F Railway Accidents
·Reports by the Government Inspectors of Railways of Inquiries into certain Accidents
"llh.il ··~~urrnJ durin~ tht:
Half-year endin~ the Jist /\'\arch 1931
No. 9
Issued by the Oo•·crnment of lnd/11 Rllil,..ll}' Dep11rtment • RDIII4'11Y Ho11rd)
CAI.fTTT.\: I;C>\'J.H:'OII..\T to!' 1:\'111.\ CE.\TIL\1. !'rlll.lf'.\TI(t.\ IIIL\.\('H I ~.'!2
Pr/u A•. "(I or lfJd. Government o! India PubUcations are obtainable from~ lment of India Central Publication Branch, 3, Government Place, w...l Calcutta, and from the following Agents: -"- Bl7BOPE. 0nro11 tn ~ IDGH OOliWISSIONER li'OB INDIA, Ilma Hovs., Ar.DwrOB, LONDON, W. 0. 2. AD4 at an Booklellen. DIDIA AlfD CEYLOll : l'!OYillcial Book Dep611. ll.uruls--Suporin~ent, Guvemment P-. Mount Road, Madras. . BoKur :-Superintendent., Government Printing and Stationery, Queen'• Rood, Bomba;r. 8nm :-Libruy attaobecl to the Offioo of the ColllDllaioner in Sind, Karaohi. Jlu
Thacker, Spink a: Co, Ltd, Coloutta and Bia>la. The Standard BoobteU, Karaoht, Qaetta, Delhi, W. Newmau & Co., Ltd., Calcutta. Murree and Rawalpindi. S. K. L&blri & Co, Caloutta. Fl't>lltier Book a: Stationery Co., RawalpiudL Tho Indian &hoot Supply Dep6t., 309, Bow Bazar •Houenbhoy Karimji and Sons,. Karachi. Street, Calcutta. The EngU.h Booketall, Karaohi. Butterworth & Co. (Indi&), Ltd .. Calcutta. Roae & Co., Karachi. M. C. &rear & &no, 1ft, College Square, Calcutta, The Standard Booketall, Quotta. Standard Lit.eratum Company, Limited, C&lcotta. U. P. Malhotra & Co., Quotta. .Auoolation Preu. Calcutta. J. Ray a: Bono, 43 K. a: L., Edwardee Road, Rawal (;hukcrYortty, Cbottorjoe & Co. Ltd., 13, College pindi, Murroo and Lahore. Squ~. CalcuttA. Tlio Standard Book Dep6t., Labore, Nainitol, Massoorie. The Book Company, Cale11tta. DalhoD.IIie, Ambal& Cantonment and Delhi. Jamee :Murray & Co., 12. Government Pla.ce, Calcutta. The North lndla Chriatian Tract and Book Society, (t'or )l•toorolo( 1. South. Inditm Rai!way.-Mr. H. Dale Green'• report on a clernilment of No. 376 Up Passenger (Pollachi Branch) at mile 348/10/11, on the 26th Ootober 1930. • • • • • • • • • , • 1-8 · 2. Buf'7114 Railvtay•.-Y.r. R. Hatt-Cook'a report' on a derailment of No. 4 . Down Mail at mile 144/17. between Sibinthl!o and Nyaungchidauk on the 28th October 1930. . • • • · • • • • • • 7-10 8. Norlh. W81tem Railway.-M.r'. J. Scruby's report on a collision between No. 33 Up mixed train and a motor. bus at a level croBBing, mile 16/11, betw'!en Nasrola and Sham Chauraai on the loth November 1930. • · • 11-la 4.. Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway.-M.r. G. W. N. Rose's . · report on a collision between 131 Up special service train and a motor bus on level crossing No. 207, neaw Mhow Station on the 16th November 1930. • • . • • • • : • . • • • • • 14-U 6. Bengal Nagpur Railway.-Mr. E. B. Robey's report on a trolly accident at mile 268(16-16, near Rourkela Statioa on the Birmitrapur Branch, on the.. 22nd November 1930. • • • • • • • • • 16-18 6. Bengal Nagpur Railway.-Y.r. E. B. Robey's report of an enquiry on the ··derailment o.f No. 206 Down goode train at J aleawar ou the 22nd Decem· be_r 1930. • • • • .. • • • • • • • 19-111 ·'f. Ea.t Indiml. Railway.-Mr. E. R. Casement's report on a derailment of No. 73 Down Debra Dun-Lahore Passenger tram at Hanawala Station · on the 20tli January 1931. 22-ts 8 Bengal mul North-Weoum Railway.-M..r. E. R. CMement'a reporl on • an enquiry into the derailment of No. 3 Up Pa....,nger train bet.,..een Maijapur and Colonelganj on the 26th January 1931. . . • • • 24-26 9. Bengal and Norlh..Wutem Railtllll.y.-M.r. E. R. Caaement'a report on an accident to a atone train in Dara N ala siding at J arwa Stat1on on the 26th February 1931. .,. · 26-27 10 Ea.t Indian Rtlt"lway.-Mr. E. B. Robev'a report on a derailment of an ' Up Gomoh Special goods train on the 27th March 1931 at Pradhankanta - Station...... • . • • · • • . ~8-29 . SOUTH INDIAN RAILWAY. DERAILME~T OF No. 375 UP PASSENGER (POLLAClll BRANCll) AT MII.E 348/10/11 ON THE 25m OCTOBER 193ll. FBOK lb. H. DALB GBEBN, Suioll Govut Description of the locality of the accident. · 12. From Pollac?i to ~me L.-348/10-11 the line is in undulating country, the steepest grade bemg lm 70 and the sharpest curve 4°. Approaching the site of the accident, the line rises with a grade of 1 in 70 to mile 347t, from there after a short bit of level it falls first with a grade of 1 inch 142·85 to a point 3,826 feet from the site of the accident. It then continues to fall with a grade of 1 in 70 to the site of the accident and beyond. There is a 3° left hand curve on the 1 in 70 grade commencing from about 1,100 feet behind the point where the engine capsized. At the site of the accident, the formation IS practically on ground level. The soil in this part is firm red earth with a mixture of kunker. 13. The track consists of 41llbs. F. F. rails 30 feet long with ll hard wood sleepers per rail length. The curve is double-spiked. Where the large pattern bearing plates are in use there are 8 coach screws per sleeper but in a few places where a smaller pattern of bearing plate is in use there a~;e 6 coach screws per sleeper. The line is fully ballasted with an ample supply of mixed broken kunker and granite ballast about 6 to 8 cubic feet to the foot-run. There is some mixture of earth with this ballast. The 3° curve is laid to a l inch slack gauge and with a super-elevation of i of an inch. 14. Though there had been almost continuous light rain with occasionally heavy showers fr!Jm the 2nd to the 25th October, .the form3;tion at the site of the accident, owmg to the firm nature of the so1l, was neither softened nor disturbed. This rain, however, very probably made the packing in the track a bit soft in isolated places where there mny have been a greater admixture of earth in the ballast. The appearance of the track both &head and in rear of the accident site was uniformly good and the gauge and super-elevation, which were checked by me, were also remarkably regular. 15. The wooden sleepers in the track date from 1915 to 1930. Of these, 75 per cent. are less than 7 years old. A munber of the sleepers had, however, been marked for renewal in the next quarter and some of tliese sleepers which were damaged during the accident showe~ that they had worn thin and had also been eaten badly by white ants, which are·a source of trouble on this section. s Detailed stattmtnt of thtJ eddt~rlce taken. _16. Time.-T~e train left Pollachi station at 17-38 hours, i.e., 8 minutes behmd schedule time. · The time of the accident is stated to be about 18-4 hours lw both tho DriYer and the Guard. • 17. Load of train.-The normal load of trains on this se~.·tion is 6 bogil's. The _load of the t~ain was _8 passenger bogies totalling 158 toM 5 l'Wt.:l. Tho maxmmm load la1d down m the Working Time Table for Y. F. clnss en~incs on this section is 8 bogies with a gross load of 160 tons. 18. Vacuum.-The train was worked with varuum brnkcs throughout nnd the '\'aCUUm througho.ut the train was tested before ]ca\'illg Po\lnehi statipll and found to be 19 mches and in thorough working order. ThP cm:ino ia fitted with a " Dreadnought " Ejector and the driver states that ho had no difficulty in mainta!ning vacu!lm on the journey. The guard al~o stall'S that he observed t_he Dnver applymg the brakes shghtly about half a 1nile awny from the acc1dent steadymg the train down the grade. There is, tlwreforo, no reason to suspect that the train had got out of control down the grade of 1 in 70 through failure of the vacuum brakes. 19. Speed of ths train.-A gang-mate who was travelling on tho train states "When the train reached L.-348/10-11 (the site of the al·ei BtJRMA ltAU.W.AYS. DERAILMENT OF No.4 DOWN MAIL AT MILE 144/17 BETWEEN SIBINTHA AND NYAUNGCHIDAUK ON THE RANGOON MANDALAY MAIN LINE ON THE 28TH OCTOBER 1930. FBo:ll l!a. R. HATT·CooK, Go\"ERN>I£.'1T L-.suCTOa or RAn.w.n~. C'IR<'I.B No. 2-A, -:RA.'1GOO!t, TO THB SECliBTART, RAILWAY DoAilD, Lt:TTER No. DM/2~/ A, DATED Tna 2ls'r NoVEllllEB 1930. (3669-T.) . In accordance with Rule 7 of Railway Board's Notifirntion No. ]1):.!6·T., dated the 19th March 1930, I submit herewith the report of the enquiry hl'ld by me into the circumstances attending the derailment of 4 Down Mnil nt milo 144/17 between Sibintha and Nyaungchidauk on the Rangoon.Mnndnlny Mnin Line on the 28th October 1930 at 1-50 hours. I held my enquiry at Toungoo on the 2nd and 3rd November 1930. Tho following Officers attended the Enquiry:- G. A. Hicks, Esq., Chief Engineer, Burma Railwnys, Rnngoun. J. Johnson, Esq., Loco. Superintendent, Burma Railways, Jn~~ein. L. T. Wilson, Esq., Superintendent of Railway Police, Rangoon. F. L. F: Boeddicker, Esq., District Loco. Superintentlent, Toungoo. A. R. Gawthorne, Esg., District Engineer, Burma Railways, Toungoo. A. F. Fitzherbert, Esq., District Traffic Superintendrnt, Toungoo. Dr. J. G. H. Davidson, M.D., Ch.B., District Medical Officer, Toungoo. U. Saw ma·Pru, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Toungoo. C. Kluseman, Esq., Deputy Superintendent of Railway Police, Rangoon. G. W. R. Strickland, Esq., Assistant Engineer, Burma Railways, Toungoo. H. J. Palmer, Esq., Assistant Loco. Superintendent, Burma Railways. Description of tlte Accident. I received a wire from Station Master, Naungchidauk, abnnt 7·30 hourt on the morning of the 28th and proceeded by first train to the site to make my investigations. The accident happened at mile 144/.17 between Sibintha and Nyaungchidauk on the Rangoon-li'Iandalay Main Double Line at approxi mately 1-50 A.M. on the 28th October. The trnin concerned was 4 Down Mail. On my arrival at the site at about 7-30 A.M. on 20tJ1 the down line had been repaired and 4 Down of 29th had been passed over it. The up line throughout had not been blocked by wreckage, and traffic was paliHCd over this line as expeditiously as possible. The District Engineer sliewcd me 4 fish bolts and nutsJ 2 fish plates and 12 spikes which l1e stated were found shortly after the accident by the Chief Secretary to the Local Government and Mr. Evans, an Engineer in a Rangoon Firm, who were pa~~~~engers on 4 Down Mail, lying undamaged under the last derailed coach. This informa tion was also certified by Finance Member and Home Member of Locul Gov ernment who were also passengers on 4 Down. The J?istrict Engineer and Permanent Way Inspector also saw the bolts, etc., lym~ some between the track, some outside, the spikes being neatly placed alongs1de and out11i~ll the dismantled joint, later on a claw-bar, one fish plate and one li11h bolt Without. nut were found just outside the fence and about 25 feet elll!t of the down line and opposite the dismantled joint. These fittings were quite undamaged, the fish bolt threads were in perfect order, with their nuts removed at site, fiHh plates were unbent in any way and the spikes bad been drawn by a claw-bar as new and bright marks were observed under the beads which incidently c 8 fitted the found claw-bar. This dismantled joint was 21' south of the south abutment of Bridge No. 224, 5 x 10' span girders. From the evidence of passengers and the District Engineer the next joint north which was on the Bridge approximately 15 feet from the south abutment had also been tampered with, for it was discovered that the 4 fish bolts had been slackened off and one spike had been removed from an adjacent sleeper, which was found later in the bed of the river with fresh bright claw-bar marks on it. This joint had evid~ntly been abandoned as the fish bolts could not be removed easily as they were jamming hard against the spikes. The train wreckers most likely found it difficult to remove spikes on the Bridge and concentrated on the joint which was completely dismantled. It was evidently intended to remove this rail length complete. No. 340 Down Goods Train passed this site safely at approximately 1-10 hours, and both the driver and guard felt no unusual lurch nor did they see anybody about. It appears therefore that the wreckers had about 40 minutes to do their job. The engine (an express passenger six coupled) and tender did not derail but the Driver felt a definite bump which he described like running over a spike and he heard a noise like a spring dropping on the track. He- at once shut off steam and applied his brake and pulled up in 435 feet from that spot. The leading four-wheeled luggage van and bogie brake together with 7 bogie passenger coaches derailed, four of which capsized, the others being canted over. The six following bogie vehicles remained on the track. Two passen gers were killed, one second class and one third class, who were in the last two derailed vehicles which telescoped. Seven passengers were injured, two of whom were stretcher cases. It is since learnt that one of these bas died. The remaining five passengers had slight injuries and proceeded on their journey after treatment. The two stretcher cases were taken to Pyu Hospital accom panied by the District Medical Officer, Toungoo, and subsequently taken to Rangoon in the Ambulance carriage of the Special Train. The two dead were handed over to Railway Police and taken to Pyu. Several other pass engers complained of bruises bnt did not wish to be detained and proceeded to Rangoon. The left hand rails along the site of the accident which were pushed forward about 12 feet, were badly buckled and were carried away about 25 feet from the centre of the track. The right band rail all along the site remained intact. The running surface of the second rail south of the dis mantled joint was scored and marked with red lead paint as if something painted with red lead had been dragged heavily along it. This was later found to be the left side leading bogie arch spring bar of the third vehicle and it is this vehicle which I conclude was the first to derail, at the dismantled joint for the tyres were badly indented and scored and there was a flake of steel (burnt blue) still standing up from the tyre when I inspected it. The horn blocks and undergear were badly knocked about and burnt blue owing to severe friction against the rail. Several high Government Officials were travelling on the train. There were 292 passengers of whom 17 were first class passengers, 25 second class ontl 250 third class. .The total weight of engine and train was 350 tons exclusive of passengers and baggage. The headlight was in good order and nothing wrong with the permanent way was visible to the driver and nobody was seen about. The driver neither saw uor. heard car.s on the ~ublic Wor~s Depart~ent Road abput a furlong t•fi runnmg alongside the railway nor did the Station Masters at Nyaungchi dauk and Kywebwe. The weather was fair and the night was dark as the moon had sunk. Description of the locality. The site of the accident is 144/17 miles from Rangoon on the double line The line wn~ doubled in 1926 and the down line is the doubled line. 4 Do~ ·was proceedmg south towards Rangoon between Sibintha (Mile 1451) and 9 Nyaungchidauk (Mile 143±) stations. For about S miles north of the u~i dent the track is dead straight. About i mile south of the DL'•:ideut there is 11. short left band 1'" curve. There is a down gradient of 1 in 1, 000 and 1 in liUO for three quarters of a mile, then level for quarter of a mile to the site of accident. The track runs on a bank about 5 feet high. InmJediatt!ly not·th o~ the site there is a we~ constructed masonry bridge No. 2:!-l of 5 x 10' spnn gtrdar:;, the track runmng on the top boom on good sound ~lt.'('pers wdl fastened down, the girders and bearings were in good order. The trnck north ?f the site was in good condition and regularly maintainl•d. The tl'lll'k 1s composed of 60 F. F. steel rails without bearing plntes on sound tl•ak sleepers la~d in the year 1926, each rail being spiked to each sleeper by means of two sptkes. . The t~ack is well ballasted. In the vicinity of the bridge a,!>out 100 !eet etthe~ stde there are no bushes or shrubs. Beyond this eithor ~1de there .1s the ordm~ry scrub jungle, not very thick. The nearest gang hut 1s approx1mately ! mile away. Conclusions. From the evidence obtained very shortly after the accident from pass. engers of 4 Down who were eye-witnesses to the dismantled joint and from the Permanent Way Inspector and subsequently the District Engintter, I conclude that the cause of the accident wns due to the dismantling of tho joint just ~uth of Bridge No. 224 by some person or persons unknown. Twel\·e removed spikes were found, 8 lying neatly placed at the joint and 4 between rails. The short rail south of the dismantled joint had only 8 slettpert! nnd two spikes per rail per sleeper, therefore it appears that all the outl'r spikes of the left hand rail were removed and four on the inner side of this rail as the right rail was intact and so also the left rail north of this joint. This cannot be definitely proved because the sleepers of this short rail were badly bunched up and knocked about and they were not preserved apart from otbct' sleepers by the Permanent Way Staff for investigation purposes. The tam pered joint on the Bridge would have caused little or no oscillation to the engine as it was closely supported on sound timbers rest in~ direct on the girder and no joint spikes were removed. The dismantled jomt with the outside support of the rail removed was undoubtedly the direct cause of the accident. The engine and probably the two following vehicles kept the track owing to the grip of the remaining four spikes on the inner side of the rail, the friction between the foot of the rail and the sleepers, and the rail cant, also the trailin1, ·wheel of the preceding vehicle (which would have. been on this rail by about 0>1 from the forward joint) steadying it thus keeping the rail in a straight line for the passage of these vehicles. When these forces had been overcome the leading left bogie of B. T. C. 9566 derailed at this joint forcing thiR rail outwards, by sliding along the inner edge which pivoting on its forwnr~ joint broke it open, freeing the short rail length, and shifting the next rml ahead outwards, causing the arch spring bar of this bogie to slide on the tup of this rail "(indicated by red lead paint) until this got pushed forward a'!d buckled, together with the rails in advance. Several fish bolts were found lD two pieces evidently broken due to tension on the joint. I conclude that the first two vehicles after the tender, kept the rails to a point approximately two rail lengths further south, where. there were distinct marks on the sleepers of vehicles coming away from the track and continuing betwe~n rails.. The;-e two vehicles remained partially between the rails, the foilowmg vehtclcs dtd not. The leadina left band bogie wheels and axle guards of the third vehicle B. T. C. 9566 ~uffered badly, and were heavily indented, burnt and scored. In certain ways this accident bears an extraordinary re!!Cmhlnnce to the accident to 4 Down Mail on 28th January 1928. So that it may he the same gang at work a~ain. The criminals could not have been far IJIT when the train crashed and m obtaining evidence I endeavoured to find out wlwthPr any suspicious looking persons of outsiders had arrived hy train the pre(~d ing evening or whether any motor cars bad ~n heard on. the ron~ durmg the hours immediately before and after the acctdent. The mformauon was not fortheoming. c2 10 I consider the driver acted with promtitude, for directly he felt the bump he shut off steam and put on his brakes although he h!ld no indicat~on th~t anything was wrong With the track, and sav~d a t?taJ disaster for whiCh he.Is to be highly commended, for he pulled up his tram m 435 feet from the dis mantled joint at a probable speed of 35 miles per hour. I have no reason to tLink that he was travelling at an excessive speed, the maximum permissible for this section is 4~ miles per hour. General. The Accident Special left Toungoo at 4-12 hours and arrived at Kywebwe at 4-48 hours and was stabled there until required. The Pyuntaza Accident Special left at 4-28 hours and arrived Nyaungchidauk at 6-30 hours. The 30- ton Steam Crane which was sent out from Insein left at 8 hours and arrived Nyaungchidauk at about 14-50 hours. Incidently this 30-ton Steam Crane did most of the work, the 10-ton cranes proving most disheartening to work with on heavy bogie stock. They should be taken off Accident relief Specials altogether. This would entail the supply of modern steam cranes to suit the particular section in which they would work, and such cranes are strongly recommended. The Ambulance Special left Rangoon at 5-30 hours and arrived Nyaungchidauk at 11-45 hours. A field telephone instrument was fixed in position at site of accident at 7-55 A.M. The Down Line was cleared of wreckage by 1 A.M. on the 29th. Thus all arrangements for clearing the line, passing traffic, and attending to the injured were very satisfactory. The statements of the Government Officials and an Engineer in a Rangoon Firm travelling on the train are most important and proved· beyond doubt that it was a case of deliberate train wrecking. No reasons can be . assigned for this object, as there was no subsequent dacoity and there were -no valuable goods on the train, e.g., Namtu Silver. There were a few Gov ernment OfHcials travelling but this appears no definite reason. First Aid Equipment was on the train. The passengers were sent on to Rangoon in portions of 4 Down and 12 Down at 8-25 hours from Kywebwe. Recommendations. 1. It would be useful in future accidents of this nature, or where the cause is unknown, to pr~serve dam~~;ged rails and sleepers, etc., in charge of Permanent Way Staff, mtact. This should help to solve certain problems which are generally met with on such occasions. 2. The guard was not provided with efficient lights in his brake van and it wo~1ld be advisable to have better lights carried with the more important trams. 3. Steam Cranes are strongly recommended for Accident Relief Trains to be placed at strategical points throughout the system. 11 NORTB WESTERN RAU.WAY. COLUSION BETWEEN No. 33 UP MIXED TRAIN AND A MOTOR BUS AT A LEVEL CROSSING, MILE 16/11, BETWEEN NASRALA A..."\D SHAl\1 CHAURASI ON THE 15TH NOVEMBER 1930. F11.o1t: Mn. J. ScnuBY, S&.~oa. GoY1Ul.'f»£NT bsncroa. or RAn.wns, C1acl.a No . .f, LA.uoli.E, TOms SECRETARY, RAILWAY DnAilD, LETTER No. T.f:!l, DATED Till\ 12-rn DBCBWIE& 1930. (3691-T.) In accordance. with Rule (8) of Railwnv Board's Notification No. 1926-T., dated the. 19th March 1930, I submi't herewith a report of the enquiry held by me into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned accident. 2. The enquiry was held by me at Nasrnla Station on lOth Novt>mher 1930 in the presence of the officers of the Ferozepore Division of North ,Western Railway. The Inspector of Police, Hoshiarpur District, and 'tbe Railway Police official of Jullundur City also attended. Description of the accident. 3. On 15th of November 1930 at about 13-30 hours whilst 33 Up Mixed Train was travelling over the level crossing provided with gntes at mile 16 I 11, between Nasrala and Sham Chaurasi on the Hoshiarpur branch line, a Chevrolet 6 cylinder motor bus, No. P-.1338, carrying six persons incl1111ing the driver proceeding in the direction from Jullundur to Hosbiarpur hurst through the level crossing ~ates and came into collision with the tenth nnd eleventh vehicles of the tram travelling in the direction of Nasrnla to Sham Chaurasi. 4. The composition of the train was: Engine SG No. 1132. 8 Goods vehicles. 1 Brake Van. 1 Composite ordinary 1st and 2nd class. 3 Bogie 3rd class. 1 Composite bogie Inter and 3rd class. 1 Brake Van. 3 Goods vehicles. The train was vacunm braked throughout. 5. As a result of the collision the motor bus was completely wrecked. It came to rest in an inverted position :parallel to the railway, about 33 foot clear of the level crossing in the directiOn the train was movmg and about 10 feet clear of the centre of the track, with its radiator pointing in a direction opposite to the movement of the train. 6. One leaf of tho level crossing gate was smashed and the other lent damaged. 7. The tenth and eleventh vehicles (coac~ing stock). of the trai'.' were damaged in respect to running boards, hand ra1ls, pannellmg, and a w1ndow. 8 The following were the casualties among persons travelling in the motor· bus :-Two men, one of whom was the driver, were instantaneouKiy killed. Two men received injuries and were rendered unconscioWI. One woman received superficial wounds. 9. The remaining passenger of the motor bus ran away and has di'l appeared. 10. No passenger in the train was injureii. H. The injured persons received ~mporary aid from the trai.n runn!ng staff an FRo>~ Ma. G. ""· N. RosE, SEstOR GoVERS)tF.ST Issi'E<"l''R op R.utw \Y~, Cmt·t.a No. G, ~OHBAY, TO THB SECRETARY, R.ur.w.t.Y DoAJlD, LETrEil No. 1893 DATt:n TUS :?BTU :NOVEMBEB. 1930. (3689-T.) • In accordance with the orders in Railway Board's Notification No. 1926- T.,. dated the 19th March 1930, I beg to forward my report on the nhove ace1dent. 2. I wa~ 1mable to reach l'l!bow before the 25th November and having in spected the site and read the eVIdence recorded at the District Ollkers' inquiry of the 20th, however, it was clear that the latter had fully brought out the true sequence of events, and I did not therefore consider it net-e: BENGAL NAGPUR RAILWAY. A 'J~OLLY ACCIDENT AT MILE 258/15-16, NEAR ROURKF.LA ::nATION ON THE BIRMITRAPUR BRANCH ON THE Z.>ND NOVEMBER 1930. - FRoM Mn. E. B. RonEY, SENIOR GOVERNMF.!IT lNSPECl'Oil OP n.m.WAYR, CJR('IJI No. 1, CALCUTTA, TO THE SECRETARY, RAILWAY BOARD, LETTER No. l03tifXI1Ij:tl DATitD TBll 13m MAY 1931. (3694-T.) • With reference to Rule 7 of ~he Railway Board's No. 1926-T., dated tho . 19th March 1930, I beg to submit my report on the trolly accident at milo 258/15-16, on the 22nd November 1930, near Rourkela Station on the Birmi· trapur Branch of the Bengal Nagpur Railway. . 2. An Officers' enquiry was held on the 26th November 1930 nnd the eVIdence recorded thereat was accepted by me; I held an enquiry at Rourke!& on the 5th March 1931. Description of Accident. 3. On the 22nd November 1930 about 21-30 hours the General Munnger ~d Manager of ~he Bisra Li.me Company we~e proceeding to Rourkcln on a hght trolly; at mile 258/15-16 beyond the station vard the trolly was run into by a light engine and smashed to pieces. • The General Manager, Mr. Duff, was seriously injured and expired shortly after-no other persons were hurt. Description of the locality of the accident. 4. The track from Rourkela station to Mile 258/15 is oren and level, thence it rises at 1 in 500 to 11-file 258/22-23 and continues leve to Mile 259/ 3-4. From Rourkela to Mile 258/14-15 it is on an embankment 2 to 18 feet high thence in cutting up to 11 feet deep. The Main Line and Birmitrapur Branch run parallel and alongside one another up to Mile 259/14; the view towards the station is open and clear. At the site of the accident the track is 3·5 feet higher than in the station ya.rd. The weather was fine and dark. History of Trolly. 5. In January 1920 permission was accorded the Bisra Lime Company to use a light trolly between Manipahar and Panposh to convey officials of the Company to and from the latter station; the terms !lDd con.ditions at tached to this sanction cannot be traced. In May 1923 th1s peruut was can celled and the Company was told that a new permit could be granted on the following conditions:- (a) Trolly to run to Koel BaJ!k ~Joe~ Hut (Mile 259/13), presumably from Birmitrapur, until lme IS opened for passenger tra.ffic. (b). Trolly_ to be run under trolly rules in force on the Bengal Nagpur Railway. (c) Trolly design to be approved of by District Engineer, Chakradhar- pur. . (d) Head trollyman to be appointed by the Bengal Nagpur Ra1lway and to be in charge of the trolly. These conditions were never ratified and b.f oversight no formal trolly ermit was issued. The Company however contmued to Ul!e the trolly. P · n2 17 6. The trolly rules of the Bengal Nagpur Ra]way prescnbe the follow ing:- (a) A certificate that the employee ~s acquainte~ with the trolly rules of the Railway and has received a copy chereof. . (b) A certificate by a District Engineer that the employee is conversant with the rules and is competent to be in charge of a trolly. 7. .For trollies on Mill and Colliery Sidings it is further laid down (t) That the trolly must be of standard design. (iz) That it is to be used .only between certain specified places. (iii) That it must only be used when in charge of the railway servant specially appointed. (iv) That it must not be run until the authorised railway servant is provided with a permit. (v) That every quarter the Mill or Colliery Manager will submit a certificate in a prescribed form to the Agent signed by the railway servant in charge that he is aware of the rule.s. (vt) That any infringement of the rules will involve the cancellation of the trolly permit. 8. From February 1924 to January 1930 certificates were signed by Gomia for Trolly No. 31 in possession of the Bisra Lime Company, that it was of standard design and that the Head Trollyman was acquainted with the rules. 9. About three years ago the frame of the trolly was renewed. 10. The trolly and H. T. Gomia were under the direct orders of the Manager, Bisra Lime Company, and it· was used by officials and contractors · of the Company and State Officials and specific sanction was alwavs obtained from the Manager before. it was used by any one. • 11. Tests made from the trolly showed that, owing to the numerous signal li~hts in the yard, a single red light on the engine could easily be confounded With the others even though visible from a distance. History of the Engine. 12. Engine No. 474 H. M. was made over to Driver Abdulla Khan at Chak_radharpur shed on the 18th November 1930 fully equipped and in good workmg order. On the 22nd Novembel." 1930 the engine had only two lights, for working light it should have had three, and the vacuum brake was out of order; the shed repair books at Rourkela were examined by me and no entries found regarding the items cited above; there is no other record to show the driver had reported the defects. 13. It subsequently transpired that one missing light was found on an other engine, the driver of the latter having removed it from No. 474 H. M. to replace one of his that had dropped off in service, this was picked up on the track. . 14. ~ests were made with this engine by me on the level to see in w~at distance It coul.d be pulled up, by using the steam brake only, at varymg speeds; at 15 miles per hour the distance was 260 feet. . 15. T.ests were made with this engine running tender foremost as to the vrew: obtamable ?f a trolly light; it was found that with the driver leaning outstde the cab m the normal way, a clear view of the light could be had from some 1,600 feet; at a distance of 300 feet the light was blotted out by the tender, as the former was on the side remote from the driver. Conclusions. 16. The trolly must have been doing about 10 miles per hour on the down grade of 1 in 500 when the accident occurred. The brakes were said to be in good order and there was a full complement <>f trollymen. 18 17. I. ~nsider that the evidence and facts narrated abO\·e clearly show that 110 VIgilance or look-out was shown by either the occupants of the trolly or the engme crew. 18. H. T. GoT?ia sta~ h~ first saw the engin~: looming up in the dark n.ess some 15~ fee. aw!ly; It Is probable he confused the engme and signal lights _and fa1led to p1ek out the former; had the engine a white light na prescnbed by the rules he would not have been misled. · . 19. The ~c~pants of the t~olly are emphatic about the mast light being alig~t a~d as 1t IS scarcely cred1ble. that the trolly would run without a light I ~bmk It must be conceded that It. was burning. There is no doubt of it bemg on the trolly as the red pieces of the lens were found among the wreck· .age by Inspector Braganza. The total disappearance of the lamp it>~elf is a mystery, Inspector Braganza states he made a careful search but failed to recover it; all o~her parts of the trolly even the brass bearings, the oil can, the lock and cham were found so that robbery can be put aside. 20. The only other point for consideration is whether there was any motive behind i~ disappearance. Its absence would absolve the engine crew from blame, and I consider. that while the persons on the trolly were busy in .att®ding to Mr. Duff some member of the engine crew deliberately removed it. The tell-tale pieces of the lens were not removed as they could not be found without a light, and had perforce to be left behind. The engine was .at the site for some four hours and there was ample time to grope in the dark .and find such a bulky object as the lamp. 21. H. T. Gomia's duty was clear, i.e., to ascertain the whereabouts of • trains and to keep a good look-out. I consider that he failed in both and must be held primarily to blame for the accident. His position is rather a delicate one, as a railway servant he should have o BENGAL NAGPUR RAILWAY. !PERAIL:MENT OF 205 POWN GOODS TRAIN AT JALESW.AR ON THE 22ND DECEMBER 1930. ---·- FnoH Mn. E. B. RoBEY, SENIOR GoVERIDIENT INSPECTOR oF RAILWA c N 1 CAL~A TO ~ S n ..• YS, TRCLII O, , , ~uu ' •= ECltETARY, ~.....u.W.~Y BoAJI.ll LETTER No 1302fXIllf30 THE 6TH Jum: 1931. (3894-T .). ' ' ' llATKD In accordance with Rule 7 of the Railway Board's Notification No. 1926.-'.!,'., dated the 19th March 1930, I beg to submit my report on the derail ment of a wagon _on 205_Down Goods on 22nd December 11130 at Basta on the Khargpur-Walta1r SectiOn of the Bengal Nagpur Railway. . 2. An Officers' enquiry was held on the 31st December 11130 and the endence recorded thereat was accepted by me. I held an enquiry at Khurda Road on 9th March 1931. Description of the Accident. 3. On the 2_2nd December 1930 about 23-40 hours while No. 205 Down Goods w~s runnmg th!ough Basta, wagon No. 40315, East Indian Rnilwav, was derailed on the pomts at the d~ end an~ dragged for 12 miles through Amarda Road; at Jaleswar the tram hose p1pe was severed and the train brought to rest on the loop with the rear portion fouling the main line. Very extensive damage (about Rs. 1 to It lakhs worth) occurred to the track from Basta to Jaleswat causing a serious dislocation of traffic Pas senger trains were got through at restricted speed of 5 miles per ho~r but -Goods traffic had to be suspended for 48 hours. Description of the locality of the Accident. 4. Basta is an interlocked station with a loop and dead end taking oil it; all on the straight and level; the station building is on the loop on the right .side for down trains. Amarda Road is an interlocked station with a loop and dead end taking ·off it; the station building is on the right for down trainH. Jaleswar is an interlocked station with a loop and a short through siding <>fi it with dead ends at either end; the station building is on the left for down trains. 5. The track from Basta to Jaleswar is straight except for two right and . -one left handed 1° curves; grades vary from level t History of 'ITUlrks on track. 7. The first set of marks were slight i_ndentat~ons. on the ";ood~n sleepers in the lead of the up end points and crossmgs beRmmng at ~7 -6 and end ing at 148' from the nose of the switches; 3i" to 5t" from the wner edge of the 11.ange of the left rail. · Nothing was found on the Cast Iron Pot sleepers between the up and -down end points and crossings. . s: the flared end of the left check rail. at the down end_cross1n~ bad a -dent on it: between the crossing and the sw1tches there were mdentat1o~s on :four sleepers some 5in inside the inner edge of the flange of the left rall. 20 From opposite the joint of the stock rail there was a continuous scored mark along the top table of the left tongue rail and the lead rail attached to it. 9. The slide chairs on the fourth and fifth sleepers of the right tongue rail had slight indentations and the sixth a deep one; all inside the t.rac~. There were no corresponding marks on the o~tside of the ~eft tongue ra:l. Some of the interlocking gear attached to the nght tongue rail was broken. The gauge tie plate at the nose of the switch and the next two sleepers bad no marks whatever; the next seven sleepers had corresponding marks inside and outside the rails of one wheel flange only; from the tenth sleeper there were marks of two wheel flan"'es inside and outside the rails respec tively where the second pair of wbe~ls came off. Beyond this these marks continue with variations right up to Jaleswar. History of wagon. 10. Wagon No. 40315 E. I. R. was attached at Cuttack on 22nd December 19!30 after having lain in a siding for 18 days; no examination of it was made prior to being put into service. It was received at W altair from the Madras and Southern Maharatta Railway on the 29th November 1930. The left leading safety hanger of the brake beam was found with the open hooked end straightened out; the brake beam hanger bad come adrift. from its pin connection to the nnderframe and was slightly damaged; the forked arm of the brake beam was broken and the straight arm bent. The safety hangers on this wagon were forged from 1 11 round bar flattened at the ends to 1~" x 5/16"; the standard type is a flat1 If' x t"; how this tvpe- came to be in use is being looked into by the East Indian Railway. • " The centre of the brake beam is normal~y 20" and the inside of the safety hanger 19'' above rail level; the brake beam hanger is 211" long and would projert 2" below rail level when dangling. Conclusions. 11. The aetual cause of the derailment ·caruiot be definitely ascertained;. but from the fads and markings cited above it is possible to frame a logical sequence of events. From the marks cited in paragraph 10 the brake beam hanger must have come adrift at the up end points. It was dangling, .and struck the check rail at the down end crossing. The constant blows transmitted to the brake beam and the weight thereof began to tell on the safety hanger, causing the· open hooked end to straighten out and the brake beam to drop after passing the down end crossing. Just before reaching the heel block, where the space between the crossing lead and left main line rails begins to close in, the fallen brake block was forced on to the top of the rail and the wheel mounted it. At the fourth sleeper under the switches the mounted left wheel must have shifted laterally and caused the right wheel to drop on the slide chairs· the left wheel remained on the brake block and ultimately came off at the third sleepet· beyond the nose of the switch. · 12. I consider that the evidence of Guard Singh and Driver Venkata-· swamy as to exchange of signals at Basta and Amarda Road must be con sidered false; as the wagon bad its wheels on the left outside the track and as sparks were being emitted they could scarcely have failed to see them. ~uarcl Singh .admitted at the pr~liminary enquiry that be did not exchange signals but withdrew the admtssion at the formal enquiry. 13. Driver Venkataswamy states he noticed no drag of the derailed wagon and is ve;y emphati? about keeping his re~lator in one position. This. is scarcely cred1ble and his evidence must be reJected. 14. From the records the " Train Entering Section ". was given from Basta at 23-39 hours and the train came to a stand at Jaleswar at 0-10 hours i.e., it covered 12 miles in 31 minutes, and must have been running about 22. miles per hour. 21 " 1~. Assistant S~ati?,n Master Mohapatra (Amarqn Road) gave the Tram out of Section to Basta at 23-48 hours. He ~t " Authoritv to ~roc~d " from Jaleswar at 23-45 hours and gave the " Train Entering St-c tiOn to Jaleswar at 23-48 hours; he reported at 23-52 hours to the Con troller that there was a hot axle on the train. He must have been engaged at the instruments for about ten minutes and during this time he evidently did not leave the office. He states he sn\V sparks from all four wheels yet he reported a hot box. It is evident he wa11 given some information by one of his staff and actually saw nothing himsclt'. 16. It seems incredible that, had he heard and seen the tlerailed vehicle passing the station, he had not sense enough to realise somethin~ was radi cally wrong. Not having seen anvthing, the fact that the traek was duma~ was not .appreciated by him and he allowed a light en~ine and 7 Down Pus sanger Tram Qver the section without taking any steps to examine th11 track. 17. Apart from the actual damage to the track, Rs. 1 to ll (approx.) lakhs, was the serious dislocation of t.raffic entailing- • (a) Goods traffic being suspended for 48 hours . (b) South-bound traffic being held up at Adra and Shalimar for 48 hours. {c) Four goods trains being stabl11d on the section for 48 hours. (d) Detention to Passenger and Goods Trains 143 working hours. 18. The derailed wagon ran over several open deck bridge11 without mis hap as it was more or less undamaged; had it been otherwise the results would have been disastrous. 19-. The precise circumstances attending the derailment cannot be stated but thete is sufficient circumstantial evidence to ~how that an equal share of responsibility must ~e borne by- (a) Guard Singh, (b) Driver Venkataswamy, (c) Assistant Station Master _Mohapatra, (d). Assistant Train Examiner Chinniah, the first three for negligence in conn~ction with a. running train and the last named for passing the wagon when 1t was defect1ve. Recommendations. 20. The examination of trains by Train Examining Staff should be looked into to ensure thorough inspection at selected places. . . 21. The question of exchange of signals between guards ~nd dnvers .on goods trains requires inves.tigatio!l to. ensure that both the tram and station staff have facilities for takmg actiOn m an emergency. . 22 The question of exchange of signals on all goods trams warrants ~n . sideration as very serious results accrue through damages en route not bemg detected in time. 22 EAST INDIAN RAILWAY. DERAILMENT OF No. 73 DOWN DEHRA. DUN-LAHORE p A SENGER TRAIN AT HARRAWALA STATION· ON THE 0TS JANUARY 1931. . • • 2 II FllOM lb. E. R. CASEMENT, 8ENIOll·GOV111lNlfE!IT !NSPE n. TO THE SECllETAllY RAILWAY BoA ~ CTOa OP ~"'ILWAY!, Lt'CKNow • 1931. (3757-T.) : no, LETTF.R ~0. 635-T.; DAT&D tllB 28Til JA!WARY • In accordance with Rule 8 of Railway Board's Notifiratiol\ No 19<)6-T ~ated the_ 19th March 1930, I beg to submit a report on the en ui i hold mto the circumstance~ attending the deraihnent uf No. 73 Down bt·J?ra nun Lahore Passenger tram at Harrawala station mile 44 on the Lhnksnr-Dchra Dun B:anch of the East Indian Railway on the 20th JanUJLry 1931. 2: The enquiry_ was held on 23rd January 1931, at Harrawala station at which the follomng officers were present :- . Mr. E. ~· Speech!y, Senior Superintendent of Works, East Indian Rallway, Moradabad. Mr. C. Pearce, Superintendent of Power, East Indian Railway, Moradabad. · Mr. E. M. Harris, Inspector, Government Railway Police. Description of Accident. 3. At about 16 hours on 20th January .1931, No. 73 Down which left Dl'hrn Dun ~t 1_5-~5, ran through Harrawala station out of control, ran throu~b t:\le _slip sidmg at the south end of the yard and the engine and two lending bog~es were derailed, the engine being over-turned and both bogies partially telescoped. . The guard of the train and one passenger were slightly injured. The mjured passenger was said to be without a ticket and disappeared after the accident. · Description o/ the Locality of Accident. 4. After running through the slip siding the engine turned over on its left side into a shallow borrowpit about 5 feet below the level of the siding. 5. Harrawala station is on a falling grade of 1 in 500 from Debra Dun. For about two miles on the Dehra Dun side there is a falling grade towards Harrawala, about one mile of which is 1 in 75 including the last quarter mile approaching the station. Conclusions. 6.. The accident was due to the carelessness and misjudgment of the driver, Badruddin, who failed to apply his brakes soon enough to pull up the train on the steep grade approaching Harrawala station. 7. The evidence shows that the vacuum brakes were in good order before leaving Dehra Dun and after the accident the six undamaged vehicles were found by the Head Train Examiner to have their brakes hard on. 8. The load was a normal one consisting of 8 bogie vehicles with !In HPC class engine and with the brakes in good order should have been eru11ly controlled. 9. The driver was new to the road and evidently did not realise that special care is necessary on steep grades. Neither he no~ t~e guard kne_w the permanent speed restrictions on the section though It. IS cl~rly la1d doWD in the Working Time Table that speed for descend1!!g tra1ns sl~ll not exCEed 30 miles per hour. On hi~ own sta~ent the dnver was going at 40 miles per hour before approaching the station. •2 23 10. There are no curves for about li miles from the station and the signals are clearly visible for an adequate distance. 11. The amended working rules for Harrawala station say that the slip siding points may be set for the main line if line clear has been received from Doiwala for a Down train. It is _not made obligatory and to do so and in. practice the points are kept set for the siding until the train has arrived at Harrawala, except in the case of non-stopping trains. The rules should be more definite. · 12. The question naturally arises as to whether catch sidings should be provided at Harrawala and similar stations on the Dehra Dun Branch. 1 !lo not consider this necessary but the slip siding should be extended to a length of 600 feet to give an adequate distance beyond the tr_ailing points. 1'he siding should be on a rising grade and the last 100 feet sanded. BENGAL AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY. DERAILMENT OF No. 3 UP PASSENGER TRAIX BETI\'EE~ MAIJAPUR AND COLONELGANJ ON THE 26TH JANUARY 1931.. FR BENGAL AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY. ACCIDENT TO A STONE TRAIN IN DARA NALA SIDING AT JARWA STATION ON THE 26ru FEBRUARY 1931. FROM MR. E. R. CAsEYEl'iT, SENioa GoVBilNlml!T INsPECTOR oP IUxLwn~, LucJt: Description of the Accident. . 3. On the morning of 26th' February 1931, a loaded rake of 25 wagons w1th 1 crew-van and 1- brake-van was being pulled out of the bnllaRt siding towards Jarwa station. Near the top of the grade approaching tho station the engine failed and the driver started to back the train in order to get a run at the slope. While it was being backed the rear of the train collided with a rake of loaded wagons which had been left near the north end of the siding and had run away down the slope of the nala. A number of contractor's coolies were travelling in the loaded wagons anrl 10 of these coolies were killed and seven injured in the collision, 19 wagons were damaged to the extent of someRs. 15,000. Description of the locality of the accident. 4. The ballast siding on leaving Jarwa station falls at a grade of 1 in 140 for about 3,000 feet to the bottom of the Dara NaJa. It continues up the bed of 'the nala for about 2 miles on rising grades the steepest of which is 1 in 60. The collision occurred on the slope between the nalo. bed and Jarwa station. At the site of accident the line is on o. sharp curve with jungle on both sides of the track. Conclusions. 5. I consider the Guard, Jamil Ahmed, primarily responsible for the accident in that- (1) He did not take the action required in General Rule 156 (3) and (12) to secure the vehicles cut off in the siding. (~) Before allowing the train to be pushed back he took no steps to see that the line behind the train was clear of obstruction. (3) He took no precautions to prevent contractor's coolies from travel- ling in the loaded wa.gons. . 6 I consider the Station Master, Jarwa, Kashi Ram, partially respon sible in that he had no knowledge of the rules for wo~king the siding and took no action whatever to see that the rules were earned out, although the rules were hung up in a prominent. place in his o!fiee. This Station Mll;S~r gave his age as 54 but I am ~onvmce~ that he 1s long. past the age hm1t and is quite incapable of carrymg on h1s work as a Station Master. 7. The arrangements for working this ballast train are most unsatl&· factory both from the traffic and engineering points of view. Although tho train was required to work on heavy grades and wagons had to be cut oil at different point& in the siding, the only steps. taken to insure saf~ working were verbal orders given by the Assistant Engineer to the Sub-Pel"IIUlnent Way Inspector, Overseer and Time Keeper) all o{ whom had other work to do. The guard was not provided with chams, padlocks or sprags to enable h~m to carry out the general roles for working ballast trains. 8. The rules for working the sidirig were apparently originally framed for some other siding. The siding referred to w paragraph S of the ~les does not exist and is not required as there is no danger of wagons rnnnmg back up the grade from the siding into' the station. For the safety of the ~tat ion it is only necessary to ensure •that ballast trains returning from the s~ding stop before entering the station limit& 11nd are. admitted on hand stgnals. · • 9. The rule limiting loads to 20 and 10 for empty and loaded wagons respectively was framed, for lighter ·e~gines than the Y. F. type used and although the load of 25 loaded ·~nd 2 empty which it failed to pull out of the siding. was evidently too great it could probably deal with 18 or 2Q: loaded wagons safely. Tests shouldoo made by a Loco. Officer or Inspector and the Assistant Engineer .to fix the maximum load for each type of·engine' in use on these ballast trains. 10. The composition of the train should have had more consideration. The practice has. been to push 50 empty wa"gons into the sidirig with one brake-van next the engine and another at the other end of'the train. The train is pulle6 out in two part& so that the only brake-van with the first· half of the train is next the engine. One brake-van should be in the middle of the train when being pushed out so that it will be in rear of the return- ing load. · · • 11. The wedges used for holding wagons are too light and sprags should be used:· • . · • · • 12. The end wagons of each rake cut off for loading should be chained ·~nd padlocl(ed. · · · 1S. A brakesman should be permanently· on duty in the siding to see that all wagons .are properly secured and that no hand shuntill!! is attempted. EAST IlrniAN RAU,W.A.Y. DERAILMENT OF AN UP C.OMOH SPECIAL C.OODS TR:\TN ON THE 27TH MARCIT 1931 AT l'RADIIANKUANTA ::'\TATION . . FKO>f }fa. E. n. RoDF.Y, SF.:(JOR 0MT.II~"F·~·r hsr~O'TtlR .. ,. R.ut.W .• T~. ('tRo'I.R No. l, CucuTTA, Tt\ TJtR S•:o·H>.TAR'i_ R•"·"'" JlnARD, urrru Nn. Jmr.!JXIllJ:\1, t>ATI The interlocking provides- (a) Thnt before the Up Loop Home can be lowered bJ>: East Cabin, We~ l!GIPO-L-X-3--l!'l-1~11.