Issue 55, 4th Quarter 2009 New Journal from NDU Press PRISM JFQ
National Defense University (NDU) is pleased to introduce PRISM, a complex operations journal. PRISM will explore, promote, and debate emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in operations in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, coun- terinsurgency, and irregular warfare. PRISM complements Joint Force Quarterly, introduced by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 years ago to similarly advance joint force integration and understanding.
PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially those that focus on the nexus of civil-military integration. The journal will be published four times a year both online and in hardcopy. It will debut in December 2009. Manuscripts submitted to PRISM should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words in length and sent via email to [email protected].
Call for Entries for the 2010 Y L R E T R A U Q E C R O F T N I O J Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition
Are you a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) stu- process early and avoid the end-of-academic-year rush that dent? Imagine your winning essay in the pages of a future issue typically occurs each spring. JPME colleges are free to run their of Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, imagine a chance to catch own internal competitions to select nominees but must meet the ear of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint these deadlines: Chiefs of Staff on an important national security issue; recogni- tion by peers and monetary prizes await the winners. n April 27, 2010: colleges submit nominated essays to
NDU Press for first round of judging. Who’s Eligible: Students at the JPME colleges, schools, and programs, including Service research fellows and international n May 18–19, 2010: final judging and selection of students. winners.
What: Research and write an original, unclassified essay in National Defense University Press conducts the compe- one or more of the various categories. May be done in conjunc- titions with the generous support of the NDU Founda- tion with a course writing requirement. Must be selected by tion. For further information, see your college’s essay and submitted through your college. coordinator or go to:
When: Essays may be written any time during the 2009–2010 www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_SECDEFEC.htm academic year, but students are encouraged to begin the www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_CSEC.htm ISSUE fifty Strategists and -FIVE, 4 t h
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY quarter 2009 STRATEGY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press > > National Defense University, Washington, DC Acquisition Reform 2009 Essay Winners 1070-0692(200934)55;1-E
Joint Force Quarterly JFQ Dialogue 2 From the Chairman Inside 5 Open Letter th Issue 55, 4 Quarter 2009 6 Letters to the Editor Forum “A campaign against extremism Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) [email protected] 8 Executive Summary will not succeed with bullets or Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. bombs alone.” Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 10 A New Grand Bargain: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Defense Planning By Thomas G. Mahnken — President Barack Obama March 27, 2009 Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Strategic Drift? The Future of the National War College Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 14 By Janet Breslin-Smith and Cliff Krieger Graphic Design Tara J. Parekh Research Assistant Ashley Harper 21 Developing Strategists: Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy Design Chris Dunham and John Mitrione, By Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook “As President, my greatest responsibility U.S. Government Printing Office Looking for a Challenge? 29 Asia: Facing Interesting Times By Dean Cheng is to protect the American people…We Printed in St. Louis, Missouri Future Gulf War: Weighing Arab and American Forces against by 35 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are in Afghanistan to confront a common Iranian Capabilities By Richard L. Russell enemy that threatens the United States, 41 The State of Play in Russia’s Near Abroad By Peter B. Humphrey Afghanistan. These are non-career Foreign Service our friends and allies, and the people NDU Press is the National Defense University’s SORT-ing out START: Options for U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions cross-component, professional military and 47 of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have academic publishing house. It publishes books, By Stephen J. Cimbala policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and least a Bachelor’s degree and eight years of relevant suffered the most at the hands of special reports on national security strategy, defense violent extremists. So I want the policy, national military strategy, regional security Special Feature experience, four of which must be overseas. affairs, and global strategic problems. American people to understand that 59 Real Acquisition Reform By Jim Cooper and Russell Rumbaugh For more information and to apply, go to we have a clear and focused goal: This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department 66 Integrating CONOPs into the Acquisition Process By John P. Jumper, of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions David A. Deptula, and Harold B. Adams http://www.usaid.gov/careers/fsls.html to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 69 Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process to Support ISR By Del C. Kostka Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever and to prevent their return to either material is quoted from or based on its content. 75 MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform By Christopher J. Lamb, The United States has a long history of extending a Matthew J. Schmidt, and Berit G. Fitzsimmons helping hand to people overseas struggling to make a country in the future…To achieve our COMMUNICATIONS better life, to recover from a disaster or to live in a free goals, we need a stronger, smarter and Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly Essay Contests online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming and democratic country. It is this caring that stands as a comprehensive strategy.” issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and Winners of the 2009 Writing Competitions access to many other useful NDU Press publications. 86 hallmark of the United States — and shows the world our Constructive comments and contributions The Efficacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” By Om Prakash — President Barack Obama are important to us. Please direct editorial 88 true character as a nation. communications to the link on the NDU Press Web March 27, 2009 Winfield Scott’s 1847 Mexico City Campaign as a Model for Future War site or write to: 95 By Daniel T. Canfield Editor, Joint Force Quarterly The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) National Defense University Press 101 Graying Panda, Shrinking Dragon: The Impact of Chinese Demographic works in almost 110 countries around the world to meet 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2505) Changes on Northeast Asian Security By Matt Isler Fort Lesley J. McNair these goals. www.usaid.gov Washington, DC 20319 Commentary Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander Email: [email protected] 104 JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu By Jeffrey B. Jones, Daniel T. Kuehl, Daniel Burgess, and Russell Rochte Energy and Environmental Insecurity By Richard B. Andres 4th Quarter, October 2009 109 ISSN 1070-0692 113 Measure, Manage, Win: The Case for Operational Energy Metrics By Andrew Bochman Features 120 Interview with General Raymond T. Odierno, USA, Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq 126 Breaking the Yardstick: The Dangers of Market-based Governance By Don J. DeYoung 136 Radar versus Stealth: Passive Radar and the Future of U.S. Military Power By Arend G. Westra PUBLISHER ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN Mind Fitness: Improving Operational Effectiveness and Building 144 President, NDU Warrior Resilience By Elizabeth A. Stanley and Amishi P. Jha VADM Ann E. Rondeau, USN Interagency Dialogue Advisory Committee BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman Col Michael Belcher, USMC Marine Corps War College The Department of Homeland Security: An Organization in Transition 152 Richard K. Betts Columbia University By Charles B. King III BG Edward C. Cardon, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC The Joint Staff A. Denis Clift National Defense Intelligence College Recall Maj Gen Maurice H. Forsyth, USAF Air War College Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses U.S. Joint Military Contributions to Countering Syria’s 1970 Invasion of Jordan RADM Garry E. Hall, USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces 160 LtCol Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.)Department of the Navy By Richard A. Mobley BG Katherine Kasun, USAR Joint Forces Staff College John A. Nagl Center for a New American Security Col David A. Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School Book Reviews Maj Gen Robert P. Steel, USAF National War College LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) 168 Futures of War: Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment RADM James Wisecup, USN Naval War College Reviewed by Clark Capshaw Editorial Board
Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism 168 Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Reviewed by Bryon E. Greenwald COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College Mark J. Conversino Air War College 169 National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Reviewed by Douglas Peifer Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan Reviewed by James T. Snyder Douglas N. Hime Naval War College 171 Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, CAPT John F. Kirby, USN The Joint Staff 172 Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College 1941–1945 Reviewed by Frank G. Hoffman Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation Joint Doctrine Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense Designing Exercises for Teaching and Analysis By Center for Applied 173 CONTRIBUTIONS Strategic Learning Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and Joint Doctrine Update shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the 176 United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on About the cover the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Front cover shows World War II U.S. and British military leaders discussing Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.JFQ is the Chairman’s strategy on war in Europe and Pacific at Conference of Combined Chiefs of flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform Staff headquartered at Mena House Hotel, Cairo, Egypt, December 4, 1943. members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint Left from front: Commander Richard Duke Coleridge, RN; Lt-Gen. Sir and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and Hastings Ismay, BA; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, RN; joint professional military education to transform America’s military and Chief of Imperial General Staff General Sir Alan G. Brooke, BA; Air Chief security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting Marshal Sir Charles Portal, RAF; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, BA; Chief freedom today. Combined Secretary Brigadier Harold Redman, BA; and unidentified Brit- ish officer. Right from front: Colonel Andrew J. McFarland, USA; Chief of The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, USN; Admiral William D. Leahy, or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or USN; Captain Forrest B. Royal, USN; and Commanding General of the U.S. any other agency of the Federal Government. Army Air Forces General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, USAAF. ndupress.ndu.edu From the Chairman Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics
t is time for us to take a harder look at nication, where videos and images plastered of a process, an abstract thought instead of a “strategic communication.” on the Web—or even the idea of their being way of thinking. It is now sadly something of Frankly, I don’t care for the so posted—can and often do drive national a cottage industry. Iterm. We get too hung up on that security decisionmaking. We need to get back to basics, and we word, strategic. If we’ve learned nothing But beyond the term itself, I believe we can start by not beating ourselves up. else these past 8 years, it should be that the have walked away from the original intent. The problem isn’t that we are bad at lines between strategic, operational, and By organizing to it—creating whole struc- communicating or being outdone by men tactical are blurred beyond distinction. This tures around it—we have allowed strategic in caves. Most of them aren’t even in caves. is particularly true in the world of commu- communication to become a thing instead The Taliban and al Qaeda live largely among
ADM Mullen addresses media
U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley)
2 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu the people. They intimidate and control and communicate from within, not from the sidelines. And they aren’t just out there shooting videos, either. They deliver. Want to know DOD (Chad J. McNeeley) what happens if somebody violates their view of Sharia law? You don’t have to look very far or very long. Each beheading, each bombing, and each beating sends a powerful message or, rather, is a powerful message. Got a governance problem? The Taliban is getting pretty effective at it. They’ve set up functional courts in some locations, assess and collect taxes, and even allow people to file formal complaints against local Talib leaders. Part of the Taliban plan to win over the people in Swat was to help the poor or displaced own land. Their utter brutality has not waned, nor has their disregard for human life. But with Chairman outlines military operations in each such transaction, they chip away at the Afghanistan during interview with CNN legitimacy of the Afghan government, saying in effect: “We can give you the stability the sure didn’t need talking points and Power- in audience reaction, perceptions, or culture. government cannot.” Point slides to deliver aid. Americans simply I recognize the information environment No, our biggest problem isn’t caves; showed up and did the right thing because it today is much more complex than it was it’s credibility. Our messages lack credibility was, well, the right thing to do. in 1909, or even 1999. As someone who because we haven’t invested enough in build- That’s the essence of good communica- “tweets” almost daily, I appreciate the need ing trust and relationships, and we haven’t tion: having the right intent up front and to embrace the latest technologies. always delivered on promises. letting our actions speak for themselves. We But more important than any par- The most common questions that I get shouldn’t care if people don’t like us; that ticular tool, we must know the context in Pakistan and Afghanistan are: “Will you isn’t the goal. The goal is credibility. And we within which our actions will be received really stay with us this time?” “Can we really earn that over time. and understood. We hurt ourselves and the count on you?” I tell them that we will and that Now I’m not suggesting we stop plan- message we try to send when it appears we they can, but when it comes to real trust in ning to communicate or that we fail to factor are doing something merely for the credit. places such as these, I don’t believe we are even in Year Zero yet. There’s a very long way to go. ADM Mullen hands out notebooks at opening of Pushghar Village Girls School in The irony here is that we know better. Panjshir Valley, Afghanistan, July 2009 For all the instant polling, market analysis, and focus groups we employ today, we could learn a lot by looking to our own past. No other people on Earth have proven more capable at establishing trust and credibility in more places than we have. And we’ve done it primarily through the power of our example. The voyage of the Great White Fleet told the world that the United States was no longer a second-rate nation. The Marshall Plan made it clear that our strength was only as good as it was shared. The policy of containment let it be known we wouldn’t stand for the spread of communism. And relief efforts in the wake of natural disasters all over the world said calmly and clearly: we will help you through this. We didn’t need a public opinion poll to launch that fleet. We didn’t need a “strat comm” plan to help rebuild Europe. And we DOD (Chad McNeeley) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 3 We hurt ourselves more when our The Muslim community is a subtle Defense Review to reexamine what we mean words don’t align with our actions. Our world we don’t fully—and don’t always by it. Strategic communication should be an enemies regularly monitor the news to attempt to—understand. Only through a enabling function that guides and informs discern coalition and American intent as shared appreciation of the people’s culture, our decisions and not an organization unto weighed against the efforts of our forces. needs, and hopes for the future can we hope itself. Rather than trying to capture all com- When they find a “say-do” gap—such as Abu ourselves to supplant the extremist narrative. munication activity underneath it, we should Ghraib—they drive a truck right through it. We cannot capture hearts and minds. We use it to describe the process by which we So should we, quite frankly. We must be vigi- must engage them; we must listen to them, integrate and coordinate. lant about holding ourselves accountable to one heart and one mind at a time—over time. To put it simply, we need to worry a lot higher standards of conduct and closing any I’m a big fan of Three Cups of Tea by less about how to communicate our actions gaps, real or perceived, between what we say Greg Mortenson. In fact, I had the opportu- and much more about what our actions about ourselves and what we do to back it up. nity this summer to help him open up a new communicate. In fact, I would argue that most strate- school for girls in the Panjshir Valley. Greg I also hope we learn to be more humble, gic communication problems are not com- believes that building relationships is just as to listen more. Because what we are after in munication problems at all. They are policy important as building projects. “The enemy the end—or should be after—are actions that and execution problems. Each time we fail is ignorance,” he told me, “and it isn’t theirs speak for themselves, that speak for us. What to live up to our values or don’t follow up on alone. We have far more to learn from the we need more than anything is credibility. a promise, we look more and more like the people who live here than we could ever hope And we can’t get that in a talking point. JFQ arrogant Americans the enemy claims we to teach them.” are. He’s right. We are only going to be as MICHAEL G. MULLEN And make no mistake—there has been good as our own learning curve. And just the Admiral, U.S. Navy a certain arrogance to our “strat comm” simple act of trying, of listening to others, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff efforts. We’ve come to believe that messages speaks volumes all by itself. are something we can launch downrange like I know strategic communication as a a rocket, something we can fire for effect. term of reference is probably here to stay. They are not. Good communication runs Regrettably, it’s grown too much a part both ways. It’s not about telling our story. We of our lexicon. But I do hope we take this must also be better listeners. opportunity under the coming Quadrennial U.S. Marine Corps (James Purschwitz)
Marine officer addresses key officials and residents during shura on reestablishing district government, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
4 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Introducing PRISM
National Defense University (NDU) is pleased to introduce PRISM, a complex operations journal. PRISM will explore, promote, and debate emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in operations in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. PRISM complements Joint Force Quarterly, introduced by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 years ago to similarly advance joint force integration and understanding. PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially those that focus on the nexus of civil-military in- tegration. The journal will be published four times a year both online and in hardcopy. It will debut in December 2009. PRISM is supported by an interactive Web site that allows readers to search past issues, submit manuscripts, provide subject matter feedback, and post letters to the editor. The editors ofPRISM evaluate submitted manuscripts with the following criteria: Direct topical relevance, continuing education for national security professionals, scholarly stan- dards of evidence and argumentation, and readability. Few submissions are rejected on the To You! grounds that they lie beyond the journal’s purview. Far more frequently, manuscripts fail to pass the “So what?” test. Even if an article is factually accurate and criticism is delivered ndupress.ndu.edu with precision, does the author recommend clear solutions, or arm the reader with action- able education? Be aggressive in seeking out and identifying problems that should be fixed Distribution: JFQ is distributed to the irrespective of agency perspective, conventional wisdom, or published doctrine. field and fleet through Service publications PRISM is chartered by the Center for Complex Operations (CCO), which was distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National Guard units, individuals, and organizations established to (1) provide for effective coordination in the preparation of Department of supported by the Services can order JFQ Defense personnel and other U.S. Government personnel for complex operations; (2) foster through the appropriate activity: Army: Publications Control Officers sub- unity of effort during complex operations among the departments and agencies of the U.S. mit requests for official subscriptions Government, foreign governments and militaries, international organizations and inter- through www.usapa.army.mil (click national nongovernmental organizations, and domestic nongovernmental organizations; “ordering” link on left side of page) (use IDN: 050042 and PIN: 071781; cite (3) conduct research, collect, analyze, and distribute lessons learned, and compile best Misc. Pub 71-1) practices in matters relating to complex operations; and (4) identify gaps in the education Navy: Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, New Cumberland, Penn- and training of Department of Defense personnel and other U.S. Government personnel sylvania 17070; call (717) 770-5872, relating to complex operations, and facilitate efforts to fill such gaps. CCO is established DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360 Air Force: within the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at NDU. www.e-Publishing.af.mil or email [email protected] Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. Marine Manuscripts submitted to PRISM should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words in Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (room 1302), Navy Annex, Wash- length and sent via email to [email protected]. ington, DC 20380; FAX (703) 614-2951, DSN 224-2951 Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Subscriptions for individuals and nonmilitary organizations: [email protected] http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 5 LETTERS
To the Editor—I have studied and applied “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpre- It is simply false to claim, as Professor systems theory for the last 40 years, encom- dictability of War” (International Security, Czarnecki does (and many systems theorists passing three careers including that of a Winter, 1992–1993). These treatises are well as well), that Carl von Clausewitz was one of military officer. My advanced degree includes known among systems thinkers and theorists the first systems philosophers of war. He was a specialty in the field of systems think- interested in military affairs; they are also not. Clausewitz’s writings cannot be rein- ing. So I find it appalling that Joint Force known to many professionals in the military. terpreted in terms of systems theory, which Quarterly would publish such a completely Alternatively, if Professor Vego had originated first in biology in the 1920s—that misinformed piece as that by Professor Milan wanted to critique systems theory from is, some 90 years after Clausewitz died. In Vego (“Systems versus Classical Approach to some of its source documents, he could have fact, he was vehemently against using rules, Warfare,” JFQ 52, 1st Quarter 2009). How one accessed the many works of scientists and principles, or systems in the study of war. In can critique the field of systems theory and its philosophers such as Russell Ackoff, C. West his seminal work On War, he wrote: related subdisciplines without referencing a Churchman, or Carl von Clausewitz. We single work that defines the field is sufficiently systems theorists believe that Clausewitz, so Efforts were . . . made to equip the conduct of disquieting; how an esteemed quarterly such ahead of his time, was one of the first systems war with principles, rules, or even systems. as yours can publish it is beyond belief. Either philosophers on the subject of war. Vego has This did present a positive goal, but people the editors are ignorant of the basics of the created a false god in his view of the systems failed to take an adequate account of the field, or they are coopted by the author. approach (“the” approach does not exist), and endless complexities involved. As we have seen, Professor Vego starts with an encour- then broken his phantom icon to his own the conduct of war branches out in almost all aging premise: that the bastardization of applause. directions and has no definite limits; while the systems disciplines by the U.S. military In fact, his last section, dealing with any system, any model has the finite nature of is incongruent to the realities of war and operational thinking and vision, is completely a synthesis. An irreconcilable conflict exists warfare. Effects-based operations, the latest consistent with the way systems thinkers view between this type of theory and actual prac- variant of the so-called Warden school, is war and warfare. I know because I now teach tice. . . . [These attempts] aim at fixed values far more representative of the American operational art, using Vego’s own book on the but in war everything is uncertain and calcu- penchant for creative English (through inven- subject, and applying my systems knowledge lations have to be made with variable quanti- tion of attractive slogans and acronyms) than accordingly. ties (Howard and Paret, 1993, 154–155). serious systems theory (read Paul Van Riper’s You, dear editor, have been had. Unfor- commentary in this same issue). In fact, the tunately, so have your readers. A prominent systems theorist con- distorted, even perverted American concepts cluded Clausewitz believed that it was of systems theory and thought as applied to —Jonathan E. Czarnecki, Ph.D. desirable to develop a system of principles war and warfare seem far more akin to the COL (Ret.), USA for the conduct of war but that goal was old continental ideas of “orderly battle” than Professor of Joint Military unattainable. However, one cannot pos- the dynamic environments that they now are. Operations sibly read the above statement and conclude And this is where Vego, the historian, Naval War College Monterey that Clausewitz was somehow a systems goes completely awry. In chastising Ameri- thinker. He wrote on friction and linearity/ can doctrine, he generalizes his critique to To the Editor—I was unpleasantly surprised nonlinearity of war, but not in terms some all systems theory. One of his comments, with both the tone and content of Professor systems theorists use to explain his writings highlighted by the editors in the article, suf- Jonathan Czarnecki’s letter. Professional today. In fact, Heinrich Dietrich von Buelow fices to demonstrate his ignorance of systems discussion should be free of ad hominem (1757–1807) and other followers of the so- science. He adduces that systems theory attacks. called mathematical or geometrical school so would include the “neo-Newtonian view of My article, as its title implies, was predominant prior to the French Revolution- the world . . . that everything runs smoothly, focused on comparing systems and classical ary and the Napoleonic Wars had much more precisely, and predictably.” That is completely approaches to warfare. I have never intended in common with some aspects of systems the opposite of what systems theorists have to provide a critique of systems theory in thinking. Not by accident, Buelow’s main discovered and published, believe, and prac- general. My use of the terms systems and work was entitled Spirit of the New System of tice. In fact, if Vego had bothered to do the systems approach clearly refers to the way War (Geist des Neueren Kriegssystems). Like slightest research in this field, as it applies systems theory is being interpreted and many systems proponents, and EBO advo- to the military, he would have found what applied by leading effects-based operations cates in particular, Buelow overemphasized systems thinkers believe in Barry Watts’ (EBO)/systemic operational design propo- the importance of quantifiable factors in classic monograph, Clausewitzian Friction nents. This is also shown by repeated use of warfare and neglected such factors as political and the Future of War, or Tom Czerwinski’s the terms EBO enthusiasts or proponents. intentions, morale of the army, psychology of collection of essays, Coping With Bounds: My article was based on numerous sources, the commander, and irrationality. Speculations on Non-Linearity in Military including writings of some leading systems One does not need 40 years to conclude Affairs, or Alan Beyerchen’s classic article, theorists. that systems theory cannot be applied to such
6 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu enormously complex human activities as need for attritional warfare. The very rapidity theories of the 20th century and the elegance warfare. That does not mean that some parts of victory causes the mass of the people to of delivering rapid strategic decision from the of such theories cannot be applied to the face the facts and accept the inevitable. When skies. War would come and those with air- military domain. Advocates of the systems domino warfare is tied to an attractive world- power, against which no defense was possible, approach need to prove practical utility of view (or ideology), the postwar situation will would win it. At the U.S. Army Air Corps their theories in the conduct of war, and in take care of itself as the repressed universal Tactical School at Maxwell Field, the heirs to operational warfare in particular; otherwise, values of “the people” emerge and align them- Billy Mitchell and Mason Patrick refined an they will deservedly meet the fate suffered by selves with those of the victors. Of course, approach that focused on the arrangement all pseudo-scientific theories of past eras. these sorts of assumptions are so much empty and interrelationship of the metaphorical nonsense, as recent military history in Iraq, dominos, the industrial system of a potential —Milan Vego, Ph.D. the Balkans, and Afghanistan suggests. The adversary. After 6 years of bloody combat Professor of Operations efficacy of domino warfare, however, seems to in World War II and the fielding of an Naval War College retain its allure. atomic bomb, victory did come—but not Newport, RI Domino warfare has fundamental quickly. More recently, SOD, when applied conceptual errors that are now being compre- to complex human “systems,” has proved To the Editor—There is a proposition that hensively examined, and it may be the wrong particularly ineffective in Iraq, Lebanon, and makes its appearance in military discus- tool to solve most problems. Its most recent Afghanistan. sions on a periodic basis—the quick, decisive manifestation seems to consist of three related Domino warfare encompasses the victory. Usually the forcing function for this concepts: effects-based operations (EBO), age-old desire to find the quick military- proposition is the historical record of warfare. network-centric warfare (NCW), and finally political victory through some technological Here is how it looks: a genius comes along, systemic operational design (SOD). First, there or intellectual shortcut or combination of wins a particularly elegant battle, campaign, is the issue of so-called EBO. This particular the two. The problem is that complex human or war, and not long after, erudite theo- concept got its start at the operational level systems do not lend themselves well to this rists gather to capture the essentials of his of war. EBO is the ideal bumper-sticker for approach. Things happen unexpectedly and “method.” Or to sell books. There is nothing domino warfare adherents. In its original form, often slowly in the human domain. For these inherently wrong in this approach toward EBO targets a relatively simple system, such as reasons, domino warfare outcomes are best war; however, capturing the universal essen- an electrical grid, a water management system, left to the realm of serendipity as one instead tials that lead inevitably to victory is probably or even a telecommunications network. The plans for a long chess tournament. a vain pursuit since each situation has its effects produced can be predicted and factored own essentials. Carl von Clausewitz himself into the design of the campaign. However, —Dr. John T. Kuehn scorned “strategic clichés” and “jargon, which the problem with EBO is that it became an Associate Professor of Military . . . bears only a faint resemblance to well oxymoron. It became effects-based operations History defined, specific concepts.” Learning from warfare—thus graduating from an operational U.S. Army Command and General history was something Clausewitz advocated, approach to a whole way of war unto itself, Staff College but not in order to find a silver bullet that with its own taxonomy and logic. guarantees success. The next concept contributing to a To the Editor—Although I do not agree with The story of military theory is littered domino warfare mindset is NCW. Like EBO, everything Ralph Peters wrote in “Trap- with just these sorts of attempts. But the short, NCW began as a simple construct: use the ping Ourselves in Afghanistan and Losing decisive war with a tidy ending is rare, if not latest information and space technologies to Focus on the Essential Mission” (JFQ 54, 3d nonexistent, in recorded history. The most rapidly gather target data for employment Quarter 2009), I commend him for reducing recent manifestation of this pursuit is best in the less complex maritime environment a complex issue to an understandable solution described as “domino warfare.” This approach (as regards human terrain). The concept by answering the questions: (1) Where are we? to war is characterized by the achievement of was at its most coherent for an air defense (2) How did we get there? (3) Where are we military success through finding the magic related problem that rapidly synchronized the going? Essentially, LTC Peters wrote, first we action that will cause a cascading series of sensors and weapons in Navy battle groups. are in Afghanistan. Second, we went there to subsequent events (or effects) that lead to As air defense systems rapidly expanded in neutralize al Qaeda after the attacks on 9/11. military success. In theory, a carefully focused tandem with information technologies, NCW Third, with al Qaeda neutralized in Afghani- attack, or series of attacks, causes the enemy came to encompass just about any networked stan, where are we going by expending our to lose both his control and composure on a system. Again we see the misuse of language resources in fighting the Taliban and nation- broad systemic scope. As the dominos fall, as jargon contributing to the inflation of building when we have bigger fish to fry? they quickly result in a broad psychological modest operational concepts into “an emerg- paralysis which translates—somehow—into ing theory of warfare.” —LtCol Fred L. Edwards, Jr., USMC a political or national capitulation. Such a Finally, there is the issue of SOD. This (Ret.) fortuitous result reduces or even eliminates the approach has its genesis in the airpower ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 7 Executive Summary
For every complex problem there is a simple by obtaining and synchronizing available resources from within the interagency to solution that is wrong. achieve theater objectives within a multina- tional environment.” —George Bernard Shaw In our fourth Forum article, CNA China Analyst Dean Cheng traces American interests in East Asia from the earliest days of U.S. n this issue, Joint Force Quarterly George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, history to its present role as the guarantor of returns to issues of grand strategy, Chester Nimitz, and James Forrestal, action is regional stability. Perhaps counterintuitively, from the training of strategists and required by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs East Asia is far more complex than Europe, associated concepts to a survey of of Staff to fulfill the pressing requirement for embodying not only ideological conflicts I rooted in the Cold War, but also historical regional context in its formulation and execu- a premier “school of strategy.” The authors’ tion. Strategists cannot hope to arrive at a observations and recommendations span the animosities, unsettled borders, internal insta- secure destination of mastery in the face of college’s mission, leadership, faculty, student bilities, and the absence of regional institutions complexity and nonlinear change. Strategy body, and academic program, leading to a that might ameliorate some of the ensuing demands an endless pursuit of contextual proposed framework for strategic analysis. tensions. In light of this, it is not surprising knowledge that is organized around and built Widening their scope to nonmilitary instru- that the end of the Cold War did not abate upon a foundation of scholarship and social ments of statecraft, they note that the War regional tensions. Rather, it merely removed insight. This edition of JFQ is presented, in College and Industrial College of the Armed the ideological component from some of the part, to reduce the risk of adopting simple Forces were envisioned as part of a constella- complicated relations within the region that solutions in its formulation. tion of colleges that included a State Depart- draw upon age-old prejudices and hatreds. The Forum begins with an informed ment College, Administration College, and The author concludes with several important essay by Dr. Thomas Mahnken, who Intelligence College. In the absence of this points for U.S. strategists. First, there is no addresses defense planning and complex augmentation, the authors propose a College “Asian perspective” on issues, as all nations operations through the prism of a “grand of Diplomacy and Development to foster examine each parochially. Second, knowledge new bargain.” The author observes that greater institutional strength at the Depart- of history matters, and any U.S. action must comprehensive approaches are supplant- ment of State and U.S. Agency for Interna- be examined in history’s light to avoid unin- ing joint operations in the evolving global tional Development. tended consequences due to long memories. security environment, consequently chang- The third Forum installment also Finally, internal instability for several East ing the identity of the Armed Forces. There speaks to the development of strategists, but Asian countries has been muted by expand- is no denying the fact that the Department in this case the authors are Naval War College ing national economies. With an outlook of of Defense has become the principal agency professors Derek Reveron and James Cook. extended economic malaise, growing discon- to address complex contingencies and that They argue that the challenge before mili- tent and interstate tensions are likely to mani- organizational flexibility across multiple core tary strategists is to coordinate the levers of fest themselves unexpectedly and violently. competencies has made it possible for “other national power in a coherent, smart way that The fifth article takes JFQ readers to parts of the national security community to shapes the security environment and defuses the Middle East with a comparative survey dodge their responsibilities.” Efforts to build situations before they become crises through of Iranian military capabilities courtesy of greater civilian capacity in the past have been a strategy of prevention at the theater level. Dr. Richard Russell of the Near East South foiled by the Federal bureaucracy and an Their essay leads the reader through the basics Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Because absence of congressional support. The key of strategic thought employing a U.S. prism, of the sophisticated conventional military to overcoming these obstacles is Presidential from levels of strategy to related principles capabilities of the United States and its Arab mandate in the form of a new National Secu- of war and from authoritative strategic plan- allies in the region, the author posits that Iran rity Planning Guidance. ning guidance to joint doctrine. In practice, is “likely to turn to its time-tested uncon- The second article is from two former strategic decisions must always compete with ventional ways of war to exploit Arab Gulf National War College professors who have the demands of domestic politics, the most state and American vulnerabilities in future been collaborating on a history of that insti- important of which concerns the “size and conflicts.” However, the author also makes tution. Their research led Dr. Janet Breslin- distribution of funds made available to the the case that Gulf Arab conventional forces Smith and Colonel Cliff Krieger to conclude armed forces.” When done correctly, “theater are more bark than bite and cites a “massive that, while the War College remains remark- strategy enables the combatant commander overemphasis on the procurement of high ably faithful to the vision of “Hap” Arnold, to effectively secure U.S. national interests technology and serious underemphasis on
8 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu GURNEY
Dust from downwash creates sparks during night landing of CH–46 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan MichaelYon-online.com (Michael Yon) MichaelYon-online.com
manpower issues, personnel selection, train- article is a wide-ranging mosaic of Russian The Forum concludes with an insight- ing, and maintenance.” It is “not much of an strategic considerations by Peter Hum- ful article from a frequent JFQ contributor, exaggeration to say that the first, second, and phrey of the Institute for National Strategic Dr. Stephen Cimbala of Pennsylvania State third missions of their forces are to protect Studies. Expanding on the premise that University–Brandywine. In this essay, he con- the regime from internal threats, while the Russia has downsized its ambitions from siders various options for U.S.-Russia strategic lagging fourth mission is to protect from global dominance to Eurasian suzerainty, nuclear arms reductions within the larger external threats.” On the other side of the the author attempts to attribute numerous politico-military context of post–Cold War scale, Iran’s military is impressive in quantity bilateral behaviors to a coherent strategy for geopolitics and offers a provisional assessment but underwhelming in quality. The bulk of success in the face of serious impediments of prospects for success. He presents hypo- Iran’s inventories are American-built weapons to its most conservative aspirations. Begin- thetical treaty-compliant and smaller forces bought before the 1979 revolution and a mix ning with the nations on Russia’s periphery, for both the United States and Russia, condi- of Soviet and Chinese weapons that are quali- Mr. Humphrey sketches exhibitions of tions for their employment, and an analysis of tatively inferior to the modern American and insecurity and arrogance, gambits, and outcomes. Beyond raw data, he subsequently Western weapons systems in the Gulf Arab genuine sovereign interest. The “bizarre and addresses the psychological impact of deter- inventories. At the end of the day, these states unsupportable claims” that Russia has made rence, coercion, and reassurance. Dr. Cimbala will have to decide whether to balance or to to the Arctic make clear a desperate attempt concludes with the description of two dangers appease Iranian power in the Gulf. Professor to survive as a broker of raw materials in for Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Russell concludes that Washington needs to the absence of an ability to compete in the Obama if they move beyond nuclear stasis. encourage the Arab Gulf states to balance, but technology market. The author subsequently First, the arms control process must not in doing so, it should focus less on building explores the demographic trends that he become the province of arms control experts up their conventional military capabilities characterizes as disastrous and that help to and “bean counters” who threaten progress and pay more attention to the Iranian threats account for contemporary aggressive behav- and, second, it would be unwise to rush to stemming from unconventional warfare. ior. He concludes with a series of issues for agreement for agreement’s sake. JFQ From the Persian Gulf to the largest the West, extrapolated from the foregoing —D.H. Gurney country in the world, the Forum’s sixth argument. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 9 A New Grand Bargain Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Defense Planning By Thomas G. M a h n k e n
he United States faces a secu- The Spectrum of Challenges deal with insurgents on their own territory. To rity environment in which The United States today faces the most achieve success, the U.S. military will need to comprehensive approaches complex and challenging security environ- develop and sustain a proficiency in irregular T are supplanting joint opera- ment in recent memory. Dealing with these operations equal to that which it possesses tions. The military’s heavy involvement in challenges requires a versatile military force. in high-end conventional warfare. Although complex operations poses a conundrum for Military power has played an important the United States has made considerable U.S. force planners and ultimately challenges role in the struggle to defeat violent extrem- progress in this area in recent years, more the identity of the Armed Forces. Closing the ist organizations such as al Qaeda and its gap between our commitments and national affiliates. The United States has used, and will Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken is a Visiting Scholar in the security capacity requires a new formulation continue to need, military power to disrupt Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul of risk and a new grand bargain on national the ability of terrorist groups to strike glob- H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, security roles and missions. ally, bolstering the ability of local regimes to The Johns Hopkins University.
Marine sniper engages enemy during firefight in Helmand Province, Afghanistan U.S. Marine Corps (William Greeson)
10 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MAHNKEN must be done, for example, to institutionalize not only combating insurgents and providing and capacity, then there is a growing chasm the mission of training and advising foreign security to the local populace, but also build- between our national security commitments military forces as a core mission of the Army ing infrastructure and supporting economic and capacity. and Marine Corps. development. Across the globe, combatant DOD is currently in the midst of the Military power will also play a crucial commanders plan to respond to future con- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the con- role in dealing with regional rogues, par- tingencies and play a major role in security gressionally mandated report that helps set ticularly those who possess or are seeking cooperation with a broad range of allies and the future course of the military. According to nuclear weapons. The threat of military force partners. At home, the military is being asked the fact sheet on the QDR’s terms of reference, has played a central role in deterring these to deal with the spillover of crime and drug the study will “re-balance DoD’s strategies, states and their surrogates from aggression. trafficking from Mexico into the United capabilities and forces to address today’s However, thinking about deterrence—a States. For example, Governors of states in conflicts and tomorrow’s threats.”1 One of central mission of the U.S. military through- the Southwest have asked the Department of the central issues that defense planners must out the Cold War—went out of fashion with Defense (DOD) to dispatch 1,500 troops to the grapple with in this context is the role of the the collapse of the Soviet Union and has only U.S.-Mexican border to analyze intelligence military in complex interagency operations. recently begun to stage a comeback. We need and provide air support and technical assis- The fact that the Armed Forces are to revive our understanding of deterrence and tance to local law enforcement agencies. heavily engaged in complex operations, and develop new approaches for competing with are likely to remain so for the foreseeable North Korea and Iran over the long term. The beyond long-term challenges, future, poses a conundrum for defense plan- United States also needs to improve its ability ners. Should the Services prepare for the best to defend against the missile arsenals that the United States must be case or the worst? In other words, should regional rogues use to coerce their neighbors. prepared to confront any DOD plan on being able to concentrate on its Finally, the U.S. military needs the ability to number of disruptive events main role, which is the use of force to achieve preempt or retaliate against aggressive behav- that could destabilize the the aims of policy, with other departments ior, ranging from rogue states’ use of terrorist international system and agencies playing their roles? Or should it, surrogates, through the use of conventional based on recent experience, plan on conduct- force, to the use of nuclear weapons. ing missions beyond its core competency, Finally, military power has a role to play The Armed Forces have become the pre- including reconstruction and stabilization, in dealing with the rise of China. Specifically, ferred means for dealing with national secu- law enforcement, and development assistance? the United States must, through its words and rity challenges for several reasons. They are How we answer that question will have a actions, maintain a preponderance of power highly professional and increasingly expedi- major impact on the size and shape of our in the Pacific in order to reassure allies and tionary. They are also responsive: the Nation’s forces. friends in the region and ensure access to the leadership can order troops into action, and This is truly a conundrum because global commons. The Armed Forces also need they will heed the call of duty. And when DOD leadership cannot know a priori what to develop asymmetric responses to those these troops reach their destination, they have the correct choice is; the answer depends not Chinese capabilities that put U.S. forces at risk. demonstrated the ability to perform admira- only on what DOD chooses to invest in, but Beyond these long-term challenges, the bly, including in roles they did not anticipate also on the capability and capacity of other United States must be prepared to confront when they joined the military. For example, parts of the national security community. any number of disruptive events that could Navy and Air Force officers have been asked Even more broadly, it depends on what activi- destabilize the international system, ranging to lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in ties Congress chooses to fund. from the outbreak of a virulent pandemic, Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, members of There are real costs associated with to the collapse of a strategic state, to the use the Reserve Component and National Guard these choices. Taking the narrow approach of nuclear weapons. Recent experience, in have frequently been called upon to use their of focusing on combat tasks runs the risk of the form of the September 11, 2001, terrorist civilian skills rather than their military train- leaving the Nation unprepared to carry out attacks, shows that such shocks can shape ing in areas such as law enforcement and the full range of postconflict missions in a what the President and the American people public administration. Above all, however, future war, as it was in Iraq and Afghanistan. expect of the military. because of its size, the military has the capac- Similarly, electing to focus on one portion of ity to undertake a range of tasks, a capacity the conflict spectrum, whether countering Complex Operations that the remainder of the national security insurgencies or the threat posed by capable The U.S. military must not only prepare community lacks. states, risks leaving the United States unpre- for a broad spectrum of contingencies but also The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have pared for future contingencies where our plan to conduct a wide range of missions in demonstrated the limits of U.S. national adversaries fail to adhere to our preferred those contingencies. Although policymakers security capacity. If counterinsurgency is “20 approach to war. frequently espouse a comprehensive approach percent military and 80 percent nonmilitary,” Taking the broad approach of embrac- to meeting current and future contingencies, the military all too often finds itself perform- ing the new, expanded set of missions carries the military in fact has become the instrument ing not only its 20 percent, but also a substan- its own costs. It risks diluting the military’s of choice for handling complex contingencies tial part of the nonmilitary 80 percent. If there expertise in its core mission of warfare. It in recent years. In Iraq and Afghanistan, it is is a gap between our military commitments also risks allowing other parts of the national ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 11 FORUM | Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Defense Planning security community to dodge their responsi- adept at complex operations, thus relieving also indeed eagerness, to take on all manner bilities in complex contingencies. Although the military of much of this burden. The of tasks, whether the force was well suited to the military has in recent years become the recent track record belies that optimistic them or not. favored instrument for carrying out a range assumption. The question that DOD must Now, more than ever, what is needed is of tasks, it is doubtful whether it is, or can now face is the degree to which the military a frank debate over the scope and contours of become, an adequate substitute for experts will play an active role beyond its core compe- the military profession. Officers and the civil- in political reconciliation, development, law tency in complex operations. ians they serve need to answer some difficult enforcement, or governance. questions, namely: what must the military Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has Redefining the Military Domain? be able to do, and what should the military spoken eloquently of the need for a dramatic The military’s heavy involvement in be able to do? In what skills must Soldiers, increase in funding of the civilian instru- complex operations raises the question of Sailors, Marines, and Airmen be proficient? ments of national security, including diplo- how the military domain of national security And what skills should they be aware of? macy, foreign assistance, and economic recon- should be defined. Today, one frequently The Armed Forces must above all be struction and development. As he put it in his sees two pathologies at work within the able to fulfill their core mission of fighting Landon Lecture at Kansas State University in officer corps. One is to define the military and winning our nation’s wars. It would November 2007: domain in excessively narrow terms. In this be a mistake to understate the difficulty of view, the role of the military was to fight this task, or the cost of failing to perform it We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave although the military has become the favored instrument for Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other ele- carrying out a range of tasks, it is doubtful whether it is, or can ments of national power that will be so crucial become, an adequate substitute for experts in the coming years. . . . Civilian participation is both necessary to making military opera- certain types of wars—generally the wars successfully. It is the core reason the United tions successful and to relieving stress on the we want to fight. To take just one example, States has a military, and no other organiza- men and women of our armed services who Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap tion can carry out this mission. The core have endured so much these last few years, has argued that the military cannot succeed tasking of the U.S. military is to fight and win and done so with such unflagging bravery and at counterinsurgency and should not even all of the Nation’s wars. These range from devotion.2 try. Rather, in his view, “we need the bulk of counterinsurgency campaigns to the need the Army prepared to go toe-to-toe with the to combat states with advanced capabilities. Gates’ well-publicized call for greater heaviest combat formations our adversaries Moreover, the Armed Forces must be able to civilian capacity was not, however, the first. can field.”4 fight and to win. They must thus be proficient The 2006 QDR examined the need for greater The opposite tendency is to define in tactics and operational art—and strategy. national security capacity, noting that: the military domain in excessively broad The military also exists to prevent or terms. Think of it as the embodiment of the deter wars. This includes maintaining forces Although many U.S. Government organiza- military’s “can do” attitude on steroids. This in readiness to deter attacks of all sorts and tions possess knowledge and skills needed to manifests itself in not only willingness, but training and advising foreign security forces, perform tasks critical to complex operations, Chairman speaks to Soldiers in Afghanistan they are often not chartered or resourced to maintain deployable capabilities. Thus, the Department has tended to become the default responder during many contingencies. This is a short-term necessity, but the Defense Department supports legislation to enable other agencies to strengthen their capabili- ties so that balanced interagency operations become more feasible—recognizing that other agencies’ capabilities and performance often play a critical role in allowing the Department of Defense to achieve its mission.3
Drafters of the 2006 QDR based their analysis of future defense requirements on the assumption that other parts of the national security community, such as the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International
Development, would become larger and more DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)
12 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MAHNKEN as well as a range of other security coopera- future. Given limited resources, minimizing due to bureaucratic foot-dragging or lack of tion activities. risk against one type of threat only creates congressional buy-in. Even successful innova- Finally, the military exists to keep the additional risk in other areas. For example, tions, such as the Section 1206 authorities that peace. That includes a range of military opera- specializing in irregular warfare would raise allow DOD to fund some programs to train tions short of war, including ensuring the our risk to attack through other means. and equip foreign forces, enjoy only tepid freedom of navigation, enforcing sanctions, Rather, now and for the foreseeable future, we congressional support. To overcome such and combating piracy. will need to balance risks. obstacles, such an effort must be led person- If these are the missions the military Fortunately, the flexibility of the mili- ally by the President and must involve both must be able to carry out, what should it be tary as a joint force can help balance risks. his Cabinet and key leaders in Congress. Only able to do? In order to carry out these mis- Although each Service has a significant role through such direct action can the United sions, the men and women of the Armed to play in meeting each challenge we face, the States achieve the type of integrated approach Forces should be aware of all the other struggle against violent extremist organiza- required. instruments of national power and how they tions will involve the Army and Marine Corps To implement a new grand bargain, the Obama administration should act on the recommendation of the 2006 QDR and draft National Security Planning Guidance. Such a document would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibili- ties to reduce capability gaps and eliminate U.S. Army (Bobby L. Allen, Jr.) redundancies. It would help departments and agencies better align their strategy, as well as budget and planning functions, with national objectives. Such an effort would help ensure that operations better reflect the President’s National Security Strategy.6
To meet the challenges of today and tomorrow, we need a military characterized by flexibility, agility, and versatility. We buy that versatility through the technology we procure. More than that, we purchase flex- Soldiers await instructions after ibility through the people we recruit, train, patrolling village in Diyala, Iraq and educate. By rebalancing national security roles, missions, and resources, the United relate to the military mission. They should more heavily than the Navy and Air Force, States can ensure that it is actually able to have an understanding of foreign culture and whereas shaping the rise of China will involve implement the comprehensive approach. JFQ language and be able to work closely with naval and air forces more than ground forces. allies and friends. They should also be able By continuing to invest in a balanced joint N o t es to contribute to nonmilitary tasks, such as force, we will mitigate risks. 1 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We also need to conceive of risk more Department of Defense, “2010 QDR Terms broadly—not only in terms of the military, of Reference Fact Sheet,” April 27, 2009, available at
By J a n e t B r e s l i n - S m i t h and C l i f f K r i e g e r
ach year, as students get their assignments to the National
DOD (NDU) War College (NWC), the faculty E wonder: Is there a “Kennan” among the group? Would this class produce a strategist in the mold of the college’s first deputy commandant and author of the Cold War containment strategy, George Kennan? It is a legitimate question. After all, from its beginning, the purpose of the school was clear: “The College is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources to imple- ment that strategy. . . . Its graduates will exercise a great influence on the formation of national and foreign policy in both peace and war.”1 While the call for grand strategists comes but once a generation, the college has a perpetual duty: turning out senior military, diplomatic, and national security officers who
can perform problem analysis at the national DOD strategic level and thus support their seniors in taking the decisions needed to achieve our The National War College at Fort Lesley J. McNair, national objectives. Washington, DC And that certainly was the intention in 1946. The National War College was created to prepare senior military officers and other national security officials for higher profes- sional responsibilities. The brainchild of Army Generals Henry “Hap” Arnold, George Marshall, and Dwight Eisenhower, as well as Admiral Chester Nimitz and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, the college had support from the highest levels of government and was essentially an American experiment in pro- fessional military education. It would be the Nation’s first senior inter-Service and inter- Above: General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower developed the War College as an institution for Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith was a Professor in the inter-Service and interagency education National War College at the National Defense Right: The Chairman is charged with reclaiming University. Colonel Cliff Krieger, USAF (Ret.), was the ownership of and strengthening the National first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair at War College the National War College.
DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)
14 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BRESLIN-SMITH and Krieger
agency school to offer a program in strategic space; or Army officers comparing wartime Defense University (NDU), in effect a subset military/political studies on war and politics. experiences with Provincial Reconstruction of a multifaceted organization that includes For over 60 years, the college has been Team members from the Department of State research centers, other schools and colleges, at this task and has remained remarkably or the U.S. Agency for International Develop- and various outreach activities. faithful to the founders’ vision for the school. ment (USAID), who practiced their political Moreover, the NWC program is no The alumni of the college read like a “who’s or economic skills in the midst of war. It is longer distinct. Over time, the other senior who” of national security—Chairmen, Service still a special place. Service colleges expanded and shifted their chiefs, combatant commanders, Ambas- Indeed, Secretary of Defense Robert curricula to approximate the joint/interagency sadors, sub-Cabinet officials. And even Gates could not have designed a better orientation of the War College and accom- though the college has more than doubled program to develop his idea of the 21st-century modate the integrating requirements of the in size from its original 100 students, and its national security professional. Joint Staff J7. The college must once again ask, core course program has undergone constant All institutions change over time— “Is the college still unique and of value? Has review and revision, the genius of Eisenhower shifts in the political environment and new it adapted to meet the needs of a new strategic and Arnold’s concept lives on. On any given bureaucratic forces push, poke, and prod, and era? What do the Nation’s senior national day, in any seminar room, we might hear attempt to modify the mission, redefine the security officials—in and out of uniform— combat veterans and seasoned diplomats program, and adapt to changing political cur- need to know and be able to do in the 21st grappling with contentious policy issues; rents. The National War College, once a well- century, as strategic leaders?” academic specialists and intelligence officers known, independent, professional program These questions take on new urgency stimulating student discussion over tribal for national security senior officials, is now with the current Defense Science Board Task issues in the Middle East or new threats from but one part of a larger unit, the National Force on Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). It will study both Service-specific and joint professional military education curricula as well as overall steps to make JPME “more U.S. Army effective in preparing U.S. military personnel to meet the uncertainties and challenges of future missions.” Buried in this study direc- tive may be an implied conceit. In fact, the Defense Science Board charge may describe a critical fault line. Strategic leaders must give as much premium to “the thinking about” as to
the “meeting” of uncertainties and challenges. DOD
Above: The War College’s first deputy commandant and author of Cold War containment strategy, George Kennan
Left: General “Hap” Arnold helped establish the National War College in 1946
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 15 FORUM | The Future of the National War College
That insight drove the founders to create Joint Staff are preoccupied with more urgent deep dedication to the NWC mission. The the college in the first place. Strategic think- matters, and that professional military educa- three-star commandants during this era ing, in their view, had to be given primacy tion falls to the bottom of the list. Under- reported directly to the Chairman and had over operational art and tactical actions, or standably, the Services focus on and support management control of the school. While else leaders would not be able to orchestrate their respective colleges—all of which now Service rotation did not guarantee strong and prioritize the application of state powers. have JPME II accreditation. As champions of performance in commandants, this abiding Deep analysis of the problem at hand, a global jointness, the Chairman and the Joint Staff tradition brought continuity and accountabil- perspective, and profound thinking about need to own the National War College. ity. With the advent of the National Defense vision must drive strategy, decisions, actions, Is the school still needed and still University in 1976, the commandant’s rank and assessments. unique? Yes. The National War College’s was reduced, and over the past few decades We recently completed a history of the special focus on national security strategy, its leadership stability was disrupted by limited National War College and have reflected on highly developed curriculum, deep joint tradi- tenures, frequent turnover, and breaks in the the school’s promise and problems. While tions, and interagency character set it apart. rotation between Services. the college remains remarkably faithful to the Over a quarter of the student body comes For the college to thrive, the comman- founders’ vision, it faces challenges unforeseen from the Departments of State, Homeland dant must be more than the NDU president’s by those wartime leaders. If the college is to Security, and Treasury, the U.S. Agency for administrative overseer for the college. He fulfill its original intention as a “school for International Development, Federal Bureau of or she must be his or her own person, with strategy,” it is time for the Chairman of the Investigation, and the Intelligence Commu- a defined mission and the freedom and Joint Chiefs of Staff to reclaim the institution nity; the faculty reflects a joint, interagency, resources to accomplish it. as his own. Both the Chairman and the Joint and academic mix. There is also a large rep- Short tours and ill-defined powers frus- Chiefs collectively should clarify the NWC resentation of international military fellows. trate even the most dedicated leader. Ideally, mission, enhance its leadership, encourage The college’s extraordinary access to Wash- the commandant position should have a the Services in their selection of appropriate ington policymakers and world leaders is as longer tenure, to include teaching responsibil- faculty and students, and provide leadership in remarkable now as it was over six decades ago. ity, and attract officers who demonstrate a commitment to lead an institution that is a specialized professional school. This has been the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs collectively should clarify the an ongoing concern over the years. In a report National War College mission, enhance its leadership, encourage to the commandant in 1953, a member of an the Services in their selection of appropriate faculty and students, academic review team wrote: and provide leadership in driving the focus of its curricula The top management has been less effective than it could be expected to be. The reasons driving the focus of its curricula. We offer the For the school to fulfill its mission, it . . . are the relatively brief tenure of the Com- following observations and recommendations needs its senior stakeholders. The college mandants . . . and their lack of experience in to strengthen the college, so it can better serve needs the active involvement of the Chair- running an institution of higher learning. Men the Nation in this new era. We also suggest that man and the Joint Chiefs in policies that will of fine character, excellent minds, and wide the college and the university itself go back to invigorate the leadership team, give more experience have served as Commandants. its roots and revive the original concept for responsibility and stability to the position of . . . But their previous experience did not joint—and interagency—senior education commandant, and reaffirm the standing of equip them to head a major, new, high-level that Eisenhower and other post–World War II the school. academic institution in the exploratory field leaders had for the college in 1946. As in the case of any institution, the of national grand strategy under conditions of college needs strong leadership. As former possible global, total war. And the shortness of Mission and Leadership faculty members, we know the benefits of an their terms of office prevented them for accu- The Chairman and the Joint Staff need involved and accomplished dean of faculty, mulating very much experience. to clarify and support the distinct mission of who must bring academic direction and con- the college, which began as an experiment in tinuity to faculty relations. But we also know To attract and mentor new comman- professional military education and had the that the college thrives when commandants dants, an NWC Oversight Board, along the active support of President Harry Truman, have the discretion to engage fully in the lines of the original Board of Consultants, Secretary of Defense Forestall, Secretary of academic program, teach, and have enough should be reconstituted. From 1946 to 1976, State James Byrnes, and the Service chiefs. tenure to support the college’s mission. this board played a vital role in advising, Both the War College and the Industrial As our research reveals, for the first assisting, and providing feedback and evalua- College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) anchored 30 years, the National War College had a tions for the commandant and the college.2 A a new educational endeavor at Fort Lesley set pattern and tenure for commandants: revived board would include, as it did in the J. McNair in Washington, DC, that earned a rotation between Services for full 3-year past, distinguished former general officers, remarkable official and public acclaim. tours. Admiral Harry Hill, the first com- Ambassadors, Cabinet and sub-Cabinet Now there is a sense that both colleges have mandant, set the standard, with prior combat officials, as well as academic leaders. Many become orphans, that the Chairman and the experience, intellectual curiosity, and a should be NWC graduates. This board could
16 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BRESLIN-SMITH and Krieger function as a selection advisory group for the Faculty Chairman, defining the criteria for leadership Military Faculty. Throughout its ■■ offer selected officers opportunities to and reviewing the needs of the school. history, the National War College debated pursue a doctorate with a future assignment But leadership goes beyond the selection the criteria and performance of its military to the college, and expand these options for of commandant to the command structure of faculty. The selection of this faculty for the minority officers to broaden the diversity of the college. In the early decades of its existence, college is largely left to the individual Services the faculty the National War College had an elaborate and the criteria lack transparency. As we ■■ extend the NWC tour to 3 or 4 years staffing structure, with 89 support personnel found in our research, the problem is exacer- ■■ allow for military faculty above and and a multitiered command structure. Cur- bated in times of war. The demands of deploy- below the rank of colonel/captain rently, the college has but a fraction of its origi- ments and wartime surges stress the ability ■■ work with the Services to recruit offi- nal staff, and overall management duties fall of the Services to release combat veterans to cers who would best perform at the college. on the dean of faculty and a combined civilian come back for advanced education and to dean of students/chief of staff. Traditionally, return to teach.4 Over the years, the college has been blessed with a corps of outstanding military for the college to thrive, the commandant must be his or her faculty, but it appears to be more happen- stance than design. NWC leadership has no own person, with a defined mission and the freedom and insight into the grand plan of any of the Ser- resources to accomplish it vices. Here again, an active Oversight Board could assist with military faculty selection and both deans were Active-duty colonel/captain At a more basic level, do the Services potential promotion options. billets. We propose that the dean of students value those teaching at senior PME institu- Agency/Department Faculty. In an revert to Active duty, separating out the chief tions? We believe that an assignment to the effort to enhance the quality of Defense of staff function as either a military or civilian college is critical to our nation’s security Department and agency personnel assigned billet. We also suggest that the dean of faculty and should be respected. The college needs to the faculty, the college needs to expand its position be open to either military or civilians, intellectually engaged military faculty from interagency recruitment efforts, to encourage ideally NWC graduates with prior teaching a variety of backgrounds to best prepare the the best match between faculty background experience. Specifically, we think the position next generation of leaders. What matters is and interest in teaching at the college. The of dean should be open to civilians since that not an officer’s potential for promotion, but standard set by George Kennan was impres- position requires a doctorate.3 The Services his or her enthusiasm, intellectual engage- sive; he taught and spoke at the college over have been hard-pressed to nominate candi- ment, and ability to teach. This has been a dates. As the Active-duty forces are stressed perennial challenge at the college. Over the by two ongoing wars and a multitude of other years, a number of recommendations have responsibilities, it is hard for military officers been advanced in this regard: to find the time to study for advanced degrees. The Defense Science Board needs to address this issue for all the professional military edu- cation (PME) schools.
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy
Fleet Admiral Nimitz (left) and Navy Secretary Forrestal (center) helped institute the War College; General Omar Bradley (right) was on college’s Board of Consultants DOD
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 17 FORUM | The Future of the National War College his entire career. Recently, the college was The college is an intellectual refuge that the tools of statecraft, as well as joint and privileged to have Ambassador Ryan Crocker must be protected. interagency operations. But each year there for a brief tour, continuing the Kennan is lively debate over a number of key issues tradition. We need the Department of State, The Student Body that pose challenges for the future. Should the USAID, and the intelligence agencies to The National War College is designed college keep the focus on grand strategy, or increase awareness of the NWC program and for its unique student body—men and should it focus on the operational level? There to alert younger personnel who might want to women in midcareer whom their Services are two components to this question. The first make longer term career choices based on an and Departments believe will go on to higher reflects assumptions about the uniqueness of eventual tour at the college. positions in the national security area. But do the college and the strategic nature of its cur- Civilian Faculty. The civilian faculty they? The process for selection to the college riculum. While the other senior schools have presents a series of special challenges. In the as well as the decisions for follow-on assign- expanded their own programs to include grand first few years, the college had four civilian ments has always been opaque. The Services strategy as well as joint and interagency topics, “visiting professors,” who taught only in the have their own senior school selection boards this is the key and central component of the fall semester. As it quickly became apparent, and tightly control these decisions. In the NWC program. Indeed, its curriculum has this “visiting” approach provided no continu- early 1990s, the college attempted to work shifted closer to, not away from, the strategic ity or planning for the following year’s course, with the Services, highlighting the national level of analysis, the broader view of grand and within a short time civilian academic security strategy focus of the program. We strategy using all the tools of critical analysis faculty was given multiyear contracts. Cur- believe this effort should be redoubled. As the and statecraft. With the mounting cries that we rently, most of the civilian faculty members Joint Chiefs and the Defense Science Board lack “strategic leaders,” it seems that the focus are hired under Title 10 of the Federal Code consider the role of PME and the mission should remain and deepen. for the Department of Defense, for mainly of the National War College, serious atten- Secondly, is this focus on grand strategy 3-year renewable contracts. There is no tenure tion should be paid to student selection and too abstract, too “next-war-itis” in a world process at the college. follow-on assignments. The Nation invests of immediate regional threats? Following The absence of tenure reflects, in part, scarce resources into the college, a specifically the attacks by al Qaeda in 2001, the NWC the distinct nature of the school and its designed program. It should be offered to the faculty discussed refocusing the course on the unique mix of faculty groups. It was clear most appropriately chosen student body. Islamic extremist threat. While some faculty from the beginning that the college was not This is easy to say, but is a challenge for members argued that this indeed was the stra- intended to be a typical graduate school, not each Service to do. Even as early as the mid- tegic threat of the era, others held that this was created to produce researchers but policy- 1950s, the NWC commandant noted that the merely the “crisis du jour” and thus should and decisionmakers. Given the diverse Services fought to send their best to their own not impact the current course offerings. This backgrounds of the faculty—a blend of senior schools. Since the National War College has been a continuing debate over these past has no “sponsoring” individual Service, the 8 years. In the context of the early years of the Chairman’s leadership in this area is vital. school, the crisis du jour of Stalin’s aggres- to enhance the quality of the sion became the existential threat defining a faculty, the college needs The Academic Program 50-year period of deterrence and smaller mili- to expand its interagency The philosophy of the school’s program tary campaigns. Are we simply in the early recruitment efforts, to has not changed over the years. As the early stages of another multi-decade challenge? student handbooks in the 1950s noted: In this regard, it is useful to go back to encourage the best match the college’s earliest days to get a better sense between faculty background the best preparation which can be given its of strategy and threat. Rather than jumping and interest in teaching at the students for their future work is an increased immediately into courses on strategy, the college capacity to think broadly, objectively, and college focused on an analysis of the threat. soundly [about] national security in this Kennan’s study of the Soviet Union led him to increasing complex world in which we live. The three basic, but profound, conclusions: scholars and practitioners (military officers, emphasis therefore is on the educational process Ambassadors, and intelligence officers)—we as opposed to the training process. The College ■■ the Soviet Union, even if defeated in strongly support the NWC tradition of col- does not train its people to be future J-3’s and battle, was too large to occupy—and we do not legiality and mutual professional respect. Counselor of Embassy. But it does strive to do occupations well Appreciative faculty members in our study make them think in such a manner that they ■■ a war fought with atomic weapons reported that it was rare in “stovepiped” cannot help but be better J-3’s and Counselors would have no victors Washington to work and learn with profes- of Embassy for having had the experience of ■■ the ideological attraction and logic of sionals who are “not in your lane.” Under- attending this College [emphasis in original]. communism had to be countered. scoring this atmosphere, the Chairman’s commitment to academic freedom is deeply The academic program was established Acknowledging the Nation’s exhaustion valued. The college’s gift to the students is to educate senior military and civilian officials after World War II, Kennan’s lectures at the the vibrant exchange of views, a mature and to think broadly and soundly. The program’s college focused on “measures short of war.”5 vigorous debate between all communities. focus has always been on grand strategy, all This reasoning, and his deep understanding
18 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BRESLIN-SMITH and Krieger of Soviet motivations, led him to the elegant lum; it can be seen in the larger, lively debate challenges attended the college during the and enduring strategy that contained the within the military on doctrine. Should the 1990s, we must look carefully at this criticism. Soviet impulse to expand, stressed its central military just concern itself with battles and Did the graduates bring their NWC education planning model, and addressed conditions of operations or with political development and to the policy arena? Although the college had poverty that fed the appeal of Marxism. governance? Traditionally, military studies a well rounded program, we make two sugges- If Kennan were still teaching at the War concentrated on orders of battle, operations, tions to focus and deepen student preparation. College today, we believe that he would be deep maneuver, envelopments, emplacements, We suggest that students need the mental into a similar analysis of “the sources of mili- tactics, technology, logistics, and victory. discipline that comes from the use of strategic tant Islamic conduct.” He knew the strategist’s Armies faced armies over a battlefield, sea and frameworks to guide analysis and that this first task is to understand motive, causes, and air campaigns subdued an enemy force. But as discipline be repeatedly exercised in complex symptoms of grievance. He would be analyzing war gravitated to complex political conflicts, scenarios. The pressure to respond to attack, to movements that go beyond the nation-state, insurgencies, and now tribal and religious act, to “do something” in crisis is so great that centered on tribal traditions and theology. Fol- conflicts, the military leadership in our nation only a disciplined education, with appropriate lowing along these lines, he would be joined is calling for new national doctrine and new specializations, can prepare an officer or civil- by General David Petraeus and Ambassador definitions of center of gravity. In report after ian official to “stand there” and think through Crocker team-teaching courses in advanced report, the Chairman, combatant command- the problem, seeing the pitfalls, before recom- strategy for hybrid conflicts. ers, and Secretary of Defense have called for mending the best course of action. Of course, this is not the only threat we “unconventional thinkers to address uncon- Currently, NWC oral examinations face, and the college must prepare students ventional challenges.” As this approach is include scenario analysis, and core courses to cope with conflicts of any ilk. How do operationalized in the new Army and Marine weave case studies throughout. But we have we make time in the academic program to Corps counterinsurgency doctrine and come to believe that this method must be present a thorough study of the host of nations, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and intensified. One approach for teaching as well Afghanistan, the War College has adjusted its as student evaluation was designed by Colonel curriculum to reflect this debate in military George Raach, a former Army member of the the curriculum has shifted thought and the larger issues of national secu- faculty. Colonel Raach took an NWC strategic closer to, not away from, the rity strategy.7 In the end, however, the college framework and applied it to what we now strategic level of analysis, is not about a single nation or region, but refer to as “hybrid conflicts.” He found that if the broader view of grand about analytic structures and broad threats. students could answer and grasp the impact strategy using all the tools of Just as David Kilcullen’s The Accidental of the following questions, they would have critical analysis and statecraft Guerrilla looks at an analytic structure that the foundation for strategic analysis. Using is applicable from Timor to Afghanistan to this framework, a student must evaluate and Iraq to Spain and England, so the War College understand: movements, and conditions that challenge must help its students to see the broad pat- us now? Should the intermediate schools terns but learn to adapt quickly to local condi- ■■ What U.S. interests are at stake? begin this study with the college providing tions, based upon local expertise. ■■ How important are these interests? booster-shot instruction? Indeed, to do this job A final observation is in order. The ■■ What are the risks of acting or not adequately would require a 2-year program.6 Departments of Defense and State find them- acting? Underscoring this argument is a more selves in the midst of dynamic intellectual ■■ What assumptions have been made? basic question of focus. Should the curriculum debates over military doctrine, interdepart- ■■ Is this conflict intrastate or interstate? be U.S.-centric or “other”-centric? That is, mental and interagency relations, and the ■■ What is the root cause of the conflict should the majority of the academic program global role of the United States. Frustrations or dispute? consider the United States, its diplomatic on the battlefield challenge the Obama ■■ Who are the antagonists and what are history, bureaucratic politics, military history, administration. Underlying the pressures of their relationships? joint military structures, and foreign policy and current operations are lingering questions ■■ What are the antagonists’ resources, crisis management challenges? Or should more about the ramp-up to war, the lack of adequate capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and likely time be devoted to the texture and detail of “the planning, the diminished role of State, and the courses of action? other?” As our history project revealed, the absence of overall strategy. The spate of books ■■ What are the antagonists’ belief National War College did not offer detailed— covering Iraq and Afghanistan in the early systems, both religious and tribal? indeed, any—courses on Korea or Vietnam years was followed by articles from Active- ■■ How willing are the antagonists to during those wars: nothing on the politics, duty troops themselves, as well as blogs and compromise? cultural traditions, social or ethnic dynamics of online journal articles in sites such as Small ■■ Who are the antagonists’ internal and these two battlefield nations. Now, there are so Wars Journal. Some address “failures in external allies? many “targets of concern” that the college does generalship”; others focus on poor integration ■■ What are the antagonists’ centers of not have the time to provide the same depth between State, USAID, the nongovernmental gravity? When did the problem begin? What that Kennan offered in the 1940s. organization community, and the military. are the antecedents? This argument about focus is not con- Since many generals and higher ranking ■■ What is the political, social, and eco- fined to discussions about the NWC curricu- civilians involved in the current debates and nomic context? ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 19 FORUM | The Future of the National War College
■■ What are the significant geographical State Department College, an Administration NEW aspects of the area? College, and an Intelligence College. Our from NDU Press ■■ What are the capabilities of regional updated proposal would include a College of organizations? Diplomacy and Development to complement ■■ How long is the operation likely to last? the NWC program and foster greater institu- ■■ What are the interests, goals, and objec- tional strength at State and USAID. We would tives of coalition partners? advocate that the Industrial College also ■■ What wildcard countries or conditions reclaim its roots. This could be ICAF’s day exist? in the sun. It is designed for industry studies, ■■ Can the policy objectives be obtained mobilization assessments, and economic with military force? analysis. It can help the Nation evaluate the ■■ How will the economic, political, impact of the economic crisis, our industrial diplomatic, and social elements of power be contraction, on strategy. synchronized with military operations? This broader “integrated component” ■■ How will success be measured? proposal suggests a larger interagency review panel, and the Defense Science Board should Did NWC graduates—both military propose a side study to this effect. But with and civilian graduates—go through this or without a broader reform at the National discipline, planning and preparing for action Defense University, the proposals above for in Afghanistan or Iraq? Even setting aside the strengthening and focusing of the War this thoroughgoing analysis, and just using College stand. the basic components in policy or military The school has never been more impor- campaign planning, did any graduate object tant, the mission never more vital, and the when courses of action, branches, and sequels requirement for strategic leaders never more were not adequately evaluated? Were any timely. JFQ alumni concerned with how little knowledge Strategic Forum 246 decisionmakers had about Iraq or Afghani- N o t es stan—history, key leaders, culture, political U.S.-Vietnam Defense Relations: Deepening 1 dynamics—the questions that Kennan would Report of Leonard T. Gerrow (1945), Wash- Ties, Adding Relevance have raised at the time? ington, DC, National Defense University Library Special Collections. At a deeper level, did NWC graduates Lewis M. Stern traces evolving U.S.-Vietnam 2 Over the years, the board has included “speak truth to power”? We argue that the defense relations. After normalization in the General Omar Bradley, Father Theodore Hesburgh, mid-1990s, relations grew slowly. Initially students need not only the discipline of the Dr. Bernard Brodie, and John J. McCloy. suspicious, the Vietnamese limited talks to strategic analysis models, but also the mental 3 The Ph.D. criterion reflects, in part, the legacy issues such as Agent Orange. In the preparation to present their best military or Middle States Accreditation requirements for Mas- early 2000s, the United States attempted to ex- professional advice, even in the face of over- ter’s degree–granting institutions. Some in the field pand the scope of engagement. Current efforts whelming political pressure. Some may call question this requirement, noting that few great are raising the dialogue to one of enduring this ethics or leadership training, but despite strategists in history had advanced degrees. strategic issues. the fact that the college had topics on both, 4 A number of the Services are concerned with past policy failures suggest that we need to this issue—particularly the Army, which is address- confront this issue. ing this tension and working to bring experienced officers for tours at West Point, Leavenworth, and Strategic Forum 245 Finally, the Defense Science Board Carlisle. Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. Troop With- should consider the calls made by the Chair- 5 Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., drawal: An Iraqi Perspective man, Secretary, and President for a “whole- Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lec- of-government” or “integrated component” tures at the National War College, 1946–47 (Washing- Former Iraqi Major General Najim Abed approach in national security, with reference ton, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991). Al-Jabouri explains why many Iraqis believe to the balance between the military and the 6 A 2-year program, referencing the past the United States may be making a mistake by nonmilitary instruments of statecraft, the so- German General Staff structure and its military edu- not using its remaining leverage to insulate the called mix of defense, diplomacy, and devel- cation system, was proposed by Martin van Creveld, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the incum- opment. Recent efforts to develop national The Training of Officers, from Military Professionalism bent sectarian political parties. He argues that security professional education should review to Irrelevance (New York: Free Press, 1990). strengthening the national character of the ISF 7 the original concept for postwar professional See Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen A. is the best hope for a stable Iraq. Mahoney-Norris, “‘Military-Political’ Relations: The education: a national security consortium of Need for Officer Education,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 schools. As originally envisioned by Eisen- (1st Quarter 2009). But with this focus, there is the Visit the NDU Press Web site hower and the NWC founders, both the War for more information on publications concern that future opponents will take other tacks, at ndupress.ndu.edu College and ICAF would have been joined and so the college must cover all aspects of threat. by three other senior professional schools: a
20 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Developing Strategists Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy
By D e r e k S . R e v e r o n and J a m e s L . C o o k
Tactics without strategy o update an old saying, “Rus- These international institutions speak with an sians play chess, Chinese play American accent. Through these institutions are a variety of roads that ‘go,’ and Americans play poker.” and others like them, the United States has are going nowhere and will T While this saying is meant to been attempting to ameliorate historic rival- evoke the astrategic nature of the United ries, promote economic development through lead to a very short-term States and convey the image of the naive international trade, and collectively address focus on a mission.1 American policymaker going from crisis to threats to international peace and security. crisis, it fails to capture the strategic continu- While there are limits (even for super- ity in U.S. grand strategy or its importance in powers) that underscore policy inconsisten- contemporary foreign policy. Since 1945, the cies, exemplified by economic engagement United States has consistently followed a stra- with China versus the economic isolation of tegic logic of global leadership through inter- Cuba, such exceptions should not be mistaken national economic and political institutions. for a lack of a grand strategy. Rather, they Dr. Derek S. Reveron and Lieutenant Colonel James The United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty should be interpreted as outcomes of a demo- L. Cook, USA (Ret.), are Professors in the National Organization, International Monetary Fund, cratic political process that enables organized Security Decision Making Department at the Naval and the predecessor of the World Trade Orga- minorities to have significant influence on War College. nization were born and raised in America. policy. To be sure, the United States in the
Soldiers train for joint air assault operation with Afghan National Army and Border Police U.S. Army (Derek L. Kuhn) U.S. Army (Derek
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 21 FORUM | Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy pursuit of its national interests sometimes edented. At the economic level, the United Defining Strategy behaves outside of the international norms States is checked by other great economic At a minimum, strategy links ends, it seeks to promote. Employing force against powers such as Japan, the European Union, ways, and means. For the Department of Belgrade in 1999 and imposing tariffs on and the People’s Republic of China, and Defense (DOD), strategy is “the art and Canadian soft lumber are but two examples. through institutions such as the World Trade science of developing and employing instru- Yet the United States behaves more like a plat- Organization. And, at the transnational level, ments of national power in a synchronized inum card member exacting special privileges the United States is but one of many state and and integrated fashion to achieve theater, from organizations that it helped create than nonstate actors that influence global events. national, and/or multinational objectives.”6 it does a hegemon on the offensive.2 To be effective in a stratified world, Put differently, strategy is about how leader- With a strong notion that strategy helps strategists must answer three basic questions: ship can use the power available to the state either prevent train wrecks or prepare for Where do we want to go, or what are the to exercise control over people, places, things, them, Washington follows a grand strategy desired ends? How do we get there, or what are and events to achieve objectives in accordance that shapes the security environment. To avoid the ways? And what resources are available, or with national interests and policies. going from crisis to crisis, the United States, Henry C. Barnett visualizes strategy and in particular its national security actors, as an interaction among key variables such attempts to defuse situations before they unipolarity dominates thinking as the security environment, ends, ways, become crises through a strategy of prevention. about the U.S. position in the means, resource constraints, and risk.7 As The challenge for the strategist is to world, but recent foreign policy represented in figure 1, strategy is shaped by coordinate the various levers of national frustrations illustrate that power the security environment, which it in turn power in a coherent or smart way. Secretary of relations are stratified attempts to shape. Allies, partners, and adver- State Hillary Clinton emphasized this during saries impact successful strategy implementa- her January 2009 confirmation testimony tion. At the same time, resource constraints when she argued, “We must use what has been what are the means? While the first question impact strategy too. called ‘smart power’: the full range of tools at is largely the domain of civilian policymak- Successful implementation is deter- our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, ers, military officers are expected to advise mined by the interaction of all variables, but political, legal, and cultural—picking the right on and ultimately implement strategy. As the achieving objectives or attaining ends is the tool, or combination of tools, for each situ- Joint Operating Environment notes, “Future overall goal of strategy. The strategist can ation.”3 Calls for smart power are a reaction joint force commanders will not make grand look to national interests as a starting point to George W. Bush’s foreign policy, but more strategy, but they must fully understand the to determine ends because they help iden- importantly they underscore that power rela- ends it seeks to achieve. They will have a role tify the reasons countries commit military tions are stratified. In the context of military in suggesting how the Joint Force might be forces. National interests can be universal, power, unipolarity dominates thinking about used and the means necessary for the effective such as ensuring the security of the state the U.S. position in the world, but recent use of joint forces to protect the interests of and its people. And national interests can be foreign policy frustrations illustrate that the United States.”5 the product of national policymakers, such power relations are stratified.4 At the military level, U.S. power is unparalleled and unprec-
U.S. Navy (Tiffini M. Jones)
Left: Secretary of State Clinton believes national power must be coordinated in coherent, smart way Above: Chief of Naval Operations meets with senior South DOD (Jerry Morrison) African defense leaders in Pretoria, South Africa
22 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu REVERON and COOK as advancing democratic institutions. The approach suggests certain criteria for the cive. Diplomacy is coercive when the threat attempt to differentiate intensity of national employment of military forces. Not all crises of military force underlies a demand, or it interests is important. Hans Morgenthau around the world warrant the commitment of can be noncoercive when it offers diplomatic differentiated between vital national interests U.S. forces, especially considering the avail- recognition to a new government or country. and secondary interests, which are more diffi- ability and utility of other elements of national Likewise, the military is coercive when it cult to define.8 One relatively simple approach power. The military, in particular, favors a engages in combat, while it is noncoercive to this rather complex and somewhat ambigu- conservative approach to force employment when it provides humanitarian assistance. ous concept is to stratify national interests: that can be traced to the Weinberger Doc- Ways can be reworked to be seen as trine, which emphasized six criteria for the concepts, which are end-to-end activities that ■■ Vital interests: What are we willing to commitment of forces. One of these criteria define how elements, systems, organizations, die for (destroy al Qaeda)?9 was a clear description of U.S. or its allies’ and tactics combine to accomplish national ■■ Important interests: What are we vital national interests.12 Donald Rumsfeld objectives or tasks.13 By specifying ways or willing to fight for (prevent genocide in proposed a similar framework in 2002 by concepts, the military departments can then Kosovo)? asking, “Is the proposed action truly neces- develop required capabilities and attempt to ■■ Peripheral interests: What are we sary? If people could be killed, ours or others, limit redundancies. For example, there are willing to fund (deploy African Union peace- the U.S. must have a darn good reason.” many ways for the military to conduct global keepers to Darfur)? Ultimately, the President determines what strike operations: submarine-launched mis- constitutes a vital interest, but the three ques- siles, precision weapons delivered by bombers, Given the U.S. ability to achieve air tions act as a way to understand the intensity sabotage missions conducted by Special supremacy or launch standoff weapons, it can of national interests and defining ends. Not Forces, and others. kill with limited risk to its Airmen or Sailors, all foreign policy crises result in deploying In 2009, there are about 20 concepts giving it a coercive advantage. In the 1990s, ground forces, and we argue that the type of that range from preparing for major combat for example, missile attacks against Iraq and force deployed (air, ground, or allies) is a good operations to conducting engagement activi- the air war for Kosovo exemplified that the empirical way to understand the intensity of ties. Each concept is designed to fully appreci- United States was willing to fight to achieve national interests. ate the various missions the military may objectives, but was not willing to suffer fatali- ties (during the 38,000 sorties in Yugoslavia, after ends are defined, policymakers and national security not a single pilot was killed). In both cases, the United States deliberately withheld ground professionals develop the ways to achieve national interests force options, which would have considerably raised the stakes. It seemed that airpower After ends are defined, policymakers undertake and is used to identify excesses and alone could achieve strategic interests.10 and national security professionals develop gaps in military force structure. The choice In addition to using military force, the ways to achieve national interests. Ways is ultimately the President’s, but DOD sees the United States also pursues its national are often equated to the tools of national its role as developing options with various interests through friendly surrogates. In power (diplomatic, information, military, levels of risk involved. When evaluating such cases, the Nation is willing to fund and economic). Yet power is more nuanced, ways, strategists should analyze for feasibility, others to provide humanitarian assistance, and all tools can be coercive and noncoer- suitability, and acceptability. First, given the conduct peacekeeping operations, or provide regional stability. The clearest example is Figure 1. The Shaping of Strategy through the Global Peacekeeping Opera- tions Initiative (GPOI), which was designed to train and equip 75,000 foreign peacekeep- 11 RESOURCE ers for global deployment. A program such CONSTRAINTS as GPOI is consistent with the preventative war strategy of the United States, which seeks to limit the impact of regional crises. STRATEGY And it gives the international community a ready response to crimes against human- MEANS ity. Along these lines, the United States ENDS WAYS was willing to fund African militaries to RISK take part in African Union/United Nations missions to stop and prevent genocide in Darfur. Deploying American ground troops SECURITY or establishing a no-fly zone has yet to ENVIRONMENT emerge as a viable option. As Presidents and their administra- tions evaluate national interests, the above ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 23 FORUM | Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy ends, is the action feasible with the means as a way to achieve this objective, but does know yourself; in a hundred battles you will available? Second, is the action suitable to not possess any power projection capability never be in peril.”18 Ideally, perfect knowledge achieve the desired ends? Finally, is the action (means), then the resulting mismatch places ensures success, but history is replete with evi- acceptable given public, political, and ethical the strategy at risk. Likewise, neighboring dence to the contrary. Since war “is . . . an act considerations? countries can respond by matching defense of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” If ways operationalize elements of acquisitions, which would be an example the enemy has a vote too.19 War is character- national power, then means are the tools of the security environment impacting the ized by fog and friction; strategy attempts to that operationalize the ways. Resources are strategy. In considering military strategy, reduce (not eliminate) uncertainty. not means until they are considered and DOD considers four dimensions of risk.16 prioritized within the context of strategy. Operational risk is associated with the Levels of Strategy Overall strategic success is based on how well current force’s ability to execute the strategy Grand strategy is the highest level ends, ways, and means are balanced. Julian within acceptable costs. Future challenges strategy and encompasses all elements Corbett observed that one has to keep in view risk considers the military’s capacity to of national power. While the country has always followed a grand strategy (for Stiletto high-speed experimental boat manned example, containment during the Cold by joint Army/Navy crew with Coast Guard War), Congress required the President to law enforcement detachment under tactical clearly state the overall vision of the United control of Joint Interagency Task Force–South States in a national security strategy under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Since this statutory requirement, there have been eight national security strate- gies released by U.S. Presidents. While each President responded to particular security challenges during his tenure, there have been continuous policies related to trade, America’s leadership in global affairs, and the promo- tion of international organizations to unify action. The United States roughly follows President Kennedy’s Cuba policy, President Nixon’s China policy, and President Clinton’s trade policy. Deriving strategic guidance from the
U.S. Navy (Alan Gragg) country’s grand strategy, DOD has regularly produced a National Military Strategy (NMS) constantly the politico-diplomatic position of execute future missions against an array since the 1990s. In 2003, Congress formally the country (on which depends the effective of prospective challengers. Force manage- required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs action of the instrument) and its commercial ment risk considers recruiting, training, of Staff to submit a biennial review of the and financial position (by which the energy equipping, and retaining personnel. And strategy in even-numbered years. The NMS for working the instrument is maintained).14 institutional risk focuses on organizational outlines the strategic direction for the Armed General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), efficiency and financial management.17 The Forces of the United States, which should be emphasized the importance of resources: “right” way is ultimately determined by consistent with the current National Security “Even if the [commanders in chief] produced policy, but the decision is informed through Strategy. Unfortunately, the Chairman has not good strategies at their level (and I believe we experimentation, war games, and exercises. released one since 2004, but one should follow did), with good ends and reasonable ways to As the preceding discussion sug- the Quadrennial Defense Review when it is achieve them, we still had no idea whether gests, strategy is developed in the context released in early 2010. or not the administration and the Congress of the international security environment. Though there is no statutory require- would come through with the means.”15 An analysis of the security environment is ment, the Secretary of Defense released a A strategy is not considered complete essential to the strategist; it identifies threats National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2005 until a risk analysis is conducted to determine to national interests and challenges that and 2008. Since the strategy is written (or the ability of the organization to carry out the impede the advancement of national interests. at least directed and signed) by the civilian tasks and missions implied by the strategy. Furthermore, the security assessment can head of the military, the strategy should be Risk results from a “mismatch” among ends, identify new opportunities, too. The analysis read as directions to the uniformed military. ways, and means. also forces the strategy to interact with the Though strategic documents are subtle, they One example of a mismatch is country real world. Strategy shapes and is shaped by are one form of civilian control. The NDS X’s objective to become a regional power external actors, which differs from Sun Tzu’s provides a more direct link between the (ends). If country X relies on its military famous exaltation, “Know the enemy and National Security Strategy and the National
24 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu REVERON and COOK
Military Strategy. It lays out strategic objec- the criticality of developing partner capacity Mackubin Owens offers a logic model designed tives for the defense of the Nation and its to address the challenges in today’s security to translate grand strategy and associated interests, articulates the ways the United environment. This notion is reinforced in the strategic direction into theater strategy and States will achieve those objectives, and dis- 2008 National Defense Strategy, which states, associated plans, including theater security cusses implementation of the strategy. The “Arguably the most important military compo- cooperation (see figure 2).25 various strategic documents are intended nent of the struggle against violent extremists is The model begins with national to “nest” together; that is, each document is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well (grand) strategy, which defines U.S. security intended to support the tasks, missions, and we help prepare our partners to defend and interests, objectives, and priorities and pro- intent of the next higher strategy. Yet delays govern themselves.”23 However, simply building vides guidance to all who are charged with in releasing the strategies do not always partner capacity is insufficient without a strat- its execution, including regional combatant enable the strategic documents to nest as egy to provide direction and ensure activities commanders. Given the National Security neatly as we might like. are unified with other government activities Strategy, DOD and the Joint Staff produce and the partner country’s goals. strategic guidance that focuses on the mili- Theater Strategy tary instrument of national power and pro- Using national strategy as a guide, com- vides direction for the combatant command- batant commanders develop theater strategies, the United States roughly ers through several critical documents. For which are: follows President Kennedy’s example, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) Cuba policy, President Nixon’s “sets forth basic guidance to all unified com- strategic concepts and courses of actions China policy, and President batant commanders; establishes their mis- directed toward securing the objectives of Clinton’s trade policy sions, responsibilities, and force structure; national and multinational policies and and delineates the general geographical [area strategies through the synchronized and of responsibility] for geographic combatant integrated employment of military forces Despite the complexity and criticality of commanders.”26 The 2008 UCP sets general and other instruments of national power. theater strategy, there is relatively little doc- roles and missions, but it also includes Theater strategy is determined by [combatant trine or other guidance on developing it. The explicit guidance. commanders] based on analysis of changing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has issued According to the 2008 Strategic Man- events in the operational environment and the direction that requires professional military agement Plan, the DOD Guidance for the development of options to set conditions for education institutions to teach senior officers Employment of the Force (GEF) “covers success.20 how to “synthesize how national military and how to use the current military to gener- joint theater strategies meet national strategic ate military effects within the battlespace, Theater strategy links national strategy to oper- goals across the range of military operations.”24 along with resource and capability needs.”27 ational level plans and activities, tailored to the To bring rigor to theater strategy development, The GEF provides strategic direction for the commander’s area of responsibility in a joint, multinational, and interagency environment.21 Figure 2. Strategy and Theater Security Logic Model A major challenge in the development Figure 3. Strategy and Theater Security Logic Model of theater strategy is the requirement to coordinate and synchronize theater security GRAND STRATEGIC STRATEGIC cooperation activities with other U.S. Govern- STRATEGY DIRECTION ESTIMATE ment activities. These activities can cover the Operational NSS NDS/NMS/JSCP/UCP Challenges/ entire spectrum of conflict and often occur NIC/NIE/JOE SCIENCE AND simultaneously, providing an additional level TECHNOLOGY of complexity for commanders and their staffs WAR GAMING to consider during planning and execution SCENARIOS RISK ANALYSIS of the theater strategy. Theater strategy must EXPERIMENTATION STRATEGIC therefore be broad and flexible enough to CONCEPTS encompass a wide variety of political-military Attributes activities across a combatant command’s area CCJO/JFC/JOC/JIC of responsibility at the same time.22 It must also THEATER take into account other countries’ activities. PLANS THEATER STRATEGY Unity of effort is the key to a successful OPLANs/ RISK ANALYSIS theater strategy. For example, a prominent way CONPLANs/TCP the United States pursues its strategy of global engagement is through military-to-military Key: CCJO: Capstone Concept for Joint Operations; CONPLANs: Contingency Plans; JFC: joint force commander; JIC: Joint Intelligence Center; JOC: joint operating concept; JOE: joint operating environment; JSCP: Joint Strategic cooperation. Admiral James Stavridis, USN, Capabilities Plan; NDS: National Defense Strategy; NIC: National Intelligence Council; NIE: National Intelligence views promoting security as an important Estimate; NMS: National Military Strategy; NSS: National Security Strategy; OPLANs: Operations Plans; TCP: Theater Campaign Plan; UCP: Uni ed Command Plan mission. His approach—working with inter- agency partners and partner nations—implies ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 25 FORUM | Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy combatant commander in the development of that could potentially assist the command in or ends. First, the strategist must consider near-term (2-year) operational activities and advancing and defending U.S. interests in the strategic alternatives that can be expressed priorities, as well as global posture and force region either as broad statements of what is to be management guidance, and is designed to link ■■ risks inherent in the depiction of the accomplished or lines of operations. As a strategy to military operations. The GEF also security environment. useful reference in this process, the strategist provides strategic end-states and priorities to can turn to the U.S. Joint Forces Command the combatant commands in the development The theater estimate is crucial for setting Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), such as of campaign and contingency plans, as well as the context for the combatant commander irregular warfare and the military contribution security cooperation activities.28 mission analysis. The commander articulates to cooperative security, that describe “how Finally, the Chairman’s Joint Strategic his intent through the theater strategic vision a Joint Force Commander will accomplish Capabilities Plan implements the guidance that describes how the theater strategy sup- a strategic mission through the conduct of contained in the GEF and “provides [focused] ports the goals and objectives of the United operational-level military operations within military strategic and operational guidance States as derived from grand strategy and a campaign.” JOCs identify “key ideas for and direction to combatant commanders and strategic direction. The vision should discuss solving those challenges, effects to be gener- Service chiefs for preparation of operations the general methods to achieve those objectives ated to achieve objectives, essential capabilities plans and security cooperation plans based on current military capabilities. It is the primary given the National Security Strategy, DOD and the Joint vehicle through which the Chairman exercises Staff produce strategic guidance that focuses on the military responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans.”29 This plan also provides instrument of national power and provides direction for the guidance concerning operational requirements combatant commanders through several critical documents and the apportionment of resources. Armed with grand strategy and strategic to include strategic communication, pertinent likely needed to achieve objectives and the rel- direction described above, as well as any guid- economic tools, and diplomacy. Additionally, evant conditions in which the capabilities must ance provided by the combatant commander, the vision may describe where the commander be applied.”34 In the 2009 Capstone Concept for the staff is prepared to begin formulating is willing to accept risk. Finally, the vision Joint Operations (CCJO), the Chairman recog- theater strategy. One of the most critical steps should introduce and describe the appropriate nized that these concepts are not intended as in developing strategy is to conduct a thor- strategic and operational concepts for the mili- “one size fits all” approaches for the combatant ough theater estimate, which is “the process tary instrument of power. commanders. The CCJO requires the joint by which a theater commander assesses the When crafting a vision, the commander force to “[a]ddress each situation on its own broad strategic factors that influence the should succinctly capture the strategic desired terms, in its unique political and strategic theater strategic environment, thus further outcome.32 The vision is a snapshot of what context, rather than attempting to fit the situa- determining the missions, objectives, and the commander wants the theater to look like tion to a preferred template.”35 courses of action throughout their theaters.”30 in the future. Effective visions are usually The strategic concept also forms the basis The estimate includes a mission analysis that short, focused, imaginable, positive, and for subsequent planning efforts that include derives specified, implied, and essential tasks, motivating.33 Constructing an effective vision combat operations, security cooperation, and as well as theater-strategic objectives (ends) statement is difficult: one or two sentences other support operations.36 Given the size of and desired effects.31 Given the complex nature must reflect the consolidated theater strategy’s the geographic combatant command areas, it of the security environment as well as changes goal so it is easily understood and engaging. is possible (if not likely) for these commanders in strategic direction, the theater estimate A good vision must also be compelling to simultaneously conduct operations across requires continuous refinement. In addition to to a broad audience. For instance, if the com- the spectrum of conflict ranging from major a detailed analysis of the combatant command’s mander is embraced by coalition partners, combat to humanitarian assistance. The devel- mission, capabilities, and limitations, the esti- regional leaders, and Congress, there is a opment of a sound strategic concept within mate should address the following: good chance that the strategy has enough the framework of theater strategy allows the critical mass necessary for success. A coher- command to better articulate to senior leader- ■■ any states, groups, or organizations in ent and credible vision serves as a practical ship what adjustments to doctrine, organiza- the security environment that may challenge reference point for subsequent strategic tion, training, material, leadership, personnel, the combatant command’s ability to advance communication initiatives in a complex and facilities, and policy or to current capabilities and defend U.S. interests in the region. This cluttered environment. The vision is primar- the commander needs during the next 8 years analysis should include an appreciation for rel- ily an essential communication tool that to achieve his theater strategy objectives. evant geopolitical, geoeconomic, and cultural provides strategic continuity and integrity to Having determined the ways, the stra- considerations within the area of operations. the everyday challenges and decisions within tegic planner must now address the required ■■ major strategic and operational chal- the combatant command’s theater. capabilities (means) to prosecute the strategy. lenges facing the combatant command Once the theater estimate and strate- DOD uses Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) as its ■■ known or anticipated opportunities gic vision are complete, the strategist must capabilities management language and frame- the combatant command can leverage includ- develop a strategic concept that articulates the work.37 The Joint Staff (J7) defines JCAs as ing those states, groups, or organizations ways to achieve the theater strategy objectives “collections of like DOD capabilities function-
26 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu REVERON and COOK ally grouped to support capability analysis, the next step is implementation, or executing competitor, increasing the number of democ- strategy development, investment decision the strategy. Without the means, competen- racies in the world, or eliminating biological making, capability portfolio management, cies, and informed thinking to carry out the weapons. In a broader sense, strategy develops capabilities-based force development and commander’s intent, the strategy is just an and employs all tools of national power to operational planning.”38 There are currently idea.41 Theater strategy should outline the advance and defend the national interest. Con- nine top-level (Tier 1) JCAs developed along critical pathways and components neces- sequently, when evaluating strategy, one must functional lines to meet combatant command sary to carry out that strategy, as well as the examine the strategy’s concept of national inter- and DOD requirements: force support, bat- required means, potential obstacles, risk ests, view of the security environment, strategic tlespace awareness, force application, logistics, assessment, timeframes, and functional priorities, role of power, impact on resources, command and control, network-centricity, accountability. Implementation requires the required means, risk, and acceptability. protection, building partnerships, and corpo- cooperation of multiple governmental and During traditional combat operations, rate management and support. nongovernmental organizations, as well as it is relatively easy to measure whether the The strategic planner carefully analyzes multinational allies and partners. One of the military disrupts, degrades, or destroys enemy these capability areas and determines the most challenging tasks for the combatant forces. However, in permissive environments, necessary means that may also include other command staff is ensuring that there is a the objectives are generally broader and can governmental and nongovernmental capa- be less clear. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of bilities within an interagency context. Upon Staff Admiral Michael Mullen noted that the completion of this analysis and an assess- if the commander is embraced effects may never be clearly measurable and ment of current capabilities, the combatant by coalition partners, regional cultural sensitivities might preclude measure- command must determine what capabilities leaders, and Congress, there ment.42 However, in a resource-constrained to request from the Secretary of Defense. One is a good chance the strategy environment, it is important to understand mechanism for this request is the combatant has enough critical mass which activities are more effective. command’s annual Joint Integrated Priority necessary for success A theater strategy should contain mea- List, “a succinct statement of key capability surements to calibrate its progress toward gaps that could hinder the performance of achieving goals and objectives. There are three assigned missions”39 and “identifies those credible commitment among all participants broad categories of measures: input, output, areas that require priority attention during” to accomplish the common goals. and outcome. Resources are typical examples of the DOD resource allocation process.40 With strategy playing a guiding role in input. Interagency or coalition support might U.S. foreign policy, it is important to know be other resource inputs. Performance mea- Implementation how to evaluate the strategy. At a minimum, a sures that directly track progress toward goals Once the theater strategy is complete strategy is designed to change the security envi- and objectives are considered outputs, which and approved by the combatant commander, ronment by preventing the emergence of a peer are dependent on adequate resources, such as
Bataan Amphibious Ready Group serves as theater reserve force for U.S. European Command U.S. Marine Corps (Theodore W. Ritchie) W. U.S. Marine Corps (Theodore
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20 securing an area or building infrastructure, and N o t es JP 3–0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: are accomplishments over which the combat- The Joint Staff, September 17, 2006, Incorporating ant command has considerable direct control. 1 General (Ret.) Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Change 1, February 13, 2008), I–3. 21 JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, These measures usually are quantifiable and Canadian Defence Staff. 2 DC: The Joint Staff, December 26, 2006), I–9. have associated timeframes. In contrast, Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: 22 Clarence J. Bouchat, An Introduction to outcomes are more difficult to measure (often Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy,” Politi- cal Science Quarterly 116, no. 3 (Fall 2001), 343–365. Theater Strategy and Regional Security (Carlisle Bar- qualitative) and are usually only influenced, 3 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “State- racks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War not directly controlled, by the combatant ment of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nominee College, August 2007), 3. 23 command. Examples may include the strength for Secretary of State,” January 13, 2009, available National Defense Strategy, 8. 24 of regional security agreements or the relative at
28 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Chinese and North Korean POWs were released during Operation Comeback after Korean War armistice was signed
National Air and Space Museum
ince the earliest days of the Republic, the United States has had vital interests in Asia. S Indeed, the ink was barely dry on the Treaty of Paris, which formally Asia recognized American independence, before the Nation was establishing its own trade Facing Interesting Times links there. The arrival of the U.S. merchant ship Empress of China in 1784 inaugurated what today is $900 billion in trade between the United States and Asia.1 The opening of By D e a n C h e n g Japan in 1854 and the Open Door policy half a century later were both intended to ensure that American interests in the region were known and respected. Consequently, Ameri- can security concerns have long included Asian contingencies. Well before the battles of the Pusan Perimeter and the Chosin Reservoir, U.S. forces had operated on the Korean Peninsula.
Dean Cheng is a Chinese Military and Technology Analyst at CNA Corporation’s Project Asia.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 29 FORUM | Asia: Facing Interesting Times
Today, American security concerns in straits. Meanwhile, the issue of U.S. arms History Remains an Open Book Asia are often associated with the potential sales to Taiwan continues to roil the trilateral Ideology is not the only potential cause for conflict in the Taiwan Straits or on the relationship among Beijing, Taipei, and of conflict in East Asia, however. Indeed, Korean Peninsula. In both cases, substantial Washington. in many cases ideology merely provided an American forces are arrayed and prepared to Another aspect is the continued one- additional overlay to longstanding histori- engage in open, high-intensity warfare. party rule of Asian communist parties, cal animosities. Taiwan, for example, was a These are not, however, the only two including in North Korea, the PRC, and the source of regional tension long before Chiang flashpoints. Indeed, Taiwan and Korea are Socialist Republic of Vietnam. These parties Kai-shek evacuated the Nationalist govern- part of a larger set of rifts and faults that survived the fall of the Soviet Union because ment there in 1949. It first became a territo- underlie most of the East Asian security land- they did not derive their legitimacy from rial issue for Chinese central authorities in scape. At the same time, the growing eco- Soviet support. This was in contrast with 1895, when the Qing Dynasty was compelled nomic interconnections between China and Eastern Europe, where the ruling parties were to cede it to Japan after losing the first Sino- the region, as well as with the United States, installed by Moscow and the advancing Red Japanese War. result in a constantly shifting kaleidoscope Army. Consequently, whereas the collapse of That war, in turn, was only part of a of rivalries and accords among the various the Soviet Union deprived the leadership of centuries-long rivalry between China and states. Unlike the confrontation between the the Warsaw Pact states of their most impor- Japan to be the preeminent power in Asia. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tant support, the same was not true for the Earlier conflicts included the attempted inva- and the Warsaw Pact, East Asia is far more Asian communist parties. sions of Japan by Kublai Khan in the late 13th complex, embodying not only ideological This legitimacy was reinforced in several century and the Japanese invasion of Korea conflicts rooted in the Cold War, but also his- of these countries by independent efforts by (then a tributary state of China) in the late torical animosities, unsettled borders, inter- the ruling communist parties to reform their 16th century. The subsequent Sino-Japanese nal instabilities, and the absence of regional economic systems and improve the national War of 1937–1945 further aggravated the institutions that might ameliorate some of the standard of living. In both Vietnam and mutual bitterness by adding a massive ensuing tensions. China, the ruling parties had commenced far- butcher’s bill to the relationship. The post– reaching economic reforms well in advance World War II Sino-Japanese competition, Last Frontier of the Cold War therefore, not only arose from rival economic The Cold War in Asia was in many Asian communist parties and political systems, but also reiterated the ways more extensive than that in Europe. Of survived the fall of the Soviet general ongoing enmity between the states. the four nations divided ideologically at the Meanwhile, historic suspicions between end of World War II, three (China, Korea, Union because they did not Thais and Khmers found renewed expression and Vietnam) were in Asia. The United derive their legitimacy from in 2003, when Cambodian crowds sacked States fought major wars in two of them. The Soviet support the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh. While collapse of the Soviet Union did not neatly it is likely that the riots had roots in a com- resolve the Asian ideological divides, despite of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. This bination of factional politics and ongoing being heralded as the end of the Cold War. has sustained popular support for the ruling Thai-Cambodian commercial negotiations, Indeed, two decades after the fall of the parties; as long as the economic benefits con- it is noteworthy that the proximate reason for Berlin Wall, the Cold War remains a reality tinue to accrue, the party’s grip on power is the rioting was a Thai television personality’s in Asia. unlikely to be significantly challenged. Only claim that Angkor Wat had been stolen by This is expressed in several ways. One North Korea has adhered closely to com- Cambodia from Thailand. is the continued division of both the People’s munist ideology, refusing to end rural collec- Nor is history an issue only when raised Republic of China (PRC) from Taiwan and tivization or shift toward a more consumer- by ideological rivals. Indeed, throughout North Korea from South Korea, enforced by based economy. most of the Cold War, competitions among the deployment of substantial militaries by Economic reform has not been accom- the communist Asian states were as likely to all sides. On the Korean Peninsula, the physi- panied by political reform in these nations, lead to the use of force as conflicts between cal divide of the Demilitarized Zone reflects however, as the various Asian communist capitalist and communist Asian states. the political and ideological gap separating parties have evinced little interest in loosen- Wars among the Asian communist powers Pyongyang and Seoul. ing their political controls. Moreover, this has included not only the 1979 Chinese invasion In the case of the PRC and Taiwan, been true whether there has been substantial of Vietnam, but also the earlier Vietnam- although the two have become much more economic reform (for example, the PRC) or ese invasion of Cambodia (itself partly in closely aligned economically, military and minimal efforts (North Korea). The prospects response to Cambodian attacks on Vietnam), political tensions remain. Beijing continues of reconciling with their opposite numbers as well as the only incidence of open armed to oppose any political interactions by third are therefore greatly reduced, since both conflict involving two nuclear states: the parties with the government in Taipei, block- Taiwan and South Korea are not only market Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. In each ing their membership in various regional economies, but also vibrant democracies. This case, historical animus likely contributed to and international organizations. It was not means that the prospect of ideologically based mutual suspicions. until 2008 that Taipei allowed direct com- conflict, including open resort to the use of The Sino-Vietnam War of 1979, for mercial flights between the two sides of the force, remains a real possibility. example, has been attributed to Vietnamese
30 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CHENG alignment with the Soviet Union, which in fears that this would encourage other they control more than 70% of corporate threatened China with encirclement. From separatists. wealth—although some dispute this figure.”2 the Vietnamese perspective, however, it only The PRC is hardly alone in confronting Several of the largest Thai corporations, underscored China’s longstanding aggressive such movements, however. Other states that including Charoen Pokphand, for example, stance toward Vietnam, dating back over two have active separatist groups or domestic were founded and are still headed by ethnic centuries. Similarly, there is strong mutual insurgencies include Burma (Karen, Shan, Chinese Thais. dislike between Khmers and Vietnamese, and other ethnic groups), Indonesia (Free This substantial economic presence has with roots that long antedate the rise of Pol Aceh Movement, Free Papua Movement), the led to significant tensions between the ethnic Pot and the Khmer Rouge. Philippines (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), Chinese and other ethnic population groups. Finally, Japanese historical revisionism, and Thailand (Pattani United Liberation As a result, many states have pursued efforts such as their depiction of the World War II Organization, among others). to promote “native” populations preferentially. “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” as Another potential source of domestic Ethnic Chinese have had to sacrifice certain an attempt to benefit Asia, as well as Japanese instability involves the substantial ethnic rights if they wish to be seen as citizens. treatment of the issue of “comfort women” and Chinese populations in many Southeast Asian Simultaneously, there has been a direct effort the Nanking Massacre, have directly affected nations. These were described by one Thai to assimilate ethnic Chinese through such regional perspectives toward Japan. Japanese king 80 years ago as the “Jews of the East.” measures as requiring the adoption of non- politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni shrine, where a Like the Jews of medieval Europe, ethnic Chinese surnames. In Thailand, these mea- number of war criminals are interred, regularly Chinese were historically often prevented sures have been sufficiently thorough as to arouse significant regional ire and the lodging from owning land, deliberately segregated and make it difficult to estimate exact percentages of diplomatic protests. The Japanese decision to discriminated against, and channeled into of ethnic Chinese. dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in entrepreneurial and financial businesses. As a Such measures, however, have proven 1991 after the first Gulf War was opposed in no result, in the postcolonial environment, many only partially successful in leading to actual small part because many in the region thought became cornerstones of the region’s business assimilation. In times of economic or political it might presage a more robust Japanese foreign class. stability, the ethnic Chinese population has policy. Similarly, it was not until 2007–2008 that Today, ethnic Chinese wield economic often nonetheless been the target of violence. Japanese and Chinese warships engaged in port clout substantially in excess of their propor- visits for the first time. tion of the population. Despite constituting the end of the Cold War In this light, it is not surprising that the only a quarter of the population or less in merely removed the end of the Cold War did not abate tensions in most Southeast Asian states (with the excep- Asia. Rather, it merely removed the ideologi- tion of Singapore), they control the bulk ideological component from cal component from some of the complicated of listed companies in local stock markets. some of the complicated relations within the region that draw upon According to one account in regard to these relations within the region age-old prejudices and hatreds. stock markets, they control “more than 80% that draw upon age-old in Thailand and Singapore, 62% in Malaysia, prejudices and hatreds Internal Stability Not a Given about 50% in the Philippines. In Indonesia, Further complicating the Asian security M–48 Patton tank moves through jungle in central dynamic are extensive underlying tensions. highlands of Vietnam, June 1969 Some of these are rooted in ethnic, religious, and other differences, as many Asian states are extremely heterogeneous. In addition, many governments, especially in Southeast Asia, are confronted by questions of their legitimacy, especially from ethnic and reli- gious minorities who often feel underrepre- sented. The combination of factors means that internal stability in many states should not be assumed. There is, for example, a range of ethnic and religious separatist movements, as various tribes and groups seek autonomy if not outright independence. Some of the better known separatist groups are in the PRC, including the Uighurs (the East Turkestan Islamic Movement) and the Tibetans. Beijing has refused to countenance any expansion of autonomy for such groups—and its intransi- gence on the Taiwan issue may well be rooted U. S. Army Military History Institute ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 31 FORUM | Asia: Facing Interesting Times
Indeed, as recently as 1998, ethnic Chinese power projection platforms, including an Community, which was created in 1951 and fled Indonesia in the face of anti-Chinese aircraft carrier, could be justifiably employed established a Western European common riots. safeguarding Chinese assets and lives (includ- market in those two commodities. It was the One major unknown is how the PRC ing a noncombatant evacuation operation). first transnational European organization. It may react in the future to anti–ethnic Chinese both provided a forum for multilateral discus- pogroms. Historically, Beijing has protested Few Institutions, Little Identity sion of economic issues and acclimatized the but refrained from directly intervening, in Not surprisingly, given the cross-cutting leading elites to the idea of mutual coordina- part because it lacked the wherewithal. But concerns and issues that have riven the region, tion. It is often credited as the intellectual and that situation is evolving with the expansion as well as the continuing impact of divergent legal forefather to the European Economic of the People’s Liberation Army. As impor- ideologies and political systems, there is far less Community, itself the basis for the European tant, although the ethnic Chinese in these regional, transnational, or pan-regional identity Union. By contrast, there are few effective nations are not Chinese citizens, many of the in Asia than in Europe. In addition to the his- institutions in Asia. Nations tend to coalesce most financially successful are significant torical factors, pan-Asian attitudes are vitiated on specific issues or in response to particular investors in the PRC. Charoen Pokphand, by the relatively recent independence of many crises, only to fragment once the moment has passed. There is little around which to create a sense of greater Asian identity. there is far less regional, transnational, or pan-regional identity There is, for example, no Asian common in Asia than in Europe market comparable to the early stage of the European Economic Community. The closest for example, was one of the first companies of the states in the region. Nations that have counterpart is the Association of Southeast to invest in China when it initially opened to only recently gained their independence are Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has estab- the West in the late 1970s. Furthermore, the hardly likely to subsume their hard-won auton- lished an ASEAN Free Trade Area. Rather region has become a major trading partner omy into a larger regional framework. Unlike than eliminating tariffs among members, with the PRC, including increasing direct Western Europe, nationalism is associated with however, and presenting a single common investment by Chinese firms and investors. international recognition and respect, rather tariff with external trade partners, there is Whether Beijing would stand idly by if its than the massive bloodletting of 1914–1945. instead a Common Effective Preferential resources or assets were to be jeopardized by Moreover, many of the initial steps that Tariff, wherein member states pledge to keep domestic unrest in these countries, consistent undergirded the European Union have not tariffs on each other’s goods within a band of with its historical policy of noninterference in been taken in Asia. There is, for example, no 5 percent or less. Meanwhile, tariffs for goods foreign domestic affairs, is unclear. Chinese counterpart to the European Coal and Steel originating outside ASEAN are set at the dis- cretion of each state. The absence of political integration, however, has not been an obstacle to greater economic connectivity. Indeed, Asian Develop- ment Bank statistics indicate that intraregional trade has grown in Asia at a pace comparable U.S. Navy (Michael Moriatis) to that of intra-European trade, despite the absence of pan-regional institutions. Regional security is even more frag- mented. There is nothing comparable to NATO; that is, there is no single security- focused entity that covers most or all of East Asia. While a number of subregional security organizations have been established, their effectiveness has been limited. In Northeast Asia, for example, despite the security con- cerns associated with four nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, PRC, and North Korea) and a variety of tensions, no formal security mechanism for the region has ever evolved. Some had hoped that the Six-Party Talks, originally established to deal with North Korean proliferation, might evolve into a more permanent, wide-ranging regional secu- rity body. The failure of the talks to manage Royal Malaysian Air Force MiG–29 lands behind F/A–18D at Pyongyang’s actions suggests that such hopes Kuantan Air Base during exercise Air Warrior were probably misplaced.
32 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CHENG
A number of security-related organiza- brings together the 10 ASEAN member states been a series of individual bilateral alliances, tions have arisen in Southeast Asia, but their with the PRC, Japan, and South Korea, mainly coupled with a general willingness to rely track records have been even more mixed. serve as opportunities for dialogue. on the United States to preserve the regional The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, for As a consequence of this lack of balance of power. example, was established in 1954 and envi- regional institutionalization, there is no In terms of formal alliances, there is a sioned as an Asian counterpart to NATO. It real “Asian” counterpart when dealing with “wagon wheel” of bilateral agreements with was always much weaker, however, with no the region. Instead, any response to a crisis the United States at the hub. These include: political counterpart to the North Atlantic will first entail individual negotiations with Council, much less the various NATO joint various states, often on an ad hoc basis. As ■■ Mutual Defense Treaty between the commands and standing forces drawn from important, especially in the security context, United States and the Republic of the Philip- its signatories. There was not even an agree- it means there are distinct limits to interop- pines (1951) ment that an attack upon any member would erability, as Asian forces often have little ■■ Republic of Korea–U.S. Mutual constitute an attack against all the others. The experience interacting. Defense Treaty (1953) organization was formally dissolved in 1977.3 ■■ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and A more successful security entity is the instead of region-wide Defense between the United States and Japan Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) (1960) system. Created in 1971, the FPDA builds institutions for security ■■ Security Treaty among Australia, New upon a series of bilateral agreements among cooperation, most Asian Zealand, and the United States (1951) Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, multilateral organizations ■■ Southeast Collective Security Treaty, or Malaysia, and Singapore to foster multilateral are formalized, regularized Manila Pact (1954). security consultations aimed at deterring meetings of senior aggression against the latter two states. government officials Other U.S. security arrangements that Unique among Asian security mechanisms, supplement these treaties include the Thanat- the FPDA has an operational component Rusk Agreement with Thailand (1962), the in the form of the Integrated Area Defence Regional Stabilizer Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and the Strategic System, centered on the Royal Malaysian Instead of allying with each other, much Framework Agreement with Singapore (2005). Air Force Butterworth airbase. It also has no of Asia prefers Washington as the guarantor This system of alliances and understandings formal American participation. of regional stability. Moreover, if the United was largely developed in the early years of the It is notable, however, that the members States is not always the most trusted nation, it Cold War, but continues to be the main struc- of the FPDA avoid the term alliance, empha- is generally the least distrusted. The result has ture for regional security. sizing instead the consultative nature of the various arrangements. This is rooted in part in a desire to avoid excessively antagonizing Indonesia, one of the original inspirations for the agreements. Moreover, despite the agree- ments, actual cooperation between Malaysia and Singapore has always been vulnerable to (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force the vagaries of their relations. Malaysia, for example, refused to allow any Singaporean army units to exercise on its territory from 1971 until late 1989. Instead of establishing region-wide institutions for resolving disputes or real- izing greater security cooperation, most of the Asian multilateral organizations are formalized, regularized meetings of senior government officials. One of the most visible, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation entity, hosts an annual regional summit of its 21 “member economies.” Yet it has steadfastly refrained from even labeling itself as an orga- nization, simply describing itself as a forum. Its Web site specifically notes that it has “no treaty obligations required of its participants,” with all commitments being nonbinding. Similarly, the ASEAN Regional Forum, with Secretary Gates briefs press after trilateral meeting with counterparts from Japan and South Korea in Singapore 27 members, and the ASEAN + 3 talks, which ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 33 FORUM | Asia: Facing Interesting Times
Compared with major regional powers Union economies become more prominent If the region desires U.S. presence to such as Japan or China, the United States over the past 15 years. For states such as maintain a balance, for the most part it is not offers significant advantages as the preserver the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, interested in taking sides with the United of the overall regional balance of power. Given Singapore, and Thailand, the United States States (except insofar as it relates to their own the overlapping demands and claims involv- and the European Union have been progres- specific national interests). More to the point, ing just about every Asian state, no regional sively displaced as an export destination by the region does not view any single state as an power is likely to be seen as an honest broker. the PRC (measured as a percentage of total enemy—least of all the PRC. Indeed, China is By contrast, Washington has no territorial exports). Thus, in the Asian context, the a competitor on many levels, especially eco- aspirations in the region, and much less his- PRC is increasingly seen as a partner to local nomically, but it is also a partner, including torical baggage than any of the major Asian economies, as well as a competitor. economically. Therefore, regional support for states. At the same time, unlike any grouping the United States in any PRC–U.S. confronta- of smaller states such as Malaysia, Thailand, Implications for the United States tion cannot be assumed. or Indonesia, the United States also possesses Given these undercurrents within the Finally, the various undercurrents a range of instruments of power, making it Asia-Pacific region, what are the implications outlined earlier are likely to be exacerbated less subject to intimidation by major regional for American policymakers? Several impor- if the current economic downturn proves powers such as the PRC. Finally, by seeking tant conclusions might be derived from this extended. Internal instability, as outlined to preserve the status quo and ensure that no overview. above, has often been muted by expanding single Asian power would come to dominate First, there is no “Asia.” While there national economies, allowing leadership the region, the United States has maximized is a geographical region, there is no “Asian” groups to buy off opponents. In the event the opportunities for the majority of Asian perspective on issues. Instead, each nation of a protracted global economic downturn, states, at minimal cost to them. In essence, holds its own view, examining issues in light however, and given the reliance of many America has freed local resources for “butter” of its own interests. Consequently, one cannot Asian economies on exports to drive their that would otherwise have gone toward craft a single message or expect a unified economic expansion, the combination is “guns.” perspective, whether on developments on likely to lead to growing discontent. Worse, In particular, the U.S. alliance with the Korean Peninsula or trade negotiations. some studies suggest that Asian recessions Japan has served these functions, while This means there will be competing demands last longer and hit harder. This will increase reassuring the region. On the one hand, the on policymakers as they seek to forge an domestic instability and likely exacerbate security commitment from the United States American policy; what will be popular in interstate tensions. has obviated the necessity for Japan to create Seoul is unlikely to resonate in Kuala Lumpur The U.S. role as stabilizer and ally makes its own conventional or nuclear deterrents, or Bangkok. Picking and choosing policies managing the various relationships both more thereby allowing it to maintain its “peace that maximize regional support, while still essential and more difficult. In Asia, U.S. poli- constitution,” which formally renounces war attaining U.S. objectives, will require regular cymakers and policy implementers, including as an instrument of national policy. Both displays of Solomonic wisdom. U.S. Pacific Command, are likely to confront Japanese and Asians generally would prefer Second, knowledge of national histories “interesting times.” JFQ to see Japan continue to operate under such matters. In light of the mutual suspicions strictures. At the same time, the U.S. alli- that permeate the region, and in the absence N o t es ance constitutes what one American Marine of security institutions, recognizing that a 1 general termed the “cork in the bottle” on any given policy is as likely to alienate neighbor- Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan K. Japanese rearmament. In essence, Japanese ing states as to please them is essential. Thus, Bhatia, “U.S. Trade Relations with Asia,” remarks to the Washington International Trade Association, July military expansion would be rendered visible where exercises are held, and with whom, is 24, 2007, available at
34 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu United Arab Emirates Mirage 2000 fighter over Southwest Asia U.S. Air Force (Aaron Allmon) (Aaron U.S. Air Force Future Gulf War Arab and American Forces against Iranian Capabilities
By R i c h a r d L . R u s s e l l
ulf Arabs are increasingly taking Long on Hardware, Short on Power craft, but today they can field 8 divisions and measure of Iran’s capabilities At first glance, the Arab Gulf states 430 combat aircraft.2 to wage war. Military power look well heeled militarily because they have The Gulf Arabs have some of the most G is relative, not absolute, and purchased the most modern and capable sophisticated armaments in the world. The to gauge Iran’s capabilities to wage war and weaponry. The United States and Europeans United Arab Emirates (UAE), for example, threaten the Persian Gulf, one must compare have been eager to sell their military wares has purchased 80 advanced block 60 F–16s— Iran’s power against that of its regional rivals. for top dollar to the Gulf states. The Saudis, which are more sophisticated than the block A rough net assessment of strategies and Kuwaitis, and Omanis spend up to 10 percent 50 F–16s in the U.S. Air Force—that are military forces in the Gulf needs to weigh of their gross domestic product on their mili- optimal for penetrating deeply into Iranian Iranian conventional military power—both in taries, which amounts to about $21 billion, airspace to deliver munitions against ground its regular military and Revolutionary Guard $4 billion, and $2.7 billion, respectively.1 The targets.3 Saudi Arabia in 2006 agreed to buy forces—against the conventional militaries Arab Gulf state forces since the 1990 Iraq war 72 Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft of Saudi Arabia, the other Arab Gulf states, also have increased in size. A decade ago, for for $11 billion and to spend $400 million and the United States. By this scale, Arab and example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could only on upgrading 12 Apache AH–64S attack American forces are heavier than Iranian field about 5 divisions and 215 combat air- helicopters, while Kuwait has bought 24 capabilities. But because they are, Iran is likely to turn to its time-tested unconventional ways Dr. Richard L. Russell is Professor of National Security Affairs in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic of war to exploit Arab Gulf state and Ameri- Studies at the National Defense University and Adjunct Professor of Security Studies in the Security Studies can vulnerabilities in future conflicts. Program at Georgetown University. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 35 FORUM | Future Gulf War
Apache Longbow helicopters and Bahrain tainability, and maneuver capabilities are not advisors, including technicians and pilots, has ordered 9 UH–60M Black Hawk heli- keeping pace with arms purchases.7 Michael to provide professionalism as well as vital copters.4 The United States also wants to sell Knights notes that Saudi Arabia’s armed skills, and to maintain a high level of combat the Saudis and the UAE Joint Direct Attack forces in particular suffer from a “massive readiness,” and the UAE “is considered the Munition (JDAM) kits that convert 500- and overemphasis on procurement of high tech- state most dependent on foreign support. 2,000-pound gravity bombs into all-weather nology and serious underemphasis on man- About 30 percent of its service personnel are precision strike weapons guided by satellites. power issues, personnel selection, training, expatriates.”10 These foreign expatriates are The George W. Bush administration proposed and maintenance.”8 akin to mercenaries who make good money in selling the Saudis 900 kits and the Emirates The reasons for the inability of the Arab peacetime but would likely be the first to flee 200 JDAM systems.5 Gulf states to field effective militaries are in a major regional military conflict. There is less than meets the eye to Gulf wide, deep, numerous, and elude any quick Arab militaries in general operate under Arab military power, however. Governments fixes. Kenneth Pollack astutely observes, stringent political constraints that profoundly have acquired impressive weapons hold- “Four areas of military effectiveness stand out hamper their effectiveness. It is not much of ings, but they are too often for show and not as consistent and crippling problems for Arab an exaggeration to say that their first, second, for waging modern warfare. As Anthony forces: poor tactical leadership, poor informa- and third missions are to protect the regime Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan assess, the tion management, poor weapons handling, from internal threats, while the lagging fourth emphasis on acquiring the shell of military and poor maintenance. These complications mission is to protect from external threats. capability, rather than the reality, is partly the were present in every single Arab army and The Arab regimes have created redundant “result of a tendency to treat military forces as air force between 1948 and 1991.”9 security and military organizations to compli- royal playgrounds or status symbols, partly a The Gulf Arabs are flush with high- cate and deter military coups. But this makes lack of expertise and effective military leader- ranking officers and prestige, but short on the for a lack of unity in military command and control during war with an external adver- sary. Arab forces suffer from heavily central- ized decisionmaking authority out of concern of coups, which severely hampers battlefield responses and the ability to respond rapidly U.S. Air Force (Bradley A. Lail) U.S. Air Force Gulf Arab conventional forces are impressive for military parades, but would be less formidable in an actual clash of arms
to changing battlefield conditions. Moreover, they lack intraservice cooperation and sup- press tactical independent initiative.11 Arab militaries also have strong propensities to promote leaders and commanders on the basis of family, tribal, and political affiliations rather than on military competence. The Arab Gulf states do a poor job using technology software to integrate General Petraeus, commander, U.S. Central Command, with Saudi Arabian Prince Khalid bin Sultan in Riyadh weapons systems hardware to gain syner- getic effects on the modern battlefield. The ship, and partly a result of the fear that effec- noncommissioned officers who make modern Saudi air force and air defense force capa- tive military forces might lead to a coup.”6 militaries run. Their education systems do not bilities, for example, are not keeping pace for Gulf Arab conventional forces are produce technically oriented men willing or future conflict because they need a modern impressive for military parades, but would able to do the grunt work on which effective command, control, communications, com- be less formidable in an actual clash of arms. military organizations depend. The Arab Gulf puter, and intelligence battle management The UAE, for example, is greatly increasing its states are forced to rely excessively on foreign system to replace the system that the United equipment and weapons holdings with large militaries, contractors, and expatriates to run States withdrew from Prince Sultan Air arms purchases, but the military suffers from their militaries. Persian Gulf expert Simon Force Base after the Iraq war.12 Likewise, the too many diverse weapons that are better Henderson notes that “several conservative UAE air force, typical of Gulf Arab mili- suited for the garrison than expeditionary Arab Gulf states, lacking trained manpower, taries, has a “knights of the air” mindset, missions, and its readiness, manpower, sus- rely heavily on foreign contract soldiers and and it lacks air control and battle manage-
36 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu RUSSELL ment systems and has limited training for The Gulf Arabs have comparatively founding in 1986, but to no avail. The GCC integrating airpower with ground force more combat experience in the air than on the countries, meanwhile, buy major weapons operations.13 These tendencies are in marked ground. Saudi aircraft supported U.S. Airborne systems without coordinating with Arab Gulf contrast to the Israeli approach to war, Warning and Control System aircraft and states and have little to no interoperability which Arabs are fond of rhetorically railing patrolled the “Fahd” air defense line during or common doctrine. The coordination and against. As Anthony Cordesman observes, the 1980–1988 Gulf war and destroyed at least integration problems are so bad that Bahrain’s “While most Arab states focus on the ‘glitter factor’ inherent in buying the most in the reconquest of Kuwait, Arab forces did little more than advanced weapons systems, Israel has given conduct an administrative procession into Kuwait City after the the proper weight to battle management, sustainability, and systems integration.”14 Americans and British secured it The Arab Gulf states, despite living in a dangerous neighborhood, have remarkably one Iranian aircraft.19 In the 1991 Gulf War, F–16 combat aircraft cannot readily operate little recent battlefield experience. They have Saudi aircraft mounted 1,656 offensive sorties from UAE air bases.22 These realities have largely stayed out of the fray and let others into Kuwait and Iraq to include 1,133 strike been strongly reflected in the steady decline fight in the last three Gulf wars. The Omani missions, 523 close air support missions, as of the GCC, which decided in 2005 to abolish army, for example, has not fought in any well as 118 reconnaissance missions. Bahraini its joint military unit called Dir’ Al-Jazeera (or major conflict for several decades.15 The Arab aircraft flew 294 combat missions in 1991, and Peninsula Shield) some 20 years after its cre- Gulf states shied away from providing peace- Qatari Mirage F–1s and armed helicopters sup- ation because of Saudi and Qatari rivalry and keeping forces to Iraq after Saddam’s ouster, ported ground operations in the Khafji battle because of the force’s lackluster capabilities.23 with the Saudis insisting on all sorts of condi- and in the liberation of Kuwait, while UAE On the other side of the scale, Iran’s tions on participation, especially that their aircraft also mounted operations in Kuwait military is impressive in quantity but under- forces not be under American command, and Iraq.20 Saudi Arabia could fairly claim a whelming in quality. Its forces are composed while discussions about UAE troops to protect Iraq’s southern oilfields also never came to fruition.16 The Arab Gulf state military perfor- mances in the 1990–1991 war in particular were on balance less than distinguished. The Kuwait military was outgunned and Avilucea) (Tommy U.S. Air Force outmanned and easily overwhelmed by invad- ing Iraqi forces in 1990, and its ground and air forces collapsed. The Saudis and Qataris had the largest engagement of all Arab forces during the Gulf War, but their performance was lackluster. The Iraqis launched a major attack against Saudi Arabia prior to the coalition ground invasion of Kuwait and captured the Saudi town of al Khafji with one mechanized division, and the Saudi bat- talion there fled. The Iraqis had moved their division into attack position at night to avoid detection by American intelligence, the limits of which the Iraqis had learned in receiving American intelligence on Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.17 Saudi and Qatari forces even- tually retook the city, but only after launching Iraqi Security Forces mark withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities two amateurish counterattacks; they had no combat experience and only marginal train- military achievement in air-to-air battle during of some 545,000 troops.24 In contrast, Saudi ing, with no plan for communication between the 1990–1991 Gulf War. One Saudi F–15C Arabia, Iran’s largest regional rival, has some Saudi and Qatari forces and no plan for direct shot down two Iraqi F–1 aircraft that had been 223,500 active duty troops.25 The small Arab artillery or air strikes, which is standard pro- attempting offensive airstrikes in the Gulf.21 Gulf states have significantly less manpower: cedure for any professional military.18 In the The Arab Gulf states have shown little Bahrain has 8,200, Kuwait has 15,500, Oman reconquest of Kuwait, Arab forces did little to no grit or resolve for joint military action. has 42,600, Qatar has 11,800, and the UAE has more than conduct an administrative proces- The United States long pushed the Gulf 51,000 active duty strengths.26 Iraq’s military sion into Kuwait City after the Americans and Cooperation Council (GCC) for a common is still taking shape and is preoccupied with British secured it. integrated air defense since the council’s battling internal security threats. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 37 FORUM | Future Gulf War
The bulk of Iran’s inventories are Amer- during the Iran-Iraq War left military service ans to keep them operational for a prolonged ican-built weapons bought before the 1979 by the mid-1990s. Iran now has a largely con- air campaign against Arab neighbors. On the revolution and a mix of Soviet and Chinese scripted force with limited military training other hand, the Arab Gulf states with F–15, weapons that are qualitatively inferior to the and little combat experience.”28 F–16, and Tornado combat aircraft have more modern American and Western weapons capabilities to strike against Iranian targets systems in the Gulf Arab inventories. Some What to Expect than Iran has to strike the Arab Gulf. The of the most technologically sophisticated A rough weighing of Gulf Arab military Iranians are trying to shore up this disadvan- aircraft in Iran’s inventory are about 24 Iraqi capabilities against those of Iran has to take tage by getting Russian help to modernize Mirage F–1 combat aircraft.27 During the into account a variety of conflict scenarios their ground-based air defenses. 1991 coalition air campaign against Iraq, involving air, naval, and ground forces. The most of Iraq’s pilots fled in their aircraft to Arab Gulf states likely would do reasonably Iran’s combat aircraft are Iran rather than face American and British well against the Iranians in air-to-air combat. airpower. It is doubtful, however, that the Although Gulf Arab ground forces capabili- aging, and it would be Iranians are maintaining these F–1s in good ties are more limited than airpower capa- difficult to keep them repair and order. The Iranians have extraor- bilities, the Iranians too suffer from severe operational for a prolonged dinary difficulty sustaining their military ground force projection problems. Iranian air campaign against Arab equipment due to a lack of spare parts and ground forces also would be vulnerable to neighbors trained mechanics. Arab Gulf state air attack. Tehran’s forces had more combat experi- The tight geographic confines in the ence in mobile conventional warfare than Gulf would allow the Iranians to make short The Arab Gulf states also have naval their Gulf Arab rivals, but that experience is dashes with combat aircraft to catch Gulf forces that could bombard Iranian ports, oil rapidly aging. The Iranians who fought on the Arab air defenses and air forces unawares and facilities and platforms, and naval assets. The frontlines during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 drop ordnance on major cities and military UAE has a longstanding dispute with Iran over to 1988 are retired. The majority of the popu- bases. But the Arab Gulf states would be able the sovereignty of three islands—Abu Musa, lation, moreover, is under 25 years of age and to put up their guards to marshal combat air Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—near tanker thus has no personal memory of the Iranian patrols to complicate Iranian follow-on air routes to the Strait of Hormuz, which were Revolution. In fact, the “vast majority of the attacks. Iran’s combat aircraft, moreover, are seized by the Shah of Iran after the British combat-trained labor power Iran developed aging, and it would be difficult for the Irani- withdrew from the Gulf in the early 1970s. The U.S. Air Force (Margo Wright) U.S. Air Force Royal Saudi air force E–3 at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
38 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu RUSSELL islands were militarily occupied by the Iranians retaliated in Operation Praying Mantis warship—a destroyer, cruiser, or even an air- in 1992 when Tehran claimed that they were and attacked Iranian coastal facilities. The craft carrier. The larger the number of drones, an “inseparable part of Iran.”29 The UAE navy Iranians tried to challenge the American the greater the chance some will get through, could try to reassert control of the disputed Navy surface ships but quickly lost two frig- sinking or seriously damaging expensive naval islands. By the same token, the Arab Gulf states ates and four other vessels.32 The Iranians vessels at little cost, and virtually without risk have coastal facilities that would make attrac- watched in awe as American and British to one’s remote pilots.34 tive targets for Iranian attacks. They all have forces in 2003 dispatched Saddam Hussein’s tanker-loading facilities, as well as power and regime in 3 weeks, a feat that Iran could The Iranians have proven adept at desalination plants along the Gulf coast.30 not achieve in 8 years of war with Iraq from recruiting and training suicide bombers The Arab Gulf states have more sophis- 1980 to 1988. similar to those that Hizballah has thrown ticated and modern ground force equipment The Iranians are apt to stick with mine- against American forces in the past. In future than Iran, but the Iranians have the advantage laying proficiencies in future war to counter- Gulf warfare, the Iranians could recruit and in the number of troops they could field for balance American surface ship superiorities. train a suicide bomber cadre for explosive- mobile-conventional warfare. The Iranians in They no doubt have learned from Iraq’s laden small craft and jet skis. the future could have a border dispute or politi- employment of mines against American and The Iranians would complement mining cal crisis with Kuwait and could threaten that coalition forces during the 1990–1991 Gulf and small boat operations with submarine country. Kuwait could turn to its GCC fellow War when the Iraqis laid about 1,300 mines, warfare. The Russians have equipped Iran’s members for help, but as previously discussed, some of which hit the helicopter carrier USS navy with diesel submarines to make up for the GCC is more political show than military Tripoli and the cruiser USS Princeton. These its formidable shortcomings in surface ships substance. Iranian troops motivated by the experiences showed the Iranians that multi- against American naval forces. Moscow sold spoils of war lying in Kuwait and the Arab million-dollar American warships could be Tehran three Kilo-class submarines, which are Gulf states might have more grit in battle than threatened and even rendered inoperable by quiet, small, and ideal for operating in shallow outnumbered and pampered Gulf state ground mines costing no more than a few thousand Gulf waters with weapons loads of a mix of forces. Arab Gulf states could leverage airpower dollars.33 18 homing and wire-guided torpedoes or 24 to intimidate and deny Iran’s air force from The Iranians have noticed the vulner- mines.35 And the Iranians are diversifying their protecting the skies over its ground forces and abilities of American warships operating submarine and irregular warfare capabilities their avenues of advance into Arab territories. in brown waters to suicide bombs at ports. and have purchased at least three one-man Gulf Arab political equities would also They have seen how the al Qaeda bombing submarines designed for covert demolition and undermine concerted military action against infiltration operations. They have also obtained Iranian ground forces. Kuwait, for example, midget submarines from North Korea.36 might be reluctant to host its Arab neighbors, in future Gulf warfare, the Moreover, the Iranians claim to be producing especially Saudi forces, out of fear of never Iranians could recruit and train their own submarines. Tehran announced in being able to get rid of them after the crisis a suicide bomber cadre for November 2007 that it had launched its second with Iran. Kuwait might worry that calling explosive-laden small craft and indigenously built Ghadir-class submarine, in Arab ground forces would precipitate an jet skis which it claimed could fire missiles and torpe- Iranian attack rather than dissuade it. The does simultaneously.37 Kuwaiti royal family made such a calculation Saturation fire of Iranian cruise missiles, when it decided against putting its armed of the USS Cole in 2000 cheaply used a boat- especially in the narrow Strait of Hormuz, is forces on alert in the face of the buildup of delivered suicide bomb to kill 17 Sailors another looming danger. The Iranians have Iraqi forces across the border in July 1990. The and nearly sink a billion-dollar warship. cruise missiles from China and could buy Kuwaiti army of some 16,000 troops was not Iran’s Revolutionary Guard navy and opera- more from Russia. The United States would fully mobilized on the eve of Iraq’s invasion tives would be keen to replicate such an have its hands full attempting to destroy Iran’s in keeping with the royal family’s attempt not operational success against American ships missile bases judging, in part, from its experi- to provoke Iraq.31 The Kuwaitis disastrously anchored or under way in waters around ence trying to counter Iraqi cruise missiles. In misjudged that a military alert would provoke Bahrain, the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, or Saudi fact, the United States did not destroy a single Saddam rather than deter him. Arabia to scare off American port visits and land-based Iraqi antiship missile launcher transit operations. during the Gulf War, and the Iranians now Weighing U.S. Forces The Iranians could easily adopt suicide have many launch sites, storage areas, caves, Iran knows well from past warfare bombers to “swarm” naval warfare. As John shelters, and small hardened facilities for in the Gulf that it has to steer clear of Arquilla explains: their cruise missiles, which are difficult to American conventional forces. During the detect and attack.38 Iran could launch swarms Iran-Iraq war in April 1988, for example, The basic vision of this new kind of naval of cruise missiles to try to overwhelm the while the U.S. Navy was escorting merchant warfare consists of a swarm of small drone defenses of a targeted American warship. and tanker ships in the Gulf to protect them craft—something even smaller than a boat, from Iranian attacks, the Iranians laid a perhaps the size of a Jet Ski, but one chock-full Iran’s Style of Warfare minefield that struck an American ship of high explosives. Imagine a number of these These Iranian capabilities leveraged and wounded 10 Sailors. The United States remote-controlled craft coming at a traditional against American vulnerabilities would be ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 39 FORUM | Future Gulf War acute problems for American naval forces in doing distance themselves from the United 16 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, a future Gulf war. The U.S. military in 2002 States and give Tehran freer rein in the Gulf. If Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupa- conducted a war game that simulated large they are more confident of American security tion of Iraq (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 540. 17 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, numbers of small and fast Iranian vessels backing, they would balance against Iran The Generals’ War (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), attacking American ships in the Gulf with and increasingly turn to the United States for 269–271. machineguns and rockets. In the simulation, security protection because their militaries 18 Ibid., 281–282. the U.S. Navy lost 16 warships, to include are inadequate to the task of countering Iran 19 Knights, 130. an aircraft carrier, cruisers, and amphibious along the full spectrum of warfare. Washing- 20 Ibid., 131. vessels in battles that lasted 5 to 10 minutes.39 ton needs to encourage the Arab Gulf states 21 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: The lessons from this game have not gained to balance, but in doing so, it should focus less America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public much intellectual traction in a Pentagon and on building up their conventional military Affairs, 2008), 240. combatant command fully engaged in today’s capabilities and pay more attention to the 22 International Institute for Strategic Studies, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and against al Iranian threats stemming from unconven- “The GCC and Gulf Security: Still Looking to Qaeda. tional warfare. JFQ America,” Strategic Comments 11, no. 9 (November 2005). The Iranians more recently have given 23 Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 155. American forces a taste of their style of uncon- N o t es 24 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ventional warfare. Five Iranian Revolutionary The Military Balance, 2008 (London: Routledge, 1 Hassan M. Fattah, “Arab States, Wary of Iran, Guard patrol boats in January 2008 charged 2008), 242. Add to their Arsenals but Still Lean on the U.S.,” The a three-ship U.S. Navy convoy in the Strait of 25 Ibid., 260. New York Times, February 23, 2007. Hormuz, maneuvering around and between 26 Ibid., 237, 250, 257, 266. 2 Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Regional Military a destroyer, cruiser, and frigate during a 27 Ibid., 244. Balance,” in The United States and the Persian Gulf: 28 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Developing half-hour challenge. One Iranian boat came Reshaping Security Strategy for the Post-Containment Military Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for within 200 yards of an American ship and Era, ed. Richard D. Sokolsky (Washington, DC: 40 Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 9. almost drew fire. The United States needs to National Defense University Press, 2003), 76. 29 Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, guard against such Iranian harassment opera- 3 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: tions as a deception ploy. The Revolutionary “Iran and Its Neighbours: Reactions to Tehran’s The Threat to the Northern Gulf (Westport, CT: Guard might calculate that periodic challenge Nuclear Programme,” Strategic Comments 11, no. 6 Praeger Security International, 2007), 24. (August 2005). operations against warships will make the 30 Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, 4 Fattah. Americans grow accustomed to them and National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, 5 Walter Pincus, “A New Arms Race in the lower their guard, making the vessels more and Challenges (Westport, CT: Praeger Security Gulf?” The Washington Post, January 21, 2008, A13. vulnerable to real attacks. The Iranians might International, 2005), 54. 6 Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al- decide that catching a large American warship 31 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the unawares with a surprise attack would reap Wars, vol. 1 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security Interna- New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University huge strategic rewards. tional, 2007), 18. Press, 1993), 67. Despite the huge military expenditures 7 Ibid., 293. 32 John A. Tempone, “How Iran Attacks,” Marine and sophisticated Western armaments in 8 Michael Knights, Troubled Waters: Future U.S. Corps Gazette (January 2007), 59. their inventories, the Arab Gulf states are ill Security Assistance to the Persian Gulf (Washington, 33 Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare: Threat prepared to defend themselves in low-end DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), and Response in the Twenty-first Century (Cam- (insurgency and militia sponsorship) and 127. bridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 117. 9 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military high-end (ballistic missile, perhaps with 34 John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of nuclear warheads) scenarios against Iran. Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: Nebraska Press, 2002), 574. These inventories, moreover, are not likely to Ivan R. Dee, 2008), 78. 10 Simon Henderson, The New Pillar: Conserva- overcome Gulf Arab shortcomings for defend- 35 Cordesman and Kleiber, 113. tive Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy, Policy Paper 36 Ibid., 116–117. ing against asymmetric Iranian attacks. no. 58 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for 37 “Tehran Launches Second Sonar-Avoiding The United States, for its part, is moving to Near East Policy, 2003), 68. Light Sub,” Associated Press, November 29, 2007. strengthen Gulf Arab military capabilities in 11 Risa Brooks, “Civil-Military Relations in the 38 Cordesman and Kleiber, 125. conventional warfare while neglecting their Middle East,” in The Future Security Environment 39 Thom Shanker, “Iran Encounter Grimly capabilities to counter Iran’s most likely and in the Middle East, ed. Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Echoes ’02 War Games,” The New York Times, more capable forms of force. Byman (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 141–147. January 12, 2008. At the end of the day, the Arab Gulf 12 Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 217. 40 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 299. states will have to decide whether to balance 41 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances 14 Anthony H. Cordesman, Arab-Israeli Military or to bandwagon Iranian power in the Gulf. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21. Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Westport, CT: Put another way, nation-states may either Praeger Security International, 2006), 96. align against a stronger state or join it.41 If the 15 Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 129. Arab Gulf states grow uncertain of the U.S. commitment to their security, they could bandwagon and appease Iran—and in so
40 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu The State of Play in Russia’s Near Abroad
By P e t e r B . H u m p h r e y ight now, Russia is engaged in a grand face-saving gesture: having lost the Cold War in so dramatic a fashion, it is swapping dreams of global domination for dreams of Eurasian suzerainty. Key to this aspiration is rigorous control over the R activities, alliances, internal affairs, and attitudes of the (generally former Soviet) states on its periphery, and a new entrant: the Arctic Ocean. With World War II now woven into their being, Russians want to be able to defeat an invader on foreign (rather than Russian) terri- tory, in buffer states such as Mongolia and the Muslim/Slavic “near abroad”—thus, their over- whelming desire to coopt these lands and create a sort of peripheral suzerainty where all others Peter B. Humphrey is a Research Associate in must fear to tread. Attempts to control the next ring of former Warsaw Pact allies have been the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the abysmal, but that has not stopped Russia from trying; witness, for instance, the political capital National Defense University. expended to prevent Kosovo’s independence or to torpedo the proposed U.S. antiballistic missile
What is driving Russia is a desire to exorcise past humiliation and dominate its “near abroad.”
—Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, January 2009
Russian honor guard in Moscow U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 41 FORUM | The State of Play in Russia’s Near Abroad defense system in Poland and the Czech accession of these three republics, Russia grated Commonwealth of Independent States Republic. Highly reminiscent of America’s touched the Alliance only on the inhospitable air warning system. Only Belarus and Nicara- own Monroe Doctrine, Moscow is asserting Norwegian frontier. With these three new gua are sympathetic to the Abkhaz and South a privileged sphere of influence and expect- members now an ever-present thorn in its Ossetian independence declarations. ing the world to concur without objection. side, Russia has countered by making clear The European Union (EU) is exploring It is increasingly laying down markers and its willingness to militarize its anomalous, membership for Minsk, largely at the urging drawing red lines in the sand so border states isolated enclave at Kaliningrad. It is there that of former Warsaw Pact members (Poland and are constantly aware they can only go so far Russia promised to place a new missile force the Czech Republic) who would like to coopt before displeasing their neighbor. in the event of an antimissile emplacement the Red and White Russian consolidation. in nearby Poland. Finlandized almost to the Ever fearing that an accompanying measure Russia’s Periphery point of absorption, the White Russians make (post-Lukashenko) could be NATO integra- Finland. The nation that gave birth to common cause with the Red Russians in tion, Russia is standing firm against the EU the term used to describe neighborly strong- almost every endeavor. feelers with enticements of its own: largely arming (Finlandizing) lost a substantial slice Belarus. The possibility of a reintegra- frozen natural gas prices and much needed of territory (Karelia) in the aftermath of tion plebiscite has been raised more than loans (which Russia can ill afford) at a time World War II. It was expected to conduct its once—delayed only by the reality that the of economic disaster. By agreement and as affairs without reference to this territorial autocratic Alexander Lukashenko seems a provision of the Collective Security Treaty excision and avoid any Western military unwilling to exchange his current position Organization (CSTO), a large Russian force entanglements that might necessitate further as president for anything less than a top post will be stationed near the EU/NATO border.1 military intervention—a sort of forced neu- in a united republic—an offer that has never Russia subsidizes arms exports to fellow trality that had the advantage of often bridg- been forthcoming. His country’s military CSTO members such as Belarus.2 In his 2009 ing the interests of the Cold War duelists. integration with Russia probably exceeds all annual Intelligence Community threat assess- Considerably freer in its post-Soviet space, other post-Soviet states, and the two nations ment, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) the Scandinavian republic senses the new recently announced entry into a fully inte- Dennis Blair affirmed Belarusian willingness assertiveness of its neighbor and is pursuing its most substantial military budget increase in many years. Finlandized almost to the point of absorption, the White Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuania, Russians make common cause with the Red Russians in almost Estonia. Before the North Atlantic Treaty every endeavor Organization’s (NATO’s) uncomfortable
USS Annapolis surfaces in the Arctic Ocean U.S. Navy (Tiffini M. Jones)
42 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HUMPHREY to assist Russia in stifling U.S.–European Soviet Union. Upon independence in 1991, nya: through the instrumentality of the missile defense plans, but noted that “Russia’s Ukraine and Russia negotiated a division of brutal autocrat Ramzan Kadyrov, nationalist continuing efforts to control key Belarusian Black Sea naval assets, with the stipulation that Chechens appear to have been coopted at the economic sectors could prompt Minsk both fleets could share the extensive base at expense of their Islamist brethren. to improve ties with the West to balance Sevastopol at least until 2017. But Russia’s fleet Central Asian States: Kazakhstan, Moscow. Lukashenko maintains an authori- may be seeing its last decade in the Crimea. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and tarian grip on power and could return to Despite regular joint training exercises, rela- Uzbekistan. Characterized by highly person- repressive measures if public discontent over tions have deteriorated since the collapse of alized politics, weak institutions, and growing the worsening economy turns to protest.”3 the Soviet Union and partition of the navy. inequalities, Central Asia is ill equipped to Moldova. Russian “peacekeeping” forces When the lease expires in 2017, Kiev wants the deal with the challenges posed by violent in Moldova continue to be a major source of foreign navy out, but Russia wants to stay. Islamic extremism, poor economic develop- friction.4 As one of NATO’s Partners for Peace, Russia’s full subornment of Ukraine ment, and energy, water, and food distribu- Moldova clearly views its own accession as would allow access to Transnistria, which tion. For instance: inevitable. But Russian forces (2,800 strong) cannot now be realistically liberated or reinte- remain in the Russophile Transnistria region, grated without crossing Ukrainian territory. ■■ Energy helped make Kazakhstan a over which the republic has little control. Were Nonetheless, with the ever-present precedent regional economic force, but any sustained it not for the insulation of Ukraine, Transnistria of fully isolated Russian Kaliningrad, the decline in oil prices would affect revenues, would have gone the way of Georgia’s Abkhazia concept is not stillborn and would, in fact, could lead to societal discontent, and would and South Ossetia long ago. serve to surround the pugnacious Ukraine if it derail the momentum for domestic reforms. Ukraine. DNI Blair notes that Ukraine could be pulled off without Western military has moved toward democracy and Western intervention. integration despite numerous political tests The Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, and August 2008 saw Russian since independence: Azerbaijan. Blair notes that the continued forces crush the nationalist difficulty of bridging fundamental differ- attempt and go on to Progress will be difficult because of weak ences between Azerbaijan and Armenia over destroy lives and political institutions, ongoing conflicts with Nagorno-Karabakh will also keep tensions infrastructure in Georgia Russia over gas pricing and contracts and the high in the Caucasus: new exigencies of the global financial crisis, which has dramatically revealed the underly- Azerbaijan fears isolation in the wake of ■■ Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have heavily ing weaknesses of the Ukrainian economy and Kosovo’s independence, Russia’s recognition depended on migrant worker remittances potentially Ukraine’s stability.5 of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and signs from both Russia and Kazakhstan for a signifi- of improved Armenian-Turkish relations. cant portion of their gross domestic product— Ukraine is of two minds with respect Armenia is concerned about Baku’s military up to 45 percent in the case of Tajikistan—and to Russia, and the divide is omnipresent in buildup and does not want to become depen- will be severely affected by the financial crisis. multiple spheres of civic life. Ukrainians dent on Russia. Both countries face the dual Tajikistan, in particular, faces increased threats can be effusive in their love for their Slavic challenges of overcoming inertia in demo- to internal stability from the loss of these brethren, but few forget the Russian-imposed cratic reforms and battling endemic corrup- revenue streams. famine that killed millions of Ukrainians in tion in the face of an economic downturn.6 ■■ Such challenges to regional stability the 1920s, a psychic hard line that will take could threaten the security of critical U.S. and many more generations to overcome. The In the most festering sore and point of NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan republic is populated by minority Uniate conflict with the West, Russia’s longstand- through Central Asia. Catholics, who tend to look West, and the ing “peacekeepers” in Georgian Abkhazia majority Orthodox, who often look East. This and Georgian South Ossetia turned hostile The Central Asian states are beholden to grand societal divide can even be found in and were strongly reinforced in response to Russia for at least four reasons: the current government, where Viktor Yush- a Georgian attempt to reestablish its hold chenko hopes to continue the flight from over these constituent territories. August ■■ Allegiance to Russia-sponsored secu- Soviet suzerainty and Yulia Timoshenko 2008 saw Russian forces crush the national- rity organizations means discount arms and embraces a sort of cold pragmatism seeking ist attempt and go on to destroy lives and no pressure to reform any rampant autocratic to mollify Russia, stepping gingerly in any infrastructure in Georgia itself. By year’s tendencies. endeavor that might upset its cantankerous end, Russia pronounced the two territories ■■ Russia is assuaged sufficiently to neighbor—even at the expense of evolutions independent and announced its intent to temper any recent recidivist tendencies. that could ensure Ukraine’s security and build more bases, particularly in Abkhazia: ■■ The army of migrant labor (now global economic integration. The two will no an airbase in Gadaut and a resuscitation of helping Russia overcome its stark population doubt face off during the winter 2009–2010 the Soviet naval facility at Ochamchira to diminution) may face racist—even occasion- presidential election. accommodate the probable 2017 expulsion ally murderous—attacks, but the potential for The contentious presence of Russia’s of the Russian Black Sea fleet from Crimea’s mass expulsions seems off the table. Central Black Sea fleet is an artifact of the fall of the Sevastopol. There is better news in Chech- Asian economies could literally collapse ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 43 FORUM | The State of Play in Russia’s Near Abroad
under the weight of hundreds of thousands of Mongolia. Never a constituent Soviet Russia’s claim is so extensive that no sudden returnees who are no longer remand- republic, Mongolia (population 2.7 million) country would be willing to accept it, yet any ing earned income to their families back was nevertheless fully Finlandized and long reduction in the claim would entirely under- home. served as a buffer zone between the ambi- mine its raison d’etre. Russia’s latest Arctic ■■ Even with its strained economy, tious Russian and Chinese entities, despite policy paper states that: Russian financial largesse continues as a sort the large Mongolian population within China of soft power successor to Soviet military (4.5 million). (With the majority—over 60 ■■ the nation must complete geological control. In exchange for certain (occasionally percent—of Mongols living in China, this is studies to prove its claim to Arctic resources anti-Western) favors, Russia continues to indeed a curious geopolitical circumstance that and win international recognition of its Arctic provide regime-sustaining grants and loans. could be exploited by either side.) Imposition border Indeed, the global financial crisis provides of a Cyrillic writing system has endured, and ■■ the Arctic must become Russia’s “top an opportunity to expand its influence in even today’s free Mongolia rarely strays far strategic resource base” by 2020 adjacent nations that are faring even worse from the Russian party line. Centrifugal forces ■■ northern border guard fences must be than Russia itself. The Kremlin has shep- in a postcommunist China could double the strengthened herded a plan to buttress five cash-starved size of this nation. ■■ a new group of forces must be created former Soviet republics by establishing a The Arctic. Arctic expansion in antici- to “ensure military security under various largely Russian-funded $10 billion bailout pation of ice melt from global warming is military-political circumstances.”8 fund. This year Moscow proposed a separate taking the forms of: $2 billion in Kyrgyz economic aid to offset the $17.4 million that the United States pays ■■ producing and modernizing Russia’s latest Arctic policy to rent Afghan-critical Manas airbase (part icebreakers paper states that the Arctic of a far humbler $150 million aid package). It ■■ resuming submarine probes and long- must become Russia’s “top is all the more astonishing that Kyrgyzstan range trans-Arctic bomber patrols strategic resource base” by ■■ accepted an annual $60 million plus ancil- asserting bizarre and unsupportable 2020 lary contribution of over half that amount. territorial claims (uniformly rejected by the Analysts ponder why Russia signed off on United Nations) this or whether defiant Kyrgyz are risking ■■ stationing more researchers through- The driver behind this new addition an independent streak. If Russia assisted in out that realm, with new stations at Alexandra to the “near abroad” is resource lust for a a Kyrgyz plot to extort the United States, Land and at Svalbard and Spitsbergen, the disproportionate share of what is potentially the hand was perfectly played—and Russia latter challenging a well-recognized Norwe- a quarter of the world’s oil and gas. Pelagic subtly aids in the fight against Islamists on gian claim (some of these scientists report to fisheries, seabed minerals, and methane its periphery without spending a ruble. Russian intelligence7). clathrates may also prove interesting. Russia
Russian Peacekeeping Presence in Transnistria
Ukraine U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley)
Russophile Moldova Transnistria Region
Romania
black sea
Chairman meets General Nikolai Makarov, chief of the Russian armed forces, in Moscow
44 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HUMPHREY already envisions a time (before 20309) when folks are free to move elsewhere, and the every year. If we don’t get them, we can forget exploitation of its vast reserves will dimin- market forces that drive labor requirements about economic growth.” Consequently, ish due to tired infrastructure and the poor often mean that a legal or illegal Chinese Russia has its own illegal immigration climate for foreign investment (which might immigrant will have to do. With an ethnic problem from former Soviet constituent otherwise have rejuvenated same). Selected negative birthrate approaching a million republics (overwhelmingly Muslim states plus offshore reservoirs may offer a fresh start, not- per year, Russia is being overwhelmed by the Christian Caucasus). This is not the labor withstanding brutal development and trans- typically high Muslim birthrates around its force Putin has in mind. The agenda here is portation costs. Pumping directly to Europe- periphery—a shadow looming ever larger and more Russians, not more Russian nationals. or Japan-bound tankers in an ice-free Arctic increasingly viewed as a Fifth Column. Russia realizes that time is not on its side could cut costs considerably. Even terrestrial Russia’s national fertility rate is 1.28 chil- and is trying to stake its Lebensraum claim reserves will fall prey to domestic consump- dren per woman, far below what is needed to now before things get any worse. These are tion eventually, crippling lucrative exports. maintain the country’s population of nearly 143 Shakeresque trends that really could finish In grabbing the Arctic, Russia makes clear its million. With a death rate 50 percent greater intent to survive as a purveyor of raw materi- than its birth rate, Russia’s population is falling Shakeresque trends really als rather than a technological powerhouse by 700,000 or more per year. It reached 145 could finish off Russia—and such as Japan or Germany. No nation has ever million in 2002 and will dip to 100 million in achieved superpower status via this route. 2050. Not so for Muslim populations—Russia’s Russians know it The Rest. Russia borders North Korea for army (a young cohort) is already almost half a mere 24 kilometers (km), but that tiny portal Muslim, and by 2020 Muslims will comprise off Russia—and Russians know it. But their may have significance soon. Reports noting one-fifth of the nation’s population. With reversal requires exceedingly difficult social the ill health of Kim Jong-il illuminate the pos- ethnic Russians now over 80 percent of the engineering. This is a stunningly complex sibility of chaos—even regime change—in the population, Russia may be only two-thirds problem to solve, and even a phenomenally near term. China’s demonstrated willingness to “Russian” in 20 years. At this rate, a Muslim successful intervention would take a decade— repatriate the steady stream of defectors who majority is possible by 2050.11 if not a whole generation. Here, then, is the have made their way north does not bode well Vladimir Putin was blunt when he source of a justifiable paranoia that seeks to for an overnight wave numbering hundreds of stated, “Russia needs a million new workers secure the margins before it is too late. thousands—and the Russia portal may be the only escape route available. China is completely Arctic Ocean Borders unprepared for this human deluge and Russia even less so. Its unrelenting bravado with respect to NATO notwithstanding, Russia’s most probable long-term adversary is the overpopulated one- party state to the south, China. Russia touches China along a mountainous 36-km border running between Kazakhstan and Mongolia, but the remote frontier has not been a source of contention since the 1880s. That cannot be said for the Russian Far East, with its centuries of historical claims, counterclaims, unresolved border disputes, and actual shooting in the 1960s. The ongoing depopulation of northern and eastern Russian territories leaves a labor shortage that may intentionally or otherwise be filled by legal or illegal Chinese—a trend that does not bode well for long-term sovereignty over the area. Indeed, Beijing has quietly encouraged Chinese immigration across its border with Russia since the Soviet breakup.10
Russian Demographics Russia is facing a demographic disaster that can help account for recent assertive- ness with respect to its near abroad. With no incentives to help build socialism in the tundra, Siberia is depopulating. The end of communist residence permits means sane ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 45 FORUM | The State of Play in Russia’s Near Abroad
Issues for the West long ago mastered the art of creating crises N o t es Economic Domination by a Failing that only it can alleviate (in exchange for State Assures Failure. Russia is no economic concessions). 1 “Belarus: Moscow Tightens Its Grip,” February powerhouse, and the degree to which it is able Arctic Gluttony. Russia’s bizarre claim 26, 2009, available at
46 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu SORT-ing Out START Options for U.S.-Russian
Strategic Arms Reductions By s T e p h e n J . C i m b a l a
merican and Russian presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev have com- A mitted their administrations to progress on strategic nuclear arms limitation. AP Images (Anatoly Maltsev) A new agreement to replace the existing Stra- tegic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) was drafted in July 2009 and may be ready for U.S. Senate ratification prior to the expiration of the treaty in December.1 The favorable politi- cal winds on nuclear arms control between Washington and Moscow might open the door to further accomplishments in their agenda of shared security concerns. These possible areas of convergent interests include Afghanistan, Iran, and nonproliferation. But nuclear arms control is more than a technical exercise. Embedded in the con- struction and negotiation of arms pacts are issues related to post–Cold War geopolitics, including North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion (NATO) enlargement, U.S. missile defenses deployed in Europe, and Russian military doctrine and reform. This article considers various options for U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear arms reductions within this larger politico-military context and offers provisional but timely assessment of pros- pects for success.
Reset START and Other Issues. The Obama administration has indicated that it wants to “reset” the button on U.S. relations with Russia, in contrast with the upsurge of politi- cal disputes that characterized the latter years of the George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin presidencies.2 The U.S. intention to move Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and President Obama are committed to progress on strategic nuclear arms limitation Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University–Brandywine. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 47 FORUM | Options for U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions forward on Russia is a positive note for inter- rizes the START-accountable launchers and are both political and military. The military national relations. But the disagreements that weapons for both the United States and Russia objective of stable deterrence is also a political characterized U.S. relations with Russia under as of January 1, 2009. objective: to create a U.S.-Russian security Bush and Putin are not merely matters of Agreement on a post-START and post- space in which Russia is recognized as a tone. Instead, those areas of disagreement will SORT bilateral arms agreement is related to coequal nuclear partner and, with the United carry forward into the Medvedev and Obama other important U.S. and Russian foreign States, as occupying a singular tier in the hier- presidencies because they involve serious policy objectives. Success or failure in nuclear archy of nuclear weapons states. and substantive political and geostrategic arms control is also connected to broader Moscow needs this perception of differences.3 issues that mark diplomatic and military fault its essential strategic nuclear parity with One area of possible and urgent security lines, as between America and Russia. These Washington to provide a foundation for the cooperation between Russia and the United issues include: remainder of its policies in Europe and Asia. States is the decision to either continue or Russia’s conventional military forces are only replace the START I nuclear arms treaty, ■■ NATO relations with Russia now being rebuilt from the locust years of the signed in 1991 and set to expire in December ■■ Russian cooperation with the United 1990s, but they are decades and many rubles 2009. In part, START has been superseded States and NATO over Afghanistan and Iraq away from being world class—or even NATO by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ■■ U.S.-Russian leadership as an essential class. Nuclear weapons are Russia’s tickets of (SORT) of May 2002, an agreement between constituent of a viable global nuclear nonpro- entry into the geostrategic debates of the 21st the Bush and Putin administrations. SORT liferation regime century. And those debates involve the very requires each state to reduce its operationally ■■ U.S. plans under Bush, now apparently definition of Russia’s strategic perimeter and deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 2,200 to under review by Obama, to deploy elements of surrounding security spaces well into the 1,700 warheads by the end of 2012.4 However, the American global missile defense system in remainder of the present century. SORT provides for none of the monitoring Poland and in the Czech Republic. The View from Russia. For example, and verification protocols so characteristic Russia is faced with a NATO expanded far of Cold War–era U.S.-Soviet arms control It would be impossible to do justice to beyond its Cold War boundaries. NATO’s agreements. In fact, SORT has piggybacked each of these issues in a single article, but their membership was expanded to 28 in April on the START protocols in this regard, but connection to the progress or lack thereof in 2009 with the addition of Croatia and the expiration of START would leave SORT nuclear arms control is important to appreci- Albania. Although these two additions pose a verification-free radical. The table summa- ate. Russia’s objectives in restarting START no particular threat to the Kremlin, interest
Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty inspection team leaves Vandenberg Air Force Base after inspections U.S. Air Force (Stephanie Longoria) U.S. Air Force
48 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA
Table. START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons on the part of Georgia and Ukraine is another matter. Russia’s war with Georgia in August (as of January 1, 2009) 2008 was not only a prompt response to alleged Georgian attacks on South Ossetia. UNITED STATES Moscow was also motivated by its concerns about eventual Georgian membership in Weapon Launchers/warheads per launcher Total warheads NATO. The Alliance had stated its clear intent to offer eventual membership to Georgia and Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Ukraine as recently as 2008. However, NATO Minuteman III 550* 1,250 has held back from an actual offer of any Membership Action Plan for either country Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) due to Moscow’s sensitivities. Russia also fears Trident I 96/6 576 interest on the part of previously nonaligned states in Europe in obtaining membership, Trident II 336/8 2,688 including Sweden and Finland. In the latter Heavy bombers case, NATO’s military guarantee would be extended to within a stone’s throw of St. B–1 56/1 56 Petersburg—breathing down Russia’s neck.5 B–2 19/1 19
B–52 air-launched cruise 141/7 987 the military objective of stable missiles deterrence is to create a U.S. Total 1,198 5,576 security space in which Russia is recognized as a coequal nuclear partner and, with the RUSSIA United States, as occupying a singular tier in the hierarchy of Weapon Launchers/warheads per launcher Total warheads nuclear weapons states ICBMs
SS–25 180/1 180 NATO enlargement is tied directly to the issue of U.S. missile defenses deployed Topol-M/SS–27 (mobile) 15/1 15 in Eastern Europe in two ways. First, the Topol-M/SS–27 (silo) 50/1 50 proposed radars for the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland would increase SS–19 120/6 720 the direct U.S. military presence in former SS–18 104/10 1,040 Soviet security space. Second, the European missile defenses are a cause for concern on the SLBMs part of Russian political and military leaders SS–N–18 96/3 288 and other security experts. Although justi- fied by the United States as necessary to deter SS–N–20 40/10 400 an Iranian missile attack against European SS–N–23 96/4 384 or American vital interests, that rationale is disputed on the grounds that the U.S. Euro- RSM–56 (Bulava)** 36/6 216 pean-based ballistic missile defenses (BMD) Heavy Bombers could threaten the viability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The argument by pessimists is not Blackjack 14/8 112 that the present small number of proposed Bear 63/8 504 interceptors and radars would do so, but that the system could be expanded to include Russia Total 815 3,909 many more BMD interceptors and radars, or even paired with offensive missiles for nuclear Source: U.S. Department of State, “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” fact sheet, April 1, 2009, available at
They are looking at shrinking their conven- tional force by several hundred thousand. They are cutting a significant—perhaps as many as 200,000 or more officer billets. So I think that—and [Medvedev] is talking about—my impression of what he was talking about was a Russian military that is more expeditionary, and not so focused as in the past on taking on NATO.6
Without endorsing the immediate past or present Russian perspectives on missile defenses or NATO enlargement, U.S. officials must take them into account to make progress on a new START agreement.
the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union removed some of the disincentives for independent nuclear forces
As Stephen J. Blank has noted, trends in the U.S.-Russian security relationship, includ- ing their nuclear arms negotiations, have profound effects on the entire international order.7 Nuclear Arms Reductions, Prolifera- tion, and Geopolitics. The outward reverbera- tions from Russian-American nuclear arms control are especially pertinent to the larger issue of nuclear nonproliferation. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union removed some of the disincentives for independent nuclear forces that existed from the dawn of the nuclear age until 1991. Secretary of Defense In addition, the post–Cold War international views ground-based systemic shift in the balance of military interceptor missile silo power, in favor of the United States and its at Fort Greely, Alaska U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force prevalence in information-led conventional
50 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA warfare, has generated both new incentives for The Bush administration, despite many shortcomings in its command, control, com- nuclear weapons spread and new options for differences of political philosophy with its munications, equipment, training, and other restraining proliferation. immediate predecessor, embraced with equal aspects of its preparedness for either military On the incentive side, states with aspi- enthusiasm a robust concept of promoting the peace operations or war. Moscow’s recogni- rations for regional hegemony or grudges spread of democracy. After 9/11, this ideologi- tion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the against neighbors may seek weapons of cal emphasis was combined with a willingness aftermath of its dustup with Georgia was an mass destruction, including nuclear ones, in to use the hard edges of military power to explicit reminder to NATO of its own decision order to deter or deny access to American support it, including preemptive or preventive to liberate Kosovo from Serbia. But this diplo- expeditionary forces that might otherwise be war. The invasion of Afghanistan to topple matic move also signaled Russia’s frustration inclined to intervene in their neighborhood. with its limited capability for power projec- On the disincentives side of the equation, encirclement by democracies tion and with the Alliance’s boardinghouse new technologies might provide for limited reach into the vitals of its security space. defenses against light nuclear attacks, or for in its near abroad combines Nevertheless, NATO has options that conventional and nuclear global strike capa- with Russia’s relative might provide a modus vivendi for improved bilities to preempt aggression with nuclear weakness, compared to NATO, security cooperation, such as offering mem- or other weapons of mass destruction. For to reduce its ability to project bership to Russia. This option, diplomati- example, the Bush administration deployed military power beyond its cally unthinkable for many Russians and missile defenses and defined a “new triad” borders some Alliance members in the immediate that included conventional and nuclear deep post–Cold War years, now lays claim to a strike, ballistic missile defenses, and improved lower “giggle factor” among serious ana- national defense infrastructure. the Taliban was followed by the overthrow of lysts and policymakers. Pushing NATO’s Russia, on account of its economic and the Saddam Hussein regime. Forcible regime eastward and Caucasian borders farther military stagnation, has not been able to match change in Iraq was opposed by Russia as well and farther makes the line between what the United States in capabilities for long-range as some European allies of the United States, is NATO’s business and what is Russia’s precision strike, command, control, communi- but it proceeded anyway with a “coalition of business more urgent to determine and will cations, computers, intelligence, surveillance, the willing.” As well, the Bush administration require cooperation and partnership. There targeting, reconnaissance, stealth, and other continued the post–Cold War expansion of exists no demilitarized buffer zone between accessories of the information age. Although NATO until it totaled 26 member states, with NATO and Russia—neither a political nor plans are in train for the modernization and others waiting in the wings. military nor economic no man’s land. If reform of conventional forces, including an What Russia feared was not the pos- Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, the increase in the number of contract troops sibility of military invasion or conquest, as preceding point about the absence of buffer and the downsizing of a bloated officer corps, was on the table during the world wars of the zones is even more emphatically true. There nuclear weapons will continue as the symbols 20th century. The objectives of NATO and the is no longer an “Eastern” as opposed to a and substance of Russian military respect United States were not the military occupa- “Western” Europe, but only a trans-Europa abroad. For this and other reasons, Russia’s tion of Russia, but the democratization of that is inclusive from Lisbon to the Ural leaders might be more ambivalent about prolif- Russia as a path to its reliable membership Mountains, including southern Europe and eration than their American counterparts.8 in a pacified European and Central Eurasian parts of trans-Caucasus. Oddly enough, the perspectives of security space. A strong Russia with a growing Even without Ukrainian membership in the Russian political leadership during the market economy and democratic polity was, NATO, history is headed toward the creation presidential years of Vladimir Putin were in in the American and NATO view, a potential of a Eurasian security community that should synch with those of the Bush administration. stabilizer and security partner. include Russia. This favorable-for-security The issue with nuclear weapons spread was NATO and Russia: Thinking Out of the development can be delayed, but not denied, not so much the “what” of additional nuclear Box? NATO enlargement, missile defenses, unless states are foolish enough to allow weapons states, but the “who” of their identity. and other security developments that threaten hypernationalism, militarism, or ideology to For Washington, rogue states or others who Russia’s current version of managed or sover- compromise their decisionmaking—which, might leak clandestine nukes to terrorists eign democracy are thus components of a geo- as the historical record shows all too clearly, were to be kept below the nuclear threshold. strategic threat—as seen from the Kremlin. they frequently do. A transcontinental Euro- For Moscow, the concern was to keep NATO Therefore, the Rose and Orange revolutions pean security space with Russia in NATO and U.S. military power from the doorstep in Georgia and Ukraine shook windows in is not a necessary condition for progress in of Russia because American conventional Red Square, especially when Russian efforts to U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control, which is deep strike might be used to attack its nuclear delay or defeat those democratic movements a matter of current importance and urgency deterrent. In addition, certain countries in came to naught. Encirclement by democra- regardless of the larger political outcome of the former Soviet security space, especially cies in its near abroad combines with Russia’s NATO and Russian high politics. But leaders in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, must relative weakness, compared to NATO, to could do worse than provide a vision that be denied any political resources, military reduce its ability to project military power inspires arms negotiations with the expecta- capabilities, or alliances that would pose a beyond its borders. Russia’s war with Georgia tion that neither excessive numbers of nuclear fundamental threat. from August 8 to 12, 2008, revealed serious weapons nor recidivism in Cold War policies ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 51 FORUM | Options for U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions will hold back the migration of Europe into a For Russia, the alternative force struc- gests that their illustrative monad would be a non–zero-sum definition of its security chal- tures analyzed here are: force composed entirely of ICBMs. lenges and into increased military cooperation Why bother to illustrate these hypo- across national borders. ■■ a balanced triad thetical alternatives if, by all indications, both History is not deterministic, however, ■■ a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs Russia and the United States are presently and leaders must resolve upon taking the ■■ a dyad of ICBMs and bombers committed to a triad of nuclear-capable incremental decisions that cumulate to ■■ a force composed entirely of ICBMs. delivery systems? The benefits of looking at preferred, as opposed to dysfunctional, alternative mixes of launch systems are at least security outcomes. This implies getting Examination of the performance of twofold. First, it may turn out that triads are meaningful reductions in U.S. and Russian different mixes of launch systems for each redundant for the accomplishment of retalia- strategic nuclear forces and connecting that state also permits us to test the significance of tory missions under some conditions. Second, accomplishment to successful leadership “conventionalization” of one or more legs of alternative mixes of launch systems provide by Moscow and Washington in nuclear the American or Russian nuclear triad. One a perspective on the question of distributing nonproliferation. of the disputes about probable counting rules conventional and nuclear forces together. for a follow-on START, as suggested earlier, is Present diplomacy suggests that one side (the Methodology the Russian concern over U.S. plans to equip United States) considers conventionalization Forces and Weapons. In this section, some formerly authorized nuclear launch of some launch platforms as an opportunity, we develop hypothetical, but not unrealistic, systems with conventional warheads. The idea while the other side (Russia) regards commin- SORT-compliant and smaller forces for the of global strike, as provided for in Bush policy gling of conventional and nuclear weapons as United States and Russia going forward.9 guidance, included a mix of long-range con- a danger. Both perspectives may be right or Each state is assigned a larger force with an ventional and nuclear weapons. U.S. planners wrong—much depends on the political condi- upper limit of 1,700 operationally deployed saw this as increasing flexibility for distant tions leading up to a crisis in which the threat warheads, or the lower end of the maximum attacks on time-urgent targets without reliance of first strike, by conventional or nuclear SORT-compliant range. In addition, each on only a nuclear option. weapons, would be imminent. is also assigned a smaller force of 1,000 deployed warheads. These forces will be Russia regarded the mixing of conventional and nuclear strike tested for their second strike capability under four conditions of alertness and launch options on the same launch systems as potentially provocative doctrine: Russia, on the other hand, regarded If Russia’s budget problems preclude ■■ forces are on generated, or ready, alert the mixing of conventional and nuclear modernization of all three parts of its long- and launched on warning of attack strike options on the same launch systems as range nuclear triad, it might be receptive to ■■ forces are on generated alert and potentially provocative of crisis instability. a two-sided and verified conventionalization launched after riding out a first strike How would Russia know whether a missile of one type of launcher for each state. Thus, ■■ forces are on day-to-day alert and are flying over or near its state territory, or that for example, the United States might choose launched on warning of an ally, was carrying a conventional or to conventionalize weapons deployed on its ■■ forces are on day-to-day alert and are nuclear warhead? Russia might assume the land-based missiles. Russia might then opt to riding out the attack. worst and respond to a conventional first equip its SLBMs with conventional warheads strike with a “retaliatory” nuclear launch on only. Each state would retain two types of In general, these conditions constitute a loss warning. launchers equipped exclusively with nuclear of strength gradient as we move from the In effect, the alternative force structures weapons. Such an arrangement would be first condition to the fourth above, but there provide a glimpse of what would happen to easier to monitor or verify than a more com- are exceptional cases. Much depends on the each state’s retaliatory capabilities, at higher plicated structure in which nuclear and non- mix of launchers used, as discussed below. and lower levels of weapons deployment, if one nuclear weapons were mixed within a given The model also allows us to test for or more components of the triad of land-based type of launcher, whether land- or sea-based the viability of different mixes of delivery missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers were missiles or bombers. systems, or launchers, for each state. For the eliminated. Pertinent force structures for each Another possibility is that both the United States, the alternative force struc- state reflect their military doctrinal proclivi- United States and Russia could retire their long- tures include: ties and past practices. For example, the U.S. range bomber forces from nuclear missions and illustration for a “monad,” or single type of equip them with conventional weapons only. ■■ a balanced triad of intercontinental nuclear launcher, is the SLBM fired from the Bombers have some advantage for crisis man- ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine- fleet ballistic missile submarine. In that illustra- agement compared to missiles since they can launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and tion, other types of launchers can be assumed be recalled after launch, and this was probably a bomber-delivered weapons to have been equipped with conventional war- meaningful asset during the tension of the high ■■ a dyad of SLBMs and bombers heads if deployed or else not deployed at all. In Cold War. However, in the present century with ■■ a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs the Russian case, the emphasis on land-based a declaredly nonhostile relationship between ■■ a force composed entirely of SLBMs. missiles, compared to SLBMs or bombers, sug- the United States and Russia, the ability to recall
52 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA bombers after launch may be less important performance parameters, but growing numbers prompt strikes against time-urgent targets. In a than other variables. The Russian bomber force of conventional missions for the long-range protracted nuclear war of the kind some envi- has deteriorated markedly from the Soviet days, bomber force compete with nuclear tasking. sioned during the Cold War, bombers offered and most of it would probably be destroyed Finally, the command and control of nuclear a residual “postattack” force for bargaining for on the ground by a U.S. first or second strike. bomber forces is complicated, and slow-flying war termination. However, this type of nuclear The U.S. bomber force is state of the art in bombers cannot compete with missiles for war is inconceivable nowadays, even to the
Figure 1. U.S.-Russia Total Strategic Weapons Deployed (1,700 limit)
TotalTotal StrategicStrategic WeaponsWeapons
United States Russia
Balanced Triad No ICBMs No Bombers SLBMs Only Balanced Triad No Bombers No SLBMs ICBMs Only ICBM 300 0 300 0 680 1,180 880 1,680 SLBM 980 1,078 1,372 1,568 480 504 0 0 AIR 416 616 0 0 534 0 820 0
Key: ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile; AIR: aircraft
Figure 2. U.S.-Russia Retaliatory Weapons (1,700 limit)
Arriving Retaliatory WeaponsWeapons
DAY, ROA
DAY, LOW United States Russia
GEN, ROA
GEN, LOW
Balanced No ICBMs No Bombers SLBMs Only Balanced No Bombers No SLBMs ICBMs Only Triad Triad
Balanced Triad No ICBMs No Bombers SLBMs Only Balanced Triad No Bombers No SLBMs ICBMs Only GEN, LOW 1,367 1,322 1,381 1,270 1,390 1,470 1,390 1,512 GEN, ROA 1,124 1,322 1,138 1,270 880 757 758 556 DAY, LOW 802 585 1,015 851 690 1,144 792 1,512 DAY, ROA 559 585 772 851 100 147 79 151
Key: ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile; GEN: generation stability; LOW: launched on warning; ROA: riding out the attack; DAY: day-to-day alert
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 53 FORUM | Options for U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions more energetic planners on the Russian and provides for more surviving and retaliating tions of operational readiness and launch doc- American general staffs. warheads than does the traditional triad. trine and for all of its force structures. Russia Would reducing the maximum limit can respond to a nuclear first strike with Analysis on weapons deployments from 1,700 to 1,000 several hundred retaliating warheads, under all U.S.-Russian Reductions. The preced- warheads change the viability of the U.S. or conditions of alertness and launch protocols, ing conditions having been explained, we Russian strategic nuclear deterrent? Some and regardless of its force structures—with now proceed to the actual data analysis. American and even some Russian pessimists the singular exception of the “day-to-day alert, Figure 1 summarizes the total strategic have expressed concerns to this effect, espe- riding out the attack” condition. However, weapons deployed under a limit of 1,700 by cially about Russia’s viability going forward Russia is unlikely to be caught in this condi- the United States and Russia in a hypotheti- if modernization lags.10 Figure 3 summarizes tion of relatively lowest readiness for an attack cal post-START and post-SORT agreement. during any crisis that would precede a nuclear Figure 2 summarizes the numbers of retalia- the United States can under all war. It would more likely be at maximum tory warheads for each state following a first readiness (generated alert and launched on strike by the other side. conditions of alertness launch warning) or on generated alert and riding out The outcomes in figure 2 show that a many hundreds of weapons, the attack, which is the U.S. declared but not post-START limit of 1,700 on the numbers of permitting retaliatory strikes necessarily operational posture. operationally deployed warheads allows each against value as well as Pessimists might conjure scenarios in state a considerable second strike capability. counterforce targets which the United States struck Russia with The United States can under all conditions of a “bolt from the blue” and caught its forces alertness launch many hundreds of weapons, in the lowest level of preparedness. But even permitting retaliatory strikes against value the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons then, Russia would provide for many tens of as well as counterforce targets. Russia can do deployed by Russia and the United States warheads striking American and/or European likewise, although its capabilities in the worst under a post-SORT and post-START limit of cities under the worst of conditions. condition of prewar readiness (day-to-day 1,000 operationally deployed warheads. Nuclear force exchange modeling alert and riding out the attack) are consider- Figure 4 summarizes the numbers of during the Cold War was arguably a stilted ably less than those of the United States in retaliatory warheads for Russia and the United art form—frequently devoid of political similar conditions. Nevertheless, Russia States under the various operational condi- common sense. In political reality, the United can retaliate with at least 100 surviving and tions that also obtained in figure 2. It shows States would never consider it a “victory” arriving warheads in three of its four force that, under a maximum of 1,000 deployed or “success” if a nuclear war destroyed the structures, even under the worst case for the weapons for each state, the United States can capitals and other major cities of its European defender. Interestingly, under some condi- provide for several hundred surviving and (or other) allies, even if the force-on-target tions for each state, a dyad or even a monad arriving retaliatory weapons under all condi- outcomes were less devastating for North
Figure 3. U.S.-Russia Total Strategic Weapons Deployed (1,000 limit)
Total Strategic Weapons
AIR
United States Russia SLBM
ICBM
Balanced Triad No ICBMs No Bombers SLBMs Only Balanced Triad No Bombers No SLBMs ICBMs Only
Balanced Triad No ICBMs No Bombers SLBMs Only Balanced Triad No Bombers No SLBMs ICBMs Only ICBM 300 0 300 0 440 530 470 980 SLBM 392 686 686 980 264 456 0 0 AIR 308 314 0 0 288 0 530 0
Key: ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile; AIR: aircraft
54 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA
America than they proved for Russia. tions can be connected to a viable model of sion, we will assume that the challenges of European and therefore Western civiliza- nonproliferation. reliable monitoring and verification for these tion cannot be divided into partial plates Proliferation. In figure 5, we establish a numbers have been surmounted, although and survive. When Franklin Roosevelt and model of a constrained nuclear nonprolifera- the “real world” problems in this regard are Winston Churchill were singing hymns tion regime. In this model, nuclear weapons compelling.11 together in Placentia Bay in 1941 aboard a spread is limited to the currently acknowl- Figure 5 also summarizes the total British warship, they were affirming this fun- edged or de facto eight nuclear weapons states numbers of deployed nuclear weapons damental truth. In addition, a deconstructed (with the exception of North Korea, whose assigned to each state in the model. These Russia would uncork chaos in Central status is a work in progress). The assumption assignments are made in generic categories: Eurasia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. is that Iran establishes a complete nuclear fuel detailed specifications of weapons and per- Figure 4 tells of history, politics, war, cycle but, under international supervision, formance parameters would be impossible common sense, and civilization. A post- agrees not to become a nuclear weapons state. and unnecessary. For example, weapons START and post-SORT arms reduction North Korea’s existing nuclear weapons and deployed on missiles or bombers of less agreement with an upper bound of 1,000 infrastructure are verifiably dismantled, in than intercontinental range might not be deployed strategic nuclear weapons would return for economic and diplomatic emolu- considered by the Americans and Russians suffice to provide for deterrence. More ments negotiated with its five interlocutors as “strategic” for their purposes (capable of important, it would provide for additional on nuclear disarmament (South Korea, inflicting unacceptable, and potentially deci- reassurance, as between Washington and Japan, Russia, China, and the United States). sive, effects). But for other nuclear weapons Moscow, permitting them to get on with The remaining nuclear powers are assigned states, actual or potential enemies do not other mutually beneficial agendas, including ranks and maximum numbers of deployed require weapons capable of covering such the agenda of nonproliferation. The common nuclear weapons on various mixes of launch- immense distances. Strategic threats can interest of the United States and Russia is to ers, depending on national capabilities and be posed to one another by states that share move forward with this win-win agenda of proclivities. Tier 1 nuclear weapons states a common border or live within a regional controlling the spread of nuclear weapons include Russia and the United States, with neighborhood: India and Pakistan, China before it becomes a lose-lose for them and a maximum of 1,000 deployed warheads and India, and China and Pakistan offer for the entire nonproliferation regime. The each. Tier 2 states, limited to 500 deployed cases in point. In addition, China and Russia, surety of stable deterrence as between the warheads each, include China, France, and although both possess intercontinental deliv- two nuclear giants is the first step. The next the United Kingdom. Tier 3 states, limited ery systems for nuclear weapons, could inflict step is to assess whether the more ambitious to 300 warheads, include India, Israel, and serious damage on one another with strikes of the two preceding nuclear force reduc- Pakistan. For purposes of the present discus- of shorter ranges.
Figure 4. U.S.-Russia Retaliatory Weapons (1,000 limit)
Arriving Retaliatory Weapons
DAY, ROA
DAY, LOW United States Russia
GEN, ROA
GEN, LOW
Balanced No ICBMs No Bombers SLBMs Only Balanced No Bombers No SLBMs ICBMs Only Triad Triad
Balanced Triad No ICBMs No Bombers SLBMs Only Balanced Triad No Bombers No SLBMs ICBMs Only GEN, LOW 812 785 826 794 820 846 809 882 GEN, ROA 569 785 583 794 504 458 469 210 DAY, LOW 483 372 642 532 439 551 423 882 DAY, ROA 240 372 399 532 61 85 42 88
Key: ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile; GEN: generation stability; LOW: launched on warning; ROA: riding out the attack; DAY: day-to-day alert ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 55 FORUM | Options for U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions
Figure 6 shows the numbers of surviving suppose. In the “generated alert, launched each can deliver enough retaliatory attacks to and retaliating warheads for each state after a on warning” or “generated alert, riding out inflict unacceptable damage by any historical notional first strike against its nuclear retalia- the attack” postures, all states can provide for precedent or standard of human decency. tory forces. As one might expect, the larger over 100 second strike retaliatory weapons. What do these figures show? Simply deployed forces offer more survivable retalia- Outcomes are less favorable for the smaller put, just as there exists a lot of potential for tory power than do the smaller ones. But the powers under both conditions of day-to-day ruin, so, too, there is a great deal of stability difference is not as meaningful as one might or normal peacetime alert. But even then, in nuclear weapons. The larger forces offer
Figure 5. Total Strategic Weapons: Constrained Proliferation Model
Total Strategic Weapons
AIR
SLBM
ICBM
Russian U.S. PRC forces Israeli forces UK forces Indian forces Pakistani French forces forces forces forces
U.S. Russian forces PRC forces Israeli forces UK forces Indian forces Pakistani forces French forces forces ICBM 400 100 204 100 0 142 144 0 SLBM 288 624 96 32 288 32 0 288 AIR 312 276 200 168 212 126 156 212
Key: ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile; AIR: aircraft
Figure 6. Retaliatory Weapons: Constrained Proliferation Model
Arriving Retaliatory Weapons
DAY, ROA
DAY, LOW
GEN, ROA
GEN, LOW
Russian U.S. PRC Israeli UK forces Indian Pakistani French forces forces forces forces forces forces forces
U.S. Russian forces PRC forces Israeli forces UK forces Indian forces Pakistani forces French forces forces GEN, LOW 821 797 407 238 388 233 243 388 GEN, ROA 497 716 242 157 388 129 127 388 DAY, LOW 516 429 236 107 47 120 130 47 DAY, ROA 192 348 70 26 23 14 13 23
Key: GEN: generation stability; LOW: launched on warning; ROA: riding out the attack; DAY: day-to-day alert
56 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA more redundancy than the smaller forces, launchers or delivery systems, and the mix Beyond the Numbers. Even more and this provides some additional measure of launch systems deployed by each state, are important than the operational performance of assurance in a crisis. However, smaller important contributors to the state’s degree of attributes of weapons systems, significant forces are not necessarily less crisis-stable crisis stability. Submarine-launched weapons as they are, are the psychological messages than larger ones under all conditions. Much offer greater prelaunch survivability, and they convey relative to military deterrence, would be scenario dependent: who is attack- therefore increased crisis stability, compared coercion, or reassurance. Think of the sizes ing whom? Both smaller and larger forces to land-based missiles and bomber-delivered and attributes of nuclear forces as an “influ- can be used for provocation, for coercion, weapons. At least this was the assumption ence operation” (in military jargon) or as for deterrence, or for reassurance. Nor does during the protracted U.S.-Soviet confronta- an exercise in nonmessage diplomacy or the model take into account the impact tion of the Cold War years. However, SLBMs military persuasion. Nuclear weapons have, of alliances—pre- and postattack. If, for as persuaders, an oxymoronic mission; they example, Russia were to attack Britain or larger deployed forces offer must convince other states that, under some France, this would automatically involve a more survivable retaliatory exigent conditions of attack or threat, they war against the United States. On the other will be used. On the other hand, other states hand, the role of other states would be more power than smaller ones must have confidence that this decision for ambiguous if China launched a nuclear first nuclear first use or first strike (tactical versus strike against Russia or vice versa. America, can also be used as first strike weapons; at strategic) will not be taken hastily. And that Britain, and France would support Israel if least, American SLBMs have significant hard- decision should certainly not be driven into Israel were subjected to a nuclear first strike target kill capabilities. Moreover, bombers, at a cul-de-sac by deployments that restrict by Iran. But British or French support for an least in theory, can be sent aloft and armed, policymakers’ options in a nuclear crisis to an Israeli nuclear or conventional preemption but they can still be recalled before they all-or-nothing response, or to preemptive or to destroy a nascent Iranian nuclear weapons complete their missions. They can also be preventive war. capability would be less certain, and Russia equipped with air-launched cruise missiles If nuclear weapons spread beyond the would strongly oppose. fired from standoff ranges, thus increasing existing acknowledged and “accepted” eight Another finding that emerges from the platform survivability compared to directly nuclear weapons states, there is another issue preceding discussion is that the attributes of overflying the target. related to stability and to proliferation. This U.S. Air Force (John McDowell) U.S. Air Force
B–52s destroyed as part of 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 57 FORUM | Options for U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions study has not dealt with nuclear command additional arms reductions. Nor, even if suc- and-Russia-to-Consider-Reductions-of-Nuclear- and control systems, but they have two cessful, can the same pattern of nuclear arms Arsenals-in-Talks-for-New-Treaty>. 2 aspects that bear scrutiny. First, they must be reductions be assumed as transitive to suc- The phrase press the reset button was first used by U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden, and designed to be survivable against enemy first cessful leadership in nuclear nonproliferation. it received at least rhetorical approval in March strikes. Second, they must be proofed against On the other hand, it is past time for the stale- 2009 from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, two potentially lethal internal disabilities. The mate in U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduc- who told a group of visiting American dignitaries: first possible disability is that the command tions to end. Going the last step from nuclear “The surprising term ‘reset’ . . . really reflects the and control system allows a mistaken launch limitation to nuclear abolition, as various essence of the changes we would like to see.” See either by unauthorized persons or through a senior dignitaries and some government Mike Eckel, “Hitting reset: U.S., Russia face tough technical malfunction. The second is the risk leaders have called for, may be premature; nuclear talks,” Associated Press, March 28, 2009. of a responsive failure in the circumstances of governments can only move incrementally in 3 See Jennifer Loven and Steven R. Hurst, an actual attack from human fallibility, tech- the best of times. But no longer do arguments “U.S., Russia call for nuke cuts in sweeping agenda,” nical glitches, or both.12 for inertia in strategic arms reductions need to Associated Press, April 1, 2009; Steve Gutterman, The United States, Russia, and other prevail, as they have in the recent past. “Analysis: Medvedev-Obama meeting a win for Russia,” Associated Press, April 2, 2009. permanent members of the United Nations It is also time to reconceptualize the 4 See Treaty between the United States of Security Council have years of experience in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian security America and the Russian Federation on Strategic relationships as positive-sum, instead of zero- the operation of nuclear forces. Future nuclear Offensive Reductions, Moscow, May 24, 2002, powers will have less. In addition to the sum, activities. Within this more permissive Arms Control Today, June 2002, available at 58 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Real Acquisition Reform By Jim Cooper and R u s s e l l R u m b a u g h ur nation’s defense suffers from There are many illusions in the Potomac a basic flaw: although we now Puzzle Palace, but some of the most profound fight jointly, we do not buy involve the Pentagon’s massive acquisition O jointly. Two recent develop system. This system has 50,000 private sector ments offer hope, however, that the Pentagon contractors just to oversee the activities will finally be making key procurement of hundreds of thousands of other private decisions. The announcement by Secretary of sector contractors. First, we pretend that our Defense Robert Gates reordering our major acquisition decisions are made at the level defense acquisition priorities is a step in the of the Department of Defense (DOD). In right direction. Likewise, the congressional reality, each Service buys what it wants, and Weapons Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 the Secretary of Defense has only a handful Representative Jim Cooper is a Member of the should incrementally improve the procure of opportunities to influence its purchases. House Armed Services Committee and serves on ment process. But until we change the Ser Second, we pretend that the Secretary of the House Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform. vices’ habit of placing their parochial interests Defense submits a single, unified budget He represents the 5th District of Tennessee. Russell above the national interest, we will continue when, in truth, he submits the three Services’ Rumbaugh is Representative Cooper’s Military to get overpriced weapons systems for the budgets cobbled together. Finally, we pretend Legislative Assistant. wrong wars. that the Services’ interests are the same as our Secretary Gates testifies before House Armed Services Committee about 2010 National Defense Authorization budget request DOD (Chad J. McNeeley) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 59 SPECIAL FEATURE | Real Acquisition Reform national interests. Although the Services are and equals the rest of the world in defense “DOD sometimes authorized contractors to filled with patriotic men and women doing spending. Secretary Gates himself has held begin work before . . . ” and “DOD obligated their best for their country, the Services are the trust of two Presidents of different politi nearly. . . .”1 But the Services themselves deter also bureaucracies—and bureaucracies have cal parties. But the tenure of a Secretary of mined 95 percent of all procurement for fiscal minds of their own. Defense has averaged less than 3 years, and year 2009. In other words, DOD did only 5 Recent congressional efforts to obtain it is easy to overstate even Gates’ actual deci percent of what GAO described. more realistic cost estimates for weapons sionmaking authority. The title of Under Secretary of Defense systems, develop better systems engineering, From the first Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and add competitive prototyping will help the onward, each has battled the selfishness of (AT&L) looks much more impressive than it acquisitions process. But we must also fix the the Services, particularly when it comes to is. When Congress asks for testimony on the fundamental political problem at the heart their own weapons systems. Secretary James acquisition process, AT&L testifies because of the system, just as we fixed fundamental Forrestal faced the “Revolt of the Admirals,” that office appears to promulgate acquisition political problems in our approach to war and each of his successors has experienced policy. But the only role that AT&L has—and fighting decades ago with the passage of the less-famous mutinies. DOD has never been a by extension the Secretary of Defense—is Goldwater-Nichols Act. Today, each Service monolithic organization; the Services rule. The to approve or disapprove Major Defense places its own acquisition needs first, with few Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force are nomi Acquisition Programs ACAT ID (Acquisition ways to resolve their disputes other than by nally subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, Category) programs as they move from one preserving the status quo. Until we empower but in fact have near-sovereign independence. phase of the acquisition process to the next. the Secretary of Defense to make procurement DOD is little more than an umbrella. Even the These programs comprise only 14 percent decisions and to arbitrate these disputes, we no-nonsense witnesses from the Government of the acquisition expenditures of DOD in a will keep getting the wrong weapons at the Accountability Office (GAO) routinely exag year, and they are almost impossible to stop wrong price. gerate DOD influence. In recent testimony, or modify once they have started. In plain for example, GAO personnel stated that English, AT&L is largely a rubber stamp. Who Runs Acquisitions? Every Secretary of Defense seems pow erful, and Secretary Gates especially so. After in plain English, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, all, DOD accounts for roughly half of all U.S. Technology, and Logistics is largely a rubber stamp Government discretionary appropriations U.S. Air Force (Andy Dunaway) U.S. Air Force The Pentagon has less control of defense acquisitions than the Services 60 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu COOPER and RUMBAUGH The Services themselves have almost We pretend that defense acquisitions guidance states the priorities of the Secretary complete authority over procurement outside are done at the highest level of the Pentagon. of Defense, it is discouraging how little impact of this one special category. For other spend The Services, however, control almost all of it actually has had on Service budgets. ing, AT&L has no role at all; a Component the acquisition process and naturally favor Very soon after issuing his private Acquisition Executive (CAE) is in charge. Of their own programs, particularly during strategic guidance, the Secretary issues his course, in military jargon, the components years of rapidly increasing defense budgets. fiscal guidance to the Services, often called are the Services that both manage and oversee The prudence and patriotism of individual the topline. This is the total funding that each CAE programs. Therefore, at least for CAE Servicemembers are no match for the needs of Service will receive in the next fiscal year, programs, the Services hold their own rubber their own bureaucracies. and it is rigorously followed for two reasons: stamp. budgets must add up, and any deviations are Of the 14 percent of acquisitions Flawed Process obvious. But these constraints only apply to within the special category, AT&L has, at Every Secretary of Defense since Robert the current fiscal year, which is almost mean most, seven decision points. These are, as McNamara has submitted a defense budget ingless for multiyear procurement. Cost over figure 1 shows: built mainly by the Services. Only President runs can easily be covered in future budgets Dwight Eisenhower with his vast World and even portrayed as vital to national secu ■■ material development decision War II military experience had the clout to rity. Revealing these overruns only hurts the ■■ milestone A review try to tame the Services, and his success was sponsoring Service. And since every Service ■■ milestone B review mixed. Figure 2 shows the current process. has such cost-overrun problems, a conspiracy ■■ preliminary design review (if done The Secretary issues both strategic and fiscal of silence is the natural result. after the milestone B review) “guidances” to the Services, allows each to ■■ post-critical design review assessment put together its own budget, and then reviews although the review does ■■ milestone C review their submissions before submitting the entire maintain the appearance of ■■ full-rate production decision. budget to the President and Congress.2 The Secretary’s strategic or planning civilian control of the military Most programs, however, enter the guidance is a classified document, internal to and can be used by an process at Milestone B, giving AT&L only four the Pentagon, which has been issued since the aggressive Secretary to focus on realisticFigure chances 1. Theto influence Defense a program. Acquisition ManagementNixon administration. System Although this strategic selected issues, it changes little Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management System Once the strategic and fiscal guidances Material development decision precedes entry into any phase of the acquisition have been issued, each Service constructs its management system own budget under its individual topline. In User Needs Entrance criteria met before entering phase fact, however, the Services’ budgets originated Technology Opportunities & Resources Evolutionary acquisition or single step to full capability at least a year earlier when their subordinate organizations began formulating priorities. (Program A B Initiation) C IOC FOC The 4 months of summer budget-building Material Engineering and in the Pentagon are spent shoe-horning the Solution Technology Manufacturing Production and Operations and Analysis Development Development Deployment Support Services’ existing years-long priorities into the Material FRP development Post- Post- LRIP/IOT&E Decision decision PDR A CDR A Review Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD’s) Pre-Systems Acquisition Systems Acquisition Sustainment topline, or planning on how to fit them into the next. = Decision Port = Milestone Review = Decision Point if PDR is not conducted before Milestone B Once the Services’ budgets have been Key: submitted, OSD reviews them, but this review CDR: critical design review; FOC: full operational capability; FRP: full rate production; IOC: initial has surprisingly little effect.3 Secretary Melvin operational capability; IOT&E: initial operational test and evaluation; LRIP: low rate initial production; Laird thought this review preserved his PDR: preliminary design review office’s power after McNamara became mired in Vietnam. The average change to Service FigureFigure 2.2. Current Current Process Process to Build to BuildU.S. Military U.S. MilitaryBudget Budget budgets resulting from this review is less than 2 percent. Although the review does maintain the appearance of civilian control of the MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB military and can, on rare occasions, be used by an aggressive Secretary to focus on selected Defense Secretary Service budgets built OSD review issues guidance issues, it changes little. Finally, the defense budget is submitted Defense Secretary issues scal guidance Service Budgets Budget sent to O ce of (budget ceilings for each Service) submitted to O ce of the Management and Budget to the President’s Office of Management and Secretary of Defense Budget submitted to Congress Budget (OMB) for incorporation into the Federal budget. Although OMB has nominal ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 61 SPECIAL FEATURE | Real Acquisition Reform authority over the defense budget, it tradition particularly if he is viewed as a short-termer. Service bureaucracies, both to the Secretary’s ally conducts its review concurrently with The formal influence of the Secretary of guidance and their own posture statements. the Pentagon’s out of respect for the greater Defense in the budget process is overwhelmed The effort to strengthen strategic guid expertise and analytical power of DOD. In by the realities of the Services’ power. ance has resulted in a cacophony of voices. practice, OMB is little more than a scapegoat Some observers look at this acquisition Besides internal guidance and the Quadren when a Secretary wants to blame someone process and see a failure of strategic guidance. nial Defense Review, Congress mandated for his efforts to make marginal changes in a If the Services are not buying what civil in 1986 that Presidents produce a National Service’s budget. ian policymakers want, then policymakers Security Strategy. Most critics agree these In the end, the defense budget submitted must have failed to issue clear instructions. documents have done little to change fun to Congress is essentially the bundling together This alternative argument implies that the damental military budget priorities. Some of the three military departments’ budgets. Services keep buying Cold War–era weapons call for more frequent guidance—as often as Although the Secretary has an opportunity to systems because they have not been told to quarterly.6 Many call for broader guidance to suggest his priorities and a chance to look over stop. Andrew Krepinevich expresses it this influence more than just DOD.7 Others argue the budgets as they are submitted, the Services way: “The importance of sound strategic that we have excessive guidance. rarely take DOD advice seriously. Indeed, guidance during a period of discontinuous All of these arguments ignore the politi- the process is almost circular because the change in the military competition cannot be cal nature of the budgeting process. The guid Services influence both the formulation of the understated. . . . Since the Cold War’s end the ance documents are produced with decisive Secretary’s strategic guidance and his conduct Defense Department leadership has struggled input from the very organizations that they of the review. The strategic guidance requires to provide this kind of guidance.”4 He argues are supposed to guide. Inevitably, the guid concurrence of the Services, giving each veto that the guidance has failed to respond to a ances contain language that the Services can power. In similar fashion, the Secretary’s review changing strategic environment, causing the use to justify the status quo. is heavily influenced by panels composed of disconnection between forces we need and senior Service officials. forces we have. Service Choices The Services come well armed to these For decades, however, Service posture Despite these flaws in the strategic bureaucratic battles because they can field sig statements and budget justifications have guidance process, the defense budget does nificantly greater manpower than OSD. Each acknowledged a changed strategic environ appear sensitive to fiscal guidance. The DOD has a resourcing and accounting staff of thou ment, although they have differed in their topline, or total funding for the Pentagon, sands compared to a resourcing staff of about responses. And since at least 1992, the secret increases at different rates, depending on 150 and an accounting staff of about 500 for internal strategic guidance has reinforced this external threats, national politics, and the Secretary of Defense. Already at a seven- change message.5 Yet the inertia continues; contractor behavior. Of course, the topline to-one disadvantage, the 1,000 members of the many of our military capabilities still resemble increases dramatically when the United Joint Staff often defer to their own Service’s those of the Cold War. The problem is not in States is involved in a large-scale overseas priorities more quickly than to the Secretary’s, the message of change but in the deafness of military conflict. Figure 3. Service Shares of the Defense Budget without War SupplementalsFigure 3. Service 1973–2013 Shares of the Defense Budget without War Supplementals 1973–2013 100% U.S. Navy (Molly A. Burgess) Defense wide 90% 80% Air Force Air Force Standard Deviation = 1.74% 70% 60% 50% Navy Navy Standard Deviation = 1.77% 40% 30% 20% Army Standard Deviation = 0.94% Army 10% 0% FY73 FY78 FY83 FY88 FY93 FY98 FY03 FY08 FY13 Source: O ce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2008 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2007), available at 62 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu COOPER and RUMBAUGH Looking at Service shares of the defense station their manpower as they choose, and dominance of the defense budget by enlarging budget, however, rather than at overall funding to implement policy in their own fashion. other Service shares, the Services have essen level or appropriation account, reveals that They resist efforts by senior officials to get tially made a permanent truce. They respect each gets virtually the same share of the budget control of their activities. each other’s budget shares on the condition each year. Figure 3 shows each Service’s share In particular, priority is attached to that their own share is respected.13 Although of the defense budget over time. The lines maintaining control over budgets. Organiza- talk about roles and missions—reorganizing are nearly flat, with a standard deviation of tions are often prepared to accept less money the Pentagon—continually resurfaces, this less than 1.8 percent over a 40-year period. with greater control rather than more money refrain does not pose an imminent threat to Moreover, the budget shares are nearly equally with less control.10 Service interests.14 As the second-ranking divided among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, general of the Army said last year when asked each of which receives just under 30 percent of Wilson explains that “what the Armed whether the shares of the budget should be the defense budget each year. Forces are doing is attempting to match adjusted: “I’ve testified before that this is not One would have expected that the mission and jurisdiction. . . . A strong sense about, again, taking money from our other massive strategic or technological changes over of mission implies an organizational juris teammates because we will always go to war four decades would have altered Service shares. diction coterminous with the tasks that as a joint force.”15 By not challenging each Yet these did not change as the U.S. military must be performed and the resources with other’s budgets, the Services probably become went from Cold War to peace dividend to which to perform them.”11 By gaining greater resistant to other forms of change as well. sustained irregular warfare during the war on terror. Service shares also remained frozen looking at Service shares of the defense budget, rather than at during the so-called revolution in military overall funding level or appropriation account, reveals that each affairs and Donald Rumsfeld’s efforts at trans formation. If major external factors cannot gets virtually the same share each year change Service shares, there must be powerful internal forces at work. Simply put, the Services autonomy, the Services can define their own Each Service’s institutional interests are adhere to their own organizational imperatives. success and produce budgets that allow them evident in their acquisition programs. These Even when a Service has no major to achieve that success. biases are not simple to state. There are excep weapons system to purchase, it can invent a Without strong OSD oversight, the tions, but these exceptions usually prove the placeholder category such as the Army did greatest threat to a Service is from a rival rule. The Air Force focuses on air superiority, with the Future Combat System (FCS) in Service. To protect their individual autonomy, preferably with piloted planes, to justify its order to maintain its share. Never more than the Services reached a compromise in 1948 theory of autonomous air power.16 The Navy a sketch, or a series of sketches, the multi- that minimized both inter-Service rivalry and remains committed to independent naval billion-dollar FCS budget plug took prece direction from above.12 Since the Kennedy forces with aircraft carriers and their escorts.17 dence over immediate warfighting needs, administration reduced the Air Force’s And the Marines are completely devoted to such as mine resistant ambush protected vehi cles and up-armored Humvee procurement.8 Chief of Naval Operations testifies before Senate Armed Services Committee In his seminal book Bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson explains why large hierarchical, civil-service organizations such as the Ser vices pursue their own interests.9 Facing mul tiple masters, resource constraints, and shift ing definitions of success, bureaucracies try to limit their duties. With such simplification, bureaucracies limit the many claims laid on them and free themselves to allocate resources to achieve their limited ends. Wilson calls this “autonomy.” Morton Halperin, in his own work on national security institutions, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, ties this autonomy directly to budgets: Career officials of an organization . . . attach very high priority to controlling their own resources so that these can be used to support the essence of the organization. They wish to be in a position to spend money allocated to them in the way they choose, to U.S. Navy (Tiffini Jones Vanderwyst) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 63 SPECIAL FEATURE | Real Acquisition Reform their own independence from the Army and security policy. He has the responsibility, and advancing military doctrine faster than the every other Service (although they are incor the accountability, to put the Nation’s security bureaucracies above them can adjust. They porated in the Navy budget).18 interests first. Although this may look obvious, are also advancing it without the politicization None of these interests is intended to the reality is that many Services simply do not that comes with promotion to general officer. undermine the national interest, but neither trust a political appointee enough to allow him To preserve military expertise while are they integrated into a coherent, modern to overrule their own plans. Even if they like avoiding organizational inertia, each Service’s defense policy. Service interests may or may the current Secretary, they fear that a future resourcing staffs should be moved to the not diverge from the national interest; they Secretary could harm their Service if they were Office of the Secretary of Defense. Joint panels are simply autonomous from that interest. to cede control. The outside political power of of military officers should be created from the For example, no Service has volunteered to Service veterans and retirees is so great that the Service’s resourcing staffs and overseen by a do nationbuilding despite the acknowledged Association of the United States Army or Navy civilian political appointee—probably at the we will reform Pentagon procurement only when we reduce Service roles in U.S. Army (D. Myles Cullen) budgeting, preferably by empowering the Secretary of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary level. These panels will be forced to procure jointly as the opera tional perspectives of a variety of military officers are brought to bear. A group made up of a Navy captain, Army colonel, Marine colonel, and Air Force colonel will answer the same question differently than a group of four Army colonels. These panels of “purple suits” should be headed by a civilian OSD official to arbitrate any irresolvable differences, with appeals to the Secretary of Defense himself. Ironically, President Eisenhower proposed a more comprehensive reform a half-century Future Combat System has been called “placeholder” to maintain Army share of acquisition budget ago. He advocated that anyone with rank above colonel wear a uniform common to all need for such skills in Bosnia, Kosovo, League can trump any new administration’s the Services, and that military academy cadets Kuwait, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and policy. For example, this spring, the Air Force spend at least a year at another academy. Pakistan over the last 20 years. Occasionally, Association emailed a scary headline railing The reforms of the 1980s make such a bureaucratic stubbornness can even thwart against Gates’ budget decisions by calling it “A procurement reform possible, even inevitable. U.S. policy objectives. Dangerous Approach.”21 The Goldwater-Nichols Act introduced joint Another example that many observers Instead of the Secretary of Defense ness of operations to give officers an appre have noted is how the Army’s fixation with nudging the Services’ budgets, his office ciation of what other Services bring to the large wars weakens its ability to conduct should build the defense budget from start fight, but had little impact on the resourcing counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.19 to finish. He may need authority to establish process.22 Full coordination of firepower is a As the insurgency in Iraq flared in 2003 a capital budget in order to handle large force multiplier; coordination of purchasing and 2004, the Army was short on patrolling weapons systems. The Secretary will need a power could be as well. Today, the same Army vehicles such as armored Humvees but well larger staff, but that staff should not be newly officer who learned about naval power at a stocked with plenty of tanks for large-scale hired or civilian. Military expertise must combatant command returns to the Pentagon conventional war.20 come from the Active-duty military itself. A to fight solely for ground-based capabilities. colonel with 25 years of experience knows He knows that his fellow Army officers will A Solution first-hand what commanders in the field need. write the evaluation of his resourcing job. If We will reform Pentagon procurement The current process is skewed because the a combination of Services rated that Army only when we reduce Service roles in budget Services pursue their organizational issues, officer, the officer would be more likely to ing, preferably by empowering the Secretary of not because of lack of patriotism or expertise overcome Service parochialism. By moving Defense. The Secretary is key to civilian control of individual troops. Throughout all the Service resourcing staffs to the Office of the of the military and coordination with national Services, men and women in uniform are Secretary of Defense, we could extend the 64 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu COOPER and RUMBAUGH success of Goldwater-Nichols from operations 5 Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for to resourcing. Insuring No Rivals Develop a One-Superpower NEW Ironically, the position of Secretary of World,” The New York Times, March 8, 1992. from NDU Press 6 Defense was created to coordinate the Ser Kathleen Hicks, “Invigorating Defense Gover nance: A Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 4 Report” vices, but 60 years later he is still hobbled by (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna parochialism. By giving him direct control tional Studies, March 2008). of the Services’ resourcing staffs, he could 7 Clark A. Murdock and Michele Flournoy, develop the capability and expertise to make Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Phase I Report (Wash a real national defense budget instead of just ington, DC: Center for Strategic and International ratifying the Services’ budgets. Studies, July 2005), 27–30. 8 “Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Secretary Gates has made progress in Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush asserting the Secretary’s preeminence over Protected Vehicles,” Inspector General, Department Service interests. While increasing the defense of Defense, December 8, 2008. 9 budget, he has cut programs that reflect James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Govern- ment Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: narrow organizational interests. However, he Basic Books, 1989). is succeeding only by exercising great political 10 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and skill. Interestingly, he is not the first Secretary Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu to cut such programs. Donald Rumsfeld killed tion Press, 1974), 51. the Army’s Crusader howitzer. Robert McNa 11 Wilson, 187. mara killed the Air Force’s B–70 long-range 12 The Key West Agreement, Department of bomber. Gates was forced to deal last spring Defense, Joint Chief of Staff files, Record Group with bureaucratic reincarnations: another 218, CS 370 (8–19–45), Section 7, Modern Military Army howitzer and another Air Force long- Branch, National Archives, Washington, DC. 13 range bomber. Old weapons systems never Dennis Ippolito, Blunting the Sword: Budget die; they just get repackaged. Policy and the Future of Defense (Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, 1994), 14; and Walter G. Hermes, “Global Until the Secretary is empowered to Pressures and the Flexible Response,” in American run the acquisition and budgeting process, Military History (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center Strategic Forum 244 he will only be able to exert decisive influence of Military History, 2005). Aligning Disarmament to Nuclear Dangers: through high-risk, politically sensitive inter 14 Colonel Richard Szafranski, “Interservice Off to a Hasty START? ventions. Our proposal would give the Secre Rivalry in Action: The Endless Roles and Missions tary the authority that the original National Refrain?” Airpower Journal (Summer 1996). 15 David A. Cooper examines the proposed Security Act envisioned. Let the Secretary be General Richard Cody, testimony before the revival of the U.S.-Russian strategic disarma the Secretary. The Services should place fight House Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2008. 16 ment agenda. He argues that there is little to ing the enemy ahead of fighting each other. General Michael Moseley, The Nation’s Guard- ians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, Chief of Staff gain in traditional military terms from further Only then will we get the right weapons at the reductions. The key issue is whether Washing right price. JFQ White Paper, U.S. Air Force, February 2008. 17 Carl H. Builder, “Roles and Missions: Back ton can achieve a modest agreement at little to the Future,” Joint Force Quarterly 4 (Spring 1994), cost, or leverage negotiations to gain wider N o t e s available at By J o h n P . Jumper, Davi d A . Deptula, and H a r o l d B . a D a m s he phrase concept of opera- with. By making CONOPS a living exercise, tions (CONOPS) has been we introduce the temporal dimension—the interpreted in many ways. Its potential of systems deemed important in a T most useful manifestation is current acquisition over extended periods when a CONOPS reveals how the horizontal of time—remembering that acquisition integration of joint capabilities can produce decisions made today must be useful to com the effects intended by the joint commander. manders 30 or 40 years from now. One need Its least useful—yet most common—mani not be convinced of the lingering value of General John P. Jumper, USAF (Ret.), was Chief festation is when a CONOPS is created to the B–52 that communicates directly with of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, USAF, is Deputy Chief of Staff for justify or rationalize one specific platform or special operations forces or is equipped with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, program. its own targeting pod and precision weapons. Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Brigadier General When applied properly, a CONOPS The original CONOPS for the B–52 was Harold B. “Buck” Adams, USAF (Ret.), leads the leads the acquisition process by forcing us focused on the strategic nuclear mission, but Science and Technology Division of Booz Allen to decide how we are going to fight before as mission needs transitioned into modern Hamilton. we decide what we are going to buy to fight applications, the idea that global range in the Marines patrol in mine resistant ambush protected vehicle in Afghanistan U.S. Marine Corps (Joseph R. Breinlinger) 66 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu JUMPER, DEPTULA, and ADAMS Cold War could be traded for persistence in transport aircraft would be available did not operations, and space platforms, sensors, or counterinsurgency operations (with a large comport with any existing war plans, and the operators that can produce target-quality precision payload ) was one born of progres use of stealth as its only defense made it vul location and identification. This means UAS sive CONOPS developed by mission-oriented nerable to any visual system during daylight. platforms that do not blow away at opera commanders and tacticians. By any defini The F–16, on the other hand, could tional altitude when the wind blows faster tion, however, the U.S. military’s efforts to self-deploy with weapons and fly directly than the platforms’ maximum speed (as is date to integrate CONOPS into the acquisi into combat 24 hours a day. It was hard to the case with many hand-launched vehicles); tion process have been of middling success. imagine that commanders would prefer vehicles that traverse a reasonable distance the lesser capability just because it was to react to emerging or time-sensitive situ Case Study: The UAS unmanned. The procurement of a limited ations; and, equally important, a command There is no better example than the number of X–45s for the purpose of develop and control system that can shift UAS way we have approached acquisitions for ing integration protocols, unmanned air resources around the battlespace to respond unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Early refueling, and command and control, and for to commander priorities. on, the UAS debate was swallowed by emo generally advancing the technology, was a Second, the next-generation CONOPS tional but irrelevant worries about replacing much better idea. should be agile enough in tasking and manned aircraft. The convenient indictment employment to serve both traditional intel was that UAS are resisted by pilots or that Search for a Construct ligence collection—that is, the tedious but their value was avoidance of dangerous expo So what would be a useful construct for necessary cycle of “collect, analyze, report” sure to threats. Unguided by a coherent joint a next-generation joint CONOPS for UAS? that yields the battlefield forensic data neces CONOPS, we have, by turns, reached either First, it has become evident that the prolifer sary to understand and anticipate—and then too far with UAS or not far enough. Today, ation of many sizes and shapes of UAS is still seamlessly shift to direct engagement—the the battlespace is saturated with a wide not delivering what is needed. The most reli real-time targeting cycle—when priorities variety of UAS platforms while complaints able UAS coverage comes from vehicles that dictate. persist down to the lowest tactical level that timely support is not available. The unfor the unmanned aircraft systems debate was swallowed by tunate debate has centered on emotional disagreements about ownership of platforms emotional but irrelevant worries about replacing manned aircraft rather than integration of information. What seems obvious is that a joint CONOPS, backed by an integrating technology, would reveal that the number of platforms is not the issue. We need a joint theater CONOPS to integrate appropriate UAS capabilities for all (David H. Lipp) U.S. Air Force our forces in the joint force at the right place at the right time in a way that optimizes utility—a CONOPS that fields an immedi ate integration capability for the current situation, on an emergency basis, followed by policy that insists on an operationally developed CONOPS to lead the acquisition process. Consider the case of the X–45. The platform-centric argument was that this unmanned fighter would be a candidate to replace the F–16. Stealth would be its main defense. While understandable from the per spective of wanting to develop an unmanned fighter platform—a worthy enough goal— this particular platform was impractical from a CONOPS perspective. The employ U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent pilots Predator B UAS to assess flood threat in North Dakota ment called for the platforms to be stored and deployed in containers aboard transport aircraft, then assembled, test flown, and offer access to multiple sensors (working day/ Third, a new CONOPS could help loaded with weapons before being ready for night through any weather) and good persis clearly define the next generation of UAS combat at the receiving base—not the picture tence and that communicate seamlessly with operators. The time has come to move away of rapid airpower. The assumption that the variety of air, land, maritime, special from the idea that a fully qualified pilot ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 67 SPECIAL FEATURE | Integrating CONOPS into the Acquisition Process is required to fly a UAS while remaining necessary. Multiple vehicles could be under UAS application as critical elements of our sensitive to the requirement that pilot-like the control of a single operator or crew nation’s defense. Unfortunately, the most knowledge is needed to operate in shared (depending on the mission), and communi recent examples of the QDR have become airspace, control zones, restricted areas, cation among crews could allow shifting of more of a program review than a strategic and within the rules of an airspace control resources to cover emerging priorities. review, aggravating Service rivalries in authority. Thus, it is reasonable to assume If we were to embrace a truly joint competition for programs rather than that the next-generation UAS operator must approach, it is not difficult to imagine inviting the real, integrative CONOPS that possess entry-level pilot knowledge, battle how the construct described above would would produce cooperative results. The management skills, and the appropriate evolve beyond UAS and be insensitive to the consequence is that the Services prepare for qualifications to assume responsibility for location or type of sensor at the end of the the QDR for 2 years and then spend 2 years compliance with rules of engagement. These repairing relationships. skills include appropriate warrior credentials the most recent examples of Specifically, the QDR should direct to assign both responsibility and authority that the Services produce joint CONOPS for weapons guidance or release. A challenge the QDR have become more for joint employment of UAS rather than will be to appropriately adjust Federal Avia of a program review than a decide on platforms and programs. Strategic tion Administration and International Civil strategic review direction—perhaps the Joint Requirements Aviation Organization rules and regulations Oversight Committee could be directed to oversee CONOPS development—would be for CONOPS to drive capabilities and then requirements in a way that keeps the acquisi tion process in the acquisition business and away from having to create CONOPS based on platform justification. If done properly, the introduction of a joint, integrating CONOPS into the acquisi tion process for unmanned systems will produce an understanding that real jointness is about using the right force at the right place at the right time. Real jointness will deliver systems that promote Service and component interdependence over Service or component dominance. In an era of decreasing resource avail ability for the Department of Defense, Service interdependence will be not an option, but a requirement. Achieving Service interdependence requires making decisions that bring the full power of air, land, sea, U.S. Air Force (Sabrina Johnson) U.S. Air Force space, and cyberspace competencies to bear Airmen load AFM–114 Hellfire missile onto MQ–1B Predator UAS in Iraq with minimum overlap and redundancy. Finally, our actions must account for the fact that today’s procurement decisions to safely integrate UAS into national and operator’s tether. The operator could at any will define capabilities for the next 35 to 40 international airspace using such UAS opera time, and with appropriate authorizations, years. Just as today’s operational concepts tors without requiring the traditional pilot bring any needed system into the network are guiding the modern utility of platforms ratings. as required to verify (for example, request and systems that were procured in the 1950s, Logically, this would all come together signals intelligence or other information), 1960s, and 1970s, future commanders will using a combined mission planning/mission bring additional firepower (call the bomber depend on the right balance of capabilities— execution system where the vehicle is flown or fighter formation), and observe more decisions being made today—to accommo by the autopilot and repositioned by mouse closely (using space, ground, or hovering date future contingencies. JFQ clicks. Technology would assist in planning platform capabilities). and executing mission tasks by displaying optimum routes, search patterns, weapons QDR Role envelopes, required coverage, number of Without question, the Quadrennial required vehicles, and so forth—with human Defense Review (QDR) will play an impor intervention always possible but not always tant role in determining the next steps in 68 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Armed MQ–9 Reaper unmanned aircraft system in shelter at Joint Base Balad, Iraq U.S. Air Force (Erik Gudmundson) U.S. Air Force Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process By Del C. Kost k a to Support ISR n 2004, the U.S. Army issued a Critical tive. In the Air Force’s opinion, its existing Mission Needs Statement for a fleet of MQ–1 Predator UAS, operationally deployed new unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). since 1999 and a seasoned veteran of Opera I The Sky Warrior, as the platform was tions Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, called, would be the Army’s premier extended could meet all of the Army’s requirements range, multipurpose UAS to support ground with minimal modification.1 The Army operations. The Army subsequently prepared countered that the Air Force’s objection was an operational requirements document to actually a veiled attempt to retain operational specify performance criteria for the Sky control of the air space and be recognized Warrior and submitted its request to the Joint as the “executive agent” for medium- and Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), an high-altitude UAS across the entire Depart all-Service panel that conducts requirements ment of Defense (DOD).2 After much debate, analysis, validates mission needs, and recom the JROC approved the Army’s requirement mends priorities for funding. for a new multipurpose UAS despite vigor The request was immediately chal ous opposition from the panel’s Air Force lenged by the council’s Air Force representa contingent. Del C. Kostka is Technical Executive for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s U.S. Transportation Command Support Team, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 69 SPECIAL FEATURE | Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process By early 2007, the Sky Warrior disagree in capabilities, growing competition for assets, key component of this examination due to ment had reached a boiling point. On April and systems that do not fully complement one their potential to substitute for or supplement 19, a congressional hearing convened to another.6 portions of the tactical ISR mission. review Service budget requests for UAS. The While the symptoms and impacts of the meeting quickly dissolved into a quagmire ISR acquisition process are easy to identify, ISR Requirements of questions and confusion. “Who is in the exact causes are somewhat harder to DOD and the DNI have separate pro charge?” and “Where is the authority?” asked determine. Without question, the current cesses to identify future requirements. In Representative Neil Abercrombie (D–HI), process is rife with inefficiencies at virtually the Defense Department, proposals for new Chairman of the House Armed Services Air every level. Based on the research outlined ISR capabilities are developed by either the and Land Forces Subcommittee. The answer in this article, the challenges facing the ISR combatant commands or by the individual from the Government Accountability Office acquisition community manifest themselves Services and then submitted to the Joint was that no one in DOD was exercising effec in three broad problem areas: Capabilities Integration and Development tive control over the Services’ competing System (JCIDS) for vetting.7 Within the DNI, programs.3 ■■ DOD does not have a comprehensive proposals for new capabilities are developed Finally, after 3 years of bickering, the vision or strategy for the ISR enterprise. by the national intelligence agencies and Office of the Secretary of Defense had heard ■■ There is no unified ISR management vetted through the Mission Requirements enough. On June 13, 2007, Deputy Defense mechanism to weigh the relative costs, ben Board (MRB). Although there is rudimentary Secretary Gordon England issued a memo efits, and risks of proposed investments. coordination between JCIDS and MRB, no randum upholding the Army’s procurement ■■ The current ISR acquisition process standard process exists to determine which rights for the Sky Warrior, but directing promotes requirements definition by individ DOD proposals will be reviewed by MRB or the two Services to form a “joint integrated ual Service components, which may not have what criteria will be used to conduct such product team” combining the Predator and insight into enterprise-level priorities or viable reviews.8 The lack of protocol in vetting coin Sky Warrior efforts into a single acquisition alternatives to acquire the needed intelligence. cident requirements often puts DOD and DNI program.4 The Army and Air Force have at odds. For example, in 2008, JCIDS reviewed agreed to cooperate in fielding the next gen a U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) eration of medium-altitude, multirole UAS, the Services are not required requirement for increased surveillance but the contentious, stovepiped nature of the to jointly develop new ISR capabilities and determined that the shortfall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, and there are vast would be best met by increasing the number (ISR) acquisition process remains. discrepancies in the way of UAS available to the USCENTCOM Service Service requirements are components. MRB determined the exact same The Problem vetted, prioritized, and funded requirement could be addressed by efficiency The inter-Service rivalry over the gains in other surveillance methods.9 medium-altitude UAS platform is symbolic of Despite DNI willingness to support an antiquated funding and acquisition process The purpose of this article, then, is tactical missions with national assets, many that does not adequately coordinate, consoli to assess and verify these three challenges DOD requirements sponsors are reluctant to date, and manage the rapidly expanding ISR facing the ISR acquisition community and consider national systems as an alternative.10 enterprise. To put it succinctly, DOD does to recommend changes to improve the inte There are a variety of reasons why DOD not have a joint, cohesive process to define gration of ISR capabilities across DOD and insists on acquiring in-house ISR capabilities and validate ISR requirements or efficiently national intelligence agencies. The objective is when national agencies offer a viable alterna acquire new systems to support warfighter to advocate a joint DOD acquisition process tive. For one, no single source of information needs. that ensures future ISR investments reflect exists that specifies the capability and avail The significance of this shortfall is enterprise-level priorities and strategic goals, ability of national assets, and even if there immense. Without a unified investment man while providing a cost-effective baseline of were, many in the DOD community lack the agement approach, each Service has aggres advanced ISR tools, platforms, and capabili security clearance needed to evaluate and sively pursued independent ISR capabilities ties to support tactical operations. select national systems.11 Trust and control are that are tailored to their own unique missions. Many organizations play a role in iden also an issue, as many within the DOD com The Services are not required to jointly tifying ISR requirements, managing assets, munity are apprehensive about dependence develop new ISR systems,5 and there are vast and developing new capabilities. National on other system owners.12 discrepancies in the way Service requirements intelligence agencies such as the National are vetted, prioritized, and funded. Efforts Reconnaissance Office, National Security Defense Acquisition Structure to integrate ISR capabilities across DOD are Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence The DOD defense acquisition structure hampered by diverse organizational cultures, Agency play a vital role in supporting the consists of three interrelated systems that independent requirements processes, and dif DOD combat mission and are aligned under can be described in broad terms as require ferent funding mechanisms. As a result, the both the Secretary of Defense and Director ments generation, resource allocation, and complex acquisition process through which of National Intelligence (DNI). Although the acquisition management. As mentioned DOD identifies, procures, and implements scope of this article is limited to the DOD ISR previously, the requirements component is advanced ISR systems is characterized by gaps acquisition process, the national assets are a known as JCIDS. Created in 2003, JCIDS is a 70 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu KOSTKA DOD-level collaborative process for identify Functional Solution Analysis,21 which is the MIP programs are the responsibility of a single ing, assessing, and prioritizing warfighter final output of the JCIDS process. In a capa defense agency while others are managed by requirements.13 Resource allocation is deter bilities-based system, requirements originated one Service as an “executive agent” for DOD.25 mined through the Planning, Programming, by the combatant commands or Service com The DNI has overall responsibility for Budgeting, and Execution System, which is ponents must be as descriptive and accurate preparing NIP budget submissions based on the framework through which JCIDS-vetted as possible, and baseline performance criteria priorities established by the President and requirements are evaluated relative to other should be articulated in standard terms and with input from the national intelligence DOD needs and budgeted in accordance with common frames of reference. agencies.26 The DNI also participates in the strategic guidance and fiscal constraints.14 development of the MIP by the Secretary of The third component of the DOD defense Funding Requirements Defense. Conversely, the Undersecretary of acquisition structure is the Defense Acquisi For budgeting purposes, the various Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) serves as the tion System. As the name implies, this system systems that collect, process, and disseminate MIP Program Executive and also ensures the is the management process by which DOD intelligence are grouped into two major cat NIP budget is compliant with DOD strategic initiates and oversees the actual procurement egories of programs, the National Intelligence objectives.27 Thus, the DNI and USD(I) play of new technologies and programs. The com Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence an essential role in the development of both plexity of this three-step process combined Program (MIP). The categories are based on the NIP and MIP. Yet these organizations have with the magnitude of personnel, activities, and funding involved in its operation can result in problems such as redundancy, ineffi cient operations, fraud/waste/abuse, and inad equate enforcement of laws and regulations.15 In DOD, ISR requirements and need statements can be developed by defense agen cies, combatant commands, or individual Services in accordance with Title 10 respon sibilities to train and equip forces.16 Prior to its submission into JCIDS, a new ISR require ment must be reviewed and approved by the JROC, a department-level panel chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and including the Vice Chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, and the Assistant Com mandant of the Marine Corps.17 The charter of the JROC is to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and priori tizing new requirements, consider alternatives Six images on MQ–1 Predator represent number to the stated need, and ensure that the prior of AGM–114 Hellfire missile shots in combat U.S. Air Force (Larry E. Reid, Jr.) U.S. Air Force ity assigned to the new requirement reflects established strategic guidance.18 To assist in vetting ISR requirements, the JROC has a the customer being served, different manage limited time and resources and have difficulty special subpanel known as the Battlespace ment arrangements, and different oversight reviewing budget requests thoroughly.28 Awareness Functional Capabilities Board.19 But the JROC does not have any insight into the complexity of this three-step process can result in the budgeting process to ensure that JROC- validated programs are adequately funded, redundancy, inefficient operations, fraud/waste/abuse, and nor is there an oversight mechanism to ensure inadequate enforcement of laws and regulations that the Services spend appropriated funds the way the JROC intended.20 entities in Congress.22 The NIP encompasses As ISR technologies continue to evolve, It is important to note that requirements those strategic intelligence programs that the distinctions between the National and the definition, submission, and vetting comprise specifically support national-level decision Military Intelligence Programs become increas a “capabilities-based” process, meaning making.23 NIPs are allocated among national ingly blurred. Some missions, such as space- the combatant command or requirements intelligence agencies such as the Central Intel based radar, are already shared by national originator submits the capability shortfall it ligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and military process owners.29 Although these wishes to address along with the minimum National Reconnaissance Office, National mission interdependencies offer substantial performance criteria needed for the eventual Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National opportunities for increased fiscal efficiency, the solution. The actual material solution for the Security Agency.24 The MIP includes those pro current budget process presents a number of submitted requirement is determined by a grams that serve the ISR needs of DOD. Some significant challenges. One is the unintended ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 71 SPECIAL FEATURE | Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process consequences of budget adjustments. For acquisition community can be consolidated not specify future ISR requirements, identify example, the elimination of a MIP-funded into three basic problem statements. funding priorities, or define a vetting mecha reconnaissance platform might require a new DOD does not have a comprehensive nism to ensure Service ISR investments reflect reliance on a national sensor, which would vision or strategy for the ISR enterprise. The the overall strategy.43 In short, DOD still now be underfunded to perform the addi lack of a clearly defined, cohesive strategy lacks a clearly defined vision of the future ISR tional tasking.30 Shared funding arrangements to guide ISR investments has been a highly enterprise to guide its ISR investments.44 present fiscal opportunities, but they have also visible area of concern for many years. In 1995, There is no unified ISR management caused rifts and schedule delays as one entity the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence mechanism to weigh the relative costs, ben- protests the percentage of funding that it has recommended a joint review by the Director efits, and risks of proposed investments. The to provide relative to the other.31 Also, require of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Deputy JROC is the current enterprise-level entity for ments that are uniquely joint are slow to be Secretary of Defense to ensure both DOD and vetting requirements and addressing capa identified and filled when no specific Service the Intelligence Community were being equally bility shortfalls across DOD. The agencies, has the responsibility to initiate a needs state served in the planning, programming, and combatant commands, and Services present ment.32 Even when potential efficiencies are management of intelligence activities.39 The their mission need statements to the JROC, identified, determining a consolidated plan for 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act included which then evaluates each candidate require funding and operations can be a challenge. For provisions that strengthened the ability of the ment on a case-by-case basis. The JROC focus example, space platforms are budgeted under DCI to participate in budget development for is on Service need and shortfall, however, NIP and operated by the national intelligence defense-wide and tactical intelligence.40 As rather than the capabilities needed to fulfill agencies. The Global Hawk UAS, on the other part of the 2004 National Defense Authoriza the mission.45 Neither the JROC nor its sub hand, is budgeted under MIP and operated tion Act, Congress directed the Office of the panels have the time or technical expertise to by the Air Force. These separate paths make it USD(I) to develop a comprehensive “roadmap” fully explore potential options for addressing difficult to assess overlaps in capabilities, study the ISR capability shortfalls. Also, there is no tradeoffs, and synchronize operations.33 mechanism in place to identify options, capa To further complicate the manage requirements that are uniquely bility gaps, or duplication of effort.46 ment and coordination of ISR programs, joint are slow to be identified To provide decisionmakers with a some elements within DOD have turned to and filled when no specific mechanism to compare and contrast Service supplemental appropriations to obtain intel Service has the responsibility requirements, DOD is compiling an inventory ligence assets that they did not get through to initiate a needs statement of functional activities known as the Joint the established budget and planning process.34 Capability Areas (JCAs). Initiated in 2005, the One such appropriation vehicle is the Defense JCAs are a set of standardized definitions of Emergency Resource Fund, an initiative that to guide development and integration of DOD DOD capabilities that are divided into man allows DOD to shift funds from a generic ISR capabilities for fiscal years 2004 through ageable categories.47 The intent of the JCAs is counterterrorism fund to specific subac 2018. It also called for the creation of an ISR to establish a common doctrinal language to counts.35 Although the supplemental appro Integration Council to address ISR integration define needs, analyze gaps in capability, and priation mechanism often results in a Service and coordination issues in conjunction with identify areas where there may be an excess of obtaining a much-needed capability, the prac DCI and to contribute to the design of the ISR capabilities.48 The JCAs have provided a basic tice undercuts the established budgeting and Roadmap.41 framework to evaluate competing Service oversight process, making it difficult to weigh Released in 2005, the ISR Roadmap requirements on a comparable basis. tradeoffs and adjust priorities. It also impedes has provided a multitude of benefits to DOD The JROC and JCAs provide positive long-term planning and has an erosive effect and the Intelligence Community. First, it has momentum toward managing ISR invest on efforts to consolidate resources.36 provided a catalogue of both existing and ments from a joint enterprise-level perspec The total fiscal budget for ISR programs planned ISR systems to help guide investment tive rather than from a single Service point is difficult to assess due to the classified decisions. It also outlined six specific strategic of view. However, DOD as a whole has not nature of programs, but the 2008 funding goals for the future ISR enterprise: established the criteria and methods to iden for the national intelligence systems alone tify the best return on investment in light of exceeded $47 billion.37 With that type of ■■ converge DOD capabilities strategic goals. massive expenditure, the need for operational ■■ attain persistent surveillance The current ISR acquisition process efficiency and sound decisionmaking is ■■ achieve horizontal integration of intel promotes requirements definition by indi- critical. Unfortunately, the current system ligence information vidual Service components that may not provides little opportunity to compare costs ■■ achieve a collaborative network-centric have insight into enterprise-level priorities or make efficiency tradeoffs. distributed operations infrastructure or viable options to acquire the needed intel- ■■ transform ISR management ligence. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Acquisition Challenges capabilities Armed Forces have made extraordinary prog The unparalleled complexity of the ■■ operationalize intelligence.42 ress in moving toward a joint and seamless DOD defense acquisition structure lends itself force. Yet this synergy has not extended into to an abundance of problematic issues.38 In Although the ISR Roadmap defines the areas of ISR acquisition and management. general terms, the challenges facing the ISR strategic objectives in broad terms, it does Entities such as JROC review and validate 72 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu KOSTKA funding priorities but have little input into the A third issue involving Service-oriented funded a $75-million-per-copy upgrade of definition of requirements. Nor does JROC ISR planning can be loosely described as the initial Global Hawk that includes greater have any oversight of the budgeting process “unintended consequences.” Many Service- payload and a more robust signals collection to ensure that its own validated requirements level ISR assets began development without a capability, but the resulting schedule delay are adequately funded.49 The Services are long-term plan to manage and sustain their has forced the Air Force to maintain the U–2 ultimately responsible for justifying funding programs. As a result, funding and resources program far beyond its projected retirement.58 priorities before Congress and maintain both are directed toward short-term needs or ownership and budgetary control over the “gluing” ill-suited and disparate components Recommendations resulting ISR assets. together in an attempt to force jointness. Also, The current DOD acquisition process Service ownership of ISR assets pres schedule delays in some programs have forced discourages the consolidation and integra ents a number of inherent challenges. First, the Services to make unplanned investments tion of capabilities across the ISR enterprise. Service-oriented planning does not consider in legacy systems to keep them active longer Since requirement and budget definitions are the full range of solutions available to fulfill than expected.55 based on stovepiped applications, ISR system operational requirements. At the Service level, Perhaps the best example of a troubled developers are forced to integrate capabilities requirements managers often lack knowledge acquisition program’s cascading effect on after the fact rather than design efficient and about national systems and can even lack legacy systems is the Air Force Global Hawk holistic systems from the start. Congress has the security clearance needed to review and high-altitude UAS. At a cost of $10 million recognized this deficiency and authorized evaluate capability options using national per copy, the Global Hawk was intended several significant enhancements to the assets.50 Some process owners have had prior to provide cost-effective reconnaissance acquisition process. In 2003, the capabilities- difficulty in tasking national satellites and capabilities similar to the aging U–2 manned based JCIDS was implemented to submit, have complained of poor quality imagery.51 There is also reluctance on the part of some DOD requirements sponsors to consider to provide decisionmakers with a mechanism to compare national ISR systems as an alternative because Service requirements, DOD is compiling an inventory of they simply do not want to be dependent on functional activities known as the Joint Capability Areas another system owner.52 At times, Service-based requirements managers have also demonstrated unrealistic platform. The Global Hawk provides an oper review, and validate requirements. The 2004 expectations of new ISR capabilities and have ational advantage over national satellite assets National Defense Authorization Act directed submitted requirements not consistent with in that it can be tasked by local commanders the USD(I) to develop the ISR Roadmap and technical levels of maturity.53 Requirement and launched on demand.56 Unfortunately, created the ISR Integration Council to inte managers who incorporate ISR technologies the initial acquisition program had significant grate and coordinate programs across the ISR that are in the early stages of development shortcomings, as the platform proved to be enterprise. Congress has also restructured the increase both the risk and cost underpowered and lacked a signals intel intelligence appropriations process to ensure of the program, often without ligence capability.57 The Air Force has now coordination by the DNI and USD(I). any significant enhancement in Less drastic modifications could also capability.54 improve the integration and coordina tion issues that are at the heart of the ISR Army technicians inspect Shadow 200 unmanned aircraft system upon completion of mission in Afghanistan U.S. Army (Andrya Hill) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 73 SPECIAL FEATURE | Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process acquisition dilemma. The following recom process for implementing new technologies in acquirer to the developer.64 This, coupled with mendations outline three initiatives that the response to changing mission needs.62 fairly loose definitions of open systems stan DOD acquisition community could imple A managed ISR enterprise architecture dards, has allowed vendors to deliver their own ment to mitigate shortfalls in the current ISR would offer benefits to planners, decisionmak proprietary solutions to performance require procurement environment. These suggestions ers, and those responsible for defining ISR ments that are not as open as they appear to are not without controversy, since implemen requirements at the Service level. An enterprise be on the surface. The development and docu tation would inevitably require coordina architecture would improve communication by mentation of baseline standards specific to the tion, resource-sharing, and potential loss of providing a standardized vocabulary through ISR enterprise would dramatically enhance decision authority by select DOD elements. out the ISR community of users. It would the affordability and interoperability of ISR The recommendations are not mutually provide a mechanism to weigh the benefits systems across the enterprise. dependent, however, and can be considered and impact of new requirements and support The term standards development is in aggregate to address portions of the ISR analysis of alternatives, risks, and tradeoffs. It generally applied to computer systems and acquisition conundrum. could also help planners discover opportunities network protocols. In actuality, all systems Define an Overall Enterprise Archi- to share ISR assets across the enterprise and have structures that allow their components tecture for ISR. A critical shortfall in the identify gaps in the current infrastructure that and subsystems to work together to achieve current ISR acquisition environment is the prohibit the sharing of resources.63 the required functionality. Adherence to a absence of a comprehensive and clearly An enterprise architecture is a living well-documented set of baseline standards defined enterprise architecture. Without a document, so one organization would be during the design phase of ISR systems devel documented enterprise architecture model, tasked with development, implementation, opment allows these structures to interact and Service requirements managers are essen and maintenance of the enterprise archi results in substantial cost savings, interopera tially making decisions based on their per tecture lifecycle. A key provision, however, bility, and efficiency benefits over the life cycle sonal perception of the ISR enterprise, which would be full participation and investment of the program. Although the main goal of is often not in alignment with the other by the Service components to document their baseline standards is interoperability, a stan Service components or the overall strategic dards-based systems development approach direction of DOD. without a documented could also be applied to database format, data Within the DOD ISR community, a schemas, operating systems, and graphic physical enterprise architecture for interoper enterprise architecture user interface models. Standardization of this ability is provided by the Distributed Common model, Service requirements nature reduces development costs, encourages Ground System (DCGS), which is a Web-based managers are essentially higher levels of performance, provides greater global intelligence-sharing network that spans making decisions based on adaptability to evolving requirements, and the military Services and defense intelligence lowers the risk of technology obsolescence.65 59 their personal perception of agencies. Included in the DCGS model is a the ISR enterprise Establish a Joint ISR Requirements set of open interface standards known as the Agent for DOD. The Intelligence Reform Act DCGS Integration Backbone, which provides of 2003 consolidated ISR program evaluation, a common framework to ensure interoper mission and operations, describe their vision assessment, and recommendations under ability, data-sharing, and collaboration among of the future, and help outline an investment the USD(I).66 Although this effort reflects a all elements.60 Although the DCGS outlines and technology strategy for accomplishing more centralized and coordinated approach a conceptual framework to ensure new ISR their objectives. It is also essential that the ISR to ISR acquisition, actual requirements for ISR capabilities can interact, it does not provide the enterprise architecture be coordinated and capabilities are still originated and defined in holistic enterprise architecture in the systems endorsed by the Service chiefs, USD(I), and accordance with DOD legacy procedures. The engineering sense needed to assess require DNI to ensure ISR acquisition activities are establishment of a joint requirements agent to ments for new capabilities and make sound consistent with the strategic vision of DOD help validate capability gaps and oversee the investment decisions. and the Intelligence Community. definition and preparation of requirements In the systems engineering discipline, Establish Standards and Baseline Capa- would substantially enhance USD(I) oversight an enterprise architecture is simply a docu bilities for Sensor Development. At one time, of ISR acquisition programs. mented model of an organization’s current the U.S. defense establishment only acquired A viable candidate for a joint ISR (as is) state, its target (to be) state, and a systems and equipment that adhered to rigid requirements agent is U.S. Strategic sequencing plan for moving between the military specifications and standards. In order Command (USSTRATCOM). In 2003, two.61 In addition to a thorough inventory of to incorporate the rapid expansion of technol USSTRATCOM was given the responsibil strategic assets, an ISR enterprise architecture ogy over the past quarter century, the defense ity to plan, integrate, and coordinate ISR in would define organizational components of acquisition community has now adopted an support of DOD operations. To execute this the ISR enterprise and the interrelationships open systems development approach based responsibility, the command established the and interdependencies of those organiza on commercial specifications and standards. Joint Functional Component Command for tions. It would define the ISR mission of each Although the open systems approach has Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais component and document the information enhanced the performance and capabilities sance (JFCC–ISR),67 whose current role is to needed to achieve that mission. An enterprise of individual systems, it has also shifted the match customer mission requirements with architecture would also document a transition burden of specification adherence from the existing ISR assets and synchronize DOD, 74 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu KOSTKA national, and allied ISR collection efforts.68 3 Bruce Rolfson, “Air Force Draws Fire in Bid 39 GAO, ISR: DoD Can Better Assess, 2. Expanding its role to include the validation to Control UAVs,” Army Times, April 24, 2007. 40 Best, 2. 4 41 and preparation of new operational and func Shalal-Esa, 1. GAO, ISR: Preliminary Observations, 7. 5 42 tional requirements would utilize USSTRAT U.S. Government Accountability Office Maryann Lawlor, “Defense Intelligence (GAO), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnais- Charts Course,” SIGNAL Magazine, August COM’s knowledge of existing ISR assets. sance: Preliminary Observations on DoD’s Approach 2005, available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 75 MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform By Christopher J. L a m b , M a t t h e w J . s C h m i d t , and B e r i t G . Fitzsimmons U.S. Army (Kamil Sztalkoper) ine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent case study for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon’s emphasis on develop ing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities. The debate was highlighted by Ma series of recent articles in Joint Force Quarterly,1 including one by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who cited the slow fielding of MRAPs as a prime example of the Pen tagon’s institutional resistance to investments in irregular warfare capabilities. He personally intervened to ensure more than 10,000 MRAPs were fielded quickly. Yet some analysts now argue MRAPs are not really useful for irregular warfare and are prohibitively expensive.2 As General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), asserted, “It is the wrong vehicle, too late, to fit a threat we were actually managing.”3 Army Chief of Staff reviews photographs of vehicle damage caused by IEDs in Afghanistan Soldiers in MRAPs clear vegetation that could conceal IEDs along roadside in Iraq U.S. Army (David J. Marshall) 76 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB, SCHMIDT, and FITZSIMMONS The controversial MRAPs raise two soft underbellies. By early 2005, insurgents one part of the solution, but there were few questions. First, does the MRAP experience were using IEDs to conduct both side and options readily available. The Army could support the contention that the Pentagon is under-vehicle attacks against the entire range only find about 200 up-armored Humvees not sufficiently able to field irregular warfare of U.S. armored vehicles. They also were using to deliver to Iraq. Clearly more were needed. capabilities? Second, what factors best explain a particularly lethal form of IED known as the Two courses of action were taken. First, the the MRAP failure, whether that failure is explosively formed penetrator (EFP), which is Army decided to procure more up-armored determined to be their delayed fielding or the able to better penetrate armor and, in doing Humvees to replace the thin-skinned ver fact that they were fielded at all? We conclude so, spray elements of the weapons and the sions. The Army worked with manufactur that MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare vehicle armor into the vehicle’s interior. The ers to increase production from 51 vehicles requirement and that the Pentagon should sophisticated EFPs never amounted to more per month in August 2003 to 400 vehicles By Christopher J. L a m b , M a t t h e w J . s C h m i d t , have been better prepared to field them, albeit than 5 to 10 percent of the IEDs employed by per month in September 2004, and later to not on the scale demanded by events in Iraq. and B e r i t G . Fitzsimmons We also argue that the proximate cause of by early 2005, insurgents were using improvised explosive the failure to quickly field MRAPs is not the Pentagon’s acquisition system but rather the devices to conduct both side and under-vehicle attacks against requirements process, reinforced by more the entire range of U.S. armored vehicles fundamental organizational factors. These findings suggest that acquisition reform is the insurgents, but they caused 40 percent of IED 550 vehicles per month. Second, the Army wrong target for advancing Secretary Gates’ casualties. From spring into summer 2005, approved the emergency expedient of adding objective of improving irregular warfare capa their use increased from about one per week armor kits to the existing Humvees because bilities, and that achieving the objective will to roughly one every other day. they could be fielded more quickly than the require more extensive reforms than many The IED Challenge and Initial Armor up-armored Humvees. realize. Decisions. Field commanders and Washing The House Armed Services Commit ton also realized early on that IEDs were a tee (HASC) monitored these efforts and, IEDs and Armored Vehicles in Iraq complex problem requiring a multifaceted pursuing a mandate from Representative By June 2003, 3 months after the initial response. Better armored vehicles would be Duncan Hunter (R–CA), took it upon itself to coalition intervention in Iraq, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had emerged as the enemy’s weapon of choice. That month, FigureFigure 1. 1.Percentage Percentage of of IED-causedIED-caused Fatalities Fatalities and and Total Total Fatalities Fatalities then–U.S. Central Command commander General John Abizaid, USA, declared IEDs his Fatalities “No. 1 threat.” By December the percentage % IED-caused fatalities of fatalities caused by IEDs rose to roughly 160 80 half of all U.S. combat deaths, and from the 70 summer of 2005 until the spring of 2008, they 140 caused 50 to 80 percent of U.S. fatalities (see 120 60 figure 1). The threat evolved over time, but all major forms of IEDs were apparent early 100 50 on—by 2004 or 2005 at the latest. Initially, the enemy tossed charges under moving vehicles 80 40 but soon began using roadside bombs set off Fatalities 60 30 remotely by electronic devices. As up-armored % IED-caused Fatalities Humvees became more prevalent, insurgents 40 20 buried large bombs in the roads to attack their Deep-buried IEDs more prominent 20 10 Explosively formed projectiles arrive Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Senior Research Fellow 0 0 in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the MAR 03 JUN 03 SEP 03 DEC 03 MAR 04 JUN 04 SEP 04 DEC 04 MAR 05 JUN 05 SEP 05 DEC 05 MAR 06 JUN 06 SEP 06 DEC 06 MAR 07 JUN 07 SEP 07 DEC 07 MAR 08 JUN 08 SEP 08 DEC 08 National Defense University. Matthew J. Schmidt is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army School The box represents the roughly 2-year period before the 2007 “surge” when U.S. operational strategy of Advanced Military Studies. Berit G. Fitzsimmons was to reduce risks to U.S. forces and transfer security responsibilities to Iraq. interned for the Research and Analysis Team of the Sources: Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, The Iraq Index (Washington, DC: The Brookings Project on National Security Reform from January to Institution), available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 77 SPECIAL FEATURE | MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform investigate Pentagon claims that production of Within a week of the exchange with the incensed that in the President’s budget request the add-on kits could not be accelerated. The Soldier in Kuwait, Secretary Rumsfeld made for fiscal year 2005, the Army had categorized HASC staffers shuttled between manufactur delivery of up-armored Humvees and add-on the up-armored Humvee and add-on armor ers and suppliers, using their private sector armor kits a priority, and Pentagon officials kits as “unfunded” requirements: “At a time experience to clear production bottlenecks “vowed to eliminate the armored-vehicle when you’re in a war fight and you’ve got and get the kits into the field. With Congress shortage in Iraq and Afghanistan within six these IEDs . . . and we’re taking fairly sub pushing hard, the Pentagon and several Army months.”4 The Army was compliant but not stantial casualties, why would force protec depots increased production from 35 kits enthusiastic. The Service’s Director of Force tion, such as up-armor, ever be an unfunded per month in December 2003 to 600 kits per Development noted both the expense of the requirement?”6 month by July 2004. Consequently, 7,000 kits program (over $4 billion) and the Secretary’s When it became clear that even the were delivered 6 months ahead of the Penta determination: “This is an enormously up-armored Humvees offered insufficient gon’s original timetable. Still, only 5,330 of expensive program, but very frankly, the com protection against IEDs, Senators from across the 8,105 up-armored Humvees required by munication from the secretary of defense has the political spectrum, including Ted Stevens September 2004 were in place. been real clear.”5 (R–AK) and Joe Biden (D–DE), weighed in on As the IED problem grew and insuf The Political Problem. Pressure to do what Missouri Republican Kit Bond decried ficient numbers of up-armored Humvees more to counter IEDs did not begin with the as an unacceptable “set of bureaucratic delays” were available, innovative U.S. troops began concerned Soldier’s question to Secretary in fielding MRAPs. Media and whistleblower adding improvised armor to their vehicles. Rumsfeld. Representative Hunter and the exposés, war college studies, congressional investigations, and inspector general reports castigated Pentagon performance. Legislators Marines put Cougar H 4x4 MRAP complained about the inability to “legislate through offroad course test a sense of urgency” and withheld funding until improvements in armor were made. In short, there was sustained political pressure to do something about the IED problem and provide better vehicular armor to the troops. Pentagon Organizational Adaptation. The Pentagon did not anticipate or prepare well for the possibility of postwar disorder. As many studies have concluded, senior civilian leadership expected U.S. military forces to leave Iraq quickly. This proved impossible as the insurgency heated up and produced the enemy intended to use improvised explosive devices and distribute the images of their effects to force the United States to leave Iraq U.S. Marine Corps (Jason W. Fudge) U.S. Marine Corps (Jason W. casualties that contributed to declining Scrap metal, plywood, and sandbags were HASC were already on the task. However, the American public support for the interven used to increase protection. The problem was incident propelled the armor issue into the tion. As General George Casey, USA, then- highlighted in December 2004 when a Soldier public consciousness. In Congress, numer commander of Multi-National Force–Iraq, complained about the improvised armor to ous Representatives and Senators from both noted in 2004, the enemy intended to use then–Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld parties complained about the Pentagon’s IEDs and distribute the images of their effects in a town hall meeting in Kuwait. The Sec inadequate efforts to supply the troops with to force the United States to leave Iraq. Pen retary’s response about “going to war with armor as well as other irregular warfare tagon leaders knew that countering IEDs was the Army you have” and his further explana equipment such as body armor and electronic imperative. tion that the lack of armor was a “problem jammers. Hunter was particularly active. His In response, a new organization to of physics” implied nothing could be done HASC hearings on military acquisition were combat IEDs was created. In September 2003, about the situation, which elicited a firestorm excruciating for the Pentagon. In an April 21, at the behest of General Abizaid, the Army set of protest from Members of Congress, the 2004, hearing, Hunter related in detail how he up a small unit dedicated to defeating IEDs, public, and manufacturers who insisted they and his staff also had built a perfectly useable which adopted the motto: “Stop the bleeding.” could increase production to meet the needs up-armored Humvee with help from Home The task force concentrated on the portion of U.S. troops. Depot. Hunter and his staff were particularly of the IED problem “left of the boom”—that 78 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB, SCHMIDT, and FITZSIMMONS is, on improving ways to avoid IEDs and prerogative of the military Services based on The slow approval of MRAP require attacking the ability of insurgents to make, their assessment of requirements. ments did not reflect lack of appreciation for emplace, and control the IEDs before they MRAP Requirements: The Lost 2 their effectiveness. Early and throughout the went off. The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force Years. Field commanders wanted more war, U.S. experts on military requirements also put its emphasis on solutions “left of the armor in general and MRAPs in particular. recommended armored cars and MRAPs for boom.” The following summer, in July 2004, First, a Military Police commander in Iraq Iraqi forces also under attack from IEDs, but the Army-centric task force was upgraded to issued an urgent request in June 2003 for those in charge of Pentagon requirements did an Army-led Joint Integrated Process Team to armored security vehicles (ASVs) to help not think they were a good fit for the U.S. mili harness the expertise of all the Services. From protect U.S. military convoys and patrols. tary. An internal Marine Corps report9 found September 2004 on, the Secretary of Defense The ASVs were lighter than the MRAPs that that the Marine requirements process largely and Deputy Secretary of Defense issued were ultimately fielded but similarly designed discounted the need for MRAPs. When Marine memoranda authorizing expedited procure for better protection against mines and other Corps senior leaders convened on March ment of equipment designed to save lives ambushes. Also late in the summer of 2003, 29–30, 2005, to consider the need for MRAPs, and created the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell the Army’s 101st Airborne Division issued a flag officers heard a strong case for their (JRAC) for that purpose. The following year, plea for more vehicle armor and training to immediate purchase from a Marine who had the Pentagon upgraded its efforts to combat evade IEDs. In September, other command long studied their value in irregular warfare. IEDs by creating the Joint IED Task Force. By ers began to request MRAPs. By November, The assistant commandant of the Marine the time the Joint IED Task Force became the a draft “urgent universal need statement” for Corps then “directed the Deputy Commandant Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), it controlled hundreds of personnel and annual budgets of more than $3 billion. Figure 2. Trendline for IED Fatalities Before the Surge and MRAP The Pentagon organizations dedicated DeploymentsFigure 2: Trendline for IED Fatalities Before the Surge and MRAP Deployments to countering IEDs could claim some success. IED effectiveness (measured by the ability to 90 IED-caused Fatalities produce coalition casualties) dropped from 80 a high of over 50 percent early in the war to less than 10 percent effectiveness by the time 70 MRAPs began flowing to theater in the fall of 2007. Thus, JIEDDO and other counter-IED 60 efforts such as up-armored Humvees reduced 50 the average effectiveness of an insurgent IED attack, thereby forcing insurgents to stage 40 more attacks to obtain equivalent effects. 30 Unfortunately, the insurgents were able to do so and actually to increase their ability to 20 inflict U.S. fatalities (see figure 2). Clearly, the battle against IEDs was not being won. 07 JUL 04–JUL Number of IED-caused Fatalities 10 In this context, considering better 0 armored vehicles was an obvious option, JUL 07 JUL 06 JUL 05 JUL 04 SEP 06 SEP 05 SEP 04 FEB 07 FEB 06 FEB 05 JAN 07 JAN 06 JAN 05 JUN 07 JUN 06 JUN 05 APR 07 APR 06 APR 05 DEC 06 DEC 05 DEC 04 OCT 06 OCT 05 OCT 04 MAY 07 MAY MAY 06 MAY MAY 05 MAY AUG 06 AUG AUG 05 AUG AUG 04 AUG NOV 06 NOV 05 NOV 04 MAR 07 MAR MAR 06 MAR but JIEDDO did not push the issue for two 05 MAR reasons. First, the organization focused more on prevention than protection. The predilec tion for working the IED problem left of the boom was consistent with an offensive mental MRAPs from a Marine field commander was for Combat Development and Integration to ity (attacking the IED network) and offered the circulating in the Pentagon. The final version, review the feasibility of developing or buying a possibility of a more elegant solution if it could sent on February 17, 2005, made the case that new, mine-resistant tactical vehicle to replace be achieved. This orientation was so strong the Marines should not continue to absorb the [Humvee] and to present the results at the that some JIEDDO members were dismissive casualties from IEDs when commercial off- next Executive Safety Board meeting.”10 That of field commanders for wanting to “place the-shelf MRAPs are available, and that these did not happen. Instead, the decision was made a cocoon around the soldier driving down avoidable casualties carried the “potential to to hold out for a future vehicle that would meet the street in his vehicle” rather than “taking jeopardize mission success.”8 Despite such all the requirements for mobility and protec out the IEDs first.”7 Second, JIEDDO did not requests from the field, it took more than tion better than either the up-armored Humvee have responsibility for acquisition of better 2 years, political pressure from Congress, or MRAPs. The Army requirements process armored vehicles. Its mandate allowed it to and a determined intervention by the Sec was even less favorably inclined toward the fund development of better armor for MRAPs, retary of Defense before the JROC validated vehicle, always moving more slowly than the but it did not have authority to procure and a large purchase of MRAPs as a military Marines to approve MRAP requirements and sustain better armored vehicles, which was the requirement. in smaller numbers. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 79 SPECIAL FEATURE | MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform Field commanders persisted, however, spring of 2007 that MRAPs were unfunded Almost 3 years after units in the field and in 2006 finally succeeded in getting the requirements. When General Cody noted submitted their requests for MRAPs, the Pen Pentagon requirements process to approve the the Army “did not have a valid requirement tagon requirements system had moved to the vehicles. On May 21, 2006, the commanding except for 335 MRAP vehicles when the point where senior Service leadership could general, Multi-National Force–West, submit 2008 Title IV supplemental was being built,” invite Congress to pay for a large number of ted a request for 185 MRAPs to the Joint he was interrupted by Representative Gene the vehicles if it was willing to do so over and Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Taylor (D–MS): above the Pentagon’s normal budget and its and in July he submitted a request for 1,000 warfighting supplemental. Two months later, more. The eventual approval of the require But we are getting back to that word require- Secretary Gates announced MRAPs were the ment for 1,185 MRAPs cleared the way for ment. And I have pointed out three instances Pentagon’s number-one acquisition priority. a joint acquisition program, which began where somebody tried to fight this war on the Shortly thereafter, the JROC validated huge in November 2006. However, an approved cheap [with needless casualties] because of MRAP requirements, first for 7,774 and then MRAP requirement did not guarantee the body armor, because of Humvees and because for 15,374 vehicles. program a high priority, as was soon made of jammers. So the question is: Why do we go Strategy Significance: The MRAP clear by HASC testimony on March 13, 2007, through this again? . . . If this vehicle is going Impact. Fielding MRAPs would have sup by Generals Robert Magnus, USMC, and to save lives, if Humvees, as we now know, are ported both the U.S. operational strategy Richard Cody, USA. vulnerable to mines and a hugely dispropor- under General Casey and the substantially General Magnus acknowledged MRAPs tionate number of casualties are occurring in revised U.S. approach to the insurgency under are “up to 400 percent more effective than Humvees because of mines and we have a way General David Petraeus. With encouragement the up-armored Humvees in reducing inju to address that, why don’t we address it now? from civilian leadership looking forward to a ries and deaths” and can “cut casualties by withdrawal of some U.S. forces, Casey’s opera perhaps as much as two-thirds.”11 Yet just Taylor complained that the Army “seems to tional strategy was to pull U.S. forces back and as the Services classified armor kits and be dragging their feet.” General Magnus then reduce casualties while pushing Iraqi forces up-armored Humvees as “unfunded require intervened to support General Cody and forward into the fight. Fielding MRAPs would ments” in 2004, General Magnus and General argued that MRAPs were a “rapidly evolving have complemented Casey’s strategy well by Cody explained to the dismayed HASC in the requirement over the past three months.”12 better protecting U.S. forces as they moved to and from their protected enclaves, reducing political pressure for rapid withdrawal, and an approved MRAP requirement did not guarantee the buying time for the transition to reliance on program a high priority, as was soon made clear by the Iraqi army and police. When MRAPs were House Armed Services Committee testimony finally approved as a requirement for U.S. forces in mid-2007, General Petraeus’s new MRAPs wait to be unloaded from USNS Pililaau at Shuaybah Port, Kuwait U.S. Navy (Kelvin Surgener) 80 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB, SCHMIDT, and FITZSIMMONS strategy was just being implemented. He sup reduction in IED-related (not total) fatali instead focused on attacking the precursors to ported the dispersion of an increasing number ties postulated by General Magnus in 2007 IED explosions. of U.S. forces (the so-called surge of five addi would have been dramatic (see figure 4). ■■ Senior military leaders only validated tional Army brigades) among the Iraq popula Such a drop in casualties would have reduced better armored vehicle requirements under tion, principally in Baghdad. The acquisition political pressure for withdrawal and bought pressure from two Secretaries of Defense and system was already primed to move quickly time for Casey’s strategy of pushing Iraqi Congress, despite the demonstrated effective on MRAPs before the Iraq War began because forces forward, just as it facilitated the strat ness of better armored vehicles and early Army engineers had negotiated the Army egy of securing the population that General appeals from field commanders. requirements process well enough to obtain Petraeus supported. ■■ The acquisition system fielded effec a handful of MRAP prototypes for clearing tive MRAPs quickly once they were approved mines from transportation routes.13 This Explaining Delayed Fielding and funded not only because Congress and fact, along with the support of Congress and The overview of the Pentagon’s record Secretary Gates made them a top priority but Secretary Gates, allowed more than 10,000 on fielding MRAPs corrects some mis also because the system had already developed MRAPs to be fielded in record time—about a taken impressions and substantiates some and tested MRAP prototypes. year and a half. popular concerns. The following points bear The MRAPs made a significant impact emphasis: In retrospect, it is clear that the acqui once they arrived in theater, but their effect sition system was not responsible for the was obscured by the decline in violence that ■■ The Pentagon was poorly prepared for Pentagon’s lack of preparedness for irregular accompanied the American shift in strategy irregular warfare and the IED ambush tactics warfare or its inability to respond quickly under General Petraeus. In addition to other it encountered in Iraq. to the need for better armored vehicles. The factors such as cooperation with Sunni ■■ The IED threat evolved, but all types tribal leaders, the surge in U.S. forces and of IED attacks—side, underbody, and EFP— testimony in March 2007 to General Petraeus’s emphasis on population were evident by 2004 or 2005 at the latest, so the effect that MRAPs could security helped produce a sharp drop in vio the need for better armored vehicles requested lence—including IED attacks—from summer by commanders in the field was evident. “cut casualties by perhaps as 2007 onward. That drop meant fewer U.S. ■■ While the acquisition system had to be much as two-thirds” seems casualties. As expected, American casualties pushed to provide armor kits and up-armored well founded (fatalities and wounded) from IED attacks Humvees faster, the Pentagon did make dropped even further after MRAPs arrived. special efforts to address the IED problem. glaring deficiency was in the Pentagon’s By the time 10,000 MRAPs were deployed ■■ Despite huge resources (for example, requirements system, which requires further in December 2008, the percentage of U.S. $12.4 billion for JIEDDO from 2006 to explanation. casualties in Iraq attributable to the IED 2008), the new organizations did not have Armored Vehicles and Military attacks that MRAPs were designed to defend the authority to tackle the IED problem in a Requirements. The major tradeoffs between against had dropped precipitously. As figure 3 comprehensive manner—particularly where MRAPs and lighter tactical vehicles were illustrates, when MRAPs began to flow to Iraq armoring vehicles was concerned—and well understood from the beginning. As in November 2007, almost 60 percent of U.S. Figure 3. MRAPs Deployed and Percentage of IED-caused Casualties casualties were attributed to IEDs. Just over Figure 3. MRAPs Deployed and Percentage of IED-caused Casualties a year later, with 10,000 MRAPs in country, only 5 percent of casualties were attribut 12,000 80 able to IEDs, even though insurgents were 70 targeting the vehicles with IEDs for symbolic 10,000 14 reasons. In short, General Magnus’s testi 60 mony in March 2007 to the effect that MRAPs 8,000 could “cut casualties by perhaps as much as 50 two-thirds” seems well founded. 6,000 40 It is natural to speculate about the MRAPs 30 impact of fielding MRAPs earlier. Using 4,000 20 the same MRAP fielding timelines from % IED-caused casualties 2,000 later in the war, and assuming other factors 10 are held constant, we can postulate the 0 effect if MRAPs had been fielded after the 0 NOV 07 DEC 07 JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08 MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08 SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08 receipt of the first urgent needs statement in February 2005. Arguably, MRAPs would Cumulative number of MRAPs deployed have achieved an even more dramatic reduc Percentage of IED-caused fatalities tion in IED effectiveness earlier in the war since other counter-IED efforts were not Overall downward trend in percentage of IED-caused fatalities yet bearing fruit. But even the two-thirds ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 81 SPECIAL FEATURE | MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform Representative Hunter noted, the advantages mobility of a Humvee,”16 which is a difficult were advising the Iraq military early on that the MRAP has over a Humvee are clear: “It’s engineering challenge. Since force protection they needed MRAPs for counterinsurgency, a simple formula. A vehicle that’s 1 foot off requirements vary from one irregular conflict so their value for irregular warfare was under the ground gets 16 times that [blast] impact to another, the optimum number and mix of stood. The reality is that decisionmakers in that you get in a vehicle that’s 4 feet off the armored vehicles, and the way they balance the Pentagon’s requirements system were not ground,” such as the MRAP.15 However, the mobility, survivability, and other attributes, is enthusiastic about any additional armor, much higher clearance and heavier armor also not self-evident. The relative value of surviv less heavy, expensive MRAPs. Decisions to make the vehicle less stable and diminish ability, mobility, and other armored vehicle provide additional armor were imposed on the mobility, making it impossible to navigate attributes is a function of multiple factors, system, first by Secretary Rumsfeld and then narrow urban streets or rough off-road including the threat posed to U.S. forces, by Secretary Gates. The lack of enthusiasm for terrain. The new MRAP All Terrain Vehicle which evolved over time. additional armor was manifest in the argu being developed for the rugged terrain of That said, the evolution of the IED threat ment made by force development leaders that Afghanistan, where IED use and effectiveness does not adequately explain the resistance to insurgents would simply build bigger IEDs in are on the rise, is smaller and designed to purchasing MRAPs for U.S. forces. First of all, response, and thus “you can’t armor your way minimize the tradeoff between mobility and the requirements system was slow to validate out of this problem.”17 survivability. The future vehicle is supposed the need for the vehicles even after insurgents The contention that additional armor to provide the “same level of protection as the were using all the major types of IEDs. More is futile because it can be defeated is not a previous MRAPs [used in Iraq], but with the over, Department of Defense (DOD) experts good requirements argument. By that logic, Figure 4. Hypothetical Reduction in Fatalities from Earlier Fielding of MRAPs the lack of enthusiasm for Figure 7. Hypothetical Reduction in Fatalities from Earlier Fielding of MRAPs additional armor was manifest 160 in the argument made by Fatalities assuming 65% MRAP “save rate” (2,612) Actual total fatalities (4,221) force development leaders 140 that insurgents would simply 120 build bigger IEDs in response 100 we would never use armor for any purpose. 80 Armor has value not because it is invulnerable 60 but because it makes the enemy’s job more dif Killed in action ficult and the tasks of U.S. forces easier. As one 40 commander of a division in Baghdad noted, 20 MRAPs forced insurgents to build bigger and more sophisticated bombs. Those bombs take 0 more time and resources to make and set up, MAR 03JUN 03SEP 03DEC 03MAR 04JUN 04SEP 04DEC 04MAR 05JUN 05SEP 05DEC 05MAR 06JUN 06SEP 06DEC 06MAR 07JUN 07SEP 07DEC 07MAR 08JUN 08SEP 08DEC 08 which gives U.S. forces a better chance of catch ing the insurgents in the act. The extra armor also boosts the confidence of U.S. troops and permits a quick response to ambushes. The requirement for MRAPs was acknowledged slowly because they are useful primarily for a DOD (Cherie A. Thurlby) limited defensive purpose in irregular warfare campaigns such as Iraq and Afghanistan that Service leaders prefer to avoid and hope will be short-lived. In this regard, the Pentagon requirements system was true to its historical mindset, which discounts the importance and persistence of irregular warfare. Irregular Warfare and Force Protec- tion. Pentagon officials defend the general lack of readiness for IEDs by arguing the threat could not have been anticipated, but the need for better vehicular protection was evident long before the intervention in Iraq. As is well understood, irregular warriors MRAPs on assembly line in Ladson, South Carolina typically hide among noncombatants, so they 82 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB, SCHMIDT, and FITZSIMMONS are not easily identified and defeated and use costs must be kept low in comparison with ASVs. By the time U.S. forces went to Iraq, ambushes and other hit-and-run tactics to perceived interests and progress, and it is only 2 percent of the Army’s 110,000 Humvees bleed and frustrate regular forces. Because a tactical imperative because hit-and-run were armored, and only the Military Police insurgents are hard to find and use ambush attacks at close quarters and from any direc were equipped with ASVs. For these and other tactics, a patient strategy of securing the tion are the norm. This is why counterinsur reasons, the DOD inspector general’s report population is required to defeat them. When gents historically invest more in key infra on MRAPs correctly concluded that DOD the population feels secure, it is more likely to structure protection, static fortifications to should have been better prepared to provide provide information to help locate the insur protect lines of communication (blockhouses armored vehicles for irregular warfare.20 gents and avoid their ambushes. or fortified operating bases), and improved Two qualifications may be raised to the Yet such a patient strategy requires force protection on the march. Convoys proposition that the Pentagon should have sustained support from the U.S. public, which that transport and supply the forces that been better prepared for the enhanced vehicu is more likely to offer that support when costs, constantly pursue the insurgents and protect lar armor requirements of irregular warfare. including American casualties, remain low in the population must include well-armored First, force protection is not an end in itself. comparison with perceived national interests vehicles that serve as firing platforms to Instead, “aggressive saturation patrolling, and discernible progress. Since the Iraq War quickly counter ambushes. ambushes, and listening post operations must was controversial from the beginning and Lessons from past U.S. participation in be conducted, risk shared with the populace, progress was not evident, it was particularly irregular warfare emphasize the importance and contact maintained.”21 Withdrawing important to limit casualties. The number of of force protection and armored mobility.19 inside of large, well-fortified vehicles may Americans who thought the level of U.S. mili The up-armored Humvee program originated seem like the tactical equivalent of retreat tary casualties in Iraq was “acceptable” given with the U.S. intervention in Somalia, but ing to large bases. On the contrary, as the the goals of the war dropped from a slight soon after U.S. forces left there the program new U.S. counterinsurgency manual notes, majority in June 2003 to 21 percent by the was phased out, only to be rushed forward counterinsurgents must treat “every logistic end of 2006.18 Support in Congress declined again when troops were sent to Bosnia. Both package or resupply operation [as] a mounted as well, and members of both parties were of these emergency acquisition efforts waned combat operation” and appreciate the need emphatic about the need to give the military quickly after the intervention. Only the U.S. for special equipment, including up-armored every possible means of reducing casualties. Army Military Police, which specialize in vehicles and specialized mine-clearing equip Thus, force protection in irregular population security, showed sustained inter ment (that is, MRAPs).22 A higher level of warfare is a strategic imperative because est in the up-armored Humvee program and protected mobility for troops conducting Soldier views damage to a vehicle caused by roadside IED in Baghdad U.S. Army (Ronald Shaw, Jr.) U.S. Army (Ronald Shaw, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 83 counterinsurgency supports rather than the absence of up-armored Humvees, ASVs, on military occupation, ranges from $1 million undermines an aggressive tactical spirit. or other armored car variants prior to Iraq to $2 million each. Considered in this context, The second qualification is that prior is much more difficult to justify than the and given their value for countering IEDs and to Iraq it was not clear that DOD needed to pre-war absence of a large fleet of much more reducing casualties, MRAPs were more than invest in a large fleet of MRAPs. As noted, expensive and heavy MRAPs. a bargain, and the same is true of up-armored determining the optimum number and mix Once the nature of the IED challenge in Humvees. Yet DOD refused to invest in better of armored vehicles for irregular warfare is Iraq became apparent, however, MRAPs should armored vehicles such as the up-armored a difficult requirements problem. However, have been fielded expeditiously. Instead, the Humvee before Iraq and was slow to field the one way to illustrate the extent to which the Services hoped to get by with less expensive up- MRAPs during the conflict. This tendency to United States should have anticipated the armored Humvees. Adding armor to a Humvee ignore irregular warfare requirements is not an force protection requirements in Iraq is by costs only $14,000; up-armored Humvees cost aberration but a persistent trend. comparing the U.S. experience there with the twice as much as the unarmored version (about The Pentagon Record on Irregular performance of other countries. Historically, $200,000), and MRAPs can cost three to seven Warfare Requirements. Incredibly, several forces well prepared for irregular warfare times as much as an up-armored Humvee, months after the Secretary of Defense have fielded MRAP variants, but more typi from $600,000 to over $1 million per vehicle. declared MRAPs the top defense acquisition cally they have had to compromise between The $25 billion cost projected for MRAPs is priority, his subordinates were explaining better protected armored personnel carriers high but not indefensible. Congress provided to Congress that MRAPs would be put in (APCs) with heavier armor and less visibility annual supplemental war funding in the hun storage because “Service chiefs have indi for the occupants and more mobile vehicles dreds of billions of dollars, and the overall cost cated that these are heavy, large vehicles that might not fit well with mobile expeditionary incredibly, several months after the Secretary of Defense declared missions.”25 The observation that MRAPs MRAPs the top defense acquisition priority, his subordinates were will not be a good fit for future conflicts explaining to Congress that MRAPs would be put in storage is odd since DOD strategy and planning guidance has long insisted irregular warfare will be a major element of the future threat with better visibility and less protection. Some of the Iraq War is estimated at over $1.6 tril environment. The perspective of the Service form of armored car variant is typically the lion. Moreover, the cold-blooded observation chiefs is at odds with national security result. Other national forces deployed to Iraq made by Senators24 and other sources is that policy and defense planning, but it is entirely and Afghanistan with better armored car protecting people in an all-volunteer military consistent with historic Service positions in variants than the United States, but they too is cheaper than replacing them. The cost of the Pentagon’s longstanding debate over the were left scrambling for MRAPs.23 If we hold enlisted casualties averages $500,000 each, nature and precise definition of irregular ourselves to the standards of other countries, while the cost for officer casualties, depending warfare capabilities. Soldiers install up-armored kits on Humvees in Afghanistan U.S. Army (Marcus J. Quarterman) 84 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB, SCHMIDT, and FITZSIMMONS This debate heated up in response to since World War II. Instead, the long delay Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (Arlington, the war on terror, figured prominently in the in fielding MRAPs is attributable first to the VA: DOD, 2008), available at Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition The 2009 annual competition was intended FIRST PLACE SECOND PLACE (Tie) to stimulate new approaches to coordinated Col Om Prakash, USAF, National War Del C. Kostka, National Geospatial- civilian and military action from a broad College Intelligence Agency, Air Command and Staff spectrum of civilian and military students. “The Efficacy of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’” College Essays were to address U.S. Government “Birds of a Feather: Moving Toward a structure, policies, capabilities, resources Joint Acquisition Process to Support SECOND PLACE (Tie) and/or practices and provide creative, the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Lt Col Steven J. Bleymaier, USAF, National feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate the Reconnaissance (ISR) Enterprise” War College core competencies of our national security “Games Bureaucrats and Politicians Play: A institutions. The competition attracted the Case Study on Congress’ Surprise Decision to largest number of entries since it began in THIRD PLACE Retire 18 B–52s” 2007. Four winners were selected, including LtCol Christopher J. Pankhurst, USMC, a Second Place tie. The NDU Foundation Naval War College awarded the First Place winner a generous “Transnational Crime: The Transformation of gift certificate from Amazon.com. Al Capone to al Qaeda” Distinguished Judges Front row, left to right: COL Robert H. Taylor, USA The NDU Foundation joins NDU Press in thanking the senior faculty judges and their (Ret.), U.S. Army War College; Prof. Charles C. respective institutions for their commitment at a busy time of the academic year. Their per- Chadbourn III, Naval War College; Dr. Stephen E. sonal dedication and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition. Wright, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Dr. Richard A. Melanson, National War College; Dr. Eric Shibuya, Marine Corps University; CAPT Joanne Fish, USN, Joint Forces Staff College. Middle row: Dr. Timothy Sanz, Army Command and General Staff College; Dr. James A. Mowbray, Air War College; Dr. Joseph J. Collins, National War College; Dr. Benjamin (Frank) Cooling, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College; Prof. Paul Romanski, Naval War College; LTC Richard (Dick) S. Tracey, USA (Ret.), Army Command and General Staff College. Back row: Prof. James R. Holmes, Naval War College; Dr. Stan Norris, Air War College; Dr. Lewis Griffith, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Keith D. Dickson, Joint Forces Staff College; Col Brett E. Morris, USAF, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Wray Johnson, Marine Corps University; Dr. Robert Banks, Marine Corps University; Dr. Kenneth Moss, Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Not shown: Prof. Stephen A. Emerson, Naval War College. NDU 86 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu The NDU Foundation is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Force Quarterly writing competitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 19–20, 2009, during which 22 faculty judges from participating Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions selected the best entries in each category. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition This annual competition, in its 28th year in 2009, challenged students at the Nation’s JPME institutions to write research papers or articles about significant aspects of Strategic Research Paper Strategy Article national security strategy to stimulate FIRST PLACE Lt Col Matt Isler, USAF, strategic thinking, promote well-written FIRST PLACE LtCol Daniel Canfield, USMC, National War College research, and contribute to a broader security Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting “Graying Panda, Shrinking Dragon: The Impact debate among professionals. The First Place “The Past as Prologue: Winfield Scott’s 1847 of Chinese Demographic Changes on Northeast winners in each category received a generous Mexico City Campaign as a Model for Future Asian Security” Amazon.com gift certificate courtesy of the War” SECOND PLACE NDU Foundation. SECOND PLACE Lincoln B. Krause, Central Lt Col Martin K. Schlacter, USAF, Industrial College of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency, National War College th “Playing for the Breaks: Understanding Insur- “Defining Today’s 5 -Generation National gent Strategic Mistakes” Security Environment and Its Implications” Joint Force Quarterly THIRD PLACE COL Andrew W. Backus, USA, Kiley Awards THIRD PLACE Lt Col Stephen B. Waller, U.S. Army War College Each year, judges select the USAF, U.S. Army War College “Growing Interagency Leaders from Grass most influential article in each of four JFQ “Fostering Cooperative Relations with China: Roots” departments: Forum, Feature, Interagency U.S. Economic and Military Strategy” Dialogue, and Recall. Best Forum Article COL Kevin M. Cieply, ARNG Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy NDU Foundation University. The Foundation provides NDU with “Rendition: The Beast and the Man” privately funded resources for: Best Feature Article The NDU Foundation is a Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization n Education, Research, Library, and Teaching Consultant, Department of Defense established in 1982 to Activities “The Defense Implications of Demographic support and enhance the mission and goals n Academic Chairs, Faculty Fellowships, and Trends” of the National Defense University, America’s Student Awards preeminent institution for military, civilian, and n Best Interagency Dialogue Article Endowments, Honoraria, Seminars, and diplomatic national security education, research, Conferences Charles A. Stevenson outreach, and strategic studies. The Foundation n Multicultural, International, and Interagency The Johns Hopkins University promotes excellence and innovation in education Programs “Underlying Assumptions of the National by nurturing high standards of scholarship, n Security Act of 1947” National Security and Homeland Defense leadership, and professionalism. It brings Outreach Best Recall Article together dedicated individuals, corporations, Karl F. Walling Naval War College organizations, and groups that are committed Keep informed about NDU Foundation activities “Why a Conversation with the Country? A to advancing America’s national security and by visiting online at: Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking defense capabilities through the National Defense www.nduf.org Maritime Strategists” ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 87 ESSAY WINNERS | The Efficacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” There is no more intimate relationship . . . they eat and sleep together. They use the same facilities day after day. They are compelled to stay together in the closest association. —U.S. Senator describing the life of a Soldier Experiments within the Army in the solution of social problems are fraught with danger to efficiency, discipline, and morale. —U.S. Army general officer U.S. Air Force (Shelley Gill) U.S. Air Force By Om Prakash The Efficacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Homosexual Servicemembers have had to compromise their personal integrity by keeping their sexuality secret Colonel Om Prakash, USAF, wrote this essay while a student at the National War College. It won the 2009 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition. 88 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PRAKASH hough the epigraphs echo Pentagon policy, subject to the executive arguments made against orders of the President. As a companion to the homosexuals serving openly in DADT policy, Congress permanently stifled T the Armed Forces, they are the this route, to the chagrin of the President. words of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia To preclude any future action to lift the ban and General Omar Bradley in opposition via executive order, Congress wrote into law, to President Truman’s 1948 executive order “Pursuant to the powers conferred by Section to racially integrate the U.S. military.1 The U.S. Army 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United Opposition to homosexuals serving openly in discourse has gone beyond what is best for the military is reminiscent of opposition to President States, it lies within the discretion of the Con- combat effectiveness of the military to become Harry Truman’s desegregation of military gress to establish qualifications for and condi- a vehicle for those seeking both to retract and tions of service in the armed forces.”7 expand homosexual rights throughout society. It has used experts in science, law, budgeting, has led to an uncomfortable value disconnect Rationale and military experience in an effort to settle as homosexuals serving, estimated to be over During congressional debate, there an issue deeply tied to social mores, religion, 65,000,4 must compromise personal integrity. were three components to the argument sup- and personal values. Given the growing gap between social mores porting the ban on homosexuals serving in A turning point in the debate came in and the law, DADT may do damage to the the military: health risks, lifestyle risks, and 1993. Keeping a promise made during his very unit cohesion that it seeks to protect. unit cohesion.8 campaign, President Bill Clinton attempted Finally, it has placed commanders in a posi- The Army Surgeon General offered to lift the ban on homosexuals serving in the tion where they are expected to know every- statistics showing a homosexual lifestyle military. After strong resistance from the thing about their troops except this one aspect. was associated with high rates of HIV/AIDS, leadership in both the Pentagon and Congress, hepatitis B, and other sexually transmitted a compromise was reached as Congress passed Origins diseases. Aside from the increased health risk, 10 United States Code §654, colloquially During the 1992 campaign, Presidential statistics also showed a homosexual lifestyle known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT).2 hopeful Bill Clinton made homosexuals in the was associated with high rates of promiscu- This law, which allowed homosexuals to serve military a political issue, promising to change ity, alcoholism, and drug abuse.9 Ultimately, as long as they did not admit their orientation, the Pentagon’s policy that only heterosexuals neither of the first two arguments made it survived the Clinton and Bush administra- could serve in the military.5 On taking office, into the rationale offered in §654—ostensibly tions essentially unchanged. Repealing the because these risk factors are not uniquely ban on homosexuals serving openly was also a associated with homosexuality and could be campaign promise of Barack Obama, though it is necessary to consider screened for and dealt with in a manner other his transition team stated that they did not the evidence as to whether than determining sexual orientation. plan to tackle the issue until 2010.3 As this homosexuality is a choice, as The central argument, and the only U.S. Air Force (Shelley Gill) U.S. Air Force debate reignites, it is worthwhile to reexamine the courts have traditionally one that made it into law, rested on unit the original premises that went into forming protected immutable cohesion. The final language adopted by the DADT policy, explore the cost and effec- characteristics Congress stated: tiveness of the law, and finally, with 16 years of societal drift, revisit the premises on which One of the most critical elements in combat it is based. President Clinton initially assumed the ban capability is unit cohesion, that is, the bonds There are five central issues. First, §654 could be lifted with an executive order, similar of trust among individual service members has had a significant cost in both personnel to the method President Harry Truman used that make the combat effectiveness of a and treasure. Second, the stated premise to racially desegregate the military. He met military unit greater than the sum of the of the law—to protect unit cohesion and fierce opposition in Congress led by Senator combat effectiveness of the individual unit combat effectiveness—is not supported by any Sam Nunn (D–GA), who organized extensive members. . . . The presence in the armed scientific studies. Strong emotional appeals House and Senate Armed Services Commit- forces of persons who demonstrate a propen- are available to both sides. However, societal tee (HASC and SASC, respectively) hearings sity or intent to engage in homosexual acts views have grown far more accommodating on the ban of homosexuals in the military. would create an unacceptable risk to the in the last 16 years, and there are now foreign Two other factions emerged in Congress, one high standards of morale, good order and military experiences that the United States can arguing for a complete repeal of the ban. A discipline, and unit cohesion that are the draw from. Third, it is necessary to consider third compromise faction finally prevailed essence of military capability.10 the evidence as to whether homosexuality with the position that went on to become is a choice, as the courts have traditionally DADT, allowing homosexuals to serve as long Associated Costs protected immutable characteristics. To date, as it was done in secret.6 Before the inception of DADT, the rates though, the research remains inconclusive. Aside from the fierce divide in opinions, of discharge for homosexuality had been Fourth, the law as it currently stands does the debate also turned into a contest between steadily falling since 1982. Once the law was not prohibit homosexuals from serving in the Article I and Article II of the Constitution. passed, rates climbed, more than doubling by military as long as they keep it secret. This Previously the ban on homosexuals was a 2001 before beginning to fall again.11 Since ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 89 ESSAY WINNERS | The Efficacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” the reasons, the fact remains that because of President Clinton attempted to fulfill campaign promise DADT, those Servicemembers no longer serve. to lift ban on homosexuals It is also worth noting that the 12,500 figure in the military is most likely low since it cannot capture the number of individuals who do not reenlist or who choose to separate because of the intense personal betrayal they felt continuing to serve under the auspices of DADT. In a report released in February 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated the financial impact to be at least $190.5 million for the previous 10 years of DADT policy. However, a University of California Blue Ribbon Commission that included former Secretary of Defense William Perry questioned the report’s methodology. The commission faulted the GAO for not including recruiting and separation costs that brought the 10-year estimate to $363 million.15 U.S. Navy (Bob McRoy) Also worth noting is that these figures do not account for the additional opportunity 1994, the Services have discharged nearly the number of discharges for homosexual costs of high-profile, prized specialties such as 12,500 Servicemembers under the law.12 acts actually declined over the years.14 Arabic speakers.16 There are various explanations for The drop in discharges under the law If one considers strictly the lost man- the rise in discharges for homosexuality since 9/11 has been used by both sides in power and expense, DADT is a costly failure. after 1993. One is that the increase reflects support of their case. Gay rights advocates Proponents of lifting the ban on homosexuals how discharges are recorded rather than an stated the military now needed every person serving openly can easily appeal to emotion underlying change in practices. A senior Air it could get, so it looked the other way, but an given the large number of people lost and Force Judge Advocate points out that prior to equally compelling argument is that in the treasure spent—an entire division of Soldiers the change in the law, homosexual discharge wake of the events of 9/11, pride and desire to and two F–22s. Opponents of lifting the ban actions during basic military training were serve reduced the numbers of those making offer interesting but weak arguments when classified as fraudulent enlistments because voluntary statements in an effort to avoid they compare the relatively small numbers the person had denied being a homosexual further duty. An Air Force source also argues of discharges for homosexuality with those when he or she enlisted and later changed against the perceived need for personnel discharged for drug abuse or other offenses. position. After the change in the law, the Air contributing in any way to the Air Force data It is necessary to look past both of these Force no longer collected the information because the response to indications of homo- arguments, remove the emotion, and instead during the enlistment process, so fraudulent sexuality has remained unchanged. The Air examine the primary premise of the law—that enlistment was no longer an option, and open homosexuality will lead to a disruption the Air Force began characterizing the dis- of unit cohesion and impact combat effective- charges as homosexual conduct. Gay rights commanders reported ness. If that assumption holds, then the troops advocates argued that the increase was due fear of being accused of lost and money spent could be seen as a neces- to commanders conducting “witch hunts,” discrimination and only sity in order to maintain combat effectiveness yet commanders also reported fear of being processing discharges when a just as other Servicemembers unfit for duty accused of discrimination and only process- case of “telling” was dumped must be discharged. ing discharges when a case of “telling” was in their laps dumped in their laps.13 Another explanation Unit Cohesion/Combat Effectiveness is that given the law and recent reduction In 1993, as the language was drafted for in stigma associated with homosexuality Force investigates all cases when presented §654, there were no direct scientific studies in society at large, simply declaring one with credible evidence or a voluntary state- regarding the effects of acknowledged homo- is homosexual, whether true or not, is the ment and has initiated discharge proceedings sexuals on either unit cohesion or combat fastest way to avoid further military commit- in all cases when the inquiry reveals a basis effectiveness. Furthermore, it is incorrect ment and receive an honorable discharge. In for such action. to equate the two because unit cohesion is support of this supposition, Charles Moskos, Though the arguments explaining the only one of many factors that go into combat one of the original authors of DADT, points patterns in discharges are compelling on both effectiveness. Potentially far outweighing unit out that the number of discharges for sides, ultimately it is difficult to prove any one cohesion, for example, are logistics, training, voluntary statements by Servicemembers factor because each explanation only partially equipment, organization, and leadership, just accounted for 80 percent of the total, while explains the trends. Furthermore, whatever to name a few. 90 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PRAKASH Testimony before the HASC and SASC sion, the factors include leadership, group size, a high percentage of identical twins share involved speculation on possible impacts shared threat, and past success. Interestingly, a characteristic (such as green eyes) while a from psychologists and military leaders.17 To success seems to promote cohesion to a greater lower percentage of nonidentical twins share date, there is still no direct scientific evidence degree than cohesion promotes success.21 that trait, it suggests there is a genetic basis. regarding homosexuals serving openly, but This leads to the conclusion that Conversely, if identical and nonidentical twins there is now additional empirical data as integration of open homosexuals might share a characteristic at equal rates (such as several North Atlantic Treaty Organization degrade social cohesion because of the lack preference for the color red), it suggests there Allies have since lifted the ban on homosexu- of homogeneity; however, the effects can be is not a genetic basis. With homosexuality, a als serving. mitigated with leadership and will further number of twin studies attempted this type Though unit cohesion is not specifi- dissipate with familiarity. More importantly, of isolation, and while early studies seemed to cally defined in §654, it does refer to “bonds task cohesion should not be affected and is in indicate a genetic linkage, follow-on studies of trust,” the sum being greater than the fact the determinant in group success. Given found the error rate too high based on sample individuals, and “high standards of morale, that homosexuals who currently serve do so selection.23 Repeat studies showed a genetic good order and discipline.” The Dictionary at great personal expense and professional linkage, if it existed, was only moderately risk, RAND interviews suggest such individu- heritable and not in the simple Mendelian als are deeply committed to the military’s model.24 there is no direct scientific core values, professional teamwork, physical In a different approach, in 1993 Dean evidence regarding stamina, loyalty, and selfless service—all key Hammer and others initially found a strong homosexuals serving openly, descriptors of task cohesion.22 genetic linkage in male homosexuality dubbed but there is empirical data as by the press as the “gay gene.”25 Their studies several North Atlantic Treaty Homosexuality and Choice involved examining the X chromosome of Organization Allies have lifted As the debate reignites on DADT, it is homosexual men (homosexual brothers and necessary to consider whether homosexual- their family members). Yet follow-on studies the ban ity is a choice. Traditionally, courts have in 2005 and a complete analysis of the entire protected immutable characteristics, and genome found a weaker correlation.26 Even of U.S. Army Terms defines unit cohesion as Americans the “result of controlled, interactive forces writ large are that lead to solidarity within military units demonstrably directing soldiers towards common goals more accepting with an express commitment to one another of character- and the unit as a whole.”18 As psychologists istics that an explored the concepts, experimental and cor- individual relation evidence supported dividing cohesion cannot change. into two distinct types: social cohesion and Contrasting task cohesion. Social cohesion is the nature this, many and quality of the emotional bonds within a opponents of group—the degree to which members spend lifting the ban time together, like each other, and feel close. assume that Task cohesion refers to the shared commit- homosexuality ment and motivation of the group to a goal is a choice and 19 requiring a collective effort. use this as the U.S. Navy (Javier Capella) When measuring unit performance, task basis of many Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, USMC cohesion ends up being the decisive factor in arguments. (Ret.), stated that homosexuality is a “sin” in a 2007 interview group performance. Common sense would Unfortunately, suggest a group that gets along (that is, has research has not yet yielded a definitive anthropomorphic differences in homosexuals high social cohesion) would perform better. answer to this question. Both sides of the such as left-handedness, spatial processing, Almost counterintuitively, it has been shown debate are armed with ultimately incon- and hypothalamus size27 that seem to argue that in some situations, high social cohesion clusive scientific studies. What follows is a for a genetic linkage can also be explained by is actually deleterious to the group decision- brief overview of several studies that have prenatal differentiation through pathways making process, leading to the coining of the attempted to settle the dispute. yet to be elucidated.28 Though these scientific famous term groupthink. This does not imply Several studies in the early 1990s exam- studies give compelling evidence that there that low social cohesion is advantageous, but ined the sexual preferences of identical twins is some biological basis to sexual orientation, that moderate levels are optimal.20 and fraternal twins in the hopes of finding a possibly genetic, and perhaps something early Several factors contribute to cohesion. genetic linkage to sexual orientation. Since in development or even prenatal, the exact For social cohesion, the most important identical twins have 100 percent of nuclear mechanism is yet to be identified. factors are propinquity—spatial and temporal genetic material in common and fraternal Anecdotal data is also compelling, as proximity—and homogeneity. For task cohe- twins have only 50 percent in common, if illustrated by statements from homosexual ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 91 ESSAY WINNERS | The Efficacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” military members: “I wish I could decide who the question of whether homosexuality is a very unit cohesion DADT sought to protect: I fell in love with; if someone thinks I would choice can be treated as irrelevant. If the ban is “I couldn’t be a part of the group for fear consciously choose such a life where I am lifted, basic respect of privacy will be required someone would find out, I stayed away from forced to live in hiding and fear, knowing the just as when women were fully integrated social gatherings, and it certainly affected my bulk of the population is against you, is just into the Services. Previously, the military ability to do my job.” crazy. I can’t help who I am.” “Why would found a lack of sexual privacy, as well as sex DADT also represents a unique chal- I choose to suffer like this?” Ultimately, it is between male and females, undermined order, lenge for commanders. Normally charged probable that sexual orientation is a complex discipline, and morale.32 Dorm and facilities with knowing everything about their troops, interaction of multiple factors, some genetic upgrades will no doubt be required. Sexual commanders are now trying to avoid certain and some developmental, and that elements of harassment regulations and sensitivity train- areas for fear of being accused of conduct- free choice exist only to the same degree that ing would need to be updated, and guidance ing witch hunts38 or looking as if they are they do for heterosexuals ignoring powerful from leadership would be necessary. These selectively enforcing a law they have moral biological urges. would not be insurmountable obstacles. reservations against. Vice Admiral Jack Sha- Taking another step back, the problem is nahan, USN, stated, “Everyone was living a further complicated by individual identifica- Disconnects and Challenge big lie—the homosexuals were trying to hide tion of sexual orientation. Frequently, indi- As social mores shift toward a greater their sexual orientation and the command- vidual men who have engaged in single, and acceptance of homosexuals, we slowly ers were looking the other way because they sometimes numerous, homosexual acts do not introduce cognitive dissonance into Service- didn’t want to disrupt operations by trying to identify themselves as homosexuals. Depend- members. Consider that a Washington Post enforce the law.”39 ing on the circumstances, such as prison poll stated 75 percent of Americans polled In the case of integration of the sexes, populations that preclude sex with women, now believe that homosexuals should be the U.S. military found lack of sexual privacy, individuals treat certain events as occurring allowed to serve openly in the military, up as well as sex between males and females, outside their sexual orientation.29 The issue is from 44 percent in 1993.33 A 2006 Zogby poll undermined order, discipline, and morale.40 far more complicated with women. Research of military serving in Iraq and Afghanistan These concerns were solved by segregated found 37 percent disagreeing with the idea living quarters. Here the issue becomes and 26 percent agreeing that they should be complicated. Those opposed to lifting the sexual harassment regulations allowed.34 The poll further found that a large ban point out that the living conditions of the and sensitivity training would percentage of Servicemembers are looking military would at times make it impossible need to be updated, and the other way, with 23 percent reporting to guarantee privacy throughout the spec- guidance from leadership that they are certain they are serving with a trum of sexual orientation. But would such homosexual in their unit (59 percent of those measures actually be necessary? Considering would be necessary reporting stated they were told directly by that estimates put 65,000 as the number of the individual).35 Growing numbers, in both homosexuals serving in the military,41 would indicates women’s ranks include primary les- the Services and those considering service, revealing their identities lead to a collapse bians, who are exclusively attracted to women, see a gap between the traditional American of morale and discipline? Many top military and elective lesbians, who shift back and forth creed of equality for all and the DADT law. To officials do not believe it would. For example, depending not on the gender but on the per- understand the moral dilemma this creates for Representative Joe Sestak (D–PA), a retired sonal qualities of a particular man or woman. many, consider the likely reaction if the forces Navy vice admiral, currently supports lifting This is a behavior not generally observed in were again racially segregated. Even former the ban. He stated that he was convinced by men.30 Such studies give insight and suggest Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General witnessing firsthand the integration of women some practical steps if homosexuals are to be Peter Pace, who publically stated his opinion on board ships as he commanded an aircraft integrated into the military. that homosexuality is a sin, also said, “Are carrier group. There were similar concerns There can be strong similarities between there wonderful Americans who happen to about privacy and unit cohesion that proved settings such as prisons and the Spartan be homosexual serving in the military? Yes.”36 unwarranted.42 Paul Rieckhoff, executive field conditions Servicemembers must at General Charles Dunlap, Jr., USAF Judge director of the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans times endure and the relatively weak correla- Advocate, points out that those serving want of America and former Army platoon leader, tion between isolated homosexual acts and to serve honorably for what they believe to be illustrates an additional point: “Just like in self-described sexual orientation. This can the right causes.37 the general population, there is a generational manifest itself as homophobia and severe self- The law also forces unusual personal shift within the military. The average 18-year- discomfort from conscious or subconscious compromises wholly inconsistent with a core old has been around gay people, has seen gay clashes of sexual desires with values gained military value—integrity. Several homosexu- people in popular culture, and they’re not this from society, family, or religion.31 als interviewed were in tears as they described boogeyman in the same way they were to Pete Though many scientific experts will no the enormous personal compromise in Pace’s generation.”43 doubt be called to testify during any future integrity they had been making, and the pain debates, lawmakers will not yet find any solid felt in serving in an organization they wholly What to Expect ground on which to base conclusions on the believed in, yet that did not accept them. Fur- If the ban on homosexuals was lifted, immutability of homosexuality. Ultimately, thermore, these compromises undermined the it is worth considering what impacts there 92 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PRAKASH tions have made similar observations that though they were not open about their orien- tation, they knew some of their subordinates knew or suspected, yet they did not experience any discrimination in disciplinary issues. In many cases, more senior Servicemembers’ U.S. Marine Corps (Michael J. Ayotte) concerns went beyond how their subordinates would handle their orientation to focus on the legal standing and treatment of their partners—another vast area of regulations the Department of Defense would have to sift through since same-sex marriages are governed by state, not Federal, law.49 Never- theless, psychologists speculate that it will not be an issue of free acceptance. Homosexual leaders are predicted to be held to a higher standard where they will have to initially earn the respect of their subordinates by proving President Obama seeks to repeal the their competence and their loyalty to other “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy traditional military values. The behavior of the next leader up the chain of command is would be on the Services. There are potential Aside from the heterosexual popula- expected to be critical for how subordinates lessons to learn from other countries that have tion, changes in the behavior of the homo- will react to a homosexual leader.50 lifted the ban on homosexuals serving openly. sexual population would also be necessary. No doubt there will be cases where units There was no mass exodus of heterosexuals, Several homosexual Servicemembers inter- will become dysfunctional, just as there are and there was also no mass “coming-out” viewed reported that given their relatively today among heterosexual leaders. Interven- of homosexuals. Prior to lifting their bans, small numbers, and the secrecy they are tion will be required; such units must be dealt in Canada 62 percent of servicemen stated faced with, hidden networks have evolved. with just as they are today—in a prompt and that they would refuse to share showers with These networks, built under the auspices of constructive fashion. Disruptive behavior by a gay soldier, and in the United Kingdom, emotional support, have also led to violations anyone, homosexual or heterosexual, should two-thirds of males stated that they would of the military regulations governing frat- never be tolerated.51 not willingly serve in the military if gays ernization between ranks. With any lifting There will be some practical changes were allowed. In both cases, after lifting their of the ban on homosexuals serving openly, and certainly some cultural changes if Con- bans, the result was “no-effect.”44 In a survey internal logic that condoned abandonment gress and the President move to lift the ban of over 100 experts from Australia, Canada, of fraternization regulations would no longer on homosexuals serving openly in the Armed Israel, and the United Kingdom, it was found have even a faulty basis for acceptance. Forces. These changes will not be confined that all agreed the decision to lift the ban to the heterosexual populations. Education, on homosexuals had no impact on military leadership, and support will be key elements performance, readiness, cohesion, or ability to in a survey from Australia, in a smooth transition even though the cul- recruit or retain, nor did it increase the HIV Canada, Israel, and the United tural acceptance of homosexuals has grown rate among troops.45 Kingdom, it was found that dramatically in the 16 years since the passage This finding seems to be backed by the the decision to lift the ban of DADT. 2006 Zogby poll, which found that 45 percent had no impact on military of current Servicemembers already suspect The 1993 “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” law was they are serving with a homosexual in their performance a political compromise reached after much unit, and of those, 23 percent are certain emotional debate based on religion, morality, they are serving with a homosexual.46 These Ultimately, homosexuals must be held to the ethics, psychological rationale, and military numbers indicate there is already a growing same standards as any others. necessity. What resulted was a law that has tacit acceptance among the ranks. Homosexuals have successfully served been costly both in personnel and treasure. In As pointed out above, basic respect as leaders. There are several anecdotal an attempt to allow homosexual Servicemem- of privacy will be required just as when examples of homosexual combat leaders such bers to serve quietly, a law was created that women were fully integrated into the Ser- as Antonio Agnone, a former captain in the forces a compromise in integrity, conflicts with vices.47 Dorm and facilities upgrades would Marine Corps. Though not openly gay during the American creed of “equality for all,” places be needed. Sexual harassment regulations his service, he claims that “Marines serving commanders in difficult moral dilemmas, and sensitivity training would need to be under me say that they knew and that they and is ultimately more damaging to the unit updated, and guidance from leadership would deploy again with me in a minute.”48 cohesion its stated purpose is to preserve. Fur- would be required. Others who have served in command posi- thermore, after a careful examination, there ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 93 ESSAY WINNERS | The Efficacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is no scientific evidence to support the claim at 94 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu By Daniel T. Canfiel d Army Heritage Museum Collection Winfield Scott’s 1847 Mexico City Campaign as a MODEL for FUTURE WAR Much work remained for General Winfield Scott even after his victorious arrival in Mexico City on September 14, 1847 ur fixation with conventional battle tends to undervalue the increasing potential of stability operations to decide the political outcomes of mili- tary campaigns and clouds our perceptions regarding both the purpose and utility of force.1 This article uses an abbreviated examination of WinfieldO Scott’s Mexico City campaign to provide perspectives on both the evolving character of warfare and the preeminent challenge confronting America’s contempo- rary operational planners—that is, how to translate ascendancy on the conventional battlefield into achievable and enduring political success. While not dismissing the pos- sibility of traditional, high-intensity, interstate warfare, this article argues that both the character and conduct of America’s future conflicts will, in all likelihood, more closely resemble those of Scott’s campaign than the black and white political and military paradigms of a bygone era where industrialized nation-states waged near-total wars of annihilation. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel T. Canfield, USMC, wrote this essay while a student at the School of Advanced Warfighting of the Marine Corps University. It won the Strategy Research Paper category of the 2009 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 95 ESSAY WINNERS | Scott’s Campaign as a Model for Future War way of war that is almost totally predicated on the conventional application of combat power directed at the destruction of an adversary’s DOD (Lou Comeger) armed forces with the reality that our future opponents, fighting among their own people and buoyed by increasingly sophisticated technical capabilities, will turn to a hybrid combination of regular and irregular methods to secure a definitive political rather than a military victory. Given the distinct possibility of con- flict in places such as Iran, Pakistan, Cuba, Venezuela, sub-Saharan Africa, or, lest we forget, the Korean Peninsula, we should expect America’s future wars to more closely resemble the Southern Campaign in the American Revolution, albeit from the British perspective, or Scott’s drive on Mexico City rather than the tidy and concise military and Soldiers drive M–1A1 Abrams tank in victory parade honoring political paradigms of a bygone era when coalition forces of Operation Desert Storm industrialized nation-states waged near-total wars of annihilation. Our future commanders If the United States hopes to consum- 9/11 and our protracted conflicts in Iraq and will be called on to do much more than simply mate military success with enduring political Afghanistan have so painfully illustrated, defeat an adversary’s armed forces; they will victory in the 21st century, it will need to we cannot expect our enemies to play to also be expected to operate among a hostile or reconcile the American way of war with our strengths or otherwise conform to our ambivalent population whose political will to the realities of the contemporary operating notions of warfare. Rather, they will continue fight does not necessarily reside in the army environment. While offering no clairvoyant to develop and utilize means that exploit our or the state. For American military power to panacea, Scott’s campaign provides valuable critical vulnerabilities and give them the best perspective on how to do so. Operating 156 chance to win. With a joint force so dominant years before the American invasion of Iraq, in the conventional application of force, do we the decoupling of traditional Scott prosecuted a bold and imaginative cam- really think our current or future adversaries military force from the ability paign that carefully balanced military means will do us the favor of engaging in a tradi- to achieve enduring political with political ends. His skillful integration tional combined arms contest? success is a function of an of anti-guerrilla, stability, and high-intensity Wars and military forces are reflections increasingly proliferated, combat operations precluded the eruption of the societies and cultures that produce politically complex, and of a widespread, religious-based insurgency them.2 While technology, firepower, and and consummated his tactical victories with the relentless quest to destroy an adversary’s globally integrated world enduring political success. In the future, as armed forces won the battles of the 20th in the past, it will not be enough to simply century, they may not, in and of themselves, be decisive, it will have to do much more than destroy or defeat the enemy’s armed forces; be enough to win the wars of the 21st century. fight its way in. It will, in all likelihood, also the American military will have to be able and In many ways, the evolution of the character need to be capable of winning the peace by ready to win the peace within the construct of of warfare could be seen as unwinding in rapidly securing the local population, estab- an overarching campaign design focused on the aftermath of the apogee of World War lishing acceptable levels of political legitimacy, securing a definitive political, not just mili- II and the introduction of nuclear weapons. and ensuring American war aims and long- tary, victory. One only need look at the decidedly mixed term political objectives are achieved amid record of conventionally superior forces in the social chaos inherent in the wake of any Future Conflicts the post–World War II era for evidence of this sizable military intervention. Ironically, the In the warm afterglow of Operation counterintuitive phenomenon. The appar- way ahead may look quite similar to the not- Desert Storm, our infatuation with technology ent decoupling of traditional military force too-distant past. and its seemingly unbounded potential to from the ability to achieve enduring politi- revolutionize armed conflict fueled illusions cal success is a function of an increasingly Back to the Future of military supremacy. In reality, however, proliferated, politically complex, and globally Through a unique combination of poli- Desert Storm did not cement our invincibil- integrated world. These trends will only tics, geography, and circumstance, America’s ity; it only demonstrated to our adversaries accelerate in the years ahead. The preeminent Manifest Destiny collided with Mexico that the means and methods for confronting challenge for American defense planners, during the middle of the 19th century.3 In the United States would have to change. As therefore, will be to reconcile an American January 1846, President James K. Polk ordered 96 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CANFIELD U.S. ground forces, under the command of ment would acquiesce in the face of mounting it is absolutely necessary, as the sequel in this Zachary Taylor, to take up positions along U.S. pressure. case showed, to strike, effectively, at the vitals the Rio Grande, while Commodore David By November 1846, however, it became of the nation,” Scott sought to avoid any Conner’s home squadron, based out of New apparent that the administration’s efforts to further protraction of hostilities by threaten- Orleans, established a naval cordon around obtain a negotiated peace had failed. Taylor’s ing the very heart of the Mexican regime.12 Veracruz. These deliberate provocations, campaign, though tactically successful, was In late November, with Taylor’s forces designed to exert political pressure on the politically indecisive. Worse, the President confronting an increasingly violent guerrilla Mexican government, proved problematic. war in northern Mexico and political pressure The President believed that the United States Taylor’s campaign, though mounting at home, the President approved could obtain the territorial concessions it Scott’s plan and placed him in command of sought through the combination of limited tactically successful, was the forthcoming expedition. After a winter military coercion and continued diplomacy. politically indecisive of hurried preparation, Scott and his naval This view, however, significantly under counterpart, Commodore David Conner, put estimated Mexican resolve and was based on faced trouble at home.6 Growing domestic three U.S. divisions ashore at Collado Beach, an incomplete comprehension of Mexican unrest and apprehensions about the desultory 2 miles south of Veracruz, on March 9, 1847.13 history, culture, and politics.4 conduct of an unpopular war resulted in a This remarkable feat of seamanship and inter- In 1846, Mexico appeared to be a weak stunning political rebuke during the Novem- Service cooperation culminated on March 29, and failing state. Nearly three centuries of ber 1846 congressional elections.7 A frustrated 1847, when the city’s beleaguered defenders Spanish occupation and a bitter war of inde- and increasingly unpopular President grudg- capitulated after an abbreviated siege. With pendence left its society stratified and politi- ingly turned to Winfield Scott. As the Nation’s Veracruz now in American hands, Scott cally divided. The government was bankrupt, senior military officer, Scott clearly under- focused his attention on the civil population. plagued by inefficiency and corruption, and stood the dangers of military indecision to Being aware of Napoleon’s difficulties in Spain generally incapable of exercising sovereignty the Republic: “A little war—a war prosecuted and realizing that the inherent religious and within its northern provinces.5 Any illusion with inadequate means or vigor—is a greater cultural differences between the victors and of a cheap or bloodless victory, however, was evil than a big war. It discredits the party the vanquished provided fertile ground for shattered on April 25 when Mexican forces, possessed of superior means; it exhausts her insurgency, the general undertook a deliberate finances, exhausts campaign to mitigate the threat of guerrilla enthusiasm, and warfare breaking out in the wake of American generally ends occupation. Scott immediately issued a formal in a failure of all proclamation to the Mexican people: Library of Congress the objects pro- posed.”8 Yet the Americans are not your enemies, but only general’s military the enemies of those who misgoverned you advice had there- and brought about this unnatural war. tofore been muted To the peaceable inhabitants, and to your by an administra- church, which is respected by the govern- tion determined ment, laws, and people in all parts of our to win the war on country, we are friends.14 the cheap and a President suspi- More importantly, the general reinforced cious of Scott’s words with decisive action. Scott moved Mexican troops ambushed a squad of U.S. Dragoons, politics and future quickly to impose order on the local population killing 14 Americans, April 1846 ambitions.9 and ensure the discipline of his own troops. He Throughout instituted martial law, employed local laborers under the command of General Mariano the summer of 1846, Scott lobbied the Secre- to clean and repair the city, opened the port to Arista, attacked Taylor’s army north of the Rio tary of War, William Marcy, for permission foreign trade, installed one of his division com- Grande. Though surprised, American forces to conduct an amphibious landing at Vera- manders as military governor, and reopened quickly regained the initiative and eventu- cruz, followed by a rapid march on Mexico the city’s shops. The general also made unprec- ally pursued Arista’s defeated army deep City.10 By late October, the general formally edented overtures to local religious leaders. into Mexican territory. Taylor’s campaign submitted the first of two reports describing American troops were required to salute culminated in late September at the Battle of his operational concept in detail.11 While Catholic priests. Scott, himself a devout Prot- Monterrey. Though seemingly victorious, the Scott’s first letter focused on the seizure of estant, took the unprecedented step of attend- Americans found themselves bogged down Veracruz, his second, dated November 12, ing Catholic Mass with the newly installed in bloody urban combat while operating at concentrated on the justification and conduct civil governor and their combined staffs.15 In the end of a dangerously extended overland of a subsequent overland drive on the retrospect, Scott’s astute handling of the civil supply route. Even at this late hour, Polk still Mexican capital. Realizing that “to compel a population remains one of the least appreciated clung to the belief that the Mexican govern- people, singularly obstinate, to sue for peace, aspects of the campaign. It was also one of the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 97 ESSAY WINNERS | Scott’s Campaign as a Model for Future War most important. Keenly aware that he would be had not been idle; he organized 30,000 men the conventional defeat of Santa Anna’s army, waging war among the Mexican people, Scott for defense of the capital. Scott skillfully proved decisive.22 The policies also reflected realized he needed their support or, at the very maneuvered his army to the south of the Scott’s genius and bore witness to his intuitive least, their ambivalence, if he harbored any city, avoiding a direct assault along the main appreciation of the complex military, political, desire to obtain U.S. war aims. avenue of approach, and defeated Santa Anna and cultural problems confronting the United On April 2, Scott’s intrepid and under- at Contreras and Churubusco on August 20. States in Mexico. manned army boldly turned its back on the After an unsuccessful armistice, Scott seized sea and raced for Jalapa (elevation 4,680 feet), a foothold on the outskirts of the Mexican Enduring Relevance a small but important town located 74 miles capital at Molino del Rey on September 8. Fourteen years before the American inland, just above the Yellow Fever belt. On Less than a week later, his relentless drive Civil War, the United States prosecuted a bold April 18, Scott’s 8,500 effectives shattered on Mexico City culminated in a crescendo and imaginative expeditionary campaign that Santa Anna’s well entrenched 12,000-man of vicious urban combat. On September 13, achieved decisive political results. In many advance guard at Cerro Gordo. With the road Scott’s army, now down to just 7,000 effec- ways, it still serves as a model of American to Jalapa now open, Scott pursued the rem- tives, pierced the city’s inner defenses and operational art.23 Operating over vast dis- nants of Santa Anna’s army deep into central seized the fortress of Chapultepec.18 tances in a foreign culture, and dwarfed by a Mexico. On May 15, the U.S. 1st Infantry Despite Scott’s seemingly victorious potentially hostile population, the American Division, under the command of Brigadier entrance into the capital on September 14, his military confronted and overcame a number General William Worth, entered Puebla (ele- work remained far from complete. Though of complex problems. Scott, ably assisted by vation 7,091 feet, population 80,000) without a Mexican forces evacuated the city on Sep- his naval counterpart, Commodore Conner, fight. Scott’s success, however, proved precari- tember 13, Santa Anna had emptied the city’s expertly planned and conducted America’s ous. He did not have enough men to secure his jails prior to his departure. The release of first large-scale amphibious assault, seizing thousands of prisoners combined with a sub- the strategic port of Veracruz with surpris- U.S. forces land at Veracruz, 1847 stantial number of disaffected residents fueled ing speed and at little cost.24 He then turned an explosion of violence directed against the his back on the sea and marched his under- Americans. As he had done throughout the manned army nearly 300 miles inland across campaign, Scott moved quickly to restore civil inhospitable terrain. Operating over an order. Martial law was immediately instituted. extended and dangerously exposed supply line Sharpshooters posted throughout the city shot Library of Congress (Nathaniel Currier) Library of Congress any Mexican brandishing a weapon. Struc- tures used by insurgents, particularly snipers, the release of thousands of were summarily leveled by U.S. artillery fire. prisoners combined with Additionally, Scott insisted that Mexican law- a substantial number of lifeline to the sea. Forced to detach troops in makers help restore order, threatening to sack disaffected residents fueled an order to garrison Veracruz, Jalapa, and now the city unless resistance ceased.19 Eventually, explosion of violence directed Puebla, he faced guerrilla bands that operated a tense calm settled over the capital, but Scott against the Americans with impunity in the hinterland between out- now faced his most formidable problem: how posts. With his supply line virtually severed to achieve a satisfactory political endstate, and Santa Anna’s main body lurking some- which was, after all, the raison d’etre for the that was tenuously tied to the sea, Scott won where to his front, Scott simply could go no military campaign in the first place. five major battles against numerically superior farther. He spent the next 2 months covertly The general never intended to and entrenched opponents. prosecuting anti-guerrilla operations and completely destroy the Mexican army or With just 7,000 men, Scott seized and attempting to resupply his ragged army while depose the government. He realized, quite occupied Mexico City, a hostile capital of he desperately awaited additional troops.16 pragmatically, that if he did so, social chaos 200,000 inhabitants, and then proceeded to By the first week of August, Scott’s would reign, and there would be no one left govern the people in such a politically astute reinforcements finally arrived after fighting to negotiate with.20 Ironically, Scott, now at way as to prevent a widespread guerrilla war their way up from the coast, but they only the zenith of his martial success, was also from erupting. Working hand in glove with managed to bring his effective strength up the most vulnerable. Down to just 7,000 the President’s personal envoy, Nicholas Trist, to 10,738.17 Nevertheless, on August 7, Scott effectives, virtually cut off from the sea, and Scott oversaw the installation of a new govern- resumed his advance on Mexico City. By operating 300 miles inland, he faced the ment, prosecuted an effective counterinsur- August 10, only a small garrison at Puebla, daunting prospect of overseeing the installa- gency campaign, and helped negotiate a treaty left behind to care for the sick and wounded, tion of a new government and preventing the that obtained U.S. war aims.25 His success, linked Scott’s army to the sea. Initially, the outbreak of large-scale guerrilla warfare while however, was neither predestined nor fore- march went unchecked. The Americans attempting to occupy and govern a potentially ordained; it was the product of imagination advanced to Rio Frio (elevation 10,000 hostile population of 7 million people.21 anchored on the bedrock of reality, boldness feet) and peered down on the picturesque Paradoxically, Scott’s aggressive and adroit tempered with judgment, and determined mountain valley that housed the fabled implementation of sound civil-military poli- leadership that understood the relationship Halls of Montezuma. Santa Anna, however, cies in the wake of his tactical victories, not between military means and political ends.26 98 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CANFIELD Scott’s campaign provides valuable perspective on the difficulties associated with U.S. troops force their way to main plaza during projecting expeditionary power inland, con- Battle of Monterrey, September 1846 ducting maneuver warfare from the sea, and facing the cruel realities of urban combat. It also offers keen insight into the challenges of military occupation, counterinsurgency and stability operations among a foreign culture, and campaign design.27 With the clairvoy- ance of hindsight, the architects of Iraq, both civilian and military, would have been much better off reflecting on the planning and execution of Scott’s campaign as opposed to attempting to emulate the military and politi- cal paradigms of Desert Storm or World War II. Predicting the future remains problematic. Scott’s campaign, however, not only repre- sents an illuminating window into our past, but may also provide an intriguing glimpse into our future. Model for Design (Nathaniel Currier) Library of Congress Future campaign planners will likely encounter many of the same problems and Reconciling the American Way of War great resources of manpower, and our national complexities that confronted Scott and his The United States faces a labyrinth of conviction that war is an abnormal condition, staff in Mexico. No matter the character emerging strategic challenges.28 Confronted completely distinct from peace, and a condi- or location of any future conflict, the U.S. with the reality of an uncertain future, it tion which should be terminated quickly in a military will have to get there first. The would be dangerous to dismiss or overweigh clear-cut decision, all equipped us admirably joint force will require rapid augmentation one form of warfare over the other. Yet it to fight and win the two world wars. But they from the Reserve Component, fight a long will not be enough to simply field a “bal- do not fit us so well for limited wars in climate way from the continental United States, anced” joint force capable of operating across and terrain where massive military power and be sustained, at least initially, from the the range of military operations. Rather, can be in some ways a liability, where victory sea. This will require sizable and sustain- the leaders of that force must know how to itself is almost indefinable, and where enemies able expeditionary power projection. Once employ it. Unfortunately, rather than adapt- fight elusively and with methods so thoroughly U.S. forces arrive in theater, they will likely ing to our opponents’ unpleasant propensity opposed to conventional rules of war that encounter a shrewd and determined enemy to wage irregular warfare, the United States many of the textbook principles for its conduct remains intellectually committed to refight- are stood on their heads and bring only boo- ing, albeit with 21st-century precision, World merang results.31 future campaign planners War II. Though much progress has been will likely encounter many made, we continue to field an expensive and Despite Vietnam, Beirut, Mogadishu, of the same problems and wonderfully equipped joint force that is, in 9/11, and our prolonged struggles in Iraq and complexities that confronted reality, more attuned to confronting our Afghanistan, the American military has yet Scott and his staff in Mexico friends and allies than actually fighting the to institutionalize the hard-won lessons of Nation’s current and future adversaries.29 counterinsurgency or reconcile the compet- More importantly, the way we think about ing theories of regular and irregular warfare. employing a hybrid combination of con- armed conflict—the so-called American way Our mental toolkit remains strangely devoid ventional and irregular threats. American of war—remains dangerously overweighted of anything save an oversized hammer that ground forces will be outnumbered on most toward the conventional.30 Writing nearly 40 is increasingly out of place in a 21st-century future battlefields and will almost certainly years ago, Russell Weigley not only ominously world. Rather than expending valuable intellec- find themselves dwarfed by an ambivalent foreshadowed the nadir of America’s tragic tual energy renaming old ideas, we should care- or potentially hostile indigenous population. involvement in Vietnam, but also propheti- fully consider how to synthesize the competing Our future commanders will be called on to cally described the fundamental problem con- theories and styles of warfare within a new win quickly at the lowest possible cost in life fronting us today: American way of war that imbues our com- and treasure. To do so, however, we must, no manders, operational planners, and warfighting matter how begrudgingly, reach a prescient The twentieth-century United States has not organizations with the flexibility of mind to appreciation of how our future adversaries adjusted easily to involvement in irregular war. prosecute regular and irregular operations will actually fight. Our immense wealth and productivity, our ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 99 ESSAY WINNERS | Scott’s Campaign as a Model for Future War simultaneously in pursuit of achievable and linear precision or undertaken sequentially 11 Winfield Scott, “Veracruz and its Castle,” enduring political goals. in phases. Rather, steps must be taken to win House Executive Document 60, October 27, 1846, We need to stop thinking, planning, both the war and the peace within the con- 1268–1270; and “Veracruz and its Castle—New line of operation, thence upon the capital,” House and acting as if there were two separate and struct of an overarching campaign design Executive Document 60, November, 12, 1846, distinct wars: a conventional one fought with that thoughtfully integrates both combat 1270–1274. heavy maneuver forces governed by the intel- and stability operations from the start. A 12 Scott, Memoirs, vol. I, 404–405. lectual auspices of AirLand Battle, and an 13 Bauer, 232–258. unconventional one fought with “special” or 14 Winfield Scott, “Proclamation,” quoted in “general purpose forces” employing counter- steps must be taken to Elliott, 461. insurgency techniques.32 While contemporary win both the war and the 15 Ibid., 460–462. defense planners grapple with the seemingly peace within an overarching 16 Bauer, 271–272. 17 dichotomous nature of combat instead of campaign design that Anton Adams, The War in Mexico (Chicago: stability operations, the reality, as Scott’s Emperor’s Press, 1998), 90–91. integrates combat and stability 18 exploits so clearly illustrate, is that current and The details of Scott’s final thrust from Puebla to the capture of Mexico City are taken from Bauer, future practitioners of American operational operations from the start 279–325; Elliott, 495–552; and Justin Harvey Smith, art will likely need to do both simultaneously The War with Mexico, vol. II, 79–188. Also see if they wish to achieve enduring political sophisticated and adroit comprehension of Scott’s official reports of the Battle of Molino del success. Perhaps the real legacy of Iraq is not the relationship between military means Rey, Battles of Contreras and Churubusco, and the the obvious conclusion that an ounce of insur- and political ends, not just “shock and awe” Battle of Mexico City, available at 100 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu China’s one child policy has increased dependency ratio of elderly to youth By M a tt I s l e r China appears to be at the edge of an historic demographic transition, setting the country on a path to grow old before UN Volunteers it becomes prosperous. —Global economist Cliff Waldman1 Graying Panda Shrinking Dragon The Impact of Chinese Demographic Changes on Northeast Asian Security ince 1980, China’s “one child” strength and increased Chinese risk aversion while the over-80 population quadruples policy has successfully slowed its will constrain China’s belligerence and stabi- from 1.8 percent to 6.8 percent.6 population growth and facilitated lize its demographic transformation. Together, Sstable economic growth. By these forces foretell an aging, constrained, and Long-term Labor Shortages curtailing over 250 million births since its less belligerent nation after the mid-2030s. One of the most immediate economic inception, however, the one child policy also United Nations (UN) population fore- consequences of the one child policy will induced significant long-term consequences. casters expect China’s population to grow be decreasing numbers of laborers entering According to China’s National Committee of only marginally until 2030, plateau at 1.46 the workforce, which threatens to increase Population and Planned Birth, China faces billion until 2035, and then fall slightly to labor costs, constrain economic growth, and three major demographic events during the 1.41 billion by 2050.4 Perhaps more signifi- increase immigration pressures. The UN next 30 years: a peak of workers entering the cant than population growth reversal will forecasts that China’s working-age population, labor market, a reversal of population growth, be rapid aging, as the median age will likely defined as those 15 to 59 years of age, will fall and a rapid increase in the age of the Chinese increase from 30 to 41 by 2030, and to 45 by after 2010 as a percent of the total population, population.2 Furthermore, China’s one child 2050.5 During this period, seniors will repre- and the absolute working-age population will policy also created a significant and growing sent the most rapidly growing demographic decline after 2015.7 The shrinking labor pool gender imbalance.3 These demographic group, as the proportion over age 60 triples will likely increase labor costs and could slow changes promise to undermine China’s long- from 10.9 percent to 35.8 percent by 2050, or even reverse China’s economic growth.8 term stability by inducing labor shortages, slowing economic growth, and increasing pressure for internal migration and immigra- Lieutenant Colonel Matt Isler, USAF, wrote this essay while a student at the National War College. It won the tion. Conversely, continued U.S. demographic Strategy Article category of the 2009 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 / JFQ 101 ESSAY WINNERS | Graying Panda, Shrinking Dragon fertility,14 low mortality, and males will likely increase competition for high income characterized by the small pool of females, intensify internal industrialized nations.15 Con- migration pressures, foster demand for immi- Global Exchange trary to such a normal demo- grant brides,23 and fuel demand for criminal graphic transition, China faces networks that recruit and traffic brides. If the challenges of economic this demand is not met, there is broad con- growth, industrialization, and sensus that China could face increased levels urban assimilation of a large of “antisocial behavior and violence [that] rural populace simultaneous will ultimately present a threat to long-term with its rapid demographic stability and the sustainable development of transitions in the age and size Chinese society.”24 of its workforce. Shrinking labor pool could slow or even reverse China’s In particular, China’s Long-term Growth in U.S. Power economic growth rapid rise in old-age depen- While China’s demographics threaten dency during a sudden to constrain its economic growth, American decline in the workforce demographics promise to support long-term A shrinking labor force is likely to “could trigger an economic and political U.S. economic health. The UN forecasts fuel internal demand for migration to meet crisis.”16 In 2025, China’s purchasing power that the U.S. population will grow strongly the country’s labor needs, which could parity will surpass that of the United States from 285 million in 2000 to 409 million in further destabilize China. Currently, the just as its last large “pre–one child” genera- 2050, largely due to immigration.25 Mean- rural provinces account for virtually all of tion, born in the 1960s, begins to retire. This while, other major economic powers such Chinese population growth, while the wealthy generation’s retirement will rapidly increase as Japan, the European Union, and Russia provinces of Shanghai and Beijing effectively China’s old-age dependency burden just as face decreasing workforce populations and produce zero population growth.9 As poorer increasing dependency ratios. According to regions such as Tibet produce excess laborers this generation’s retirement a 2008 report from the Center for Strategic and more wealthy coastal areas fail to produce will rapidly increase China’s and International Studies, the United States enough laborers, China faces long-term pres- “is the only developed nation whose popula- sure for internal migration.10 However, social old-age dependency burden tion ranking among all nations—third—will benefits for migrant laborers are tied to their just as China becomes a remain unchanged from 1950 to 2050. . . . rural households, most lack insurance, and middle-income country [The United States] is also the only developed the government considers the displaced labor- economy whose aggregate economic size will ers the primary source of crime and a threat to China becomes a middle-income country.17 nearly keep pace with that of the entire world’s public order.11 Because these economic and demographic economy.” As the U.S. gross domestic product In addition to increasing pressure for transitions will occur simultaneously, China will likely expand steadily as a share of the internal migration, China’s labor shortage “will face a developed country’s level of developed-world totals, China, Russia, Japan, will likely fuel demand for immigrant labor old-age dependency with only a developing and the European Union will see their eco- after 2015. Among China’s neighbors, Japan country’s income,”18 and may face social insta- nomic power relatively decreased.26 This will and South Korea face similar workforce bility beginning in the mid-2020s.19 strengthen the relative power of the United declines. Meanwhile, China’s less-developed States in the developed world to a situation neighbors—Vietnam, Mongolia, and Growing Gender Imbalance mirroring its relative position immediately Burma—should continue steady population China’s family planning policy also following World War II.27 The net effect of growth past 2050.12 These three countries induced a significant gender imbalance that these changes will be increased U.S. influence should offer a more favorable working-age will likely exacerbate (15–59) cohort in 2020, and may be able to migration and immigra- meet some of China’s labor needs.13 Regard- tion pressures. China’s less of how China’s labor needs are met, labor sex ratio balance, the shortages promise to constrain economic number of males per 100 U.S. Navy (David Rush) growth after 2020 and increase migration and females,20 grew from a immigration pressures. healthy 106.3 in 1975 to an imbalanced 120.5 Transitions in 2005.21 The imbal- Furthermore, the simultaneous nature of ance is worse in rural China’s economic and demographic transitions areas, where individual presents a further source of internal instability. provinces have reported “Normal” demographic transitions generally sex ratios over 137.22 This Changing demographics could produce a less belligerent follow a path from a high fertility rate, high significant population China within several decades mortality rate, and low income to a state of low (20–21 percent) of excess 102 JFQ / issue 55, 4th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu ISLER minimizing man- 5 Richard Johnson, “Economic Policy Impli- power demands, the cations of World Demographic Change,” Economic military may be forced Review 25 (January 1, 2004), available at U.S. Navy (Scott D. Sagisi) activities, invest in UN World Population Forecast. high-tech capital 6 Chatterji et al. such as robotics and 7 Waldman, 6. unmanned systems, 8 Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, “The and find labor through Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and offers of citizenship Geopolitics in the 21st Century—Major Find- for service. China may ings of the Report” (Washington, DC: Center also be more willing to for Strategic and International Studies, May participate in security 2008), 4, available at Strategic Communication AND THE Combatant Commander By J e f f r e y B . J o n e s , t is important to emphasize the ments of influence. They are “current” in indispensable role that combatant terms of what might have resonance and what D a n i e l T . K u e h l , commanders play in strategic com- will not. They have built personal relations munication (SC), which includes the and are unparalleled conduits of influence in Daniel Burgess, and I coordination of statecraft, public affairs virtually every country. These commanders (PA), public diplomacy, military information realize that every member of their commands R u s s e l l R o c h t e operations, and other actions through which who interacts with any international audi- we engage and influence key global commu- ence, no matter how large or small, is their nities. Given the current negative assessment most important strategic communicator at of U.S. efforts in this arena, a concurrent, that moment and location. balanced, and collaborative effort is required. This article explores the role of the Combatant commanders and their staffs, as combatant commander as a central conduit well as deployed forces, are important instru- for, contributor to, and implementer of U.S. Jeffrey B. Jones was Senior Director for Strategic Communication and Information at the National Security Council. Dr. Daniel T. Kuehl is a Professor in the Information Resources Management College at the National Defense University. Daniel Burgess was an Intelligence Officer for U.S. Forces Korea. Russell Rochte is a Faculty Member at the National Defense Intelligence College. 104 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu JONES, KUEHL, BURGESS, and ROCHTE Government strategic communication. It activities or even research, development, test, that convey the informational content that also examines the concept of the “Influence evaluation, and acquisition. creates a cognitive effect. The Influence Cycle Cycle” and presents a series of focused rec- begins with the recognition that every audi- ommendations for the improvement of this Based on experience in both Afghani- ence—whether as small as one individual or as critical national security function. stan and Iraq, it is clear that while planning large as the global Islamic population—is con- for military operations has a broad scope stantly sensing the content carried by rapidly The Commander’s Role of considerations, planning for SC effects expanding global connectivity. The audience The combatant commander leads the remains neither pervasively integrated into reaches out to obtain some of this informa- largest single group of America’s strategic the process nor, in some cases, even a consid- tion, some is sent to the audience, and much communicators in almost any area of the eration for operations. Even what constitutes just “happens.” The goal of any influencer/ world—the uniformed men and women of strategic communicator is for the audience the Armed Forces and a growing number of to internalize that information so it becomes civilians under his command. To be effective, planning for SC effects a set of perceptions favorable to the attain- he must have an effective SC architecture remains neither pervasively ment of particular objectives. This new set of that consists of qualified people, analysis, integrated into the process perceptions must be constantly reinforced and technology, systems, procedures, advocates, nor, in some cases, even a developed—especially in the face of inevitable education, linguistic and lexicon knowledge, consideration for operations adversary reaction—so they become a new set innovation, fusion, coordination, coopera- of beliefs, which thus enables a set of observ- tion, and effective linkages among strategic, able behaviors. If the behavior is observable operational, and tactical levels of engage- the information environment is not well and its change from previous behavior is ment, as well as among joint, combined, and understood. Planning for SC effects needs measurable, we have that most valuable com- interagency players and planners. Successful to be incorporated into the targeting cycle modity: a metric for gauging the effectiveness architecture also requires resonance, educa- regarding poststrike influence activities, a of an influence campaign. tion and training, and incentives. Finally, role for which the Intelligence Community is Any professional influencer can quote the combatant commander’s role in strategic poorly prepared. We remain either reactive or the necessary steps of what amounts to communication is now mandated by Annex overly incremental in giving visibility to the a template for influence, beginning with Y of the Joint Operation Planning and Execu- facts, allowing the adversary or adversarial a clear understanding of the intended tion System (JOPES) process. media to retain the “offensive.” Worse, our objective and cultural analysis of the key In terms of multinational and coalition reaction is often slowed by our bureaucracy audience, then progressing through the issues: to the point where efforts are ineffective. If formulation of the message, determination adversarial media use disinformation, not of the most effective transmission medium, ■■ Combatant commanders can/must/do responding to disinformation emboldens and assessment of the effort’s success. Each play a central role. those who produce and propagate it. Disin- of these steps is critical in its own right, and ■■ “Standing” information coordinating formation needs to be actively countered as when viewed holistically, they clearly imply committees would help. rapidly and vigorously as possible. Failing to that the task is very difficult. While there ■■ There is a mandate for SC inclusion from respond tends to validate the disinformation. are certainly quantitative methodologies the outset, not as an afterthought, for all oper- that can aid some of the necessary analytical ational plans (OPLANs), concept of operations The Influence Cycle steps, such as polling and audience measure- (CONOPs) plans, Department of Defense Air Force Colonel John Boyd developed ment, an influence campaign cannot be (DOD)-sponsored regional centers, and all his concept of decision superiority from his developed using a slide rule. It needs the transnational issues including but not limited experience flying combat missions during the expert hands of people with long education to combating terrorism, counterproliferation, Korean War. Known as an OODA (observe, and experience in the arts of influence, and and counterdrug operations. orient, decide, act) loop, Boyd’s concept holds any advertiser or political persuader knows ■■ While we have some degree of uni- that whichever decision system—whether this. Get the audience and cultural analysis lateral capacity, we should tap into a much an individual warrior or an entire command wrong, and our influence effort may actu- wider set of conduits and capabilities, and structure—can observe what is happening, ally stiffen the adversary’s negative percep- be actively involved in helping to increase orient as to what those observations mean, tions toward us. Get the wrong message to capacity; we need to engage the U.S. inter- decide what to do about it, and act to execute that audience—never forgetting the most agency community, private sector, and allies that decision will generally win the contest. important form of message or content is an in these efforts. But the concept is focused on short-term, action that the target audience observes— ■■ Some allies and friends have better fast-acting decisionmaking. Can it influence and all the hard work of the audience human intelligence, superior equipment, outcomes over the course of decades? analysis may be wasted. Select the wrong more resonant conduits, and significantly The answer is “not exactly,” but the means of message delivery—shortwave radio more presence and knowledge in areas where approach itself is useful and provides a way when the audience is on Twitter or is in the we have little or none. Some of our partners forward. It is important here to be aware of the mosque every Friday—and all the positive may be open to providing cooperative analy- information environment, the combination work of the earlier steps will be for nothing. sis and feedback, or engaging in combined of information connectivity and the networks Finally, if we do not have a useful means for ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 105 COMMENTARY | Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander measurement, we may not even know that 4. Intelligence divisions should we have been successful. But marrying this approach SC requests for information dif- analytical process to the Influence Cycle ferently in support of a continuous require- will provide the SC planner and the combat- ment for an “influence campaign.” Include ant commander with a useful approach for preclearance for declassification of prestrike U.S. Navy (Paul Seeber) the planning and conduct of the influence intelligence supporting the target rationale, campaign. cockpit video, other aspect imagery, attack However, unlike the OODA loop from details, and other relevant, explanatory, and which it is drawn, nothing about the Influ- “defensible” information—all within existing ence Cycle is likely to happen quickly; the authorities of the commander. When con- measurement period will not be hours or sidering the influence objective and strategic days—it will probably be years to decades. and operational influence effects, apply intel- This is not a tool for tactical impact on short- ligence gain/loss considerations, but beware period crises, but is a strategic weapon for of letting the tactical needs of the moment employment in long-term campaigns such as outweigh the long-term strategic need for the “war of ideas.” success in the influence effort. 5. Each combatant command should Recommendations immediately build a media “order of battle” 1. Each combatant command should for its area of operations, encompassing both Reaching a country’s youth through establish a Strategic Communication and “adversary” and “neutral/friendly” media. popular culture is a way to influence Response Element to prepare for and respond This should be an essential part of the intel- future decisionmakers to propaganda, misinformation, and disin- ligence preparation of the operational envi- formation. The Multi-National Force–Iraq ronment. DOD has several systems, albeit and including analytical outreach to Defense SC section is supposed to integrate, coordi- not yet fully funded, that could significantly attachés, are key sources of this information. nate, and synchronize information efforts, enhance strategic, operational, and tactical These data are critical to identifying the acknowledging different audiences as well information management. Combatant com- conduits, form, and medium through which as different missions. However, the mandate manders should demand immediate funding to convey a particular message or theme in is for coordination and not overstepping to facilitate the earliest possible deployment order to reach those whose attitudes remain bounds while contributing to the achieve- of these systems to commands, forward head- vulnerable to “shaping” the youth. That ment of the same objectives. quarters, and joint task forces. These include is not to say that we ignore civilian elites, 2. Each combatant command should other policymakers, academics, or senior establish a standing Interagency Information military leaders; it is only to emphasize the Coordinating Committee consisting of the each combatant command importance of reaching those who will be J2, J3, J5, counterterrorism, and information should develop appropriate in positions of power and influence in the operations (IO) planner, political advisor, external information requests future, and whom we have a chance to affect special advisor, PA officer, deployed joint task that identify the interagency now through longer term interagency efforts. force representative, legal counsel, and, when requirements We often focus on the decisionmakers of appropriate, Embassy public affairs, politi- today while forgetting those of tomorrow. We cal officer, station chief, joint psychological only need to look at the population by ages operations task force, allied representatives, Media Mapper, the Information Strategy worldwide to know that the youth cannot be and regional U.S. Agency for International Decision Support System, OpenSource.gov, ignored—and we only need to read the news- Development representatives. and MAPS. Currency must be maintained on papers to understand why. 3. If there is SC policy guidance, use it. each country’s indigenous media as well as 7. Each combatant command should If not, ask for it. In many cases, summaries external media that reach the populace. Data develop appropriate external information of conclusions from policy deliberations must include frequencies, broadcast times, requests (EIRs) that identify the interagency have been disseminated but not further key communicators, caricatures in news- requirements/desires of the commanders distributed to the lowest level necessary and papers, and so forth. Commanders should to support their respective informational laterally among all the players who are either ensure that their staffs track what has been efforts in theater, including peacetime affected or who have the capacity to influ- reported, when, and by whom to catalogue activities, transnational threats, and exist- ence foreign audiences. Draft needed guid- egregious broadcasts that incite violence. ing OPLANs/CONPLANs. These would ance. Consider asking specific questions as a 6. Combatant commands should be forwarded to both the Chairman of the means to influence the policy process. Com- maintain and catalogue data on the popular Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense for batant commanders are far more influential culture of the countries in their respective insertion into the National Security Council in focusing interagency attention than staffs. areas of responsibility. The Strategic Studies (NSC) process. For standard OPLANs and Requests for policy/SC guidance should be Detachments of the 4th Psychological Opera- CONPLANs, they would be included in in writing. Recommend “Personal for” mes- tions Group, assisted by the Defense Intel- Annex Ys and submitted to the NSC for sages or memoranda. ligence Agency Human Factors personnel review and coordination. EIRs would also 106 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu JONES, KUEHL, BURGESS, and ROCHTE include combatant commander–desired U.S. of State and the interagency community, the context of the overall mission and strate- Government interlocutors, regional experts channeled through agencies to the Deputy gic goals. If we are on offense, the adversary is (Arab-Americans, for example), and inter- National Security Advisor for Communica- on defense. nationally recognized figures to “fill the tions to ensure consistency and coordination 14. Greatly expand our use of imagery to information void” on regional media that with national-level guidance. Determine support our rhetoric. This requires pervasive is all too often exploited by our adversaries, what effects are needed based on a range use/augmentation of Joint Combat Camera, resulting in their getting their message out of possible outcomes, and reach agreement PSYOP electronic news gathering capacity, aggressively and our being reactive. on talking points, language, timing, com- possible addition/activation of Reserve Com- 8. For command post exercises and municators, means of dissemination, and ponent PA, or other photographic expertise. simulations, strategic communication, opera- feedback conduits. Ensure sufficient systems are available to tional, and tactical information operations 12. Within each combatant command, uplink/downlink both still photos and video must be incorporated to identify strengths as and via J7, modify the JOPES process and for cataloging and selective use in disseminat- well as weaknesses and the degree to which make concomitant doctrinal changes to ing to desired foreign and domestic audiences. allied/coalition participation and contribu- include the appropriate responses in the Ensure and budget for satellite time to ensure tion are possible. Full-spectrum SC simula- influence realm, creating a more comprehen- transmission. This was a major deficiency tions need to be conducted to coordinate, sive approach beyond the kinetic effects of an during Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite integrate, and synergize activities during attack. Historically, we have concentrated our recognition of the problem during Enduring deterrence, conflict, and postconflict phases, efforts on the planning and operational phase Freedom and extensive coordination with as well as to identify resource shortfalls. In and on effects regarding the target only. In Joint Combat Camera, their preparedness, addition, combatant commanders need to our current approach, we “own” everything improve simulations so that they incorporate up through the strike, and the adversary effects/reactions as a result of the informa- (and his media support) “owns” everything just as in sports, nobody cares tion efforts as well as to ensure simulations past the strike. We need to reverse this trend. about second; the images that include a realistic number of events for the Most targeting work/matrices only go until come in second will not get process to be exercised. the bomb is dropped. We need to extend that play time 9. Each combatant command should matrix to deal with post-action effects. This issue IO effects synchronization guid- will allow us to be proactive instead of reac- ance, coordinated with the PA guidance, tive. Talking points must be “loaded” and and their recognition of the public diplomacy and disseminated during the information “dropped” in synch with the bomb. importance of the images only they could coordinating committee meetings described 13. Be prepared to follow and some- “capture.” Rapid release of the images to the above. Involve military PA in each step of the times precede kinetic strikes with “influence open source world is key. Delays in releasing process, resulting in guidance in line with strikes.” Using precleared information that these images hurt us. We have to be first. Just the overarching approach and nested in the supports our position, we must demonstrate as in sports, nobody cares about second; the public communications guidance given U.S. combat power within the constraints of rules images that come in second will not get play Embassies and missions. Active rather than of engagement to achieve objectives within time, no matter how accurate. Consideration passive guidance is needed in most cases, tapping into known and predicted foreign General Raymond T. Odierno, USA, commander, Multi-National journalist interest. Force–Iraq, briefs press at Pentagon 10. As critical contributions to address- ing the ever-increasing number of jihadist Web sites that provide “inciteful” language and recruitment enticements, combatant commands should develop Web initiatives in accordance with DOD guidelines that assist in achievement of theater and national infor- mational objectives. All of the elements of information operations, including computer network and operations and psychological operations (PSYOP), need to be integrated in this effort. Two useful examples/models might be the Southeast European Times, produced by U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and Magharebia.com, origi- nally created at USEUCOM and now oper- ated by U.S. Africa Command. 11. For select operations, rehearse contingency options with the Department DOD (R.D. Ward) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 107 COMMENTARY | Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander since we tend always to win, lulling ourselves into dangerous complacency. 19. Similar to combat operational debriefings for the media during times of “hot” war, ensure that we take the informa- U.S. Air Force (Dawn M. Price) U.S. Air Force tional initiative in operations other than war/ low-intensity conflict by doing the same, taking our information to television first and establishing the facts, thus preempting disinformation or propaganda that could be developed regarding an incident. 20. Use an organizational template (matrix) to coordinate actions and options. When guidance is sent out to action agents, it takes the form of whatever tool that agency or office uses to communicate. Always balance the need for proactive participation with operational security. 21. Combatant commanders should use the U.S. Special Operations Command joint mission support activity to plan, coordinate, Strategic communication director for Combined Joint Task Force– and implement transregional PSYOP. Horn of Africa speaks during dedication of clinic in Tanga, Tanzania Implications Although nation-states and politi- might be given to attempting, in advance, to 17. Bring in the media, establish the cal entities have exercised some of these get copyright releases in case we do not get facts, and show them sites where alleged principles and operations for centuries, our own photographers/videographers to an attacks on civilian targets occurred. Have the information environment—especially incident scene before embedded press repre- embeds ready to go just after sensitive site cyberspace—is a new concept. We are not sentatives do and there is a need to use other exploitation is done. If we feed these types well organized—strategically, bureaucrati- images on our products. of stories to Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyah, for cally, or procedurally—to operate effectively 15. Consider, as U.S. Central Command example, or let others scoop them, this will in this space, certainly not in comparison did, embedding within DOD units (such push our side of the story to their audiences. to recent and current adversaries. We have as civil affairs, engineers, and medical) not Pushing information is critical, and histori- not dedicated sufficient resources—human, only Western media, but also media such as cally we do not do it very well. An active PA organizational, or fiscal—for success. Nor Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyah and from across posture is far preferable to remaining passive. have we created the training and educa- the global range of print, visual, broadcast, 18. “Red team” the actions from an tional mechanisms within our primary and Web-based media. This will provide adversarial propaganda perspective. Iden- strategic communication arms—the State not only a sounding board for the truth, but tify and game likely scenarios and possible and Defense Departments—to adequately also the most credible sources for the global preemptive as well as responsive actions that prepare future strategic leaders to operate in audience since local media and reportage are might be appropriate. Because actions are the this environment. We must see our interna- almost always seen as the most believable to most important form of communication and tional partners and allies as indispensable any audience. Connect our “embeds” with always have more resonance, the spectrum actors and treat them accordingly, involving information response teams, as well as the should include PA, public diplomacy, IO, and them in the planning and conduct of criti- appropriate operations command center. special activities as well as military actions. cal influence operations and campaigns. 16. Arrive first on scene to an attack Have a dedicated team of subject matter The good news is that we have the ability to area with an information response team. If experts available and prepared to defend/ improve every one of these processes and we know we are going to hit a significant explain actions in front of the press to identify capabilities. It is up to us—and the time to target, deploy a Combat Camera team and inconsistencies or discrepancies in any adver- begin is now. JFQ some operators either prepositioned or ready sarial disinformation that is disseminated that (with dedicated helicopter transportation) to we should exploit/point out. As part of the risk “scoop” adversarial media and preempt their assessment/mitigation of any significant oper- stories. Get “before and after” pictures to ation, influence factors need consideration, prove we were monitoring a target (with con- with a preemption/reaction plan ready to sideration of operational risk) beforehand, execute from the proper communicators and and to avoid any disputes over the authentic- through the appropriate channels. It is critical ity of the site and the environs. that we are hard on ourselves during this game 108 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Energy and Environmental Insecurity By R i c h a r d B . A n d r e s U.S. Army (Kani Ronningen) Flame at oil refinery in Bayji, Iraq, burns 24 hours a day nergy security is now a com- dollars—as its historic median price.1) Almost fossil fuels have powered the rise of indus- manding priority. The emerg- as harmful as the high price of oil, the rapid trialization and globalization. During this ing energy system is far more fluctuations in its price—from around $25 per period, free-market mechanisms ensured that E complex and global than the barrel in 2001 to almost $150 in 2008—have world markets had access to petroleum and industrial era system it is slowly replacing. discouraged investment in energy technol- other sources of energy. This system relied on Today, when security planners talk about ogy and infrastructure solutions such as new competition to drive the price of energy com- energy security, they are as likely referring to sources of renewable energy, ensuring that modities toward the price of extraction and carbon emissions as to energy self-reliance global markets will not be prepared for the depended on a liberal trading order in which and affordable oil. Moreover, the solutions next cycle of high prices.2 Internationally, governments generally left energy transporta- that the international system has employed for energy diplomacy has become increasingly tion, supply, and demand to the market.4 over a century to secure its access to energy confrontational as states jockey for control of Over the life of the energy market, the are becoming decreasingly effective. This gas and oil markets and pipelines. Meanwhile, fundamental threat to cheap and reliable article examines critical issues surrounding concerns about pollution and greenhouse energy commodities has been that govern- energy in the evolving security environment. gases have strained diplomatic relations with ment intervention in the supply, transport, other nations and are forcing fundamental and demand for energy would transform Emerging System changes in energy policy.3 the global distribution system from one Energy has become one of the most The emerging crises described above are adjudicated mainly by markets to one based pressing problems in national and global secu- symptoms of a gradual transformation in the on politics and force. Threats to the market- rity. Over the last decade, significant increases underlying geopolitical and economic system based system have always been possible. in the price of oil have weakened the global that has supplied the world with cheap energy States with diplomatic or military influence economy, contributed to a sharp rise in global for over a century. Since the 1800s, cheap on the global lines of communication by food prices, and transferred trillions of dollars to autocratic oil-exporting regimes. (Even in the midst of the current recession, oil costs Dr. Richard B. Andres is Energy and Environment Security and Policy Chair in the Institute for National around twice as much—in inflation-adjusted Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 109 COMMENTARY | Energy and Environmental Security which energy is transported have frequently use its geographic proximity to and influence been tempted to further their interests by states with diplomatic or on Central Asian and Eastern European states charging rents for access. Supplying states military influence on the to seek economic and diplomatic rents from have regularly attempted to band together global lines of communication natural gas exports. 5 to increase market prices. At least since the have frequently been tempted Russia has routinely made use of its 1970s, environmental groups have put pres- to further their interests by influence over energy supply routes. In sure on governments in rich states to look January 2006, Moscow flexed its muscles by beyond the market and consider externalities charging rents for access cutting off natural gas exports to Ukraine when setting energy policy. and did the same in 2007 to Georgia and Despite these pressures, until recently parochial reasons. During the World Wars, Belarus.7 After Russia’s intervention into the world has generally maintained a global Cold War, and Iran-Iraq war, belligerents used Georgia in 2008, Russian leaders made it free-market energy economy in which the diplomatic and military power to interdict clear that opposition to Moscow could affect prices of energy commodities have hovered opponents’ energy supplies. However, because natural gas supplies.8 Russia’s energy realpoli- around the cost of extraction and the supply most global energy commodities traveled tik has been effective. Major European states has been dependable.6 Historically, this by sea, and because Great Britain and the have regularly recoiled in the face of threats system has rested on three pillars: United States were dominant sea powers, their to their energy lifeline. Meanwhile, America’s opponents’ efforts were generally frustrated in support for the free transport of gas in ■■ reliance on freedom of the seas for most war and free-market distribution mechanics Central Asia and Eastern Europe has put it at international energy trade persisted in times of peace. odds with Russia.9 ■■ multiplicity of energy-exporting nations In recent years, however, a number of Supply lines have also become less and multinational corporations that made col- events have begun to undermine freedom secure in the Persian Gulf’s narrow Strait of lusion and nationalization difficult of energy transportation. Over the last two Hormuz through which 40 percent of global ■■ preference given by oil-importing nations decades, natural gas has become an increas- oil exports flow. As Iran amasses modern to energy supply and price over considerations ingly important part of Europe’s energy antiair and antiship missiles and enhances such as the environment. economy, and Russia and Central Asian its capacity for harassing tanker shipping, states have begun to supply a large portion the United States assumes a riskier and Each of these pillars, and hence the basic of that resource. Unlike petroleum exports, costlier burden as guarantor of the freedom energy system, is increasingly uncertain. which mainly travel across oceans to final of the seas.10 In the longer term, China’s growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil may heighten Beijing’s concern about U.S. control of the sea lines of communica- tion. These concerns have led it to expand its influence along the routes connecting U.S. Navy (Andre McIntyre) U.S. Navy (Andre the Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, and South China Sea through a network of treaties, access to ports and airfields, and modernized military capabili- ties.11 If global petroleum demand continues to outpace supplies, the temptation for regional powers to seek diplomatic and financial rents by controlling sea lines and chokepoints is likely to increase. From Free Market to Oligopoly For more than a century, global energy supply has been dominated by international corporations competing to find and extract energy resources for profit. The result has Exercise Sector Guardian assesses Iraqi navy ability to been that known reserves have expanded defend oil platform in Persian Gulf faster than demand, and prices have usually remained low. Petroleum, in particular, has Insecure Energy Lines of buyers, natural gas must generally travel by averaged around $20 per barrel in inflation- Communication pipelines through sovereign territory. The adjusted dollars for nearly a century.12 While Unimpeded transportation of energy main geopolitical implications of overland energy-exporting nations have attempted has never been assured. Throughout the transport are that the United States cannot to coordinate their export policies to reduce history of the modern energy market, states use its maritime power to secure energy sea supplies and increase prices, the large number have attempted to influence transit routes for lines of communication and that Russia can of exporting states and the critical role inter- 110 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu ANDRES national corporations have played in provid- ing technology and expertise have usually frustrated cartels. The longstanding dynamics of the global energy market are changing. Known oil and gas reserves have become increasingly U.S. Navy (Nathan Schaeffer) consolidated in the hands of a small clique of often politically unstable states.13 In four of the top eight reserve-holding nations—Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela—a combina- tion of international sanctions, war, civil disorder, and corruption has reduced energy exploration and extraction below market expectations, diminishing supply and known oil and gas reserves Sailor stands guard have become increasingly on Khawr Al Amaya consolidated in the hands of a oil platform small clique of often politically unstable states supplying nations through diplomatic and The net effect of these changes has military instruments of state power. The been to reduce the amount of gas and oil on system that allocates energy internationally the international market—resulting in tight increasing prices.14 Over the same period, as has become more mercantilist. China has vig- supplies—and to move the market toward oli- extraction technology has spread from private orously attempted to use its newfound finan- gopoly. The emerging system is less stable and companies to states, exporting countries cial muscle to bring autocratic African and less predictable than the older market-driven have regularly nationalized their reserves Central Asian oil-exporting regimes within system. In the old system, the large number and seized multinational oil and gas compa- its sphere of influence to bypass market of competing energy-supplying states and nies doing business within their territory.15 mechanisms. Russian attempts to control the companies dampened the effects of actions by Whereas most reserves and nearly all major flow of energy in Central Asia and Eastern particular suppliers and inhibited the ability energy companies were once private, around Europe have regularly escalated to energy of suppliers to coordinate policy. In the new 90 percent of all reserves are now under state blackmail and threat of force. Similarly, at system, market supply is increasingly depen- control and a progressively larger number of least since the early 1990s, the United States dent on the nuances and preferences of indi- oil and gas companies are partly or wholly has used various diplomatic tools, including vidual states. Recently, even apparently trivial owned by exporting governments.16 military-to-military contacts, with regimes in political events in exporting nations have As this has happened, major import- Central Asia and the Middle East to increase been enough to cause dramatic fluctuations ing powers have become keen to influence their connections with the West.17 in prices, and the United States has, on occa- sion, been reduced to cajoling Saudi Arabia and other major exporters to increase energy supplies to reduce market prices.18 From the viewpoint of the emerging autocratic oil- exporting oligarchy, the system works. Before the current recession, it funneled trillions of U.S. Navy (Jason R. Zalasky) dollars into their economies and increased their political power at home and diplomatic power abroad. According to most analyses, this situation will return when the reces- sion ends. There is little reason to expect the current trend toward oligarchy to reverse itself or anticipate a return to the more competitive energy environment of the 20th century. Diminishing Importance of Price The third dynamic altering the current global energy market is the increasing impor- German frigate Mecklenburg-Vorpommern sails tance of environmental concerns in determin- Strait of Hormuz near USS Vella Gulf ing importing states’ energy policies. Whereas ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 111 COMMENTARY | Energy and Environmental Security energy policies in rich states were once hold out hope that new technology will even- 4 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest determined mainly with an eye to reducing tually solve current problems. for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and price, today price is becoming less important Environmental concerns, and particu- Schuster, 1991). 5 Sergei Blagov, “Russia Mulls Energy vis-à-vis fears of pollution and particularly of larly global climate change, may prove to be Cartels with Venezuela, Iran,” September 29, global warming.19 this century’s greatest security challenge. 2008, available at 112 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Measure, Sailor tests samples in fuel analysis laboratory aboard USS John C. Stennis U.S. Navy (Kenneth Abbate) Air conditioning installed in uninsulated tents Manage, is major source of energy waste Win Wyman) U.S. Navy (Wendy THE CASE FOR OPERATIONAL ENERGY METRICS By A n d rew Bochman oday, the Department of Defense Fuel efficiency has not been fully incor- (DOD) is beset by budgetary porated into the design of DOD warfighting problems, hampered by worn- systems. In fact, efficiency is seldom seri- T out equipment, faced with sky- ously considered because all legacy systems rocketing personnel costs, and spread thin in were required, designed, and procured on short- and long-term obligations that span the the assumption that fuel logistics was free globe. One business process change that will and invulnerable, so saved fuel was valued improve force effectiveness, reduce mission at typically one or two orders of magnitude risk resulting from high fuel and logistics below its true cost delivered to the platform in demand, and, by fortunate coincidence, help theater in wartime. Nor do DOD wargames mend budgets is implementation of energy normally “play fuel”; required fuel is assumed metrics for operational systems. to appear automatically when and where it Andrew Bochman is founder and author of the DOD Energy Blog and the Smart Grid Security Blog. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 113 COMMENTARY | Case for Operational Energy Metrics Airman pulls hose to refuel E–3 Sentry in Southwest Asia U.S. Air Force (Brian J. Ellis) U.S. Air Force is needed. Equally apparent, unless change that are less vulnerable to fluctuations in The commodity price of oil is compara- comes quickly, ensuing generations of the global price of fossil fuels. The primary tively low today, but its recent climb to $150 systems will be fielded with equal or greater metrics encompass the inclusion of energy per barrel put everyone on alert and elevated energy appetites. efficiency as a key performance parameter energy security to the fore of the Presidential Although DOD naturally focuses on (KPP) in the acquisition process and the use campaign. Prices that high were alarming, but effectiveness over efficiency, it is seemingly from a planning and budgeting perspective, unaware that the two attributes are not the volatility has been even more problematic. mutually exclusive. For instance, inefficient according to OSD, oil price According to OSD, oil price volatility and the platforms require fat logistic tails that incur volatility and the sheer sheer amount required to run the modern huge costs (in both blood and treasure), tie amount required to run the military are causing big problems: up whole divisions hauling and guarding modern military are causing ■■ fuel, and create attractive targets for our big problems 70 percent of the tonnage moved when adversaries. Especially now, in the shadow the Army deploys is fuel and water2 of $150-per-barrel oil and in the middle of ■■ about half of current casualties in theater a deep fiscal crisis, it is long past time for a of the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) to are associated with convoys3 change. DOD has shown that it can measure determine baseline and continuing costs so ■■ logistics consumes roughly half of DOD and manage energy requirements on the that saved fuel is more highly valued in the personnel and a third of its budget.4 facilities side; now it is time to do the same trade space. with operational systems. Energy advocates inside and outside One of the fastest ways to reduce DOD Undervalues Fuel the DOD community are well aware of these operational fuel demand and gain substantial Out of all the challenges that DOD problems with valuing fuel. Some of the strategic, operational, and tactical benefits faces, one condition is chronic and will only organizations that have contributed recom- is through the expedited implementation of get worse if changes are not made fast: the mendations over the last decade include OSD, energy frameworks and metrics mandated DOD appetite for fuel. In 2006 and 2007, the Center for New American Studies, Center for in the National Defense Authorization Act Department spent $26 billion per year on Strategic and International Studies, Center for (NDAA) of 2009. When fuel efficiency is fac- energy, and in 2008 requested an additional Naval Analyses, American Enterprise Insti- tored into the design, procurement, and field- $5 billion on top to offset higher prices. Each tute, Rocky Mountain Institute, two Defense ing of all DOD systems, the cumulative effects $10 per barrel price increase in oil costs DOD Science Board (DSB) Energy Task Force teams will reduce logistics tails that slow operations, over $1.3 billion per year.1 As cited by the that released encyclopedic reports in 2001 and limit maneuver and deployability, tie up force Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 2008, and the Government Accountability structure in combat support, keep too many those baseline energy expenditures are just Office (GAO). In one of its latest reports on Soldiers in force protection mode, and expose the beginning. One presentation says, “Fiscal this matter, GAO reports that it “found that Servicemembers to serious and unnecessary and operational costs from DOD’s fuel DOD has made limited progress in incorpo- risks. In addition, reducing fuel use and fuel demand are orders of magnitude bigger than rating fuel efficiency as a consideration in key logistics will result in smaller DOD budgets we appreciate.” business processes—which include developing 114 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BOCHMAN for military facilities energy managers yet of the address list that is important; it is what the Services have focused on produced. On the operational side, the plan the memo directs: “All new Army acquisition installation power costs, and reports that pilots and Airmen now remove programs, to include new program starts and not on reducing demand in every superfluous pound from inside the new increments, with end items that consume the operational force planes (savings recently identified in four energy shall include the fully burdened cost of heavy aircraft types have a present value energy needed to operate the system in their of billions of dollars), and pilots do more total ownership cost analysis.” 7 requirements for and acquiring new weapons simulator work and fly with smaller fuel systems.”5 The same report notes the missed loads. However, despite claims to the con- Poised for Progress . . . or Simply opportunities inherent in considering pro- trary from leadership, it appears that there is Stalling? curement of energy efficiency capabilities in little emphasis on calibrating energy-related As indicated above, the Services have forward operating locations: investments to weigh the risk of mission focused on installation power costs, and not disruption. The omission is clear when there on reducing demand in the operational force. Given DOD’s high fuel demand for base is almost no mention of the FBCF or a KPP This first inkling of a change came with a support activities at its forward-deployed loca- related to energy. request by General Richard Zilmer, USMC, tions, without guidance in place to incorporate Army. The Army, which is having from the field in 2006 for a less oil-depen- energy efficiency considerations into procure- success with energy demand reduction at dent military, but overall DOD is just now ment decisions when practical, DOD may its fixed facilities, is also working to reduce getting some appreciation for the military be missing opportunities to make significant demand from weapons systems, tactical vehi- capability angle. reductions in demand without affecting opera- cles, and power generators. In January 2009, Across DOD, the real potential for tional capabilities.6 Army Acquisition Executive Dean Popps embracing energy metrics has little to do signed an important new Army energy docu- with saving money and everything to do with In short, there seems to be little top- ment, whose distribution list includes every saving lives and maximizing chances for down institutional interest in reducing the Army senior leader in every significant unit mission success. A handful of commanders billions spent annually on energy and the around the globe. And it is not just the reach in the field, noting fuel convoys’ enormous tens of billions spent to deliver it. But there are a handful of initiatives in the Services According to DOD, generators are the single that indicate a bottom-up movement toward largest battlefield fuel consumer embracing energy efficiency metrics. Some are moving faster than others, albeit 8 years after initial recommendations were issued by the first DSB task force. Following is a summary of recently announced energy policy from the Service components. The focus remains overwhelmingly on facilities energy; there continues to be a great deal of reluctance to look operational energy chal- lenges square in the eye. Navy/Marines. It appears that the Navy—unlike OSD, the Air Force, and the Army, all of which have had Senior Executive Service (SES)–level personnel working facili- ties energy issues for some time—has only recently appointed an SES energy lead who reports to the Secretary of the Navy. The Navy has had success in annually reducing its facili- ties energy consumption, but its Incentivized Energy Conservation and Fleet Readiness, Research, and Development programs appear to be making fuel reduction headway. A Navy Energy Coordination Office has formed to guide further progress on installations and oversee the operational energy side as well. Air Force. The United States Air Force Infrastructure Energy Strategic Plan 2008, covering buildings, ground vehicle fleets, and renewables, is the most thorough roadmap Graham) U.S. Marine Corps (Audrey ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 115 COMMENTARY | Case for Operational Energy Metrics drain on resources, have demanded change ■■ Recommended fuel use and energy years for both to become accepted in DOD from business as usual. The Power Surety efficiency metrics have a long way to go before guidance, and now in 2009 they are finally Task Force, partially created in response to a implementation in the Planning, Programming, being studied for initial use. request by General James Mattis, USMC, from Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). The Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel. The Iraq to “unleash us from the tether of fuel,” is ■■ The Defense Authorization Act 2009, also FBCF was formally codified last year in one example of a new understanding of what known as the Duncan Hunter Act (HR 5658), NDAA 2009 and DOD Instruction 5000.02. it takes to manage energy demand to improve requires that analyses and force planning The fully burdened cost of energy is defined chances for tactical success.8 processes consider the requirements for, and in the NDAA as “the commodity price for Earlier this year, Congress attempted to vulnerability of, fuel logistics. It also created a fuel plus the total cost of all personnel and shine some light on one aspect of operational new Director of Energy Operations Plans and assets required to move and, when necessary, energy problems facing DOD in a House Programs position and directs that fuel use protect the fuel from the point at which the Armed Services Committee’s Readiness and energy efficiency metrics will be imple- fuel is received from the commercial supplier Subcommittee hearing on fuel demand man- mented in the PPBES. This position remains to the point of use.”10 In theater, this often agement at forward-deployed locations and unfilled at this writing. includes expensive force protection assets operational energy initiatives. Indeed, OSD and, as has been documented, can drive the and other DOD energy policy organizations These indicators show that even at this late delivered cost of a gallon of diesel or J–P8 now acknowledge that “DOD planning pro- date, senior DOD leaders are not taking from a base cost of $2 or $4 to tens or hun- cesses undervalue fuel and its delivery costs,”9 energy measurement and metrics seriously. dreds of dollars. Impossible to measure is the yet it also appears that few senior DOD worth of the many Soldiers and Marines and leaders are aware of the problem, much less Operational Energy Metrics Are Ready U.S. contractors whose lives are lost while trying to change it. While progress has been made using attempting to transport and/or protect fuel Apart from demonstrated success with millions of British thermal units (MBTUs) per resources, and the opportunity cost of their facilities energy reduction, DOD finds itself square foot to track energy demand reduction diverted combat capability. having made little progress on operational and efficiency gains on fixed installations, In “The Peculiar Economics of Energy energy strategy or governance structure. The operational systems have proven resistant to in Defense Operations,” Michael Canes cites repeated findings of the DSB task force rein- having energy inputs quantified via metrics. the 2001 DSB report and suggests the power of force the impression of inaction. In short, the For instance, if delivered energy is always the FBCF approach: 2008 report revealed that the most emphatic assumed, there is no reason to measure it. Iraq recommendations of the 2001 report were and Afghanistan should have taught us that The 2001 DSB study made no formal estimates ignored. There have been several additional DOD has some bad assumptions. Moreover, of what it termed the “true cost” of fuel, but indicators of a lack of progress in 2009: operational energy metrics are a tougher nut stated that Army sources had estimated that to crack as the use cases are an order of mag- it costs $13/gallon merely to deliver fuel to a ■■ No central energy security strategy has nitude more varied than in garrison energy foreign theater, and much more to deliver it been articulated. use scenarios. from its landing point to the front lines. In one ■■ Energy risks, and the understanding The two metrics that have yet to play example, using helicopters to fly bladders filled of vulnerabilities caused by our operational a significant role in DOD thinking are the with fuel to troops several hundred kilometers reliance on fuel delivery, have not been FBCF and a KPP related to energy efficiency. inland, the fully burdened cost of fuel was esti- mainstreamed. First proposed in 2001, it took several more mated to be as much as $400 per gallon.11 Almost half of in-theater casualties are associated with convoys, such as this one delivering fuel to airfield in Iraq U.S. Marine Corps (Kelly R. Chase) 116 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BOCHMAN Logistics costs drive up energy costs and Marine refuels M1A1 are tightly correlated to the type of environ- Abrams main battle tank at ment into which fuel is being delivered. Pen- Twentynine Palms tagon planners are not paying attention if they think the JP–8 and diesel used in theater cost anything similar to high-grade gasoline at the local Sunoco. But the fuel value assumed when their existing platforms were required and designed is in fact less than that—based simply on the wholesale cost of fuel that is neither delivered nor protected. Energy Efficiency KPP. According to DOD, a KPP is “an attribute or characteristic of a system that is considered critical or essen- tial to the development of an effective military capability.”12 Stated simply, KPPs allow people generating requirements in a systems defini- tion process to quantify their descriptions of the most important characteristics of a given system, based on the scenarios in which it is being designed to operate. KPPs allow series impossible to measure is the worth of the lives lost attempting to transport and/or protect fuel resources of measured tradeoffs, with some typical KPPs being speed, survivability, stealth, and sustainability. Energy efficiency, or the value of reducing demand for fuel logistics in opera- U.S. Marine Corps (Kelsey J. Green) tions, has never been a consideration. Total consumer is generators, which provide power replacement for up-armored Humvees that cost of ownership can include fuel costs, and for base support activities such as cooling, offers severalfold gains in fuel efficiency, for aircraft, range and payload KPPs factor heating, and lighting.”14 Indeed, one-third of weight, and acceleration with greater lethality in fuel use, but these estimates currently the Army’s wartime fuel use is for fossil fuel– and greatly improved stability and protec- ignore the support “tail” costs that it takes to powered generators to make electricity that is tion—yet at comparable cost using integrative make these systems functional. The energy largely wasted: in a typical forward operating design and novel ultralight armor to reverse efficiency KPP is called out for “selective base, about 95 percent of the electricity is the normal assumption that efficiency implementation” in new procurement guid- inefficiently used to cool desert tents that increases costs.15 Indeed, civilian land, sea, ance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of until recently were uninsulated (now about and air platforms have already disproven that Staff Instruction 3170.01F.13 To date, it has not half have been urgently sprayed with insulat- assumption, including Boeing’s civilian 787 been applied to any program. ing foam, with the other half in process). Dreamliner, which saves a fifth of its fuel at One way of understanding the relation- At present, it is difficult to set energy no extra cost. ship between these two metrics is that the efficiency or energy productivity baselines More broadly, when fuel efficiency energy efficiency KPP is monetized via FBCF. that work across different programs or factors into all of the systems designed, Today, the only drivers are schedule, perfor- organizations. Should a new ground vehicle procured, and fielded, the cumulative effects mance, and non-energy costs, and program trade armor for acceleration, or should DOD will reveal: managers have no tool to measure energy pay more for the lighter but better armor, or factors. The same holds true for personnel reduce both for greater range or resilience, ■■ reduced logistics tails that slow opera- in the field trying to measure (and report all the while seeking to trim the logistics tions, limit maneuver and deployability, tie on) the effectiveness of all systems creating a tail wherever possible? A new unmanned up force structure in combat support, and fuel demand. A February 2009 GAO report aerial vehicle or manned fighter or bomber keep too many Soldiers in force protection on energy demand management revealed can leverage additional fuel efficiency for mode when they could be taking the battle to what was a surprise to some: “While weapon extended range, heavier payloads, or loiter the enemy platforms require large amounts of fuel, DOD time, or to reduce logistics costs. The 2008 ■■ when more energy efficient solutions reports that the single largest battlefield fuel DSB report even identified a prototype are sought, entire systems can become better ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 117 COMMENTARY | Case for Operational Energy Metrics designed to accomplish the original task (for Factor Energy Efficiency into All New ments drive multiple variables, including force example, with a more fuel-efficient engine, the Systems. Depending on the type of system, structure and acquisition. For force planning, space savings from the smaller fuel tank may improvements to energy efficiency will not the benefits immediately accrue when fuel allow a redesign of other parts of the vehicle always be practical or possible. But because efficiency metrics are employed by: and perhaps the entire power train to add even procurements, even the most recent ones, more efficiency traits) have yet to include a KPP for energy efficiency ■■ building fuel delivery, protection, and ■■ a smaller and more predictable DOD or energy productivity, DOD must ensure that vulnerability risks into campaign plans budget, less reliant on supplemental funding the next wave of systems is scored and selected ■■ setting targets for reducing fuel delivery requests to Congress, and much less vulner- with input from the energy efficiency KPP. burden within force plans able to fluctuations in the global price of Systems defined today are fielded 10-plus ■■ limiting operational fuel demand to fossil fuels. years from now and in some cases remain improve capability and reduce mission risk online 50 years later. The F–22, our current and frame the efficiency/effectiveness trades In sum, the FBCF and energy efficiency frontline air superiority fighter, was designed accurately. KPP would not turn DOD upside down; they 25 years ago. are simply a means to give energy a seat at Give People Needed Tools. At present, Acquisition activities can also benefit the table in all the discussions that can affect program managers, including commanders from the incorporation of FBCF and energy budget, capabilities, force structure, and and managers, have no tools to measure energy or energy efficiency KPPs. For example, DOD mission effectiveness. efficiency gains and losses, no tools to ensure would be able to base technology investment business cases on the FBCF and operational areas where energy delivery will be contested; incentivize suppliers to offer the most efficient solutions; and award contracts to buy the most efficient solutions, especially in cases where other scores indicate rough parity. To achieve these benefits, energy metrics–based policy will have to be codi- fied at the acquisition guide book level, and program managers and other acquisition officials will need to be trained in how to work with these new energy metrics and measurement techniques. This will require significant changes. But given the energy security challenges we now face, the changes Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting Vehicle is joint project to would be well worth the pain—and there is demonstrate potential of hybrid electric drive technology General Dynamics no time to lose. Use Energy Metrics to Enable Questions Recommendations guidance is provided to help them incorporate Never Asked Before. A fully implemented The energy efficiency KPP will help energy efficiency targets in their objectives, and DOD energy security strategy with appropri- program managers and others make better no tools to communicate status using terms ate policy and metrics will allow DOD, for the informed decisions. The 2008 GAO report familiar to all. As noted earlier, facilities cam- first time, to answer questions such as these on mobility energy showed the way based paigns are maturing, with MBTUs per square when defining a new system: on energy lessons learned and gains already foot as the common currency used to manage achieved at Defense facilities: and measure energy progress with buildings. ■■ How does this technology specifically influence operational effectiveness and force DOD has created a management framework DOD must ensure that the structure? to oversee facility energy, which accounts ■■ How will it reduce convoy footprints? for about 25 percent of the department’s next wave of systems is scored ■■ How will it require less logistics mass? energy use. . . . The establishment of such a and selected with input from ■■ How will it free up force protection assets framework for mobility energy could provide the energy efficiency KPP so they can be applied to other activities? greater assurance that DOD’s efforts to ■■ What are the energy impacts of the 2025 reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel Absent the FBCF and energy efficiency KPP force being designed today? will succeed without degrading its opera- and more granular metrics derived from tional capabilities and that DOD is better them, leadership trying to manage the energy According to OSD and others, fuel positioned to address future mobility energy demands of operational systems simply will savings bring enormous benefits to DOD: challenges—both within the department and not be able to keep up. For example, future as a stakeholder in national energy security system development should consider how ■■ major warfighting, logistic, and budget dialogues.16 systems with varying energy demand require- benefits 118 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BOCHMAN 5 Government Accountability Office (GAO), the election of a President with a strong energy security Defense Management: Overarching Organizational orientation and his creation of an energy-aware National Framework Needed to Guide and Oversee Energy Reduction Efforts for Military Operations, GAO– Security Council have laid the groundwork for rapid change 08–426 (Washington, DC: GAO, March 13, 2008), available at GEN Odierno greets Defense Secretary U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force Gates upon his arrival in Iraq 120 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu ODIERNO JFQ: How important was the role of that governs our military presence in Iraq impact the flow of illegal weapons, persons, the Awakening/Sons of Iraq in the success of through 2011. It was the right thing to do, and and materiels. This is another step in recog- the surge? How do the Sons of Iraq fit into a it happened at the right time. It has provided nizing Iraq’s sovereignty and moving toward united, multiethnic Iraq capable of standing the ISF a psychological lift and has made clear the government taking full responsibility for on its own two feet? our intent to abide by the agreement. Three security. years ago, we tried transitioning security Regarding long-term progress in Iraq, General Odierno: In 2006, the responsibilities when the security situation June 30 was a seminal event for the Iraqis. tactical-level reconciliation with former was significantly worse, and the ISF simply The psychological effect cannot be overstated Sunni insurgents, known as the Awakening, were not ready. Since then, we have had an as they fully embraced security responsibili- made a huge difference in Anbar Province. 80 percent reduction in security incidents, ties. They feel empowered and in control— Al Qaeda had clearly overplayed its hand and through coalition partnership, training, and, again, they are ready for this task. Our with tribally focused Sunnis, creating a mentoring, and advising, we have seen steady visible movement out of the cities confirmed seam that our leaders could exploit. Seizing progress in ISF capabilities. America’s commitment to recognizing Iraqi that opportunity, they also assumed risk sovereignty. In fact, I’d say that by abiding by building cooperative relationships to our bilateral agreement, even in the tough with Sunni leaders—many of whom had areas such as Mosul, we took the wind out previously conducted attacks against U.S. of the sails of many extremist and insurgent forces—to reduce the violence. And it groups who have recruited based on false worked; it improved security. Later, the Sons propaganda that America will not live up of Iraq program was one of the multiple, to its commitments. Overall, we assumed simultaneous approaches that contributed to some tactical risk for strategic gains, and so the overall success of the surge. far it is working out fairly well. I believe the At the operational level, we set the right calculated risks are worth the strategic gains and left limits of the program and allowed of having a long-term, stable partner in the tactical commanders across the battlespace region. to nurture local reconciliation. So while the Awakening movement began as a local rejec- JFQ: How would you characterize the tion of al Qaeda, we were able to carefully threat in Iraq today? shepherd this into a national, Iraqi-led recon- ciliation program. Today, the government of General Odierno: The greatest threats Iraq administers the Sons of Iraq program— to a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant Iraq are with our oversight. It is part of their overall DOD political drivers of instability. With security security architecture, and this past summer GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, Commander, Multi- incidents down to levels last seen in 2003, we National Force–Iraq they began transitioning program members have helped set the conditions for the Iraqi into other ministries. Granted, it took the political process to move forward. Iraqis are Iraqi government some time to embrace Although our combat forces have learning how to build alliances, generate this program, but it is now integral to the moved out of the cities, we still have small consensus, and solve issues through dialogue country’s future. In fact, earlier this year as numbers of troops in the cities to train, and compromise. However, despite the sig- the government struggled with the effects of advise, enable, and coordinate support for nificant progress, many underlying sources the downturn in oil prices on their national ISF operations. Outside the cities, our forces of conflict across Iraqi civil and political budget, the first program that the government continue to conduct full-spectrum opera- society have not yet been resolved—many fully funded and supported was the Sons of tions—by, with, and through the ISF. So issues take time. Iraq is a nascent democracy Iraq program. That says a lot. regarding immediate security concerns, I emerging from over 30 years of authoritar- think the June 30 milestone actually pro- ian rule based on ethno-sectarian privilege. JFQ: On June 30, 2009, U.S. combat pelled us toward a more effective security Iraqis are still dealing with lingering ethno- forces departed Iraqi cities. What are our posture. The ISF are fully responsible for sectarian histories, Arab-Kurd tensions, and forces doing now? What do you think this will the cities; this allows U.S. forces to reposi- violent extremist groups such as al Qaeda do for our short-term and long-term progress tion to the belts around the cities and on and other external actors who seek to exploit in Iraq? the borders. Operating in the belts allows us any fissures. The Iraqis are still determin- to disrupt logistics, training, and freedom ing the nature of their federal state and the General Odierno: On June 30, we of movement for insurgent elements, and balance of power between the central and turned over security responsibilities in the our increased emphasis on the border will provincial governments. cities to the Iraqi Security Forces [ISF]—as outlined in our bilateral security agreement Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly General Raymond T. Odierno, USA, is Commander, interviewed General Odierno at his headquarters, Camp Victory, in Baghdad, Iraq. Multi-National Force–Iraq. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 121 FEATURES | Interview Until the Iraqis solve key issues such as JFQ: You’ve talked about reconciliation The third most significant development the distribution of wealth and disputed inter- and ISF development. Surveying the last six is undoubtedly the signing of two historic nal boundaries, the government will remain years in Iraq, what have been the three most bilateral agreements with the government of vulnerable. We will continue to support the significant developments affecting our mission Iraq in December 2008. The security agree- government and ISF in providing a stable and goals for Iraq? ment now governs our military presence and and secure environment, allowing them cooperation through 2011. Recognizing Iraqi space to develop political solutions. Across General Odierno: The self-perpetu- sovereignty, it establishes a new operating Iraq, I have asked all commanders—with ating cycle of ethno-sectarian violence was environment of complete transparency within their Provincial Reconstruction Team [PRT] one of the most significant developments. the Iraqi rule of law. This has paid huge divi- leaders—to understand the root causes of Frankly, we were slow to recognize the dends for our partnership with the ISF, their instability in their areas of responsibility budding insurgency and were unable to deal continuing development, and for overall secu- and work with local Iraqi leaders to mitigate effectively with many of the “accelerants” rity. The ISF are increasingly assuming more them. With security as it is, in many cases fueling spiraling reprisal attacks. When I and more responsibilities—including security our primary efforts are focused on assisting returned to Iraq in 2006, General [George] in urban areas. Essentially, we are shifting PRTs to help provincial governments provide Casey—the Multi-National Force–Iraq com- away from security-centric operations to essential services and economic opportuni- mander at the time—challenged me to find stability operations and a long-term bilateral ties for their citizens. a new approach to reduce the violence. We relationship guided by the Strategic Frame- Having said this, I remain concerned knew we had to break the cycle of intimida- work Agreement. Most Iraqis are also shifting that security is improving, but not yet tion, coercion, and extortion—and we had their attention to the Strategic Framework enduring. Our sustained, combined pressure to protect and regain the confidence of the Agreement and the roadmap for our enduring has degraded al Qaeda, but it is still capable Iraqi people. We implemented the “surge,” strategic partnership. This clearly demon- of conducting isolated high-profile attacks— which was much more than simply a surge of strates our maturing relationship with Iraq. GEN Odierno speaks with local leader of citizens group that provides security around city of Hawr Rajab our sustained, combined pressure has degraded al Qaeda, but it is still capable of conducting isolated high- profile attacks—continuing its tactics of killing innocent civilians in order to try and prevent Iraq from moving forward peacefully JFQ: You mentioned shifting from secu- rity-centric operations to stability operations. With about 130,000 troops in Iraq today—the vast majority located outside of cities—how does support to the ISF work through the prism of counterinsurgency [COIN] doctrine? What about support to the civilian interagency efforts? Have there been any lessons learned? U.S. Army (Curt Cashour) General Odierno: COIN involves a continuing its tactics of killing innocent forces—it was a surge of new ideas and inte- combination of offense, defense, and stabil- civilians in order to try and prevent Iraq grated approaches. I would say this change ity operations. Across Iraq, the emphasis from moving forward peacefully. There are in mindset is the second most significant on each may be different, depending on the also still Sunni-based insurgent groups and development. Our change of strategy and established security conditions. I would Shi’a militant groups conducting opera- tactics focused on protecting the population actually say that across Iraq we are transi- tions in Iraq, but we are beginning to see and exploiting the positives of the Awakening tioning from COIN-focused operations to more and more of these groups interested in movement, and applying constant pressure stability operations—and I consider this an moving forward politically. Therefore, the on extremist and insurgent networks to neu- extremely positive sign of our continued government is experiencing some success tralize their influence and try to bring some progress in Iraq. I mentioned earlier that— reconciling with some of these groups and of them into reconciliation talks with the with the ISF responsible for security in the bringing them into the political process. government of Iraq. cities—U.S. forces are able to focus on the 122 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu ODIERNO belts surrounding the cities to eliminate developed relationships that will pay divi- or seams. Some of the major issues fueling extremist support zones and safe havens, dends in the future. The challenge now is to the Arab-Kurd tensions include the disputed as well as on the border regions to stop the take what we have developed here and codify internal boundaries, including the status flow of lethal aid. In all these operations, it in our educational institutions, doctrine, of Kirkuk, as well as federal versus regional we operate by, with, and through our Iraqi and leader development across our different authorities and hydrocarbon issues. However, partners in completely transparent opera- institutions. the United Nations Assistance Mission–Iraq tions. In many cases, the Iraqis are leading JFQ: You mention that security is high is actively promoting a process that provides a successful operations with our support—and in the southern parts of Iraq. What about in forum for dialogue and political solutions. We subsequently gaining legitimacy in the eyes the north? Do Arab-Kurd tensions complicate fully support its efforts, most notably through of the Iraqi people—a main objective for the security situation there? security confidence-building measures COIN operations. Given the security gains to date in many areas, our Brigade Combat Teams [BCTs] are actually taking a supporting role, enabling both the ISF and our partnered State Department PRTs, which have proven U.S. Army (Kani Ronningen) absolutely essential in Iraq’s development. One of our earlier challenges in Iraq was unity of effort through unified action. We have worked very hard to come together— the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Multi-National Force–Iraq, the United Nations, and nongov- ernmental organizations. Together, we devel- oped a Joint Campaign Plan [JCP] signed by the Ambassador and me. This is our base for synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating our activities—working toward our common goals of a stable, sovereign, self-reliant Iraq with a just, representative, and accountable government that contributes to the peace and security of the region. We established a process to regularly assess and update the JCP. We have developed a scheme focused around Advisory and Assistance Brigades [AABs] that will ultimately replace our BCTs. Built around BCTs, AABs will be trained and provided enablers that focus them on stability operations and support to our interagency partners. The first AAB President Obama speaks with GEN Odierno at Camp deployed was the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Victory during President’s first trip to Iraq Division, in September 2009, and it is a converted BCT organized to advise and train the ISF and support civil capacity- we have a generation of young leaders who have grown building. On the ground today, 4th Brigade, up thinking through not only joint, but also interagency, 1st Armored Division—while not structured solutions—and they have developed relationships that will pay as an AAB—has successfully implemented dividends in the future this concept across portions of southern Iraq for many months. What also helped us is the emphasis on developing strong interpersonal relationships General Odierno: I see Arab-Kurd between the ISF and the Kurdish peshmerga with our counterparts—from my relationship tension as the greatest single driver of instabil- and police forces. Our goal is to establish a with the Ambassador down to the relation- ity in Iraq—and it does complicate the secu- joint security framework that will reduce the ships between those deployed across Iraq. We rity situation in the north to an extent. While chances of any tactical miscalculations—by have a generation of young leaders who have our combined operations have degraded al either force—turning into strategic incidents. grown up thinking through not only joint, Qaeda, there is still a presence in the north, I am confident that our efforts will help bide but also interagency, solutions—and they have and those cells work to exploit any tensions time for the political process to move forward. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 123 FEATURES | Interview Both the Embassy and my team are very I believe that our institutions continue General Odierno: I believe that view is focused on this issue. to adjust, which allows for the development dated and based largely on his observations of our adaptive, creative, and fundamen- from 2005 to 2008. It does not accurately JFQ: Some pundits claim that the tally sound leaders. The real question is not reflect the current state of the ISF. As a task Armed Forces do a poor job of producing stra- whether they have adjusted but whether they force commander just south of Mosul in tegic thinkers. Looking back on your experi- will continue to adjust. I have complete confi- November 2004, I experienced first-hand ences in Iraq, have you detected deficiencies in dence that they will, but it is up to us as senior the near collapse of the just developing this realm, and would you suggest changes in leaders to ensure this happens. Iraqi police and to a lesser degree the Iraqi the way joint professional military education army. Starting nearly from scratch, coali- institutions produce strategic thinkers? battlefield victories alone do tion forces, along with brave men such as General Al-Jabouri, were left with the daunt- General Odierno: Today’s complex not equal strategic success, ing task of rebuilding the ISF. When I left world creates an environment that requires and effective solutions require Iraq in September 2005, we had, as General much more of our leaders. It is not enough to a thorough understanding Al-Jabouri describes, a semifunctional ISF be technically and tactically proficient. We of the underlying cultural, challenged by corruption, sectarianism, must be able to assess, understand, adapt, political, tribal, and weak rule of law, and lack of professional- ism. However, through the combined efforts and yet still be decisive. We have to think socioeconomic situation through complex multidimensional prob- of Multi-National Security Transition lems, taking into account the diplomatic, Command–Iraq and the government of economic, military, political, and cultural JFQ: In a report recently published by Iraq, we have made tremendous progress in implications of every action. And we have to the Institute for National Strategic Studies addressing these challenges through training do all of this in an age of instantaneous global [Strategic Forum 245, Iraqi Security Forces programs, professional development courses, communication, an age in which the flow of after U.S. Troop Withdrawal: An Iraqi Per- and partnerships. information and its influence on the local and spective], Major General (Ret.) Najim Abed Iraq’s increasingly professionalized mili- global audience is often just as important as Al-Jabouri anticipates the prospects of the ISF tary depends on both the trust of the people military action in determining the outcome of after the U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011. He and a fully functioning judiciary system. operations. asserts that “supporting and strengthening Establishing rule of law is fundamental to This is especially true in Iraq—and the national character of the ISF is the best Iraq’s long-term success. The transition from success in this environment requires a certain hope for a stable and integrated Iraq,” and a confessions-based to an evidentiary-based type of strategic thinker and leader. As we’ve goes on to describe the major challenges facing judicial system is an ongoing process that learned, battlefield victories alone do not the ISF. He opines that the ISF could become requires hard work throughout—from the equal strategic success, and effective solu- politicized by ethno-sectarian parties and thus point of capture to the courts. We continue tions require a thorough understanding of might not be capable of maintaining security to develop training programs with the ISF the underlying cultural, political, tribal, and following a U.S. withdrawal. What are your and judicial officials designed to teach them socioeconomic situation. thoughts on this assertion? the use of advanced forensic techniques, such DOD (R.D. Ward) Infantry Division Public Affairs (Zachary Mott) Infantry Division Public Affairs th 4 GEN Odierno briefs press on security operations in Iraq as foreign allied troop GEN Odierno talks to Iraqi army officer levels decrease and Iraqi forces assume greater responsibility 124 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu ODIERNO as biometrics, and to reduce the potential for Tempering sectarianism is a key com- time. The Iraqi senior army officer, who is a corruption. ponent of U.S. and Iraqi efforts to build ISF Kurd, remarked the board was the best he has The reduced corruption, decreased professionalism. We have made great progress seen in the last 3 years and that it was totally sectarianism, improved professionalism, and in the past few years helping the ISF develop impartial to religious or ethnic affiliations. adherence to the rule of law have all con- into an effective and professional force. Both General Al-Jabouri raises important tributed to recent ISF successes in providing the army and police are integrating profes- points in his article. He has identified many security for the Iraqi people and are reflected sional standards of conduct into training and of the same challenges to Iraq’s stability as in the increasing public confidence in the day-to-day operations. The army’s promo- we have in our joint campaign plan, and we ISF. According to a July 2009 Multi-National tion board system is an example of efforts have made tremendous progress in address- Force–Iraq poll, over 70 percent of the public to improve professionalism and overcome ing them. What is emerging from our joint believe the Iraqi army, and 60 percent believe sectarianism. The board itself is composed of efforts with the Iraqi government and people the Iraqi police, are prepared to perform their officers representing the demographic diver- are distinctly Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems. respective duties. These confidence levels have sity of the entire country. It considers officers Make no mistake—we still have work to do in increased over the last 4 months. Addition- for promotion from a pool of candidates overcoming the issues that General Al-Jabouri ally, 60 percent of the Iraqi public believe the representing all of Iraq’s tribes, provinces, and identifies. But the government of Iraq and army and federal police are not influenced ethnic communities. Candidates must meet ISF have made tremendous progress, and are by sectarian interests, and only 20 percent of strict standards: they must have at least 3 years coming closer every day to achieving the stra- Iraqis believe the police are sectarian, a sharp of service, have served in the field at their tegic goal of building a sovereign, stable, and decrease from just 1 year ago. Finally, over 65 current rank, and have been recommended self-reliant Iraq that is just, representative, and percent of Iraqis believe the army is effective for command—and are then only promoted accountable, and that contributes to the peace at preventing or stopping sectarian violence, based on merit. A recent selection board for and security of the region. JFQ and nearly 70 percent believe the police can promotion to brigadier general, conducted protect their neighborhoods. in July 2009, was fully automated for the first GEN Odierno briefs news media on security conditions in Baghdad U.S. Army (Curt Cashour) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 125 Breaking the Yardstick The Dangers of Market-based Governance By D o n J . D e Y o u n g n the middle of the last century, and satellite prototypes of the Global Position- This article, a sequel to The Silence of America became a superpower. It ing System, vital for all post–Cold War con- the Labs,2 examines how the loss of in-house happened, in part, because of a well- flicts; created fundamental “stealth” principles scientific and engineering expertise impairs I balanced technological partnership and night vision devices, a lethal combination good governance, poses risks to national between the Federal Government and com- in the first Gulf War; and produced the ther- security, and sustains what President Dwight mercial sector. After winning a world war mobaric bomb, which spared U.S. troops the Eisenhower called “a disastrous rise of mis- against fascism, this public-private alliance bloody prospect of tunnel-to-tunnel combat in placed power.”3 went on to cure infectious diseases, create the mountains of Afghanistan. instant global communications, land humans In recent years, however, the private A Sea Story on the Moon, and prevail in a long Cold sector has been increasingly tasked to The new attack boat is undergoing sea War against communism. All this and more carry out the labs’ functions on the belief trials. Shrouded in a gray summer haze, the was accomplished without bankrupting the that “through the implementation of free remote coast of the homeland slowly fades Nation’s economy. The partnership’s record of market forces, more efficient and effective away. The boat slips under the rolling ocean service to the American people and the world use of resources can be obtained,” which the surface and angles into a routine deep dive. has been remarkable. Defense Science Board asserted in 1996.1 As The crew moves with efficient military disci- A key element of this partnership has this development has progressed, there is a pline. As the boat glides downward, hairline been Department of Defense (DOD) labora- growing body of evidence that, rather than fractures crawl slowly across the muzzle doors tories. They helped make the U.S. military the faster, better, and cheaper, the new approach to the torpedo tubes. Those doors, made from most formidable fighting force in the world. is actually slower, less effective, and costlier. an unproven alloy, must stand firm against Among their many achievements, the labs This is, in part, because the government’s the sea’s relentless urge to claim the boat. developed and fielded the first modern radar own scientific and engineering competence, a in time for duty in World War II; invented the hallmark of the great successes in the past, is Don J. DeYoung is a Senior Research Fellow in the first intelligence satellite, indispensable during destroyed or bypassed as a result of the private Center for Technology and National Security Policy the Cold War; pioneered the original concepts sector’s ascendant role. at the National Defense University. U.S. Navy (Tiffini M. Jones) U.S. Navy (John F. Williams) U.S. Navy (John F. Commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command briefs Chief of Naval Operations tours littoral combat ship USS Independence at Chief of U.S. Naval Research and executive director of Office of Naval Research shipyard in Mobile, Alabama, where he received status updates on ships, on current science and technology initiatives unmanned systems, and industry facilities 126 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu DeYOUNG But the laws of physics are unforgiving. Reacting quickly, the Navy formed a of making government perform more like a The waters gather their power as the boat study team with “the best available experts on business was understandable. descends. The fractures lengthen, propagate, process and material technology.”7 This panel Market-based governance is the pursuit and deepen. Without warning, two doors of government scientists determined that the of public goals by exporting governmental fail in rapid succession. Many miles away, a contractor’s decision had indeed “placed a functions to private firms and by importing sonar station hears the metallic groans of the material with risk of unstable, catastrophic commercial management methods into the crushed, dying hull. The sounds echo in the failure at the pressure hull boundary,” and government.13 Outsourcing is the chief tool deep and then cease. The submarine lies silent they proposed improvements to the process of for the first approach, whereas centralizing and broken on the dark ocean bottom—all selecting materials.8 The Navy implemented and downsizing are tools for the second. hands lost. the proposals and praised these “unbiased Historically, the government has used these But for luck, this fictional tale could technical experts” for having “contributed to tools successfully to fulfill its obligations have become reality for the USS Seawolf. Seawolf’s safe and effective operation.”9 while remaining accountable to the American During its construction, with approval from people. So the merit of the tools is not the the Navy’s program office, the contractors Market-based Governance issue. At issue, however, is that excessive and chose a titanium alloy for the boat’s muzzle Seawolf’s troubles arose during a time of inappropriate use of them destroys the gov- and breech doors instead of the usual steel. dramatic change within the Federal Govern- ernment’s ability to preserve its internal com- Because Seawolf’s torpedo tubes were larger ment. In the 1990s, agencies were reinventing petence and make use of that which remains. than those of the older Los Angeles–class themselves by increasing their levels of con- boats, the contractors quite reasonably tracting, downsizing their workforces, and The Federal Yardstick wanted to use a material as strong as steel but importing commercial practices. By 1996, the The U.S. Government ultimately bears only half the weight. The alloy, however, had year of the Seawolf investigation, more than sole accountability for national missions and another property—under certain conditions 200,000 Federal jobs had been cut, and the public expenditures. Decisions concerning it is brittle. government workforce as a percentage of the the types of work to be undertaken, when, by Some government scientists knew about Nation’s was at its smallest since 1933.10 This whom, and at what cost should be made by the phenomenon, called stress corrosion campaign to reinvent government evolved, government officials responsible to the Presi- cracking (SCC), and understood how cracks by 2001, into one of transforming governance dent. Such decisions often involve complex can form by the simultaneous action of tensile itself.11 scientific and engineering issues, a challenge stress and a corrosive environment—such as These efforts have produced a govern- made more difficult by the fact that the seawater. If consulted, these experts could ment that depends on a massive conglom- companies competing for Federal contracts have warned that SCC will fracture some eration of private interests to do its work. can be very compelling advocates of their titanium alloys, at times fast enough for one Private firms now manage defense acquisition products. to “stand there and watch it happen.”4 Acqui- programs, perform intelligence opera- The government must be a smart buyer sition commands within DOD cannot be tions, deploy corporate soldiers, conduct and be capable of overseeing its contracted knowledgeable in all scientific and technical background checks of civil servants, and, work. For this the government uses, or should fields that bear on their areas of responsibil- until recently, collected taxes. Contractors use, its yardstick.14 In technical matters, this ity, but they should have procedures to find, even prepare the government’s contract measure is the collective competence of within the government, the required exper- tise to meet their mission. if consulted, experts could have warned that stress corrosion The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) had quantified the sensitivity of titanium cracking will fracture some titanium alloys, at times fast enough alloys to SCC in seawater many years before for one to “stand there and watch it happen” Seawolf was designed.5 One paper written in 1969 cautioned that “no prudent program documents, recommend contracting actions, government scientists and engineers (S&Es). manager would schedule a program in which assist in negotiating the deals, and investigate Their advice must be technically authorita- SCC of new materials might be a problem alleged misconduct by other contractors.12 tive, knowledgeable of the mission, and without provision for a sound experimen- This market-based governance is, at accountable to the public interest. William tal characterization of stress-corrosion least in part, a response to the public’s deep Perry, before becoming Secretary of Defense, properties in the pertinent environment.”6 frustration with its government. Difficulties underscored that necessity when he stated Unfortunately, NRL experts were not asked in solving problems and providing services that the government “requires internal tech- their opinion on using this alloy, nor were made dissatisfaction with the Federal bureau- nical capability of sufficient breadth, depth, they consulted until after the mistake was cracy a bipartisan sentiment by the 1990s. and continuity to assure that the public inter- detected—by chance. The stroke of luck By contrast, there was high confidence in est is served.”15 occurred when, during Seawolf’s construc- the private sector’s ability to deliver. Given More specifically, this “internal techni- tion, a hinge pin fractured while being industry’s soaring efficiencies, derived in part cal capability” is the cadre of government straightened by a hydraulic press. It was made from the development and use of information S&Es who perform research and develop- from the same titanium alloy as the muzzle technologies, its enormous production capa- ment (R&D). Their hands-on expertise door it was intended to support. bility, and its more flexible nature, the idea distinguishes them from the much larger ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 127 FEATURES | The Dangers of Market-based Governance acquisition workforce. The S&Es provide With its yardstick, NASA used an effec- had proposed that the shuttle program authoritative advice to the acquisition tive partnership of public and private talent to move toward a “point at which government workforce, which is in turn responsible for achieve its historic feats of space exploration. oversight of human space transportation is managing procurement programs. The two The government’s role was vital and its per- minimal.”18 communities serve a common purpose, but sonnel were competent. John Glenn’s humor- The loss of Columbia drew attention to they operate within different environments, ous remark about the Mercury missions and NASA’s troubled yardstick when the investi- with different requirements and skills. As his ride into orbit hints at the importance of gators implicated both approaches of market- Wernher von Braun, then-director of the that competence: “We were riding into space based governance: exporting public functions National Aeronautics and Space Administra- on a collection of parts supplied by the lowest and importing commercial processes: tion (NASA) Marshall Space Flight Center, bidder on a government contract, and I could explained it: hear them all.”17 Years of workforce reductions and outsourcing Glenn believed those low-bid parts have culled from NASA’s workforce the layers In order for us to use the very best judgment would get Friendship 7 home. Some of that of experience and hands-on systems knowl- possible in spending the taxpayer’s money confidence came from trust in the yardstick, edge that once provided a capacity for safety intelligently, we just have to do a certain the S&Es who provided authoritative and oversight. . . . amount of this research and development objective expertise to the mission. Because Aiming to align its inspection regime with work ourselves. . . . otherwise, our own ability NASA’s workforce was insulated from market the International Organization for Standardiza- to establish standards and to evaluate the pressures to earn a profit, its only bottom line tion 9000/9001 protocol, commonly used in proposals—and later the performance—of was accountability to the American people. industrial environments—environments very contractors would not be up to par.16 different than the Shuttle Program—the Human Fractured Yardstick Space Flight Program shifted from a compre- A strong yardstick requires a compe- In 1986, the space shuttle Chal- hensive “oversight” inspection process to a more tent S&E staff, which must include a small lenger exploded on liftoff, killing all seven limited “insight” process.19 number of exceptionally creative individuals, crewmembers. In the 1990s, the Hubble adequate financial and physical resources, telescope was launched with a misshapen By contrast, the investigators paid sound management practices, a sufficient mirror and three spacecraft were lost on homage to NASA’s Apollo-era culture, noting degree of autonomy to sustain an innovative missions to Mars—one of them because one that it “valued the interaction among research environment, and the ability to perform chal- team worked in centimeters while another and testing, hands-on engineering experi- lenging R&D. But as the Seawolf revealed, used inches. In 2003, the shuttle Columbia ence, and a dependence on the exceptional preserving the yardstick is not enough. The disintegrated on reentry, killing all aboard. quality of its workforce and leadership that government must also be willing to use it. Just a month earlier, an outsourcing panel provided the in-house technical capability NASA government scientists and engineers provide authoritative advice to the acquisition workforce, which is in turn responsible for managing procurement programs to oversee the work of contractors.”20 Barely a year after the investigators finished their work, inadequate oversight was again blamed when the returning Genesis satellite capsule crashed in the Utah desert. NASA’s admin- istrator later announced that his agency “has relied more than I would like to see on con- tractors for technical decision-making at the strategic level.”21 Market-based governance also drives DOD, where its yardstick resides principally within the Service labs.22 The following sections suggest that in a market-based environment, the tools of outsourcing, Astronaut John Glenn in state of weightlessness traveling 17,500 miles per hour in Mercury capsule centralizing, and downsizing have had a Friendship 7 destructive impact on the yardstick and 128 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu DeYOUNG yielded outcomes that have impaired good ■■ Coast Guard’s $24-billion Integrated labs were needed “to manage or help manage government, posed risks to national security, Deepwater Systems. Six years after the project weapons system development.” and sustained a rise of misplaced power. started, the GAO reported “cost breaches, And as recently as 2002, a year before Excessive Outsourcing. In 1996, the schedule slips, and assets designed and deliv- the FCS contract was awarded, the Army’s same year that Seawolf ’s safety problem ered with significant defects.”28 Eight patrol plans were briefed to a study team chaired became evident, two Defense Science Board boats failed seaworthiness tests.29 by Hans Binnendijk, director of the Center (DSB) reports asserted that outsourcing ■■ Navy’s $25-billion to $33-billion for Technology and National Security Policy Federal work would yield savings of 30 to Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Costs for two (CTNSP) at the National Defense University. 40 percent. One of the reports advocated lead ships more than doubled and three The subsequent report stated that the team outsourcing, centralizing, and downsizing have had a destructive impact on the yardstick and yielded outcomes that have impaired good government, posed risks to U.S. Marine Corps (Keith A. Stevenson) national security, and sustained a rise of misplaced power that DOD privatize its lab facilities, adding, “It is quite likely that private industry would compete heavily to obtain the DoD laboratories, particularly if they come fully equipped.”23 Eventually, a growing body of evidence yielded more sober assessments about the merits of outsourcing R&D. For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the DSB estimate of $6 billion in annual savings was overstated by as much as $4 billion.24 Nonetheless, an Marines use laptop computers to control robotic unmanned ground vehicles with payload capacity of 1,400 increasing amount of the yardstick’s R&D pounds that assist with transport requirements has been placed on contract over the years. Navy labs outsourced 50 percent of their ships were dropped from procurement. was “not comfortable with an approach that workload in 2000, up from 26 percent in LCS did not have an executable business turns this much control over to the private 1969. Army labs outsourced 65 percent, up case or realistic cost estimates, which led to sector,” and warned that there must be suf- from 38 percent.25 This was the situation higher costs, schedule delays, and quality ficient technical expertise within the govern- prior to September 11, 2001. problems.30 ment so that outside technical advice does not After the 2001 terror attacks, DOD and ■■ Department of Homeland Security’s become de facto technical decisionmaking.34 other agencies were tasked with larger work- (DHS’s) $20-million Project 28. The 28-mile The criticism of LSIs grew as price tags loads. Federal contracting doubled by 2006.26 “virtual fence” along the Arizona-Mexico fattened and schedules stretched. In the wake So, with smaller in-house S&E workforces, border was rejected because it “did not fully of the Deepwater problems, the Coast Guard’s some turned to lead systems integrators meet agency expectations.”31 DHS will replace commandant stated, “We’ve relied too much (LSIs): a contractor, or team of contractors, the fence with new towers, radars, cameras, on contractors to do the work of government.” hired to execute a large, complex Federal and computer software.32 While not addressing LSIs directly, the Insti- acquisition program. Commercial firms thus tute for Foreign Policy Analysis went to the assumed unprecedented authority—but LSIs These outcomes should not be a sur- heart of the matter, stating, “Increasingly the have produced troublesome results: prise. As far back as 1961, Harold Brown, Pentagon leadership is losing its ability to tell then–Director for Defense Research and the difference between sound and unsound ■■ Army’s $234-billion Future Combat Engineering (DDR&E), observed that “it is decisions on innovative technology and is System (FCS). Costs more than doubled from not always wise or economical to try either outsourcing key decision-making as well.”35 $92 billion, and the program fell years behind to have a large project directed by a military Congress has banned the use of new schedule.27 Items to be acquired have been user who does not understand whether what LSIs after October 2010 and suspended the reduced for lack of technological feasibility, he wants is feasible, or to let the contractor “competitive sourcing” of Federal jobs.36 affordability, or both. be his own director.”33 He believed that DOD In addition, there have been proposals to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 129 FEATURES | The Dangers of Market-based Governance increase the size of the acquisition workforce (“demos”) that have helped the labs recruit for success. All three have unique systems tai- and improve DOD cost estimating. Though and retain talent. lored to their R&D missions. NIH is managed these actions may be necessary, they are not In terms of flexibility and effectiveness, under Title 42 of the Public Health Service. sufficient. Procurement problems will persist the personnel authorities offered by the demos NIST had a demo that was later made perma- until the executive and legislative branches exceed those under NSPS by a significant nent by Congress. NRL has a demo now, but strengthen the Pentagon’s strongest voice for degree. There is no debate on that score. In it may be pulled into the NSPS, along with independent, authoritative technical advice— 2006, the directors of eight labs—from across eight other DOD labs. This would place them its S&E workforce. In short, acquisition the Army, Navy, and Air Force—sent an at a serious disadvantage in the coming years. reform will not succeed without laboratory unprecedented joint letter to the office of the The government is facing a large-scale reform. DDR&E. It compared the NSPS and demo exodus from its workforce. By 2012, accord- A healthy yardstick is vital for success projects, confirmed the superior nature of the ing to the Office of Personnel Management, in specifying the types of work to be under- demo authorities, and requested DDR&E help more than 50 percent of the current work- taken, when, by whom, and at what cost, and in preserving the demos.38 The letter was not force, including a third of its scientists, will be for judging the quality of the work DOD answered. However, a study on Army science gone.43 Replacing them amid the worrisome and widely reported global trends in science after the Soviet Union’s collapse, DOD adopted its adversary’s and engineering education means the govern- ment will be competing for talent at the same devotion to centralized administration and standard processes time the national S&E workforce is shrinking and foreign competition is strengthening.44 places on contract. Excessive cumulative and technology (S&T) examined the letter A recent CTNSP study outlines a strat- levels of outsourcing must be prevented. and concluded that “DOD should approve the egy to rebuild the DOD S&E workforce over Contracts may be justified on their individual request recently put forward by senior labora- the coming years. However, it warns that if this merit, but when taken together, they can tory managers from each of the Services to the workforce continues to decline relative to the break the yardstick, or erode the govern- DDR&E.”39 size of the national workforce, “a point will be ment’s willingness to use it, as in the case of Separate personnel systems for Federal reached where it becomes irrelevant. . . . It will Seawolf. labs were first advocated by a White House not be able to maintain competence in newly Inappropriate Centralizing. DOD study, chaired in 1983 by David Packard.40 developing fields of science and technology labs helped make America’s military the The idea was urged again in 1988 by the while at the same time maintaining compe- most formidable fighting force in the world. president of the National Academy of Public tence in the traditional fields that will continue In addition to the innovations mentioned Administration, who testified to Congress to be important to DOD.”45 earlier, they more recently invented the hand- that: In the last 5 years, the Army and Navy launched Dragon Eye surveillance plane, used centralized their facility management func- by combat forces in Iraq and now exhibited in [t]he traditional “cookie cutter” approach— tions under single commands. The Navy led the National Air and Space Museum, as well that all personnel issues impact all employees the way in 2003, when the Chief of Naval as a novel biosensor that was deployed in time and all cultures alike and therefore call for Operations (CNO) consolidated his organiza- for the 2005 Presidential inauguration. mega-solutions across the board—should be tion from eight claimancies (facility-owning Talent is the lifeblood of a lab; facilities abandoned. . . . The federal “cultures” that commands) down to one: the commander, are its muscle. Lab contributions to military might warrant tailor-made personnel systems Navy Installations (CNI). The CNO’s action power were due, in part, to the way they were are not the Cabinet-level departments. They applied to his organization alone, so the allowed to manage their people and facilities. are . . . the military research laboratories, not property and base operating support (BOS) Ironically, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Department of Defense.41 functions of the four naval warfare centers DOD adopted its adversary’s devotion to were placed under CNI ownership.46 NRL centralized administration and standard The lab demos were finally established was not included because it reports to the processes. That business model does not work in 1994, and evidence shows that these Chief of Naval Research, and ultimately well in a lab environment. Peter Drucker, who systems have been crucial for attracting the to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for has been called the most important manage- best S&E talent. For example, when measured Research, Development, and Acquisition ment thinker of our time, thought that R&D against non-Federal peer groups, the National (ASN [RDA]). Navy policy also mandates that “should not have to depend on central service Institutes of Health (NIH), National Insti- NRL manage its own real property and BOS staffs” because those staffs are “focused on tute of Standards and Technology (NIST), functions because of its “unique Navy-wide their functional areas rather than on perfor- and NRL compare favorably to comparable and national responsibilities.”47 mance and results.”37 private sector labs in terms of publications The CNI uses a management concept DOD is modernizing the Civil Service and National Academy memberships. In that it imported from General Motors (GM). system. On balance, the features of the some cases, they set the bar for their private Some time earlier, GM adopted the original National Security Personnel System (NSPS) sector counterparts.42 idea from McDonald’s and relieved its product may work well for the general workforce. NIH, NIST, and NRL may not be typical divisions (such as Buick and Chevrolet) of However, the one-size-fits-all system would of all public sector institutions, but separate their facilities, centralized their management, destroy the personnel demonstration projects personnel systems suggest a primary reason and standardized the delivery of services.48 130 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu DeYOUNG The CNI describes its version of the concept priate “insight” inspection regime. As for The Base Realignment and Closure this way: “The installation will be controlled the similarity between the Navy and GM (BRAC) Commission understood the risks of by a central committee,”49 and it “will establish environments, the auto maker is “a single- applying inappropriate management methods a standard level of service to be provided to all product, single-technology, single-market to R&D. In 2005, it rejected a proposal to Navy funded tenant activities that is consis- business,”52 which also fairly describes absorb NRL’s facilities and BOS functions tent across all regions.”50 McDonald’s. It does not describe the U.S. into a “mega-base” operated by CNI’s Naval Management of R&D facilities by Navy, which requires efforts across a wide District Washington region. The commis- central committee, with standard levels of range of scientific disciplines and technol- sioners ruled that “NRL’s continued control service, is a mistake. A one-of-a-kind nano- ogy areas; and its operational environments, of laboratory buildings, structures, and other science facility requires a far higher level such as steel-crushing ocean depths, demand physical assets is essential to NRL’s research of service than one established for piers or extraordinary levels of technical sophistica- mission,” and they endorsed the ASN (RDA) base housing. The Center for Naval Analyses tion and reliability. policy by codifying it in law.55 Unfortunately, expressed similar misgivings in a report to Cost reduction is a poor reason to neither the commission’s statutory ruling, the CNO: “There is a difference between import a risky commercial concept into a lab. ASN (RDA) policy, nor the CNO’s own RDT&E and upkeep and maintenance. . . . By itself, successful innovation can save vast directive has stopped CNI from asserting an NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command] and sums of money. For example, NRL developed inappropriate and unapproved authority to NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command] an algorithm that allowed new and legacy manage NRL facilities.56 should retain their claimancies. They have military phones to work together.53 This Risky Downsizing. Closing unneeded laboratories and test ranges with technologi- meant that legacy phones did not have to be infrastructure is good stewardship of tax- cally sophisticated, sensitive, and expensive retired by DOD and North Atlantic Treaty payer dollars. However, as the private sector’s equipment. Delays and errors are extremely Organization forces. Nearly $600 million was role has increased, DOD labs have been mar- costly.”51 saved, nine times the CNI’s projected savings ginalized and closed despite the urgent need The value of an imported process from consolidating global base operations.54 for technology’s help on today’s battlefields. depends on how closely the government environment resembles the industrial one. a one-of-a-kind nanoscience facility requires a far higher level This was underscored in a tragic way when of service than one established for piers or base housing the shuttle program adopted the inappro- NASA Workers investigating cause of Columbia’s destruction reconstruct bottom of orbiter in grid on hangar floor ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 131 FEATURES | The Dangers of Market-based Governance In March 2004, DOD certified to Congress closures and cuts would deepen the shortfall around the globe.” In April, the first human that a significant level of excess capacity and, in the law’s language, “deviate sub- to reach outer space spoke Russian. Days still existed within its base structure.57 This stantially” from the Force Structure Plan.61 later, the United States was humiliated in cleared the way for a fifth round of closures However, as revealed by a newspaper investi- Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. In August, construction and realignments. Previous cuts had already gation, the data on Future Required Capacity started on the Berlin Wall. And in October, run deep. Between 1990 and 2000, DOD lab were missing from the TJCSG’s May 19, the Soviet Union detonated a 58-megaton personnel were reduced by 36 percent, due in 2005, final report to the BRAC Commission, hydrogen bomb that sent an atmospheric large part to BRAC.58 though the data were contained in a draft 9 shockwave around the planet three times, What stops the Pentagon from cutting days earlier.62 the most powerful manmade explosion in too deeply? BRAC law prevents it by requir- Congress and the commission were history. In the midst of these grave events, ing that the Secretary of Defense base all unaware that the proposals deviated substan- DDR&E Harold Brown announced that the proposals on DOD’s 20-year Force Structure tially from the Force Structure Plan, so the Secretary of Defense would be strengthening Plan. This ensures that today’s cuts do not lab closures and realignments were approved. the DOD labs. place tomorrow’s military in jeopardy. Data The resulting cuts to the S&E workforce Brown’s efforts were aided by a gov- on Future Required Capacity were key to could place future troops at risk by exacerbat- ernment-wide panel, led by budget director knowing if lab closures would support or ing a projected shortfall of technical support. David Bell. Members included the Secretary undermine the Force Structure Plan, and Moreover, the cuts ensure gross waste. For of Defense, the President’s science advisor, the closure of Fort Monmouth is estimated to cost more than twice the original projection, U.S. Navy (Jim Brennan) and it could take 13 additional years to reconstitute its capability at Aberdeen and the leaders of NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Civil Service Commis- sion. They were tasked by the President to assess “the effect of the use of contractors on direct federal operations, the federal personnel system, and the government’s own capabilities, including the capability to review contractor operations and carry on scientific and technical work in areas where the con- USS Seawolf conducts sea trials before its tract device has not been used.”64 scheduled commissioning, July 1997 President Kennedy’s concerns were sparked by contracting abuses in the 1950s it was the job of the Technical Joint Cross- example, the closure of Fort Monmouth, New and by a growing realization that the Service Group (TJCSG) to derive those data.59 Jersey, is estimated to cost more than twice increased outsourcing spurred by the Hoover The TJCSG improved upon the analyses the original projection, and it could take as Commission had not markedly improved of earlier BRACs by adding the number of many as 13 additional years to reconstitute efficiency. In fact, President Eisenhower’s on-site contractor personnel into the cal- its capability at Aberdeen, Maryland.63 Lastly, Science Advisory Committee had concluded culations of capacity. Previously, the large the cuts apply more stress to the already frac- by 1958 that an extreme reliance on contracts numbers of contractors who work at the turing yardstick. damaged “the morale and vitality of needed labs and use their infrastructure were not government laboratories.”65 counted. The TJCSG’s complete account of Reform Works The Bell Report, as it became known, all on-site personnel showed current excess Excessive outsourcing, inappropri- made a big impact. Salary scales were capacity levels to be far less than expected— ate centralizing, and risky downsizing are improved. Agencies were given the autho- an average of 7.8 percent from 2001 to 2003, endangering the Pentagon’s yardstick. The rization to allocate, with no set limits, Civil and only 4.4 percent for 2003.60 Hence, small good news is that the yardstick was threat- Service grades 16 through 18 to positions cuts would not affect today’s forces. ened once before, and the challenge was met primarily concerned with R&D.66 Appoint- As for the law’s requirement to support successfully. ments of exceptionally qualified individuals tomorrow’s warfighter, the data on Future The year was 1961. President John to steps above the minimum entrance step in Required Capacity projected a future deficit Kennedy called it “a most serious time in the grades GS–13 and up were allowed.67 More of necessary infrastructure, which meant that life of our country and in the life of freedom discretionary research funding was provided, 132 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu DeYOUNG and construction funds for new lab facilities dollars) from 1963 through 1968, but only $154 Private interests pose a threat to democ- were increased considerably. These and other million (FY08 dollars) over all years after 1968. racy when they gain a role in governance, reforms yielded “significant improvement in ■■ Restore to civilian lab directors all a fear felt keenly in the early days of the [the labs’] ability to attract first-class people.”68 the authorities lost over the last two decades, Republic. The authors of the Federalist Papers The reforms were not born out of affec- including those to make program and person- believed private interests to be unresponsive tion for government infrastructure. In fact, nel decisions, allocate funds, and otherwise to the public good. James Madison argued DOD conducted hundreds of base closures manage the necessary resources to carry out that a republican, or representative, form of and realignments during the 1960s, proving the mission. One example is to return facility government was the best way to control them that it is possible for the Pentagon to nurture management authorities to the Army labs and and thereby save the new democracy from a high-quality S&E workforce and cut infra- naval warfare centers. Another is to reinstate being destroyed by corruption. In The Feder- structure at the same time.69 It took only the the full strength “direct hire” authorities held alist No. 10, he stated, “No man is allowed to commitment to do so. by the labs until the 1980s. be a judge in his own cause, because his inter- Signs appeared in the 1980s that the ■■ Restore the dual-executive relation- est would certainly bias his judgment, and, in-house system was again in need of help. ship of the military and civilian leadership at not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” Scores of studies have analyzed the problems all labs where it has been weakened or elimi- The Republic needs a strong yardstick. and offered a remarkably consistent set of nated. While difficult in practice, authority Without one, our government cannot govern solutions. In fact, a 2002 tri-Service report must be shared equally to meet the mission. well—not even if it retains the best and bright- by the Naval Research Advisory Committee, The military officer assures continuing ties est on contract. The government’s own assets Army Science Board, and Air Force Scientific with the Services that the labs exist to support. must capably bear the responsibility for deci- Advisory Board noted that the subject “has The senior civilian assures stable, long-term sions that affect the Republic’s interests, and been exhaustively investigated” and found direction of the organization and the tough they must maintain public confidence by the the labs’ situation critical.70 technical oversight needed to protect the pub- manner in which those decisions are made. Little has been done in the wake of lic’s interests. This is vital. As Adlai Stevenson stated, “Public these studies, with the notable exception of confidence in the integrity of the Government establishing the now-threatened lab person- research and development is indispensable to faith in democracy; and nel demos. The problems are well known, well when we lose faith in the system, we have lost understood, and solvable. Five solutions are has not fared well since the faith in everything we fight and spend for.” listed below: reform period of the 1960s The Solution. In matters involving science and technology, competent govern- ■■ Divide the Senior Executive Service Accountability-based Governance ment S&Es in sufficient numbers, with into an Executive Management Corps (EMC) The last two decades stand in stark sustained support from the executive branch, and a Professional and Technical Corps (PTC). contrast to the reform era, when the Kennedy are the only means for tempering the private This change was proposed by the National and Johnson administrations, during a time sector’s natural tendencies and for harnessing Commission on the Public Service.71 Like at least as dangerous as our own, preserved its formidable skills in ways that serve public the current Senior Executive Service, the the labs’ ability to perform long-term research purposes. A healthy balance was restored EMC and PTC must be equivalent in rank to and oversee contracted work. It is tempting to in the 1960s. It can be done again. The Bell general/flag officers. Personnel within the PTC blame “bureaucracy” for the dismal situation, Report’s central finding offers clear direction should run the labs. but doing so would miss the problem and its and should be endorsed as a global principle ■■ Exclude the lab personnel demos from solution. by the new administration: “No matter how NSPS permanently—but do not freeze them The Problem. America’s great techno- heavily the Government relies on private con- in time. Empower them to pioneer additional logical achievements in the 20th century were tracting, it should never lose a strong internal personnel concepts. This can be done using born of a healthy partnership between the competence in research and development.” legislated authorities that remain unimple- public and private sectors. By comparison, This is critical because market-based mented or otherwise constrained by the Office market-based governance has spawned great governance is accountable to a financial of the Under Secretary of Defense for Person- failures, and the costs have been dear in bottom line and to a well, or poorly, written nel and Readiness. One example is Section terms of wasted dollars, lost time, and unmet contract. Without strong oversight, it injects 1114 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 National national needs. Less obvious is the diminished political illegitimacy into the exercise of state Defense Authorization Act, by which Congress transparency of decisions, largely because power and risks the failure of national mis- placed the creation of new demo authorities in companies are not subject to the Freedom of sions. By contrast, accountability-based gov- the Secretary of Defense’s hands. Information Act. Moreover, accountability ernance contributes to making government ■■ Create a separate R&D military erodes as the yardstick fractures and the safe for democracy. Our republic is more than construction budget. The current process pits government is forced to rely more and more a market, our government more than a busi- “tomorrow” against “today” by forcing R&D on private sources. In time, private interests ness, and our citizens more than consumers. to compete with operational needs, such as attain “unwarranted influence” and make However, given the demonstrated costs hospitals or enlisted housing. R&D has not public decisions through “misplaced power,” of market-based governance, one question fared well since the reform period of the 1960s. the very concerns voiced by President Eisen- still needs to be answered. If the problems For example, NRL received $166 million (FY08 hower in his farewell address. of the government’s yardstick are so well ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 133 FEATURES | The Dangers of Market-based Governance known, well understood, and solvable, then émigré Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who was no N o t e s what explains the persistent inaction? friend of communism, lamented the West’s “cult of material well-being” that depends 1 Defense Science Board (DSB), Achieving an Misplaced Power on little more than a cold legal structure Innovative Support Structure for 21st Century Mili- President Eisenhower warned that “in to restrain irresponsibility.75 Thirty years tary Superiority (Washington, DC: DSB, 1996), the councils of government, we must guard after his warning, not even the code of law II–48. 2 Don J. DeYoung, The Silence of the Labs, against the acquisition of unwarranted influ- could protect us from ourselves and the most Defense Horizons 21 (Washington, DC: National ence, whether sought or unsought, by the fearsome economic crisis since the Great Defense University Press, January 2003), available military-industrial complex. The potential for Depression. at 134 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu DeYOUNG the Competitive Sourcing of the Space Shuttle 43 Tony Dokoupil, “C’mon and Be a Bureau- 61 Don J. DeYoung, letter to Alan R. Shaffer Program,” December 31, 2002, 46. crat,” Newsweek (March 10, 2008). (Technical Joint Cross-Service Group executive 19 Columbia Accident Investigation Board 44 Committee on Prospering in the Global director), “The Conduct and Lessons of BRAC– Report, vol. I (August 2003), 181. Economy of the 21st Century, Rising above the 05,” November 29, 2005. 20 Ibid., 101–102. Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing 62 Bill Bowman, “Key Data on Future Needs 21 Guy Gugliotta, “NASA Chief Sees Space America for a Brighter Economic Future (Wash- Withheld,” Asbury Park Press, June 17, 2007. An as an Inside Job,” The Washington Post, June 27, ington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007). earlier draft containing the data was posted by the 2005. 45 Coffey, vi. Federation of American Scientists. See ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 135 Radar versus Stealth Passive Radar and the Future of U.S. Military Power aced with the prospect of aerial By A r e n d G . W e s t r a stealth proliferation, states in the 21st century are looking for F antistealth defense options. One such alternative, passive radar, appears a cost- effective counter to stealth. Passive radar is a receive-only system that uses transmitters of opportunity.1 Integrating a system of netted receivers, passive radar can detect, track, and target piloted and unpiloted stealth systems and provide cuing for antiair weapons systems. A passive radar system emits no radio energy and can be well camouflaged in both urban and rural landscapes. The threat system produces no indications on friendly radar warning receivers and is difficult to locate and target. Faced with a passive radar threat, the United States may find itself unable to achieve air superiority at an acceptable cost. As this article shows, ongoing advances in passive radar will deny traditional means to defeat enemy air defenses, make air supe- riority difficult to achieve against a passive radar opponent, and require changes in thinking to maintain U.S. power projection capability. In developing this central idea, this article describes the history of the battle between aircraft and radar, the rise of stealth and counterstealth, and the ongoing surge in passive radar and how it relates to advances in signal processing and sensor fusion. Addi- tionally, this article assesses the passive radar threat to stealth, posits implications for future U.S. military power, and recommends a U.S. course of action regarding passive radar. Aircraft versus Radar “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive”—so argued Carl von Clausewitz in On War.2 The static warfare of the late 19th century and the Lieutenant Colonel Arend G. Westra, USMC, is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Plans Officer at 3d Sailor monitors radar screen in Combat Direction Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Corps Air Station Center aboard USS John C. Stennis U.S. Navy (Walter M. Wayman) U.S. Navy (Walter Miramar, San Diego, California. 136 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu WESTRA Great War of 1914–1918 appeared to validate transmitter and receiver via a shared antenna, a always get through.” Indeed, stealth aircraft this idea. In 1921, however, Giulio Douhet configuration known as monostatic, thus creat- have maintained the overwhelming advantage asserted that the airplane changed warfare ing the conventional radar configuration most in recent conflicts, including Operation Allied “by magnifying the advantages of the offense commonly used thereafter. Force and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. and at the same time minimizing, if not nul- Historically, radar has been the corner- Despite the overall success of the U.S. lifying, the advantages of the defensive.”3 stone of air defense. For example, during the stealth program, in 1999 an F–117 was shot Douhet did not envision the many sur- Vietnam War, North Vietnamese air defense down in the Balkans by a Serbian SAM face-to-air threats that would evolve over the radars targeted U.S. aircraft, which, in turn, battery.15 Although some considered the decades after his work was published. Neither countered with jamming and antiradiation downing an anomaly, the incident created did airpower critics. As Sir Stanley Baldwin missiles. Due to the success of North Viet- much controversy. While the Air Force informed the British parliament in 1932, “I namese air defenses, the United States was assessed tactical lessons learned, others saw think it is well also for the man in the street only able to establish temporary air superior- evidence that stealth could be defeated.16 The to realize that there is no power on earth that ity over local areas of North Vietnam. Over incident illustrated what stealth designers can protect him from being bombed, what- the course of the war, the North Vietnamese already knew: stealth technology does not ever people may tell him. The bomber will shot down 190 U.S. aircraft using 1950s-era make an aircraft invisible. As a submariner always get through.”4 Russian surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).10 once aptly noted, “Stealth is a zero-sum game. Yet a few decades earlier in 1904, German engineer Christian Hülsmeyer had the overwhelming offensive power of the airplane was largely patented the telemobilskop, an early form of radar. But it was not until 1935 that radar first mitigated by the deployment of radar and modern air defenses showed significant operational promise. In the now famous Daventry experiment, Sir A third paradigm shift began in the In a given encounter, one platform has it Robert Watson-Watt used radar to detect a 1970s in the “Skunk Works” of Lockheed and the other does not. The tactical advan- British Heyford bomber at a range of 8 miles.5 Martin, where stealth pioneers first created tage accrued by being able to detect, close, Notably, the Daventry experiment tested a the F–117 “stealth fighter” (more bomber than and attack from a covert stance completely passive radar system using the BBC Empire fighter in usage).11 Made operational in 1983, dominates all other factors in any encounter broadcast as a transmitter of opportunity.6 the F–117 saw combat in Panama in 1989 and algorithm.”17 In Serbia in 1999, a SAM battery Watson-Watt went on to develop the British again in the Gulf War in 1990.12 During the commander attacked from a covert stance and Chain Home radar that played a critical role Gulf War, the F–117 was employed against won the tactical advantage. It was a missile in defeating the German Luftwaffe during the Iraq’s most heavily defended targets. In spite shot heard around the stealth world.18 Battle of Britain in 1940.7 of Iraq’s robust air defenses, not a single F–117 World War II served as catalyst for a was lost or damaged during the conflict.13 By The Future of Stealth second paradigm shift. The overwhelming comparison, 32 nonstealth aircraft were lost If anything, the downing of an F–117 offensive power of the airplane was largely to antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and SAMs.14 If over Serbia only highlighted to the United mitigated by the deployment of radar and Baldwin had witnessed the Gulf War, he might States the importance of stealth. Increasingly, modern air defenses. Airpower did not prove have concluded, “The stealth bomber will the U.S. military has made stealth one of its Figure 1. Bistatic Geometry an all-powerful offensive weapon that could not be countered, and the bomber did not Figure 1. Bistatic Geometry always get through. Air defenses of both the Axis and Allied opponents proved complex and resilient, and combatants obtained air TARGET superiority only locally and for limited dura- tions through the costly reduction of enemy air defenses. This paradigm held firm through Rtx ß Rrx World War II and for the duration of the Cold War. For the time being, it seemed that Clausewitz had caught up with the airplane. Despite Watson-Watt’s breakthrough at Daventry, the experiment highlighted passive L radar’s difficulties, including intermittent signal TRANSMIT TER RECEIVER strength and, at the time, irresolvable locating and tracking ambiguities due to the passive Note: L = distance between transmitter and target ("bistatic baseline"); radar geometry.8 Passive radar is bistatic, Rtx = transmitter range to target; Rrx = receiver range to target; ß = bistatic angle. meaning the receiver is located at a distance from the transmitter.9 Bistatic radar geometry Source: C.J. Baker and H.D. Gri ths, Bistatic and Multistatic Sensors for Homeland Security (London: University College, 2005), 4, available at Figure 2. Conventional and Stealth Aircraft Radar Cross Section Signature dBsm CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT NOTIONAL STEALTH AIRCRAFT dB 35 40 30 30 25 20 20 10 15 0 10 -10 5 Note: dBsm = decibels per square meter; dB = decibels Source: David Lynch, Introduction to RF Stealth (Raleigh, NC: SciTech, 2004), 6. 138 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu WESTRA nance that enables VHF and UHF radar to MMW antiair missile seekers, and other off-the-shelf technology makes them attrac- detect stealth aircraft. Poor resolution in angle countries are following suit.37 tive for nonpeer countries as well. and range, however, has historically prevented While the aforementioned technologies Passive radars use transmitters of these radars from providing accurate target- offer important capabilities, they possess opportunity. Potential waveforms include FM ing and fire control.32 limitations that restrict their effectiveness and AM radio, television, digital audio/video Since the Gulf War, the Russian defense for air defense. Conventional radar is vulner- broadcast, and cellular phone networks.38 radar industry has put considerable effort into able to detection and attack by electronic Today, passive radar is often configured as digitizing its VHF and UHF radar systems warfare and air-delivered weapons; listening a “multistatic” system using three or more to improve counterstealth capability. Russia’s systems do not provide tracking information; transmitters and receivers. older model radars now have improved reso- and IR/EO/MMW is limited in surveillance Passive radar locates and tracks targets lution and signal processing, and newly devel- capabilities. through a combination of methods, greatly oped models, such as the Nebo surface vehicle In contrast, passive radar is covert, all simplified here for the sake of discussion. unit, which is a VHF adaptive electronically weather, and capable of medium- to long- First, the radar measures the time difference steered array radar, likely present significant range surveillance, and shows strong potential of arrival between the direct signal from the counterstealth capability.33 in detecting, tracking, and targeting stealth transmitter and the reflected signal from the Other recently developed conventional aircraft. It is thus emerging as a solid competi- target to determine the bistatic range. Bistatic radars likely to have counterstealth capabil- tor in the counterstealth game. range, expressed as an ellipse, is shown in ity include Lockheed Martin’s theater high- altitude area defense radar and the Israeli a new paradigm is emerging, enabled by advances in Green Pine radar (recently sold to India), systems with both long range and high networked computing and passive radar technology resolution in the UHF L-band.34 The Signal Multi-beam Acquisition Radar for Tracking Passive Radar figure 3. The radar uses the intersection of the (L) naval radar manufactured by Thales is A new paradigm is emerging, enabled by receiver-to-target bearing and the bistatic range yet another system with reputed counter- advances in networked computing and passive ellipse to estimate approximate target location. stealth capability.35 radar technology. Because of their potential to In a multistatic system, the radar refines target Passive listening systems, such as elec- counter stealth-based airpower advantage, the location based on intersecting bistatic range tronic support measures (ESM) and direc- use of these technologies by peer competitors ellipses. The radar further measures Doppler tion finding (DF), attempt to detect stealth is highly likely. That these systems are both shift—wavelength compression or expansion aircraft radar, radio, and data link emissions low cost and, in part, based on commercial- caused by relative motion—to determine target and pass this information to surveillance radars. LPI techniques of stealth are designed Figure 3. Bistatic Range to reduce or deny ESM and DF, but systems Figure 3. Bistatic Range such as the Russian Kolchuga remain formi- dable threats that are likely being updated with digital processing.36 TRANSMIT TER Another counter to stealth is IR/electro- 0 optical (EO) systems, which include IR search Rtx TARGET and track and high magnification optics. Such systems, however, are limited in the ability to scan large volumes of airspace and usually must be cued by other sensors. In addition, L Rrx most of this spectrum is degraded by clouds, low illumination, and low visibility. Stealth aircraft counter IR/EO through heat signature management, stealthy flight profiles, and LO paint schemes. Constant range 0 Growing in potential as a counterstealth ellipse RECEIVER technology is millimeter wave (MMW) imaging, which uses the radiometric signa- ture naturally emitted by all objects. MMW penetrates clouds and low visibility. The wave- Note: Rtx = transmitter range to target; Rrx = receiver range to target; L = distance between transmitter and receiver. Bistatic range, expressed as Rtx + Rrx – L, form can also be transmitted by radar, which remains constant at all points on the ellipse. then receives and processes the return echo. The A–64 Apache Longbow/Hellfire system Source: NationMaster Encyclopedia, “Bistatic Range,” available at F–117A Nighthawk stealth fighter while passive radar can perform detecting, locating, and tracking functions, it may also be able to perform target identification SAMs with a command guidance mode, the passive radar could provide midcourse guid- ance via data link. In keeping with the passive radar system, a passive missile seeker—IR, EO, MMW, or perhaps multisensor—would likely be used for end-game guidance in order to complete the kill chain. Threat Employment A future adversary will look increasingly to counter the U.S. stealth advantage with passive radar, either as a stand-alone system or in conjunction with active surveillance U.S. Air Force (Andy Dunaway) U.S. Air Force radars. Passive radar is relatively cheap, and 140 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu WESTRA its covert stance lends itself to a strategy of Electronic warfare (EW) offers the Building new generations of stealth striking from concealment. Moreover, our potential to temporarily neutralize passive aircraft may be feasible, but efforts to most likely future opponent—an authoritar- radar. Standoff noise jamming would have improve stealth will eventually reach a point ian state—already possesses tight control over an effect, but because the location of the of diminishing returns. Advantages will its commercial media, a situation that requires receivers is unknown, the jammer would grow more difficult and expensive to achieve a relatively small step to optimize broadcast- need to emit across a wide sector, unavoid- as counterstealth technologies concurrently ing parameters for passive radar use. ably reducing jamming signal density.51 grow more advanced. This same adversary will build a passive multistatic receiver network in the VHF and North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile UHF bands, blending the system into the crew in front of SA–2 launcher vertical buildup of urban terrain.50 In remote areas not served by media broadcast, the adversary may disperse a network of inex- pensive throw-away transmitters to function as the surveillance area illuminators. He will integrate passive radar and other sensors for rapid, efficient command and control. It is likely that such an adversary will make efforts to develop or acquire passive SAMs with low observable launch signatures and procure and deploy high- and mid-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles—“missile trucks”—to deny flight at those altitudes. Countering Passive Radar Countering passive radar will prove difficult. What are the signs that an opponent is using passive radar? Forehand knowledge of the threat may provide an idea of general capabilities. Are friendly air forces losing U.S. Air Force aircraft to ground fire with little or no threat warning indications? With no radio frequency basic stealth techniques will be less effective than they once electronic intelligence available, locating the were against passive radar systems that benefit from bistatic passive radar receivers will be challenging. Intelligence will face a difficult task of using geometry and the use of counterstealth waveforms indirect methods—human intelligence, ground surveillance, computer network Moreover, deception jamming may be of Implications operations, and nodal analysis—to collect on limited use against passive radar, also due to Passive radar has many implications for sparse information. the unknown receiver location.52 Other types future U.S. military power. Stealth will con- If the command and control nodes and of jamming, however, may prove highly effec- tinue to be a critical feature of tactical military receivers cannot be found, targeting planners tive. Overall, the lack of known threat loca- aircraft, particularly as a defense against pres- could focus on destroying suspected trans- tion bolsters the argument for a robust EW ently fielded weapons systems. As is evident mitters—for example, FM radio, television, capability that is integral to friendly multirole in the continued proliferation of conventional and HD television networks. Depending on aircraft. Advocacy for or against a dedicated radar SAMs and AAA, these threats are not their location and the potential for collateral EW platform, however, is beyond the scope of going away any time soon. damage, however, destroying these targets this article. Stealth airframes require long design may result in undesirable strategic conse- Other means of countering passive and procurement processes, whereas avion- quences, particularly in urban areas. radar include special operations and computer ics and software are more readily modified. At the tactical level, friendly forces could network attack. In the end, targeting passive This phenomenon is driving a philosophy employ reactive defenses against SAM launch radar systems may fall in the “too hard” cat- in tactical aircraft design that basic stealth and fly-out and conduct immediate counter- egory for limited warfare. Missile systems— techniques are the critical solid foundation attack of associated threat systems through mobile SAMs, UAVs, and even man-portable upon which the aircraft’s more malleable electronic attack, standoff weapons, directed air defense systems—may be easier to find offensive and defensive capabilities—sensors, energy, or other means. This approach, than passive radar. The adversary will likely weapons, and communications—are built. however, would consume time and resources deploy substantial passive air defense assets, The concept of a layered defense will be criti- and would likely fail to achieve low- to mid- and U.S. forces will face a long, tedious cal to the survivability of stealth aircraft in altitude air superiority. process of locating and attriting them. the future. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 141 FEATURES | Passive Radar and the Future of U.S. Military Power Basic stealth techniques, however, will planners must recognize the counter to U.S. ■■ work hand in hand with key allies to be much less effective than they once were stealth-based air-superiority that is currently develop shared capabilities against passive radar systems that benefit from unfolding, of which passive radar forms a core ■■ explore enhancing parallel technolo- bistatic geometry and the use of counterstealth technology. These self-same leaders must take gies (such as disposable transmitters). waveforms. Increasingly, combatants will use appropriate measures to ensure that the United passive radar and weapons systems to detect, States is not caught off guard by this impending Develop methods of degrading enemy acquire, track, and target aerial stealth plat- shift in the technological landscape. The fol- passive radar. In support of this effort: forms. Against such systems, stealth on its own lowing recommendations are in order. will likely provide inadequate protection for Endeavor to be a leader in the passive ■■ focus on a multilevel EW capability manned aircraft, UAVs, and missiles. radar field. Arguably, the United States has against passive radar54 This article posits that an ongoing race marginalized the passive radar field due to ■■ continue to develop layered defensive between stealth and counterstealth is emerg- a focus on conventional radar systems. The measures for aircraft and UAVs. ing, in which technology will provide only U.S. military must gain an understanding incremental advantage to a combatant until of passive radar, not merely theoretically, or Prepare for military operations without a new counter is found. This assertion does with minor research and development proj- air superiority. In support of this effort: not mean that there are no further opportuni- ects, but with a dedicated effort. But why, one ties to leverage stealth advantages, but that may ask, build a stealth counter when there ■■(again) develop passive radar, but advances in stealth will be more evolutionary is no immediate stealth peer competitor? The in this case to deny enemy air superior- than revolutionary. The future of stealth and answer is that would-be competitors in the ity—future enemy stealth capabilities are counterstealth will more closely resemble the stealth arena are making a dedicated push to ultimately not a matter of if but when technological one-upmanship that occurred develop this technology. We cannot afford to ■■continue to integrate complementary during World War II and the Cold War than spend billions on stealth, only to fail to thor- piloted and unmanned system capabilities the order of magnitude advantage the United oughly understand and counter rival systems. ■■plan and train to the contingency of States enjoyed during the Gulf War and the two In support of this effort: military operations with only local air supe- decades that have followed. Against a passive riority or with air superiority largely denied. radar adversary, air superiority will likely only ■■ build collaboration between key indus- be achieved at significant cost. Forcible entry try and independent electronic engineers Passive radar will play a critical role and amphibious operations will accordingly ■■ increase prioritization of passive radar in future conflict. Ongoing advances in prove much more challenging. Once again, the research and development passive radar will deny traditional means defensive form of warfare asserts itself. ■■ develop and field a passive radar of defeating enemy air defenses, make air system on a U.S. training range—as a train- superiority difficult to achieve against a Recommendations ing tool for U.S. stealth pilots and systems to passive radar opponent, and require changes To best position the United States for test countermeasures and tactics and assess in thinking to maintain U.S. power projec- the future, military strategists and operational performance53 tion capability. we cannot afford to spend billions on stealth, only to fail to thoroughly understand and counter rival systems F–35 Lightning II flies over Eglin Air Force Base, future home of Joint Strike Fighter training facility U.S. Air Force (Julianne Showalter) U.S. Air Force 142 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu WESTRA Will the United States go forward to hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/gulf_war_air_power_ 32 Willis and Griffiths, 95. 33 a future that resembles the past—one in survey-vol5.pdf>. “Nebo-SVU Surveillance Radar (Russian 14 which air superiority is gained only through Ibid., 641. Federation)—Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare 15 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Kosovo and the Con- Systems,” available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 143 Mind Fitness Improving Operational Effectiveness and Building Warrior Resilience By E l i z a b e t h A . S t a n l e y and Amishi P. Jh a oday’s complex, fluid, and and nature of the different missions the ous situations with balance and nonreactivity, unpredictable operational envi- military must concurrently fill. The military while drawing on stores of cultural awareness ronment both demands more needs to be able to mix offensive, defensive, to “win hearts and minds.” Finally, these mis- T from the military in terms of and stability operations conducted along mul- sions require that decisionmaking be pushed mission requirements and exposes troops to tiple lines of operations, without the benefit down to the most junior levels, as the doctrine more stressors and potential trauma than ever of a clearly demarcated “frontline.” Many of “distributed operations” makes clear. Such before. On the one hand, situational aware- Soldiers liken this complexity and unpredict- challenges require a tremendous amount of ness, mental agility, and adaptability are char- ability to “the faucet,” that is, needing to attentional capacity, self-awareness, and situ- acteristics that the military wants to cultivate adjust to situations that could change from ational awareness. to succeed in such complex environments. In cold to hot instantaneously. Moreover, Ser- On the other hand, because of the part, this complexity comes from the number vicemembers must navigate morally ambigu- stressors and challenges of this operating Marines fire during operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan U.S. Marine Corps (Pete Thibodeau) 144 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu STANLEY and JHA environment, the U.S. military is showing mental agility, emotion regulation, attention, large study of Army troops found that Soldiers signs of strain. In 2007, the Army experienced and situational awareness. Importantly, these who served in Iraq were highly likely to show its highest desertion rate since 1980, an 80 exercises appear to achieve improvements lapses in memory and an ability to focus, percent increase since the United States in mind fitness by changing brain structure a deficit that often persisted more than 2 invaded Iraq in 2003. The warning signs of and function so that brain processes are more months after they arrived home.4 In the study, future retention problems are increasingly efficient. Our pilot research, conducted in pre- 654 Soldiers who deployed to Iraq between apparent: suicide, post-traumatic stress disor- deployment Marine Reservists, suggests that April 2003 and May 2005 did significantly der (PTSD), substance abuse, divorce, domes- MMFT is similarly successful at bolstering worse in tasks that measured spatial memory, tic violence, and murder within the force are mind fitness and building resilience against verbal ability, and the ability to focus than 307 on the rise. Recent attention has focused on stressors in a military cohort. Drawing on the Soldiers who had not deployed. In contrast, the growing number of suicides, with the well-documented theory of neuroplasticity, the Soldiers who had deployed outperformed Marine Corps experiencing more suicides in which asserts that experience changes the those who had not in terms of quick reaction 2008 than since the war began and the Army brain, this article argues that mind fitness time (for example, how long it takes to spot logging its highest monthly total in January training could complement the military’s a computer icon and react). In effect, the 2009 since it began counting in 1980. Not sur- existing stress inoculation training by devel- deployed Soldiers’ brains built the capacity for prisingly, PTSD rates are highest among Iraq oping skills to promote resilience against quick reaction, a function more necessary for and Afghanistan veterans who saw extensive stress and trauma so that warriors can execute survival in Iraq, while experiencing degrada- combat (28 percent). However, military health their missions more effectively. tion in other mental capacities. care officials are seeing a spectrum of psy- In another study, Soldiers who screened chological issues, even among those without Stress Can Degrade Performance positive for mental health problems after much combat experience. Various surveys A variety of research indicates that returning home were up to three times more provide a range of estimates, with up to half of harmful conditions such as chronic stress, likely to report having engaged in unethical returning National Guard and Reservists, 38 neglect, and abuse can produce harmful behavior while deployed.5 Such behavior, percent of Soldiers, and 31 percent of Marines changes in the brain.3 Stress is produced by including unnecessarily damaging private reporting mental health problems.1 real or imagined events that are perceived to property or insulting or physically harming It is no wonder. Troops manning check- threaten an individual’s physical and mental noncombatants, is obviously counterproduc- points or on patrol have to make split-second tive to winning the confidence of the local decisions on when to use lethal force, and population. This finding suggests a strong veterans say fear often clouded their judg- pilot research suggests that link between the negative effects of stress, ment. As Army Sergeant Dustin Flatt put it, Mindfulness-based Mind which degrades Soldiers’ capacity to manage “The second you left the gate of your base, Fitness Training is successful their own emotions and thereby control you were always worried. You were constantly at bolstering mind fitness and impulsive, reactive behavior, and a decrease watchful for IEDs [improvised explosive building resilience against in their ability to perform their mission devices]. . . . If you’ve been in firefights earlier stressors in a military cohort effectively. that day or week, you’re even more stressed Other studies of military environments and insecure to a point where you are almost have found substantial degradation in cogni- trigger-happy.”2 The perpetual uncertainty is well-being. Today, stress is commonly under- tive performance when subjects experience mentally exhausting and physically debilitat- stood to mean external events or circum- sleep deprivation and other environmental ing, and often its effects linger even after stances, and as a result, we tend to think of stressors. One recent study of sleep depriva- returning home. stress as something external to us. However, tion among Navy SEALs and Army Rangers What can be done to enhance the stress is actually a perceived, internal response. during a field training exercise demonstrated military’s capacities to operate in such The right amount of stress will allow a deci- that the lack of sleep affected troops so badly complex environments while simultaneously sionmaker to function at peak performance. that after a week they performed worse on protecting against the stressors inherent in However, excessive stress has biological and cognitive tests than if they were sedated or them? This article proposes a new training psychological consequences that reduce the legally drunk. In this study, the SEALs and program for both improving operational capacity to process new information and Rangers showed severe degradation in reac- effectiveness and building resilience to the learn. Stress may also bias decisionmaking tion time, vigilance, visual pattern recogni- stressors of deployment: Mindfulness-based more toward reactive, unconscious emotional tion, short-term memory, learning, and gram- Mind Fitness Training (MMFT, pronounced choices. matical reasoning skills.6 M-Fit). This program includes techniques and Recent empirical research about deci- Another group of studies examined exercises that previous research in civilians sionmaking in stressful military environ- more than 530 Soldiers, Sailors, and pilots has demonstrated to be effective at enhancing ments demonstrates that trauma and stress during military survival training, includ- the capacities central to mind fitness, such as lead to deficits in cognitive functioning. One ing time in mock prisoner of war camps, to prepare them to withstand the mental Dr. Elizabeth A. Stanley is an Assistant Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and and physical stresses of capture. In these Department of Government at Georgetown University. Dr. Amishi P. Jha is an Assistant Professor in the studies, exposure to acute stressors resulted Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. in symptoms of dissociation (alterations of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 145 FEATURES | Mind Fitness: Building Warrior Resilience one’s perception of body, environment, and return home and provides no skills training. complement existing military predeployment the passage of time), problem-solving deficits Instead, it introduces them to the cognitive training, as it helps warriors to perceive and (as measured by objectively assessed military and psychological effects of being deployed, relate to deployment stressors differently. performance), and significant inaccuracies provides psychological debriefing sessions, In other words, mind fitness training may in working memory and spatial memory (as and helps them identify warning signs for provide “mental armor” to protect troops as measured by eyewitness identification tests).7 when to seek help. In short, the military gen- they prepare for deployment and experience These findings corroborated with other erally lacks proactive mind fitness training the stressors of deployment itself. studies that found multistressor environments programs designed to give warriors skills that Just as stress and trauma can function- lead to substantial degradation of executive optimize performance and protect against the ally and structurally change the brain, so control capacity and cognitive skills, and such stressors of deployment. too can training, practice, and expertise. degradation has been linked to battlefield The brain of an expert—such as surgeon, errors, such as friendly fire incidents and col- the military generally lacks taxi driver, or musician—is functionally and lateral damage.8 structurally different from that of a nonex- proactive mind fitness training pert. In one study of London cab drivers, for Mind Fitness Training and programs designed to give example, researchers found that cab drivers Performance warriors skills that optimize have larger hippocampi than matched con- Optimal combat readiness requires performance and protect trols and that the longer an individual worked three things: against the stressors of as a cab driver, the larger the hippocampus. deployment The hippocampus is the brain region that ■■ mission essential knowledge and skills controls conscious memory, obviously needed ■■ physical fitness to navigate London’s circuitous streets. These ■■ mind fitness. Most military training is “stress differences in hippocampus size were the inoculation training” because it exposes and result of experience and training as a cab All three components are crucial for equip- habituates warriors to the kinds of stressors driver, not of preexisting differences in the ping warriors to handle the challenges and they will face while deployed. Paradoxically, hippocampal structure.9 stressors of deployment. The military devotes however, as the previous section demon- The London cab driver study highlights substantial resources to the first two catego- strates, stress inoculation training depletes the well-documented theory of neuroplastic- ries, both in terms of funding and time on the warriors’ executive control capacity—that is, ity, which states that experience changes the training schedule. However, there is virtually the mental capacity that allows us to focus on brain.10 Areas of the brain may shrink or no focus on mind fitness training today. The demanding cognitive tasks and/or emotion- expand—become more or less functional— Army’s Battlemind program is a first effort to ally challenging situations. As we explain based on experience. In other words, the raise Soldiers’ awareness of the psychological below, mind fitness training may counteract brain, like the rest of the body, builds the health issues associated with deployment, this cognitive degradation that results from “muscles” it uses most, sometimes at the but Battlemind mostly occurs after Soldiers stress inoculation training. Therefore, it could expense of other abilities. This concept is something athletes, musicians, and martial Secretary of Defense reenlists Soldiers at Forward artists have known for a long time: with physi- Operating Base Airborne, Afghanistan cal exercise and repetition of certain body movements, the body becomes stronger, more efficient, and better able to perform those movements with ease. A similar process can occur with the brain: with the engagement and repetition of certain mental processes, the brain becomes more efficient at those processes. This improved efficiency arises because any time we perform a physical or mental task, the brain regions that serve task- related functions show increased neuronal activity. Over time, as we choose to build a new mental skill, the repeated engagement of the brain regions supporting that skill creates a more efficient pattern of neural activity, for example, by rearranging structural connec- tions between brain cells involved in that skill. In other words, experience and training can lead to functional and structural reorganiza- tion of the brain. U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force 146 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu STANLEY and JHA Thus, there is a profound parallel Mindfulness has been described as a process A growing body of empirical sci- between physical fitness and mind fitness. of “bringing one’s attention to the present entific evidence supports the efficacy of Athletes know that with repetition, physical experience on a moment-by-moment basis”13 mindfulness-based interventions. Clinical fitness exercises can produce training-specific and as “paying attention in a particular way, studies demonstrate that civilian patients who muscular, respiratory, and cardiovascular on purpose, in the present moment and non- participated in such programs saw improve- changes in the body. They know that specific judgmentally.”14 Mindfulness differs from a ment in many physical and psychological training will correspond to specific benefits more conceptual mode of processing informa- conditions and reported a decrease in mood and promote better recovery from specific tion, which is often the mind’s default way disturbance from, and stress related to, these injuries. For example, sprints can build of perceiving and cognizing. In other words, conditions. Similarly, numerous studies have fast-twitch muscles, while longer runs can paying attention is not the same thing as documented how mindfulness training posi- teach the body to burn fat instead of glucose. thinking, although we often equate the two. tively alters emotional experience by reducing Similarly, specific mental exercises may allow negative mood as well as improving positive 15 the mind to become more “fit” and better mindfulness has been mood and well-being. Mindfulness training protected against certain types of challenges described as a process of has also been shown to increase tolerance by neuroplastic changes in the brain. of unpleasant physical states, such as pain,16 Mind fitness in today’s operational envi- “bringing one’s attention to produce brain changes consistent with more ronment entails having a mind with highly the present experience on a effective handling of emotions under stress, efficient capacities for mental agility, emo- moment-by-moment basis” and increase immune functioning.17 Finally, tional regulation, attention, and situational many studies have shown that mindfulness awareness (of self, others, and the wider envi- ronment). Just as physical fitness corresponds to specific enhancements in the body, mind fitness may correspond to enhancements in specific brain structures and functions that support these capacities. And, like physical fitness, mind fitness may be protective: it may build resiliency and lead to faster recovery from cognitive depletion and psychological stress. We propose that mind fitness can be maintained even in high-demand and high-stress contexts by regularly engaging in certain mental exercises. These exercises engage and improve core mental processes, such as working memory capacity, which lead to a more mentally agile, emotionally regu- lated, attentive, and situationally aware mode of functioning. This scientific understanding is start- ing to be recognized and applied with many recent research studies and popular books describing training programs to bolster mind fitness.11 These training techniques have existed for thousands of years, originating in Eastern spiritual traditions. In recent decades, they have been adapted for secular use, including in medical and mental health set- tings, corporations, prisons, and elementary schools. The most common and well-vali- dated training program is mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR); more than 250 U.S. hospitals offer MBSR programs, and more than 50 research articles document its utility in many domains.12 Mind fitness can be enhanced through a variety of training techniques, but the foun- Marines wait to leave temporary dational skill cultivated in both MBSR and patrol base in Afghanistan our MMFT program is called “mindfulness.” U.S. Marine Corps (Pete Thibodeau) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 147 FEATURES | Mind Fitness: Building Warrior Resilience training improves different aspects of atten- personally disliked groups.21 Thus, WMC mission accomplishment. During the course, tion, which is the ability to remain focused on corresponds to an individual’s success at troops learn about the stress reaction cycle task-relevant information while filtering out willfully guiding behavior while overcoming and its effects on the mind and body. They distracting or irrelevant information.18 cognitive or emotional distractions or impul- also learn how mind fitness training can While this research draws from civilian sive tendencies. boost resilience to stress. Most importantly, populations, its findings clearly have implica- Warriors with higher WMC are more and unlike the Army’s Battlemind training, tions in the military context. These techniques likely to have better mind fitness and thus be MMFT provides skills training through mind have already been extended to war veterans better equipped for responding to the cogni- fitness exercises. These exercises are prac- with PTSD, and preliminary results from this tive and emotional challenges that come from ticed 30 minutes a day. Some exercises build work suggest a reduction in symptoms.19 In preparing for and experiencing deployment. concentration by focusing on one object of addition, mindfulness training could help These warriors are also more likely to main- attention, such as a particular body sensation. optimize warrior performance by cultivating tain an effective level of performance when Others build situational awareness and non- competencies critical for the modern battle- confronted by obstacles, setbacks, and distrac- reactivity through wider attention on internal field, such as improved self-regulation, better tions, and return to their baseline functioning and external stimuli. And some exercises use attentional skills, and enhanced situational after being exposed to stressors or traumatic focused attention to reregulate physiological awareness. experiences. Nonetheless, all warriors (even and psychological symptoms that develop those with higher WMC) are likely to suffer from traumatic or stressful experiences. Working Memory Capacity and Mental from some degree of WMC degradation The exercises are incorporated into physical Armor through the deployment cycle because the training and other mission essential tasks Mind fitness, as we have operationalized stressors of this time period are so deplet- and completed during the duty day, in groups it here, comprises mental faculties critical ing of cognitive and emotional resources. and/or individually. Thus, an important com- for military effectiveness, such as mental Moreover, an individual’s position within the ponent of the course is engaging in MMFT agility, emotion regulation, attention, and military command structure may exacerbate training exercises each day. situational awareness. Interestingly, the the problem because recent evidence suggests We recently conducted a pilot study cognitive neuroscience construct of “working that being lower in a power hierarchy reduces of MMFT with a detachment of 31 Marine memory capacity” (WMC) has also been WMC.22 Reservists, who received the training before linked to these faculties. WMC is the ability Thus, an important component of they deployed to Iraq. (In March 2009, they to maintain relevant information online optimal combat readiness should be to returned home from this deployment.) While while resisting interference from irrelevant maintain or increase baseline levels of WMC, some Marines resisted the effort required by information. Growing evidence suggests that despite the increase in stressors over the the training, the initial exposure was relatively working memory capacity is tied to the ability deployment cycle. Because WMC can be to engage in abstract problem-solving and strengthened through training, performance counterfactual thinking. Recently, neurosci- on both cold cognitive processes and hot an important component of entists report that in addition to these “cold” emotional regulation can be enhanced. Main- optimal combat readiness cognitive processes requiring a high degree of taining or enhancing warriors’ baseline levels should be to maintain or mental flexibility and agility, “hot” emotional of WMC could have cascading effects for increase baseline levels of regulation processes also rely on WMC. effective decisionmaking, complex problem- working memory capacity While individuals differ in their solving, and emotional regulation processes, baseline WMC, everyone’s WMC can be all of which are heavily taxed over the deploy- fatigued and degraded after engaging in ment cycle and are crucial for mission effec- positive. The entire detachment received highly demanding cognitive or emotional tiveness. In other words, training to improve training, and MMFT’s didactic information tasks.20 Conversely, WMC can be improved WMC may provide “mental armor” to protect and group practices helped to socialize the and strengthened through training. Studies against impending deployment-related degra- concept. Once deployed, the Marines person- have shown that individuals with higher dation in mind fitness. alized their approach to the MMFT exercises, WMC have better attentional skills, abstract differing in how they incorporated them into problem-solving skills, and general fluid MMFT their daily routines. From their anecdotal intelligence (that is, the ability to use rather Mindfulness-based Mind Fitness Train- reports during and after the deployment, it than simply know facts). They also suffer less ing is a 24-hour course that is taught over 8 appears some Marines continued the exercises from emotionally intrusive thoughts and are weeks in groups of 20 to 25 Servicemembers. during their down time, some incorporated more capable of suppressing or reappraising MMFT is based on the well-established them into their physical fitness regimes, some emotions when required. In contrast, individ- MBSR course known to improve attentional employed them as part of their premission uals with lower WMC have poorer academic functioning and reduce the negative effects rehearsals, and some employed them to achievement, lower standardized test scores, of stress. However, MMFT is tailored for the keep themselves alert and focused while on and more episodes of mind-wandering. They military predeployment training cycle, with missions. Many Marines reported using the are more likely to suffer from PTSD, anxiety real-world examples from the counterin- exercises at bedtime, which they said helped disorders, and substance abuse, and are more surgency environment that show how mind them to quiet their minds, fall asleep faster, likely to exhibit prejudicial behavior toward fitness skills can enhance performance and and sleep more soundly. 148 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu STANLEY and JHA Before and after MMFT training (before working memory capacity occurred before gave neutral responses, and the rest said they they deployed), the Marines participated in a deployment, and thus does not reflect the did not use MMFT skills while deployed. battery of behavioral tasks to measure their additional stressors of the deployment itself. Thus, while only 16 percent practiced cognitive capabilities. We had predicted that The apparent costs of the predeployment mind fitness exercises regularly during the the increase in stressors during predeploy- context are striking, given that the intention deployment, more than a quarter used the ment training would degrade the Marines’ of the predeployment training is to prepare practices to reregulate themselves after stress- cognitive performance. However, statistical Servicemembers physically, emotionally, ful experiences and more than half used analysis shows that the Marines who spent and cognitively for the stressors of deploy- MMFT skills during the deployment. These more time engaging in mind fitness exercises ment. Our findings highlight the potential findings suggest the need for adding more (on average, 10 hours outside of class) saw an importance of providing mind fitness train- structured mind fitness exercise sessions improvement in their cognitive performance ing within the predeployment time period to into a unit’s daily schedule during deploy- compared to Marines who spent less time buffer against WMC depletion. ment. They also highlight again the parallel engaging in the exercises (on average, 2 hours While we have not yet fully analyzed to physical fitness: just as building muscle outside of class).23 Specifically, despite the real the data from their postdeployment cognitive requires repetitive physical exercise, improv- increase in stressors during the predeploy- behavioral testing, it is clear from a post ing cognitive and emotional performance ment period, the Marines who engaged in deployment survey that the Marines contin- requires engaging in mind fitness exercises in more mind fitness training maintained the ued to engage in mind fitness training and/ a sustained, disciplined manner. While mind same perceived stress level and preserved or or use the skills they learned while deployed. fitness skills are quickly and easily taught, even improved their working memory capac- Sixteen percent of the Marines said that they they require ongoing commitment to develop ity over their initial baseline. “practiced regularly while deployed,” while and strengthen over time. In contrast, the Marines who engaged 35 percent gave neutral responses, and 48 We acknowledge several limitations in less mind fitness training experienced percent said they did not practice regularly. to this pilot study. Our cohort was a conve- an increase in their perceived stress levels In contrast, 26 percent of the Marines said nience sample, consisting of a detachment and the predicted decrease in their working that they practiced mind fitness exercises that agreed to receive training. There was no memory capacity. This degradation in their “after particularly stressful or traumatic waitlist or active control group, although we WMC produced test scores of working experiences,” while 35 percent gave neutral are currently gathering control group data memory capacity on par with populations responses and 38 percent said they did not. for further analysis. We think this weakness that have suffered psychological injuries Perhaps more importantly, 54 percent of the was partially mitigated by our use of well- such as PTSD and major depression.24 It is Marines said that they “used the skills learned validated cognitive behavioral instruments important to note that this degradation in in this course downrange,” while 27 percent shown to be stable over time. This minimizes Virtual reality software that recreates traumatic situations in safe environment is used in therapy for Servicemembers with post-traumatic stress disorder U.S. Air Force (Lance Cheung) U.S. Air Force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 149 FEATURES | Mind Fitness: Building Warrior Resilience the possibility that the observed changes mission performance, mind fitness training and Reserve Component Soldiers Returning from simply reflected measurement artifact. is protective: it builds resiliency and leads to the Iraq War,” Journal of the American Medical Nonetheless, the fact that all Marines started faster recovery from cognitive degradation Association 298, no. 18 (2007), 2141–2148; “Alcohol Abuse Rises among Combat Veterans: Study,” with similar WMC scores and that changes in and psychological injury. While warriors may Reuters, August 12, 2008; “Divorce Rate Up in their scores over time correlate, in a statisti- choose to engage in mind fitness exercises to U.S. Army, Marine Corps,” Associated Press, cally significant way, with the amount of optimize their performance downrange, the December 3, 2008; A. Keteyian, “Suicide Epidemic time spent engaging in mind fitness exercises protective effects will still be accruing—likely among Veterans,” CBS News, November 13, highlights the need for further study. To this leading to a decrease in psychological injury 2007; Tony Perry, “Marine suicides in 2008 at a end, we have recently received funding from upon returning home. As a result, mind yearly high since Iraq invasion,” The Los Angeles the Department of Defense to examine how fitness training could reduce the number Times, January 14, 2009; Lizette Alvarez, “Army mind fitness training can build resilience and of warriors in need of professional help and Data Shows Rise in Number of Suicides,” The combat readiness among Army Soldiers. The thereby reduce caregiver burnout among New York Times, February 5, 2009; D. Sontag and first study will compare MMFT to the Army’s Armed Forces’ chaplains and medical and L. Alvarez, “Across America, Deadly Echoes of Battlemind program in a predeployment mental health professionals. In other words, Foreign Battles,” The New York Times, January 13, 2008, A1; Terri Tanielian and Lisa Jaycox, eds., context. The second study will compare dif- mind fitness training’s beneficial effects could Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cogni- ferent versions of MMFT in a nondeployment continue long after the deployment is over, tive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to increasing the likelihood that warriors will be context, to see which version is most effective Assist Recovery (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008); at producing optimal cognitive and psycho- ready, willing, and able to deploy again when Office of the Surgeon Multi-National Force–Iraq, logical performance among warriors. needed. JFQ Office of the Command Surgeon, and Office of the Surgeon General United States Army Medical As this article has shown, mind fitness N o t e s Command, Mental Health Advisory Team training can immunize against stress by (MHAT) V Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08: Iraq 1 buffering the cognitive degradation of stress L. Baldor, “Army desertions surge in past Operation Enduring Freedom 8: Afghanistan, Feb- inoculation training and by permitting more year,” San Jose Mercury News, November 17, 2007, ruary 14, 2008. 4A; C.W. Hoge et al., “Mental Health Problems, 2 adaptive responses to and interpretation C. Hedges and L. Al-Arian, “The Other War,” Use of Mental Health Services, and Attrition from of stressors. Mind fitness training can also The Nation (July 30–August 6, 2007), 23. Military Service after Returning from Deployment 3 Douglas Bremner, Does Stress Damage the enhance warrior performance by cultivating to Iraq or Afghanistan,” Journal of the American Brain? Understanding Trauma-related Disorders from competencies critical for today’s security Medical Association 295, no. 9 (2006), 1023–1032; Mind-Body Perspective (New York: Norton, 2002); environment. Finally, beyond its immediate Charles S. Milliken et al., “Longitudinal Assess- Robert Scaer, The Trauma Spectrum: Hidden Wounds effects for managing stress and enhancing ment of Mental Health Problems among Active and Human Resiliency (New York: Norton, 2005). U.S. and French servicemembers set out on survival training hike in Geggade Desert, Djibouti U.S. Air Force (Joe Zuccaro) U.S. Air Force 150 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu STANLEY and JHA 4 Jennifer J. Vasterling et al., “Neuropsycho- 14 Jon Kabat-Zinn, Wherever You Go, There You logical outcomes of Army personnel following Are: Mindfulness Meditation in Daily Life (New York: deployment to the Iraq War,” Journal of the American Hyperion, 1994), 4. NEW Medical Association 296, no. 5 (2006), 519–529. 15 P.C. Broderick, “Mindfulness and Coping from NDU Press 5 Office of the Surgeon Multi-National Force– with Dysphoric Mood: Contrasts with Rumination Iraq, Office of the Command Surgeon, and Office and Distraction,” Cognitive Therapy and Research for the of the Surgeon General United States Army Medical 29, no. 5 (2005), 501–510. See also, Ruth A. Baer, Command, 32. “Mindfulness Training as a Clinical Intervention: A Center for Technology and 6 Harris R. Lieberman et al., “Severe decre- Conceptual and Empirical Review,” Clinical Psychol- National Security Policy ments in cognition function and mood induced by ogy: Science and Practice 10, no. 2 (2003), 125–143. sleep loss, heat, dehydration and under-nutrition 16 Joshua Grant, “Pain Perception, Pain Toler- during simulated combat,” Biological Psychiatry 57 ance, Pain Control and Zen Meditation,” presenta- (2005), 422–429. tion at the Mind and Life Summer Research Insti- 7 Charles A. Morgan III et al., “Accuracy of tute, June 5, 2007. eyewitness memory for persons encountered during 17 Richard J. Davidson et al., “Alterations in exposure to highly intense stress,” International brain and immune function produced by mindful- Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (2004), 265–279; ness meditation,” Psychosomatic Medicine 65, no. 4 Charles A. Morgan III et al., “Stress-Induced Deficits (2003), 564–570. in working memory and visuo-constructive abilities 18 A.P. Jha et al., “Mindfulness Training Modi- in Special Operations Soldiers,” Biological Psychiatry fies Subsystems of Attention”; E.R. Valentine and 60 (2006), 722–729. P.L.G. Sweet, “Meditation and attention: A compari- 8 D.R. Haslam, “The military performance of son of the effects of concentrative and mindfulness soldiers in sustained operations,” Aviation, Space meditation on sustained attention,” Mental Health, and Environmental Medicine 55 (1984), 216–221; Religion and Culture 2 (1999), 59–70; Heleen Slater Harris R. Lieberman et al., “Effects of caffeine, sleep et al., “Mental Training Affects Distribution of loss and stress on cognitive performance and mood Limited Brain Resources,” PLoS Biology 5, no. 6 during U.S. Navy Seal training,” Psychopharmacology (2007), 138. 164 (2002), 250–261; K. Opstad, “Circadian rhythm 19 A.P. King et al., “Pilot Study of a Mindfulness- of hormones is extinguished during prolonged based Group Therapy for Combat Posttraumatic physical stress, sleep and energy deficiency in young Stress Disorder (PTSD),” poster presented to Ameri- men,” European Journal of Endocrinology 131 (1994), can Psychosomatic Society, Baltimore, MD, 2008. 56–66; G. Belenky et al., “Sustaining Performance 20 B.J. Schmeichel, “Attention control, memory Defense Horizons 67 during Continuous Operations: The U.S. Army’s updating, and emotion regulation temporarily Sleep Management System,” in Pennington Center reduce the capacity for executive control,” Journal of Breaking the Yardstick: The Dangers of Nutritional Series 10, Countermeasures for Battlefield Experimental Psychology: General 136, no. 2 (2007), Market-based Governance Stressors, ed. K. Friedl et al. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 241–255. State University Press, 2000). 21 A.R. Conway et al., “Working memory span In this Defense Horizons, a sequel to The 9 E.A. McGuire et al., “Navigation expertise and tasks: A methodological review and user’s guide,” Silence of the Labs (DH 21, January 2003), Don the human hippocampus: a structural brain imaging Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 12, no. 5 (2005), J. DeYoung examines how the loss of in-house analysis,” Hippocampus 13, no. 2 (2003), 250–259. 769–786. scientific and engineering expertise impairs 10 Jeffrey M. Schwartz and Sharon Begley, The 22 P.K. Smith et al., “Lacking power impairs good governance, poses risks to national secu- Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of executive functions,” Psychological Science 19, no. 5 rity, and sustains what President Eisenhower Mental Force (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003). (2008), 441–447. called “a disastrous rise of misplaced power.” 11 Sharon Begley, Train Your Mind, Change 23 A.P. Jha et al., “Examining the Protective Your Brain (New York: Random House, 2007); Effects of Mindfulness Training on Working Defense Horizons 66 Ryuta Kawashima, Train Your Brain: 60 Days to a Memory Capacity and Affective Experience,” st Better Brain (New York: Kumon Publishing, 2005); Emotion (in review). A 21 -century Concept of Air and Military Joel Levy, Train Your Brain: The Complete Mental 24 C.R. Brewin, and L. Smart, “Working Operations Workout for a Fit and Agile Mind (New York: Barnes memory capacity and suppression of intrusive and Noble Publishing, 2007). thoughts,” Journal of Behavioral Therapy and Robbin F. Laird argues that fifth-generation 12 A. Lutz et al., “Attention regulation and Experimental Psychiatry 36, no. 1 (2005), 61–68; T. aircraft coming on line now will transform monitoring in meditation,” Trends in Cognitive Sci- Dalgleish et al., “Reduced autobiographical memory the roles of all air elements, leading to new ences 12, no. 4 (2008), 163–169. See also A.P. Jha et specificity and posttraumatic stress: Exploring the concepts of operations. Designed and built al., “Mindfulness Training Modifies Subsystems of contributions of impaired executive control and in the information age, these aircraft take full Attention,” Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neu- affect regulation,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology advantage of and contribute to the networking roscience 7, no. 2 (2007), 109–119. 117 (2008), 236–241; T. Dalgleish et al., “Reduced of U.S. Armed Forces. 13 G.A. Marlatt and J.L. Kristeller, “Mindful- specificity of autobiographical memory and depres- ness and Meditation,” in Integrating Spirituality into sion: The role of executive processes,” Journal of Treatment: Resources for Practitioners, ed. William Experimental Psychology: General 136 (2007), 23–42. R. Miller (Washington, DC: American Psychological Visit the NDU Press Web site Association, 1999), 68. for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 151 Customs and Border Protection officer checks documents for entry to the United States CBP The Department of Homeland Security An Organization in Transition By Charles B. King i i i n November 25, 2002, the review these changes and to examine the Homeland Security Act of 2002 extent to which it would be advisable to make became law, and 60 days later, further modifications to DHS. In that spirit, O the Department of Homeland this article represents a synthesis of a series of Security (DHS) became the newest Cabinet- 19 interviews with current and former career level organization in the U.S. Government. and noncareer DHS officials, staff members Over the following 5 months, DHS merged of both the House and Senate Homeland elements of 22 agencies from 9 departments Security Committees, academic observers into its structure.1 In the nearly 7 years since, of the Department, and staff members who the Department has undergone one major supported the National Commission on Ter- internal reorganization (the 2005 Second rorist Attacks Upon the United States (the Stage Review), two externally driven reorgani- 9/11 Commission). The 19 interviewees made zations (prompted by the Intelligence Reform suggestions for the Department in four areas: and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and changes to policy, modifications to oversight, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management management and integration improvements, Reform Act of 2006), and several smaller, and areas in need of additional focus. agency-specific reorganizations. Charles B. King III is the Risk Analysis Branch Chief The transition from the George W. Policy for the Transportation Security Administration of the Bush administration to the Barack Obama Interviewees had few policy-related sug- Department of Homeland Security. administration provides an opportunity to gestions for the Obama administration. There 152 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu KING was, however, one policy issue that many ing border control efforts aimed at stopping streamlining oversight of DHS, and merging interviewees felt warranted significant atten- illegal migration, a task that would be linked the Homeland Security Council (HSC) with tion: immigration. to easing temporary and permanent work visa the National Security Council (NSC). The key test of a successful immigra- requirements. By shifting the incentives of Congressional Oversight. The most tion reform package is how well it addresses immigrants from attempting illegal crossings important issue facing DHS is congressional several interrelated issues: to making legal crossings at designated points, oversight, but the Department has very little the Federal Government would facilitate its influence on it. Groups as diverse as the ■■ provision of temporary work visas task of focusing screening efforts on people 9/11 Commission, Council for Excellence in ■■ path to citizenship for noncitizens cur- with suspect backgrounds. Government, Homeland Security Advisory rently illegally working in the United States DHS should have three roles in the Council, National Academy of Public Admin- ■■ means by which the United States will development of this policy. First, it should istration, and Center for Strategic and Inter- enhance border control conduct outreach efforts to state and local national Studies have identified streamlining ■■ expansion (numbers and eligibility) of governments to gather input on how best to congressional oversight as one of the most the work visa program execute this policy. State and local govern- difficult, and most important, issues for DHS, ■■ establishment of a reliable system for ments bear the brunt of illegal immigration, and many interviewees agreed.3 employers to validate the citizenship (or visa and their buy-in would be vital to enacting Streamlining oversight would enhance status) of prospective employees meaningful legislation. Secretary Janet unity of effort for DHS; having between ■■ provision of work and training oppor- Napolitano’s engagement is critical in this 79 and 86 committees and subcommittees tunities for current U.S. citizens. phase because of her credibility, by virtue of (depending on which organization is count- her experience as a border state governor, with ing) claiming jurisdiction has led to no com- This list is similar to those that under- these constituencies.2 mittee providing effective supervision. This pinned President Bush’s 2006 immigration aspect is particularly important in that DHS reform proposal—unsurprisingly, perhaps, spends over $35 billion and provides over $3 neither the numbers of migrants nor the establishing a straightforward billion more in grants each year based on a Nation’s interest in addressing their presence safe-haven process for risk assessment process that relies on intuition has changed significantly. The United States validating worker credentials far more than on hard data. It is a situation still has between 12 and 20 million illegal would complement enhanced that begs for better, not more, oversight. aliens in the country, far too many to have penalties Streamlining oversight would also provide a “reasonable expectation [to] send . . . back for more effective management of the orga- home.” The United States still has an inter- nization; having senior management testify est in welcoming and retaining immigrants The second element should be providing frequently to a wide variety of committees is (particularly those who are smart, creative, the White House with input on the feasibility a significant drain on management time and and industrious). And the United States still of implementing the policy. The final role attention. has an interest in promoting the employment should be publicly discussing DHS imple- Congress partially implemented the of citizens over noncitizens for both high- and mentation requirements under the legislation. oversight portion of the 9/11 Commission’s low-skill jobs. However, DHS should not have any public role recommendations in 2005, but has found The consensus view of the interviewees in discussing the policy elements of reform the politics of implementing the balance of is that a reform package would consist of three legislation. After the Bush administration those recommendations daunting. DHS has a elements, each requiring positive and nega- designated Michael Chertoff as its point- number of activities not related to homeland tive inducements to change both individual person for immigration reform, Secretary security—such as providing aids to naviga- and corporate behavior. The first of those Chertoff’s lobbying efforts hurt his credibility tion—embedded in it, and these activities elements is enhancing penalties for employers with the Federal legislative branch on a range are important to many Members of Congress who knowingly violate the provisions of the of other issues because immigration reform who are on neither the House nor the Senate Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 became so politicized. When making com- Homeland Security Committees. as they apply to hiring illegal immigrants. ments on this subject, DHS should also take One partial solution is to expand the Establishing a straightforward safe-haven care not to overemphasize border control as jurisdiction and membership of the Home- process for validating worker credentials either a counterterrorism issue or an antidote land Security Committees at the expense would complement those enhanced penalties. to illegal immigration. With a 1,969-mile of other committees. A useful model would The second element is facilitating a path southern border that runs through both cities be the Department of Defense oversight to citizenship for illegal immigrants who and mountains, border control cannot be a structure in which, despite having bases have been in the United States for a period 100-percent success story, and DHS should be in almost every district and a budget 13 of years and have been net contributors to careful to not imply that it could be. times that of DHS, only 36 committees and the Nation’s well-being. Complementing this subcommittees provide oversight.4 Such a element would be some form of noncriminal Oversight change would reduce conflicts in guidance penalty (a requirement for community service Interviewees made a number of com- from appropriators and authorizers, provide or a fee) in order for the program to avoid the ments touching on oversight. This article for better defined requirements, enhance “amnesty” label. The third element is enhanc- addresses only two of these recommendations: relations between branches of government, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 153 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | DHS: An Organization in Transition and improve the effectiveness of acquisition expand the NSC long-term issue integration Having a headquarters that functioned more programs.5 This is one of the few areas where staff. In addition to retaining its current capa- as an umbrella than a command element con- the important question is not, “What is best bilities, this staff should possess the capacity tributed to their ability to do so. for the Nation?” Here, the important question to manage integration issues, should be famil- One approach to addressing this issue is, “How do we make the politics work?” iar with the capabilities of DHS, and must be would be to increase the influence of the Homeland Security Council. Estab- capable of writing a strategy with state and Office of Policy by elevating the Assistant lished by Presidential directive on October local involvement. Secretary for Policy to an Under Secretary 28, 2001, the HSC is a stepchild of the NSC, position while also selecting an Under Secre- and its function is to “ensure coordination interviewees believe that the tary for Policy who has the confidence of, and of all homeland security–related activities chemistry with, both the White House and among executive departments and agencies concept of national security the Secretary. This officer would require the and promote the effective development and includes homeland security staff and the judgment to focus only on the implementation of all homeland security and that addressing terrorist most critical issues. The combination of these policies.”6 As one may expect from its origin, threats will never again be the changes, each necessary but not sufficient on its membership has significant overlap with second-tier issue it was before its own, would set the preconditions for the that of the NSC: 11 of the NSC’s 15 members/ September 11, 2001 Office of Policy to monitor and enforce the statutory advisors/substantive invitees are also Secretary’s guidance to the components. on the HSC. Risk Management Link to Budget. The There is a considerable degree of sym- Management and Integration next integration-related issue upon which metry between its role and that of the NSC, Interviewees suggested changes in four interviewees commented was the absence of which is charged to “coordinate executive areas to enhance cross-component manage- a link between risk management and budget Departments and agencies in the effective ment and integration. These recommenda- development. A linkage between the two development and implementation of those tions focused on meshing the needs of each functions would have two major impacts: it national security policies,”7 including the of the components with those of the Depart- would provide the Secretary with an addi- defense of the Nation. The very fact that the ment’s senior leadership. All interviewees tional vector for unifying the Department’s NSC jointly administers 3 of the HSC’s 10 who commented in this area were aware that efforts, and it would improve the connection policy coordinating committees illustrates the one impact of most of these changes would between risk management and policy. degree of overlap between the two organiza- be to slow the decisionmaking process, but As one interviewee noted, risk manage- tions’ roles and membership.8 they believed that the same forces that would ment is at the heart of all the Department does. Interviewees who commented upon the produce delays would also result in a better Inherent in every decision is a prioritization, HSC supported merging the organization performing Department. implicit or explicit, of the risks DHS chooses to into the NSC. They believe that the concept of Under Secretary of Policy. Because DHS address. While some of the threats facing the national security includes homeland security began as a merger of 22 agencies, with none Nation are knowable (for example, floods cause and that addressing terrorist threats will never of them dominating the integration process, an average of $8 billion worth of damage every again be the second-tier issue it was before it started without a common purpose to unite year), others—particularly terrorist threats— September 11, 2001. Accordingly, they recom- its components. That lack of a singular raison are inestimable. The two questions that then mend that the Obama administration return d’être has contributed to situations where face DHS are what threats to focus on, and the functionality and personnel of the HSC to components have been willing to “reinterpret” how to address them. The current approach the NSC, add more departmental representa- guidance from tives as full NSC members, build a strategic the Secretary. planning capability at the NSC, and DHS (Barry Bahler) Homeland Security Secretary visits Federal Emergency Management Agency headquarters (left) and receives briefing at DHS on flooding in DHS North Dakota and Minnesota (above) 154 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu KING is for DHS to focus on the large-scale threats, budgetary priorities, thereby expanding the Over the past 2 years, DHS has made while providing grants and technical support connection between the Secretary’s priorities significant improvements to the IT acquisition to state and local governments to address the and agency budgets. process, particularly on the chief information small-scale ones. This approach is aligned with Information Technology Acquisition/ officer (CIO) front. The DHS CIO now has the foci of the various organizations involved in Integration. One of the most effective ways increased authorities; DHS has an IT lifecycle homeland security. The Federal Government that the Secretary can ensure intradepartmen- management process; and the IT project feels a need to concentrate efforts on large-scale tal coordination is through the acquisition review process, with levels of scrutiny depen- events, while local governments prefer to focus process, and the largest element of acquisi- dent on project cost, has become effective. on the small-scale hazards they deal with on a tions (consuming about 10 percent of the With respect to improving IT acquisi- regular basis. DHS total budget) is information technology tion staff capabilities, DHS has not been as That approach leaves DHS in a quan- (IT). Because IT procurement is a technically successful. The components maintain their dary as to how to prioritize the large-scale complex and detail-driven subject, senior own procurement organizations that work threats it needs to counter. The Secretary leadership tends not to focus on it, which is a with legacy systems, and the Department would be well advised to have a portfolio significant error.11 The devolution of respon- has not assigned enough people, dedicated analysis performed to inform those choices. sibility to component procurement organiza- enough leadership attention, or allowed for Without such an analysis, the Secretary is tions results in projects that meet the needs enough planning time to execute IT acquisi- working on intuition. This all-hazards portfo- of individual agencies but not those of the tions well. One congressional staff member lio analysis should be based on a simple model and should be tailored to meet the Secretary’s because information technology procurement is a technically stated needs. Moving primary sponsorship of the complex and detail-driven subject, senior leadership tends not Homeland Security Institute9 from the to focus on it, which is a significant error Science and Technology Directorate to the Office of Policy would give the Office of the Department as a whole. In situations where a believes that, as a direct result of these factors, Secretary direct control over the analytical lead component has opened the development DHS has not had any unqualified successes in capacity needed to develop a risk portfolio of project requirements to other components, regard to major IT acquisitions. Others differ, analysis.10 Such an analysis would inform the it has occasionally begun too late in the acqui- citing the success DHS has had executing the Secretary’s Interagency Planning Guidance, sition process to avoid substantial cost and U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator which the components use as a roadmap to set schedule overruns. Technology program as a gauge. SECRETARY Executive ______Secretariat U.S. Department of Homeland Security Chief of Staff DEPUTY SECRETARY Military Advisor SCIENCE & NATIONAL PROTECTION MANAGEMENT POLICY LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS PUBLIC AFFAIRS TECHNOLOGY & PROGRAMS GENERAL COUNSEL INSPECTOR GENERAL Under Secretary Assistant Secretary Assistant Secretary Assistant Secretary Under Secretary Under Secretary Chief Financial Officer CITIZENSHIP & HEALTH AFFAIRS INTELLIGENCE & OPERATIONS CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL COUNTERNARCOTICS IMMIGRATION CHIEF PRIVACY Assistant Secretary/ ANALYSIS COORDINATION LIBERTIES ENFORCEMENT SERVICES OFFICER Chief Medical Officer Under Secretary* Director Officer Director OMBUDSMAN FEDERAL LAW NATIONAL DOMESTIC NUCLEAR ENFORCEMENT CYBER SECURITY DETECTION OFFICE TRAINING CENTER CENTER Director Director Director TRANSPORTATION SECURITY U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER U.S. CITIZENSHIP & U.S. IMMIGRATION & FEDERAL EMERGENCY U.S. SECRET SERVICE U.S. COAST GUARD ADMINISTRATION PROTECTION IMMIGRATION SERVICES CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AGENCY Director Commandant Assistant Secretary / Commissioner Director Assistant Secretary Administrator Administrator *Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis title created by Public Law 110-53, August 3, 2007 Approved March 20, 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 155 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | DHS: An Organization in Transition IT projects have a high impact on emergency—as a stand-alone organization, it its eagerness to respond to emergencies—its Department-wide performance because the would have access to 2,600 full-time employ- desire to do more than write checks in an Department as a whole has a requirement to ees and 4,000 standby employees rather than event’s aftermath. While they still blame know as much as possible about those whom the 162,000 members of DHS.13 Similarly, FEMA for communications breakdowns at it screens.12 Without a CIO who enforces both a stand-alone FEMA would not have the the local level, they understand that those the use of open standards and the execu- bureaucratic heft that its present parent, a breakdowns are, for the most part, the Gover- tion of a detailed, time-consuming, cross- full-scale department, has when coordinating nors’ issues to address. departmental requirements-development a response to an emergency. Interviewees had some recommendations phase, DHS either builds multiple, similar, Interviewee observations about a poten- for FEMA. Two thought that FEMA authori- incompatible IT structures at an increased tial FEMA move took three forms: the impact ties under the National Response Framework cost or changes requirements at a late date and on DHS, impact on the President, and impact were insufficient and that the agency needed pays for those changes through increased cost, on the Nation. From a DHS perspective, a to be able to execute tactical control over other lengthened program schedule, and decreased FEMA move would reduce the conceptual agencies when necessary. Another thought that project performance. viability of DHS, which is currently a full- FEMA needed to build a deliberate planning Federal Emergency Management spectrum homeland security organization; it capacity to complement its response expertise. Agency. The Federal Emergency Manage- addresses prevention, protection, response, Finally, one mentioned that the Post-Katrina ment Agency’s (FEMA’s) proper location in recovery, and preparedness. Without the Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 the Federal bureaucracy has been a topic of responsibility to execute FEMA’s response/ gave the FEMA administrator certain statutory considerable discussion for almost as long as recovery functions, DHS would lose its ability responsibilities that used to be the Secretary’s it has been a part of DHS. Broadly speaking, to execute its integrative function, and that and that the change created friction between from a Presidential perspective, it is useful to have someone, in this case CBP (James R. Tourtellotte) a Secretary, act as political insulation in the event a response goes poorly the two officials until they developed a shared view of the administrator’s responsibilities.14 That interviewee went on to note that the understanding was a matter of personalities, and that the next administrator and Secretary will have to reach a similar understanding. Customs and Border Protection officer Of note, one interviewee thought that lessons directs truck with seaport container to identified in the Federal Response to Hurricane inspection area Katrina Lessons Learned report did not place enough emphasis on the role of leadership there are two schools of thought regarding loss would invite the Departments of Defense during a crisis. the proper structural place for FEMA. One and Justice to “encroach” on DHS prevention school, led by former FEMA Administra- and protection functions. Focus Area Issues tor James Lee Witt, believes that the agency From a Presidential perspective, it is In addition to these oversight and should return to its Clinton administra- useful to have someone, in this case a Secre- integration changes, interviewees suggested tion–era position of an independent agency tary, act as political insulation in the event that the Department place additional focus reporting directly to the President. A direct a response goes poorly. As one noncareer on several areas, including the national cyber reporting relationship between FEMA and the official framed the issue, “Does any politi- security strategy; liaison with state, local, President would give the agency additional cian really want to have the head of FEMA as and private sector authorities; infrastructure bureaucratic clout and restore some of the a direct report?” Finally, at a national level, protection; and resiliency. The one theme that public confidence it lost after its response to requiring yet another reorganization would was consistent across all interviewee com- Hurricane Katrina. jeopardize current reforms that appear to be ments was that DHS should take account of, Moving FEMA out of DHS has disad- paying dividends. Since early 2007, Governors and incorporate into planning, the views of vantages that President Barack Obama must have begun complementing FEMA’s response outside stakeholders while developing and weigh against these advantages. It would to emergencies (for example, the wildfires in executing policy. reduce the number of personnel the agency California and the hurricanes in Texas). They Cyber Strategy. With the exception could immediately call upon during an like FEMA’s “forward leaning” posture and of congressional oversight, no other issue 156 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu KING received as much attention as cyber secu- and weaknesses. The most effective ways customer should be state and local emergency rity. Interviewees noted three fundamental the Federal Government can support those preparedness employees, mostly—but not challenges when dealing with cyber issues: leaders are by providing them with informa- exclusively—police officers. This definition technology moves faster than regulation, even tion on the threats to their facilities and would represent a profound shift from the partial solutions require significant inter- serving as a platform upon which they share current practice that holds DHS leadership agency cooperation, and the private sector best practices within and across sectors. as the primary consumer of intelligence. does not trust the Federal Government. Unfortunately, there are stumbling blocks Essentially, interviewees recommended that To improve cyber security, DHS should to doing so. As one interviewee noted, “If it the Department deliberately decide to play a focus on two missions: acting as a conduit to the private sector for enhancing critical infrastructure Supervisory Control and Data interviewees recommended that the Department deliberately Acquisition (SCADA) systems; and serving decide to play a backup role to state and local governments as a coordinator for protecting the Federal Government’s systems. The DHS lead element has taken us 8 years to get to the information backup role to state and local governments. for improving SCADA security should be the sharing point we are at, it is because it is hard This recommendation dovetails with the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), to do, not because we are stupid.” Director of National Intelligence’s recognition which should begin by gaining situational DHS’s fundamental issue with infor- that the Federal Government must move from awareness of cyber attacks on both the private mation-sharing lies in defining the primary a “need-to-know” mindset to one that recog- and the public sectors. NCSD should continue customers of intelligence products. Interview- nizes its responsibility to provide information its work by providing public praise for com- ees suggested that DHS’s primary intelligence to new partners.16 panies that collaborate with DHS, working Coast Guard C–130 Hercules patrols with through the National Institute of Standards USS Crommelin and Micronesian–FSS and Technology to develop standards for Independence in western Pacific Ocean SCADA system security, and partnering with the Securities and Exchange Commission to require publicly traded companies to include a discussion of cyber-related risks in the Man- agement’s Discussion and Analysis section of their quarterly 10–Q filings.15 Addressing private sector security is the first half of the equation, and addressing Federal cyber security is the second half. DHS, through a significantly expanded National Cyber Security Center, should be the interde- partmental lead agency to protect the “.gov” domain on the Internet. This task will not be trivial for a number of reasons, not least of which is developing a consensus opinion of to whom (employees, contractors, vendors) authentication rules should apply. In an effort to address the private sec- tor’s reluctance to share information with the government, DHS should develop proposed legislation establishing limited-access provi- sions (akin to, but more restrictive than, those for Protected Critical Infrastructure Informa- tion) for narrowly defined types of cyber- related information. This task, too, will not be a trivial effort since it will require DHS to hire cyber experts such as those found at Google or Microsoft, and those candidates have not tradi- tionally been attracted to the Federal culture. State and Local/Private Sector Infor- mation Sharing/Outreach. It is axiomatic that the people best positioned to protect infrastructure are those closest to it, since they are the ones most aware of its strengths U.S. Coast Guard (Michael De Nyse) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 157 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | DHS: An Organization in Transition Such an approach would demand that public health or safety, or any combination of executive branch is a challenging and time- DHS emphasis be on building trust on the those matters.” When the executive branch consuming task, so senior officials should part of state and local officials. There is still a published the 2007 edition of the National establish relationships with their counterparts popular misconception that DHS knows more Strategy for Homeland Security, it restated the in other departments and agencies before than it does, that it is keeping the “good stuff” definition to include whole sectors because a crisis begins.17 Building confidence with to itself. While the Department will never of the possibility of significant downstream counterparts before an emergency will not completely eliminate that perception, having consequences stemming from an attack. guarantee success, but not earning their trust liaison officers regularly ask what local offi- This expansion was an error. The beforehand will guarantee failure. cials need, and then delivering on those needs, Federal critical infrastructure protection Spreading a reassurance message (that would go far toward reducing it. DHS has mission should be ensuring that critical “terrorists getting lucky is not the end of the taken a number of steps to address this issue: assets work in a crisis, and executing that world”) has to start before an incident, and mission would require limiting the direct should be repeated until the public internalizes ■■ granting 1-day clearances Federal role to supporting security improve- the concept that, provided the government has ■■ developing Information Sharing and ments at a defined set of possible targets. One made reasonable attempts to prevent them, acts Analysis Councils interviewee took a restrictive view of what of terrorism are in the same category as plane ■■ funding Fusion Centers may be critical, suggesting that the Federal crashes and traffic accidents. They are terrible ■■ including local officials in the Inter- Government use the downstream, nation- tragedies for the families involved, but cannot agency Threat Assessment and Coordination wide impacts of Hurricane Katrina as a test be eliminated under any set of measures that Group within the National Counterterrorism to determine which types of assets may be are remotely reasonable to implement, and are Center critical. In this more limited infrastructure certainly not a threat to society as a whole. ■■ granting clearances to state officials protection model, the Federal Government, and private sector leaders. specifically the Office of Infrastructure Pro- tection, would focus on enhancing the point- in an emergency, the These steps address most of the process defense/survivability-assurance mission for government’s information changes needed; now DHS needs to focus on those critical assets, while the Sector Specific dissemination strategy will the human element. Agencies (SSA) would focus on facilitating have a tremendous influence To help build those relationships, DHS information-sharing and standards-setting on the population’s reaction should change its paradigm to one in which across the 18 critical infrastructure sectors. most intelligence products are unclassified Such a layered approach would focus and are geared for law enforcement use. These lead agency efforts on their areas of expertise. Conceptualizing Homeland Security products should identify behaviors that local The Federal Government—through the In addition to the policy, oversight, law enforcement and infrastructure opera- SSAs—adds the most value on a sector-wide management and integration, and focus area tors should be suspicious of, and they should basis when providing refined intelligence to issues discussed above, interviewees provided describe those behaviors in operational terms. support local decisions (no other organization their thoughts on two broad questions, DHS should support the development of these has the capability) and when identifying secu- neither of which has firm answers: “What is products by establishing a core of analysts rity standards that have applicability across homeland security, and where does DHS fit who know both law enforcement needs and sectors (no other organization has the scope within that construct?” and “How does DHS how to address those needs through Intel- of view). In those cases where the Federal structure itself within that model?” ligence Community resources. Government determines that specific pieces Homeland Security Defined. Homeland Infrastructure Protection. Few people of infrastructure have to remain operational security means many things to many people. would argue with the premise that one of regardless of circumstances, the Office of The 2006 National Strategy for Homeland DHS’s core missions is ensuring the continu- Infrastructure Protection is well positioned to Security defines it as “a concerted national ing function of critical infrastructure during provide direct assistance to the operators. effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the a crisis. However, that consensus dissipates Resiliency. A vital element of homeland United States, reduce America’s vulnerability when people begin to discuss what constitutes security is resiliency—ensuring that events, to terrorism, and minimize the damage and “critical infrastructure,” and it vanishes when natural or man-made, are no more disrup- recover from attacks that do occur.” However, people discuss how to execute that protection tive to the Nation than they have to be. A that definition, limited to countering ter- function. Congress defined critical infra- key element of resiliency is reassurance, and rorism, excludes many DHS activities, sug- structure in section 1016(e) of the Uniting providing reassurance is the responsibility gesting that it is too narrow. An alternative and Strengthening America by Providing of DHS’s senior leadership. In an emergency, definition of homeland security, taken from Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and the government’s information dissemina- several interviewees’ comments, could be Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of tion strategy, primarily by means of officials’ “a concerted national effort to prepare for 2001 as “systems and assets, whether physical statements and answers to questions, will and address the full range of physical and or virtual, so vital to the United States that have a tremendous influence on the popula- virtual domestic risks to the Nation’s citi- the incapacity or destruction of such systems tion’s reaction. People want reassurance, and zens and their well-being.” This definition and assets would have a debilitating impact on multiple conflicting messages will not provide would encompass the protection, prevention, security, national economic security, national it. Coordinating messages even within the response, recovery, and preparedness activi- 158 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu KING ties inherent in an all-hazards view of DHS tions. A group on the Secretary’s staff with the challenges_report.pdf>; National Academy of Public without requiring that all homeland security influence to require convergence among the Administration, Addressing the 2009 Presidential activities be part of the Department. Secretary’s risk-informed priorities, component Transition at the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: National Academy of Public The Path Forward. Congress has pro- budgets, and agency information technology Administration, June 2008), available at By R i c h a r d A . M o b l e y n the midst of the Jordanian civil war Jordanian army armored with Palestinians during September personnel carriers patrol streets of Amman after 9 1970, Syria conducted a short-lived days of civil war against armored incursion into northern Palestinian guerrillas, I Jordan. U.S. leaders, seeing Syrian inter- September 25, 1970 vention through the prism of Cold War politics, responded with extensive military preparations to intervene on behalf of Jordan’s King Hussein and prepared to block Soviet intervention on behalf of Syria. When Syria withdrew its forces after 3 days of combat with the Jordanian army, U.S. decisionmakers not only praised the Jordanian resistance but also concluded that Syria’s withdrawal was a victory for U.S. statecraft. Recently declassified material provides a richly detailed account of how Washington quickly developed plans, deployed forces, and solicited Israeli military assistance in response to the rapidly developing crisis. The combina- tion of these steps would have allowed U.S. or encouraged Israeli intervention to save King Hussein from a potential Syrian onslaught. Contemporary memoirs, public statements, and diplomatic cables suggest that several key international actors involved in the crisis acknowledged the import of the U.S. military moves. A review of U.S. military behavior during this episode thus offers a case study on suc- cessful crisis decisionmaking, military plan- ning, and operational deployments on behalf of a major ally faced with a sudden threat. Although set in the context of the 1970s, such a study is still relevant because it demonstrates how Washington effectively responded to the threat when U.S. popular will and military resources were sorely tested by ongoing con- flict in Southeast Asia. U.S. strategy succeeded Commander Richard A. Mobley, USN (Ret.), is an AP Images Intelligence Analyst for the U.S. Government. 160 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MOBLEY from an American and a Jordanian perspec- tanks—unlike the Fedayeen militias—would ordered the USS Independence carrier strike tive, according to memoirs and contemporary be vulnerable to airstrikes in the open Jorda- group to move 100 miles off the Lebanese diplomatic messages. How the strategy affected nian terrain. This concern with redressing the coast and positioned six C–130 aircraft toward Damascus is more difficult to determine numerical imbalance and armored vulner- Turkey.3 USS Saratoga, the second carrier because of the paucity of information on Syrian ability in northern Jordan probably made deployed to the Mediterranean, was then decisionmaking during the crisis, but the invading tanks key targets in U.S. planning to enjoying a port visit but would be en route threat of U.S. or Israeli intervention must have defend Jordan against Syrian or Iraqi attack. to the same destination by September 15. An weighed heavily on a Ba’ath party leadership amphibious readiness group was continuing 4 that exhibited only lukewarm commitment to given suspicions of Moscow, an exercise on Crete on September 11. the intervention. U.S. contingency planning On September 9–10, the WSAG sought to delineate the consequences of a protracted Strategic Context focused on ways to block U.S. military operation in Jordan in support U.S. leaders in September 1970 were con- a Soviet intervention in the of the king and to assess the force posture cerned about the role of several actors and their Middle East on behalf of Syria required to deter Moscow should Israel move behavior in three concurrent Jordanian crises, into Jordan. On September 10, WSAG meet- each posing different planning requirements: the Palestinian hijacking of airliners to Jordan “Black September” in Jordan, 1970 (September 6 and 9), the commencement USS Independence carrier of Jordanian military operations against the strike group to move 100 miles off the Lebanese coast Palestinian militias within Jordan (September LEBANON 17), and the Syrian armored incursion into SYRIA Jordan (September 20–22). The Palestinians USS Saratoga is A E deployed to Sept. 20–22 and Iraq posed the more immediate threat to S Lebanese coast Syrian armored forces conduct King Hussein given their military presence in N incursion into Jordan A Jordan. Planners appeared to treat Syria as a E IRAQ N Deraa lesser threat because it had no forces in Jordan A Irbid Sept. 23 R Syrian forces withdraw Ramtha before its incursion. Finally, Washington sus- R from Jordan E T WEST Al Mafraq pected that Moscow might encourage, if not I BANK As-Sarish militarily support, adventures by its Arab allies. D ★ E Amman M President Richard Nixon and his Jerusalem Azraq ash national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, Shishan perceived that Moscow had been trying Al Qatranah Sept. 17 Al Karak Commencement of Jordanian to exploit regional unrest throughout the GAZA ISRAEL military operations against the STRIP Palestinian militias within Jordan summer of 1970.1 Kissinger claimed that Al Hasa Moscow had foreknowledge of the invasion JORDAN and later criticized Moscow for not quickly and visibly urging Syria to stop. Given such suspicions of Moscow, U.S. contingency plan- ning focused on ways to block a Soviet inter- vention in the Middle East on behalf of Syria. Al Aqabah SAUDI ARABIA EGYPT U.S. Planning to Defend Jordan The United States in June 1970 began updating plans to support King Hussein if G U L F O F AQABA Syria or Iraq attacked. Kissinger had assem- bled the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), a crisis management team compris- The National Command Authorities ings set in motion the basket of plans that the ing principals from the White House, Depart- again focused on Jordan when the Popular United States would turn to during the Syrian ment of State, Department of Defense (DOD), Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked intervention. Kissinger directed the group and Central Intelligence Agency in response and flew three airliners there on September 6 to prepare a plan to deter the Soviet Union to President Nixon’s directive that the United and 9.2 In response, Kissinger on September 9 if Israel intervened to support King Hussein States update its planning to support Jordan. convened the WSAG, which considered, fused, against the Fedayeen, to review a contingency U.S. planners were concerned about the size and recommended diplomatic and military plan for U.S. intervention in order to support of Syrian and Iraqi tank inventories, which courses of action for the Jordan crises in him against the Fedayeen should he request it, far exceeded Jordan’s arsenal of 300 British meetings occurring several times daily for the and to determine logistic support for Israel.5 Centurion and American M–60 tanks. next 17 days. Following the hijacking (and as The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assessed that a likely result of the WSAG process), the JCS Admiral Thomas Moorer, responded that the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 161 RECALL | Countering Syria’s 1970 Invasion of Jordan JCS had been updating its contingency plans forces combined. The WSAG observed that In the Mediterranean, the JCS ordered for Jordan since June 1970, but warned that the eruption of Fedayeen violence in other USS Saratoga to depart Malta and join the “our first recommendation is that we not get cities could spread Jordanian forces thin, Independence battle group in the eastern involved.” If Washington decided to commit however, and pursued options to save the king Mediterranean. The amphibious readiness forces anyway, the JCS recommended airstrikes should he be unable to deal with the Iraqis.9 group was to remain within 36 hours steam- against ground units and lines of communica- The complexion of the crisis changed ing time from Jordan. Defense Secretary tions.6 A U.S. ground campaign was the least on September 17 when King Hussein initiated Melvin Laird announced that the Sixth Fleet preferred option given the logistic difficulties— hostilities against his Palestinian challengers. had moved units closer to the eastern Medi- “a real problem,” in Admiral Moorer’s words— Rather than masking its military prepara- terranean, and DOD disclosed that Guam was that the JCS anticipated U.S. forces in Jordan tions, the United States sought to demonstrate ordered to depart the United States earlier would encounter. Addressing the challenge of that it could support Hussein and conse- than scheduled.15 deterring Soviet intervention, the Chairman quently revealed some of its precautionary As these forces steamed east, the WSAG urged forceful measures: “We can’t do it half- military movements in U.S. Government press concluded that carriers would provide most, way; we have to be convincing. The movement releases. The same day, Nixon told reporters if not all, of the airpower required to support of one ship or squadron is a feeble gesture that that only the United States or Israel could stop the Jordanian army, conduct a show of force, won’t serve the purpose.”7 an Iraqi or Syrian invasion of Jordan. Echoing or accomplish a noncombatant evacuation The WSAG updated its plans on Sep- the comment he had penned in a Kissinger operation or resupply mission. The Navy had tember 15, with special emphasis on scenarios memorandum, Nixon stated in a newspaper far more aircraft immediately available, and that the United States might face in Jordan.8 interview that day that he preferred that U.S. WSAG participants doubted that most of the (Although the WSAG remained focused on (rather than Israeli) forces come to Jordan’s bases near Jordan would be available for con- Iraq rather than Syria as the primary external aid.10 That night, he told Kissinger, “I made tingency operations. The WSAG concluded threat, many of the planning issues would it clear . . . it would be fatal to the king if the that Cyprus was the only viable base for this have been similar for countering a Syrian Israelis came in . . . Jordan has to be strength- contingency given political sensitivities. armored force.) The WSAG and U.S. Embassy ened to scare off Iraq and Syria. . . . We The Air Force would require 7 days to bring in Amman assessed that the Jordanian army also have airplanes to strike. I want Europe in the supplies and equipment to support could defeat the Fedayeen as long as it did mobilized in readiness if we do. I want to hit strike operations from there. Even then, the not also have to fight outside troops. The U.S. massively—not just little pinpricks.”11 JCS estimated that the United States could Embassy also judged that the Jordanian army Despite Nixon’s initial views, the United generate about 50 tactical sorties daily from could even handle the Fedayeen and Iraqi States and Israel negotiated over the possibil- there to Jordan—only a 25 percent increase ity of Israeli intervention several times during the crisis. They failed to reach final agreement the United States and Israel over which country would pursue what mili- negotiated over the possibility tary course of action, however, at least during the 3-day duration of the Syrian occupation of of Israeli intervention several northern Jordan. Both retained the option of times during the crisis air intervention if necessary, and—as Syrian forces were preparing to withdraw—Israel above the 200 daily sorties expected from the advised that it would be prepared to conduct Independence and Saratoga strike groups. The airstrikes against the Syrians. The Israelis WSAG concluded that the additional land- mobilized forces in preparation for a possible based tactical sorties would be of marginal ground intervention in Syria, although Tel value, especially because the Navy would gain Aviv steered clear of firmly committing to an the capability to fly a total of 300 sorties daily invasion of Jordan. when the USS Kennedy group arrived. Con- The U.S. Navy’s reaction to the Jordan sequently, the WSAG recommended that the crisis consequently became more robust on United States rely solely on carrier-based air September 17, although staying within the in its planning to deal with Syria.16 bounds of a “maximum rational response,” Syrian and Iraqi public threats against in the words of former Chief of Naval Opera- King Hussein between September 17 and 19 tions Admiral Elmo Zumwalt.12 The JCS raised the possibility that the carriers would ordered a third carrier battle group led by USS soon see combat. President Hashim al-Atasi John F. Kennedy to depart the Atlantic Fleet claimed that Syria would “spare no blood” Weapons Range off Puerto Rico and begin its to help the Palestinians, an insinuation that Mediterranean deployment a few days early.13 Damacus might send forces into Jordan. On Yasser Arafat and Jordan’s King Hussein walk to A second amphibious readiness group led September 17, Radio Damascus echoed this conference hall in Cairo, Egypt, to meet with other by USS Guam was to complete its loadout at theme by reporting that the Syrian foreign Arab leaders to sign peace agreement ending Morehead City, North Carolina, and depart ministry had warned Jordan’s ambassador Jordanian civil war, September 27, 1970 14 AP Images on September 18. that the “Syrian revolution cannot remain 162 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MOBLEY silent or idle about the massacres to which the assistance three times on September 20.25 Zaid vinced an air campaign would be sufficient to Palestine revolution groups and the masses in Rifai, the close advisor who delivered the king’s dislodge the Syrians. The Israelis—who prom- Jordan are being exposed.”17 written request, clarified that Jordan would ised to take no action without consulting the accept air support from any country, including United States—advised that they would make Syrian Incursion Begins Israel, in his comments to the U.S. Ambas- an assessment after receiving the next day’s Sunday, September 20 sador in Amman. In a telephone conversation photo reconnaissance reporting. Kissinger Damascus committed a reinforced divi- between the Foreign Office and White House later observed that the United States kept a sion to the Jordanian civil war on September staff, the British also explained that they had careful watch on Israeli actions and noted 20, probably in hopes of facilitating a quick confirmed that the king “definitely requested that they were moving quietly and calling up Palestinian victory. The Jordanian army [Her Majesty’s Government] to pass on to the reserves. Within 36 hours of the Syrian incur- was making halting progress in defeating Israelis a request on the Syrian troops which sion, Israel concentrated additional forces on the Fedayeen, and Syrian leaders probably are massing. The request seems to have been the Golan Heights.31 reasoned that a limited commitment might be made first this morning and then at about 1830 sufficient to tip the scales on behalf of the Pal- Jordan time this evening.”26 Urgent Jordanian Requests for estinians (or at least to help create a safe haven The U.S. Ambassador also recommended Assistance for them in northern Jordan without trigger- that the United States consider an Israeli Monday, September 21 ing Israeli intervention). Syria’s Fifth Division “spooking” operation to eject the Syrians from The ground order of battle in northern (including elements of four Syrian brigades Jordan. Commenting that “the Israelis are Jordan still favored Syria on the morning and the Palestinian Hittin Brigade) began experts at this,” the Ambassador suggested of September 21. Syria had nearly 300 tanks invading northern Jordan at approximately 2 that Damascus might withdraw if distracted and 60 artillery tubes near Ramtha and a.m. local time on September 20.18 More than by the massing of Israeli forces opposite Syria Irbid.32 Some tanks had entered Irbid but 170 T–55 tanks and 16,000 troops initially and by low-level Israeli reconnaissance over supported the invasion, but Syria declined Damascus. The reasoning was that endorsing the U.S. Ambassador to commit its air force even after Jordanian such an initiative would at least “give us some- fighters started to attrite the invasion force. thing to say to the king.”27 (Amman would recommended that the United As fighting continued, the Jordanians repeat this recommendation the next day, States consider an Israeli repulsed two armored offensives and report- noting that “escalation of Israeli activity, real or “spooking” operation to eject edly inflicted heavy losses on a Syrian armored manufactured signs, Iraqi activity, careful leaks the Syrians from Jordan brigade.19 The tanks had crossed near Ramtha re contingency plans U.S. and others might and by 3 p.m. were 5 miles south of there.20 contribute” to a Syrian withdrawal.)28 They slowly moved toward Irbid, a Jordanian Faced with all these requests, the WSAG city only 45 miles north of Amman and under encountered difficulties making timely assess- Fedayeen control. Complementing the ground ments given delays in obtaining current tacti- campaign, Hawker Hunter aircraft attacked cal intelligence and in communicating with the Syrian tanks and set some on fire.21 They King Hussein in war-torn Jordan. Kissinger were grounded after nightfall, however, when commented, “We did not possess enough intel- at 6:15 p.m. the Jordanians reported that ligence or targeting information to respond to Library and Museum Nixon Presidential two armored brigades operating on a broad the king’s pleas with American forces.” Kiss- front were attempting a third assault.22 British inger asked Israeli ambassador Yitzhak Rabin reporting noted, “Jordan forces are reported as to forward a request for the Israeli air force quote doing badly and they are outnumbered to fly reconnaissance missions over Jordan at and undertanked unquote.”23 By 9 p.m., three daybreak on September 21 because the United Syrian brigades with 215 tanks—the equivalent States lacked information. The JCS subse- of a division—were located near Irbid.24 quently directed the fleet to develop recon- Fortunately, despite all the Syrian activ- naissance and strike plans to be used against ity, the Iraqi expeditionary force remained the Syrian forces in Jordan. The WSAG even uncommitted. They moved east, presumably approved sending a delegation from the USS to remain clear of a Syrian-Jordanian battle- Independence to Tel Aviv to pick up last-minute ground. The Syrian 6th Armored Brigade—nor- intelligence from the Israelis on the disposition mally stationed in Deraa—reportedly moved of Syrian forces for targeting purposes.29 (The toward Mafraq. Iraqi officers also asked the White House envisioned that this visit would Jordanian air force to depart the Mafraq air- signal the Soviets that the United States and field and fly to the H–5 airfield 75 miles east, Israel were cooperating closely.30 ) explaining that they did not want Iraqi forces The United States also approached Israel near the airfield drawn into the contest. about possible Israeli air and land interven- Faced with this rapidly growing threat so tion. Late on September 20, Rabin responded President Nixon in Oval Office, September 25, 1970 near the capital, King Hussein asked for U.S. that Israeli military leaders were not con- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 163 RECALL | Countering Syria’s 1970 Invasion of Jordan remained in groups rather than dispersing now,” according to the American Embassy in Washington agreed not to hold Israel in the city streets. Other tanks remained in Amman.38 responsible if its actions led to the death of groups outside town. Construction work at The WSAG continued to investigate the hostages taken from the airliners that had Irbid suggested the Syrians were preparing possibility of Israeli air and land intervention, been hijacked to Jordan. The United States to hold it. A Syrian second echelon com- despite President Nixon’s earlier reservations. explained that it did not know whether King prising supply vehicles and bulldozers was positioned between the Syrian border and King Hussein phoned the U.S. Ambassador and asked that he Irbid.33 The units included the Fifth Division headquarters, two armored brigades, and relay an urgent message to Nixon one tank battalion. In other words, Syria had committed as much as a third of the 900 tanks In fact, Nixon relented. He had told Kissinger Hussein would formally request Israeli assis- available between Deraa and Damascus to the early on September 21 that he had decided to tance or establish methods of Jordanian-Israel operation. Jordan had a smaller force—three approve an Israeli ground action and dictated communications, although it noted that King infantry brigades and 120 to 140 tanks—in a message to be relayed to Rabin. Hussein had repeatedly requested or approved the area.34 Syrian forces continued to advance, U.S. Embassy personnel simultaneously Israeli airstrikes.40 and by 5 p.m. had captured two key cross- engaged the Israelis in Tel Aviv on the details In particular, Washington cited the roads, including an intersection serving as a of an Israeli intervention. To support its plan- increase in Sixth Fleet readiness to reassure gateway to Amman, only 45 miles south.35 ning, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sought the Israelis that the United States could act to Despite successes on the ground, Syria operational information to avoid inadvertently prevent Soviet intervention: was also sensitive to the U.S. naval buildup. striking Jordanian units. They warned that they On the morning of September 21, the foreign were beginning to doubt that an air operation We have and will continue to make clear to the ministry denied that Syria had intervened in alone would be effective, although it might Soviets our support for Israel’s security and integ- Jordan and stated that such accusations were have worked 36 hours earlier.39 rity and its right to live within defensible borders. a “prelude for U.S. military intervention in The Israelis agreed to intervene “in In the present crisis, the U.S. has augmented the area, particularly since the U.S. had been principle” but awaited answer to their first the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other readiness moving its Sixth Fleet and sending its naval battery of questions for U.S. assurances. On measures. These clearly imply a decision not units to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean September 21, Washington promised diplo- to permit Soviet intervention in the conditions for some time.” The Syrian spokesman then matic support, including the use of a veto on under discussion. As for specific measures the demanded the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet.36 Israel’s behalf in the United Nations Security Jordan’s requests for assistance contin- Council. ued because the Syrian force was undefeated and civil war raged elsewhere in Jordan. King Hussein phoned the U.S. Ambassador at 3 a.m. local on September 21 and asked that he relay an urgent message to Nixon: Situation deteriorating dangerously fol- lowing Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. Irbid occupied. This having disastrous effect on tired troops in the capital and surroundings. After continuous action and shortage supplies . . . I request immediate physical intervention both air and land as per the authorisation of government to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inde- pendence of Jordan. Request immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover are imperative. Wish earliest word on length of time it may require your forces to land when requested which might be very soon.37 Rifai added that the king’s first prefer- ence was for a U.S. strike, but because the situ- Naval Historical Center Historical Naval ation seemed to be “coming to the worst, the most important thing was to hit the Syrians President Nixon with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, aboard USS Saratoga prior to deployment to Mediterranean Sea 164 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MOBLEY U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, Syrian Defeat and Withdrawal Jordan concluded that it had achieved these would depend on the circumstances and Tuesday, September 22 tank parity with the Syrians.49 Amman had the situation that exists at the time. We have The Syrian forces again attempted to achieved this through attrition of Syria’s Fifth contingency plans for these eventualities.41 breach Jordanian lines on the northern ridge- Division and by reinforcing its own forces line of the Ajnun Mountains and attacked in the north during the night of September To bring the point home, DOD that day from Hawara toward Irbid by midday. After 21–22. An estimated 200 Jordanian tanks announced naval movements toward the Medi- advancing 3 kilometers toward Irbid and As- were located in the battle zone.50 These losses terranean and the heightened alert for U.S. Sarish around 10 a.m. local, they withdrew and the shift in the correlation of forces Army units in Europe, the 82d Airborne Divi- after falling under Jordanian tank and artil- probably account in part for Syria’s decision sion, and supporting C–141 airlift units based lery fire—behavior similar to that they had to withdraw from Jordan on the night of Sep- in North Carolina.42 The Kennedy battle group displayed the day before.45 Rifai advised the tember 22–23. and Guam amphibious readiness groups con- U.S. Embassy that Jordan had repulsed Syria’s As the United States and Israel prepared tinued their Atlantic crossings en route to the attempt to move south of the Irbid/Irbid junc- to attack the Syrian invaders, Jordan’s need eastern Mediterranean. Kennedy was to enter tion/Ramtha line using tanks, artillery, and for assistance dropped, given its successes on the Mediterranean by Friday, September 25. aircraft.46 Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers the ground. The U.S. Embassy in Amman Two more nuclear attack submarines (Whale continued to attack the Syrian armor in relays advised late on September 22 that Amman and Gato) were to enter the Mediterranean of eight aircraft, with intervals of half an hour had less need of an Israeli ground attack, between September 25 and 29.43 between sorties.47 The small Jordanian air although King Hussein still sought external A message from Admiral Isaac Kidd, force—with fewer than 50 Hawker Hunter air support. The Embassy warned that some commander of Sixth Fleet, revealed that the and F–104 fighters—ultimately flew as many Jordanian army units might even conclude fleet was pondering the tactical implications as 250 sorties during the crisis. that invading Israelis would be a greater threat of engaging the Syrian armor. Admiral Kidd Airstrikes, logistic shortfalls, and than the Syrians and raised the specter of warned that it would be “virtually impossible” mechanical breakdowns began to attrite the a conflict arraying Jordanian units against to guarantee that the United States would not Syrian armor, and the Israelis, who had flown those of Israel, Syria, and perhaps Iraq.51 penetrate Syrian airspace because some of the reconnaissance missions over Jordan on Sep- Even a successful Israeli intervention “would tanks were close to the Syrian border. He also tember 21 and 22, assessed that the Syrians strain the king’s personal standing” with his addressed rules of engagement and prohibited would encounter serious logistic difficulty subjects and fellow Arabs. The Ambassador hot pursuit of enemy aircraft into Syria. Finally, within 3 to 4 days. (One battalion reportedly also warned that Israel might attempt not only Kidd admonished his subordinates to ensure had only 8 operational tanks out of an inven- to force a withdrawal but also to “so smash that Navy aircraft did not lead any Syrian fight- tory of 31 due to breakdowns.48 ) By midday the Syrians that they won’t rise again for a ers back to the carriers after an attack.44 on September 22, approximately 50 of 200 long time.”52 The American Embassy in Tel Syrian tanks were inoperable. the Embassy warned that some Jordanian army units might conclude that invading Israelis would be a greater threat than the Syrians Aviv similarly warned that the United States risked being faced with a “large Israeli force entrenched on Irbid Heights and perhaps reluctant to leave there.”53 Ultimately, the king was ambivalent about airstrikes and against Israeli ground intervention. The Embassy quoted King Hussein’s response, as relayed through Rafai, who said the king “prefers action from up high” (an allusion to the Israeli air option) and that “if anything is to be done low it should not be here but away” (a suggestion that he would prefer Israeli forces invade Syria, not Jordan). Rifai said the principal White House Photographic Office Collections aim was to force Syrian withdrawal because President Nixon meeting with Secretary of State Kissinger, Vice if they stayed, it would complicate even President Ford, and Chief of Staff Alexander Haig in Oval Office further the “job that the government has in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 165 RECALL | Countering Syria’s 1970 Invasion of Jordan Amman.” He concluded that, more impor- deployed six more P–3s to deal with the ■■ Faced with strong Jordanian army tantly, Syrian success might “give the Iraqis Soviet problem.62 resistance, Damascus assessed it would have the idea that they too can get away with had to increase its troop commitment to the something in Jordan.”54 Aftermath campaign—a move that risked confrontation Nevertheless, Israel mobilized reserves Wednesday, September 23 with Israel. and moved the equivalent of a division into Syrian forces completed their with- ■■ The Soviet Union pressured Damascus the Beit Shin area, from where55 they could drawal on September 23, when they started to to withdraw.72 intervene at almost any point in the Jordan regroup near the Syrian side of the border.63 Valley. The U.S. Embassy, however, also In the latest fighting, the Jordanians reported Prime Minister Meir said that U.S. judged that the mobilization was most likely destroying 70 to 75 tanks,64 but the final “political and tactical steps” contributed to precautionary and conducted only to give losses reached 135 tanks and 1,500 casualties, the general deescalation in the region. More- Israel the option of intervening.56 The Israeli according to subsequent interviews with the over, Israel’s readiness to intervene “did not government had not taken steps to ready 40th Brigade commander.65 The Israelis ulti- escape the knowledge of the Syrians and their Israeli public opinion for an intervention in mately assessed that Damascus had lost 120 [Soviet] military and political advisers.”73 Jordan.57 Despite the assurances being given tanks: 60 to 90 damaged by Jordanian attack Kissinger assessed that Israel’s obvious mobi- in Washington, the Embassy subsequently and the rest due to mechanical breakdowns.66 lization and readiness measures and Jordan’s commented that the government of Israel In contrast, Jordan reportedly lost only 16 unexpectedly strong resistance played major “appeared neither to feel its security seri- tanks and an armored car and sustained 112 roles in the Syrian withdrawal. He also criti- ously threatened nor anxious to intervene in casualties.67 cized the Soviets for not playing a helpful role fighting.”58 WSAG members remained concerned during the past few weeks.74 Perhaps also sensing Israeli ambiva- that Damascus might again intervene in the Finally, naval power was probably the lence, the WSAG continued to orchestrate ongoing civil war to create a liberated zone for most visible tool the United States had to pres- the U.S. military response to the crisis and the Palestinians in northern Jordan.68 Talking sure Syria, although it was just one of many ordered DOD to accelerate collection of target points prepared for a WSAG meeting stated levers Washington relied on to buttress King information. It also requested additional that U.S. and Israeli plans for intervention Hussein during the Syrian invasion. The rapid contingency plans: one to deliver equipment were “in good shape.”69 WSAG recommended naval augmentations gave the Sixth Fleet to Israel should it engage the Syrians, and that the United States continue to move tremendous striking power—far more than another to address a breakdown of the Suez additional naval units into the Mediterranean, could be generated by land-based air—within Canal truce while Israeli forces were engaged and on September 25, the National Security days of the decision to generate forces. At a in Jordan. The WSAG also reviewed plans Council recommended that the Sixth Fleet minimum, the augmented fleet might have for coping with a Soviet response to an Israeli retain all augmentees and maintain the been used to deter Soviet intervention in the attack on Syria.59 “present state of advanced readiness.”70 crisis, but it also promised rapid destruction With most of the planning completed, Participants in the crisis attributed of the invasion force if Israel balked or the Jor- Washington promised King Hussein that the Syrian withdrawal to several factors, danian army had not fought so well. JFQ the United States would promptly provide among them changes in Israeli and U.S. materiel assistance. By September 22, both military posture (including the naval surge), DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency had Jordanian military effectiveness, the costs N o t e s developed plans to airlift military equipment and risks to Syria of escalation in what was to 1 Seymour Hersh, The Price of Freedom: Kiss- to Jordan. U.S. European Command also have been a low-risk operation, and pressure inger in the White House (New York: Summit Books, prepared to send U.S. military field hospitals Moscow might have imposed on Damascus. 1983), 234–238. to Jordan within 11 hours of notification. The According to a memorandum that Kissinger 2 Alexander Haig, Inner Circles (New York: airborne brigade in Germany remained on forwarded to the President, King Hussein Warner Books, 1992), 242–243. alert, with one airborne battalion capable of extended his thanks to the United States and 3 Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to arriving in Jordan with only 8 hours warning. the Israelis for “an effective spooking opera- Principals, “Middle East Contingencies,” September Two battalions from the 82d Airborne Divi- tion,” which he felt was a major contribution 9, 1970, Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) sion remained on alert.60 to the Syrian withdrawal. He asked that the Meetings, box H076 (Nixon). 4 The Saratoga and Independence battle United States extend his thanks to Israeli Kissinger memorandum to the President, “Contingency Planning for Jordan,” September groups remained south of Cyprus, along Prime Minister Golda Meir while advising 16, 1970, National Security Council (NSC) Files, with an amphibious force with one battalion that he did not need Israeli assistance.71 Country Files, box 615 (Nixon); telephone confer- landing team embarked. The Navy had Israeli and U.S. participants drew out ence (telcon) between Kissinger and Nixon, Septem- committed a cruiser and 14 destroyers to the similar explanations. Ambassador Rabin cited ber 17, 1970 (Nixon). operation.61 Kennedy and Guam were to enter four reasons for the Syrian withdrawal: 5 Kissinger memorandum to the President, the Mediterranean on September 25 and 26, “Contingency Planning for Jordan,” September 16, respectively. The JCS ordered another tanker ■■ The United States raised its regional 1970. and four destroyers to the Mediterranean to military posture. 6 Ibid. 7 support the Kennedy, and the United States ■■ The Jordanian Arab army fought well. Ibid. 8 Ibid. 166 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MOBLEY 9 Ibid. 33 U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv 210945Z, September Numeric Files, 1970–73, POL 27, box 2056 (National 10 Memorandum from Brigadier General Alex- 21, 1970, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, box Archives, College Park, MD). ander Haig to Richard Helms forwarding “remarks 619 (Nixon). 56 U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv 221525Z, September attributed to the President,” September 19, 1970, 34 Secretary of State 211824Z, September 21, 22, 1970, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, Arab-Isr, Haig Chronological Files, box 972 (Nixon). 1970, NSC Files, Country Files, box 619 (Nixon). POL 27 (National Archives, College Park, MD). 11 Department of State Office of the Historian, 35 U.S. Embassy Amman 211310Z, September 57 Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 21, 1970, NSC Files, Country Files, box 619 (Nixon). “The Situation in Jordan,” September 23, 1970, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian 36 Dishon, 852. WSAG Meeting, box H076 (Nixon). Peninsula, 1969–1972, document 262, “Transcript of 37 Memorandum by Foreign Office Emergency 58 U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv 240920Z, “Military a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon Unit, September 21, 1970, PREM 15/124 (PRO). Sitrep September 17–23,” September 24, 1970. and the President’s Assistant for National Security 38 U.S. Embassy Amman, 211435Z, “Syrian 59 Memorandum from Kissinger to President, Affairs (Kissinger),” available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 167 BOOK REVIEWS The author concludes that advent of “a worldwide economic aries within such states” (p. 166). there is consensus throughout collapse” (p. 150). Although the A brief final chapter is devoted to the community on a number of state of the economy at the end the challenges of defense planning propositions. Concerning threats, of 2008 did not meet the defini- in general. for example, “There will be tion of a worldwide collapse, the As Yogi Berra once put it, “Pre- ideological rivals to democracy, tremors were of sufficient magni- diction is very hard, especially but . . . there will not be a rival tude to prompt one to ask if any about the future.” This aphorism military coalition” to threaten the of the report’s conclusions should applies to this book. But consider- United States in this timeframe be revised on the basis of the new ing the dire predictions made (p. 61). Under military technology, situation. Since this study was during the Cold War, the reader “advanced military technology completed before those events, should be buoyed by the consen- Futures of War: Toward a will continue to become more the true effect is not included in sus that neither strategic nuclear Consensus View of the Future diffuse, [but] . . . if there is a ‘tech- the analysis. war, nor global war against a Security Environment, nological surprise’ innovation, it However, in his prediction of military near-peer, nor even any 2010–2035 is likely it will be developed by the the possible effect of an economic significant alliance against the by Sam J. Tangredi U.S. or [an] ally” (p. 61). The con- collapse, Tangredi notes that there United States is considered likely Newport, RI: Alidade Press, 2008 sensus about opposing strategies is are three potential implications during this period. 274 pp. $19.98 that “the homeland of the United for U.S. defense policy. The first Overall, Tangredi’s book is illu- ISBN: 978–1–4363–1024–6 States will become increasingly is either greater engagement by minating, but one wonders what vulnerable to ‘asymmetric attacks’ U.S. forces in conflict caused by will come of it. Will the consensus Reviewed by . . . and [that] ‘information economic problems around the of opinion on many of these CLARK CAPSHAW warfare’ . . . will become increas- world or the reverse: a move- issues be taken as basis for policy, ingly important” (p. 61). Each of ment in the United States toward or will it disappear through the utures of War is a follow-on these consensus points is exam- neo-isolationism. The second is cracks like so many of the studies work to Sam Tangredi’s ined in detail, with contrary views strained relations with traditional that Tangredi references? JFQ FAll Possible Wars? Toward also identified and explained. allies if the United States or its a Consensus View of the Future It is both encouraging and illu- allies (or both) are in the throes Dr. Clark Capshaw is an engineer Security Environment, 2001–2025 minating that most of the sources of economic collapse. The third and evaluator of aerial intelligence (NDU Press, 2000). Like its agreed on so much. However, implication is pressure for a sub- systems for the U.S. Army Test and predecessor, Futures of War there were some areas where the stantial reduction of the defense Evaluation Command in Alexandria, aims to provide a comparative sources present divergent views. budget. It will be interesting to see Virginia, and an online instructor for analysis of multiple studies of the On the nature of future conflict, if any or all of these predictions the University of Phoenix. future security environment of Tangredi notes the contrast are realized in the current eco- 2010–2035, focusing on points between the propositions that nomic crisis. of consensus and divergence in “globalization, transformation, The penultimate chapter—and these studies. The components of and fourth generation warfare the focus of the book’s efforts—is the future security environment have fundamentally changed dedicated to developing a “con- under consideration include the nature of war” and that “the sensus scenario,” one that is true “oncoming threats to national nature of war is immutable” (p. to the points of agreement and security; future elements that 123). Concerning threats, the view points of divergence addressed will or will not contribute to our that “a near-peer competitor is above. Tangredi does a creditable political, economic, or military inevitable over the long term; we job with this, noting that there strength; trends in relations need to prepare now” is at odds is agreement among almost all between national governments with the belief that “preparing for sources that U.S. military forces and between national govern- a near-peer will create a military need to prepare for contingen- ments and non-state actors; and competition (thus creating a cies such as “high level[s] of The Limits of Power: The End of all other factors that impact the near-peer)” (p. 123). In the area information warfare,” “attempts American Exceptionalism physical security and continued of opposing strategies, the proposi- by a regional competitor or by Andrew J. Bacevich existence of the United States” tion “conventional military force non-state actor to attack the U.S. New York: Metropolitan Books, (p. 11). will not deter terrorism or non- homeland using ‘asymmetrical’ 2008 Tangredi uses the same state threats” conflicts with the means,” “continual diffusion of 206 pp. $24.00 methodology as in his earlier proposition that “U.S. military military technology to potential ISBN–13: 978–0–8050–8815–1 work: that of a meta-study. He capabilities will retain consider- competitors and non-state actors,” surveys future security environ- able deterrence or coercive effects and “involvement in failed states, Reviewed by ment literature published in the against terrorism and non-state SSTR [stability, security, transi- BRYON GREENWALD last decade by both government threats” (p. 124). tion, and reconstruction], and and nongovernment sources. A chapter on “wild cards” humanitarian actions” (p. 165). aving authored, co- He then classifies the position introduces the notion that certain On this last point, Tangredi authored, or edited 10 in each study on a number of world events could have an argues that such “involvement Hprevious books and propositions related to threats, outsized effect on many of the in failing states will become less published nearly 40 major military technology, and oppos- predictions included in the study; discretionary as long as there is articles, Andrew Bacevich is one ing strategies. one of these wild cards is the the potential for terrorist sanctu- of the most prolific and thought- 168 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu provoking commentators on ditional concept of freedom and producer and creditor to being however, saves particular scorn contemporary American defense now imperils the Nation. its leading consumer and debtor, for General Tommy Franks, and security issues. A West Point Bacevich details with devastat- he indicts the American people offering withering analysis of graduate, Vietnam veteran, ing effect the decline of American for their undisciplined pursuit of Franks’ campaigns in Afghanistan cavalry regiment commander power since the end of the Cold material “happiness.” For Bacev- and Iraq and asking rhetorically, during the Persian Gulf War, and War and the simultaneous rise of ich, the current “great recession” is “Does knowing Doug Feith is currently a professor of interna- hubris governing the exercise of proof of the “instant gratification” stupid make Tommy Franks tional relations at Boston Uni- that power. He holds that quite attitude that has paupered the smart?”—a reference to Franks’ versity, Bacevich has long been a paradoxically, in the early 1990s, Nation and taught a generation of now-famous characterization straight shooter when targeting during its self-coronation as the obese schoolchildren (and adults) of the former Undersecretary of the folly of military and political world’s sole remaining super- that hard work, self-sacrifice, Defense as the “stupidest . . . guy leadership. His first book, The power, America ended what some and even the national defense is on the planet.” Pentomic Era (NDU Press, 1986, historians called the “Long Peace” someone else’s responsibility. Bacevich has written an 1995), took aim at the Army of and embarked on an incoherent Bacevich is equally critical of aggressive and provocative yet the 1950s for its ill-conceived series of military interventions America’s political performance eloquent book. Blogs, newspa- pursuit of relevance as part of that presaged the “Long War” since the Great Depression. He pers, and professional journals are President Dwight Eisenhower’s to protect and preserve our self- argues that the Federal republic, full of opinions and judgments, nuclear-tipped, fiscally austere indulgent concept of freedom. as established by the Constitution but none approach The Limits of “New Look” strategy. As aggres- Along the way, he suggests, the with limited and specific powers, Power in their confident concep- sive as he is eloquent, Bacevich Nation drank its own Kool-aid, no longer exists. It has been tualization and organization of continued his critique of Ameri- became punch-drunk on its replaced by a vast centralization knowledge. Military and civilian can foreign and military policy apparent success, and accelerated of power at the Federal level and defense professionals will find in American Empire: The Reali- its descent toward domestic and specifically within the executive much to consider in this small ties and Consequences of U.S. international calamity. branch. Members of Congress, volume. The crises that Bacevich Diplomacy (Harvard, 2002) and Central to Bacevich’s thesis more focused on getting reelected cites are not intractable, but they The New American Militarism: are three self-induced, interlock- than balancing power, abetted will be extremely difficult both to How Americans Are Seduced by ing crises confronting America: this centralization. Equally guilty confront and to solve. JFQ War (Oxford, 2005). an economic and cultural crisis are the unseen courtiers who In The Limits of Power, (what he terms the “crisis of derive their livelihood from this Dr. Bryon Greenwald is a retired Bacevich examines the American profligacy”), a political one, and a centralization—the press, pundits, U.S. Army Colonel and an Assistant cultural, economic, political, military one. In discussing these and “power elite” who cover, pon- Professor of Military Theory and and military performance crises, Bacevich relies heavily on tificate about, and populate the History in the Joint Advanced of the last 50 years and finds the works of theologian Reinhold Federal Government. To Bacev- Warfighting School at the Joint Forces the Nation’s citizens, political Niebuhr, whom he describes as ich, none of this would matter if Staff College. leaders, and soldiers wanting. “the most clear-eyed of American the Federal Government were not He contends that the American prophets.” As a potential model grossly incompetent. reinterpretation of freedom, against which future historians The military crisis involves especially since the 1960s, “has might analyze current U.S. injurious attempts to “reinvent” had a transformative impact on security policy, Bacevich offers war, enlarge the size of the Armed our society and culture.” The Niebuhr’s judgment that every Forces, and continue the doctrine reader is asked to consider a civilization is most pretentious, of “preventive war.” Bacevich series of seemingly simple, yet cocksure, and convinced of its defends the troops, attacks their deceptively complex, questions: own immortality at the moment it civilian and military leadership, “What is freedom today? What is begins to decline. and argues effectively that the its content? What costs does the For Bacevich, the crisis of failure to articulate and imple- exercise of freedom impose? And American profligacy is all too ment a coherent post–Cold War who pays?” (p. 8). In his analysis, obvious. Be it land, wealth, or grand strategy further exacerbates Bacevich believes American material goods, he contends our problems. He offers that a National Security Dilemmas: appetites for and expectations of that the accumulation of more generation of leaders has replaced Challenges and Opportunities “freedom” have grown exponen- has characterized our national the need for a better appreciation by Colin S. Gray tially and today far outstrip the identity more than most Ameri- for war’s limited effectiveness with Washington, DC: Potomac ability of our domestic political cans understand or are willing derivative strategies based either Books, 2009 economy to satisfy them. This to admit. From the Louisiana on specious ideology or military 333 pp. $29.95 situation has led a generation Purchase to the current war operations completely removed ISBN: 978–1–59797–263–5 of self-selected “power elite” to in Iraq, Bacevich argues that from their larger geostrategic pursue a foreign policy of excep- Presidents have adhered almost context. Bacevich correctly Reviewed by tionalism and expansionism that universally to the American desire concludes that the proponents of DOUGLAS PEIFER in its execution looks, feels, and for more while failing to demand “shock and awe” or “net-centric- behaves a lot like the creation of of the people a commensurate ity” confuse the enduring nature olin Gray has analyzed an American empire—an empire level of sacrifice. Citing America’s of war with temporary, often tech- a wide array of strategic whose maintenance, Bacevich transition over the last 40 years nologically determined, changes Cchallenges in the course offers, is antithetical to our tra- from being the world’s leading in the conduct of war. Bacevich, of his distinguished career, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 169 BOOK REVIEWS publishing over 20 books and occasionally “truly gratuitous” “recognizing and understand- a superb overview of how the dozens of articles, and serving mistakes made since 9/11. Rather ing revolutionary changes in concept of RMA emerged, and on myriad committees, com- than dwelling on the past, Gray warfare,” and “irregular warfare more importantly, situates it missions, and panels addressing provides six lessons that may and the American way of war.” within its political, strategic, British and American national be useful in the future. First, Less tightly reasoned and fully economic, technological, and security issues. One constant personality, individual judg- developed are his essays on geographical contexts. Thought- pervades his voluminous schol- ment, and personal relations are “defining and achieving decisive ful, engaging, and supporting his arly output: Clausewitz’s endur- vital ingredients to policy and victory” and “transformation points with ample historical and ing relevance. True to form, in strategy. Gray cautions that the and strategic surprise.” contemporary examples, Gray National Security Dilemmas: George W. Bush administration Gray’s essay on preemptive is at his best in showing how Challenges and Opportunities, was filled with hugely experi- versus preventive war doctrines and why context is important Gray hammers home several enced individuals who nonethe- should be required reading for in assessing military revolu- Clausewitzean themes that he less “suspended their critical those who persist in using these tion, transformation, and other has been emphasizing for years. intelligence” and based strategy terms interchangeably. As Gray concepts. War is a means to a political on hopes and dreams. Second, points out, preemption is uncon- Even the best writers fall end, and one cannot analyze Gray cautions that U.S. leaders troversial, sanctioned by just war short at times, and the chapter warfare in isolation from policy must subordinate their procliv- theory and generally conceded on “defining and achieving and politics. Uncertainty, ity to crusade for democracy, under international law. Preemp- decisive victory” leaves one chance, and friction are inher- freedom, and open markets, tion is based on the knowledge with a nagging sense that ent characteristics of war, and and instead devise strategies that an enemy is about to strike Gray has set up a scarecrow while technology may solve that “fit” foreign cultures. Third or, as formulated by Daniel only to soundly demolish it. certain problems and chal- and fourth, Gray advances the Webster in 1837, is restricted to He attacks the pacifist refrain lenges, new difficulties surely rather unremarkable insights those cases where “the neces- that wars never accomplish will arise. War is a duel of wills, that the U.S. military was not sity of self-defense is instant, anything. Wars decided and strategists must analyze it prepared for counterinsurgency overwhelming, leaving no choice whether Wilhelmine and Nazi in its wider context, to include operations and that stabiliza- of means, and no moment of Germany would control the its social, cultural, and, above tion proved more difficult than deliberation.” Prevention, on the European continent, whether all, political dimensions. anticipated. In the future, the other hand, pertains to military South Vietnam would survive These themes will strike U.S. military must show more action against gathering threats as an independent, noncom- Gray’s admirers as familiar— flexibility and adaptability, be or potential enemy actions. munist country, and whether indeed, even a bit stale. And prepared to combat irregular These definitions are well the Taliban would continue to as a good Clausewitzean, Gray opponents, and train and known, but Gray’s genius is that rule Afghanistan. Yet the more would be the first to admit that equip for stability operations. he moves beyond the liberal- interesting question of defining these persistent themes offer no Fifth, Gray sounds a warning realist-neorealist debates of decisive victory against insur- radically new interpretations of that interstate conflict will not 2002–2003 and instead assesses gents, terrorists, and others is the fundamental relationship disappear so long as power and preventive war on its own merits barely touched. Indeed, from between warfare, politics, and influence shape the interna- as a grand strategy. He notes the perspective of 2009, the strategy. Yet where Gray earns tional environment. Writing that those advocating preventive decisive defeat of the Taliban in his reputation for keen, percep- from a realist perspective, Gray war too often simply assume it 2001 seems less definitive. Eager tive thinking is in his elabora- believes that balance of power is more reliable than deterrence to refute misguided mantras tion of how these verities con- concerns will not fade within without recognizing that it is that war is always useless, Gray tinue to assist in understanding our lifetimes. Gray’s final point nonetheless war, with all the momentarily overemphasizes the current security environ- is perhaps the most provoca- uncertainty, unpredictability, war’s political utility and ment. In eight chapters, Gray tive: the shift to capabilities-led and friction Clausewitz ascribed neglects Clausewitz’ insight that analyzes topics such as defining defense planning, while to it. As a realist, Gray refuses subordination to policy jostles decisive victory, maintaining laudatory in the absence of a to rule out preventive war in with violence, hatred, and effective deterrence, under- dominant threat, was profoundly all cases, but as a strategist and enmity on one hand, and the standing revolutionary change astrategic, resulting in the waste Clausewitzean, he asserts that element of chance on the other, in warfare, and understanding of billions of dollars. “military prevention is not, and thereby making war both politi- the implications of preemp- Chapters 2 through 7 are cannot be, a doctrine, let alone cal and unpredictable. tive and preventive strategies. revisions of U.S. Army War the dominant national security National Security Dilemmas In each essay, Gray combines College Strategic Studies Insti- doctrine.” brings together eight thought- general, enduring insights and tute essays originally published A good many military provoking essays by one of analysis with specific, contem- from 2002 to 2007, and while officers, defense analysts, and today’s leading scholar-strat- porary recommendations. the pressing debates of the day planners may be tempted to skip egists. This eclectic collection Gray’s opening chapter, flavor a number of these essays, Gray’s chapter on revolutionary offers a Clausewitzean, realist written in the fall of 2008, seeks most have withstood the test of changes in warfare, content to examination of security dilem- to avoid assigning blame for time, and all contain nuggets let the concepts of revolutions in mas from deterrence to irregu- the “arguable train wreck that of wisdom. Among the best are military affairs (RMA) and its lar warfare, combining broad is American national security” Gray’s chapters on “the impli- offspring, transformation, retire macro-analysis with specific while conveying realist disap- cations of preemptive versus into oblivion. Yet this would recommendations and critiques. pointment over the serious, preventive war doctrines,” be ill advised. Gray provides This collection should prove 170 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu most useful for those unfamiliar of mystery and speculation. At 345th Separate Paratroop Regi- he ascended as General Secre- with Gray’s work or in search the time, it was seen as a naked ment, 860th Separate Motorized tary. His agenda seems clear in of a convenient, single-volume land grab, the first step through Rifle Regiment, 56th Separate Air retrospect, of course, but Feifer collection of his contributions India, Iran, or Pakistan toward Assault Brigade, 2d Air Defense only infers that Afghanistan to the Strategic Studies Institute the open sea. But the Soviets Brigade, and 34th Composite was a distraction from his larger over the past 7 years. JFQ probably never sought so far- Aviation Corps. On December vision. He does not explore how fetched a notion as a year-round 27, 1979, Soviet forces assaulted Gorbachev linked Afghanistan Dr. Douglas Peifer teaches strategy port on the Indian Ocean. Steve Herat, Bagram, Kabul, and to the larger problems he faced. at the U.S. Air War College. He is a Coll in Ghost Wars wrote that Kandahar. Given such treatment, it may historian by background, with his the invasion intended to shore Special forces and KGB units be easy to forget the scale of the research focusing on the intersection up a friendly but weak commu- had set up in the capital with commitment: 620,000 Soviets between military strategy, politics, nist regime in a country whose orders to decapitate the Amin served in Afghanistan from and culture. ethnic and religious politics the regime and install a replacement, 1979–1989, even though no more Politburo did not understand, Mohammad Taraki. The opera- than 150,000 were deployed at a viewpoint that Feifer shares. tion was badly coordinated. The a time. The official death count Feifer also notes that mutinies by KGB’s botched attempt to poison was 12,833, but Feifer reports the Afghan army, plus a nascent Amin was discovered when a that number may be closer to revolt in Herat, alarmed Soviet Soviet embassy doctor in Kabul 75,000. A staggering 469,685 authorities enough to warrant intervened. No sooner had Amin became ill or wounded, in large an increased stream of weapons, recovered than Soviet spetsnaz measure due to entirely prevent- materiel, and advisors. units stormed the Taj-Bek Palace able dysentery, hepatitis, and But at least as important in outside Kabul, killing Amin typhus. The Soviets lost 118 jets, Afghanistan for the Soviet mind in front of the doctor who had 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1,314 was American regional influ- aided him and his family. armored vehicles, and 11,369 ence. The Islamic Revolution Given daily experience trucks. The Great Gamble: The Soviet in Iran, if anything, increased during the following decade, It would be interesting to War in Afghanistan Politburo concern. After the the unintended nature of the explore the historical context by Gregory Feifer fall of the shah, they reasoned, Soviet adventure becomes more of the commitment. The Soviet New York: Harper, 2009 the Americans would certainly comprehensible. Soldiers lived in military consumed 25 percent 336 pp. $27.99 search for other geopolitical appalling conditions, fought with of the gross domestic product. ISBN–13: 978–0061143182 points of entry in Central Asia to substandard gear, and hunted an Soviet military personnel num- hem in the Soviet Union. enemy they did not understand. bered in the millions, armed Reviewed by Intriguingly, Feifer argues Local markets were well stocked with thousands of combat JAMES THOMAS SNYDER that the Soviets did not intend to with fresh fruits and vegetables, aircraft, helicopters, and tanks. invade and occupy Afghanistan modern electronics, and warm Given the experience of the regory Feifer, a National at all. The historical record, clothes they could not find at Great Patriotic War, during Public Radio correspon- such as exists in the occasionally home. This imbalance—a bizarre which 6.3 million Soviet soldiers Gdent in Moscow, returns murky Soviet archives, reveals inequity for young soldiers of a perished, the Soviet Union to the Soviet trauma in Afghani- nothing resembling a direct superpower to experience in so could have fought indefinitely in stan, just as that country replaces invasion order. There is simply poor a country—quickly cor- Afghanistan. Iraq in the public debate. Once one page of handwritten notes rupted the occupation forces. But Feifer only hints at such thought won and relegated to the from a Politburo meeting of What began as an exchange of context here. Afghanistan was status of a secondary front in the December 12, 1979, where the World War II–era rations for the Soviet Vietnam, we remem- war on terror, Afghanistan—“the critical decision took place. fresh produce escalated to the ber from the time, and Feifer crossroad of empires,” Feifer The document, written by sale of weapons and equipment, insinuates that Iraq is America’s reminds us—has again attracted Konstantin Chernenko—who theft, looting, and murder. The Afghanistan. Then what is the the attention of the United States, was not yet General Secre- systemic inadequacies of the American Afghanistan? Feifer the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- tary—notes only that certain Soviet political and economic most intriguingly evokes, on the nization, and the broader interna- “measures” be taken. Defense system compounded the very last page, the wreckage of tional community. Minister Dmitri Ustinov, a con- immense violence wreaked by European imperialism on the The problems now confronted summate apparatchik without Soviet forces as they seeded the shoals of the 1956 Suez Canal in Afghanistan exist in large part military experience who was country with land mines, carpet adventure. But as with this and due to events set in motion by abetted by a diffuse Soviet bombed, and destroyed whole other historical analogies, Feifer the sudden rise of a communist bureaucracy, in effect executed villages. With such benefactors, does not provide enough depth government in Kabul in 1978. an invasion without an invasion it becomes clear Kabul could for a proper comparison. JFQ Moscow was unprepared for the order. never survive. putsch that brought Hafizullah This may be difficult to If the mystery surrounding James Thomas Snyder is the Amin to power, and his cabal believe, given the scale of the the invasion remains impene- U.S. Information Officer on the appeared to the Soviets even less “limited contingent” that fol- trable, Feifer unfortunately casts International Staff at North Atlantic prepared to exercise control. lowed: elements of the 40th Army, little light on the fateful decision Treaty Organization Headquarters in The motives behind the Soviet including the 108th Motorized to withdraw. Mikhail Gorbachev Brussels. invasion have long been a matter Rifle Division (MRD), 5th MRD, advocated a pullout long before ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 171 BOOK REVIEWS personality and character in the were continually at odds with ences and summits detailed by interplay of the relationships their leading military men, and Roberts. These running con- between these four fiercely Roberts captures that inherent versations certainly did involve strong-willed leaders. The inter- civil-military cultural clash. ends, ways, and means in an action of their biases, animosi- Marshall and Brooke were fear- iterative and interactive process ties, egos, and personalities had less with their masters, whose that impacted policy as much as a huge influence on the conduct explosive tempers and extraordi- strategy. of the war and the strategy that nary sense of duty they matched. Masters and Commanders steered the efforts of American The situation is exacerbated by details this harmonization of and British forces. This, then, what Professor Colin Gray calls ends, ways, and means. Roos- is a history of the relationship the “reciprocal ignorance” of evelt did not merely set policy between “the four chief strate- the two spheres that lacked the and await his commander’s gists of the Western Allies, the perspective, background, and proposals for implementation, Masters and Commanders: quartet of power that ultimately knowledge base to appreciate the nor did Marshall and his acid- How Four Titans Won the War crafted the victories that were to other side. tongued colleague simply accept in the West, 1941–1945 come.” As the principals were Masters and Commanders goals that were beyond realistic by Andrew Roberts not timid and labored under brings out the benefits of candid, attainment with the means New York: HarperCollins, 2009 significant stress, the story is not even hotly debated, dialogue. available. The process can be 674 pp. $35.00 without emotion. The emphasis is on the “dia- one of cooperative engagement if ISBN: 978–0–0612–2857–5 Roberts is the author of a logue” and its product. Roosevelt possible, but if necessary, collab- dozen books, mostly biographies. and Churchill dominated the orative confrontation must occur. Reviewed by In all his work, he has been aims but did not dictate policy, Roberts tells the history of a FRANK G. HOFFMAN careful with details, and Masters and Marshall and Brooke fre- series of confrontations where and Commanders reflects quently challenged them on the the synergy of the collaboration his is not that Patrick the same mastery of archival aims and the restraints placed was superior to the sum of the O’Brian novel about sources, including recently dis- upon means. The Commanders individuals. T British seapower. Rather, covered contemporaneous notes served as a crucial bridge not In his book Modern Strategy, it is a superlative account of the from British officials. Robert’s only to ensure that strategy was Colin Gray noted that “the management of World War II brief biographical sketches are both suitable and appropriate human dimension of strategy is by the West’s two major allies. delightful. Marshall was self- but also to maintain the linkages so basic and obvious that it often The “Masters” are President effacing; Brooke was cold logic between policy and military escapes notice by scholars with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and on the outside and an emotional plans. a theoretical bent.” Kudos to his determined counterpart in wreck on the inside. Marshall History suggests that civil- Andrew Roberts for reminding London, Prime Minister Winston was quietly determined to influ- military relations are not us of this enduring but too often Churchill. The “Commanders” ence Allied strategy, and his mechanistic or about the sub- overlooked dimension of strat- are the respective uniformed sub- remote and seemingly heartless ordination of strategy to policy. egy, and for writing an intricate ordinates of these elected civilian coalition partner was equally The process is a reciprocal one story of the interplay of politics, leaders, General George Mar- bent on preserving his nation’s in which masters and command- policy, and personality. When shall and General Alan Brooke. interests. ers interact in a disciplined and the stakes were high and tempers Crafted by gifted British historian Churchill is covered in detail, comprehensive search for viable were flying, compromise and Andrew Roberts, the book is part warts and all. Roberts concludes solutions. As Eliot Cohen has concerted action were the biography, part strategic history, that “he was a genius, and the properly stressed in Supreme outcome at the end of the day. At and part study of the “clash of madcap schemes he occasionally Command, political and military times, the process was tedious, cultures” that is civil-military came up with were merely the matters are not separate and and it was almost always messy. relations. tiny portion of inevitable detri- distinct spheres of responsibility. But the result was victory. JFQ In The Making of Strategy, tus that floated in the wash of his The roles overlap, as suggested by Williamson Murray, Alvin greatness.” The author fails to Churchill’s famous dictum, “At Frank G. Hoffman is a retired Marine Bernstein, and Macgregor Knox capture the elusiveness of Roos- the summit strategy and policy infantry officer and Deputy Director in noted the important factors that evelt as well as James McGregor are one.” Answers to questions the Office of Program Appraisal at the influence the development of Burns did in The Lion and the generated by the process should Department of the Navy. strategy: geography, history, the Fox, which is absent from the be part of a continuous dialogue, nature of the regime, ideology, bibliography. However, Roberts “a running conversation” at the economics, and the organiza- offsets this deficiency when strategic level. Other scholars tion of government and military recognizing that of the four, such as Hew Strachan have institutions. However, they “the man who most influenced joined with Cohen, conclud- neglected to consider one other the course of the war was the ing that the normative model contingent element: human one who openly acknowledged of Samuel Huntington’s The personality and the interplay of that he knew the least about Soldier and the State “is proving strong-willed allies. grand strategy: Franklin Delano profoundly dysfunctional to the Masters and Commanders is a Roosevelt.” waging of war in the twenty- remedy with particular relevance No one should be surprised first century.” This is borne today. It dissects the roles of that Roosevelt and Churchill out during the many confer- 172 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Designing Exercises for Teaching and Analysis Center for Applied Strategic Learning xercises are designed for purposes to excite and compel participants. They have ences, including in qualitative work common that can generally be collapsed many different functional roles for partici- in political science and sociology, but not into two overarching goals: pants, giving them some representation of always thoroughly discussed in the exercise E teaching or analysis. The goal of the experience of performing those duties, design and evaluation community. Neverthe- teaching is usually to make theoretical lessons the more realistic the better. They accurately less, it is crucial to a defensible analysis. concrete and convey some aspect of the convey the complexity of the real world and An exercise that will be the basis of or demands that a student might face in applying require them to make responses to sudden contribute to an analytical study needs to them. When we use an exercise as an analyti- developments, the more unexpected the incorporate features that allow investigators cal tool, in contrast, we use it as a model that better. The lessons that participants learn and to generalize some findings and explain why represents some real world problem or, better, are to apply to the real world have more to do their conclusions are not contingent on a class of problems and uses participant actions with process than outcome and often simply random scenario detail or quirk of a particu- to generate information about how at least underscore the difficulty of making choices in lar participant. Here, then, parsimony trumps one of the elements of that model impacts the thick of things. detail, and we are more interested in the decisionmaking. In this article, we discuss The more specific and detailed the sce- smallest number of shared factors that might design process and examine the ways in which nario or exercise, however, the more limited be causally related to outcomes and solutions exercise purpose impacts its form, particularly the conclusions that can be extrapolated from to a problem. There is a variety of interest- its scale. Perhaps controversially, we also cast it to other problems or situations. If we are ing work on the ways in which qualitatively doubt on the analytical utility of large-scale conducting an exercise to explore the con- specified games can be used analytically, exercises. tours of some ill-defined future problem, for ranging from being bundled together to vali- instance, it is crucial that we be able to justify date formal mathematical models to serving Design Choices why we reach certain conclusions or how we as mechanisms for aggregating the expert Games successfully used for teaching generalize lessons learned from an exercise. knowledge of participants. purposes appear to incorporate a number of Answering the “How do I know that I know factors. They are rich and detailed enough that?” question is routine in the social sci- Key Differences The elements of good exercise design for teaching and analysis can be somewhat different for the simple reason that the lessons to be learned are different. Analytically, what we learn from tabletop exercises usually has to do with whether the model of the problem U.S. Air Force (Scott T. Sturkol) (Scott T. U.S. Air Force described in the scenario introduces the right independent variables, whether others should be added, how they could be refined and their relative weight, and how differences in them might require different actions and result in different outcomes. Exercises for teaching purposes are rooted in an assumption of the value of experiential learning, that giving participants a visceral feel for the exigencies of policy deci- sionmaking will be an effective way of making theoretical lessons they have learned concrete. For this reason, exercises are frequently used as capstones to courses, particularly at U.S. graduate military education institutes, and a single iteration of them more than suffices for American, Australian, and British airmen work together during Global Mobility Wargame at U.S. Air Force teaching purposes, though problematic for an Expeditionary Center, Fort Dix, New Jersey analytical exercise. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 173 Each year the U.S. graduate military Large exercises encompassing a number something internal to the scenario, preventing colleges collaborate to conduct a joint cam- of crises but only a single iteration are exactly lessons learned. The other way to characterize paign planning exercise called the Joint the opposite of the structures necessary to this tradeoff is one of generalizability versus Land, Aerospace, and Sea Simulation. A doing more analytical work with them. The representativeness. We can, roughly, either multiday, multimove exercise that requires key to discussing conclusions is reproducibility design an exercise that allows us to compare a management team of some 50 faculty and of findings (observing the same thing over the impact of a few important characteristics professionals drawn from across the colleges many iterations of an exercise) and represen- to try and learn something empirically valid and several governmental agencies, it offers tativeness of sample (how similar the partici- about a real world problem. Or we can create over 100 students the opportunity to practice pants are to the population of individuals who an environment so similar to a single real strategic level planning amid several simulta- might be making decisions in the real world). world problem that participants believe they neous unfolding crises, posited to take place are actually making decisions specifically a decade in the future. Participants practice Tradeoffs about it. everything from speaking to the press to Most design choices make some trad- The former approach is important to a playing Cabinet-level officials. Plans are eoffs. As we expand either the number of roles design that allows serious analysis, while the applied, revised, and critiqued at each move of or the amount of scenario detail, the longer latter approach can be a powerful teaching the game. Observing the exercise, we see that the exercise will need to be, both in terms tool, similar to rehearsing a routine, if more an important lesson learned for students is the of moves and total duration—and this is interactive and dynamic, and can teach par- sheer amount of coordination that must occur costly. Designers always make a compromise ticipants important skills such as negotiation, and the extraordinary challenges of doing so, between the details that add real world fidelity the function and impact of different roles, and given all the important stakeholders and deci- to a scenario and layering so many that every how to make decisions in the face of stress and sionmakers and synchronicity of events. choice and outcome is seen as contingent on time limits. The biggest difference between Visit the NDU Press Web site for more NEW information on publications at from NDU Press ndupress.ndu.edu Fighting Chance: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment Edited by Neyla Arnas “a premier effort to think about the future”—Leon Fuerth, George Washington University “a significant addition to the defense foresight literature”—Timothy C. Mack, World Future Society “this valuable volume should alert all of us to the potential sources of strategic surprise”—Casimir A. Yost, Georgetown University The editor has assembled distinguished scholars from a broad range of backgrounds to examine global and regional trends and shocks in six categories: conflict, demographics, economy, environment, culture/iden- tity/governance, and science and technology. Looking insightfully at broad trends, Fighting Chance goes beyond the obvious dangers in order to warn of future perils—and future opportunities. 320 pages; ISBN 978-1-59797-495-0 Available for purchase from Potomac Books, Inc., for $39.95 (use code NDU109 for 25 percent discount). Order at www.potomacbooksinc.com. For organizational bulk orders and discounts, contact Sam Dorrance, Potomac Books, at (703) 996-1028 or email [email protected]. Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations Edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin The United States lacks adequate civilian capacity to conduct complex operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and New Orleans. Such operations require close civil-military planning and cooperation in stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster relief, and irregular warfare and counterin- surgency. Only partial solutions to building civilian capacity have been offered thus far. With contributions from a team of National Defense University experts, this book presents a comprehensive review of all as- pects of this national need. It concludes that current efforts to build sufficient civilian response capacity are unfinished and that the Obama administration needs to dedicate additional resources to complete the task. 326 pages; ISBN 978-0-16-083166-9 Available online at ndupress.ndu.edu. Print copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, at bookstore.gpo.gov, or by call- ing toll free (866) 512-1800. 174 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu exercises for teaching and analytical purposes is that they weigh this tradeoff in opposite directions. There is considerable risk in taking an exercise that has worked well for teach- ing and assuming that will be an effective basis for analysis because these tradeoffs cannot be wished away or blindly ignored. The large-scale exercises that abound in the security policy planning community are often ill suited to the task of analysis, whether for operational planning or strategic policy. For analytical purposes, we certainly need a representative sample of participants and a valid scenario, but, perhaps most importantly, multiple iterations of the exercise. A single iteration may not allow us to conclude much of anything about a problem, let alone its ideal solution, because it generates too small a sample. Historians seldom fail to point out that the wargames run at the Naval War College in Newport during the 1920s and 1930s suc- Introducing NDU Foundation’s cessfully predicted virtually every naval move used in the Pacific during World War II. The key was the sheer number of wargames conducted—some 300 in the interwar period. NetCommunity In contrast, the Millennium Challenge for NDU Alumni, Faculty, and Staff 2002 exercise, a major wargame conducted by U.S. Joint Forces Command to validate The National Defense University Foundation is proud to announce the doctrinal changes, grew quite controversial addition of an online community network to its Web site, after exercise designers found that one set of NDUFoundation.org, exclusively for NDU alumni, faculty, and staff. actions appeared overwhelmingly effective, and adjusted the exercise to minimize those factors. This free service will allow qualified individuals to: Once designers have identified the topic of their qualitatively specified exercise n locate classmates, alumni from all components of NDU, or policy game, they must proceed to make and alumni from the past 30 years who have also regis- some design choices. The goals of the exercise, tered primarily whether for teaching or analytical n explore a growing database of members searchable by year, purposes, will drive design. At this stage, school, or any keyword however, designers will be forced to make n engage in discussion groups and use document sharing inevitable tradeoffs that are best addressed tools forthrightly in the discussion of the lessons n post event information, job opportunities, and other to be learned. The methodology and process alumni-related activities of designing a game for analytical purposes n stay informed about Lifelong Learning opportunities is similar to that of case study research, and offered by NDU. a great deal of flexibility is engendered by the choice to do qualitative research. This choice, however, does not eliminate entirely the need Be a part of what will become one of the most extensive online net- to match methodology to conclusions. A little works of highly trained National Security Professionals of its kind. reflection on the purpose of the exercise yields benefits in terms of identifying the appropri- Visit www.NDUFoundation.org to sign up TODAY! ate form. JFQ For more information, contact: [email protected] or call 202-685-3800 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ 175 doctrine by placing effects into proper Joint Doctrine Update sequence regarding objectives. We will continue to challenge the doc- trine community by ensuring that we are on Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education the leading edge of the integration of lessons learned and identifying the best practices to be and Doctrine Division cited into joint doctrine. Doctrine development and assessment will remain the core focus areas he joint doctrine development information briefing to the planning confer- with the implied task of identifying potential community (JDDC) recently held ence on cyberspace strategic plans and policy subject areas for future inclusion. the 43d Joint Doctrine Planning fundamentals. It presented cyberspace as a Conference. Participants included national security issue, outlined the growth of JPs Revised or Under Review T JP 1–05, Religious Support to Joint Operations the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, the threat, and detailed some of its character- Air Land Sea Application Center, multiple istics. Additionally, it showed how cyberspace JP 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations Service schools, and many international allies. functions converge and are executed through- JP 2–01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint As such, it provided an ideal forum not only to out the interagency community, including Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment synchronize the efforts of the JDDC, but also Title 6 (homeland), 10 (military), 18 (crime), JP 3–0, Joint Operations to launch some of the groundbreaking discus- 44, and 50 (intelligence) responsibilities. The JP 3–02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations sions affecting today’s doctrine. brief listed key cyber-security organizations JP 3–02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for One such discussion centered on the within the Department of Defense, outlined Landing Force Operations JP 3–06, recently completed Joint Doctrine Survey. a military cyber-security organizational Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations JP 3–07, Stability Operations Of note was the survey’s focus on providing construct, and enumerated 12 comprehensive JP 3–07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for a “voice to the customer.” Participation was cyber-security initiatives. Antiterrorism excellent and generated nearly 2,500 responses Directly linked to this discussion is the JP 3–08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and from the combatant commands alone and greater doctrine communities discussion sur- Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint another 4,500 respondents on the Joint Doc- rounding cyberspace operations. Over the past Operations JP 3–09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close trine, Education, and Training Electronic several months, the Joint Staff J5 and J7 have Air Support Information System (JDEIS) Web portal. By been working closely with the JDDC to incor- JP 3–10, Joint Security Operations in Theater comparison, the 2006 survey had only 750 porate cyberspace and cyberspace operations JP 3–13, Information Operations responses total. The survey indicated a tremen- language in joint doctrine. Thus far, both defi- JP 3–13.2, Psychological Operations dous increase in both its perceived value and nitions appear in Joint Publication 1–02, DOD JP 3–13.3, Operations Security usage among the combatant commands and Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JP 3–13.4, Military Deception Service schools. Recently, a proposal to modify the definition of JP 3–14, Space Operations Another important aspect of the plan- cyberspace operations was staffed. JP 3–17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations ning conference is that it is the preferred venue This joint J5 and J7 proposal seeks to JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense for the introduction of new doctrine proposals. properly align the definition with the doctrinal JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency As such, the Joint Staff J65 and U.S. Army “ends, ways, and means” paradigm regard- JP 3–26, Counterterrorism Signal Center provided a decision brief on joint ing effects. Currently, cyberspace operations is JP 3–29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO) defined as the “employment of cyber capabili- JP 3–30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations for the purpose of gaining approval to develop ties where the primary purpose is to achieve JP 3–31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations a discrete JEMSO joint publication. This pro- military objectives or effects in or through JP 3–40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass posal stemmed from a concern that current cyberspace. Such operations include computer Destruction JP 3–52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat joint force thinking on the subject is ad hoc. network operations and activities to operate and Zone It highlighted that lessons learned from Iraq defend the Global Information Grid.” The new JP 3–53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations and Afghanistan have identified significant proposed definition of the term is the “employ- JP 3–61, Public Affairs frequency interference issues, and the plethora ment of cyber capabilities where the primary JP 4–01.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for of electronic warfare systems today have served purpose is to achieve objectives in or through Transportation Terminal Operations only to exacerbate an already complex and cyberspace. Such operations include computer JP 4–03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water JP 4–05, oversaturated electromagnetic operational network operations and activities to operate and Joint Mobilization Planning JP 4–06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations environment. Following the briefing, confer- defend the Global Information Grid.” JP 4–08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational ence participants unanimously approved the This proposal recognizes that the Operations development of a separate JEMSO joint publi- November 10, 2008, definition treats “objec- JP 4–09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution cation and assigned the Army as author. Work tives” and “effects” as synonyms regarding the JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning began in the summer of 2009. outcome of cyberspace operations. Doctrinally, JP 6–0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support in Joint Operations Another topic of great concern through- however, objectives relates to “ends” whereas out the doctrine community is cyberspace. effects relates to “ways.” This proposal brings Looking for the latest in doctrine? Check out The Joint Staff J5 Cyber Division provided an the definition into alignment with broader the JDEIS Web portal at https://jdeis.js.mil 176 JFQ / issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu JFQ Dialogue 2 From the Chairman Inside 5 Open Letter th Issue 55, 4 Quarter 2009 6 Letters to the Editor Forum “A campaign against extremism Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) [email protected] 8 Executive Summary will not succeed with bullets or Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. bombs alone.” Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 10 A New Grand Bargain: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Defense Planning By Thomas G. Mahnken — President Barack Obama March 27, 2009 Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Strategic Drift? The Future of the National War College Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 14 By Janet Breslin-Smith and Cliff Krieger Graphic Design Tara J. Parekh Research Assistant Ashley Harper 21 Developing Strategists: Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy Design Chris Dunham and John Mitrione, By Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook “As President, my greatest responsibility U.S. Government Printing Office Looking for a Challenge? 29 Asia: Facing Interesting Times By Dean Cheng is to protect the American people…We Printed in St. Louis, Missouri Future Gulf War: Weighing Arab and American Forces against by 35 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are in Afghanistan to confront a common Iranian Capabilities By Richard L. Russell enemy that threatens the United States, 41 The State of Play in Russia’s Near Abroad By Peter B. Humphrey Afghanistan. These are non-career Foreign Service our friends and allies, and the people NDU Press is the National Defense University’s SORT-ing out START: Options for U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions cross-component, professional military and 47 of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have academic publishing house. It publishes books, By Stephen J. Cimbala policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and least a Bachelor’s degree and eight years of relevant suffered the most at the hands of special reports on national security strategy, defense violent extremists. So I want the policy, national military strategy, regional security Special Feature experience, four of which must be overseas. affairs, and global strategic problems. American people to understand that 59 Real Acquisition Reform By Jim Cooper and Russell Rumbaugh For more information and to apply, go to we have a clear and focused goal: This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department 66 Integrating CONOPs into the Acquisition Process By John P. Jumper, of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions David A. Deptula, and Harold B. Adams http://www.usaid.gov/careers/fsls.html to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 69 Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process to Support ISR By Del C. Kostka Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever and to prevent their return to either material is quoted from or based on its content. 75 MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform By Christopher J. Lamb, The United States has a long history of extending a Matthew J. Schmidt, and Berit G. 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Canfield Editor, Joint Force Quarterly The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) National Defense University Press 101 Graying Panda, Shrinking Dragon: The Impact of Chinese Demographic works in almost 110 countries around the world to meet 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2505) Changes on Northeast Asian Security By Matt Isler Fort Lesley J. McNair these goals. www.usaid.gov Washington, DC 20319 Commentary Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander Email: [email protected] 104 JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu By Jeffrey B. Jones, Daniel T. Kuehl, Daniel Burgess, and Russell Rochte Energy and Environmental Insecurity By Richard B. Andres 4th Quarter, October 2009 109 ISSN 1070-0692 113 Measure, Manage, Win: The Case for Operational Energy Metrics By Andrew Bochman Issue 55, 4th Quarter 2009 New Journal from NDU Press PRISM JFQ National Defense University (NDU) is pleased to introduce PRISM, a complex operations journal. PRISM will explore, promote, and debate emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in operations in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, coun- terinsurgency, and irregular warfare. PRISM complements Joint Force Quarterly, introduced by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 years ago to similarly advance joint force integration and understanding. PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially those that focus on the nexus of civil-military integration. The journal will be published four times a year both online and in hardcopy. It will debut in December 2009. Manuscripts submitted to PRISM should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words in length and sent via email to [email protected]. Call for Entries for the 2010 Y L R E T R A U Q E C R O F T N I O J Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition Are you a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) stu- process early and avoid the end-of-academic-year rush that dent? Imagine your winning essay in the pages of a future issue typically occurs each spring. JPME colleges are free to run their of Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, imagine a chance to catch own internal competitions to select nominees but must meet the ear of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint these deadlines: Chiefs of Staff on an important national security issue; recogni- tion by peers and monetary prizes await the winners. n April 27, 2010: colleges submit nominated essays to NDU Press for first round of judging. Who’s Eligible: Students at the JPME colleges, schools, and programs, including Service research fellows and international n May 18–19, 2010: final judging and selection of students. winners. What: Research and write an original, unclassified essay in National Defense University Press conducts the compe- one or more of the various categories. May be done in conjunc- titions with the generous support of the NDU Founda- tion with a course writing requirement. Must be selected by tion. For further information, see your college’s essay and submitted through your college. coordinator or go to: When: Essays may be written any time during the 2009–2010 www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_SECDEFEC.htm academic year, but students are encouraged to begin the www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_CSEC.htm ISSUE fifty Strategists and -FIVE, 4 t h JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY quarter 2009 STRATEGY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press > > National Defense University, Washington, DC Acquisition Reform 2009 Essay Winners 1070-0692(200934)55;1-E Joint Force Quarterly