter 9 encountered restricted visibility due to (A) Current editions or currently relied on scanty radar information and fog, up to the point of collision, there is corrected editions, if the vessel failed to adequately assess, and or no evidence to suggest that any effort was engages in towing exclusively on recognize the risk of collision with the made on his part to determine his relative the navigable waters of the U.S., BUCHANAN-14 and its tow. The last position within the channel and assess the including Western Rivers”. radio transmission between the A.V. risk of collision with the ship. He was KASTNER and the BUCHANAN-14 navigating using radar heading flasher 6. Evidence suggests Chief Officer occurred approximately 3.5 minutes prior only and was unaware of’ his compass JJJJ of the A.V. KASTNER to the collision when the vessel were heading. Moments leading up to this violated Rule 5 (Lookout). of the Inland 1,500 yards from one another. At that incident a risk of collision did exist Regulations for Prevention of Collisions time, KASTNER’s pilot indicated that he between the BUCHANAN-14 and the at Sea 1972 (COLREGS). Rule 5 states; was as far to the right as he could A.V. KASTNER and Captain JJJJ Every vessel shall at all times possibly get and that the BUCIIANAN - admittedly was having difficulty finding, maintain a proper look-out by sight 14 was close to the green side of the and was more concerned about the and hearing as well as by all available channel (“fairly close to my side”). potential of alliding with buoy R16. means appropriate in the prevailing However, there is no evidence of However. Captain JJJJ never circumstances and conditions so as to additional radar plotting, follow-up radio slackened his speed, initiated any course make a full appraisal of the situation transmissions, or any actions taken on the changes, or exercised additional caution and the risk of collision. part of the A.V. KASTNER’s crew to or measures to further assess the risk of Upon exiting the C&D Canal, Chief adequately ascertain the BUCHANAN- collision. He only altered course once he Officer JJJJ released the Bosun from 14’s actual position, heading, and relative found himself in extremis. his duties on the forecastle. At the time the bearing to assess the risk of collision. It is apparent that the crew of the Bosun was released, the A.V. KASTNER This resulted in the bridge team of A.V. BUCHANAN-14 exercised poor was approaching Old Town Point Wharf, KASTNER failing to recognize the judgment in deciding to continue its and the Chief Officer reported observing BUCHANAN-14 had crossed into its approach toward the A.V. KASTNER “steaming fog just above the surface of the path until both vessels were in extremis. given the existing conditions. Based on water, maximum height about 2 meters.” the maximum draft of eight feet, and the Shortly afterwards, the Chief Officer 8. Evidence suggests Chief Officer charted depth of water immediately noticed a thick fog developing, and he JJJJ violated Rule 8 (Action to Avoid surrounding the Elk River Channel, the attempted to contact the Bosun by radio to Collision), of the Inland Regulations for BUCHANAN-14 and the remainder of have him return to his position on the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 1972 the flotilla could feasibly have exited the forecastle with negative results. The Chief (COLREGS), which contributed to this channel without running aground prior to Officer then instructed the bridge lookout casualty. Rule 8 states in part: meeting the A.V. KASTNER and waited to physically find the Bosun and direct him (a) Any action taken to avoid collision for the ship to safely pass. to resume his watch on the forecastle while shall, if the circumstances of the case Had Captain JJJJ made a full the vessel transited through the heavy fog. admit, he positive, made in ample appraisal of the situation based on the The collision took place between the time time and with due regard to the existing conditions and taken all the AB contacted the Bosun and before observance of good seamanship and appropriate and prudent actions necessary both individuals resumed their respective (e) If necessary to avoid collision or to and in ample time to avoid collision with look-out positions. allow more time to assess the the A.V. KASTNER on the morning of At the time of the collision, there was situation, a vessel shall slacken her 25 February 2002, this unfortunate no lookout posted on the bridge or speed or take all way off by stopping situation which resulted in the tragic loss forecastle of the A.V. KASTNER. or reversing her means of propulsion. of four lives, would likely have been Although visibility was significantly avoided altogether. reduced due to the fog conditions, 9. Evidence suggests Chief Officer witnesses stated the A.V. KASTNER’s JJJJ violated Rule 19 (Conduct of 5. The crew of the BUCHANAN-14 forecastle remained visible at all times Vessels in Restricted Visibility), of the failed to have on board an up to date during the voyage. It is reasonable to Inland Regulations for Prevention of navigational chart for the area being conclude that had a proper lookout, as Collisions at Sea l972 COLREGS. Rule transited. Although the outdated chart required by Rule 5 of the COLREGS and 19(d)(e)…(are cited above). was not a likely contributing factor to the the Beltship’ Management Limited’s Chief Officer JJJJ indicated that collision, the lack of an updated Technical Operations Manual, been at approximately 0634 “the visibility navigational chart is a violation of Title posted on A.V. KASTNER’s forecastle, suddenly and drastically deteriorated.” 33. Code of Federal Regulations, Part the BUCHANAN-14 may have been The elapsed time from when the A.V. 164.72(b) which states in part: “Each spotted earlier, and potentially within KASTNER first encountered restricted towing vessel must carry onboard and adequate time to take sufficient action to visibility to the point of collision was maintain the following: avoid collision. approximately ten minutes. During this (1) Charts or Maps. Marine charts or same period of time, the Chief Officer maps of the areas to be transited. 7. Evidence suggests Chief Officer indicated there was some concern on his published by the National Ocean JJJJ violated Rule 7 (Risk of part with regard to the position of the Service (NOS, the ACOE, or a river Collision), of the Inland Regulations for BUCHANAN-14 and its tow. In the authority that satisfy the following Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1972 Chief Officer’s statement he indicated: requirements: (COLREGS) which contributed to the “It appeared on radar that the tug had (ii) The charts or maps must be either collision. JJJJ appears to have moved into the middle of the channel.

Newsletter 10 Pilot JJJJ called and asked the tug ahead or nearly ahead and by night 12. Drugs and, or alcohol were not a to keep as far to their side as possible.” she could see the masthead lights of contributing cause to this incident. Also during this time, there was no the other in a line and/or both Although test results indicated JJJJ assigned look-out posted on the bridge, sidelights and by day she observes the by one individual, he was not involved and there was no assigned look-out corresponding aspect of the other with duties directly affecting the posted on the forecastle of the A.V. vessel. navigation of a any vessel. KASTNER. Despite the restricted (c) When a vessel is in any doubt as to visibility conditions, the fact that no look- whether such a situation exists she 13. Evidence suggests that watertight outs were posted and he expressed shall assume that it does and act integrity on the SWIFT was less than concerns regarding the movement of accordingly. adequate and not properly maintained known oncoming traffic, the Chief while underway. This condition likely Officer initiated no additional actions to The vessels were in apparent extremis contributed to rapid down-flooding and avoid collision or to allow more time to at the point when both vessels sighted one the subsequent sinking of the vessel. At assess the situation. At no time during another visually. Based the A.V. the time the Swift was raised, two of the this ten minute period was the power KASTNER’s maneuvering characteristics three starboard side watertight doors were setting for the A.V. KASTNER’s main data and the point at which the crew made discovered open. Additionally, two wall- propulsion reduced in attempt to slacken visual contact with the BUCHANAN-14, mounted air conditioning units were the vessel’s speed or all way taken off by it appears that there was insufficient time installed through the watertight bulkhead stopping or reversing. Only after the to initiate an alteration of course or “crash on the main deck (one mounted on the BUCHANAN-14 passed beneath the stop” procedures to avoid the collision. forward, starboard side bulkhead leading ships bow were any actions initiated to Further, based on its relative heading at into the main deck berthing area, and the alter the ships speed. the time of extremis and its limited other was mounted on the aft bulkhead on maneuverability due to the size and time port side leading to the galley). Both 10. Prior to the collision, the configuration of the tow, the air conditioning units measured BUCHANAN-14 with tow and the A.V. BUCHANAN-14 was not able to approximately 18 inches by 24 inches. KASTNER were on nearly reciprocal maneuver its tow in time to avoid The air conditioning units became course – “Head-on” as defined by Rule collision with the A.V. KASTNER. dislodged during this casualty and likely 14 of the Inland Navigation Rules. Rule contributed to the additional ingress of 14 states: 11. Crew fatigue was not an apparent water and subsequent down flooding. (a) When two power-driven vessels are contributing factor to this incident. All meeting on a reciprocal or nearly surviving crewmen interviewed that were [GCMA Comment: We believe our reciprocal courses so as to involve directly involved with this incident efforts to promote the effective risk of collision each shall alter her indicated receiving sufficient rest during inspection of towing vessels by USCG course to starboard so that each will the preceding 72 hours and all reported inspectors will increase attention to pass on the port side of the other. that they felt well rested at the time of the improved watertight integrity issues on (b) Such a situation shall be deemed to collision. commercial towing vessels.] exist when a vessel sees the other

been willing to share his knowledge and expertise with us on OILFIELD LIFTBOAT CUTS GAS PIPELINE many occasions. IN $4,600,000 ACCIDENT The NOSAC liftboat sub-committee forthrightly addressed the industry’s safety problems several years ago and, with the [Source: MSO Mobile, Misle Activity #1984377, Misle Case Offshore Marine Service Association, is developing an #160245. GCMA file #M-452.] improved training program for liftboat captains. This will be a difficult undertaking because professional engineers must be Liftboat Safety brought “down-to-earth” to translate their technical expertise into language that can be easily understood by lower-level Liftboats are unique pieces of equipment designed to licensed mariners with 100, 200 and sometimes 500-1,600 ton perform specialized maintenance tasks in the oilfield. They near coastal licenses. We look forward to watching this had such a poor safety record that they were eventually program develop and, hopefully, make liftboats a safer work brought under Coast Guard inspection in 1989-1990. platform for our mariners. Inspection gradually brought law and order into the wild Unfortunately, accidents still happen especially where waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Safety standards and mariners (and/or their employers) cut corners. reasonable limits were imposed on existing vessels before they were “grandfathered” into an “inspected” status. The L/B Paul Danos GCMA observers participated in liftboat safety sub- committee meetings conducted by the National Offshore January 8, 2004: The liftboat PAUL DANOS was enroute Safety Advisory Committee. NOSAC always has been from Pascagoula, MS to Chandeleur Block 40 in the Gulf of managed in a professional manner by Mr. Jim Magill, its Mexico. At approximately 1600 hours the vessel started to Assistant Executive Director, who accumulated a lifetime of experience adverse weather conditions beyond its normal maritime and oilfield experience in the United States and limitations, as cited in the Danos & Curole standard operating (1) abroad. Jim always cooperated fully with GCMA and has procedures manual. The Master phoned Danos & Curole to notify them of the weather conditions. [(1) The vessel owners.]

Newsletter 11 The Master instructed the office that they were proceeding This was not the first time the M/V PAUL DANOS was to Chandeleur Block 20 to jack-up and get above the sea rendered legless.(1) On August 17, 1999 working in waters 15 conditions which is an important advantage of a liftboat. At miles northeast of Aransas Pass, Tx, this vessel suffered an approximately 1800 hrs the vessel arrived in Chandeleur apparent “punch-through” of the substrate under its port Block 20 and proceeded to lower its 3 legs. The legs pierced forward leg in pre-loading operations utilizing 600,000 the bottom surface at approximate position N 29.57.815° - W pounds of ballast with an air gap of 5 feet during wreck 088.43.284° at approximately 1830 hours. The Master jacked removal operations involving another liftboat. When the port up to approximately 4 feet above the water. forward leg penetrated the substrate, it caused the vessel to Between the hours of 2300 and 2330 the tilt alarm sounded rapidly drop to port where it settled to a 24° angle benging all and the Master and Mate „„ proceeded to the bridge and three legs. The leg wells were damaged and the legs later had jacked the rig up another 4 feet to level the lift boat. The Chief to be removed. [(1)Case #MC99010506, GCMA File #A-197.] Engineer was lying in his bunk and felt heavy vibrations coming from the vessel. He proceeded to the bridge and was Conclusions instructed by the Master to go to the engine room and turn on the Z-Drives. The Able Seaman and the Ordinary Seaman were The vessel was operating in the Gulf of Mexico and also in their bunks at the time of the incident between 2300- making port calls in Pascagoula, MS. There were no 2330 hrs. They both were awakened from their bunks and corrected navigational charts onboard the vessel for the area proceeded to the bridge area. All personnel onboard that she was operating in. There were several charts onboard acknowledged that they smelled a strong odor of gas, as well as for other areas. However these charts had not been corrected seeing a plume of water and mud approximately 30+ feet high from the Notice of Mariners. According to the crew, there on the starboard side of the liftboat. was a laptop computer with navigational software that was The PAUL DANOS had jacked up on a natural gas used to navigate the vessel. pipeline approximately 9 to 12 feet below the sea floor. The The company confirmed that they had purchased a laptop pipeline had approximately 900 PSI of pressure, and once the computer for use on the bridge, but not for navigational leg broke through the pipeline, the natural gas was released. purposes. The software being used to navigate the vessel was The high pressure eventually washed out around the legs of not approved by the company. In fact, USCG regulations the rig and caused the liftboat to lose stability and heel over. require the vessel to have updated and corrected navigational charts onboard. [GCMA Comment: We are reminded of the OSV At the time of the incident, the vessel was using a block ANGELA BRILEY(1) that exploded after colorless and chart to navigate the area. The block chart being used was cut odorless natural gas accidentally entered the engineroom. in half and had no corrections from the notice of mariners The supply boat exploded as the Master and Chief made to it. The block. chart indicated that chart #11363 Engineer tried to restart a generator. Both men died and should be used when navigating in the area where the accident an able seaman was seriously injured.] [(1)NTSB/MAR- occurred. However, chart #11363 was not onboard the vessel. 85/02/SUM; GCMA File M-015C] In addition, chart #11363 clearly shows the pipelines that the PAUL DANOS jacked up on and ruptured. The Master instructed all personnel to prepare to abandon ship, while he maintained a level bubble on the rig. The Coast [GCMA Comment: Block Chart #1115A has a scale of Guard was notified via VHF-FM channel 16 by the Ordinary 1:456,394 covering a three-state coastal area and contains Seaman. The M/V Christine McCall, was diverted to retrieve an overprint of oilfield block numbers whereas chart all crewman from the liftboat. All personnel were evacuated #11363 has a larger scale of 1:80,000.] to the M/V Christine McCall and transported to Chevron facility in Pascagoula, MS. [GCMA Comment: Mariners should note the Coast February 20, 2004. The Coast Guard interviewed Captain Guard’s emphasize using the largest scale chart available „ and Mr. (Redacted) at MSO Mobile. Captain „ and (#11363) and up-to-date chart corrections. As this case (redacted) admitted fault and gave no reason as to why there illustrates, companies do not always provide their were not the appropriate charts for the area onboard the vessel mariners with the latest charts or provide copies of the at the time of the incident. Captain „ advised that the charts latest Local Notice to Mariners. Many mariners were that were onboard had never been corrected. Both advised never taught how to correct charts properly – a time- they were using a laptop computer purchased by the company. consuming process if done thoroughly. The Master in this case reportedly had 40 years of experience in the offshore Amputation by Cutting Torch oil industry.] Leaves L/B Paul Danos Legless for Second Time The weather at the time of the incident was seas from 4 to March 18, 2004: The liftboat legs were eventually cut 6 feet and winds at 20 knots. The weather forecast was from the vessel and the vessel removed without structural reviewed from the national weather service for the day of the damage (excluding the legs). The vessel proceeded to incident and two days prior to the incident. The forecast Pascagoula, MS to await repair proposals and future actions. clearly showed forecasted seas to be 5 feet and winds at 20 The vessel eventually proceeded to drydock in Louisiana. knots. The limiting envelope in accordance with the PAUL According to reports by company officials and the crew, the DANOS Operations manual is 4-foot seas. The Operations vessel was broken into while in the Port of Pascagoula, after Manual also provides for the Master to check the weather (being salvaged following) the pipeline incident. The pipeline prior to getting underway to ensure proper operation of the was repaired and is fully functional. vessel. The Master did not properly review the weather and

Newsletter 12 did not discuss the vessels options for transiting to the work representative. location in the Gulf of Mexico with the company Several events occurred prior to the vessel departing, that The PAUL DANOS had approximately 7,000 gallons of if done properly and in accordance with rules and regulations, diesel fuel and 158 gallons of motor oil on board. No product would have prevented this accident. The vessel should have was discharged into the Gulf of Mexico. Approximately 42 had the appropriate charts onboard to transit in the areas of million cubic feet of natural gas was released from the operation. If the vessel had Chart #11363 onboard and was pipeline. However, natural gas (methane mix) does not have using the chart, the master would have known the location of an reportable quantity associated with it. Marine the pipeline (which was clearly indicated on the chart). If the Environmental Response Branch took no further action with Master had checked the appropriate weather forecast, he could the incident. //S// Pollution Investigator. have communicated that the vessel should have stayed in port until the seas were below the limiting envelope to ensure a Settlement Agreement safe transit. The end result of these actions caused several million dollars in damage, the loss of 42 million cubic feet of “In light of the respondent’s cooperative attitude, good natural gas, shut-in of a major pipeline for several weeks, and faith efforts to reach compliance and completion of a Bridge risked the lives of 5 crewmembers onboard the vessel. //s//LT Management Course, a mitigated penalty of 36 months „„„, Investigator suspension (12 months outright suspension with 24 months stayed on 24 months probation will be assessed.” Pollution Investigation

determining the amount of potable water that should be POTABLE WATER available on a vessel; (b) design practices and policies used for testing; and (c) industry standards that could be applied to the [Source: File #GCM-44. GCMA initiated action several years design and testing of potable water systems on vessels. ago to improve the quality of the water carried aboard the vessels our mariners serve aboard. This water is used for Vague Definition drinking, bathing and cooking. The following article by Dennis L. Bryant appeared in the August 2005 issue of Maritime The word “potable” is defined as “fit to drink” and is as Reporter and Engineering News and adds an important and accurate as it is concise. The word is derived from the Latin useful insight on this matter. Underlining for emphasis is ours.] word “potare,” meaning “to drink.” Thus, potable water is water that is fit to drink. The problem is that, like pornography, In this age when it seems like everything related to ships has you may know it when you drink it, but it is difficult to write a been regulated to an extreme, it comes as a surprise to learn that regulation setting enforceable standards regarding potability. there are no general regulations relating to potable water on U.S. vessels. That is about to end, as the Standards and Guidelines Coast Guard initiates a rulemaking project to establish such standards. While there currently are no general U.S. regulations regarding potable water on U.S. vessels, Rulemaking Project that does not mean there is no available guidance. There is actually a wide variety of guidance The project seems to have begun with a 2002 letter documents available for adaptation into appropriate from the Gulf Coast Mariners Association petitioning the Coast regulatory format. Guard for a rulemaking. The letter complained of the poor The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) quality of drinking water on some of the vessels manned by issues guidelines on sanitary issues related to construction and members of the Association. It pointed out that the Coast operation of large passenger ships. These guidelines are Guard has general superintendence over the merchant marine applicable to the cruise ships (mostly foreign flag) that embark and one of the agency’s missions is to look after seamen’s passengers at U.S. ports and may have limited applicability to welfare. non-passenger ships. The Food and Drug Administration In 2004, Congress amended the vessel inspection law to (FDA) has promulgated regulations regarding the source and provide that, for U.S. vessels subject to inspection, the use of potable water on conveyances engaged in interstate inspection process shall ensure (an) adequate drinking supply of traffic. Portions of those regulations apply to vessels, but they potable water for drinking and washing by passengers and provide few specifics. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the crews. In determining the adequacy of the supply of potable Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has issued regulations water for drinking and washing by passengers and crew, the and guidance regarding standards for safe drinking water and Coast Guard is to consider: maximum contaminant levels for drinking water. The EPA (1) the size and type of vessel; standards are focused on municipal water sources and similar (2) the number of passengers and crew on board; land-based water systems. (3) the duration and routing of voyages; and The U.S. Coast Guard has standards applicable to potable water (4) guidelines recommended by other federal agencies. and waste water systems at its units afloat and ashore, but has not On July 11, 2005, the Coast Guard issued a notice soliciting utilized them outside the agency. The USCG Marine Safety Center public input. Comments should be submitted by September 9. has developed rudimentary guidelines for review of potable water In addition to the statutory requirements, the agency would like systems when those systems included in ship construction plans comments on: (a) other factors that should be considered in submitted for agency review. Unfortunately, there is no

Newsletter 13 requirement that a potable water system be included in the The U.S. Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, has a construction plans submitted to the Coast Guard and not all ship Manual of Naval Preventive Medicine. One chapter of this construction plans are submitted to the Coast Guard for review. manual is devoted to water supply afloat. It addresses such issues as receipt and transfer of potable water, storage and distribution, and disinfections, among other things. One section developed standards for potable water supply on ships and is devoted to potable water on smaller vessels (yard craft, in marine structures. These standards come in two parts: ((1) Navy parlance) that lack their own water production capability. planning and design; and (2) method of calculation. The manual also addresses recommended amounts of potable Classification societies include potable water systems in their water for various uses on a per person per day basis: drinking rules and regulations for building and classing ships. The (0.5 to 1 gallon); galley and scullery (1.5 to 4 gallons); personal American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) has also published a guide hygiene (5 to 20 gallons); and laundry (5 to 10 gallons). for crew habitability that addresses potable water systems and Norway promulgated guidelines and regulations for potable related issues. water systems and potable water supply on offshore units, such as platforms and drills ships, operating under Norwegian Summary jurisdiction. The Norwegian Institute for Public Health issued a lengthy checklist for design of potable water systems on Potable water is a basic human necessity – more important offshore units. For vessels and offshore units with water than food. Crewmembers on ships have as much need for, and production systems, it recommends that there be at least two right to potable water as persons ashore. It is assumed(1) that production units, each capable of producing at least 100% of the the number of U.S. ships with inadequate potable water systems water needed, or three production units, each capable of is very low, but the number should be zero. [(1)GCMA producing at least 50% of the water needed. The number and Comment: Whoever “assumed” this must have had limited size of potable water tanks is to be based on the vessel’s potable experience working on towing vessels and OSVs.] water production capability and size of the crew. The agency Guidance and basic regulations should resolve any provides minimum standards for the vessel’s potable water problems. If nothing else, this rulemaking project can serve to manual. Finally, it includes a handy listing for a potable water focus the attention of the industry on this important issue and quality criteria and recommended analysis program. This lead ship owners and operators to double-check the potable program addresses subjective factors such as smell, taste, and water systems on their vessels. This is a very low cost effort appearance along with objective factors such as pH value, that will pay important dividends – and one that everyone can conductivity, free chlorine, color, e-coli count, copper, fully support. ammonia, benzene, lead etc. The International Organization for Comments on the rulemaking project appear at: Standardization (ISO), located in Geneva, Switzerland, has www.dms.dot.gov on the internet in Docket #USCG 2005-20052.

involved tasks that did not involve plenty of hard work, but GCMA – THE VOICE FOR MARINERS there were rewards of personal satisfaction of a job completed (An Editorial) or a job well done. In viewing the offshore oilfields along the Louisiana coast, it is clear they were not developed by idiots or The Gulf Coast Mariners Association serves as the voice for without lots of toil and sweat. In the past, a mariner could count “lower-level” mariners or, if you prefer a less demeaning term on their being enough other mariners working alongside him to “limited” mariners who serve on thousands of tugs, towboats, share the burden. offshore supply vessels, small passenger vessels, and other In recent years all of these factors started to change. “Cost commercial craft of less than 1,600 gross register tons. cutting” by corporate “bean-counters” reduced the number of Whether “limited” or “lower-level” we are the forgotten licensed and unlicensed mariners on each boat. The cooks on mariners although we always have been in the clear majority of tugs, towboats, and OSVs were eliminated and mariners were all the nation’s merchant mariners. Nevertheless, some in left to raid the icebox and survive on microwave snack foods. management seem to forget that nothing moves in this industry Additional duties dumped on mariners by the government, large unless our mariners move it! and small corporations, safety management systems, and In GCMA, our mariners have an outlet to express their “homeland security” concerns extended the workweek for needs, concerns, and interests in an arena monopolized by large licensed officers beyond the “legal” but grinding 84 hours. A corporate egos and governed by the Coast Guard. Boat owners, perfect example lies in the existing “Safety Management represented by increasingly larger and larger corporations have System” called the Responsible Carrier Program that finds taken our mariners for granted and mercilessly exploited them. absolutely nothing wrong with 15-hour workdays. The Coast Guard often serves as little more than a corporate The Coast Guard bends over backwards in praising the handmaiden. Responsible Carrier Program though saying nothing about its Until recently, there was no shortage of mariners to work on failures. Although we brought the 15-hour workday to the commercial vessels. Small commercial vessels were an area attention of the Towing Safety Advisory Committee at its last that offered individuals a unique opportunity for advancement two meetings, both AWO and the Coast Guard are too dense to without a hassle if they were mechanically inclined, loved the see that building an industry around policies like this are water, and found heavy-equipment operation appealing. Others strangling the goose that lays their golden egg. Can you believe found an occupation that was inviting, attractive, or lucrative that the following statement was added as a footnote to a TSAC where they could learn a trade while making their way upward Working Group document dated September 21, 2005: “The through the “hawsepipe” from deckhand to Captain – all within Working Group considered, but did not adopt, a the limits of their formal education. recommendation that all crewmembers receive a minimum of The marine industry used to be an area where there was six hours of uninterrupted rest in every 24-hour period. Ten minimal government interference and the rules allowed a great working group members opposed not including such a deal of personal freedom. Working on the water rarely recommendation in the working group report to TSAC.” More

Newsletter 14 about these “working groups” appears in this newsletter. Association, sabotaged our training program, and then set out to Our mariners need to understand that this “Working Group” cripple Offshore Mariners United (OMU), a fledgling union, as was staffed almost exclusively by corporate members of the it tried its best to improve the lot of mariners in the offshore oil American Waterways Operators (AWO), an industry trade industry from 2000 to 2003. It is factually correct to say that association representing the interests of about 200 of the most the “lockdown” of offshore mariners and restriction of their free influential towing companies. The meeting that generated this speech and freedom of association along the Louisiana and document was held in the Washington area in September 2005. Texas coasts occurred long before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 GCMA did not have the funds available to attend this meeting and long before “homeland security” ever became a although we have plenty to say about its outcome. consideration. Consequently, the interests of lower-level mariners were not Under this type of pressure, no individual dares to risk his represented even though we submitted a timely list of “123 job and his career by speaking up to oppose management or Suggestions” to TSAC. The corporate wimps will only back Coast Guard positions no matter how ignorant or uninformed off when a dozen or so well-informed mariners show up at these these positions may be. GCMA does not ask our supporters to meetings and challenge some of the points offered by chair- “stick their necks out” because we see that they have little bound corporate executives without any real work-experience protection from the nation’s labor laws. on the boats they manage. We are at a point where too few individuals are interested in Since April 1999, GCMA has been the only real “voice” for accepting a job in an overbearing industry where they work the nation’s lower-level mariners. We follow every major hard, gain invaluable experience but still be treated like ignorant issue, attend numerous meetings, prepare research reports. peons. Mariners who work in towing and in offshore oil Under the dedicated supervision and hard work of Captain understand why these sectors of the marine industry have David Miller, we make our work available to the public on the earned such a bad reputation. Both the Coast Guard and its internet. But GCMA is a “voice” shouting in the wilderness. “partners” in industry have done their best to domineer and Over the years, our “lower-level” mariners documented silence “lower-level” mariners and, for the most part, their open intimidation by corporate management. There are succeeded. clear signs, however, that some mariners have “had enough.” A Yet, we point out that our mariners clearly make up the group of experienced river pilots known as the “ARTCO Six” majority of all mariners in the U.S. Merchant Marine who lack any banded together to expose the tactics used by a subsidiary of sort of meaningful representation. While both sectors of the one of the nation’s largest corporations – Archer Daniels industry try to woo new “Academy” graduates who have the book Midland. The egregious behavior of other industry giants like learning, the college diploma, and a license, they find that many of American Commercial Barge Line (ACBL) toward our these graduates lack the experience to handle our boats or the mariners and their families have been exposed in the courtroom inclination to accept the abuse they can see all around them. and reported in the GCMA newsletter. The latest travesty to mariners seeking to rise through the In the past, grass roots organizations like American Inland hawsepipe is boosting the requirements for the 1,600-ton license – Mariners (AIM), Pilots Agree, and Offshore Mariners traditionally a “lower-level” license to that of a third-mate license. United (OMU) that dared to express the true concerns of their Our lower-level mariners’ attain a 1,600-ton license with a lifetime mariners were silenced, crushed, and their leaders driven from of hard-won experience. Now, they find that they must attain the the industry for daring to stand up and assert “rights” for same level of “book knowledge” as a graduate of a four-year mariners. Both industry and the Coast Guard chose to ignore maritime academy. Among other things, there is a considerable grass-roots mariner organizations like AIM with a strong price for such an education both in dollars and in time. The fact leadership structure and an expressed willingness to work with that the 500 and 1,600-ton licenses are inextricably tied together them. The marine industry’s past is littered with oversize egos, doesn’t help things for our “hawsepiper” who never saw the inside missed opportunities, and incredibly poor and unresponsive of a college lecture hall, or for that matter, may not have a high management. school or a G.E.D. diploma. Large corporations do not want to hear any “back-talk” It seems unlikely that most academy graduates will be from their employees. Unfortunately, this back-talk could teach willing to work in jobs where they can survey the situation and many important safety lessons that must be learned the hard see that the mariners around them are treated like dirt. Most of way at the expense of the public, insurance carriers, and them did not struggle through four years of college to attain that eventually by our mariners. kind of privilege. Many young graduates are uncomfortable and stand out like sore thumbs if an employer offers them Mariner Rights special treatment over hawsepipers who fought to come up through the ranks. Many measure their success by moving into At this point, it might be pertinent to ask: “What rights do I management rather than staying on the boats. Although many have as a mariner?” It is difficult to give a definitive answer. Academy graduates will survive these conditions, will it be However, the question encouraged us to publish Revision 1 to enough to ensure the glowing forecasts for future expansion of GCMA Report #R-344 entitled Mariner Rights in early trade and industry in the next quarter century? September. If nothing else, this report will give our mariners a In our six years of existence, GCMA has been able to make chance to look at the situation they face today in dealing with very limited headway against “stacked” advisory committees Corporate America from the unenviable position of an who pay little attention to problems of “lower-level” mariners. “Employee-at-Will.” Nevertheless, this report is really a work- For several years, our representative on MERPAC patiently in-progress and subject to change based upon what GCMA waited for that advisory committee to deal with any meaningful supporters tell us. “lower-level” issues. The Coast Guard puts off answering our It is painfully clear that our “lower-level” mariners have few wide-ranging inquiries even though we must address dozens of rights. Our mariners are nothing more than “at will” employees problems that our mariners report to us. Our mariners report to who can be fired at will for almost any reason. They missed the us and we report the truth and publish our findings. opportunity to join labor unions that are virtually non-existent Both corporate management and the Coast Guard that in our segment of the U.S. Merchant Marine. control our industry made serious mistakes that hurt our GCMA could only watch as union busters financed by mariners. Not listening to the mariners who face each and wealthy corporations and trade associations lied about our every problem we report on is the biggest mistake they ever

Newsletter 15 made and is about to turn around and bite them with a has very little appeal to “lower-level” mariners that remain and vengeance. The fare that the Coast Guard and industry offer little to attract new personnel. legislative history of 33 U.S.C. §1231 a geographic balance” I am concerned that COAST GUARD RESPONDS TO indicates that there have been eight there do not appear to be any ONOUR TOWING QUESTIONS SAFETY amendments since Congress enacted representatives who are NOT members ADVISORY COMMITTEE Public Law 96-380 (94 Stat. 1521) on of the American Waterways Operators. October 6, 1980 to establish TSAC. AWO is a large and powerful Five of these amendments periodically Washington lobby. While AWO claims On March 27, 2005, GCMA wrote to extended the existence of the committee to represent 80% of the tug and barge Captain David Scott (G-MSO), (in 1984, 1989, 1996, 2002 & 2004). industry, past Coast Guard rulemakings Executive Director, Towing Safety Currently, TSAC is authorized to operate and current Corps of Engineers statistics Advisory Committee at U.S. Coast until 2010 (Section 418 of the Coast indicate that there are between 900 and Guard Headquarters asking 10 questions Guard and Maritime Transportation Act, 1,300 business entities that operate about TSAC. We will combine the two Public Law 108-293, August 9, 2004). towing vessels. AWO membership letters: The three other amendments, which currently includes slightly less than 200 On August 25, 2005 we received the all occurred in 1982 (Public Law 97- companies. following response from USCG Captain 322), added the notice to publish notice In light of the Coast Guard’s 10-year L.W. Thomas with the following in the Federal Register for solicitation of “partnership” with AWO, there appears explanation for the delay: members, authorized TSAC to make to have developed a distinct bias in favor “This is in response to your June 1, information available to Congress, and of the AWO on the TSAC committee 2005 letter to the Commandant and your inserted provisions respecting since non-AWO-member towing March 27, 2005 letter to Captain David compensation and travel expenses. companies do not even have a seat on L. Scott, former Chief, Office of Regarding travel expenses, the law states the Committee. Chairmanship of TSAC Operational and Environmental that the Secretary may – but is not appears to pass from AWO member to Standards (G-MSO) and former required to – pay travel expenses AWO member without question in light Executive Director of the Towing Safety (including per diem) for TSAC of their grip on the committee. Subject Advisory Committee (TSAC). I members. to correction, do you see any non-AWO- relieved Captain Scott in July of this member companies represented in this year. I apologize for the time it has taken [GCMA ¶2: Membership.] Since the group of seven? I am unable to pull the to provide you with a formal reply. Mr. composition of the 16-member latest TSAC membership list from the Gerald Miante, the Assistant Executive Committee was established by Congress website. Director of TSAC, informs me that he in October 1980, is it correct to say that Since the Coast Guard superintends has been in telephone contact with you any additions or changes affecting its the merchant marine and should have on several occasions regarding your composition can only be changed by accurate knowledge of its composition at letters. I trust that Mr. Miante has Congress. Can the Coast Guard make USCG Headquarters level, we ask you already answered the most pressing of changes when it renews the committee verify whether the 80% figure cited your concerns. I will address each point charter – and to what extent? above represents verifiable information of your letter to Captain Scott in the or is simply self-serving hype or wishful same paragraph number below. [USCG Response to ¶2] 33 U.S.C. thinking. 1231(a) requires the Secretary to appoint We also ask for a definitive answer [Introduction & GCMA ¶1: Since the 16 total TSAC members in a specified as to whether the 900-1,300 vessel September TSAC meeting, I have ratio among six listed categories: seven population figures cited above (far in become increasingly concerned about members from the barge & towing exceeding AWO membership data) the direction the Towing Safety industry, one member from the offshore indicates the presence of a large, Advisory Committee has taken and the mineral & oil supply vessel industry, unrepresented sector of the towing very limited role that working mariners two members from port districts, industry whose views need to be actively and small towing vessel operators (i.e., authorities or terminal operators, two solicited either by the Coast Guard or by businesses) have in the operation of this members from maritime labor, two TSAC in the rulemaking process. federal advisory committee. shippers and two members of the general We seek this information because we As its Executive Director, I would public. While the Secretary appoints the detect a possibility that a favored, well- appreciate it if you would clarify, individual members who fill the organized, and well-funded cabal of correct, or comment on any of the positions required by the statute, you are powerful companies will throttle following points regarding TSAC so that correct that only Congress can change numerous legitimate towing vessel I may bring these matters to the attention the positions required by the statute. owners (e.g., independent smaller of Congress. I will number these points The TSAC charter, which the Secretary operators). We see the possibility that for brevity and ease of response. renews every two years, cannot conflict these companies may seek to obtain TSAC was established by Congress with the statute. Therefore, we cannot some tangible business advantage by in 1980 in 33 U.S.C. 1231a [Enclosure make changes to the positions when we mandating the institution of a complex, #1]. Are you aware of any subsequent renew the charter. expensive safety management system amendments to the law that do not that could put smaller towing companies appear in [Enclosure #1]? [GCMA ¶3. Membership]. On the out of business. “seven members from the barge and [USCG Reply to ¶1]: A review of the towing industry, reflecting a regional [USCG Reply to ¶3.] To my knowledge,

Newsletter 16 any particular relationship to the American 31,500 towing vessels and barges, Washington from Louisiana costs about Waterways Operators (AWO) is not a which is 80%. The Coast Guard has $1,000. Running back and forth to factor in the Secretary's decision to appoint not verified any of the data that attend working group meetings (such as one candidate over another in the seven- AWO provided, and we cannot attest the four working group meetings person barge and towing industry to the accuracy of any of these scheduled to meet to consider the towing membership category. The application for figures. vessel inspection safety management TSAC membership does not ask if the system task statement) is prohibitively applicant is affiliated with AWO, so the [GCMA Comment: Since the Coast expensive. However, I note that the Secretary would not normally be aware of Guard controls vessel documentation, statute [Enclosure #1, item 5] indicates AWO affiliation unless the applicant they should know how many towing that travel and per diem can be paid. volunteered such information. The vessels there are in the industry. Yet, the Committee Charter [Enclosure potential "bias" you perceive may simply USCG figures appearing in several #2, item #1] says that neither travel nor be a result of significantly more persons rulemaking dockets list 5,200 towing per diem is available. This statement in applying to TSAC who work for AWO- vessels. We can only hope that the the charter would discourage many affiliated companies and fall into this Coast Guard will have a clearer idea otherwise qualified applicants from membership category. of the number of towing vessels after applying for membership to TSAC. It The Secretary recently made new each towing vessel must earn a USCG appears that Members of Congress appointments to TSAC on August 3, Certificate of Inspection.] understand that private citizens need 2005. Analyzing the current TSAC compensation for this type of expense membership, there are now eight AWO- [GCMA ¶4. Membership. One although the Coast Guard just does not affiliated members and eight non-AWO- member is selected from the offshore seem to get the message with TSAC. affiliated members on TSAC (total of 16 mineral and oil supply vessel industry. The same comments are true of NOSAC. members). Six of the eight AWO- We have no complaint about the I can only speculate that the Coast Guard affiliated members fall within the "barge selection, but would respectfully suggest believes that it doesn’t need to import and towing industry" category. that Congress consider updating the expertise on the towing industry from You also assert that AWO claims to wording of the statute to “the towing other parts of the country (including our represent 80% of the "tug and barge sector of the offshore mineral and oil “lower-level” mariners) when AWO has industry," and you ask us to verify this industry” to represent the 200+ towing a ready supply of talent at their beck and claim. The Coast Guard is under no vessels rather than offshore supply call in nearby Arlington, VA. obligation to verify the claims of AWO, vessels (OSV). OSVs are well and we neither collect nor maintain the represented by the National Offshore [USCG Reply to ¶5.] As discussed in data necessary to fulfill your request in Safety Advisory Committee (NOSAC) paragraph #1 above, the TSAC enabling this regard. Nonetheless, Mr. Miante that was formed years after the statute provides that the Secretary may, spoke with AWO about the 80% figure. formation of TSAC. There is a but is not required to, pay travel AWO advised us of the following: significant difference between OSVs and expenses (including per diem) for TSAC • Using Army Corps of Engineers' tugs. members. Currently, TSAC members data, AWO estimates that there are are not paid travel expenses. approximately 1,287 towing vessel [USCG Reply to ¶4.] The Coast Guard Recognizing that this may pose a companies, including those that agrees with your statement in item #4 disproportionate burden on small engage both in towing and in other that the offshore category should be businesses and individual mariners who endeavors (but excluding filled from the "towing sector of the might otherwise apply for TSAC government agencies, oil field offshore mineral and oil industry." membership, we are currently exploring production, shipyard and other "tug Indeed, the offshore supply vessel the possibility of obtaining additional assist" work). (OSV) contingent is well represented at funding to cover these expenses; • AWO claims to represent about 200 the National Offshore Safety Advisory however, we do not currently know of these companies (plus Committee (NOSAC). Perhaps you if/when we will obtain these funds. approximately 200 "affiliates" who might include these views when you not directly own/operate towing petition Congress for the addition of [GCMA Comment: The Coast Guard vessels, e.g. insurance companies other membership categories (see does pay travel and per diem for the and shipyards). paragraph #6). Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory • AWO estimates that these 1,287 Committee (MERPAC). They towing vessel companies [GCMA Comment: We did this in recently held a meeting in Hawaii! own/operate approximately 3,932 our petition to Congress transmitted Aloha.] towing vessels regularly engaged in in GCMA Report #R-417.] the business of commercial towing. [GCMA ¶6. Working Mariner • AWO estimates that these 1,287 [GCMA ¶5. Travel and Per Diem.] In Perspective.] Although the TSAC towing vessel companies also the September (2004) TSAC meeting, committee advises on “matters related to own/operate approximately 27,568 Captain William Beacom rose from the shallow-draft inland and coastal barges, for a total of approximately audience to state that most mariners waterway navigation and towing safety,” 31,500 towing vessels and barges would find it impossible to serve on in the September (2004) TSAC meeting combined; and, TSAC if selected because travel and per we noted that only two committee • AWO members own/operate diem were not covered. I share his members present actually had experience approximately 25,200 of these concern. Speaking for myself, a trip to operating towing vessels. A third

Newsletter 17 member with such experience was not in month gaining on-the-water experience the eight federal advisory committees he attendance. Of these three members, all in riding towing vessels and making sponsors for as long a time as he is are currently in “chair-bound” necessary industry visits throughout the permitted by his other marine safety and management positions. country before signing aboard. security duties. [Enclosure #3] shows that from the Coast Guard’s first selection of members [USCG Reply to ¶7.] While the work [GCMA ¶9.] We note that [Enclosure that participants from industry were of any federal advisory committee #2] taken from the Committee website overwhelmingly selected from the ranks should be understood by the Coast shows the current committee Charter of corporate executives – a trend that Guard officials designated to facilitate expires on July 1, 2003. Surely, the continues today. We find it shocking the operation of the committee, the committee has not passed out of that no working mariners are represented resultant recommendations should be existence, has it? on this federal advisory committee. those of the expert members. The Consequently, GCMA will suggest that missions of the Coast Guard are diverse, [USCG Reply to ¶9.] The charter date Congress review TSAC membership and our military members generally to which you refer is the date of criteria. We are preparing to ask that change duty stations every two to four enactment of the previous charter. It Congress change the membership groups years. The remaining civilian expired two years from July 1, 2003 represented on the committee to employees, although possessing varying (i.e., it expired on July 1, 2005). As of represent our 32,000 “lower-level” expertise in the general maritime field, the date of this letter, TSAC's charter has mariners. Our mariners, who actually may not be career towboat personnel. been renewed until August 1, 2007. The work on towing vessels on a day-to-day We will consider your suggestion to current charter is available on Coast basis, must be accorded some afford Coast Guard personnel with Guard Homeport: opportunity to stand up and discuss TSAC responsibilities the opportunity http://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/ mariner problems. We will recommend for appropriate towing-specific training home.do that the following mariners be included and/or experience; however, we cannot (select "Ports & Waterways" in left as members of TSAC in the future: commit to any additional training or column of opening page, then click 1) An inland towboat pilot with broad qualification requirements for Coast "Safety Advisory Committees" in lower experience on Western Rivers and Guard personnel at this time. middle of next screen, then select Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. "TSAC"). 2) An offshore tug captain, [GCMA ¶8.] Since the sixteen 3) A ship docking or harbor tugboat members of TSAC as well as members [GCMA ¶10.] We request a copy of the master, of the public travel from all parts of the Department of Homeland Security 4) An unlicensed towboat engineer. country to attend a TSAC meeting, this Directive that speaks to the operation of and involves considerable expense it is is the department’s federal advisory [USCG Reply to ¶6.] The Coast Guard not a social gathering. Since these committees. Please advise whether a respects your right and applauds your meetings often are announced 6 months separate FOIA request is necessary. interest in petitioning Congress to add to in advance, it is only reasonable to ask TSAC's membership categories as you that the Committee Sponsor attend the [USCG Reply to ¶10.] You may see necessary. We also encourage you meeting in its entirety. As formal contact the Department of Homeland to widely publicize all TSAC presentations by members of the public Security for the federal advisory membership opportunities amongst your are relegated to the last 30 minutes of the committee directive that you seek. You members so that we can increase the main meeting, it would be rewarding to should direct your request to Ms. number of "working mariner" applicants have an officer of flag rank in Georgia Abraham: [email protected]. for TSAC. attendance. One of our members Ms. Abraham's phone number is 202- suggested that starting the meeting with 282-9150. [GCMA ¶7.] This remark is not the Pledge of Allegiance also would be Thank you for your continued intended to be personal. In the dignified and appropriate and its absence interest and participation in TSAC. If immediate future, it would be helpful if in past meetings was noted. you require additional information, the Coast Guard appointed an Executive please contact Mr. Miante at 202-267- Director of TSAC who had recent [USCG Reply to ¶8.] Your suggestion 0221, fax: 202-267-4570, or via e-mail experience in the towing industry. This for the Pledge of Allegiance is at: [email protected]. Sincerely, is especially important in light of the noted. As to the attendance of TSAC's L. W. Thomas, Captain, U.S. Coast coming inspection of towing vessels. sponsor, Rear Admiral Gilmour's Guard Chief, Office of Operating and Since the Coast Guard may not be able scheduling requirements are subject to Environmental Standards. to find the person in their ranks with this change even within several days or hours Copy: G-CCS; G-CQM; G-M; G-M-1. background, in lieu of that, we suggest of our meetings. He remains committed, that your successor spend at least one however, to attend as many meetings of

BLOOMFIELD & KATZ THE RIVER LAWYERS

L. Jeff Bloomfield Telephone: (901) 528-1702 50. N. Front Street, Ste. 800 1-888-31-RIVER

Newsletter 18 Post Office Box 3290 Facsimile: (901) 528-0246 Memphis, TN 38173-0290 Email: [email protected] • The evidence indicates that the Port Leg Jacking Tower M/V LAUREN: LIFTBOAT SINKS housing suffered a major structural failure. IN THE GULF OF MEXICO • The evidence indicates the loss of the L/B LAUREN was due to the failure of the Master and the Owners of the vessel [Source: USCG MISLE Case #222740, GCMA file #M-565.] to properly inform the USCG or have the malfunction and On or about 1140 on March 13, 2005 the Liftboat Lauren, repairs inspected by shipbuilding engineers. owned and operated by Melancon Marine of Cut Off, LA, sank • Fatigue was not a factor in this casualty. after the port leg jacking tower failed while the vessel was in • Weather was not a factor in this casualty. South Timbalier Block 21, Well #111 in the Gulf of Mexico just south of the Louisiana coastline. Remedial Action The 99 gross register ton liftboat was 62 feet long with a beam of 46 feet and was built in 1973. It had three 90-foot legs Suspension and revocation proceedings are being taken with two cranes and berths for 16 people including a crew of against Captain „„„„. Civil Penalty actions are being taken four. It was operating in approximately 30 feet of water at the against Melancon Marine, LLC. time of the accident. The liftboat capsized on its side and pictures revealed it was The Captain’s Statement to USCG totally submerged. It was declared a total constructive loss with a reported value of $1,150,000. There were no injuries, [The Captain’s typed statement was submitted through his minimal pollution. Fortunately, there was no damage to the attorney and was not edited.] well the liftboat was servicing.. On 3/11/05, I was Captain aboard the M/V LAUREN, a liftboat. The deckhand on board was „„„„. At The Coast Guard Investigation approximately 1300 hours, we were going to move at the instruction of our customer back to ST 21 #111. I had 10 On or about 1300 on March 12, 2005, the L/B LAUREN people onboard vessel, including a customer representative, and was jacked up at position 29°01’N, 090° 16’W with contractors. Secured vessel and started jack down about 15-20 approximately 30 feet of air gap between the keel and the ft. when the port leg had a problem. I stopped jacking and went water’s surface. The Master, Capt. „„„„ made preparations and inspected the port leg. I saw a crack near the top of the to lower the liftboat. When Capt. „„„„ began the jackdown tower. I spoke with , the customer's representative, and told procedures, he and the crew of ten personnel onboard heard a him that's it, we have to get all contractors off the boat. We noise that was determined to have originated from the Port Leg called the C/B MAGGIE to come offload all contractors onto Jacking Tower. Jacking operations were secured, and the crew the MISS LEAH. While waiting to offload contractors, I inspected the leg tower and discovered cracks in the structure. required everyone to stay off the front deck and to stay on Capt. „„„„ contacted the owner of the L/B LAUREN, wheelhouse level on starboard side until everyone could be Mr. „„„„ of Melancon Marine, LLC. Mr. „„„„ evacuated. We had three life rings and lifeboat on deck contacted Marine Industrial Fabricators (MIF) to have a welder (wheelhouse) starboard side. report to the L/B LAUREN to make repairs to the subject vessel For the rest of the night, the boat crew was on board only, on site in the Gulf of Mexico. and the M/V INTERNATIONAL LEADER was at ST21 D&H At approximately 0730 on March 13, 2005, Mr. „„„„ on standby in case of emergency to assist us. We kept watch from MIF arrived on board the L/B LAUREN to make repairs. and stayed in constant contact with that boat. Life rings were Mr. „„„„ welded two patches over the visible cracks on the still on wheelhouse deck in case of emergency. At around Port Leg Tower and declared it fixed. 0730, we offloaded one repairman from Marine Industrial At approximately 1140 on March 13, 2005, the leg was Fabricators to make repairs to the port leg tower. tested and it failed. The vessel listed to port, fell 15 feet. The Adjustments were made toward lining-up the rack of the crew abandoned ship by jumping overboard, and the L/B port leg with the pinions. „„„„ (welded) two plates to the LAUREN sank in 30 feet of water. top of the leg tower and the pinion box. Installed the hoses on Captain „„„„, Mr. „„„„, nor any other the motors for the pinions. All brake lines were attached to representatives of Melancon Marine LLC or MIF notified any each brake. Capped off the hose for the no. 2 motor and looped U.S. Coast Guard personnel regarding the major malfunction of the hose for the no. 1 motor. After „„„„ finished his the Port Leg Jacking Tower on board the L/B LAUREN or repairs, he said to give it a shot to jack-down. received permission to conduct repairs to the leg. I got everyone up on the starboard side with lifejackets on The evidence indicates that the Port Leg Jacking Tower and called the M/V INTERNATIONAL LEADER to come suffered a structural failure of its housing. The situation was standby and be ready in case of emergency. When I tried to go stabilized enough to bring in a repair company the next day but up on the port leg to start the process for jacking down, it never there was no engineering review of the Port Leg Jacking Tower moved up. It just went down on its own. I tried to come down malfunction or the welding repair plan. on the starboard and stern legs to catch up with the port, but After the accident, Mr. „„„„, the welder, claimed that he there was no catching up. had no training other than basic welding skills. No other ship I instructed everyone to abandon ship. The M/V building engineers or liftboat specialists came aboard to inspect INTERNATIONAL LEADER was right there to rescue us. No the damage prior to the subject vessel’s sinking. one was injured. We all were hauled in on M/V INTERNATIONAL LEADER. Apparent Cause

Newsletter 19 Action Against the Captain the Coast Guard’s permission before making repairs on an inspected vessels. This will be a whole new ballgame for Subject: Warning in lieu of suspension and revocation towing vessels when they finally come under inspection. We proceedings believe the towing industry will fight to preserve their ability to Dear Mr. „„„„, “save a buck” by performing all sorts of unsafe and unsupervised An investigation has revealed the following conduct on your repairs as they always have done. As a licensed officer, you must part while serving aboard the L/B LAUREN O/N548383 under be sure the Coast Guard has an opportunity to supervise all the authority of (your) license repairs on your vessel. These rules were promulgated for your Complaint: 46 CFR 5.29 (Negligence). safety and the safety of your crew. Your crew is your To wit: On or about 1140 on March 13, 2005, while you were responsibility. Don’t let them down or sell them out! piloting the L/B LAUREN, you failed to safely operate the vessel and thereby contributed to the sinking of subject vessel. The Regulations It was determined that justice will be best served by a issuing a warning rather than conducting a formal proceeding for your 46 CFR §176.700. Permission for repairs and alterations. conduct as set forth above. You are advised that this warning will (a) Repairs or alterations to the hull, machinery, or equipment become a part of your merchant mariner's record and will be that affect the safety of the vessel must not be made without considered during any future enforcement actions involving you. the approval of the cognizant OCMI, except during an If you feel this warning is not warranted, you may decline it by emergency. When repairs are made during an emergency, signing and dating the under the statement below and returning the owner, managing operator, or master shall notify the this letter to the address above within 30 days of the date of the OCMI as soon as practicable after such repairs or letter. However, your refusal will result in suspension and alternations are made. Repairs or alterations that affect the revocation proceedings being initiated against your Merchant safety of the vessel include, but are not limited to: Mariner's Credential in accordance with Title 46 USC Chapter replacement, repair, or refastening of deck or hull planking, 77. You may contact me at the number above with questions. plating, and structural members; repair of plate or frame Sincerely, LCDR R. D. Patrick, Investigating Officer. cracks; damage repair or replacement, other than replacement in kind, of electrical wiring, fuel lines, tanks, Lessons for our Mariners boilers and other pressure vessels, and steering, propulsion and power supply systems; alterations affecting stability; In light of their poor safety record, the Coast Guard brought and repair or alteration of lifesaving, fire detecting, or fire every liftboat in the offshore oil industry under inspection 1n extinguishing equipment. 1989-1990. (b) The owner or managing operator shall submit drawings, It is apparent, both from the Captain’s handwritten sketches, or written specifications describing the details of statement as well as his typed statement, he did almost any proposed alterations to the cognizant OCMI. Proposed everything that was reasonably possible under the alterations must be approved by the OCMI before work is circumstances. However, his company put his license in started. jeopardy by failing to notify the Coast Guard that they proposed (c) Drawings are not required to be submitted for repairs or to repair the vessel on site in violation of 46 CFR §176.700. replacements in kind. If you operate an inspected vessel, that will include towing (d) The OCMI may require an inspection and testing whenever vessels as soon as the regulations are in place, you must have a repair or alteration is undertaken.

MOC) asking for our comments on a Coast Guard Legislative USCG SEEKS CHANGE IN Change Proposal (LCP). This is the first time I can FEDERAL LICENSING STANDARDS remember that the Coast Guard asked our Association to By Richard A. Block comment on a LCP. [Docket #USCG 2005-21187; GCMA File GCM-128] This Legislative Change Proposal is an initiative by Coast Guard Headquarters staff (especially lawyers) to ask Congress Introduction to change existing laws. To summarize this proposal, “The Coast Guard believes that identity verification is a critical It is important for our “lower-level” mariners to present element of port security, recognizing that we must know and our views at the national level. While it may be important, it trust those who are provided unescorted access to our port can also be extremely tedious and to wade through what could facilities and vessels (as part of) the President’s proposal to well be legislative and regulatory minefields. After doing so, implement the recommendations of the (9/11 Commission it is an immense sigh of relief just to put your thoughts on Report in the area of Merchant Mariner Credentials and to paper and move on. modernize these statutes.” The problem with “moving on” for “lower-level” mariners The draft proposal, if adopted by Congress, would create is that while we may go “on record” for one position or two new Chapters in Title 46 of the United States Code, another, we have no staff resident in Washington to present Chapters 72 and 74. These two Chapters would contain these our views to Congress or even to properly inform the Coast new Sections (§) that deal with subjects that are of concern to Guard. For years, trade Associations like AWO and OMSA our mariners: have totally ignored the views of their mariners and pushed forward with their own greedy and selfish corporate agendas. New Chapter 72 In late May 2005, GCMA received a call from a Mr. Dan Fitzgerald at the Coast Guard’s Office of Compliance (G- §7201 General

Newsletter 20 §7202 Issuance of Merchant Mariner Credentials. GCMA Letter Submitted to the Docket §7203 Oath §7204 Citizenship June 2, 2005 §7205 Duration. §7206 Background Checks. Mr. Dan Fitzgerald §7207 Drug and Alcohol Testing. Office of Compliance (G-MOC) §7208 Fees. U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters §7209 Substitution for Service 2100 Second Street, SW §7210 Exemption From Draft Washington, DC 20593-0001 §7211 Records. References: New Chapter 74 • Docket #USCG-2005-21187; §208 (proposed) Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2005. §7401 General. • Your call of Monday May 23, 2005. §7402 Administrative Procedures for Suspension & Revocation Hearings. Dear Mr. Fitzgerald, §7403 Subpoenas and Oaths. Thank you for extending us an invitation to comment on §7404 Grounds for Suspension or Revocation of a Merchant §208 of this Legislative Change Proposal. I want to preface Mariner Credential. my remarks by saying that I am not a lawyer. My background §7405 Grounds for Temporary Suspension. on this LCP is limited to “plain reading” the material from the §7406 Penalties internet on this date. The Gulf Coast Mariners Association represents “lower- Changing the statutes would mean that soon thereafter the level” licensed and unlicensed mariners who serve on vessels Coast Guard would have to issue new regulations so they of less than 1,600 gross register tons – primarily tugs, could enforce the new statutes. This ponderous procedure is towboats, offshore supply vessels and small passenger vessels. so dull that most mariners will give it one great big yawn. My comments reflect these limits. I will be unable to attend However, this yawn dismisses a number of things that could the public meeting in Washington and request that you enter be of great concern to our mariners in the years to come. these comments in the docket. These comments refer to the following proposed LCP sections and subsections. GCMA Reviewed the Proposed Changes §7201(b)(3) Definition of “mariner.” It would be useful if Mariners can access the entire Legislative Change you defined a “merchant mariner.” We consider this term to Proposal on the internet at http://dms.dot.gov. In fact, our refer to any licensed, unlicensed, or certificated person who letter (below) is of only limited interest unless you read it works on a commercial vessel. along with the Coast Guard’s Legislative Change Proposal. In 46 U.S.C §2103, “The Secretary has general The LCP, along with all the responses from members of superintendence over the merchant marine of the United the public, appears on the Department of Transportation’s States and of merchant marine personnel…” The statute Docket Management System website. When you reach the should define exactly who the Secretary superintends! site, you can access this particular docket by typing the numbers 21187. There you will find our letter (below) §7202(c)(3). “Qualified professionally as demonstrated by surrounded by several dozen letters from other groups – each education, examination, training, and experience.” A with its own point of view. Our viewpoint is unique in that it significant number of well-qualified lower-level mariners and concentrates on problems that our mariners face on a daily hawsepipers would leave the industry if they had to possess a basis. Many of the items we cite were ignored by the Coast high school or college diploma as a condition of entry or Guard for years. Every day we watch the Coast Guard advancement in the merchant marine. I see no problem with gravitating toward the centers of political and business power the other words, specifically “examination, training, and (i.e., kissing up to trade associations like AWO and OMSA). experience.” Because they consider our mariners insignificant in I can recall a meeting a number of years ago, well attended comparison to boat owners, trade associations, labor unions by local commercial boat owners, where a Coast Guard etc., these groups receive most of their attention. All of these Captain from G-MVP suggested that it might not be possible groups exercise much greater “power” than our mariners. to obtain a license in the future without at least a 10th grade The voice of our “lower-level” mariners is ineffective education. That comment stirred angry controversy. Formal because boat companies make it virtually impossible for education is a sensitive issue with many lower-level mariners mariners to join unions. Unions can hire the staff necessary to who are practical people and must make do in life with follow important mariner issues in Washington as well as whatever education they have obtained. locally and speak up whenever necessary. Our Association, on the other hand, does not garner sufficient support to attract §7202(e). “…seaman working in the deck department or enough interest, commitment, and funding to send our engine department or any other capacity deemed appropriate.” representatives to important meetings in Washington such as What happened to the Steward’s Department? Did the the one on June 17, 2005 where important matters were “Steward’s Department” vanish as a “cost cutting” measure? discussed and decisions made that will affect us for years to If so, this certainly cannot benefit mariners. come. The Coast Guard is supposed to regulate the marine industry. “…Any other capacity deemed appropriate” allows

Newsletter 21 employers to decide what is appropriate and what is not vessels over 200 feet in length. All of these vessels could appropriate. Our mariners report significant problems with pose a threat if they were in the wrong hands. deckhands, engineers, and tankermen without even basic One problem has always been the high turnover of sanitation training cooking meals for the vessel’s crew. deckhands. Our mariners expect the new towing vessel [Enclosure #1] explains some of the practical problems our inspection regulations (Docket #USCG-2004-19977) to end mariners face when they are not sufficiently regulated. We the work-hour abuse of our mariners on these vessels. have reported major problems with “green” deckhands being Improving working conditions may improve the turnover “deemed appropriate” by their employers and then assigned situation. to engineroom duties without any training. [Enclosure #2] Our mariners working on inland towing vessels where lays out the whole sorry problem with engineers in this “deckhands” do not require any USCG credentials report industry. As you can see, we shared this report with Congress employers hire criminals and drug abusers to work on these several months ago. vessels. During the mid-1990s, the Coast Guard would not pay the small fee to obtain routine FBI checks for all mariners §7202(h) & §7404(a)(7). “The Secretary may deny issuance applying for credentials. That invited the type of problems we of a merchant mariner credential to an applicant…who will must deal with today. Has the Coast Guard learned from that adversely impact good discipline at sea.” experience? Which Coast Guard official is the custodian of the crystal It seems that this Legislative Change Proposal misses the ball that predicts future acts? There have to be adequate mark if it skirts this issue and fails to require identity appeal procedures for unjustified actions taken against a credentials and background checks for all merchant mariners – mariner who may be denied the opportunity to work and inshore and offshore, on all commercial vessels. support himself and his family. Employers abused their mariners by overworking their licensed and unlicensed personnel – and the Coast Guard did §7202(k). “The Secretary may refuse to consider an nothing about it for years. A significant source of this abuse incomplete merchant mariner credential application.” is the AWO’s Responsible Carrier Program that still tells its This problem reflects one of the greatest abuses of the member companies that a 15-hour workday is acceptable. existing Regional Exam Centers. A mariner pays quite a bit of [Enclosure #5] Even that policy is abused in the “Call your money for a government service. License and MMD watch” system as mentioned in [Enclosure #3] for Engineers “evaluation” has become a very specialized part of an extremely and in [Enclosure #4] for deckhands. This contributes to the complicated application process. One of the better-organized turnover problem. RECs had an application “package” in excess of 30 pages. Many applicants, especially our lower-level mariners need §7207(b) and §7404(a)(6). I believe this provision has been help in completing their applications. They often leave spaces on the books for a long time. It does not seem to have any blank because they don’t know how to fill them in. Reaching meaning in the context of the drug laws enforced by the Coast many RECs by phone has been especially challenging. Guard. Its meaning and usefulness remains a mystery. Consequently, many individuals who are uncomfortable with the bureaucracy are discouraged from applying for licenses §7210. “If killed or wounded when performing these and MMDs. Others turn away because they cannot get timely duties…” Excellent change – only 60 years late! help from existing RECs. One alternative is to spend more I am sure Congressman Filner, who stood up for World War II money to get a “application preparer” to do the job for them – merchant mariners, will appreciate it, too. often a tall order for a person who may be out of work. Paperwork gridlock is one of the major causes of the current §7211(b) & (c). Thank you for including GCMA’s requested personnel shortage. change in the Legislative Change Proposal. This provision will be of little help to our mariners because it will guarantee that the RECs will never take the §7401(a). The “purpose” of Suspension and Revocation time to improve their service to mariners. It is easier to drive should include the words “remedial in nature.” That is still them away than put up with the hassle of helping mariners true, isn’t it? with their paperwork. It is easier to “highlight” blanks on the application, throw it back in the mail, and get rid of it for §7404(a)(4). The word “may” that governs this subsection is another few weeks. That is exactly what this proposal does. like a Sword of Damocles suspended over a mariner’s head for up to 5 years. This leaves uncertainty when a mariner §7206(a) & (c). “The Secretary may conduct background goes to renew his license or MMD. We have had cases like checks on applicants for merchant marine credentials.” The this and they are very stressful, especially when they word “may” should be changed to “must.” completed punishment or cure and are not recidivists. This I believe that you may have overlooked the very important will be an administrative wasteland lorded over by petty fact that most mariners who work on commercial vessels on bureaucrats acting as God. We can do better than this! inland waters (i.e., where all the ports we must protect are located) were never issued Merchant Mariner Documents and, §7405(a). “A merchant mariner credential may be consequently, all fly below the Coast Guard’s radar. In temporarily suspended for not more than 45 days…” Does a addition, even when working offshore on vessels under 100 mariner have a claim to his 45-days lost pay and attorney fees GRT (e.g., where many important and vulnerable installations under the Equal Access to Justice Act if the government are located, especially in the Gulf of Mexico) mariners do not cannot prove its case? If so, include that information in the have MMDs either. Over the years, the size of vessels under proposed statute. Again, note the term “merchant mariner” the 100 GRT thresholds has grown so that it includes some should be defined.

Newsletter 22

§7405(b). “…shall be provided with….” Suggest: “may request” an expedited hearing. §7406(a)(1). Unfortunately, you cannot legislate honesty. §7406(a)(2) Even paid or unpaid “preparers” who try to help Until after 9/11, the Coast Guard seldom scrutinized mariners prepare their applications can mistakes. There are so applications or performed perfunctory checks. In the mid- many regulations, policies, and such voluminous NMC 1990s, Regional Exam Centers purged license files to make guidance documents that it is very easy to get lost. I helped space in their filing cabinets. Important personal documents fill out applications for over 30 years. I no longer do so such as court records of convictions were trashed in the because I could not keep up with all the regulations – and I process. The whole process was very loose. Suddenly, the have a Master’s degree. Coast Guard tightened the process after 9/11 and mariners I watched the Coast Guard harass and threaten an were told to find or replace irreplaceable documents the RECs “application preparer” at a local maritime school who was trashed. This was at the root of some of the alleged failure to accused of what would become 46 USC §7706(a)(2). I report convictions settled years before – and had nothing to do believe those charges were baseless. The harassment was with honesty. uncalled for. The proposed change escalates the punishment Keep in mind that the license and MMD application process with an overblown civil penalty. became excessively complex over the years – comparable to filing an income tax. The application process and the Coast §8101 – The core of your problem with lower-level merchant Guard mismanagement of merchant marine personnel has mariners does not lie in the changes you propose to make. It become the poster child for intolerably poor public service. lies elsewhere. But, since the document mentions §8101, you Processing merchant marine personnel has become such a will find my thoughts in the opening pages of [Enclosure #3]. disgrace that Congress should take it away from the Coast Guard I hope that these comments will be useful. because of the way it denigrates our mariners! Very truly yours, There may be reasonable explanations for minor s/Richard A. Block infractions that ought to be excusable under normal Master #1014425, Issue #8 circumstances. However, I have seen these infractions treated Secretary, Gulf Coast Mariners Association as an S&R case where absolutely nothing is excusable and no excuse can deter revocation. Enclosures

§7706(e). License applications always carried the 18 USC §1001 Enclosure #1 – Excerpt from GCMA Report #R-276, Rev. 9, penalty. I believe the existing penalty is sufficient, even for #9, 42, 52. “willful violations.” Expecting to recover $10,000 per day for Enclosure #2 – GCMA Report #R-401, Rev 1, Crew each day of a violation from one of our mariners is unrealistic! Endurance and the Towing Vessel Engineer I seldom see the Coast Guard take a company to court over Enclosure #3 – GCMA Report #R-412. Towboat Engineer’s a license or MMD violation – even when they hire unqualified Death Points to Need for Changes in the Law. mariners and work them unconscionable hours. When you Enclosure #4 – GCMA Report #R-375, Crew Endurance: The show the need to impose a $10,000-a-day civil penalty on a Call-Watch Cover-Up. large corporation to make it unprofitable for them to continue Enclosure #5 – AWO Responsible Carrier Program, Section to break the law, like working our mariners unconscionable V – B. hours, then change the law.

has been ongoing, these words appeared in a recent editorial in THE APPRENTICE MATE/STEERSMAN The Waterways Journal.(1) [(1)Sept. 19, 2005, p.4] SITUATION “…What is worrisome is that the agency published in its most recent Proceedings magazine a list of persons holding As the Coast Guard prepared to update towing vessel various mariner licenses. This list shows only 84 hold the licensing in the late 1990s following the Amtrak-Bayou Canot new steersman license! What this means is that in the entire disaster, they held a number of public hearings. A major country, there are only 84 people training to become towboat concern voiced by a number of mariners was that there were a pilots. This begs the question: How can the industry expect number of pilots that could not handle their tows. The Coast to replace people lost to even routine attrition during the next Guard interpreted this as a call for more practical training – a two years with hardly anyone in the training pipeline? Two call that eventually led to creation of the Apprentice years is the average amount of time it will take to train a Mate/Steersman program with its Towing Officer Assessment steersman to become a pilot. The Coast Guard lists about Record (TOAR). 30,000 operators of uninspected towing vessels, some of The towing industry is slow to adopt changes. Although whom hold more than one type of operator’s license. It is the Towing Safety Advisory Committee, that has become very clear that there will need to be a lot more than 84 steersmen closely linked to the American Waterways Operators, out there or there will be a lot of boats tied up for lack of spearheaded many of these licensing changes, GCMA crew. The Proceedings list revealed a problem only representatives participated in many of the Washington exacerbated by (hurricane) Katrina.” meetings where the Apprentice Mate/Steersman concept was Actually, the situation may not be as drastic as pictured. developed and finalized before May 21, 2001. The figure of “84 steersmen” comes from a count made last Although the regulations have been on the books since December that appears in this newsletter. In addition, many May 21, 2001 and training of the new candidates presumably candidates for pilot licenses who could provide sea service

Newsletter 23 letters showing service before May 21, 2001 were able to sit GCMA Letter to TSAC Licensing Working Group for their pilot licenses directly under the “old” licensing system. However, that window of opportunity has closed. [Background: The Towing Safety Advisory Committee is a Federal advisory committee that advises the Coast Guard on issues involving the towing industry. Unfortunately, it often serves as a “rubber stamp” for the American Waterways Operators, an industry trade association. On July 14, 2005 Captains David C. Whitehurst and Richard A. Block attended a licensing working group meeting at the offices of Buffalo Marine in Houston, TX. Following that meeting, we submitted the following letter for the working group’s consideration. Unfortunately, but predictably, these suggestions were largely ignored]

July 25, 2004

We respectfully submit that each of the following points be considered in regard to towing vessel licensing by the Towing Safety Advisory Committee (TSAC), the Coast Guard and the towing industry in general.

For TSAC Consideration

1. GCMA suggests that TSAC reaffirm that the purpose of the original rulemaking for Apprentice Mate/Steersman was to provide for systematic training through observation and hands-on training in the pilothouse by a licensed Master or Mate Pilot. It was not designed as off-duty, or after-hours training for deckhands after completing their required 18- month service on deck.

2. GCMA suggests that TSAC reaffirm that, although not spelled out in the regulations, this pilothouse training requires carrying an “extra man” (i.e., the Apprentice Mate/Steersman) in addition to the Master or Mate/Pilot on duty for training purposes. This does involve training expense for the company.

3. GCMA suggests that TSAC reaffirm that pilothouse training is not mandatory for any towing company. However, the regulations and guidance in NVIC 4-01 expect the management of a towing company that trains one or more Apprentice Mate/Steersman to have a training program, to administer it properly, and use the services of a Designated Examiner certified by the National Maritime Center (NMC) to check out each Apprentice Mate/Steersman candidate using the appropriate TOAR.

4. GCMA suggests that TSAC reaffirm that 18 months service on deck with 12 of those months served on towing vessels (as is presently required) is the minimum acceptable service time on deck as a prerequisite to enter the Apprentice Mate/Steersman program. The only way this service time can be shortened is if a candidate attends a USCG-approved training course that trains a candidate in deck skills (counted towards the 6 months required) and/or in towing-related skills (as part of the 12-month towing vessel service requirement).

5. GCMA suggests that TSAC reaffirm that pilothouse training and observation does not include filling the slot or carrying out the duties of any (missing) deckhand, engineer, or other crewmember.

6. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider recommending that approved courses in engineroom safety and equipment

Newsletter 24 operational subjects pertinent to towing vessels be credited for officer took an unlicensed mariner “under his wing” and a portion of the required 18-month sea service required before trained him until he was a proficient Mate/Pilot. While the a person can sit for the Apprentice Mate/Steersman test. old system successfully trained many of today’s pilots, the same personnel conditions that supported the older system 7. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider recommending that may no longer exist in many places following the Pilots Agree existing Academy hands-on training programs could be re- strike of 1998. See #30 below.] evaluated to calculate any days of sea service that might be applicable toward 1) deck service (6 month limit) and/or 2) towing For USCG Consideration vessel service (12-month limit). Eight hours are creditable for one day of sea service or as determined by NMC policy. 16. The Coast Guard’s National Maritime Center approved hundreds of training courses that now serve as a basis for training 8. GCMA suggests that TSAC express concern that, after 4½ merchant mariners. However, when the Coast Guard fails to years of the 5-year grace period has already passed, it appears budget the funds to monitor these training courses and, by that management of many towing companies did not fulfill default, trusts any for-profit system (even an “educational” their responsibilities in training Mates/Pilots using the system) to operate without adequate and knowledgeable Apprentice Mate/Steersman/Designated Examiner program. supervision, the entire training system – especially a complex one – is likely to fall apart. Captain Fink (NMC) described his budget 9. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider whether an industry-wide shortfall at a TSAC meeting at Headquarters a year ago. mandatory training program based on an attainable career path to generate Mates/Pilots is a viable alternative and seek help from 17 The Coast Guard failed at Headquarters level to transmit in the U.S. Department of Labor to fund such a program. an effective and timely manner the importance of the new (Previously suggested at the March 2004 TSAC meeting). towing vessel licensing program the TSAC License Working Group helped to put together in 2000-2001 to their own 10. GCMA suggests that TSAC reaffirm that one year of Regional Exam Centers. Nor did the Coast Guard undertake observation and training is a fair and reasonable period for an the task of outreaching to EVERY company in the towing Apprentice Mate/Steersman to participate in pilothouse industry to tell them about the new licensing program and training, preparing his TOAR, and advancing to Mate/Pilot. Apprentice Mate/ Steersman program. (GCMA is disgusted that, after all the TSAC License Working Group did that the 11. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider, the following in Coast Guard failed to get the message out.) light of the existing two-watch system, the 12-hour rules, as well as for increasing their future knowledge. Each 18. In a letter to Captain R. L. Skewes (G-MSO) on December Apprentice Mate/Steersman should be given complete 15, 1997, we pointed out that the Coast Guard was not getting instructions by appropriate company officials that are its message out to “lower-level” mariners in general and made necessary to relieve the fully licensed watchstanders of many some suggestions. These suggestions now appear in GCMA paperwork burdens they are expected to complete after their Report #R-382 available on our web site and is “nothing new.” watch ends. This would give the Master more time to rest as well as time to supervise the operation of the vessel that is 19. It is clear that many companies may not understand the entrusted to his care. need for Designated Examiners. Some companies signed up dozens of Designated Examiners while other companies only 12. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider whether each have one or two – and the vast majority of companies have Apprentice Mate/Steersman should receive formal training as none! Yet, since 2001, the Coast Guard signed up 652 a Vessel Security Officer so that he might fulfill that individuals and apparently never brought this discrepancy to “collateral duty” to relieve the licensed officers. the attention of anyone in authority – after 4½ years.

13. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider whether each 20. GCMA cannot fathom why the Coast Guard took no Apprentice Mate/Steersman be trained to conduct the fire and action to establish and contact a complete list of all the other required safety drills as well as safety meetings and corporate players in the towing industry including the 900+ eventually conduct those drills when he becomes proficient towing companies that own towing vessels but are not thereby relieving the Master of this collateral duty. members of the AWO or OMSA trade associations. Although the USCG cannot force management to attend meetings, 14. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider that, when a towing unless they contact management of these companies with a vessel is safely moored, that the Apprentice Mate/Steersman be stiff, no-nonsense letter about what is coming down the pike, trained (and allowed) to relieve the licensed watchstander, and implementation of the new licensing and inspection maintain the radio and security watch from the pilothouse, regulations will be as dismal a failure as the current according to company policies and the night orders left by the Apprentice Mate/ Steersman – Designated Examiner program Master. has been in producing enough Mates/Pilots for the industry. We called for this effort at two separate TSAC meetings. 15. GCMA suggests that TSAC consider recommending that each Apprentice Mate/Steersmen be trained in as many 21. GCMA suggested to the USCG representative at the different geographic areas and on as many vessels as possible TSAC License Working Group meeting in Houston on July to gain as broad experience as possible during his 14, 2005 that the Coast Guard notify each towing company by apprenticeship. [Note: The Apprentice Mate/Steersman certified mail, return receipt about important new programs system tacitly replaced the older system where one licensed such as the licensing program (and also the inspection

Newsletter 25 program) so that these companies can be held responsible for book-knowledge of 1) Deck-General, 2) Deck-Safety, and complying with this information. The response we received 3) Rules of the Road questions that apply to all inspected was that the Coast Guard was “not funded” to do anything like vessels of the size range of 0 to 200 GRT. Most of this that. We find this unacceptable! We question whether the material would be generic to all commercial inspected Coast Guard must get permission from Congress to buy vessels and would require the candidate to demonstrate postage stamps to save a program it has already invested familiarity with the CFR and other government considerable time and money on. (GCMA alone spent over publications as references. $6,000 to send representatives to attend the License Working Group meetings. This says nothing of the expense to every • To this basic exam add: other Working Group member). 1) A separate Western Rivers Navigation module to test candidates for western rivers routes on “Navigation– 22. The seventeen RECs’ failed to handle their licensing load General” topics. in a prompt and expeditious manner for the past five years. 2) A separate “towing module” for all towing candidates. This discouraged many mariners from pursuing a career in the This would differentiate a towing license from a non- towing industry. In spite of industry complaints and in spite towing license. The towing module represents the “book of the fees the Coast Guard charges mariners for almost every knowledge” required for all towing modes. Although license transaction (with the most noticeable exception of normally taken at the Apprentice Mate/Steersman level, it time-consuming STCW transactions), the Coast Guard failed also should be available for any individual moving into the both the towing industry and its mariners. GCMA has records towing sector. Existing towing questions in the USCG of the Coast Guard’s failures to manage the system going back database should be sufficient to outline the subject area almost 20 years. with ongoing advice from TSAC. These questions should cover all types of towing without distinction. 23. Homeland Security Issues: • Neither the Coast Guard nor the towing industry treat • Addressing specialties that cause problems: unlicensed personnel on the western rivers or those who 1) A candidate who needs to use a Western Rivers license work on towing vessels under 100 GRT offshore as bona on the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway where there are limited fide “mariners.” Most, with the exception of tankermen, expanses of “open water” could attend an approved are not required or even permitted to obtain entry-level training course in basic piloting including use of GPS to documents (MMDs). The Coast Guard has no record of learn how to lay out a course from buoy to buoy and find who these individuals are nor does it know their his position in the limited expanses of protected open background. Consequently, the Coast Guard has virtually water in fog or if buoys are missing. Keep in mind that the no authority over them. Although such practices might greatest distance between buoys on the Gulf Intracoastal have been acceptable before 9/11, this needs to change. Waterway is no more than 5 miles. (Vessels in these • “Green deckhands,” who may be acceptable to some waters should be equipped with GPS.) This approved employers, may no longer be suitable for the Coast Guard training could lead to a limited endorsement for the “Gulf since they not be able to pass criminal record checks. Intracoastal Waterway” instead of a more strenuous GCMA hears reports of suspected illegal immigrants “inland waters” endorsement required in other parts of the working on vessels in these categories. One of the country like Long Island Sound and Chesapeake Bay with complaints our experienced mariners often report but must broader expanses of open water. to cope with on board the vessel is their deckhands’ lack of training. Now they also learn that many deckhands also 2) Require each candidate for an Inland Waters, near- have drug abuse and violent criminal records. coastal, or oceans route to take an approved piloting • Since the shortage of Mates/Pilots puts pressure on course to demonstrate the proficiency currently required companies and mariners, both groups need to understand the by the 200-ton course (i.e., which does not differ greatly enhanced implications of submitting a false report, from the 100-ton requirement.) including false sea service, to the Coast Guard. This might be avoided if regulations were put in place to ensure that • Tonnage considerations: vessel logs are signed by the steersman and entries are 1) The tonnage on any license up to 200 GRT issued still verified by the vessel’s Master. [Refer to 18 USC §1001 should depend upon the tonnage of the largest vessel and 46 USC 8104(c) that includes recordkeeping served on for at least 30 days plus the usual margin that requirements for “hours of service.” Also refer to GCMA allows credit for service or observation on a larger vessel. Report #R-291, Revision 1, Establishing Logbook Typical license tonnages in the past were 25, 50, 100, 150, Standards for Lower-Level Mariners.] and 200 tons. 2) On river and inland routes, any initial tonnage above 24. The Coast Guard must seek to simplify the licensing 200 tons (i.e., 500 GRT and 1,600 GRT) could be issued process for lower-level mariners. Without disrupting the according to proven sea service according to vessel TOARs established to assess skills, we suggest these general tonnage accompanied by 30 days observation and training “book knowledge” test changes: in the pilothouse on larger vessels as certified to by a • Establish one basic exam from 25 to 200 GRT. Designated Examiner on a TOAR as satisfactory. Drawing on the similarities between the exams for Master 3) On near-coastal and oceans routes where most tugs 100-ton, Master 200-ton, and the exam for Apprentice previously were built less than 200 GRT, the licensing is Mate/Steersman (for any size towing vessel), these exams controlled in part by STCW and the next tonnage step should be combined into a single basic exam that tests the would continue to be 500/1,600 tons.

Newsletter 26 25. Entry level training on towing vessels. NVIC 1-95, personal gain other than, perhaps, some degree of satisfaction based on the TSAC report of February 7, 1994, recommended that comes from successfully training another mariner. Many Voluntary Training Standards for Entry-Level Personnel on of these trainer/trainee connections were broken when the Towing Industry Vessels. company overrode this voluntary effort by arbitrarily The Coast Guard is responsible for superintending the U.S. assigning the Captain and his trainee to different vessels. Merchant Marine. In light of its poor workplace safety record(1) we suggest that the National Maritime Center For Towing Industry Consideration approve formal deckhand training curricula and facilities and make attendance at such a program mandatory for all new 31. It appears that many customers insist upon Masters and entrants into the towing industry. Mates holding the 500/1600-ton near-coastal and oceans GCMA suggests the training be offered only in USCG licenses even though these licenses are in short supply. The “approved courses” for deckhand training since most mariners 500/1600-ton near-coastal licenses are now equivalent to a hired “off the street” need basic seamanship training once in third mate license in their cost (e.g., $20,000) and degree of their career. That one-time course should be taken before difficulty (e.g., 4-year academy) to obtain. This means these entrants are allowed to serve in the towing industry. licenses will continue to remain in short supply. An attempt Although towing companies could offer these courses, the to force mariners to obtain a 500/1600 ton license just to curriculum covered should be separate and distinct from any please a customer may place unacceptable pressure on some instruction in “company orientation” whose purpose is to licensed mariners as well as their employers. cover company policy and employment practices. We suggest that these customers may need assurance that the Master of Towing Vessel license is suitable for all vessels 26. Mariners should not have to pay “headhunters” exorbitant fees of the appropriate tonnage and that industry policy reserves to obtain jobs on towing vessels in violation of 46 U.S.C §10505 or assigning license holders of 500/1600-ton licenses to larger International Labor Organization Convention No. 9 (1920). vessels beyond the 200-ton range and vessels in international service that carry larger ITC tonnages. 27. On a recent list furnished by the National Maritime Center under FOIA, the addresses and contact information of 57 32. No mariner should be allowed to work for more than 12 Designated Examiners not affiliated with a towing company hours in a 24-hour period. Until Congress changes the law and were redacted. The Coast Guard should consider obtaining provides the adequate protection to unlicensed mariners that we Privacy Act releases from these individuals so that Apprentice advocated for years, we suggest that the American Waterways Mates/Steersmen working for companies without any Operators eliminate its approval of a 15-hour workday for approved Designated Examiners might be better able to utilize unlicensed personnel that appears in the Responsible Carrier their services. [Refer to GCMA Report #R-383, Revision 2, Program. [Refer to GCMA Report # R-375, Aug 17, 2003. Designated Examiner Qualifications.] Crew Endurance: The Call-Watch Cover-up.]

28. Many mariners prefer not to “put their name on the dotted 33. Licensed mariners serving on towing vessels need a crew line” on any paper including a TOAR that is sent to the Coast that is trained adequately to support them. This means that Guard. The reasons may include: vessel “deckineers” and/or engineers need complete and • They have not been instructed in and may not understand adequate safety training as well as full training in maintenance complex Coast Guard methods and administrative and operation of their equipment. This is an area that has procedures. been seriously neglected by both industry and the Coast • They may not trust the Coast Guard to protect their Guard. [Refer to GCMA Report # R-401, Crew Endurance interests from past experience ranging from their treatment and the Towing Vessel Engineer – A Direct Appeal to at the REC, to vessel boardings, to their Coast Guard’s Congress and GCMA Report #R-412, Towboat Engineer’s perceived lack of interest in improving conditions on Death Points to Need for Changes in the Law.] towing vessels. Consequently, most towing companies and many 34. We suggest that employers provide each Apprentice Apprentice Mates/Steersmen will never be able to count on Mates/Steersmen with any specific training necessary to carry 100% participation in any organized pilot training program. out the “collateral” non-navigating paperwork duties dumped on licensed officers by the companies. Some of these duties 29. Mariners cite problems where they left one or two blank may be associated with the Responsible Carrier Program and spaces on their TOAR for what they believed were valid various ISM requirements. This means “Secretarial” duties reasons. However, they reported the REC was not interested such as preparing reports, making required log entries, using in listening to these reasons and rejected the TOAR the computer, conducting inventories etc. will not be required “incomplete” and “not acceptable.” That puts any mariner beyond the time allotted for watchstanding duties which fall seeking to upgrade to Mate/Pilot between a rock and a hard within the definition of “work” in G-MOC Policy Letter #04- place. It also pressures a Designated Examiner to “pencil in” 00, Rev. 1. his initials to keep the process moving forward for his employer (who controls his paycheck). There needs to be 35. We suggest that each Apprentice Mate/Steersmen be some uniform policy to resolve this type of problem. trained fully in security duties so that he may fulfill the role of Vessel Security Officer. This is one of the “collateral duties” 30. In the past, some Captains were willing to volunteer their dumped on many licensed towing vessel officers by the Coast time to train a friend, family member, or a candidate that Guard and violates the 12-hour rules and the definition of expressed interest in learning the trade. This was done at no “work” in G-MOC Policy Letter #04-00, Rev. 1.

Newsletter 27 and other union benefits. Companies support these training 36. Since there is a shortage of Mates/Pilots and Masters of facilities and have a voice in training their mariners. Towing Vessels, we suggest the towing industry establish an industry-wide training program to train new mariners from 40. Many mariners believe their employers do not have their scratch – possibly similar to the training program established best interests at heart – and often for good reason. Some by Kirby Inland Marine. Such a program should offer career companies see no need to cut any slack for an older mariner or training and a clear path for advancement within the industry. a mariner with a history of medical problems that his doctor We suggest that few if any mariners can afford to pay for and the Coast Guard medical review board believes is still fit training that runs between $100 to $200 per day. Although for duty. Mariners, like machinery, wear out over time. Older some may be willing to do so, it is clear that there are not mariners may show this wear in the form of medical enough to fill in the gaps that currently exist. conditions that require Coast Guard waivers. Some company(1) personnel managers are careless in their 37. For the past 4½ years, it appears that a vast majority of exploitation of their older mariners by abusing their work towing companies avoided training new personnel under the hours, ignoring the severity of the working conditions, and Apprentice Mate/Steersman program. Their clear preference failing to consider the effects of stress(2) on their mariners. was to train personnel under the old system rather than [(1)Example: Refer to GCMA Report # R-370, 12 Hour Rule encourage use of the new system. This offered a “quick fix” Violation: The Verret Case. It happens that the company in rather than a long-term solution to the pilothouse personnel this case was Delta Towing. (2)Refer to GCMA Report # R- shortage. This procrastination explains why there is such a 403, Stress and the Licensed Mariner.] difficult transition from the “old” to the “new” system. 41. Many mariners recognize that the towing industry is not a 38. We suggest that towing companies recognize that suitable job they will be able to hold until retirement age and, “training” is a major cost of doing business on public consequently, make other career choices. The towing industry waterways. We suggest that corporations in this industry as it now operates does not appeal to many academy graduates invest in their workers not continue to abuse and mistreat to make their career at sea. them – or consider getting out of the towing business. 42. Many mariners are not good teachers and are not 39. Although GCMA is not and never has been a union, we interested in training others. Others, through past experiences suggest to the towing industry that many of their workers want in the industry, have no intention of training a potential an opportunity to join a union of their choice in a smooth Mate/Pilot to take their jobs. Some mariners see training a transition to take advantage of “free” union training facilities pilot as an additional duty, an extra assignment or a nuisance – and an unpaid assignment at that. group on the Apprentice Mate/Steersman and Designated Examiner requirements. 43. Industry management needs to relieve the pressure and stress on all licensed towing vessel officers by calling on the • We suggest that if Delta Towing wants to use these Coast Guard to control the operation of oversize and licensed crew boat masters and mates with 100/200-ton overloaded tows by other companies that restrict their use of licenses, they must become fully qualified in all respects to the waterways, cause excessive delays, and result in operate towing vessels by serving a full 12 months as an preventable accidents. [Refer to GCMA Report #R-340, Apprentice Mate/Steersman under the supervision of a Oversize and Overloaded Tows.] fully licensed Master or Mate/Pilot of towing vessels.

The Delta Towing Question: • Since Delta is a large company and has many towing vessels of all sizes that work both inland and offshore, 44. Our mariners oppose Delta Towing’s request to change assigning their existing crew boat Captains as a “third existing regulations for these reasons: man” in the pilothouse to learn about all aspects of towing • The equivalent authority for Masters/Mates of steam and and towing seems to be exactly what the new regulations motor vessels of not more than 100 GRT (with “mates” envisioned. expanded to 200-tons) to serve as operators of towing vessels was dropped in the new licensing regulations for • GCMA respectfully suggests that Delta Towing train their many valid reasons and was discussed thoroughly by licensed crew boat Captains for a year on a variety of TSAC’s licensing working group before the new rules towing vessels to give them maximum exposure. We took effect. suggest that Delta pay them for the licenses they already hold. We do not believe Delta can expect success if you • A recurring theme expressed by many towing vessel work them for half-pay or have them “learn on their time officers in public hearings and comment periods in the late off” by expecting them to work on deck in addition to the 1990s was the inability of some licensed mates/pilots they required “observation” and hands-on training in the worked with to safely handle a tow. The new licensing pilothouse as suggested in the Houston TSAC Working regulations require a candidate for Mate/Pilot license to Group meeting . prove to a qualified “Designated Examiner” that he actually can handle the boat and its tow. This was a • Delta appears to have a number of Designated Examiners provision that our experienced mariners urged the Coast that are approved to check out all their Apprentice Guard to put in place. There was no lingering opposition Mate/Steersman candidates. Your connections with from the companies represented on the TSAC working Edison Chouest Offshore indicate you have use of

Newsletter 28 excellent training facilities – perhaps better than most fully competent officers and placed the mate-trainee as a towing companies. “third man” in a training slot. This oversight cost Delta Towing well over one million dollars and should have • The record of Delta Towing speaks for itself in regard taught them a valuable lesson on this subject. using one of our mariners as an example. GCMA Report #R-370, 12-Hour Rule Violations: The Verret Case. The • Delta and its predecessor companies contributed to the report that shows that management sent a poorly qualified existing pilot shortage by buying out a number of smaller (but licensed) mate-trainee as the second licensed officer companies and tying up their boats and releasing a number of on an anchor-handling tug in the Gulf of Mexico. The licensed individuals. Many experienced mariners left the strain of handling the vessel for 12 hours watches plus the industry – many as a result of this consolidation. Delta must additional duty of supervising the mate’s training in now adjust to the resulting personnel shortage by training new anchor handling during off-duty hours caused Captain personnel following the new set of rules put in place since the Verret to suffer a paralytic stroke and to become “consolidation” took place. Licensed mariners are no longer permanently disabled. The vessel should have carried two a “dime a dozen” and may never be again.

PROMINENT ADMIRALTY ATTORNEY (4) Paragraph (1) of this subsection and section 8701 of this WARNS GCMA OF PROVISIONS OF H.R. 889 title do not apply to individuals transported on international voyages who are not part of the crew complement required [Source and Introduction: Ralph J. Mellusi called and under section 8101 or a member of the Stewards department, directed us to his posting on website www.sealawyers.com . and do not perform watchstanding functions. However, such At first glance, the subject matter appears to apply only to individuals must possess a transportation security card issued “upper-level” deep-sea mariners. However, the implications under section 70105 of this title, when required.” of Section (§) 425 of this bill should be very clear and equally disturbing to our lower-level mariners as well. The significance of this is the following. First, what this Because of the shortage of experienced merchant mariners Bill accomplishes, in simple words, is that it permits U.S. flag at all levels (as documented in a WorkBoat magazine article vessels to carry an unspecified number of foreign seamen on in the October 2005 issue), it is disheartening to see that international voyages to perform any type of work (outside of Congress appears to have caved in by encouraging use of the stewards department) excepting work considered to be a foreign seamen. “watchstanding function”. This means that all non-watch This “Bill” passed the House of Representatives by a vote standing work, including but not limited to maintenance and of 415 to 0. It now moves on to the U.S. Senate. Time is repair, heretofore performed by U.S. citizen crews, can now short, and if you find it as troubling as we do, pick up your be performed by foreign seamen. phone and call your United States Senator – NOW NOT The impact of this will greatly affect licensed personnel LATER!. His or her number is in the phone book under U.S. (engine more so than deck) and all unlicensed ratings Government. Additional emphasis by underlining is ours. excepting those in the stewards department. The law offices of Tabak, Mellusi & Shisha are located at 29 A glimpse into some history which preceded this Bill is Broadway, New York, NY 10006-3267. Tel (212) 962-1590 or reflected in an exchange of correspondence between Admiral (800) 280-1590; FAX (212) 385-0920.] Thomas H. Collins, USCG, William G.. Schubert, Maritime Administrator, and Vice Admiral David Brewer, Department September 26, 2005 of the Navy, attached as Exhibit “2”. [Attachments are available on the website.] Comments on H.R. 889 As reflected in this exchange and to their credit, the U.S. An Act To Authorize Appropriations for Coast Guard Coast Guard has stood fast, against the contrary intentions and Fiscal Year 2006 opinions of these agencies, by properly interpreting and (Otherwise known as an Act to Out-Source American enforcing the U.S. citizenship and other requirements Seafaring Jobs) contained in the federal manning laws and regulations. However, and based on the current and growing use of foreign On September 15, 2005, the House of Representatives, seaman riding crews on U.S. vessels, (more will be said later passed H.R. 889. One of the amendments to the Bill, which on this) it would appear that the Coast Guard’s enforcement was sponsored by Congressman Young from Alaska, will efforts have not been completely effective. have a major adverse impact on U.S. maritime, seagoing A concise summary of the relevant laws and regulations labor. Oddly, this amendment sailed through the House are contained in the Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual, without a single opposition, 415 to 0. which can be viewed on line at: The amendment, which is found in section 425 of the Bill, http://www.uscg.mil/hg/g-m-nmc/pubs/msm /v3/c20.htrn is entitled “Citizenship and Naval Reserve Requirements.” A In a nutshell, the current federal law and the Coast Guard’s copy of the Index to the Bill, the relevant section, and interpretation as stated in the Marine Safety Manual, is Congressional Record are attached as Exhibit 1. Relevant summarized as follows: section 425 reads as follows: Definition of Seaman “Section 8103 (b) of Title 46, United States Code, is amended by adding the following language at the end of that “In general, the term “seaman” is interpreted broadly by subsection: the Coast Guard to mean any individual engaged or employed

Newsletter 29 in the business of a ship or a person whose efforts contributed The above quotations are taken directly from the Coast to accomplishing the ship’s business, whether that person is Guard Marine Safety Manual, Vol. 3, Chapter 20. involved with the operation of the vessel.” Other pertinent provisions of the U.S Code pertaining to “... A crewmember may be a seaman although he or she is manning requirements are the following: not occupying a position required by the Certificate of • 46 USC section 10101 defines a “seaman” in extremely Inspection.” broad terms (with limited exceptions), as “an individual “... Under normal circumstances, the Coast Guard does not employed in any capacity on board a vessel. consider a person who is briefly visiting the vessel in a • 46 U.S.C. § 8701 prohibits employment of any individual consulting capacity (e.g., a vendor’s technical representative) that does not have a merchant mariners’ document. to be a crewmember. Similarly, the Coast Guard does not • 46 USC section 10302 requires ship owners to have apply citizenship requirements to shoreside personnel who written shipping articles which must be signed with all come on board vessels while they are not underway to load or seamen employed on theft vessel. unload cargo or to perform services such as maintenance of shipboard equipment. However, under most circumstances. How HR 889 Changes the Existing Law. individuals who are compensated for performing their jobs while the vessel is underway are considered seamen for A new paragraph (4) is added to 46 U.S.C. 8103(b), which purposes of applying citizenship requirements. Waiters, does two things: entertainers, industrial personnel, oil recovery workers, riding • it specifically exempts citizenship requirements for maintenance crews, and others employed in the business of persons who are not part of the licensed and unlicensed the vessel are considered seamen.” (emphasis added) crew complement set forth in the Certificate of Inspection and who also do not perform watchstanding functions; General Citizenship Requirements • it exempts the requirements to have a merchant mariner’s document for this new class of worlcers. 46 U.S.C. 8103(a) states that only a citizen of the United States may serve as a Master, Chief Engineer, Radio Officer, In summary, all persons who by law have been (or should or officer in charge of a deck watch or engineering watch on a have been) considered seaman, subject to citizenship, vessel documented in the United States. merchant mariner document, and other regulatory Section 8103(b) further states that each unlicensed seaman requirements, which include riding maintenance crews, must be a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully waiters, entertainers, industrial personnel, oil recovery admitted to the United States for permanent residency, and not workers, etc, will no longer be subject to these restrictions, – more than 25 percent of the total number of unlicensed if this Bill passes in the Senate, is approved by the President seaman on a vessel may be permanent resident aliens.” and becomes law. done by the U.S. crews during the vessel’s normal service. It Of particular and crucial importance in this list are the is not shipyard work, or work which is beyond the capabilities riding crews. For those of you who are not currently familiar of U.S. crews or work U.S. crews do not want to do. Attached with industry developments, it is a fact of life that foreign as Exhibit “3” are summaries of four months of overtime seamen riding crews, none of whom have been admitted to the records, for one Polish foreign seaman who homesteaded a U.S. for permanent residency, are currently being used U.S.-flag vessel during the period 1999 to 2001. extensively on US flag vessels in violation of existing laws. His overtime work was categorized by a maritime expert They are paid significantly less than Federal Minimum wage, for my office into ten areas. It clearly shows the work is not they live and work alongside US seamen, logging more sea- only routine, but of the type typically performed by licensed time than U.S. seamen, and they perform all manner of routine engineering (boiler, main engine) and unlicensed deck and maintenance work traditionally done by licensed and engine ratings. Moreover, whoever heard of riding crews unlicensed crews. being hired to so “sanitary work” or “taking on ships stores”. Maritime Administrator Schubert states in his letter that “it Other of his overtime records are not attached, as they are has been a worldwide practice for many decades to utilize repetitive of the same type work. This foreign seaman is only foreign and industrial maintenance teams on commercial one of many employed on other vessels in the fleet of the merchant vessels, both foreign and U.S. registry ships, and same U.S. vessel operator. also on U.S. Naval Military Sealift Command Ships”, and that The making of a generalized statements as to what foreign riding “the teams are used to perform shipyard type repairs and crews are doing aboard U.S.-flag vessels, is simple to make; vessel maintenance that are either beyond the capability of the however, reviewing the maintenance records in detail – the gold vessel’s crew or which the crew does not desire to do.” standard will show a different picture. With all due respect to Administrator Schubert, what may In the same vein, the comments of Congressman Young as be done on foreign flag ships should not dictate U.S- flag reported in the Congressional Record, that “it is well manning laws. Moreover, the suggestion or claim that established that foreign workers may work on U.S. flag American seafarers by design or intent seek to limit the scope vessels on international voyages to conduct various non- of their traditional work and to outsource their jobs, is an watchstanding functions” and that these personnel are not astounding claim. Secondly, his characterization and considered seamen” is totally wrong. As noted above, Federal description of the work performed by foreign riding crews on law clearly identifies such personnel as “seamen” and U.S. ships is completely inconsistent with documents I have prohibits such employment whether the work performed is obtained in litigation involving foreign seamen. Maintenance watchstanding or non-watching. and other records I have reviewed demonstrate that foreign How and why this practice has been permitted, and why it riding crews are doing the day to day M&R repairs typically has grown are issues that should be studied and addressed.

Newsletter 30 More pressing at this time, however, is the present problem Having brought this matter to the attention of all concerned, it caused by the House passage of this Bill and the urgent need is my hope that individually and collectively efforts will be made to prevent it from becoming law. to spread the word and to take actions which will defeat this There are numerous legal authorities including U.S. amendment when it is considered in the Senate. Supreme Court precedent supporting the Coast Guard If the merchant marine is to remain vital, dependable and interpretation of seaman status. Looking ahead, on the available to perform its historic defense and its new security assumption that this Bill will become law, maritime labor will functions, it is imperative that U.S. flag vessels be manned likely see a further curtailment of jobs traditionally performed and crewed by U.S. citizens. I urge all to contact their by U.S. citizens. Senators, the Coast Guard and all groups, associations, and One likely scenario will be reductions in the size of the crew organizations interested in these issues to express their composition as set forth in the Certificate of Inspection (COI). concerns and reasons as to why this amendment should be Vessel owners may likely argue that such reductions are justified deleted from the Bill. because all maintenance and non watchstanding functions are performed by others thereby permitting the vessel to be operated Respectfully submitted, safely with a reduced COI manning level. Tabak, Mellusi & Shisha Thereafter, the next inroad may well be based on efforts to s/Ralph J. Mellusi reduce the concept of watchstanding activities. Vessel owners s/Jacob Shisha may argue that traditional watchstanding really means navigational watches, not in-port watches.

that belong to the American Waterways Operators, a powerful GCMA ALERTS COAST GUARD beltway lobby in Arlington, VA, we believe this working AND TSAC TO AWO REGULATORY HIJACKINGS group’s work product is biased against the interest of our working mariners. It is unfortunate that so few working mariners, especially Working groups that prepare “recommendations” for the those working in the towing industry, have taken the time to Coast Guard are open to all members of the public whether learn about the Towing Safety Advisory Committee (TSAC) they attend TSAC meetings or not. However, the fact of the and made the effort to attend at least one TSAC meeting to matter is that very few working mariners or independent discover what goes on behind the scenes in the towing towing vessel owners or operators attend these meetings – industry. Of course, as they say, ignorance is bliss! especially when they take place in Washington, DC. The cost The work done by this committee can have a great impact of travel, lodging, and rearranging work schedules among upon the direction the towing industry will take in the future. other things keep many mariners away. Add to that, GCMA At GCMA, we worry about the undue influence that the has documented instances where corporate management American Waterways Operators (AWO) continues to exert pressures their mariners (our mariners) to stay away from upon the Coast Guard through TSAC. these meetings and keep their mouths shut. The towing In the broadest sense, TSAC is a Coast Guard “advisory” industry has run roughshod over its employees for years! committee – one that gives its “advice” to the Coast Guard. Two of the active TSAC working groups are those on The committee meets twice a year, usually at Coast Guard Towing Vessel Inspection and on Towing Vessel Licensing Headquarters in Washington. The Secretary of Homeland problems. We believe that both of these working groups were Security appoints new members to the TSAC committee based “hijacked” when their memberships were flooded by AWO upon recommendations by senior Coast Guard officers after corporate members to the virtual exclusion of working publicly soliciting the public (in the Federal Register) seeking mariners and independent owners/operators of towing vessels. those persons interested in serving on the committee. The While inspection and licensing issues are important to committee then appoints “working groups” or sub-committees management, they are also important to labor! that are headed by an appointed committee member. These GCMA presented its case for inspecting towing vessels in “working groups” prepare reports that are accepted, rejected, GCMA Report #R-276 a number of years ago. TSAC or modified when presented to the full committee. assigned a working group headed by the present TSAC GCMA maintains that AWO has, for all intents and Chairman Mario Munoz, a minor official of the American purposes, “hijacked” the important working groups so they Commercial Barge Lines, who did his absolute best to delay can move the AWO agenda forward without opposition from and derail our initiative. However, GCMA persisted and kept their mariners (i.e., their 30,000 employees) or from our report up-to-date for almost 5 years. competing independent vessel operators. GCMA represents Although GCMA’s dues structure ($36.00 per year) does working mariners; to date, no similar organization represents not provide for travel expenses to attend meetings in distant the views, interests, and concerns of independent vessel cities, we were able to keep posted on the activities underway operators (i.e., small boat companies, the moms-and-pops of at the meetings in Arlington, VA on July 19 & 20, 2005. the towing industry. Consequently, we submitted a list of “123 suggestions” to the Chair of TSAC’s Inspection towing group, Mrs. Jennifer Hijacking #1 Carpenter, who is also a Vice-President of AWO. After reviewing the final draft of the working group report, we “Working Groups” do the work of TSAC, both at the believe that our “123 suggestions” were ignored. However, formal TSAC meetings twice a year and in between meetings. there is nothing new about this – it has gone on for years. However, when the overwhelming majority of members of AWO must wonder why we don’t get the message. these working groups are corporate officials from companies

Newsletter 31 [GCMA Comment: Our “123 suggestions” appear in • (4) Status Report of the Towing Vessel Inspection GCMA Report #R-419 posted on the GCMA website.] Working Group. (INSPECTION). • Congressional Oversight of TSAC. Hijacking #2 • (5) Status Report on the Licensing Implementation Working Group. (LICENSING). GCMA attended and reported on the Licensing meeting in • (7) Legislative Change Proposal Regarding 46 U.S. Code Houston, TX, on July 14, 2005 to our Board of Directors in §8509(b).” GCMA Report #R-416 that is posted on our website. We also submitted the body of our report to Mrs. Jennifer Carpenter, Inspection who is the co-Chair of this working group as well. The final report that the working group will submit to TSAC on October The Gulf Coast Mariners Association made its position on 12, 2005 largely ignores our report – again! towing vessel inspection clear at the TSAC meeting on March The key to understanding our treatment by AWO is to 15, 2001 in GCMA Report #R-276 and at subsequent realize that AWO and its member companies want to ignore meetings. and marginalize their mariners completely. This tactic has not We believe that Coast Guard must inspect towing vessels changed from the days of Pilots Agree and will never change in the same manner as every other inspected vessel of as long as their mariners remain “employees at will.” comparable size and horsepower. Those regulations, for the Although they may listen politely,(1) they ignore us most part, appear in 46 CFR Subchapters T & L. completely. [(1)After all, who wants unpleasantness to mar We believe that the formal Coast Guard inspection process the façade of a TSAC meeting.] is the only way our mariners serving on these vessels can For the Houston meeting, GCMA reviewed the problems receive the same degree of regulatory protection as mariners in an article titled Training and Licensing Problems for serving on inspected vessels of comparable size and Towing Vessel Officers that appeared in our July 2005 horsepower – nothing more, and certainly nothing less. newsletter.(1) [(1)Reprinted as GCMA Report #R-415, Revision Our mariners are emphatic that neither self-regulation, nor 1, available on our website.] the Commercial Towing Vessel Examination Program (CTVEP), nor the existing Responsible Carrier Program offer GCMA Alerts the Full TSAC Committee comparable protection. GCMA continued to work with TSAC until such time as At this point, it is only fair to say that the Towing Safety the Coast Guard formally notified us that they required Advisory Committee contains some members who are NOT authority from Congress to inspect towing vessels. At this members of the American Waterways Operators. While point, we approached Congress with a revised version of AWO members hold key positions on this federal advisory GCMA Report #R-276. We continued to review, revise, committee, they do NOT hold EVERY position on the consolidate, and augment our report through Revision 9 issued committee. on June 1, 2005. We offered this report to the Coast Guard, GCMA maintains that the reports that the Inspection and TSAC, and members of Congress for consideration. Licensing “Working Groups” will submit to the full TSAC [Attachment]. In addition, all GCMA research reports are committee for approval on October 12, 2005 are in reality available to the public on our website, AWO work products. We are asking the full committee to www.gulfcoastmariners.org recognize this fact and pass them along to the Coast Guard as GCMA monitored the work of the TSAC Working Group AWO and NOT TSAC recommendations. While this may be on Inspection although we were unable to travel to Arlington, a technical point, it will show that our mariners have very VA, to attend meetings. On August 18, 2005 we submitted serious reservations about AWO’s hijacking one of the most 123 “suggestions” as GCMA Report #R-419 [Attachment] to important means our mariners can present our points of view the working group based on their July 27, 2005 draft to Coast Guard regulators. Here is what we said in a letter e- document following the Working Group meeting in Arlington mailed to the full TSAC committee: on July 19-20. We subsequently reviewed the Working Group’s September 21, 2005 revised document on “Subchapter M” and “GCMA remained committed to improving conditions for concluded it contained irreconcilable differences between working mariners between TSAC meetings. In reference to our mariners point of view and those of the consensus of the Notice of Meeting published in the Federal Register, we working group members. ask you (the Assistant Executive Director of TSAC) to We note that the Inspection Working Group contains an distribute electronically a copy of the material in this e-mail overwhelming number of representatives of American including attachments to each member of the Towing Safety Waterways Operators member companies. In fact, we do not Advisory Committee for their consideration in advance of the believe any independent operators who represent non-AWO committee meeting on October 11-12, 2005. In addition, companies attended the working group meetings. please provide copies to TSAC’s Executive Director, Captain Consequently, we ask that the “Subchapter M” work-product Karr in the Office of Compliance, and Captain Fink at the planned for submission to TSAC be identified, submitted, and National Maritime Center. We will comment on three forwarded to the Coast Guard without endorsement as an numbered agenda items from the meeting notice and on a AWO rather than a TSAC product. fourth item that we determine is essential to the continued We respectfully request that the Coast Guard, out of presence and contributions of working mariners at future fairness to our mariners, inspect towing vessels in the same TSAC committee meetings: manner as every other inspected vessel of comparable size and horsepower. This will bring uniform enforcement to

Newsletter 32 regulating vessels of less than 1,600 gross register tons and the mariner or to company officials who inflate this sea will be less confusing for Coast Guard personnel to service to serve their own purposes. Our mariners are aware understand and effectively enforce. of many cases of “paper” sea service. This would not have been the case if Congress required all mariners serving on Congressional Oversight of TSAC commercial vessels to hold a Merchant Mariner Credentials as was recommended in the mid-1990s or for security purposes On August 1, 2005 GCMA submitted GCMA Report #R- following the 9/11 terrorist attack. 417 [Attachment] to members of Congress requesting additional Congressional oversight for and recommending 3) The weakness of the existing apprenticeship program is changes to the composition of the Towing Safety Advisory evident from the following words extracted from the Working Committee. Group’s proposed statement: “…(I)ndustry practice regarding the training of wheelhouse personnel varies considerably. In Licensing some companies, for example, the holder of an Apprentice Mate or Steersman license (sic) occupies a supernumerary(1) GCMA has a serious problem with one Licensing Working training position on the vessel, meaning that he or she has the Group recommendation. We do NOT believe that the Coast opportunity to spend virtually all of his or her time steering Guard should amend its licensing regulations to eliminate the under the supervision of an experienced master, mate, or requirement for a mariner hold a license as Apprentice Mate or pilot….In other companies, meanwhile, the holder of an Steersman for 12 months for the reasons enumerated below: Apprentice Mate or Steersman license works essentially as a full-time deckhand, making use of opportunities to steer under 1) The Coast Guard does not track the personal information, supervision when circumstances allow.” To this we will add security background, or sea service of most unlicensed that it is an increasingly common practice for Apprentice personnel on commercial inland and river towing vessels or Mates and Steersmen to stand regular watches in the absence on coastal towing vessels of less than 100 GRT by requiring of a second properly licensed officer on towing vessels in 24- merchant mariner credentials (MMDs). This represents a hour service. [(1)Vocabulary: Supernumerary: Extra or security gap that the Coast Guard must address in the future. additional position.] Consequently, the time a person claims to spend as a deckhand (or in any other unlicensed position) is only as 4) If the Coast Guard is to amend licensing regulations, we trustworthy as the sea service letter upon which that sea believe it should be in a direction that requires uniformity of service is based. training practices so that an Apprentice Mate or Steersman receives uniform (and comprehensive) training along with the 2) The Coast Guard already accepts the 1½ years of broadest possible experience. To do this, the program must be unlicensed time at face value with little legal recourse either to strengthened to require Apprentice Mates and Steersmen to serve as a supernumerary in formal training as a Pilot for 360 that state that new pilots must serve an apprenticeship for 1½ 8-hour days and NOT as a deckhand who must beg for an years before standing (the) back watch alone. opportunity to train on his off-duty hours. There is much “Assuming that I have the numbers right, this means that more involved in being a towing vessel officer than just for a year and a half we will be teaching these “cubs” our steering the boat. trade. In effect we will be doing two jobs: 1) Standing our own watch, and 2) being a teacher to a young pilot. So how GCMA Report #R415, Rev. 1 [Attachment] presents our much is this worth? What are the rules for accepting and views on a number of licensing problems. instructing new pilots? I don’t have any of the answers but I do have a few questions and a couple of points to make that We would like to point out two other licensing issues that we need to talk over with each other, pilot to pilot: may require TSAC and Coast Guard attention. 1) What should our financial compensation be for teaching? The first was an issue that the original Licensing Working 2) Who should determine which hands are taught? Should the Group sidestepped in 2000-2001 hoping that it would resolve office be allowed to order us to teach an individual, or should itself. This issue appeared as a “Letter to the Editor” in The we be able to teach those that we have found deserving, as has Waterways Journal that I cite below: always been the case in the past? 3) How many pilots should be taught each year industry- Training Pilots wide? “Each of these questions deserves to be discussed amongst [Source: The Waterways Journal, Letter to the Editor, by ourselves. And each is vitally important not only to those of us Mark Haury. Sept. 19, 2005.] working in the industry now, but also to the ones that will follow. “One of the things I’ve always enjoyed in my 23+ years as “That we deserve to be paid for extra work is pretty much a pilot is talking with friends and acquaintances up and down a given.(1) But, how much? Remember that you will not only the river. Most of the time it’s all friendly chatter but there be putting in time, but you will also be giving away hard- are occasions when serious issues need to be discussed and we earned knowledge, too. How do we put a price tag on that? are entering into one of those times now. [(1)GCMA Comment: We have only heard of a few companies “The law of supply and demand is starting to have a who offer extra pay as an incentive for training apprentice serious effect on the pilot market. It is resulting in higher mates/steersmen.] wages as the number of pilots declines. This shortage of “And most importantly, remember when the market of the pilots will only get worse over the next few years due to early 80s when pilots truly were a “dime a dozen.” If we teach deaths and retirements, but also due to the new licensing rules too many, we only cheapen our own value, and also that of the

Newsletter 33 pilots we are teaching. I think that we need to ensure that we crew. The Proceedings list revealed a problem only have enough pilots to replace those that leave the industry. And exacerbated by (hurricane) Katrina.” that’s it! But I want to know what other pilots think also. “So talk about these issues the next time you “switch over” GCMA Report #R-383, Rev.2 [Attachment] discusses the to chew the fat. I’ll be listening in. Designated Examiner problem in detail.

The second also appears in a paragraph extracted from an 46 U.S. CODE §8509(b). Editorial in the same issue of The Waterways Journal: GCMA joins with MERPAC in fully supporting the Coast “…What is worrisome is that the agency published in its Guard’s Legislative Change Proposal.(1) [(1)This long-overdue most recent Proceedings magazine a list of persons holding change would require officers serving on towing vessels in the various mariner licenses. This list shows only 84 hold the offshore oil industry to hold a towing license.] new steersman license! What this means is that in the entire country, there are only 84 people training to become towboat pilots. This begs the question: How can the industry expect As the World Turns to replace people lost to even routine attrition during the next two years with hardly anyone in the training pipeline? Two When all is said and done, no matter what TSAC years is the average amount of time it will take to train a recommends, no matter what AWO recommends, and no matter steersman to become a pilot. The Coast Guard lists about what GCMA recommends, the Coast Guard will make the final 30,000 operators of uninspected towing vessels, some of decision and turn it into regulations at some future date. whom hold more than one type of operator’s license. It is GCMA has submitted all of its positions to the Coast clear that there will need to be a lot more than 84 steersmen Guard for their review. out there or there will be a lot of boats tied up for lack of

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Newsletter 34

U.S. licensing and mariner documentation program is a complex MARINER CREDENTIALS (AS OF DEC. 31, 2004 one that meets a broad spectrum of industry needs. There are [Source: USCG. Proceedings of the Marine Safety and literally hundreds of different permutations and combinations of Security Council, Summer 2005.] licenses and ratings issued to U.S. mariners. It is not possible in the space available to list all of these alternatives. We have patterned Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Proceedings of the Marine Safety the listed categories after previous reports, and it is our hope that and Security Council, Summer 2005, pages 38-40. these provide sufficiently informative detail. Where qualifications After a 10-year hiatus, Proceedings is again publishing are in transition (for example, the transition from Operator statistics on the make-up of the U.S. merchant marine. It is Uninspected Towing Vessel to Master Towing) and there are our plan to make this a regular feature of the summer issue. mariners holding both qualifications, they have been combined. Technology improvements have enabled us to improve Many mariners hold more than one qualification. The the utility of the published statistics. Previous statistics were numbers presented here endeavor to capture all of those based on hand-compiled tallies of annual licensing qualifications. For example, a mariner holding a license as a transactions. While the data provided a general idea of 1600-ton Master and an unlimited second mate would be licensing activity and program workload, the figures could counted in each category. Similarly, a Chief Engineer, Steam not be used reliably to provide a breakdown of the U.S and Motor, is counted in each propulsion category. merchant marine population and its qualifications. We hope this breakdown is useful to Proceedings’ The numbers provided with this article represent mariners readers. We welcome your suggestions for improvements. with the qualification indicated as of December 31, 2004. The U.S. Merchant Marine: Summary Statistics Master (OSV) Total number with STCW Chief Mate (OSV) 1 Mate (OSV) 19 Master Great Lakes and In. Any 305 Mariners with an MMD only 66,870 16,322 Mate Great Lakes and In. Any 222 Mariners with a license only 95,789 4,166 Master Great Lakes and In. Not More Than 1,600 tons 155 Mariners with both a license and an MMD 42,176 28,674 Mate Great Lakes and Inland. Not More Than 1,600 tons 53 Master Great Lakes and Inland. Not More Than 200 tons 30 TOTAL 204,835 49,162 Mate Great Lakes and Inland. Not More Than 200 tons 12 Master Inland And 1,049 Mate Inland, Any Gross Tons 241 U.S. Merchant Marine: MMD-holder Statistics Master Inland Not More Than 200 tons 438 Total Mate Inland Not More Than 200 tons 353 Number Master Inland Not More Than 100 tons 7,451 Mariners with one or more qualified Deck Dept. Mate Inland Not More Than 100 tons 40 36,618 ratings First Class Pilot 3,541 Mariners with one or more qualified Engine Dept. OUTV/Master Towing 13,336 16,921 ratings 2ND-Class OUTV/Mate (Pilot) 185 Mariners with any Tankerman rating 18,214 Apprentice Mate (Steersman) 84 Mariners with only entry-level ratings 43,339 Operator Uninspected Passenger Vessels 30,518 Mariners with only entry-level ratings + lifeboatman 2,598 Assistance Towing Endorsement 21,332 Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) 1,784 Barge Supervisor (BS) 632 Licensed Deck Department Ballast Control Operator 351 Description Number of mariners

Master Ocean, Any Gross Tons 3,411 Licensed Engine Department Master Near Coastal, Any Gross Tons 93 Description Chief Mate Ocean Any Gross Tons 875 Chief Engineer Motor 3,175 Chief Mate Near Coastal, Any Gross Tons 3 1ST Asst. Eng. Motor 1,062 Second Mate Ocean, Any Gross Tons 1,417 2ND Asst. Eng. Motor 1,151 Second Mate Near Coastal, Any Gross Tons 8 3RD Asst. Eng. Motor 3,940 Third Mate Ocean, Any Gross Tons 3,475 Chief Engineer Steam 2,204 Third Mate Near Coastal, Any Gross Tons 102 1ST Asst. Eng. Steam 985 Master Ocean Not More Than 1,600 tons 5,089 2ND Asst. Eng. Steam 1,108 Master Near Coastal Not More Than 1,600 tons 2,742 3RD Asst. Eng. Steam 3,974 Mate Ocean Not More Than 1,600 tons 286 Chief Eng; Turbine 2,256 Mate Near Coastal Not More Than 1,600 tons 985 1st Asst. Eng. Turbine 876 Master Ocean Not More Than 500 tons 579 2nd Asst. Eng. Turbine 934 Master Near Coastal Not More Than 500 tons 1,269 3rd Asst. Eng. Turbine 2,105 Mate Ocean Not More Than 500 tons 78 Chief Engineer (Limited-Ocean) 1,466 Mate Near Coastal Not More Than 500 tons 181 Assistant Engineer (Limited-Ocean) 448 Master Ocean Not More Than 200 tons 180 Chief Engineer (Limited-Near Coastal) 438 Master Near Coastal Not More Than 200 tons 2,184 Designated Duty Eng. 2,379 Mate Near Coastal Not More Than 200 tons 972 Chief Eng; Uninspected Fishing. Master Near Coastal Not More Than 100 tons 2,662 589 Industry Vessels. Master Uninspected Fishing Industry Vessel 804 Assistant Engineer Fish. Ind. 114 Mate Uninspected Fishing Industry Vessel 204 130

Newsletter 35

Chief Engineer MODU 114 “V.J. GIANELLONI REJOINS Assistant Engineer MODU 0 GCMA BOARD OF DIRECTORS Chief Engineer (OSV) 534 Engineer (OSV) 7 We are pleased to announce that “V.J. Gianelloni has Licensed Radio Officer and Certificates of Registry rejoined GCMA’s Board of Directors. “V.J.” was one of Description Number of Mariners GCMA’s founding members and previously served on the Radio Officer 335 board. Chief Purser 189 “V.J.” is a U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Graduate as Purser 65 well as a law school graduate. He recently retired from the Sr. Asst. Purser 26 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers where he served as Engineer Jr. Asst. Purser 138 aboard the dredge WHEELER. He previously served as a Medical Doctor 86 Professional Nurse 85 Legislative Assistant to former Congressman (and later Surgeon 3 Governor) David Treen and ran the Congressman’s office in Houma, LA.. He also held a commission as a Commander in Merchant Mariner Document Ratings the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. “V.J.” established the Louisiana Marine and Petroleum Rating Number of Institute in Houma, LA and served as its director for a number Mariners Able Seamen AB-Special 3,649 of years. He is active in curriculum writing and is an expert in AB-Limited 3,491 the lower-level engineering licenses. He is a teacher, an AB-Unlimited 11,870 author, and above all is a passionate and outspoken mariner AB-Special(OSV) 3,241 rights advocate. We are proud to welcome him back on the AB-MOU 2,463 board. AB-Fishing 173 AB-Sail 299

Qualified Member of the Engine Department QMED-Deck Engine Mechanic 179 QMED-Deck Engineer 924 QMED-Electrician 1,199 QMED-Engineman 191 QMED-Junior Engineer 1,505 QMED-Machinist 755 QMED-Oiler 4,583 QMED-Pumpman 1,303 QMED-Refrigerating Engineer 859 QMED-Fireman/Watertender 2,382 QMED-Any Rating 865

Lifeboatman 19,810

Tankerman Tankerman-Person In Charge (PIC) 4,291 Tankerman-PIC (Barge) 871 Tankerman-Engineer 901 Tankerman-Assistant 4,464

Licensed Officer Ratings Any Unlicensed Rating in Deck Dept Except AB 995 Any Unlicensed Rating in Deck Dept 12,214 Including AB Any Unlicensed Rating in Engine Dept 11,137

Cadet/Deck or Engine 3,587

Entry Level Mariners 43,339

GCMA Newsletter 36 Number 34 GCMA Newsletter September/October 2005

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ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED

GCMA Newsletter 37