Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua

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Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua INDONESIA: DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN PAPUA Asia Report N°232 – 9 August 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE JAYAPURA SHOOTINGS, KNPB AND DEATH OF MAKO TABUNI .......... 3 A. PROTESTS GATHER FORCE ........................................................................................................... 3 B. A STRING OF SHOOTINGS ............................................................................................................. 5 C. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE? ........................................................................................................... 7 III. ABEPURA AND WAMENA: POOR DISCIPLINE AND IMPUNITY ...................... 8 A. PAPUAN PEOPLE’S CONGRESS ...................................................................................................... 8 B. RAMPAGE IN WAMENA ................................................................................................................ 9 IV. PANIAI: VIOLENCE AND GOLD-MINING .............................................................. 10 A. BACKGROUND TO THE MINING .................................................................................................. 11 B. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE .......................................................................................................... 12 C. RUMOURS OF EVICTION AND THE OPM’S INVOLVEMENT .......................................................... 12 D. MORE VIOLENCE ....................................................................................................................... 14 E. WHY PANIAI MATTERS .............................................................................................................. 15 V. THE ABSENCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT .......................................................... 15 A. WHY THERE IS NO GOVERNOR .................................................................................................. 15 B. UNDERMINING THE MRP ........................................................................................................... 18 C. FURTHER PROBLEMS AT SUB-PROVINCIAL LEVEL ...................................................................... 19 VI. WHERE IS JAKARTA? ................................................................................................. 22 A. UP4B: GOOD INTENTIONS, DIMINISHED HOPES ......................................................................... 23 B. DIALOGUE: MORE SLOW STEPS ................................................................................................. 25 C. SECURITY POLICY ...................................................................................................................... 26 VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF PAPUA AND PAPUA BARAT PROVINCES............................................................................... 29 B. MAP OF GREATER JAYAPURA AREA ................................................................................................ 30 C. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 31 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 32 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 ......................................................... 33 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 35 Asia Report N°232 9 August 2012 INDONESIA: DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN PAPUA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS A spate of violence in Papua in May and June 2012 ex- left the Papuan provincial government in limbo. Mean- posed the lack of a coherent government strategy to address while, the organisation of a new election has been stymied this multidimensional conflict. Shootings of non-Papuans by a provincial legislature that has focused most of its en- in the provincial capital Jayapura in June, likely involving ergy on blocking the former governor from running and pro-independence militants, were followed by the death vying in national courts with the local election commis- of one of those militants at police hands, highlighting the sion for control over parts of the electoral process. The political dimension of the problem. In Wamena, a rampage picture is just as grim at district level. This leaves the cen- by soldiers after the death of a comrade shows the depth tral government without an engaged partner in Papua, and of distrust between local communities and the army, and Papuans without a formal channel for conveying concerns the absence of mechanisms to deal with crises. The shoot- to Jakarta. ing of five Papuans by newly arrived members of a para- military police unit (Brigade Mobile, Brimob) in a remote The role of a new policy unit – the Unit for Accelerated gold-mining area of Paniai highlights the violence linked Development in Papua and West Papua, known by its In- to Papua’s vast resource wealth and rent-seeking by the donesian abbreviation of UP4B – established in Septem- security apparatus with little oversight from Jakarta. While ber 2011, increasingly appears limited to economic affairs, these events are still under investigation, they signal that where it will struggle to show visible progress in the short unless the Yudhoyono government can address these very term. Hopes that it might play a behind-the-scenes political different aspects of the conflict, things may get worse. An role in fostering dialogue on Papuan grievances are fading, overhaul of security policy would help. as it becomes increasingly clear that dialogue means dif- ferent things to different people. Efforts to hammer out some Two factors are driving much of the violence: a wide consensus on terms and objectives have been set back by range of Papuan grievances toward the Indonesian state the violence, as the government is reluctant to take any and a security policy that seems to run directly counter to steps that might be perceived as making concessions under the government’s professed desire to build trust, acceler- pressure. ate development and ensure that a 2001 special autonomy law for Papua yields concrete benefits. To date the law The challenge for the government is to find a short-term has failed to produce either improvement in the lives of strategy that can reduce violence while continuing to work most Papuans or better relations with the central govern- out a policy that will bring long-term social, economic and ment. Its substance has been frequently undercut by Jakar- political benefits and address longstanding grievances. ta, although provincial lawmakers also bear responsibility That strategy must involve clear and visible changes in the for failing to enact key implementing regulations. One of administration, control and accountability of both the po- the last measures to prompt accusations in Papua of Jakar- lice and military. The security apparatus is not the only ta’s bad faith was the 2011 division into two of the Papuan problem, nor are police and soldiers always the perpetra- People’s Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP), an insti- tors of violence; many have been victims as well. But they tution set up under the law to safeguard Papuan values and have come to symbolise everything that has gone wrong culture that was supposed to be a single body, covering all with Jakarta’s handling of the Papuan conflict. It there- of Papua. In many ways the MRP was the keystone of spe- fore follows that a change in security policy is the best hope cial autonomy but it has been plagued by problems since its for a “quick win” that can transform the political dynam- much-delayed establishment; the division, with Jakarta’s ics and halt the slide toward further violence. active endorsement, has further reduced its effectiveness. These problems would be hard enough to manage if Papua had functioning political institutions, but it does not. An ineffectual caretaker governor appointed in July 2011 has Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua Crisis Group Asia Report N°232, 9 August 2012 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS 3. Review policy on use of live ammunition with a view to restricting its use to specific situations and ensur- To the Government of Indonesia: ing an adequate supply of non-lethal equipment for handling civil unrest. 1. Develop a more integrated policymaking mechanism 4. Ensure that police are fully equipped with protective on Papua at the national and provincial levels to en- body equipment when assigned to insecure areas or sure that: when facing civil unrest so as to reduce the incentive a) programs designed to deliver concrete benefits to to shoot first. Papuans and build trust are not inadvertently under- 5. Reassess training needs, to ensure that anyone posted cut by decisions or actions taken in home affairs to a particular kabupaten (district) in Papua receives a or by intelligence and security agencies; thorough and detailed briefing from those who have b) a more unified security reporting mechanism is cre- served in the area about local conditions, conflict dy- ated under the Papuan regional police commander namics and relations with local government and com- to ensure that elements
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