MILITARY Mipb/Mipbhome/Welcome.Htm INTELLIGENCE FEATURES PB 34-01-1 6 the Future of MIPB Volume 27 Number 1 by Michael P

Check us out on the Internet MILITARY http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/ mipb/mipbhome/welcome.htm INTELLIGENCE FEATURES PB 34-01-1 6 The Future of MIPB Volume 27 Number 1 by Michael P. Ley January-September 2001 7 Intelligence Support to TF Falcon’s Peace Enforcement STAFF: Mission Commanding General by Major General Bantz J. Craddock Major General John D. Thomas, Jr. 8 Kosovo: A Year of Intelligence Operations Requirements Development, by Lieutenant Colonel John S. Rovegno Determination and Integration Director 14 Kosovo: Lessons Learned Colonel Charles Atkins by Lieutenant Colonel John S. Rovegno Managing Editor 18 HUMINT Collection During Peace Operations Michael P. Ley by Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary G. Barnett Editor 20 MI Tactical HUMINT Team Operations in Kosovo Elizabeth A. McGovern by Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary G. Barnett Assistant Editors 23 Ground Surveillance Operations: The Nightstalkers of Vitina JoNell M. Elkins Countermortar Operations in Kosovo Second Lieutenant Brandon S. Woll by Captain Robert A. Culp, II (Please see the box on page 65 for a list of the 26 Ground Surveillance Systems Operations in Kosovo contributing editors and proofreaders.) by Captain Frank F. Tank Art Director 29 Electronic Warfare Operations in Kosovo Specialist Ernesto A. Bolanos by First Sergeant David Redmon Assistant Art Directors 33 Building the ACE in Kosovo Staff Sergeant Sharon K. Nieto by Major Donald K. Wood and Major Joan B. Mercier Specialist Robert F. Pierson Private Misty L. Simpkin 37 G2 Operations in Peace Operations by Captain Gregory P. Lisi Administration Specialist Maurice N. Hartley 41 ACT Operations--With U.S. and Allies Private Misty L. Simpkin by Captains Kirk A. Loving, Jason B. McCoy, David P. Payne, Jeffrey Thurnher, and First Lieutenant Melanie Shippitka Cover photograph courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel John S. Rovegno as digitally 44 ACT in Action—In Mitrovica manipulated by Sergeant Richard S. Grimes by Captain Jason B. McCoy Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and 47 Long-Range Surveillance Operations in Kosovo— Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the Mili- Complementing Existing Capabilities tary Intelligence Professional Bulletin quar- by Major Robert L. Chamberlain and First Sergeant Ralph terly under provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB dis- Kluna seminates material designed to enhance 53 Sustained Company Operations: Lessons from the GS MI individuals’ knowledge of past, current, and emerg- Company in Kosovo ing concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional developments in the MI Corps. by Captain Robert A. Culp, II 56 Kosovo: Ancient Battlefield, Ancient Enemies Submissions: Please send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquir- by Lieutenant Colonel John S. Rovegno and Major T. Mitchell ies to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-FDR- Cowen CD, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E- mail to [email protected]; or telephone DEPARTMENTS (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-0979. 2 Vantage Point 67 TSM Notes Subscriptions: Subscription rates are $14.00 per year (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $17.50 4 CSM Forum 69 Hall of Fame per year (Foreign). Send changes of address and 60 Concepts & Doctrine 71 Distance Learning subscriptions (see page 46) to Commander, 64 Proponent Notes Inside Back Cover- Unit Profile— USAIC&FH, ATZS-FDR-CD, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. For further information, telephone 66 Sly Fox 142d MI Battalion (Linguist) (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-0979 or E-mail ATZS- By order of the Secretary of the Army: FDC-D@hua. army.mil. Rates are going up this fall. Official: Disclaimer: This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position JOEL B. HUDSON ERIC K. SHINSEKI and does not change or supersede any informa- Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army tion in other U.S. Army publications. We reserve Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff the right to edit any submitted material. 0110805 by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr. We all understand that the world holds a great deal of uncertainty and this uncertainty has significant implications for the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps. An excellent example of the challenges the 21st century holds for the MI Corps is the mission in Kosovo. Operations in Kosovo included many of the challenges we expect in the small-scale contingency (SSC) operational environment. The task of organizing and executing the Kosovo mission has challenged the MI Corps. Working from a structure more appropriate for the Cold War than an SSC, MI leaders quickly established the necessary organization and capabilities. We need to learn from their experiences. This Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) issue addresses the lessons that many individuals and units learned during these unique times. The sharing of experiences and lessons learned is an im-

portant way to stimulate critical thinking and U.S. Army Photo. the innovation required to meet our challenges. Major General John D. Thomas, Jr. I appreciate the willingness of those involved to share their experiences and perform the hard cess on the battlefield. Intelligence is a critical work to put those experiences in writing. We part of that information; in fact, so critical I think need to do more to encourage this kind of dia- it is fair to say that intelligence, surveillance, and log. Thanks to the authors. reconnaissance (ISR) is the most important com- We need to build on these kinds of experi- ponent of information superiority. ISR is not wholly ences as we move forward in transforming the the responsibility of the MI Corps; rather, many Army. As we begin to understand the future elements conduct reconnaissance and surveil- operational environment through the work of the lance missions, including MI. However, the MI U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Corps must provide leadership in two distinct (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence functions—converting information into intelli- (DCSINT), we had better understand the events gence through analysis and integrating and fo- in operations like Kosovo. Additionally, we gain cusing all available ISR assets. experience through Combat Training Center The Objective Force must also have the capa- rotations. Taken together, this broad baseline bility to provide information and intelligence of experience will help us to successfully shape “down” to the units actually involved in combat. the Interim Force and, consequently, the Ob- These units, operating in the “Red Zone,” need jective Force. The Army’s accomplishments to add ISR to their equation of lethality, surviv- with the Interim Force and the establishment of ability, and mobility to achieve their missions. the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—as outlined Newly available information technology gives the in the last issue of the MIPB—are exciting, but MI Corps the opportunity to provide this intelli- these are only the first steps toward the Objec- gence to combat units. “Integrated intelligence” tive Force. is an opportunity to increase the value of the MI We have learned an important lesson from the Corps, and it will truly allow information to be- Army’s initial efforts with the Objective Force— come an element of combat power. information is critical to the success The Objective Force is an opportunity to con- of the Objective Force Commanders. FM 3-0, tinue the integration of MI as a part of the com- Operations, clearly explains that information bined arms team, but it is an opportunity with is an element of combat power, and the correct challenges. There will be significant change use of information in increasing the knowledge as we move to the Objective Force; things will of the combat commander is critical to suc- not remain the same. Resistance to change

2 Military Intelligence is inevitable; however, the MI Corps will be critical to me every day. The soldiers of the active Army, U.S. Army the Army transformation. We must embrace this Reserve, and U.S. Army National Guard, as well as our change and actively participate in it. Sharing our ex- Army civilians and supporting contractors, are truly our periences through MIPB and other professional mili- greatest assets. As General Dennis J. Reimer would tary journals is an important part of the intellectual put it, “they are our credentials.” In every unit or location element of the transformation process. Think, write, I visited, the professionalism, dedication, and innovation and share your professional knowledge. With all of demonstrated by our folks is awesome. There really is us participating, I am confident that MI will make a no mission too tough, no challenge too difficult for the major contribution to the Objective Force vision of See personnel of the MI Corps. As the Army moves to the First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Deci- Objective Force we will need all the talent and dedica- sively! tion that our folks demonstrate daily. I look forward to This is my last issue of the MIPB as Chief of Mili- joining our retirees who provide such great support to tary Intelligence. By the time you read this issue, I our Corps and hope that I can continue to contribute to will have changed command and begun my transition the Military Intelligence Corps. I am confident as our into retirement. It has truly been a privilege to serve Army transforms into the Objective Force we will remain— for the last three years as the fifth Chief of MI. The great people associated with MI continue to impress ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

MI Corps Hall of Fame

The Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame (HOF) recognizes those individuals who have made a lasting contribution to the MI Corps or have distinguished themselves as intelligence professionals. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or professional civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination for induction into the Military Intelligence Corps HOF. Nominations for HOF must be for individuals only; the MI Corps will not consider unit or group nominations for induction. Furthermore, individuals cannot nominate themselves, and nominees cannot be current U.S. Government employees in an intelligence role. An individual who has retired from military service but continues to serve as a U.S. Government civilian in any intelligence capacity is precluded from consideration until retirement from all forms of federal intelligence service. The exclusion from nomination includes temporary retirees, medical or otherwise, and members of the Active Reserve or National Guard until transition to permanent inactive or retired status. Although nominees must have served with Army Intelligence in some capacity, the supporting justification for their nominations may include accomplishment from any portion of their careers, not merely their periods of service in Army intelligence. For example, a noncommissioned officer (NCO) who served in Army MI and then, after retirement, joined the Defense Intelligence Agency as a civilian, is eligible for the Hall of Fame by virtue of his or her Army service. However, the justification may include achievements from both the military and civilian careers, even though the civilian intelligence service was not with an Army unit. Each Hall of Fame nomination packet must include the following: ✹ A nomination letter signed by the nominator that includes his or her current postal and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers. ✹ The full name and official rank or grade of the nominee at the time of departure, retirement, or death. ✹ A career biography, to include the crucial assignments and accomplishments of the warrant induction into the HOF. ✹ A narrative justification specifically stating the major accomplishments and achievements of the nominee and his or her impact on the Army and MI. ✹ The current address, E-mail, and telephone number of the nominee (if living), or the address and telephone number of a surviving family member. ✹ The nominee’s Social Security Number/Service Number. ✹ An 8” x 10” photograph of the nominee, if possible. If an 8” x 10” is not available, any photo that clearly shows the nominee is acceptable. Nomination packets must be complete. Any nomination packet received without the first four items above will not go before the Selection Board until receipt of the missing item(s). The HOF Action Officer will review all packets and, if needed, will ask the nominator to provide more information in order to assure the nominee receives the fullest consideration by the Selection Board. Send your nominations to Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CDR (Jim Chambers), Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-6000, or by E-mail to [email protected]. The HOF telephone numbers are commercial (520) 533-1178 and DSN 821-1178. HOF will notify the nominators of the receipt of their packets and the date of the next Selection Board, as well as update them on the packet’s strength, completeness, and the results of the Selection Board.

January-September 2001 3 by Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich

The first thing I would like to say as your new command sergeant major is to bid a fond farewell to CSM Scott C. Chunn, a great Military Intelligence (MI) warrior. His many distinct contributions to the MI Corps the last three years will continue to have an impact on our Corps through the transformation process. I am delighted to introduce myself as your new MI Corps Command Sergeant Major and to share my view of the MI Corps’ future. Until my recent selection as your CSM, I served in troop units both in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS

(OCONUS), most recently as a brigade U.S. Army Photo. CSM. Throughout my career, I have had both Command Sergeant Major a personal and professional desire to serve Lawrence J. Haubrich at the center of the MI community, but hon- estly believed an assignment to Fort Huachuca would come as an instructor, a I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I first sergeant, or a battalion CSM. That said, will support and defend the Consti- I feel honored to serve as your CSM. tution of the United States against Values all enemies, foreign and domestic; I believe in “Duty, Honor, and Country” and that I will bear true faith and alle- that this belief will propel our Army and giance to the same; and that I will Corps forward into the 21st century. Our obey the orders of the President of soldiers embody the Army values: Loyalty, the United States and the orders of Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, In- the officers appointed over me, ac- tegrity, and Personal Courage. Our funda- cording to regulations and the Uni- mental values are those we as soldiers live form Code of Military Justice. So and die by. It would be an impossible task help me God. to choose which of the Army values is the most crucial; I would say all seven share equal importance for they all make soldiers We MI professionals working in the Army have what they are today. My top priority is to all sworn or affirmed to this or a similar oath. We lead, develop, and care for our soldiers and all are volunteers and during this transformation, their families as well as to have a positive we will continue to shape this Army and our Corps influence on everyone with whom I come in to remain the best in the world. contact. We in our Army and Corps have two basic responsibilities: the mission and The 21st Century MI Corps the welfare of our troops. I support the Ser- At no time in my career has the future of the MI geant Major of the Army in guiding our Army Corps or its place in our Army been more impor- back to the basics—we have to get back to tant or clear. Our clearly defined path is the on- traditions, customs, and courtesies, and I going Army Transformation: developing a force would encourage you all to read and have that is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, our soldiers read our oath of enlistment. lethal, survivable, and sustainable. The Army’s

4 Military Intelligence transformation goal will ensure the Army fulfills its stra- ! All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). tegic responsibilities, continuously meeting the require- ! Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). ments of the National Military Strategy. To this end, the Army will meet its goal through continued focus in three ! Couterintelligence/Human Intelligence Automation areas: people, readiness, and transformation. Tool Set (CHATS). People. MI’s investment in the Army is in its soldiers ! Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS). and civilian workforce, contractors, and surrounding com- ! Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System munities. MI soldiers span the spectrum from the Active (Joint STARS). Component through the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. They serve worldwide, providing intelli- ! Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT). gence to tactical-, operational-, strategic-, and national- ! Prophet. level commands. We work with the best and brightest Each product improvement to our crucial systems, soldiers our Army has ever known. They are intelligent, combined with new technologies, will allow MI soldiers highly skilled, motivated, and fiercely loyal to our na- to provide the decisive indicators that focus our Army tion. Family members, communities, local employees, for success. and dedicated contractors all support MI soldiers. Final Thoughts Readiness. Our MI Corps and community stand ready to support both warfighters and decision-makers at all I am very excited to be your CSM during the historic levels. Throughout the world, our soldiers are in place changes that will occur with the Army’s transformation. and contributing to the readiness of our Army. From MI is poised for success because of you and soldiers Korea, Southwest Asia, the Balkans, Colombia, and like you. However, as much as the Army transforms, it elsewhere throughout the world, our nation’s readiness remains the same—it stays the same in the sense that is stressed by the complications of terrorism, weapons the individual remains the crucial element of our suc- of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, and organized cess. The key to success with soldiers remains the crime, to name just a few. The MI Corps is at a high same: take care of soldiers, set and enforce tough de- state of readiness, whether it is the MI National Guard manding standards, treat each soldier with dignity and battalion providing intelligence support to Task Force respect, and support and defend the Constitution of the Eagle in Bosnia, the MI soldier serving in Korea, those United States of America against all enemies, foreign serving with joint or combined commands, our MI sol- and domestic. diers providing intelligence to national-level agencies, We are a great institution, a great army, and a great or those serving in CONUS or OCONUS, in both Active corps. Let us take care of each other and our families. and Reserve status. You train hard, you die hard; you train easy and die Transformation. The transformation process is mov- easy. Peace needs protection. ing our Army and Corps forward into the 21st century; it relies solidly on MI soldiers to enable a survivable and ALWAYS OUT FRONT! lethal force. Essential to transformation is the current Legacy Force, which sustains our Army and stands ready to fight and win our nation’s wars. Next is our new Interim Force with the initial and interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs). Fundamental to the IBCT is a new MI force structure, ready to employ and respond to Attention NCOs immediate operational needs and enable the strategic deterrence that will provide the National Command Au- Send us your articles and book reviews. If you thority with real and viable options. These MI soldiers have any experience you can share on MI doc- will move forward with the Army to become the Objec- trine, professional development, or “how-to” tips, tive Force, enriched by new and enhanced intelligence please send them to Military Intelligence Pro- systems better capable of contributing fast-paced in- fessional Bulletin. Topics of interest for future is- telligence and analysis to crucial commands at the right sues include: analysis, global conflicts, MI skills time. The Army’s science and technology programs, training, and tactical operations. E-mail them to supported by our Army civilians, acquisition program [email protected] or call (520) 538-1005/6 or managers, and industry representatives will both sus- DSN 879-1005/6. tain and improve C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems such as—

January-September 2001 5 The Future of MIPB

If you are a subscriber to MIPB or a field unit, you should have recently received a letter that apologizes for the delays and discusses the crisis management plan mentioned below. A recent assessment of the causes for the unacceptable and significant delays in publishing this and the last few issues of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) have resulted in the development of an aggressive plan to correct the problems. We are moving swiftly to get MIPB back on track. The plan includes aggressive measures to publish the October – December 2000 issue featuring Army Transformation on 14 August 2001, the January – September 2001 issue featuring Kosovo Forces on 31 August 2001, and the October – December 2001 issue featuring the Combat Training Centers and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield on 31 October 2001. These publication dates reflect the day the printer-contractor will be contractually responsible to mail the issue. The publication of these three issues, the introduction of more streamlined procedures, and the adoption of a more disciplined production process, will ensure we publish future issues of MIPB on time.

As another result of this assessment, our senior leadership has given the Doctrine Division, Combat Developments, the mission of improving MIPB in the near future. The mission of MIPB is to enhance professional development and to serve as a forum for discussing intelligence doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). This is a two-way forum that we must manage from our end and that you must participate in from your end. The dialogue allows us to discuss and evaluate TTP that we can add to our current field manuals (FMs) or to capture in some other type of document (like an initiative we hope to conduct on web-based field observations). We do not plan any radical departure from the course MIPB has been on in the past. However, we will take steps to better integrate doctrine, TTP, and other areas like force structure into MIPB and use MIPB input to affect these areas.

We plan to make some incremental changes in the future to improve MIPB. Additionally, we look forward to your support. Page 72 has a portion that discusses how you can submit articles to MIPB. The quality of MIPB directly reflects the input we receive from you—the intelligence community. MIPB needs you to submit feature articles, to provide feedback through letters to the editor or other corre- spondence, and to participate in the MIPB book review program.

Again, I want to assure all subscribers that, although we did not produce four issues of MIPB in calendar year 2001, you will eventually get four issues for your yearly subscription. I appreciate your patience and understanding as we overcome this challenge.

Michael P. Ley Managing Editor, MIPB

6 Military Intelligence tional relationships in our assigned operating area. As always, our strength was our soldiers. Their re- sourcefulness, ingenuity, and mental agility were the reason we were successful. I am very proud of the contributions the Task Force 101 MI team made to this division and to the Military Intelligence community. They were instrumental in helping create and maintain the peace in Kosovo. Their accomplishments will continue to shape and influence emerging doctrine and their lessons learned will IntelligenceIntelligence SupportSupport totoTF TF Falcon’sFalcon’s PeacePeace help the Army operate better in future peace operations.✹ Enforcement Mission Commissioned an Armor officer upon graduation from West Virginia Univer- sity, Major General John Craddock has by Major General true across the breadth of operations, excelled in a number of command and Bantz J. Craddock from the team or squad leader who staff positions including materiel design and testing, strategy, and policy “Big Red One” Military Intelligence had to know who operated in the blocks around his position to the development. He commanded the 4th soldiers deployed twice during the Battalion, 64th Armor, 24th Infantry Di- Task Force Commander constantly last five years to conduct peace vision (Mechanized) for 26 months, de- enforcement entry operations into the dealing with the nuances of multiple ploying with the Division to Operations Balkans. The first deployment was interests, hidden agendas, and tenu- DESERT SHIELD and DESERT in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and ous and shifting alliances. STORM and commanded the 194th the second to Kosovo in 1999. When In the following articles, soldiers Separate Armored Brigade (SAB). As combined with operations in from the 101st Military Intelligence the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) of the 1st Infantry Division, Battalion—teamed with soldiers and Macedonia, elements of the 101st MG Craddock became the first Com- MI Battalion remained in the Balkans civilians from our Army and national mander of U.S. Forces, Kosovo (Task for 45 continuous months. The intelligence organizations—examine Force Falcon), deploying the initial TF Division’s entry into Kosovo differed how they confronted these chal- into Kosovo in June 1999. He became significantly from the entry into lenges and accomplished their commander of 7th Army Training Bosnia in two important areas: we unique missions. Using existing doc- Command in August 1999 and as- entered Kosovo with a reinforced bri- trine as a guide, they rapidly and ef- sumed command of the 1st Infantry gade instead of a division, and we fectively developed new procedures Division in September 2000. In addi- knew very little about the operational and structures to collect and ana- tion to his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science, he earned a Master lyze intelligence information to sup- area and the situation. These chal- of Military Arts and Science degree. lenges stretched our doctrine and port commanders and leaders on the forced us to rethink what we thought ground in Kosovo. we knew and had validated. This was To meet these unique demands, Read Any Good Books Lately? especially true for our intelligence op- we modified the Intelligence battle- We welcome reviews of books re- erations and structure. field operating system (BOS) from lated to intelligence professional de- Kosovo proved to be an environ- top to bottom. Modifications ranged velopment or military history. Please ment in which intelligence truly drove from task organizing human intelli- mail or E-mail your book reviews to operations—operations and intelligence (HUMINT) teams, to support- [email protected] gence became one. Commanders ing multiple allied commanders with or mail them to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort and leaders on the ground, at all lev- analysis and control teams (ACTs), Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CD els, depended on intelligence to and developing custom analytical (McGovern), Fort Huachuca, AZ shape their operations and define tools to assess the extremely com- 85613-6000. their tactical objectives. This was plex personal, familial, and institu-

January-September 2001 7 TF 101 MI :

tain a mission of this magnitude for by Lieutenant Colonel John S. oped future tactics, techniques, and twelve months. If we try to do so, Rovegno procedures (TTP). It outlines some of the significant accomplishments we cannot provide the commander On 9 June 1999, Lieutenant General and shortfalls and explains how we with the quality of intelligence that Sir Michael Jackson, with represen- built the team and conducted opera- we, as a community, owe to both tatives of the Federal Republic of Yu- tions. him and the soldiers on patrol. That goslavia (FRY) signed the Military said, you go to war with what you Technical Agreement dictating the Building the Team have. The 101st MI Battalion was at withdrawal of FRY forces from The initial entry force deployed on 68-percent strength, the lowest of Kosovo. On that day, the 101st Mili- short notice, tactically configured for any battalion in the division and was tary Intelligence Battalion—already a difficult fight. We conducted a sec- the only battalion to execute the split between Würzburg and ond, compressed, mission analysis Kosovo mission for a full year. Ma- Hohenfels, Germany—task orga- while reconfiguring our sparse re- jor General (now Lieutenant General) nized to support the 1st Infantry Di- sources to provide the best mix of John Abizaid’s intent was very clear vision in a forced entry operation intelligence support for our evolving when he said “There is no one in against a prepared defense through and expanding mission. the division more important than the the Kacanic defile into Kosovo. Less The 101st MI Battalion provided the soldier on patrol in Kosovo in the than 72 hours later, after load-out, headquarters and the bulk of the in- middle of the night.” He further fo- marshalling, convoying to Ram- telligence collection and analysis for cused us with his “3 FARs” (special stein, and arrival in Macedonia, lead MNB-E and TF Falcon for the first common sense rules) (see Figure elements of the 101st MI Battalion year of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) 2). We, the intelligence community, entered Kosovo Province with Mul- mission. A divisional MI battalion violated rule number three; we could tinational Brigade–East (MNB-E) on does not have the resources to sus- have done more. We could have pro- a peace enforcement mission (see Figure 1). Initial entry operations are hard. Leposavic You do not have the experience of a

predecessor on which to build, so Kos ovsk a Zu bi n Mi tro vica Potok you rely on experience from the next Zvecan best thing, the last war. We made Podujevo mistakes as we built our intelligence Vucitrn Istok structure in this war-torn region, but SRBICA PEC Obilic we accomplished the mission and Pristina Kosovo Glo go vac Polje Kosovska Kamenica Novo Brdo forged the way for others to follow. Klina Decani We also applied our lessons Lipljan Gn jliane

learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Orah ovac Suva Stimlje Reka especially those of human intelli- Djakovica Urosevac gence (HUMINT) operations and dis- Vitina

Strpce rupting insurgent operations. Kacanik

Lessons learned from Bosnia pro- PRIZREN vided the Task Force (TF) with a critical edge in conducting operations.

This article, introduces several oth- Go ra ers on Kosovo operations, written by great soldiers, telling how they accomplished the mission and devel- Figure 1. Sectors of the NATO Kosovo Force.

8 Military Intelligence While we were designing the orga- vided the soldiers on patrol with bet- HUMINT collection positions. Using nization, we deployed. ter capabilities and a better mix of all available personnel, we filled 75 intelligence soldiers to support the percent of the austere organization, Crossing the Line of mission. Figure 3 highlights the chal- accepting risk in reduced command Departure lenges we encountered, and shows 2 and control (C ), administrative, lo- On 12 June 1999, Alpha Company, what measures we took to overcome gistics, maintenance, and battle staff 101st MI Battalion, crossed from them. functions. Throughout the first rota- Macedonia into the Kosovo province ! Don’t get complacent. tion, we had no platoon leaders, pla- tactically configured for combat op- ! Don’t underestimate your toon sergeants or executive officers, erations. They moved up the enemy. and the staff consisted of a first lieu- Kacanic defile, which the Serbian ! Never place American soldiers tenant as the S3 and a sergeant as Army had heavily defended just 48 in harm’s way without being the S1. hours earlier. The next day, A/101 able to mass the full weight of The Division identified several ca- MI occupied a wheat field just east the U.S. Army behind them. pability gaps and requested both of Urosevac, which today is known equipment and personnel augmen- as Camp Bondsteel and three days Figure 2. MG John Abizaid’s tations. Most requests either went later produced their first intelligence Rules for Success. unanswered or continuously re- summary (INTSUM). The G2 and MI Battalion abbrevi- turned for “further staffing.” Our Two weeks later, B/101 MI entered ated the military decisionmaking pro- three most effective solutions Kosovo and moved to Gnjilane where cess (MDMP) and created the most were— they based at Camp Monteith. Ini- austere organization possible to ac- ! Augmenting Battalion S2 shops tially, A/101 controlled the MI gen- complish the mission. We then di- with additional personnel eral support (GS) assets while B/ vided the available “trained” (98Gs). 101 had the direct support (DS) as- personnel into two rotations, which ! Gaining an exception to policy sets. As the theater matured, both left significant gaps. We filled these to both continuous days de- companies assumed GS roles, di- gaps the best we could by cross- ployed and second deploy- viding MNB-E into the North and leveling MOSs. The primary bill pay- ments for soldiers we needed to South Sectors (see Figure 4). Ini- ers were the 98Gs (Signals bring back. tially, Field HUMINT teams from the Intelligence [SIGINT] Analysts) who ! Pulling branch-detailed lieuten- 165th MI Battalion moved from Task filled all of the HUMINT operations ants out of maneuver units to fill Force Hawk in Albania to augment and analysis positions and many vacant platoon leader positions. TF 101 MI. One month later, A Com-

Challenges ! G2 not permitted to deploy—To prevent the appearance of the Division colors forward on a brigade mission, the division primary staff could not deploy forward. ! S2 shops not resourced for peace support operations (PSOs)—The static nature of PSOs and continuous contact with the local populace resulted in far more intelligence reported directly to battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs). ! No one could deploy more than 180 days—Necessitated two rotations, unsupportable by a full strength battalion. ! 101st MI at 68% strength—Exacerbated the personnel-resourcing problem. ! Analysis and Control Element (ACE)—35 assigned/31 needed per rotation—Required significant augmentation with untrained personnel. ! Officers at 100% of Officer Distribution Plan (ODP)—Good news for one rotation, but the mission was two. ! Augmentation slices come without command and control (C2)—Additional teams increase C2 and admininistrative-logistics requirements. Solutions ! Cross-Level Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) ! Augment battalion S2s ! Exception to policy—increase authorized deployment days ! Bring back branch-detail lieutenants

Figure 3. TF Falcon MI’s Challenges and Solutions.

January-September 2001 9 dling and evacuation procedures. Our units detained people for reasons ranging from hostile military operations to rape, murder, speed- ing, and petty theft. We had to seg- regate and evacuate some rapidly; others only needed lectures and release. Between the extremes, the situation was less clear and procedures changed. Compound that with the continuous swap-out of U.S. units and personnel and varying ways of defining the mission by our MNB-E allied units, and one realizes how hard it was to develop standing operating procedures (SOPs). The last and most important challenge was understanding the limitations we faced in conducting interrogations in a peace support Figure 4. Disposition of the Forces Comprising MNB-E. operation (PSO). First, the lawyers needed to define the legal status of each group of people. We were not pany, 519th MI Battalion (Tactical and predictive analyses ever seen at war, and although we captured Exploitation) (Airborne), a compos- in an initial entry operation. The fol- Serbian soldiers, most detainees ite company of soldiers from the A lowing discussion introduces both were civilians. Secondly, command- and B Companies of the 519th, re- the highlights and lessons learned ers had to decide jointly the spatial placed the 165th MI Battalion teams. from our intelligence operations. Additionally, the National Intelli- limits for maneuver units, and how gence Support Team (NIST) from TF Deteinee Questioning. Detainee the UNMIK Police, allied units, mili- Hawk joined our team. questioning was not one of our speci- tary police (MPs), and the criminal fied or implied tasks, but through investigative division (CID) fit into the We now had the basic set with twelve months of operations, we equation. Chief Warrant Officer Three which to begin operations. The next questioned more than 700 detainees Gary Barnett further explains de- section of this article discusses the and screened 1,300. When we ar- tainee operations in his HUMINT types of operations we conducted rived, all the HUMINT Collectors were Collection article (see page 18). while introducing some other articles in Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs). in this issue of the Military Intelli- Tactical HUMINT Operations. Detentions were the responsibility of Our HUMINT and CI soldiers have gence Professional Bulletin the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (MIPB). task organized into “force protection (UNMIK) and responsibility for ques- teams” in the Balkans for the past Conducting Intelligence tioning fell on the UNMIK Police. As five years. Part of the reason for this Operations arrests soared and the number of de- name was to make it easier for the Our intelligence analysis and op- tainees exceeded UNMIK’s holding team members to explain what they erations were huge successes. capability, TF Falcon assumed de- did when conversing with the local Former Major T. Mitchell “Mick” tention, screening, and holding re- populace; another reason was to fo- Cowan and I explain (see page 56) sponsibilities. At first, we pulled cus the soldiers on force protection. how the environment differed from HUMINT Collectors from THTs on a While force protection is important, anything our Army previously expe- case-by-case basis but after the it is a G3 function and with the name rienced, especially when entering capture of the first Serbian Army comes multiple tasks, such as threat such an intelligence void. Despite patrol in the MNB-E sector, interro- vulnerability assessments. It also the difficulties, the soldiers, sailors, gation became one of TF 101 MI’s brings false perceptions of what our airmen, marines, and civilians com- full-time missions. teams should be doing. Force pro- prising TF 101 MI started with a zero In addition to the shortage of tection is defensive in nature—we intelligence baseline, and developed HUMINT Collectors, we faced an on- cannot win wars or accomplish some of the most robust databases going challenge with detainee han- PSOs by withdrawing into a defen-

10 Military Intelligence sive posture, but must rather seize wear of body armor, and alcohol con- As TF Falcon received the Re- the initiative with offensive operations. sumption). Contacts feel more at motely Monitored Battlefield Sen- Hence, we gave it the name “Force ease and mission effectiveness sig- sor System (REMBASS), the 96R Protection from without.” nificantly increases. Generally, each (Ground Surveillance System Op- erator) soldiers recalled their We changed the name of these time a new commanding general prior training. The operators per- teams from “force protection” to (commander) arrives, the MI com- formed magnificently as they “Tactical HUMINT” early in the op- mander and G2 must restate the planned collection and emplaced eration. This simple change made a reasons why teams should have re- sensor strings to monitor military big difference. We were able to fo- laxed standards. Sometimes the movements and smuggling routes cus on intelligence collection in sup- General approves, sometimes not. along the Kosovo–Serbia border. port of our mission to establish a In our case, the first two CGs ap- They later used additional sensors safe and secure environment for the proved, then the third reversed the for perimeter security of small base people of Kosovo. decision. Our mission effectiveness immediately declined as our con- camps near the borders, freeing up Initially we assigned the teams tacts became warier of us. We tried crucial personnel resources for opstinas (counties) as their sectors. all possible explanations like, “the other missions. We later made some adjustments environment is more tense,” but we Finally, they worked hand in hand but still generally kept sectors along never regained the same rapport with with the Canadian Coyote Teams, established government and social new and old contacts. New doctrine using today’s technology in inno- boundaries. Each team comprised must explain how reducing threat- vative ways. Captains Bob Culp a mix of HUMINT Collectors and ening gestures as well as under- and Frank Tank detail all of these counterintelligence (CI) agents. Their standing and adapting to the culture operations in their articles (begin- varied training and skill sets comple- of the people with whom you work ning on page 23). mented each other as they worked significantly enhances HUMINT and with the local populace to accom- Low-Level Voice Intercept CI mission effectiveness. plish their missions. (LLVI) Operations. Our Intercept Ground Surveillance Operations. operators combined new doctrine As we started to work with both Our ground surveillance systems op- and TTP with old, finding innovative higher and adjacent units, intelli- erators conducted operations using ways to cope with the constantly gence sharing became a problem. every skill they knew. Operations evolving signals environment. They KFOR did not have a GS intelligence ranged from DS for maneuver compa- used off-the-shelf equipment, in co- battalion similar to the Allied MI Bat- nies to GS for TF Falcon. They used ordination with organic systems, as talion (AMIB) supporting the Stabili- AN/PPS-5 and/PPS-15 radars, both they developed an employment zation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. mounted and dismounted, to cover strategy that assigned teams to per- Instead, KFOR relied on all contrib- military and civilian movements manent sectors, similar to the uting countries to share information. throughout the sector. They even de- HUMINT team’s deployment. This We never completely solved the veloped strategies to counter the mo- approach gave our operators a situ- sharing problem and probably never bile mortars’ firing missions to harass ational awareness unmatched in will; however, all nations began pro- Serbian people in several towns. any previous operation of the people, ducing releasable, comprehensive daily summaries. Our two most difficult challenges were in replacing teams and gaining approval to operate under reduced force protection requirements. Coordinating HUMINT and CI replacements was the biggest personnel challenge we faced. This issue of MIPB discusses specific problems in the lessons learned article on page 20. Draft doctrine is beginning to address how and when the

team relaxes force protection mea- U.S. Army Photo. sures (for example, the number of Camp Bondsteel’s humble beginnings: The ACE and Task Force vehicles in a convoy, continuous Falcon headquarters in a wheat field in June 1999.

January-September 2001 11 from other than division resources was disturbing. Preparations focused on the FRY Army as the primary ag- gressor. We knew their structure, strengths, weaknesses, and how they fought…but now they were gone. Instead there were the now non-uniformed Serbian “Special Po- lice,” Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK), and armed civilians. In addition to the intelligence void, the division’s extreme personnel shortages hit the ACE very hard. Sig- nals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept

Photo courtesy of author. operators filled the HUMINT and all- Houses burning in Kosovo. source analysis cells. Following a communications nets and nodes, flict for most of our existence. There- steep learning curve, they accom- and communications timelines. They fore, we cannot forecast which lan- plished every task. The HUMINT received authorization to jam com- guage skills to train, although we analysis cell developed the “Kryp- munications nets but never exer- know we will use interpreters in ton HUMINT Database” and fused it cised this capability. Perhaps the most future operations. We must with all-source intelligence to de- most significant event occurred on expand the limited doctrine in this velop a complete picture. They le- 8 February 2000 when the “King of area and develop TTP for how best veraged data from the National Battle”1 fired in DS of intelligence to use interpreters to accomplish the Intelligence Support Team (NIST) collection operations for the first time mission. We must also standardize and the National Imagery and Map- in history. The event, while not sig- our hiring methodology, streamline ping Agency (NIMA) to provide nificant in overall collection volume, our procedures, and determine commanders with outstanding intel- showed the trust of the commander whether we should recruit a base of ligence. Majors Donald Wood and in the Intelligence battlefield oper- interpreters to hold on retainer for Joan Mercier, two of our ACE Chiefs, ating system (BOS) and his will- future operations. explore peace support doctrine and ingness to adjust operations to In our interpreter article, which will how they leveraged the ACE to sup- gain intelligence. It also brought appear in a future issue of MIPB, port our unique mission. (see page the working relationship of Artil- Linda Hajdari and Drita Peresic (who 33). lery and Intelligence even closer entered Kosovo with us in the initial ACT Operations. We clearly have as, in this operation, we reordered entry operation) join me in describ- not standardized how to best sup- 3 field artillery D A doctrine to ing how Task Force 101 used inter- port maneuver commanders with → → → Deliver Detect Assess Decide. preters. We chronicle the procedures analysis and control teams (ACTs), First Sergeant David Redmon details from hiring and training to assign- as evidenced by the number of ar- these operations in his article (see ment and assimilation into opera- ticles recently published on this sub- page 29). tions, as well as recommending ject. MI commanders continue to Interpreters. Kosovo operations improvement and solutions for future develop SOPs and TTP that work for again proved our dependence on lin- operations. them. “ACT Operations—With U.S. guist outsourcing. Intelligence inter- ACE Operations. The Analysis and Allies,” written by four ACT preters—all U.S. citizens with security and Control Element (ACE) pro- Chiefs who accomplished the mis- clearances similar to those of the sol- duced timely, relevant, predictive in- sion in an initial entry peace enforce- diers with whom they worked—pro- telligence for the commander. The ment operation (PEO), provides vided the critical link between our ACE also explained the vast differ- unique insights of how to operate in soldiers and the local population. They ences between Bosnia and Kosovo this environment. learned the language and culture as to the intelligence community. Not Captains Kirk Loving, Jason a part of growing up and possessed only was the environment austere, McCoy, David Payne and Jeff unique insights that are significant the intelligence database was non- Thurnher, and First Lieutenant force multipliers. existent. Initial intelligence reports Melanie Shippitka explain how we Our military has not been able to from “higher” were our own ACE’s established ACTs at our U.S. and predict the location of the next con- reports and this void of information Allied headquarters, what additional

12 Military Intelligence Endnote intelligence and non-intelligence stances of capture and information 1. The “King of Battle” is a commonly used functions they performed, and how known about their individual pris- nickname for Field Artillery. linguists made their tasks easier oners. The diminished sharing re- (see page 41). They outline the im- duced the effectiveness of our Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno portance of knowing all the collec- interrogations and eventually con- has served for more than 20 years as tion capabilities at our disposal and vinced the command to end our an intelligence officer throughout the the need to be ready to perform support of the operation. United States, Europe, and the Middle mobile operations, in or outside their East. His assignments include pla- assigned sectors. They also explain Intelligence soldiers produced sig- toon leader, two company commands, the need to understand the customs, nificant successes during the next S2, the first S2 Observer/Controller at doctrine, and language of the sup- three out-of-sector operations. Our the Combat Maneuver Training Cen- ported unit, and how the specific ACT and FHTs accompanied the ter, Battalion S3 and Executive Officer, Instructor, J2 Operations Officer, and PSO tasks of working with non-gov- 501st Mechanized Battalion (GR) and deployed with the intelligence- G2. While at U.S. Army Central Com- ernment organizations (NGOs), lo- mand, he deployed on several opera- reach analytical power of the ACE. cal organizations, MPs, Civil Affairs, tions including VIGILANT WARRIOR, FHTs, and Special Forces teams We added LLVI to the MI team ac- VIGILANT SENTINEL, DESERT assist in accomplishing our mission. companying the 504th Parachute STRIKE, and RUGGED NAUTILUS. Infantry Regiment (U.S.). The LLVI He joined the 1st Infantry Division in Out-of-Sector Operations. When teams coordinated with the UK LLVI April 1997 as the G2, serving as tensions exploded in Mitrovica, the teams which had the same Mitrovica G2, Task Force Eagle in Bosnia- KFOR commander ordered MNB-E mission. LLVI teams shared both tip- Herzegovina for six months. LTC to reinforce the French forces con- offs and lines of bearing as they Rovegno remained the 1ID G2, work- trolling that sector. TF 101 MI de- found, and never lost, the enemy. ing extensively in Germany and Macedonia until February 1999 when ployed assets into Mitrovica four Finally, when we deployed to sup- times, providing DS first to the he took command of the 101st MI Bat- port the 18th Airborne (PL) Battal- talion and deployed with the battalion French, then to three MNB-E bat- ion, we knew the environment so talions from Greece, Poland, and as part of the Kosovo Initial Entry Force well that we were able to provide in June, remaining in Kosovo just over the United States. In his article on immediate and continuous one year. He is a graduate of the MI page 44, CPT Jason McCoy explains targetable intelligence to the com- Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the challenges in providing intelli- mander. Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Officer gence to both U.S. and allied units Course, Command and General Staff while operating outside our assigned Conclusion College, and the Armed Forces Staff sector. Initial entry operations are hard. College. LTC Rovegno received a Bach- elor of Science degree in Business Ad- Editor’s Note: Readers may also wish They are demanding, personnel in- ministration from Shippensburg to see “Multinational Brigade–East tensive, frustrating, and dangerous. University, Pennsylvania, and a Master ACT Operations in Kosovo: 18th Air- However, no matter the shortages, of Public Administration degree from borne/Air Assault (Poland) ACT” by 1LT drains, demands, and length of de- the University of Missouri. He is currently Mike E. Crane in the July-September ployment, one fact remained stead- attending the War College. Readers can 2000 issue of MIPB. fast—today’s MI soldiers are ready reach him via E-mail at john- The first, and most challenging and able to answer the call.✹ [email protected]. deployment, occurred when we received orders to provide Interroga- JAC/JRISE Needs MI Reservists tion Teams in DS of MNB-N The Joint Analysis Center/Joint Reserve Intelligence Support Element (France). The French took more (JAC/JRISE) located in Atlanta, Georgia, is looking for branch-qualified than 40 detainees during the ini- Military Intelligence officers (35B/D), warrant officers (350B, 350D), and tial clashes between Serbs and Al- enlisted personnel (96B, 96D). Applicants must have a current TS/SCI banians in Mitrovica. They had security clearance and be MOS-qualified. Unit members typically drill at task organized the few interroga- Fort Gillem, Georgia, for IDT, ADT, and AT but also participate in mission tors they had on HUMINT teams work at the Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom and other over- and thus had not done any inter- seas assignments on an as-needed basis. In addition, this unit offers rogations. The inherent national training, challenging work (supporting real-world intelligence missions), sensitivities in sharing intelligence flexible scheduling, and combined IDTs. Interested soldiers should con- quickly complicated the mission. tact SGT Campbell, the JAC JRISE recruitment NCO, at (404) 362- MNB-N was reluctant to provide in- 3151) or DSN 797-3151. telligence concerning the circum-

January-September 2001 13 by Lieutenant Colonel John S. Rovegno General Lessons Learned ✹ Future POs will include coalition partners and constrained ground There is no one more important than elements. the soldier on patrol, in Kosovo, in ✹ the middle of the night. Mission analysis is continuous—we must revisit it often. ✹ Doctrine works, but it needs some revision. —Lieutenant General (then MG) John ✹ We will be hard pressed to use legacy doctrine with the Transfor- Abizaid, former Commander mation force. Task Force Falcon ✹ Communications and bandwidth—we need more everywhere. Initial-entry operations are difficult ✹ Command and control (C2)—start heavy, you will grow to fit it. and those in peace operations ✹ Train, then trust your junior leaders. (POs) are even harder. Harder be- ✹ Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) downlink with a recording capabil- cause we train to fight an enemy ity is critical. organized and arrayed on a defined ✹ Unclassified imagery is necessary. battlefield, but in Kosovo, this was ✹ Field smaller, more capable, intercept and direction-finding (DF) not the case. A combination of systems. Cold War systems do not work. thugs, criminals, radicals, and un- knowns replaced the organized prepare with training and doctrine. both vertically and horizontally, to enemy. The lessons we learned Second, because most of the mili- leverage agencies outside the area may represent the future of war and tary forces of our allies are so thin- of operations, and to support com- peace. The battlefield and the en- spread, we will operate with a manders within the sector. emy of the future will probably be small, constrained ground element. Do not underestimate C2. Suc- like the situation in Kosovo, asym- Mission analysis is a continuous cess in POs is very dependent on metrical and undefined. This article process; you must revisit it often. large quantities of intelligence takes a critical look at how the Mission requirements drive your about multiple people, organiza- Military Intelligence (MI) Corps and troop-to-task analysis, determining tions, and factions. We are usu- Task Force (TF) 101 trained, de- the right forces for the mission. We ally on the ground before we ployed, operated, and redeployed. were prepared for a forced entry, convince military planners and It addresses what we did and what but then reorganized available commanders of the need for more we of the Intelligence battlefield forces to accomplish the new mis- collection capability. Prepare be- operating system (BOS), could sion. This was an obvious mission fore you deploy for the re- have done better to support the change. Less obvious were the quirements associated with coor- commander and the soldiers on continual changes in organizations dination, receipt, and execution of patrol. threatening mission accomplish- increased missions and resources. We learned many lessons during ment, local leadership, and tech- Junior leaders in POs make de- our twelve months in Kosovo; some nological advances, as the region cisions with strategic implications were new and some, unfortunately, recovered from war. every day. They operate in small were not. I will not repeat the op- Doctrine, lessons learned, and teams, interacting with critical fac- erational lessons described by the the tactical training program, de- tion leaders, and the media moni- other authors in this magazine, but veloped in prior operations, work tors them continuously. Clearly will focus on overall lessons (see well. The answers concerning the articulate goals, objectives, direc- figure), particularly lessons con- proper conduct of operations are tion, and rules of engagement so cerning training, personnel, and out there. The challenge is finding they have the information neces- equipment issues. the time to read these documents. sary to make the right decisions. Learned in Kosovo The MI community depends on UAVs are ideally suited for POs; Kosovo reflects two aspects of stable communications and an their images are often the “smok- POs we can expect to see in the ever-increasing need for more ing gun” we need to prove guilt or future. First, we will operate in a bandwidth. We must prepare early quell tensions during or after inci- coalition environment and must to move large quantities of data dents. Use other imaging capabili-

14 Military Intelligence ties like portable cameras, Apache we deployed far more intelligence guntapes, or Coyote camera tapes capability for this brigade than is in the same way. Once you dem- organic to a division. TF Falcon onstrate the capability, you have needed a G2 with division- or TF- the upper hand. level experience to direct intelli- Unclassified overhead imagery is gence. Instead of canvassing the a significant force multiplier. A large Army for talent, United States percentage of operations occur in Army, Europe (USAREUR) was urban areas, and the best planning forced to look internally. We saw and C2 tool is a picture. Given that four G2s in the first ten months and we will conduct primarily coalition still had no clear direction for the operations, we need to provide pic- Intelligence BOS. We are mea- tures printed in large format to both sured by the capability and qual- U.S. and allied leaders. As in ity of our leaders. In the future, the Photo by LTC John Rovegno. Photo by LTC Bosnia-Herzegovina, the enemy op- MI Corps needs to look at all of erated the most modern, small, our talent, build a qualified G2 pool Guard shack entrance to TF 101 handheld communications. We from which to select, and let the MI TOC and ACE. could neither intercept nor DF them. commander decide. orders passed rating authority Placing the burden of resourcing and Uniform Code of Military Personnel an operation of this magnitude on Justice (UCMJ) authority. Sol- We go to war the way we are in a tables of organization and equip- diers earned varying amounts garrison. Tactical MI units in the ment (TOE) unit, and allowing sup- of per diem pay and stayed legacy force do not have the per- porting units to decide how and varying amounts of time. Gen- sonnel in sufficient quantity or spe- when to provide replacements erally, the units cutting orders cialty to accomplish peace-support separates the intelligence effort were trying to take care of missions. TF 101 MI was at 68- and reduces mission effectiveness. “their” soldiers, while they un- percent strength when we de- This uncoordinated effort caused intentionally hurt other sol- ployed. My main intent in showing many problems including: diers. our personnel challenges is to help readers understand our decisions ! Fifty percent of intelligence sol- MI should be able to manage indi- and to show that we need better diers worked outside their mili- vidual replacements centrally. Look- Armywide management of intelli- tary occupational specialties ing at soldiers available Armywide, gence personnel during POs. One (MOSs). Untrained soldiers we could fill most of the authorized can accomplish this by— filled critical analytical posi- slots with qualified soldiers. We saw tions when Army inventory had similar problems when trying to syn- ! Selecting an experienced G2. trained soldiers. chronize unit and team rotations. ! Centrally managing individual ! Sixty MI soldiers deployed for Teams should be able to arrive pre- replacements. more than 270 days although pared to begin operations. Synchro- ! Synchronizing unit and team the Joint Chiefs of Staff order nization requires direct coordination rotations. limited individual deployments between supporting and supported The G2’s role in a PO is even more to 180 days. commanders. The operational com- crucial than during high-intensity ! TF 101 MI experienced seven- mander did not have direct liaison conflict operations. The “bad percent turnover per week. authority for the first human intelli- guys”—any person or organization With reduced C2 and a volatile gence (HUMINT) team transition. dedicated to disrupting our ability mission, this extremely high This denial resulted in reduced in- to accomplish our mission—are turnover unnecessarily created telligence capability for the com- not obvious. The G2 needs to find continuous turmoil. mander and increased turmoil for the this elusive enemy before we can ! Inconsistent assignment or- soldiers on duty. TF Falcon re- plan operations. Politics kept our ders. Soldiers in nearly all TF quested the simultaneous arrival of Division G2 from ever reaching Falcon units arrived on tempo- five trained, equipped, and task-or- Kosovo. Kosovo Force was a bri- rary change of station (TCS) ganized tactical HUMINT Teams gade mission; therefore, the divi- orders. MI organizations sent (two HUMINT collectors and two sion primary staff worked from the soldiers in assigned, attached, counterintelligence [CI] agents) for periphery. However, a General Of- operational control, temporary a mission rehearsal exercise. We ficer commanded the Brigade and duty, and TCS status; not all received—

January-September 2001 15 ! One HUMINT collector team ! Increase flexibility in fielding our HUMINT teams out of contact and four CI teams. plans. for a week to train on CHATS. ! Four separate arrivals over a ! Cross-level equipment to While the fielding team maintained five-week period. forces in contact. outstanding flexibility, our soldiers ! Fifty percent of soldiers arrived ! Leverage commercial off-the- never received the focused train- lacking the mandatory training. shelf (COTS) equipment. ing that they deserved. The CHATS ! One team with weapons we ! Field a NightStalker-Coyote- brought a better capability to parse could not maintain. type ground surveillance sys- into the All-Source Analysis Sys- ! One team without weapons. tem. tem (ASAS), but our systems and ! Teams had insufficient radios, Inflexible fielding plans delayed databases were in place without vehicles, night-vision goggles, deployment of both the CI/HUMINT ASAS. Similarly, we requested and Precision Lightweight Glo- Automation Tool Set (CHATS) AN/ PRD-13(V2)s as an out-of-cycle bal Positioning System Receiv- PYQ-3(V2) and AN/PRD-13(V2)s. fielding in May 1999. Twelve ers (PLGRs). TF 101 MI was scheduled to re- months later, after numerous receive new equipment fielding of quests from the TF Falcon Equipment CHATS in summer 1999. With the Commanding General, the PRD- Task Force 101 MI deployed impending deployment, we re- 13(V2)s arrived. Early fielding of with legacy systems designed for quested early fielding and training. CHATS and PRD-13(V2) would a major theater of war. Every re- After several unsuccessful at- have significantly increased both quest for systems with better ca- tempts over the next four months our HUMINT and signals intelli- pabilities met with roadblocks by 1ID to gain approval for early gence (SIGINT) capabilities. and delays. Individuals went out fielding, we deployed into the com- Other equipment available in the of their way to help, but in many bat zone with the less capable system but not organic to TF 101 cases, they were not able to over- Theater Rapid Response Intelli- MI could have also enhanced our come the bureaucratic hurdles. gence Package (TRRIP) systems. mission effectiveness. After hear- When our systems are unable to Two months after we arrived in ing of our difficulty acquiring the do the job, the validity of the MI Kosovo and developed databases PRD-13(V2)s and understanding Corps suffers. and tactics, techniques, and pro- that we were still using outdated The primary lessons we learned cedures (TTP) using TRIPP, the PRD-12s, a fellow MI battalion in equipment and system deploy- CHATS systems and fielding team commander greatly aided us by ment were that MI must— arrived. They requested that we pull lending us some of his excess PRD-13(V1)s. We also requested Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance Sensors (REMBASS) in May 1999, to use for both base camp perimeter security and route monitoring in sector. Rather than transferring systems from non-deployed units, the Army fielded our first sensors ten months later from TF Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both of these systems were in the inventory and could have increased force protection, improved collection effectiveness, and allowed our soldiers to perform other critical tasks. A central Department of the Army (DA)-level point of contact (POC), who knew where all the systems U.S. Army Photo. were in use could have facilitated CPT Brian Scott, XO, TF101MI, Inspects wreckage of a coordination for finding and push- Serbian tank. ing systems forward.

16 Military Intelligence Initial-entry operations magnify 501st, 519th, 165th, and 101st MI know. The Intelligence community the validity of “You don’t know what battalions are conducting multiple needs to put aside agency paro- you don’t know.” In many cases, Balkans rotations, some are there chialisms, break down the bureau- we did not even know what capa- now and others will return in the cratic obstacles, and focus on bilities to request. COTS systems near future. Additionally, certain what the “Big Red One” accolade were available but when one is in MOSs pull more than their fair extols; “There is no one more im- contact with the adversary, it is share of the load. Virtually all portant than the soldier on patrol difficult to research what system HUMINT soldiers and warrant of- in the middle of the night.”✹ could best aid in mission accom- ficers have completed multiple ro- plishment. During the first part of tations. The Army is now tracking 2000, representatives from the how many days each soldier de- Department of Defense command, ploys in a two-year period. We, as control, communications and intel- Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno is a Corps, must also track which ligence (C3I) offered solutions to currently a student at the U.S. Army soldiers are deploying and find War College in Carlisle, Pennsylva- some of our problems. They pro- ways to ensure that we spread the nia. He has served for more than 20 vided scanners, frequency grab- work to all the soldiers in those years as an intelligence officer bers, and COTS versions of burdened specialties. throughout the United States, Eu- REMBASS. All of these systems rope, and the Middle East. He joined proved invaluable to our mission. Current legacy units cannot ac- the 1st Infantry Division in April 1997 This type of assistance should complish the missions they are as the G2, serving as G2, Task Force happen immediately following ini- facing. Although future units will Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina for six tial entry, coordinated by a DA-level have more capabilities, they can- months. LTC Rovegno remained the POC with the ability to deliver new not prepare for what they do not 1ID G2, working extensively in Ger- many and Macedonia until February and emerging technology. know. We need to continue to build units that can accomplish the mis- 1999 when he took command of the Finally, the Canadians showed sions. DA-level teams to assist MI 101st MI Batallion and deployed with the battalion as part of the Kosovo us how effective Coyote (a lightly forces in contact would facilitate armored system with both ground Initial Entry Force in June, remain- fielding the best force possible. We ing in Kosovo just over one year. surveillance radar and day-night must trust the commander and G2 video capability) was in monitor- Readers can contact the author on the ground to tell us what they via E-mail at john-rovegno@ ing and tracking illegal activity. We need; they are in contact and they us.army.mil. had a similar system in the NightStalker a few years back. We need to use COTS technology and quickly build a similar system. Looking to the Future The future of MI is bright. The Army transformation is putting the right soldiers with the right equipment at the right place on the battlefield. We must remember that while the transformation pre- pares us for the future, the legacy and interim forces are in contact with the enemy protecting our soldiers as they construct a fragile peace in areas where most seem content with war. POs and the Balkans mission will be with us for a long time. Be- cause of the type of mission, a few John Rovegno. Photo by LTC units and specialties are doing Sign covering a five-story burned out hotel in downtown Gnjilane, more than their fair share of enforc- made by local Kosovar-Albanians for the celebrations marking the ing the peace. Specifically, the first aniversary of Americans (NATO) entering the sector.

January-September 2001 17 HUMINT Collection During Peace Operations by Chief Warrant Officer Three document captured personnel, Gary G. Barnett gence “system of systems” time to equipment, and material on DD Form prepare for incoming detainees. 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War Cap- Most units used the Mobile Sub- When the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) ture Tag, and follow established pro- scriber Equipment (MSE) network to rolled into Kosovo as the initial entry cedures for interrogation operations. alert the G2 Operations Battle Cap- force, Task Force 101 Military Intelli- After several years in Bosnia- tain and furnish the required informa- gence (TF 101 MI) established intel- Herzegovina and two rotations in tion from Part B of the EPW capture ligence operations. A critical fact we Kosovo, the same problems still tag. (Since the 1ID units did not de- assumed during our mission analy- plague units in peace operations. ploy with DD Forms 2745, the Op- sis proved to be false: the United Field Manual 34-52, Intelli- erational Mangement Team (OMT), Nations (U.N.) Mission in Kosovo gence Interrogation, states, “The HUMINT Operations Center, and (UNMIK) and specifically the UNMIK- goal of any interrogation is to obtain HUMINT Collection Chief, developed Police, not us, were responsible for the maximum amount of useable and a locally reproducible form and E- all detainees. Within the first two reliable information, in a lawful man- mailed it to unit S2s.) After notifica- weeks, the detainee flow exceeded ner and in the least amount of time, tion, G2 Operations provided the Part UNMIK’s capabilities, leading TF which meets intelligence require- B information to the MI Battalion tac- Falcon to establish a detention facil- ments.” Proper documentation and tical operations center (TOC) and the ity at Camp Bondsteel. Although completed capture tags provide G2. most of the detainees were petty HUMINT collectors with essential G2 Operations maintained a list of criminals captured by U.N. Kosovo information that assists their exami- high-value target (HVT) personalities; Force (KFOR) soldiers, that nation of detainees. Starting ques- detainment of an HVT personality changed when TF Falcon captured tioning by asking “What brings you meant expedited interrogation. De- a Serbian Army patrol in the north- here today?” is not the preferred ap- tention of these personalities initi- ern part of our sector. proach technique, but without docu- ated immediate notification of the G2 This article addresses challenges mentation, HUMINT collectors are and MI Battalion Commander. The TF Falcon faced in processing mili- not primed for success with the ex- MI Battalion TOC notified the on-call tary and civilian detainees in a ploitable information that leads to the HUMINT collection team to begin peacekeeping environment. It also best approach in each case. Cap- preparation for an HVT detainee in- discusses methods we used to build ture tags provide the means to verify terrogation. This notification process our capabilities and the lessons we the information in detainee state- prevented units from alerting the col- learned that are applicable to future ments. They also ensure— lectors directly for every detention of peace operations. ❑ Timely processing. petty criminals and thus aided as- Background ❑ Accurate inventory of docu- set management. If there were any The combat training centers (CTCs) ments, material, and personal special linguist requirements, the MI continuously identify problems that property. Battalion TOC coordinated interpreter units have with detainee identifica- ❑ Easily retrievable data con- support from a pool of Category II tion and processing; entries from the cerning detainees. (Secret cleared) linguists. Center for Army Lessons Learned Timely Reporting Upon receiving notification of de- (CALL) Internet site record these TF 101 MI implemented the follow- tainees, the G2 Operations Battle observations in detail. HUMINT Col- ing tactics, techniques, and proce- Captain also informed the Analysis lector interviews revealed that cap- dures (TTP) to assist in detainee and Control Element (ACE) HUMINT turing units, soldiers detaining processing. Efficient reporting pro- Analysis Team (HAT) and provided individuals, and military police (MP) vides early notification and implemen- detainee identification data. The HAT at detention facilities attempted to tation of standard procedures. To prepared target folders with informa- question detainees. Untrained sol- handle this age-old problem, the TF tion retrieved from the local HUMINT diers should not question detainees G3 charged units to expedite all de- database and E-mailed the prepared because it can destroy trust and tention reports to the G2 operations target folder—including any new in- hinder proper HUMINT Collection ef- section. The quickest secure means formation requirements or special forts. Units and soldiers also fail to of communication gave the intelli- instructions for the HUMINT Collec-

18 Military Intelligence tors—to the OMT, which passed the ❑ Location where detention sonal property. During detainee in- target folder and information require- occurred, including city and processing at the IDF, MPs will ini- ments to the collectors. Once the grid coordinates. tiate a chain of custody in HUMINT collectors received the tar- ❑ Name and full unit designation accordance with AR 195-5, get folders, they could initiate inter- of soldier implementing the Evidence Procedures, using DA rogation planning. The ACE-prepared detention. Form 4137, Evidence/Property Cus- target folder tailored the intelligence ❑ Reason for detention. tody Document. The itemized lists requirements to the individual de- Tag all detainees with Part A of the should include serial numbers, col- tainee, which improved the DD Form 2745. Ensure the tags ac- ors, makes, models, license plate interrogator’s operational results. company them, and are available to numbers, quantities of ammunition, A Soldiers’ Common Task the soldiers, MPs, or persons who lot numbers, money, and any other Knowledge of detainment proce- transport them to the detention com- items found at the scene that may dures is a soldiers’ common task pound. The MPs or other escorts impact on future questioning of de- and includes standardized actions. should obtain this information from tainees. Take control of the detainees. the detaining unit before transport- Notify the battalion S2 of the de- Search detainees for weapons, docu- ing detainees to the intermediate detentions and forward data from Part ments, and equipment and do not tention facility (IDF). B of the DD Form 2745. All CEE and allow them to discard any belong- Search the detainees for weapons, CEDs possessed by detainees re- ings. If detainees possess radios, identification documents, and mate- quire transportation as quickly as walkie-talkies, cellular telephones, or rials on which to record information possible to the detention facility. any other communications devices, such as papers, notebooks, plan- HUMINT collectors use CEDs and do not adjust, turn off, or manipulate ners, or books. Place into plastic CEE to assist them in planning and switches. Captured enemy equip- bags all items removed from detain- conducting questioning and will pass ment (CEE) ranges from the small- ees or removed from the vehicle in them on for other exploitation. est specialized electronic device to which detainees were traveling. Tag HUMINT collectors have the oppor- huge pieces of machinery, weapons, these bags with the required infor- tunity to confront detainees with or weapon systems. Captured en- mation from Part C of DD Form 2745. these items and conduct repeat and emy documents (CEDs) and CEE fre- Information listed on this part of the control questioning to determine the quently provide valuable intelligence form provides an inventory of the detainees’ cooperation and veracity. information and facilitate interroga- items in the detainees’ possession. Unit S2s should ensure ample DD tion. This part of the capture tag also al- While conducting the search, do lows for the initiation of a “chain of (Continued on page 63) not allow the detainees to commu- custody” of both evidence and per- nicate with one another. Allowing detainees to talk may give them a chance to create and coordinate ali- bis and to corroborate or concoct stories to frustrate questioning at- tempts. Obtaining the “untainted” version of a detainee’s story allows HUMINT collectors to cross-check each detainee’s statement against others. Completing the entries on the three-part DD Form 2745 is one of the most helpful actions a soldier can do to assist the collectors. If capture tags are not available, provide the following information on a separate piece of paper: ❑ Date and time of detention. ❑ Last name, first name, and U.S. Army Photo. middle initial of detainee. Soldiers from the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment hold their ground ❑ Date and place of birth. against Serbian crowds during the Mitrovica Riots, when U.S. Forces ❑ Home address. reinforced the French Forces assigned to Mitrovica.

January-September 2001 19 MI Tactical HUMINT Team Operations in Kosovo

try soldiers as well as ground sur- by Chief Warrant Officer Three soldiers at first because soldiers who Gary G. Barnett veillance systems operators. Two teams had a soldier serving in mili- deployed together did not always What is a “Tactical HUMINT tary occupational specialty (MOS) stay together as teams. Cross-lev- Team”? The concept of employing 11B; these infantry soldiers contrib- eling skills made better use of avail- counterintelligence (CI) agents and uted to TF success and provided able personnel and gave each team HUMINT Collectors to obtain infor- knowledge of patrol operations, a skill base on which to build. When mation from persons in the area of movement, and security techniques. teams transitioned, we took an in- operations (AO) is nothing new. While not the preferred method of ventory of their experience and The name ”Tactical HUMINT Team” fielding a team, the MOS diversity cross-leveled to ensure continued gives a clear indication of the CI did not hamper the mission. These mission success. and HUMINT Collection teams’ mis- Tactical HUMINT teams overcame Transitioning and sions and capabilities. It also aptly many challenges while conducting described the concept of using CI their collection operations in a Preparing New Teams and HUMINT Collection for collect- treacherous environment. Soldiers Once a unit received deployment ing tactical information in the without a HUMINT MOS (97E Hu- notification, they began training and Kosovar environment. man Intelligence Collector) or a honing MOS-specific skills. Most Over the past several years, se- Counterintelligence MOS (97B CI continental United States (CO- nior leaders and MI officers have re- agent) on the teams had limits in the NUS) based units attended a mis- ferred to CI and HUMINT Collection scope of support they could provide, sion rehearsal exercise (MRE) at teams as force protection teams. but their professionalism enabled their home stations or at Fort The term “force protection team” them all to contribute their specific Benning, Georgia. Germany-based brought on many taskings as well talents. units attended an MRE at the Com- bat Maneuver Training Center as questions outside the CI and Team Composition HUMINT Collection spectrum. We (CMTC) in Hohenfels. In preparing task-organized Tactical HUMINT Ideally, we wanted to staff the THTs to rotate six new teams for Kosovo teams (THTs) in Kosovo to provide with CI agents, HUMINT collectors, Force Mission 1B (KFOR-1B), we the command with answers about and civilian linguists. Each THT con- realized we could provide incom- persons and organizations in the sisted of either of the following con- ing teams with a mission-focused Multinational Brigade–East (MNB-E) figurations. A warrant officer (351B MRE in Macedonia at Camp Able U.S. sector. The THTs collected in- CI Technician) as a team leader, Sentry. TF 101 MI assembled a formation that enabled the Analysis with a sergeant (97E HUMINT Col- team of trainers (including officers, and Control Element (ACE) to sat- lection) as the team noncommis- warrant officers, and NCOs), devel- isfy the TF Commander’s priority in- sioned officer (NCO) or a warrant oped a task list, and assembled telligence requirements (PIR). officer (351E HUMINT Collection training packets. Transitioning six Technician) as team leader with a of the eight teams would be a ma- Fielding Teams to Support sergent (97B CI Agent) as the team jor personnel turnover, and we Task Force Falcon NCO. We also wanted to give the wanted to broaden the knowledge It was a challenge finding person- teams a mix of Active Component base for incoming personnel. To nel to fill ten THTs and provide cover- (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) acomplish this, we set up a train- age in MNB-E. Personnel from five soldiers. ing area comprised of senior mem- MI battalions and two continents Resourcing teams in this way en- bers from the ACE, Operational rounded out the eight teams in abled a broader range of expertise on Management Team (OMT), Kosovo and two in the Former each team and cross-leveled CI and HUMINT Analysis Team (HAT), and Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. HUMINT skills. We assigned civil- TF 101 MI. Topics included: Eventually, we ran out of CI and ian linguists based on the ethnic ! Briefings and hands-on experi- HUMINT Collection personnel and composition of the sector their ence with rules of engagement began augmenting teams with sig- teams patrolled. Building THTs in this (ROE). nals intelligence (SIGINT) and infan- way caused resentment among the ! Mission planning.

20 Military Intelligence ! Drivers and convoy operations specific information requirements matured, focus, and reports an- training. (SIRs) as they related to their AOs swered specific questions for ACE ! Reporting requirements. or team sectors. Team leaders analysts and the TF commander. ! HUMINT database. briefed their teams on where they ! PIR. were going, sources they would Counterintelligence/Human ! Collection planning. contact, and the IR each source Intelligence Automated ! Detailed overview of the AO might meet. When the team satis- Tool Set (CHATS) and personalities. fied the IR, they could disengage and move on to the next require- Deployments are “come as you Based on the soliders’ familiar- are” situations. The 1st Infantry Di- ity with the AO, it was evident that ment or return to base camp for reporting. The collection plan was vision (1ID) received the Theater their parent units had prepared Rapid Response Intelligence Pack- them for deployment to this area. sufficiently detailed to allow for source selection, or the identifica- age (TRRIP) in early 1998, and de- The OMT tasked outgoing team ployed with it to Kosovo. CI and leaders to develop a five-day relief- tion of requirements for source development. Before development of HUMINT Collection teams in each in-place plan to cover details of sec- MI battalion direct support (DS) tor-specific mission requirements. the collection plan, most of the work done by Tactical HUMINT company shared one of these sys- Team leaders ensured that re- tems. TF 101 MI received CHATS placement soldiers knew the teams was purely “initiative reporting” and the teams had no basis (AN/PYQ-3(V)2) during the sum- routes in sector, familiarized them mer of 1999, while deployed in with checkpoints, supported unit to determine if they had met an IR. The hard work the Collection Man- Kosovo. A Mobile Training Team locations, points of contact, and (MTT) conducted “train the trainer” Kosovars with whom they inter- agement and Dissemination (CM&D) Section put into the col- sessions on the system, but it was acted. The “right-seat ride” with an evident that all THT soldiers experienced counterpart was prob- lection plan gave THTs a tool that team leaders used as a map for needed detailed training on the ably the most important part of the systems, including the automated transition. The time on ground gave intelligence collection. The plan’s detail was adequate to drive the report formats in the CI/HUMINT the new teams the confidence they utilities software. needed to continue with the col- HUMINT and CI collection process. lection mission uninterrupted, Using this intelligence tool, team The teams frequently sent informa- making the transition transparent leaders were not taking their teams tion via field-produced intelligence to intelligence consumers. and equipment into harm’s way reports (FPIRs) using their experi- without a clear reason. As the ence with TRRIP. The HAT received Focusing HUMINT and CI teams learned to use the collec- the FPIRs from the teams and posted Collection tion plan, teams’ collection efforts them to the HUMINT database by Early in the initial deployment to Kosovo, the THTs did not have sufficient mission focus. County (opstinas) borders provided the basis of the teams’ sectors. Teams planned Tactical HUMINT missions early by selecting a village or town the team had never visited or had not been to for several days. Meet- ings with contacts occurred by chance until the teams developed the security situation and the In- telligence battlefield operating system (BOS) matured. Other missions were reactions to incidents such as demonstrations and criminal activity. After the ACE developed a collection plan, teams planned missions based on PIR, Army Photo. U.S. information requirements (IR), and A Tactical HUMINT team meets with Serbian villagers.

January-September 2001 21 would update the database stored Lessons Learned on the RWS hard drive. ✹ Task organizing quickly depletes organic HUMINT and CI Most importantly, soldiers who are assets. proficient in HUMINT collection, CI ✹ Assign linguists to a team; do not put them in a pool. force protection source operations Linguists are integral to the team. The teams establish (CFSO), tactical questioning, and confidence in linguists and the linguists establish Subversion and Espionage Directed rapport with contacts. Against the Army (SAEDA) investi- ✹ Establish HUMINT and CI collection requirements early gations will operate and maintain to focus collection. these systems. After all, the THT ✹ Home station intelligence preparation for deploying soldiers’ making contact, establish- teams ensures a quicker transition; this broadens the ing relationships, and fostering co- base of knowledge concerning the AO. operation remains the pinnacle of the ✹ Detail the “right seat ride” and allow sufficient time to Intelligence BOS. meet all points of contact with supported units, liaison contacts, and sources. Conclusion Reflecting on a year of operations and changes, our soldiers accom- cutting and pasting the data. CHATS Army Intelligence Center visited plished amazing feats while provid- has preformatted messages for both TF 101 MI in Kosovo during KFOR- ing the TF Falcon Commander with CI and HUMINT reports. The sol- 1B. After mission briefs and dis- the majority of his actionable intelli- diers had experience with TRRIP cussions on operations and gence. Soldiers from the United and the systems in place; since it mission requirements, we provided States and Europe, AC and RC, was working well, there was no push them an after-action review of the HUMINT and non-HUMINT MOSs, to change everything in the middle CHATS hardware and software. task-organized into cohesive teams of the rotation. The teams rarely When asked what we would in- and accomplished the mission. The used the CI/HUMINT utilities soft- clude if we could design our own au- fact that HUMINT soldiers provide the ware on CHATS. Lack of operator tomated system for CI and HUMINT, bulk of intelligence to commanders training and difficulty with the soft- we replied that we wanted a hard- in peace support operations (PSOs), ware and hardware in Kosovo’s rug- ened laptop computer with a key- no matter how reliant we become on ged environment were the most board that could withstand dust. The technology, was a significant lesson ✹ significant reasons for avoiding notebook computer would slide into re-learned in KFOR. change to the new system. a vehicle-docking station located un- Endnote derneath the vehicle’s communica- The amount of data reported to the 1. Six of our THTs were in Kosovo for HAT by the THTs quickly exceeded tions equipment mount. The vehicle approximately ten months. the storage capability of the CHATS communications system would not hard drive. The teams could no be limited to line-of-sight. Our com- longer copy databases to the hard puter system would connect to a drive, so time-consuming queries to tactical radio and synchronize data the HAT for information became the with our next higher headquarters standard. Operators also experi- whenever the two echelons commu- enced frustration with CHATS be- nicated. This ideal system would Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary cause the system sometimes also parse information from Barnett is currently the CI Team Leader, locked up; rebooting meant lost preformatted reports into the All- B Company, 101st MI Battalion. He data. Having four or five team mem- Source Analysis System (ASAS) served as Chief, OCE, for TF Falcon bers sharing one terminal also Remote Workstation (RWS). A ve- from March to June 2000. CW3 Barnett slowed reporting, which resulted in hicle-mounted video camera, ca- holds a Bachelor of Liberal Arts de- long days when the THTs returned pable of hand held use, would record gree from the University of New York Regent’s College and is a graduate of from their missions and all needed routes and points of interest and pro- the Federal Bureau of Investigation vide a video surveillance capability. to submit their reports. National Academy. Readers may con- Upon returning to base camp, we Looking to the Future tact him via E-mail at barnettg would remove the notebook and @hq.1id.army.mil and telephonically Representatives of the MI Fu- dock it to a workstation. When the at 0931-889-7215 or DSN 350-7215/ tures Directorate from the U.S. system powered up, the notebook 7309.

22 Military Intelligence

Electronic Warfare Operations in Kosovo by First Sergeant in collection in support of a high- David Redmon 175s with a cadre of eight Elec- tronic Warfare Voice Interceptors intensity conflict. The validation A lone C-17 lifted off from Ramstein (98Gs). Upon arrival, this squad plan in Figure 1 outlines the col- Air Base, Germany, in early Octo- performed system shakeouts and lective tasks assessed during this ber 1999 and turned southeast initiated limited signal surveys in phase. toward Camp Able Sentry, the Multinational Brigade-East We never executed this phase Macedonia. It was the first time (MNB-E) sector, as well as low- and the final phase of redeploy- that the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) level voice intercept (LLVI) missions ment of the “call forward” team to had deployed its general support from the A Company, 3/504th Para- the Central Region. Intelligence (GS) electronic warfare (EW) as- chute Infantry Regiment (PIR) gaps and the demonstrated capa- sets since Operations DESERT headquarters in the troubled city bilities during the first two phases SHIELD and DESERT STORM. of Vitina. forced a decision to leave the team “Team Dominator” initiated Phase in place and start LLVI operations Concept throughout the sector. The initial plan comprised four Two shortly after the start of the phases. Phase One called for the new year. A “call forward” team of Environment forward deployment of systems twelve 98Gs joined the existing and Challenges and cadre to Camp Bondsteel, cadre and completed a three-week The operational architecture Kosovo. The EW Company, D training program consisting of con- adopted after the decision to keep Company, 101st MI Battalion sent voy operations, site selection, and organic signals intelligence a force package of two AN/TRQ- target briefings. (SIGINT) systems in the MNB-E 32(V)2s (TEAMMATEs), two AN/ The plan for Phase Three was to sector was at first doctrinal in its TLQ-17As (TRAFFICJAMs), two conduct a validation of D employment. Placement of the AN/PRD-13s, and two AN/TSQ- Company’s assets intended for use TRQ-32s and TSQ-17s ensured

Task Force 101 Military Intelligence (MI) Staff ! Prepare the logistics plan ! Develop the Battalion communications plan ! Manage intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets Company Tactical Operations Center ! Execute GS MI company operations ! Perform limited analysis of reported information IEW Platoon Operations ! Execute collection and jamming platoon operations ! Establish an electronic warfare support or electronic attack site ! Conduct voice communications intercept or radio direction finding using the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 TEAMMATE ! Conduct voice communication intercept or RDF using AN/PRD-13 ! Conduct high frequency (HF) or very high frequency (VHF) electronic attack (EA) operations using AN/ TLQ-17A(V)3 TRAFFICJAM ! Monitor squad operational status Security ! Implement information security procedures ! Prepare for communications security procedures

Figure 1. Validation Plan Training and Evaluation Outlines.

January-September 2001 29 ganic military linguists resulted in the use of Category II civilian linguists under a civilian contract. Use of these linguists required re- working of collection and transcrip- tion methodology since they had no specific knowledge of system operations nor an ability to determine crucial intelligence indicators. Clearance levels of Category II linguists reduced the volume of technical data we could provide to the collection site, thus reducing sensor capabilities. The organic company equipment did not meet the requirement for smaller and less recognizable element footprints throughout the All Photos courtesy of LTC John Rovegno. All Photos courtesy of LTC An EW site the first time artillery fired in direct support of intelligence sector. As a result, TF Falcon re- collection, (8 February 2000). ceived commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware to allow the EW Net Radio Protocol (NRP) connec- taskings became the norm. platoon to operate within this new tivity with the Communication and The Intelligence and Electronic requirement. This commercial Control Set (CCS) in the Analysis Warfare (IEW) Company’s modified hardware increased their capabili- and Control Element (ACE). table of organization and equip- ties while maintaining the small- SIGINT analysts (98Cs) were not ment (MTOE) contains only Rus- est operational profile possible. included in the initial call-forward sian and Arabic linguists; we were The greatest problem with rapid plan, nor was the ACE Technical fortunate that three individuals had fielding of a SIGINT effort came in Control and Processing Cell ro- received Serbian language training the terrain of Kosovo. Organic re- bust enough for this additional col- at the Foreign Language Technical transmission capability and Signal lection. D Company subsequently Center–Europe. This lack of or- Corps support was never part of the deployed 98Cs from the company tactical operations center (TOC) to conduct front-line communications analysis and asset tracking. These additional soldiers rounded out the end-state SIGINT platoon for Task Force (TF) Falcon. Certain challenges to the first several collection missions forced adaptations to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by the Electronic Warfare Platoon. These included lack of technical data, lack of organic Serbian-language linguists, equipment size, and the terrain. The lack of available technical data created the need for a signal survey in each regional area of the country and dynamic retasking and database management. A general search followed by more directed The first tactical SIGINT mission in Kosovo.

30 Military Intelligence original design. To keep force protection requirements at a mini- mum, collection sites were colocated with friendly units and not always in the optimum locations for collection and direction finding (DF). Urban missions made line of sight nearly impossible. Careful placement of teams as re- lays to Camp Bondsteel enabled NRP and FM voice communications at the Company TOC. This dedicated systems for relay and security instead of collection. Types of Missions The missions tasked during the rotation were one of three types: urban, traditional hilltop collection, or EW site near the Serbian border. special purpose. Of the urban collection missions, the most suc- The most successful SIGINT collec- A first achieved by the task cessful force protection mission tion occurred while operating in a more force was artillery firing in DS of occurred in Kosovska Mitrovica. The traditional hilltop collection role. IEW SIGINT collection. Elements of 1- EW Platoon deployed north into the Company soldiers were able to use 6 Field Artillery fired numerous French Sector to provide direct sup- HIC TTP to provide analysts with the illumination missions during the port (DS) collection in support of the predictive intelligence in high de- rotation; designed as a show of 3/504th PIR and the 18th Air Assault mand. In addition, collection man- force for MNB-E, these were spe- Battalion (Polish). An Analysis and agement within TF Falcon had more cial-purpose Bright Sky mis- Control Team (ACT) in DS to the ma- clearly defined this type of mission. sions. TF 101 MI took advantage neuver commander accomplished all All missions had the added benefit of of this capability by planning and tasking and reporting. This mecha- providing additional information about executing illumination missions nism ensured the rapid dissemination the signals environment to consum- in areas where we needed clari- of intelligence to the Battalion S2s. ers and analysts at all levels. fication on critical intelligence questions throughout the MNB- E sector. Crews and Operations As we developed new TTP, the squad became the focal point for EW operations. Teams of four to six soldiers under the direction of a Staff Sergeant organized to form four LLVI teams. The company tasked the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant for execution of all logistical and communications support. Whenever possible, external security elements from the supported unit provided the additional personnel necessary for site operations. The LLVI teams maintained a lower profile in areas in which the enemy had the results of our ef- EW site near Vitina, Kosovo. forts.

January-September 2001 31 Future EW Operations in ✹Adapt doctrine to accomplish the mission. Kosovo ✹COTS items are force multipliers. The dynamic signals environment in Kosovo provides a unique set of ✹Conduct periodic signal surveys—the environment changes. challenges for SIGINT collection ✹Native speaking interpreters greatly increase capabilities. operations. Designed to provide combat intelligence to the tactical commander in a high-intenisty Figure 2. Lessons Learned about EW Operations in Kosovo. conflict environment, the GS MI Company must adapt to meet the mal looks like. Creation of half a Teams, one Mobile Interrogation changing mission parameters (see dozen “collection zones” would Team, the Task Force Falcon ACE, Figure 2). lead to greater satisfaction of the two ACTs, and the Battalion head- commander’s priority intelli- quarters element. He previously The age-old discussion of the served as a Technical Control and gence requirements and more need for tactical SIGINT operations Analysis Center Noncommissioned is apparent when analyzing TF Fal- focused operations. Officer, 501st MI Battalion, 1st Ar- con intelligence operations. The Deliberate intelligence architec- mored Division; Training NCO and focus of echelons above corps tures and increased support from Platoon Sergeant at the U.S. Army (EAC) intelligence organizations, the signal community must be Field Station-Key West; Division Of- and rightfully so, is still too broad part of the initial design for any ficer at the Naval Security Group– Key West; V Corps ACE Technical in scope to satisfy the tactical operation in Kosovo. Only with Control and Analysis Element commander’s need for time-sensi- clearly defined mission param- (TCAE) NCO in Charge and tive, combat intelligence and intel- eters and theater SIGINT support SYSCON, A Company, 302d Mili- ligence vital to making immediate can we maintain the MI motto, tary Intelligence Battalion; NCOIC, force protection decisions. LLVI “Always Out Front.”✹ Battle Technology Lab, Battle Com- teams with equipment capable of mand Battle Lab-Huachuca; Endnote collecting against a wide-range of NCOIC, Modeling and Simulations, enemy communications systems 1. A TRQ-32 equipped with additional Directorate of Combat Develop- scanners near Presevo, Serbia. still offer the greatest potential for ments, U.S. Army Intelligence Cen- ter and School. He participated in success. To operate against an the Task Force XXI and Division enemy cognizant of our efforts to First Sergeant Dave Redmon has XXI Advanced Warfighting Experi- collect information, tactical LLVI served as First Sergeant for D ments (AWEs), III Corps Warfighter teams must operate covertly (or Company, 101st MI Battalion, since Exercise, the Rapid Force Projec- less overtly) and with systems that September 1999; he deployed to tion Initiative and KFOR Rotation- are smaller and highly mobile. Kosovo with three Field HUMINT 1B. Determination of collection and asset management strategies for the Kosovo problem must include continued development of the target set and regional focus must remain the standard for collection. The diverse ethnic composition and disbursement within the MNB-E sector make expert knowledge of numerous areas difficult. To ensure the highest degree of predictive analysis, the LLVI team employment must concentrate on allowing the collector-linguist team members to gain familiarity with their specific targets. It is impossible to know what is out of the ordinary when U.S. Army Photo. one cannot ascertain what nor- An electronic warfare site at dusk.

32 Military Intelligence Building the ACE in Kosovo by Major Donald K. Wood and throughout the sector. Their missions (SOR) to varied collectors to answer. Major Joan B. Mercier were collection requirements, re- The S2s did a great job of passing questing or tasking collection agen- the PIR to the soldiers and develop- When the 1st Infantry Division rolled cies for required information, and ing the answers for the commander. into Kosovo in June 1999, as part of disseminating intelligence. Addition- The challenge came with SIGINT, Kosovo Force (KFOR), the Analysis ally, CM&D developed priority intelli- imagery intelligence (IMINT), and the and Control Element (ACE) of the gence requirements (PIR), prepared many other HUMINT assets such as 101st Military Intelligence (MI) Bat- collection plans, supported target- psychological operations (PSYOP), talion was there to provide nearly in- ing, managed requests for informa- Civil Affairs (CA), and Special Opera- stantaneous intelligence support to tion (RFIs), and coordinated with tions elements. The initial collection Task Force (TF) Falcon. As the ACE other intelligence elements. plan was more than 60 pages and set up in the austere environment, it CM&D had twelve members from very hard to follow. We refined it began the arduous task of providing to 35 pages by the end of KFOR- timely and accurate intelligence to various doctrinal and non-doctrinal intelligence military occupational 1B, but it was still difficult to the Commander, U.S. KFOR. This manage on a day-to-day basis. article explores how the TF Falcon specialties (MOSs), primarily 98G (Cryptologic Linguist) and 98C (Sig- Consequently, many units did not ACE adapted doctrine in organizing use it as they should have. for its unique mission and what les- nals Intelligence [SIGINT] Analyst). sons we learned. During KFOR-1B, civilian analysts The Secure Internet Protocol brought in by a contracted organiza- Router Network (SIPRNET) was The Mission of the ACE tion provided invaluable intelligence the primary means for intelli- Doctrinally, the mission of the ACE support to the section (96B is the gence dissemination. The ACE is to perform collection management, military occupational specialty posted all products on the TF produce all-source intelligence (ASI), [MOS] for an Intelligence Analyst). Falcon homepage so units could provide intelligence and electronic They became the continuity between pull their own information off the warfare (IEW) technical control, and KFOR-1B and KFOR-2A. Internet. For time-sensitive information, we contacted the units disseminate intelligence and target- The greatest challenge for the sec- immediately. ing data. The ACE supports the com- tion was managing the collection mander in executing battle command plan and disseminating the PIR, spe- All-Source Intelligence (ASI). and planning future missions in the cific information requirements (SIR), The ASI section had one of the most range of military operations. and specific orders and requests challenging intelligence missions in ACE Organization The TF Falcon ACE varied some- what from doctrinal organization. It consisted of a— ! Headquarters element . ! Collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section. ! ASI section . ! Technical control and processing (TC&P) section, with a separate HUMINT (human intelligence) analysis cell (HAC).1 ! National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D). The CM&D section was a multifaceted section, handling a myriad of tasks and man- John Rovegno. Photo by LTC aging more than 53 moving pieces Falcon ACE, Camp Bondsteel, June 1999.

January-September 2001 33 and to receive the bulk of the daily message traffic from national and theater sources. The section developed a relational database using Microsoft (MS) Ac- cess™, which greatly enhanced the section’s ability to query and export data into other products. The relative ease of using this database, the ability to export data to share with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, and its adaptability made MS Access™ the ideal tool for the multinational, nonlinear environment of Kosovo. By the end of KFOR-1B, the database consisted of approximately ten thousand events, and we used the database Photo by Captain Robert A. Culp, II Robert Photo by Captain in tandem with the Krypton2 data- View of the Task Force Falcon NIST area inside the TFF ACE SCIF, base as a powerful analytical tool. July 1999. Technical Control and Process- TF Falcon. It was the nexus for all the Presevo Valley region of Serbia, ing (TC&P). The TC&P section did information and intelligence flowing as well as the political and ethnic a great job in managing all of the into the TF. The missions of the ASI situations in Macedonia. separate intelligence disciplines in the ACE. Some of the particular les- section were multifold: Managing the volume of information sons we learned dealt with HUMINT ! Assimilate, analyze, and data- and intelligence entering the ACE and IMINT. base all relevant information and was the greatest challenge for the intelligence. ASI section. On an average day, ASI During KFOR Mission 1A (June– ! Produce two daily intelligence section analysts reviewed approxi- December 1999), the infrastructure summaries (text and graphic). mately 300 messages and products of Kosovo was almost nonexistent, ! Prepare daily and weekly intelli- from national, theater, and local and HUMINT was our primary in- gence briefings for the Com- sources. To manage this information, telligence collection method. manding General, TF Falcon. we divided the analysts into teams Trained linguists and HUMINT col- ! Provide input to the collection focused on specific districts lectors well versed in casual and target nomination cycles. (opstinas) within MNB-E. The teams source operations were critical. ! Write special assessments and were responsible for analysis of The information they gained al- conduct long-term analysis. events in those areas. We required lowed the ACE to quickly identify ! Conduct liaison with the NIST, that they visit those opstinas peri- important individuals and groups in KFOR, the Joint Analysis Cen- odically to talk to the commanders, the sector and to determine with ter (JAC), 66th MI Group, V S2s, and soldiers responsible for that whom they associated throughout Corps, and the national intelli- sector. This practice enhanced their Kosovo. Trained analysts who gence agencies to build a com- awareness of the geography, culture, could interpret the information were mon understanding. and political considerations within essential to the success of the intelligence mission. These HUMINT As part of these tasks, the ASI their opstina. products were used daily not only section monitored and analyzed the The analysts conducted the ma- by the Commander, U.S. KFOR, movement of Yugoslavian Army (VJ) jority of their research using the but also by the KFOR staff and other forces garrisoned less than ten kilo- ASI database, SIPRNET re- intelligence agencies throughout meters from the Kosovo boundary. sources, and local historical files. They also tracked the activities of The ASI section also made exten- Kosovo. insurgent groups active along the sive use of the SIPRNET Auto- IMINT was critical in the initial boundary between the Multinational mated Message Handling System phase and for planning operations. Brigade-East (MNB-E) sector and (AMHS), both to conduct research The destruction of the local infra-

34 Military Intelligence structure created challenges for TF der the staff supervision of the G2 ACE. ! Coordinated imagery support. Falcon planners. The National Im- Composed of representatives from the ! Coordinated targeting and battle agery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), damage assessment (BDA) sup- Customer Support Response Team the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the port. (CSRT) produced imagery that pro- National Security Agency (NSA), and The NIST provided invaluable sup- vided commanders and planners NIMA, the NIST performed the follow- port. The key to success for the NIST with timely, accurate information ing functions: and the ACE in Kosovo was a cohe- for planning operations. Those ! Provided reach-back to national sive group of professionals who products enabled the commanders agencies. worked as a team to answer the and planners at all levels to visual- ! Expedited time sensitive RFI. commander’s questions. We found ize the terrain. The lesson is clear: ! Coordinated indications and warn- that the best technique was to hold never deploy without a NIMA ings (I&W) support. periodic meetings to determine who CSRT. ! Coordinated special assess- had access to the best resources to National Intelligence Support ments. answer PIR and then to divide and Team (NIST). The mission of the ! Provided video teleconferencing conquer. NIST was to provide a tailored, na- (VTC) and E-mail support for ana- tional-level, all-source intelligence lyst-to-analyst deconfliction of re- ACE Support to the TF team to deployed commanders dur- porting. Falcon Targeting Process ing crisis or contingency operations ! Provided immediate access to From the Intelligence battlefield op- and to support the TF commander, un- national databases. erating system (BOS), the important

Lessons Learned ✹ Train on basic analysis skills thoroughly before deployment. Analysts must be proficient in time-event and pattern analysis, creating link and association matrices, and producing event overlays. Automa- tion cannot replicate these tasks. Senior analysts must also be sufficiently comfortable with these tasks to adapt them to a nontraditional intelligence environment. ✹ Writing and basic automation skills are essential for all analysts. All analysts, regardless of rank, must be capable of producing intelligent, structured, and grammatically correct products requiring little editing. They must also be capable of adeptly using common programs, such as MS PowerPoint, MS Word, MS Excel, and MS Access. Train on these skills aggressively in garrison before deployment. ✹ Analysts must get out into the environment. They must understand the complexity and the dynamics of the peacekeeping environment. ✹ All-source intelligence fusion is very difficult but necessary. KFOR-1A and -1B proved that fusion can work in a environment as challenging as Kosovo. With the many sources of potential intelligence in the TF Falcon sector, it was imperative that someone collect all the information and then collate and package it into a usable product. ✹ The Hunter UAV proved itself again and validated the need for an airborne platform capable of providing real-time imagery to the commander and flexible enough for dynamic retasking. The Hunter UAV was extremely useful during KFOR-1A in developing the situation throughout the sector and as an effective tool in assisting in riot control. Along with the TS II, the commander wanted the Hunter UAVs fully mission capable at all times. ✹ The NIST gave the commander timely reach-back capability. The most important idea in using the NIST effectively in Kosovo was to understand its capabilities and exploit them to free up other assets. ✹ The ACE web page was a massive time saver. It provided situational awareness to users worldwide on a daily basis. ✹ The 66th MI Group provided a liaison officer (LNO), a 350B warrant officer (All-Source Intelligence Technician), to work in the TF Falcon ACE. The LNO’s mission was to represent 66th MI Group at TF Falcon, coordinate 66th MI Group support to the TF, and to assist in intelligence analysis and production. The 66th MI Group sent its best and brightest soldiers to assist the TF. They proved invaluable by answering difficult and time-consuming RFIs. Having the LNO in the ACE simplified communications with the theater ACE. This made coordination for changing support requirements easier.

January-September 2001 35 players in support of targeting and tar- gathering the critical information to Task Force Falcon ACE provides the get development were the TF G2 Op- assist in answering the commander’s Army with a living laboratory to de- erations Officer, the ACE Collection PIR. velop new doctrine on how best to Management Officer, the Field Artil- provide intelligence support to the lery Intelligence Officer (FAIO), and the Communications and Ana- commander in an unknown environ- ACE Targeting Officer. lytical Tools ment. The Army will continue to re- The targeting team also included The backbone of the intelligence ar- fine and re-examine the lessons the Land Information Warfare Activ- chitecture supporting TF Falcon learned during KFOR operations for ity (LIWA), PSYOP, and CA. Sup- proved to be the Trojan Special Pur- years to come. If there is one les- ported by the ACE target nomination pose Integrated Remote Intelligence son that must stand out before all team, they worked with other ACE Terminal II (Trojan SPIRIT II). The Tro- others, it is this: never be afraid to sections and staff elements of the jan SPIRIT II (TS II) deployed with the try something new.✹ command to support the targeting initial-entry force of the 101st MI Bat- Endnotes process. Interaction of the ACE with talion and was operational within hours the fire support cell was essential 1. An article by Chief Warrant Officer Two of arriving, providing Joint Worldwide Timothy Larson and Warrant Officer One to effective IEW support to targeting Intelligence Communications Sys- Cynthia Beard, “HUMINT Analysis in for both lethal and non-lethal fires. tem (JWICS) connectivity to the Kosovo,” will appear in a future issue of TF Falcon was unique in that we ACE. It also provided SIPRNET con- the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. It discusses the HUMINT focused our targeting on information nectivity to the ACE and the TF tac- analysis cell in depth. operations (IO), not traditional tar- tical operations center (TOC). The 2. Krypton is a relational, event-driven geting. Using HUMINT as our pri- TS II later provided connectivity for the targeting database that aids in finding the mary collector, the targeting cell JWICS Mobile Integrated Communi- links from events to people, places, largely focused on which messages cations System (JMICS). This pro- things, towns, and groups. to broadcast (tolerance, mine vided the additional capability of awareness, compliance with United sensitive compartmented information Nations (UN) Resolution 1177 and (SCI), VTC, and secure voice com- the Military Technical Agreement) munications. The TS II remains the Major Donald K. Wood is the 1st Infan- and then determined the campaign’s backbone for these capabilities today. try Division ACE Chief in Würzburg, effectiveness. Germany. From July through Decem- The Analyst Notebook software, ber 1999, he served as the ACE Chief The FAIO provided the critical link commercial software designed for use for Task Force Falcon during KFOR- between the ACE and the fire sup- by the law enforcement and intelli- 1A, in Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. He port cell. He provided the ACE with gence communities to develop links has had assignments in Fort Hood; a detailed understanding of the tar- between people, places, and events, Baumholder, Germany; Fort Devens; geting process, attack system in- and the National Training Center. He proved to very helpful to our analysts. holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Po- formation requirements, and target We used Analyst Notebook in con- litical Science from Texas Tech Univer- acquisition system capabilities. The junction with the Krypton database to sity. Readers can reach him via E-mail FAIO worked with the ACE to de- aid the HAC in developing and under- at [email protected]. velop an intelligence collection plan standing the infrastructure and the that supported targeting and BDA- competing organizations throughout Major Joan Mercier is the Executive related PIR. During all operations, Kosovo. Officer of the 101st MI Battallion, 1st the FAIO helped the ACE identify and Infantry Division in Würzburg, Ger- nominate potential targets to the fire The Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle many. She served as the ACE Chief (UAV) was extremely useful during support cell. for Task Force Falcon during KFOR- KFOR-1A in developing the situation 1B in Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. She Identifying and tracking HUMINT throughout the sector. It was used has had two tours in Germany and as- targets was one of the most chal- effectively to assist in riot control by signments in Korea; Fort Lewis, Wash- lenging aspects of the targeting pro- feeding reports of potential riots into ington; and California. MAJ Mercier cess. When we consider targeting, the ACE, allowing the collection man- commanded A/502d MI Battalion at Fort Lewis. She holds a Bachelor of Arts we think in terms of lethal and non- ager to investigate these towns as degree in Resource Management lethal fires. In Kosovo, the majority necessary. from Slippery Rock University and is a of the time, we were targeting for col- graduate of the Command and Gen- lection: identifying the individuals who Conclusion eral Staff College. Readers can reach could provide us information, target- The KFOR mission has proven to her via E-mail at [email protected]. ing them with collection assets, and be both unique and dynamic. The army.mil.

36 Military Intelligence G2G2 OperationsOperations inin PeacePeace OperationsOperations by Captain Gregory P. Lisi nated daily intelligence across ! Providing intelligence support to MNB-E. In addition, he was the The Brigade S2 for the 2d Brigade the Information Operations (IO) G2’s representative for the daily Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Working Group. close battle targeting meetings, Division, had the unique challenge and he provided intelligence sup- of having to transition a brigade S2 Organization While a table of distribution and port to the targeting process for the shop into the G2 operations section IO Working Group. for Task Force (TF) Falcon, Multina- allowances (TDA) that the Division tional Brigade-East (MNB-E), in staff developed before deployment The Section noncommissioned Kosovo. While we had the lessons covered the section, the initial G2 officer in charge (NCOIC) became learned from our Bosnia-Herzegovina operations section structure paral- the G2 Operations NCOIC, respon- support, establishing intelligence leled that of the Brigade S2 shop. sible for ensuring the well being of operations in Kosovo provided its own We took advantage of early-estab- the section. He also interacted with unique challenges. The TF Falcon lished organizational and working the G3 Battle NCOs, G2 Sergeants G2 operations section was just one relationships and began to forge Major, and ACE NCOIC to ensure piece of the intelligence family that new roles in an atypical environ- that the task force was coordinat- took on a new form. ment. ing the current intelligence at the The Brigade S2 became the G2 NCO level. The assistant brigade Mission Operations Chief; therefore, the S2s became day and night “battle The G2 operations section mission Brigade’s Senior Intelligence Of- captains,” whose primary role was was not significantly different from a ficer was no longer responsible disseminating the daily flow of in- typical brigade S2 shop. The solely to the brigade commander. telligence information to the proper section’s roles and players evolved The G2 Operations Chief worked end users. They conducted daily over time as the MNB-E headquar- in a division-like staff organization battlefield update briefs, and kept ters took form. In the end, our mis- supporting the G2, a lieutenant the battle staff informed of current sion was to provide real-time colonel who answered directly to intelligence situations. intelligence support to the TF Fal- the TF Commander (a brigadier In addition, the G2 operations sec- con commander and staff. The sec- general). The G2 Operations Chief tion also coordinated open-source in- tion performed several important was responsible for the overall func- telligence (OSINT) collection and tasks: tioning of the section, ensuring dissemination throughout MNB-E The ! Conducting daily intelligence that we processed and dissemi- section added an OSINT chief to over- briefs to the TF Falcon Com- mander on current operations within MNB-E. ! Providing current intelligence support, through first-line analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), to G3 operations and MNB-E battle staff sections. ! Coordinating intelligence flow from the various U.S. and multinational battalions that comprised MNB-E, ensuring a timely flow of intelligence information from the TF analysis and control element (ACE) to MNB- E members and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) headquarters.

! Supplying current intelligence John Rovegno. Photo courtesy of LTC support to daily targeting meetings. Early morning at Camp Bondsteel.

January-September 2001 37 holding critical pieces of information that other operation sections required. The multinational nature of MNB-E operations lent itself to the segregation of information. The MNB-E tactical operations center (TOC) had liaison soldiers from Russia, Poland, and Greece, as well as other international organizations, forcing the operations sections to work only with information releasable to other nations, classified as “Releasable KFOR.” Consequently, there was a low probability that all operations sections were fully knowledgeable of the complete intelligence picture.

Photo courtesy by LTC John Rovegno Photo courtesy by LTC It was G2 Operations’ role to en- Major Cowan briefs General Shelton on the intelligence situation. sure that all intelligence information was available (to cleared see these duties, augmenting its tra- come several obstacles that were parties) for making daily opera- ditional modified table of organization unique to its position in MNB-E. tional decisions. and Equipment (MTOE). The OSINT First, the section had to define its The sheer size and span of con- chief was a First Lieutenant (35D All- role concerning the division’s ACE. trol of the MNB-E provided another Source Intelligence Officer) assisted As a brigade S2 section, we did unique challenge to the G2 opera- by one primary Category II (cleared not usually have the luxury of options section. While a typical for U.S. Secret level) translator and a erating so close to the ACE. A mechanized infantry brigade is pool of local national translators. mechanized brigade will normally comprised of one armor and two deploy with its organic analysis The greatest challenge came at the infantry battalions, MNB-E was and control team (ACT), which pro- intelligence analyst level. Our 96Bs composed of one mechanized in- vides connectivity to the division (Intelligence Analysts) had to learn and fantry battalion and one armor bat- ACE. The formation of a MNB head- assist in developing an order of battle talion that were organic to the BCT. quarters with its own ACE ended in an environment where there was no In addition, a light infantry battal- the requirement for the ACT and intelligence baseline. They had to ion from the 82d Airborne—with allowed the 101st Military Intelli- draw analytical connections between whom the brigade had not previ- gence (MI) Battalion to deploy sev- emerging indicators and events that ously operated, a Marine Expedi- eral ACTs throughout the MNB-E they did not normally track in a high- tionary Unit, a Polish battalion, a area of operations (AO). This fa- intensity threat environment. House Russian tactical group, and a cilitated intelligence flow and fires, theft, drive-by shootings, am- Greek battalion rounded out the analysis across the brigade area. bushes of farmers, and random mor- early structure of MNB-E. This en- tar attacks were regular threat events Without the need for an ACT, the larged multinational brigade had in- during TF Falcon’s early months. G2 operations section had to de- telligence officers and staffs who velop its own immediate relation- had not previously worked together. While the G2 section had to adapt ship with the ACE. Frequent daily Each unit brought different stand- its organizational duties to fulfill sev- meetings with the All-Source Intel- ing operating procedures (SOPs) eral additional roles, we were able to ligence (ASI) section, collection and tactics, techniques, and pro- draw upon our fundamental wartime management and dissemination, cedures (TTP) with them as they mission skills to forge an effective and G2X were critical to ensure we assumed their missions in Kosovo. team. The principles of IPB did not had a current picture of all the in- change, only the operational environ- To overcome these differences, it telligence available within the TF. ment did. was important that intelligence of- As the G2 operations section, we ficers from these various elements Challenges had to avoid building a two-tiered develop close working relation- In completing these tasks, the G2 knowledge system. We could not let ships. Monthly G2/S2 confer- Operations section had to over- the ACE become the “green door,” ences, in which the various

38 Military Intelligence intelligence officers could ex- system. We initially passed sharing of a common former Kosovo change ideas and perspectives, INTSUMs and intelligence reports Liberation Army (UçK) operating were helpful in overcoming some using systems we were not familiar zone, and the shared use of the pri- of these differences. Developing a with like Ptarmigan, Crisis Response mary main supply route from Skopje close working relationship with li- Operations in NATO Operating Sys- to Pristina made the open flow of aison officers from our multinational tems (CRONOS), and Linked Opera- communications with the British contributing nations also assisted tional Intelligence Center, Europe headquarters essential. in easing the flow of intelligence (LOCE) computer systems. information from these nations. Regardless of the nation, the G2 While these systems were not operations sections from each MNB The decision to employ ACTs complex, they did offer challenges needed to feel free to talk directly to throughout the MNB-E sector was in maintenance, upkeep, and com- each other without the need to go also critical to assisting in the con- patibility with U.S. systems. The through KFOR headquarters. De- trol of intelligence information systems also came with their own pendence on KFOR headquarters for across the brigade. Using the classification concerns that allowed information from our flanks meant a ACTs, the G2 operations section us to pass only information classi- dramatic slow down and possible and the TF ACE were able to es- fied “Release KFOR” and “NATO loss of critical information. Effective tablish Secure Internet Protocol Secret” levels. It was difficult to en- crosstalk between MNBs greatly Router Network (SIPRNET) con- sure that we passed only the appro- enhanced overall situational aware- nectivity with the contributing priate level of information on each ness. We achieved this crosstalk nations. The result was compre- system, while continually providing not only through daily interaction but hensive Internet information flow to timely and accurate information flow also through formal conferences and from U.S. intelligence soldiers to KFOR headquarters. We were sponsored by the KFOR G2. who were working with the Russian, unable to create the most efficient Polish, and Greek intelligence sec- information flow until we established Conclusion tions. secure connectivity with the KFOR During its six months as MNB-E The G2 operations section, how- main headquarters and a connection G2 Operations, the 2d Brigade, 1st ever, could not rely solely on infor- to U.S. elements using the Defense Infantry Division, S2 section fell back mation from the ACTs and battalion Secure Network (DSN) over MSE. on several fundamental principles to S2 sections. It was important that It was also important that we perform its role. Good crosstalk, all G2 operations section members quickly learned the NATO report and development of common SOPs, re- made frequent trips into the sec- INTSUM formats used by the KFOR liance on the basic IPB tenets, and tor to see first-hand how the situa- headquarters and the other contrib- a strong desire to develop a com- tion was developing on the ground. uting members. Similarly, it was im- mon picture of the battlefield allowed It was too easy for the intelligence portant that we understood the us to reorganize, refocus, and com- section to bury itself, reading in- methods that other organizations plete our mission. telligence summaries (INTSUMs) used to move their intelligence infor- and daily situation reports mation throughout the province of Captain Greg Lisi is currently the Com- (SITREPs), losing perspective on Kosovo. mander of B Company, 101st Military what was really happening. We The asymmetric nature of the Intelligence Battalion, 1st Infantry Di- could not provide quality first-line Kosovo AO made it critical that we vision. He served as G2 Operations analysis to the battle staff if we had Officer, Task Force Falcon, from June knew what was happening with the to December 1999. His previous as- not frequently left the confines of other brigades. We needed to have TF Falcon Headquarters to visit the signments include S2, 2d Brigade, 1st direct contact with other contribut- Infantry Division; S2, 1st Battalion, 26th different MNB-E sectors. ing nations in order to provide accu- Infantry Regiment; Assistant S3, Scout Interaction with the KFOR G2 rate intelligence support to current Platoon leader, and Assistant S2 for 1st brought its own unique set of chal- operations. While English is the offi- Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st lenges. Communications and con- cial language of NATO, language Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. nectivity was the first problem. While skills often served as an impediment CPT Lisi is a graduate of the Armor MNB-E relied on SIPRNET, secure to information sharing. Fortunately, Officer’s Basic Course, the Military In- telligence Imagery Officers Course, the frequency modulation (FM), and our immediate boundary was with the Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) British in Multinational Brigade–Cen- the Military Intelligence Officers Ad- communications for the passing of tral (MNB-C), with whom we share a vance Course. CPT Lisi holds a Bach- intelligence information, KFOR common language. The free flow of elor of Arts Degree in Government from worked with its own independent people across brigade sectors, the Harvard University.

January-September 2001 39 1 2

1. Orthodox church and Mosque stand side by side in Urosevac - Ferizaj. 2. MG Abizaid talks with 101 MI Bn’s MSG Newton and other TF 101 MI maintenance personnel on Camp Bondsteel. 3. A Co, 101 MI, moves into their SeaHut. 4. The beginning of TF 101 MI HQ. 4 5. TF 101 MI soldiers continued to train even while deployed. Preparing to enter Quick Shoot M16 range. 6. SSG Peoples, TF 101 MI operations sergeant, in the TOC.

Photos courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

5 6

40 Military Intelligence by Captains Kirk A. Loving, 1999, the 101st MI Battalion reor- hearsal Exercise where the ACTs Jason B. McCoy, David P. ganized into general support (GS) trained in 96B skills and Kosovo- Payne, Jeffrey Thurnher, and areas of responsibility. C Company related situational awareness. First Lieutenant replaced the Russian ACT and the However, these training events did Melanie Shippitka Monteith ACT, which were now pro- not prepare the ACTs for operating viding support to TF 2-2 IN and TF with their allied units, and it did not realistically represent the work When the North Atlantic Treaty Or- 1-63 AR from 3d BCT. D Company they would do while deployed. They ganization (NATO) finalized the replaced the Greek and Polish gained most of this knowledge Military Technical Agreement, it in- ACTs. through on-the-job-training during curred the immediate task of or- Each ACT consisted of one MI the deployment. The situation was ganizing and deploying the Lieutenant, one Intelligence Ana- unique for all involved because this U.S.-led contingent of NATO lyst or Counterintelligence Agent was the first time we worked in this Kosovo Force, Multinational Bri- (96B or 97B, respectively) non- capacity with units from Russia, gade-East (MNB-E). Immediately commissioned officer in charge, Poland, and Greece, and we had after the signing, the 101st Mili- and one or two 96B enlisted sol- no standing operating procedure tary Intelligence Battalion quickly diers. The Russian ACT had one (SOP) for integrating an ACT into deployed assets, including Analy- Voice Intercept Operator (98G) allied units. Unfortunately, each al- sis and Control Teams (ACTs) Russian linguist added to provide lied unit used its ACT in a slightly throughout the MNB-E sector, to translation between the ACT and different manner. Therefore, without the U.S. and the newly identified Russian unit. Each ACT used one standard baseline SOP, each allied battalions in the U.S. sec- maps, overlays, the TF Falcon hu- ACT trained only to meet the needs tor. This article discusses how man intelligence database (known of the particular allied nation it sup- they trained, organized, and oper- as Krypton), and mobile subscriber ported. ated during one of the most com- equipment to accomplish its mis- plicated peace enforcement sion. They also used a computer The majority of the training the operations in history. with connectivity to TF Falcon’s ACTs received was through rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Organization of the ACTs Analysis and Control Element (ACE) through the Secure Internet Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Ger- The 101st MI Battalion, 1st Infan- Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). many. They deployed to CMTC with try Division (1ID), used ACTs to Each remote ACT was collocated their habitual brigade S2, and pro- support maneuver battalions in the with a communications support vided support during high-intensity MNB-E sector of Kosovo during team from the 121st Signal Bat- conflict scenarios against oppos- the KFOR-1A and -1B rotations. talion and a Liaison and Coordina- ing forces. The ACTs, like every During the KFOR-1A, all four ACTs tion Element (LCE) from the 10th other unit that deployed to Kosovo, from B Company, the direct sup- Special Forces Group. completely refocused their training port MI company, we were based for peace support operations. For- at Camp Monteith. One ACT re- Pre-Deployment Training tunately, ACT personnel quickly mained on Camp Monteith and pro- adjusted their training focus and vided support to Task Force (TF) Before deploying to Kosovo, all deployed ready to perform their 1-26 Infantry and TF 1-77 Armor soldiers received the standard in- missions. (AR) from 1ID’s 2d Brigade Com- dividual readiness training to pre- bat Team (BCT). The other three pare them for the country’s ACT Operations ACTs deployed to remote sites and environment. They received in- Each ACT was a conduit for in- provided support to allied units: the struction in mine awareness, how telligence from TF Falcon to its Greek 501st Mechanized (Mech) to conduct vehicle and personnel subordinate battalions (U.S. and Battalion, Polish 18th Air Assault searches, how to talk to the me- allied), and this was their most vi- Battalion, and Russian 13th Tacti- dia, and how to react to direct and tal role. This role was more critical Group (TG). For the KFOR-1B indirect fire. Following this training, cal for the allied ACTs because the rotation, beginning in December they participated in a Mission Re- allied S2s were not familiar with

January-September 2001 41 their U.S. higher headquarters. By comfortable asking questions and Commander did not see the need using the SIPRNET connection, obtaining information during his vis- for the levels of planning that are each ACT ensured that its sup- its to Camp Bondsteel. The ACT common in U.S. operations, so the ported unit had the latest intelli- also ensured there was a sharing ACT had to constantly communi- gence products from the TF Falcon of information between the Greek cate to ensure relationships and ACE. battalion and U.S. units operating operations between TF Falcon and in the area, to include the field The ACT Supporting the Polish the 13th TG ran efficiently. HUMINT team (FHTs). Battalion frequently provided as- Maintaining communication con- sistance to the Polish S2 and staff The Monteith ACT provided first- nectivity from remote sites was during mission analysis for recon- line analysis for the two U.S. TF one of the greatest challenges for naissance and surveillance mis- S2s at Camp Monteith. They gath- all the ACTs. SIPRNET was the pri- sions. They also assisted in ered all information collected by mary carrier for almost all products preparing intelligence annexes, the units operating in their areas provided to units and the ACE. The conducting terrain analysis, and of operations (AOs) and provided ACT locations were anywhere from developing enemy courses of ac- intelligence products to the TF thirty minutes to two hours from tion. S2s. They cross-referenced raw Camp Bondsteel, making it too data with patrol reports and S2 The Russian government did not long a delay to courier products. INTSUMS to produce an accurate approve employing an ACT with Each ACT depended on a small de- intelligence picture on a daily ba- the 13th Tactical Group until Sep- tachment from the 121st Signal sis. The Monteith ACT did not face tember 1999. Initially, the ACT Battalion to maintain their the operational challenge of work- translated daily Russian reports SIPRNET link. Initially, the signal ing with an allied unit, but it did and created the 13th TG Intelli- soldiers were not familiar with the face the challenge of working with gence Summaries (INTSUMs). equipment with which they de- multiple S2s and ensuring that the Eventually, they provided daily ployed, and it took several weeks intelligence products they gener- INTSUMs for the 13th TG Com- for the link to become a depend- ated met the unit commander’s mander and served as the primary able means of communication. needs. pipeline for requests for informa- The ACT’s small size also pre- tion and imagery from the ACE to Challenges sented a challenge for the soldiers. the 10th Group LCE. They also pro- Doctrinally, an ACT has a habitual For example, when the ACT sup- vided information to any U.S. units relationship with the maneuver bri- porting the Greeks deployed for- conducting missions in the area gade S2, and provides support to ward to Mitrovica in support of including field HUMINT, military that S2 when the brigade deploys. 3-504th Parachute Infantry Regi- police (MP), psychological However, the ACTs in Kosovo con- ment, the 501st Mech Battalion operations(PSYOP), civil affairs stantly supported S2s with whom was without their ACT for the du- (CA), and engineers. The Russian they had never worked before. ration of the operation. The next ACT quickly became the U.S. in- Three of the four ACTs supported time the Greek ACT deployed to telligence hub for their sector of S2s from other countries and had Mitrovica, they left one soldier be- Kosovo. to deal with language and opera- hind to provide intelligence support The ACT with the Greek Battal- tional differences on a daily basis. for the Greek Battalion. Since each ion provided the 501st Mech Bat- Often, patrol reports or INTSUMS ACT consisted of three to four sol- talion with the ability to obtain from allied units took hours to diers, they had to prioritize their products such as imagery and the translate and send to higher ech- work and provide the most critical local personalities and organiza- elons. This affected the ACT’s abil- information in a timely manner. tions databases. They also as- ity to correlate the incident with a Kosovo’s harsh conditions also sisted in intelligence preparation similar event and to predict follow- presented many problems during of the battlefield and mission on events before they happened. the initial months of the deploy- analysis for operations in the The ACT supporting the Russians ment. The ACTs operated in tents Urosevac sector of Kosovo. A cru- learned that operating with the where the heat and dust made it cial element for success was in- 13th TG was different from work- necessary to continuously clean tegrating the Greek S2 into TF ing with a NATO country. They op- computers and printers to keep Falcon’s staff operations. We in- erated in a command-driven them operational. Zip disks were troduced him to several individu- environment, with no real staff or the only disks capable of with- als in the ACE so that he felt staff process at all. The Russian standing the Kosovar dust, and

42 Military Intelligence 3.5-inch disks had a life expect- ancy of less than three days. Lessons Learned Lessons Learned ✹ There were several lessons Teach allied army customs, military operations, and language. learned during our pre-deployment ✹ Train peace support operations—specific tasks: working with training. ACTs serving with allied interpreters, NGOs, and local organizations. units need training on the sup- ✹ Use all resources available: MP, CA, FHTs, Signal Operations ported nation’s customs, military Command and Control Element, International Organizations, structures, and language. They NGOs. also need to know the mission of ✹ Maintain active communication between the collector and the CAs, MPs, FHTs, and Special analyst. Forces Liaison Teams and their ca- ✹ Use ACT to serve in linking the supported unit with its higher pabilities. We should incorporate headquarters; this is a vital role. the aspects of working in a peace support environment— such as working with interpreters, nongov- ernmental organizations (NGOs), Officer program in Garmisch, Ger- and local nationals— into future 889-6565/7305 or DSN 350-6565/ many. Loving enlisted in the Army training. Since the ACTs served as 7305. in 1988 as a Russian linguist-inter- the supported unit’s intelligence rogator. He attended basic training Captain David Payne is currently the links to TF Falcon, it was vital the at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, the Assistant S2, Brigade Combat ACT shared information with all of Defense Language Institute in Team, 1st infantry Division. He Monterey, California; and advanced these organizations to maintain served as the 13th Tactical Group individual training (AIT) at Fort current knowledge of their AOs. (Russian) ACT Leader from Decem- Huachuca, Arizona, and served with The ACTs provided efficient, timely, ber 1999 to June 2000. His previ- the 4th Psychological Operations and accurate intelligence to their ous assignments include Executive Group. He was Commissioned commands by knowing who knew Officer, Headquarters and Opera- through Officer Candidate School; what information and how best to tions Company (HHOC), 101st MI he attended Field Artillery Officer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, and obtain it. Basic Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. ACT Leader, A Company, 101st MI He has served in numerous posi- Finally, we cannot overemphasize Battalion. 1LT Payne holds a tions with the 17th Field Artillery Bri- how important it was to have regu- Bachelor of Arts degree in Political gade at Fort Sill. After attending the lar, face-to-face meetings between Science from Salisbury State Uni- Military Intelligence Officer Transi- the collectors and the analysts. It versity. tion and Officer Advanced Courses was crucial that the ACT effectively at Fort Huachuca, he was the Battal- Captain Jeff Thurnher is currently the convey requirements to the collec- ion S2 in to the 1st Battalion, 26th assistant S2 for Battalion, Infantry, in tors on the ground and ensure that Infantry, and subsequently was the Vilseck, Germany. The assistant Opera- all reports received for analysis S3 training officer and All-Source tions Officer in Headquarters, 101st MI Intel Chief at the 101st MI Batallion. were accurate and timely. Although Battalion, 1ID, and previously served CPT Loving holds a Russian stud- this was more difficult with allied as the assistant S2 for Battalion, In- ies degree from George Washing- units, it was no less important. fantry, in Vilseck, Germany. 1LT ton University. The most important lesson we Thurnher has a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Virginia. learned was that the ACT was the Captain Jason McCoy’s current as- Readers can contact him via E-mail critical link between each supported signment is as Platoon Leader, D at [email protected] or by Company, 101st MI Battalion. He unit and TF Falcon in Kosovo’s mul- telephone at DSN 314-350-7213. tinational environment. As the served as an ACT Chief with the Greeks in Multinational Brigade– Kosovo mission continues, the First Lieutenant Melanie Shippitka East, Kosovo, Task Force Falcon, ACTs’ procedures and capabilities is currently the C Company Opera- will become more refined to meet the from December 1999 to June 2000. 1LT McCoy holds a Bachelor of Arts tions Platoon Leader, 101st MI needs of the units they support.✹ degree in Business and Economics Battalion, 1ID in Wuerzburg, Ger- from the Virginia Military Institute. many. She has also served as the Readers may reach him via E-mail Camp Monteith ACT Chief support- Captain Kirk Loving is currently en- at [email protected] and ing 1-63 Armor Battalion and 2-2 tering the Russian Foreign Area telephonically at commercial 0931- Infantry Battalion from December

January-September 2001 43 1999 to June 2000 in Operation tary Intelligence Officer Basic Course. guished military graduate of John JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR-1B). This 1LT Shippitka holds a Bachelor of Ex- Carrol University. Readers may con- was her first assignment after the Mili- ercise Science degree and is a distin- tact her at [email protected].

ACT In Action–In Mitrovica by Captain Jason B. McCoy had stretched the French forces to the current situation in Mitrovica. their limits, KFOR units from other The most critical tools needed in- By the end of 1999, the peacekeep- areas of Kosovo began providing cluded combat acetate, markers, ers in Kosovska-Mitrovica saw the temporary reinforcement. My ACT various maps and imagery of the fragile peace deteriorate in this eth- deployed to support a 3/504th com- city, and a SIPRNET (Secure nically divided city. In January pany-size combat element, mark- Internet Protocol Router Network) 2000, tensions passed the boiling ing the first time that an ACT computer. The SIPRNET provided point as Serbs and Albanians deployed in support of a company- us a secure communications link clashed in the streets and on the size element. Our ACT consisted with the rest of the U.S.-controlled bridges spanning the Ibar River, of two intelligence analysts (96B) zone (MNB-E). One of our 96Bs re- which divides the city into ethnic and one intelligence officer (35D). connoitered Mitrovica on an ad- enclaves. Seeing no immediate end Our mission was to provide as vance reconnaissance mission two to the riots, the KFOR Commander much real-time analysis as pos- weeks before our deployment. His ordered Multinational Brigade-East sible to support elements of the 3/ reconnaissance gave the ACT in- (MNB-E) (the U.S.-led Brigade) to 504th PIR, and to serve as the valuable information, allowing us to reinforce the French peacekeepers communications conduit for both gain a working knowledge of the in Mitrovica. Through January and intelligence and operations traffic city. He explained in detail the un- February MNB-E deployed four task to MNB-E headquarters. rest between the Albanian popula- forces into Mitrovica. Two of these tion in the South and the Serbian out-of-sector operations included Deployment of the ACT population in the North, a result of an Analysis and Control Team and Support the desire for control of an area rich (ACT). This article details the third Immediately upon notification of in natural resources. He also out-of-sector operation—Mitrovica. our deployment, we collected all showed us the location and impor- The Mission necessary tools and supplies and tance of the two traffic bridges and then familiarized ourselves with one footbridge that connects the In late February 2000, my ACT, which normally worked in direct support (DS) to the Greek 501st Mechanized (Mech) Battalion, deployed to Kosovska Mitrovica to support the 3/504th Parachute In- fantry Regiment (PIR).The 3/504th had the mission of reinforcing Mitrovica in what was dubbed Op- eration Ibar. Mitrovica is located in northern Kosovo and within the French sector (MNB-N), approximately 70 kilometers north of the U.S. headquarters at Camp Bondsteel. The Ibar River divides the city geographically and ethni- cally. Kosovar Serbs live primarily on the northern side of the river and Kosovar Albanians on the southern John Rovegno. Photos courtesy of LTC side. Because unrest in the city Albanian demonstrators march in Mitrovica.

44 Military Intelligence divided city. Finally, upon receipt of our attached interrogation/human intelligence (HUMINT) team, we deployed to Mitrovica in our Field Liter Ambulance (FLA), which provided the necessary workspace to operate on the move. With the satellite hook-up from the 121st Signal Battalion, we were operational three hours after arrival in Mitrovica. Shortcomings Our primary mission in Mitrovica was to consolidate all intelligence and to provide the 3/504th PIR’s S2 with the latest analysis. Initially, we relied on the Intelligence assets of the French forces but, unfortunately, some allies hesitated HUMINT teams establish operations in Mitrovica. when we required support, and we collection in order to support our seemed to be the low priority for telligence and feed it directly to the commander and soldiers properly. intelligence distribution. We also S2 and the commanders on the We therefore asked TF 101 MI for requested that 3/504th soldiers ground. The LLVI team did a great support to fill the void. Our com- bring back information from their service for the intelligence commu- mander, working in conjunction patrols in sector. The 3/504th PIR’s nity with their support to the 3/ with the British forces reinforcing first mission met with stiff resis- 504th PIR. They not only gave the Mitrovica, then brought forward or- tance as Serbian crowds congre- U.S. Army intelligence community ganic collection assets to support gated around the soldiers. The a better image with the infantry bat- the 3/504th. Serbs then followed the patrols, talion, with which they worked, but harassing them by throwing rocks Low-Level Voice Intercept also earned a great deal of respect and yelling profanities. Fortunately, (LLVI) among their peers. the 3/504th soldiers maintained TF 101 MI employed an LLVI HUMINT Support their composure and came out of team of six Army intercept opera- TF 101 MI’s Interrogation Team the incident with no serious inju- tors and four contract linguists. also deployed to Mitrovica. Despite ries. Understanding that we They provided real-time intelligence severe constraints placed on them needed a better way to predict and to the commander on the ground, by the French Commander, the track possible threats for these giving the commander the oppor- team accomplished great things patrols, we began seeking addi- tunity to be proactive rather than while there. Although the French tional intelligence sources. reactionary. The most critical Commander did not allow them The second mission during the Al- pieces of information provided by access to detainees during the cor- banian protest march from Priština the LLVI team were indications and don and search operations, they to Mitrovica also caused my team warning (I&W) of planned riots. The did not let this stop their mission. difficulties. Approximately 200,000 LLVI team also provided informa- The team coordinated with the Albanians participated in the tion in so timely a manner that the United Nations Mission in Kosovo– march to Mitrovica, a protest 3/504th Commander was even Police (UNMIK-P) to interrogate against perceived French support able to determine when and where the current and incoming UNMIK- for the Serbs. Reconnaissance did his soldiers were under observation P detainees. The information ob- not begin tracking the crowd’s throughout the sector. The LLVI tained from these interrogations progress until they were at the city team also was able to determine allowed us to start a database of limits. Thus, we had no real intelli- call signs and names of individu- criminals in the area. The interro- gence or warning as to what might als and began databasing the lo- gation team brought great credit to happen that day. We realized that cal population. This gave the ACT the intelligence community and we needed organic intelligence a chance to analyze real-time in- made the ACT’s job easier.

January-September 2001 45 Later Deployments In addition to the previously mentioned lessons, we also learned An ACT from TF 101 MI would de- the following: ploy to Mitrovica twice more, once in support of the Greek 501st Mech ✹ National sensitivities often prevent intelligence sharing be- Battalion and once with the Polish tween military forces. 18th Air Assault (AA) Battalion. ✹ Out-of-sector operations need dedicated intelligence collec- The ACT used the lessons learned tion capabilities. from the first deployment to sup- ✹ Sufficient bandwidth must be available to receive and dis- port the follow-on missions. Since seminate intelligence products. future missions also took ACTs ✹ Backfill all intelligence capabilities before deploying on out- from their habitually supported of-sector operations. units and placed them in support of new units, we made the deter- Figure 1. Lessons Learned from the ACT Operations in Mitrovica. mination that the ACT had to sepa- Deploying ACTs out of the MNB-E represented the Military Intelligence rate into two parts to continue sector went relatively smoothly. The community extremely well.✹ intelligence support to our allied biggest challenge to the ACTs was battalions in MNB-E. Thus, one in maintaining a continuous flow of soldier remained at the ACT base intelligence. Since we did not have while the other two deployed to Captain Jason McCoy’s current assign- a full complement of U.S. intelli- ment is as Platoon Leader, D Company, Mitrovica. gence collectors on the ground, a 101st MI Battalion. He served as an The LLVI team deployed again steady flow of information often did ACT Chief with the Greeks in Multina- with the Polish 18th AA Battalion. not exist, which left U.S. soldiers tional Brigade–East, Kosovo, Task This was the first time we knew of relying on other countries for intelli- Force Falcon, from December 1999 to an intercept team deploying in di- gence collection. However, the ACT June 2000. 1LT McCoy holds a Bach- elor of Arts degree in Business and rect support of an allied battalion. proved to be a great asset in Economics from the Virginia Military They succeeded in large part be- Mitrovica allowing the S2 to plan Institute. Readers may reach him via cause of the frequency and call while the ACT analyzed intelligence. E-mail at [email protected] and sign databases that they had All the MI soldiers who deployed to telephonically at commercial 0931-889- started during their first rotation. Mitrovica did an outstanding job and 6565/7305 or DSN 350-6565/7305.

RATES

DISCOVER

exp. date ______

Commander. U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CD,FDR CDFort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

46 Military Intelligence

SustainedSustained CompanyCompany Operations:Operations: LessonsLessons fromfrom thethe GSGS MIMI CompanyCompany inin KosovoKosovo

101 by Captain Robert A. Culp, II A MI MI In February 1999, the 1st Infantry Di- vision (1ID) in Germany began a deliberate planning process to conduct a forced entry operation into Kosovo MI ACE HQ to perform peacemaking operations. Ops The training for this mission, from individual to collective and leader training, began immediately and ASI/ S1 S3 lasted until two weeks before units MI OCE Production CM & D of the 1ID began deploying to S4 Kosovo in June 1999. The training Systems TC & P/ included individual readiness train- IPW CI Control Targeting ing and a Mission Rehearsal Exer- cise at the Combat Maneuver G2X NIST Supply Maint Training Center (CMTC), demanding maneuver live-fire exercises, and survival, evasion, resistance, and es- CMD Grp & Drivers cape (SERE) training for leaders and flight crews. The successful 78-day air campaign in Kosovo (Operation KEY: IPW-Interrogation, Enemy Prisoner of ALLIED FORCE) negated the re- ACE-Analysis and Control Element War quirement to perform a forced entry ASI-Additional Skill Identifier Maint-Maintenance operation. This change in the nature CI-Counterintelligence NIST-National Intelligence Support of the upcoming operation caused CM&D-Collection Management and Team leaders at every level to expend Dissemination OCE-Office of the Chief of Engineers enormous amounts of time prepar- Grp-Group TC&P-Tecnical Control and Processing ing training and equipment as well as developing deployment and em- Figure 1. TF Falcon GS MI Company in August 1999. ployment orders. grown to 125 soldiers, sailors, air- Plan Before You Go A Company, 101st Military Intel- Leaders without SOPs for sus- men, marines, and civilians. ligence Battalion, deployed to taining operations in a deployed Kosovo in two “serials,” over two The 101st MI Battalion and the environment will face certain weeks, in June 1999. Upon arriv- company leadership quickly re- challenges, even after intense ing in theater, the company realized that the unit’s standing preparation. They will need to ceived immediate augmentation by operating procedures (SOPs), simultaneously plan and ex- a National Intelligence Support although adequate for high-inten- ecute missions in an uncertain Team (NIST) and Field Human In- sity conflict or operations at the and unfamiliar environment. telligence Teams (FHTs) from the combat maneuver training com- Units will have to focus almost 165th MI Battalion. In July, FHTs plex, were inadequate for opera- exclusively on executing the and an organizational control ele- tions from a base camp in troop-leading procedures for ment (OCE) from the 519th MI Bat- Kosovo. The simple ideas pre- these new missions and will of- talion as well as national level sented below will help all units ten fail to take the time to de- human intelligence (HUMINT) sup- transition from the training cycles velop a comprehensive unit SOP port replaced the 165th FHTs. By of garrison operations to sus- that addresses the necessary August 1999, the general support tained operations in a deployed policies required for extended (GS) MI Company in Kosovo had environment. operations.

January-September 2001 53 The types of processes and ics above must be balanced and explosives in vehicles? Current range policies that sustain a unit in realistic and allow soldiers to practices in most units and field garrison will also sustain them in visit one another during off-duty training exercises with blank ammu- a deployed environment. The hours without creating dissen- nition do not adequately address SOPs will be effective when sion or low morale for other these considerations. modified in a well thought out, groups. Maintenance operations. Fail- deliberate, integrated manner. Security of arms, ammunition, ure to develop an aggressive Units that do not take the time and explosives. We must realis- maintenance program before de- to properly modify their SOPs to tically address the security of ployment can have disastrous meet the local U.S. Task Force arms, ammunition, and explo- consequences. While units can policies will be forced to develop sives. Since unit arms rooms will use most of their garrison SOPs expedient solutions for problems most likely not exist. The standard in a deployed environment with a and incidents as they occur. This sensitive-items reports that sustain little modification, it is vitally im- is dangerous because policies units through field exercises will portant for the chain of command created “on the fly” are not not be sufficient to address the to communicate maintenance thoughtfully developed and end range of activities in which soldiers standards while on deployment. up conflicting with each other or and units will be involved during an This will quickly dispel the rumor with local policies. Worse, poli- extended deployment. The more a that maintenance standards will cies and procedures developed unit operates its deployed arms be different when deployed. Fail- hastily may not pass a legal re- room like a garrison arms room, ing to meet the standard before view if tested, may violate local the less likely the unit is to lose deployment will result in many or Army regulations, or may have accountability of sensitive items. hours of work for the mainte- second- or third-order effects that While soldiers will most likely re- nance section and the chain of are damaging to unit morale. tain their individual firearms and command to get maintenance Control Measures ammunition, it is not realistic to operations up to standard. SOPs and policies are really a expect every team and squad to Soldiers will still need training and set of control measures used to guard its crew-served weapons, licensing on unit equipment. Did guide individual and unit behav- mines, pyrotechnics, or nightvision the unit instructor driver (UID) en- ior through routine actions so goggles around the clock for ex- sure that all current drivers’ li- their handling is consistent, fair, tended periods of time. Where will censes for deployed soldiers are and efficient. Some examples of the unit store this equipment? Who in the Unit-Level Logistics Sys- control measures that require will guard it? Who has the author- tem-Ground (ULLS-G) computer? implementation through policies ity to issue and receive these Did the UID bring the company UID follow. items? What is the mechanism for book and appropriate regulations Cohabitation, visitation, and controlling the inventory of stored for training and licensing drivers? sharing of facilities. Soldiers of items? The unit should address all Units must conduct and track ser- different genders deployed to an the above questions before arriv- vices on all categories of unit austere location may not have ing in theater. equipment and must calibrate separate facilities for sleeping Weapons and ammunition tools. The Army Oil Analysis Pro- and hygiene for a period of time. safety. Proximity to large numbers gram will eventually become opera- Eventually the chain of command of weapons and ammunition pre- tional in the theater. All of these must decide whether male and sents a safety issue that must be maintenance systems are admin- female soldiers may share tents addressed and briefed to soldiers be- istratively intensive. Units that de- or barracks. If they do, what con- fore they are issued the ammunition. ploy without the appropriate trol measures will be put into Failure to develop these policies be- manuals, documentation, forms, place to ensure that everyone’s fore a unit deploys will result in sol- and ULLS-G configuration are dignity and right to privacy are re- diers being issued ammunition and doomed to having an ineffective spected without adversely affect- discarding the packing material that maintenance program. Before de- ing the morale of a particular will help them maintain the ammu- ployment, enlist the expertise of group? Latrine use must similarly nition in a clean, safe manner for the the maintenance experts and ci- be considered. Married couples duration of the deployment. How will vilian contractors. This will help pre- who deploy together may wish to soldiers carry grenades or belted am- pare maintenance policies to cohabitate or have conjugal vis- munition on their person? What is ensure that the policies are ad- its. Policies that address the top- the stoage/load plan for mines and equate for extended operations in

54 Military Intelligence a deployed environment. This will workday and PT schedule to meet Similarly, leaders must carefully also ensure that the unit deploys soldier, mission, and Army stan- control and supervise the out pro- with all the required paperwork and dards. cessing of soldiers from the unit. documentation to maintain the In- Failure to establish clear out pro- telligence battlefield operating sys- It is not sensible to insist that all cessing guidelines supervised by soldiers assemble at 0630 for unit tem (BOS). first-line leaders and checked regu- PT every day. This type of program larly by everyone in the chain of Company administration. Stan- will fail because the mission will command can result in soldiers dard garrison procedures for pro- continuously intrude on the PT leaving the area of operations with cessing routine administrative plan. The objective of the PT pro- unit equipment. A strictly enforced actions may not apply in a de- gram should be to ensure that sol- SOP will ensure that soldiers deployed environment. Promotion diers remain fit and healthy and to part the theater with all awards and boards, personnel actions, pay in- develop unit esprit de corps. First- entitlements, while will drastically quiries, and a host of administra- line leaders who will lead small reducing the number of reports of tive procedures will be different teams of soldiers on intelligence survey for missing equipment. based on the servicing personnel collection operations should be and administration center (PAC) able to execute, without supervi- Simple Solutions and finance unit. Commanders and sion, a unit PT program that meets The issues addressed in this ar- first sergeants must sit down with basic standards. ticle may seem overly simple; how- unit S1s and PAC noncommis- Inprocessing and outpro- ever, “Murphy’s Law” is always in sioned officers early in the deploy- cessing. During extended military the details. The practical execu- ment to iron out the problems that operations, units will gain person- tion of routine company business will occur in adapting to the new nel when they receive replace- can be enormously difficult and systems. ments. Personnel will also leave time consuming for the company’s These issues make the impor- the theater due to sickness, injury, leadership if not properly set up tance of having SOPs and systems family emergency, or death. Sol- and executed. In order to be suc- for tracking administrative actions diers will arrive in country with a cessful, units must implement even more important than they are variety of backgrounds and expe- clear, directive unit SOPs and in garrison. The same types of riences. They may come from sis- policies before an extended data you track in unit orderly ter services or other government deployment.✹ rooms and at command and staff agencies. All will need training on meetings in garrison require track- the equipment that they will oper- ing in deployed units. Plan on hav- ate and the weapons they will Commissioned at New Mexico Mili- ing regularly scheduled meetings handle. They will need to know the tary Institute, Roswell, New Mexico, to sit down with the company and rules of engagement, uniform and Captain Robert Culp served as an battalion leadership to review this equipment standards, SOPs, and Infantry officer in the 101st Air- data, just as you would in garri- the policies and procedures of the borne Division at Fort Campbell, son. The inability to process rou- higher headquarters. The unit’s re- Kentucky. Following the MI Officer tine personnel actions because of placement training program is the Transition and Advanced Courses, inadequate tracking systems seri- most important, fundamental train- he served in a variety of positions ously decreases unit morale. ing program in the company; you in the G2, Division ACE, and S2 Physical Training. The decen- must strictly enforce it to be suc- for TF 1-26 IN in Bosnia with 1ID. tralized nature of a general support cessful. He commanded A Company, 101st MI company requires a realistic, First-line leaders are responsible MI Battalion, the GS MI Company, innovative approach to implement- for executing the program accord- for TF Falcon in Kosovo. CPT Culp ing a physical fitness program. ing to the standards that you set. is currently assigned as TF S2 Night time meetings with sources, First sergeants and commanders Observer/Controller at Joint Readi- shift work, early morning mainte- must spot check and supervise to ness Training Center, Fort Polk, nance recovery operations, and a ensure that the standards are met. Louisiana. Readers may con- host of other factors demand a flex- Failure to do so can endanger sol- tact the author via E-mail at ible physical training (PT) program. diers because of inadequate [email protected] (work) It must have achievable standards training or poorly maintained equip- or [email protected] (home) or and allow first-line supervisors the ment. This must be a zero-defect telephonically at (337) 531- latitude and flexibility to tailor the policy. 0162 and DSN (312) 863-0162.

January-September 2001 55 Kosovo: Ancient Battlefield, Ancient Enemies

by Lieutenant Colonels John S. Rovegno and T. Mitchell Cowan On 12 June 1999, just three days after Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson signed the Mili- tary Technical Agreement (MTA) with representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the lead elements of Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo. The path into Kosovo was through the nar- row Kacanic pass, a route very familiar to Task Force (TF) Falcon intelligence analysts who had Figure 1. NATO and the U.S. Sector. studied it in detail as a possible invasion route. Once in Kosovo, the with the Former Yugoslav Repub- no armor, no radio nets, and most scenes of the recent fighting be- lic of Macedonia to the south, FRY significantly no frontlines. came evident. We saw a few Alba- to the east, German sector to the The bombing campaign of Opera- nian flags (signs of a perceived west, and the British sector to the tion ALLIED FORCE had two sig- victory) but most apparent were the north (see Figure 1). nificant impacts on intelligence destroyed buildings, burned-out The pre-conflict population of the collection before our entry. First, cars, animal carcasses, land area was approximately 47,000 it reduced the telephone lines and mines at the side of the road, and Serbs and 400,000 Kosovar Alba- cellular telephone networks to a notable absence of people. nians. When U.S. elements en- rubble, effectively eliminating the This article discusses the forma- tered the MNB-E area of use of electronic surveillance to tion and deployment of KFOR and operational responsibility, there gather information. Second, the the differences between Kosovo were approximately 35,000 Serbs movement of the population out of and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We then and fewer than 1,000 Kosovar Al- Kosovo negated timely intelligence present a short lesson in Balkans banians. By 24 June 1999, nearly on ongoing operations. history and how it affects KFOR. 150,000 Kosovars had returned and retributions began. Collection operations encom- TF Falcon and MNB-E passed all facets of MNB-E. Pa- TF Falcon, the U.S. element led Establishing the trols, unmanned aerial vehicles by the 1st Infantry Division (1ID), Intelligence Baseline (UAVs), Special Operations and the Multinational Brigade-East Kosovo was an intelligence void. Forces (SOF), civil affairs (CA), psy- (MNB-E) entered Kosovo on 12 The MTA removed all Serb forces chological operations (PYSOP), June, established base camps from Kosovo; the Minister of Inte- force protection teams, U.S. Na- Monteith and Bondsteel, and com- rior Police (MUP), Paramilitary tional Intelligence Support Teams menced operations in the U.S. Forces, and Serbian Army (VJ) (NISTs), and North Atlantic Treaty sector. The Multinational Battal- forces had departed. The Kosovo Organization (NATO) partners all ions from Greece, Poland, and Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK)—its provided vital input. Collection fo- Russia augmented the Brigade. force composition never docu- cused on any area where Serbs re- MNB-E’s area of operations (AO) mented—entered cities and towns mained and along the border to the is in southeastern Kosovo; it in- to establish itself as the “rightful” east where the VJ stood poised to cludes the opstinas (counties) of government of the province. The return. It was quickly apparent that Kosovo Kamanecia, Novo Brdo, historical notion of “enemy” did not tensions would and did rise in the Gniljane, Vitina, Urosevac, Kacanic, apply. There were few uniforms areas of the most brutal ethnic and Strpce. The AO shares borders (some uniformed UÇK), no units, cleansing.

56 Military Intelligence Balkans History or honor. Personal honor is the pri- What is Different in mary principle of the code. Individu- Kosovo? Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it. als who break their word pay for In a word, everything. This was the offense, not in property but in not Bosnia—although it may have —George Santayana, The Life blood. In Kosovo, the extended looked like another Balkans of Reason family is the executor of retribution mess, it was completely different. and the blood feud exists today as There was no zone of separation: Kosovo is a history lesson. There a reason for retribution in Kosovo. Serbs and Albanians lived side by are no short-term memories, for- Family honor is at stake and sat- side, separated by language, giveness, or compassion where isfying that honor is paramount. It culture, and, for the most part, history is concerned. Whether it is easy to justify vengeance with an intense hatred fueled by more covers events of the past 600 years history as an ally. than 600 years of conflict. Alba- or the past week, history drives While personal honor is the banians and Serbs both claimed the the mindset of both Kosovar Alba- MNB-E region as their own and sic principle of the code, another nian and Serb. It is a history set principle is the besa (oath) equiva- there was plenty of fight left on in epic poem1, storytelling, and both sides. lent to one’s word of honor, which folk song. To understand the creates a situation of inviolable The initial threat, the VJ, was people, you must first understand trust. No contract or witness is gone, as were the MUP and the bru- their past, however skewed it is. necessary for an oath to be bind- tal paramilitary. There was no judi- History is a standing priority intel- ing. One forestalls the burden of ciary or civil government to ligence requirements (PIR). To “entering into” a besa by not say- administer the law and govern the gain the advantage and disrupt an ing something unless intending to people. Organized crime inflated event, action, or revenge, learn the deliver. prices and established storefronts. history of the town, opstina, and Much of the Albanian history of Violence and retribution continued. clan (family) (see Figure 2). The Albanian population, which had revolts and rebellions is attribut- fled under the relentless pressure The Albanian People able to the internalization of the of Serb intimidation, returned and One cannot understand the Alba- kanun. Bloodshed is the only rem- immediately sought vengeance. nian people without understanding edy to dishonor; a person must arm Whether personal or clan, this ret- the code (kanun) of Leke himself at all times to be ready to ribution was part of the Albanian Dukagjine. (He was a powerful 15th protect his honor. The implications code discussed later in this article. century Albanian feudal lord gen- for KFOR are obvious. One of the In areas where Serbs had commit- erally credited with the formation peacekeepers’ primary tasks is ted atrocities against Albanian of the code.) This “code” has an confiscation of weapons, but the families, the Albanians struck back impact on a person’s word (besa) Albanians believe they cannot give hard and without mercy. They used threats, intimidation, and violent attacks to drive the remaining Serbs 7th Century - Slavic Serbian Territory from Kosovo. In areas around 12th - 14th Century - Serbian Independence Urosevac (now Ferazai), the Serb 1389 - The Battle - Kosovo Polje - Turks Win population dwindled from 5,000 to 1690 - 1738 - Serbs Fled fewer than 25 in 3 months. 1878 - Treaty of Berlin - Serbs Independent In the first nine months of MNB- 1914 - WWI - Kingdom of Serbs, Croats & Slovenes E operations, more than one thou- 1944 - WWII - Tito liberates Yugoslavia - Detaches Kosovo sand incidents occurred between 1963 - Kosovo Receives Autonomous Status Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. 1989 - Milosevic Revokes Kosovo Autonomy These included 826 reports of 1991 - Kosova Shadow Government hostile fire, 24 mortar or recoil- 1996 - UÇK Formed less rifle attacks, 144 grenade 1998 - MUP Sent to Quell Unrest attacks, 63 mine strikes, and 1998 - UN Observers Enter numerous physical assaults. 1999 - Peace Talks / UNSCR 1244 / MTA Hostile action resulted in the death of 1 MNB-E soldier and 32 wounded. Figure 2. Kosovo: A Short History.

January-September 2001 57 them up. Family retribution retains the roads, 70 percent of small busi- and RUGGED NAUTILUS. He joined honor no matter who is in control. nesses in Kosovo have restarted, the 1st Infantry Division in April 1997 and the main population areas’ as the G2, serving as G2, Task Force I grieve for my birth place, necessity streets have a continuous succes- Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina for six and misfortune compelled me to months. LTC Rovegno remained the sion of cafes and bars. However, move. My father and grandfather and 1ID G2, working extensively in Ger- great-grandfather are buried in problems still exist and infrastructure many and Macedonia until February Kosovo; my heart is down there. I’ll is still weak. Kosovo still operates 1999 when he took command of the never be myself here, in spirit I’m without light or heavy industry. The still in Kosovo. 101st MI Battalion and deployed with water system is problematic every- the battalion as part of the Kosovo where and many towns use shallow Initial Entry Force in June, remain- — Serb worker after fleeing to ing in Kosovo just over one year. He Serbia from Kosovo, August 1999 wells sited beside outhouses. A ju- dicial system and local government is a graduate of the MI Officer Basic The Serbs are still lacking, but the elections are and Advanced Courses, Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Officer Course, Kosovo has been a part of the na- a step in the right direction. However, Command and General Staff Col- tional consciousness of the Serbian a government that represents only people for six centuries. The basic lege, and the Armed Forces Staff one side can never solve the prob- College. LTC Rovegno received a ethical values bequeathed to the lems or overcome the history each Bachelor of Science degree in Serbians on Vidovdan in 1389 are holds so dear. Business Administration from impressed in the innermost being of Indicators of normalcy abound, but Shippensburg University, Pennsyl- every Serb. Every nation has one vania, and a Master of Public Admin- as George Santayana asserted, date in its history that it considers istration degree from the University most important; for the Serbs, that “History cannot be forgotten.” Secu- of Missouri. He is currently attending date is 15 June by the old calendar rity in the region exists because of the War College. Readers can reach or 28 June by the new or Vidovdan our presence; it will last only as long him via E-mail at john-rovegno@ calendar. On that day in 1389, as KFOR soldiers are there. The us.army.mil. Serbian and Turkish armies clashed situation still requires an international on the Kosovo Field. end-state. If the international community develops the right strategy, Lieutenant Colonel Mick Cowan is cur- To the Serbs, Kosovo is their Holy we can act now at a much lower cost rently the Chief, Intelligence Support Land, the cradle of Serbdom, which in personnel and other resources contains their inalienable historical, to Acquisition and Current Intelligence, than if we wait for the situation to Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, national, and cultural heritage. deteriorate further. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Vidovdan, 15 June 1389, is not just Endnote Command. He has served in a variety the date of a battle but the day the of intelligence positions including S2 for national identity was born; the will 1. Task Force Falcon’s name comes from an epic Serb poem. Its first three lines 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 25th Infantry and testament containing religious, are— Division (Light). He served as S2, 1st ethical, and national principles that Brigade, and Commander, A Company, guided all Serb generations since. The Fall of the Serbian Empire 124th Military Intelligence Battalion with In the national conscious, that his- Yes, and from Jerusalem, O the 24th Infantry Division, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. While assigned to the 1st In- toric day divides Serbian history. On from that holy place, A great fantry Division, he served as G2 Plans the Kosovo Field on Vidovdan, the gray bird, a taloned falcon flew! Officer for TF Eagle in Bosnia, and G2 Serbs chose by unwritten pledge Plans Officer and Deputy G2 with G2 their religious, cultural, ethical, and Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno TF Sabre, Macedonia, G2 TF Falcon/ national identity and they live by that has served for more than 20 years Multinational Brigade-East in Kosovo, pledge today. as an intelligence officer throughout and Executive Officer, 101st Military KFOR and MNB-E are now charged the United States, Europe, and the Intelligence Battalion. He is a gradu- Middle East. His assignments in- ate of the Command and General Staff to protect the Serbs in their enclaves clude platoon leader, two company College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. and reverse the effects of social and commands, S2, the first S2 Ob- LTC Cowan earned a Bachelor of Sci- economic isolation brought on by the server/Controller at the Combat Ma- ence degree in Criminology from Saint Albanians. neuver Training Center, Battalion S3 Leo College and a Master of Science Conclusion and Executive Officer, Instructor, J2 in Management from Saint Mary Col- Operations Officer, and G2. While at lege. Readers may contact him via E- Life in Kosovo has clearly improved U.S. Army Central Command, he mail at thomas.cowan@monroe. during KFOR’s first year. Job growth deployed on several operations in- army.mil or cowantm@monroe continues and employment exceeds cluding VIGILANT WARRIOR, VIGI- .army.mil and telephonically at (757) that of the pre-war years, traffic clogs LANT SENTINEL, DESERT STRIKE, 728-5385 and DSN 680-4194.

58 Military Intelligence 1

1. Thumbs up for NATO. 2. BG Fast speaks with Intelligence soldiers at Camp Montieth. 3. Camp Bondsteel with mountains in background. 4. D Co, 101 MI, breaks the monotony with a donut eating contest. SPC Juan Aponte takes the gold.

Photos courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

January-September 2001 59 CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE TRADOC Analysis Center—Fort Lee Reconnaissance Study Part II: The Findings

! Virtual Exercise. Employing Legacy System and three newer by Michael P. Ley eight specific treatments, this systems include: Editors Note: The first article, exercise focused on the proposed ! RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter. “...Part I: The Study,” was in the July- TTP associated with the four sys- ! The Interim Armored Vehicle September 2000 issue of MIPB on tems under study. Fort Knox, (IAV). page 47. You can access it at the Kentucky, hosted this May 2000 ! The Future Scout and Cavalry MIPB website (http://huachuca- exercise. System (FSCS).1 usaic. army.mil/mipb/mipbhome/ ! Constructive Exercise. This ex- ! The Shadow 200 Tactical Un- welcome.htm). ercise examined the effective- manned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV). ness of the reconnaissance The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine The TRAC-Lee Reconnaissance systems and associated TTP Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief across the full spectrum of con- of Staff for Combat Developments study focused on those systems that will serve as the Army’s pri- ditions—terrain, threat, and vis- (DCSCD) designated the TRADOC ibility. The focus in this exercise Analysis Center, Fort Lee (TRAC- mary reconnaissance platforms through end of this decade. When was to further explore potential Lee) as the lead agency to conduct TTP and assess the effect on this study. The study focused on the fielded, combatant commanders and intelligence managers and mission accomplishment as four tactical reconnaissance sys- METT-TC (mission, enemy, ter- tems that the Interim Brigade Com- analysts will rely on these systems not only to collect informa- rain and weather, troops, and bat Team’s (IBCT) Reconnaissance, time available and civilians) con- Surveillance, and Target Acquisition tion critical to the outcome of the close battle, but in the case of the ditions varied. Whenever pos- (RSTA) Squadron would employ sible, the exercise contained through 2010. Comanche, to serve as a weapons platform and critical force sufficient replications to attain Purpose and Relevance of multiplier. Because of their value statistical validity and quantifica- the Study to combatant commanders, the tion of variations in performance IBCT’s S2 and intelligence ana- within each case or iteration and The purpose of this study was to lysts should have an understand- for each reconnaissance system. conduct a comprehensive examina- ing of both their information This exercise took place at White tion on how the IBCT’s RSTA collection capabilities and their Sands Missile Range, New Squadron could fulfill their reconnais- combat capabilities, limitations, Mexico, in July 2000. sance requirements using these and survivability factors. This ! Subject Matter Expert (SME) systems. The study also identified study provides information that is Map Exercise (MAPEX). In Sep- requirements and tactics, tech- important because it is relevant to tember 2000, the third in the se- niques, and procedures (TTP) for mission planning, ISR manage- ries of exercises and evaluations command and control (C2), commu- ment, and force design. TRAC-Lee was also at Fort Knox. This ex- nications and computers, and in- designed this reconnaissance study ercise focused on issues asso- telligence, surveillance, and to provide information in an exercise ciated with specific alternatives reconnaissance (ISR) architecture environment that is as realistic as and excursions not addressed by interface and technical improve- possible. All of the exercises used the constructive simulation. This ments to meet the maneuver a simulated Balkans environment. exercise also addressed employ- commander’s reconnaissance ment of the previously identified needs. Supporting Exercises reconnaissance systems within TRAC-Lee evaluated four recon- Three exercises supported the an urban environment, an envi- naissance systems. The one evaluation. These included: ronment in which their capabili-

60 Military Intelligence ploy under widely disparate ties would be weakest. This ex- METT-TC conditions? RAH-66 Comanche. The ercise used the target urban area ! What tactical C2, communica- Comanche is a powerful combi- of Pristina, where a mixed infan- tions and computers, and ISR nation of wide-area, rapid search try regiment—light and mecha- requirements exist to ensure sensors; terrain independent mo- nized—represented the threat. Army XXI cavalry and recon- bility; and highly lethal weapon Study Objectives naissance units can success- systems. The Comanche pro- and Issues fully obtain, fuse, share, and vided a powerful wide-area exploit battlefield information search capability, and across the Given METT-TC constraints, the across METT-TC extremes? battlefield. Linked to the C2, com- Reconnaissance Study explored ! What improvements to exist- munications and computers, and the TTP associated with the IAV, ing methodologies, models, ISR architecture, the Comanche TUAV, FSCS, and Comanche in and simulations would provide without equal in its ability to scenarios revealing their ex- better analysis of intelligence, maneuver to an area, quickly pected capabilities in 2007 and reconnaissance, and situ- assess the situation, and provide 2010. The objectives were to: ational awareness issues? this information to the unit’s com- ! Expand the body of knowl- mon operational picture (COP). edge concerning how IBCT Conclusions When needed, the Comanche RSTA units execute the com- The synergy of Comanche, TUAV, could provide lethal fires and di- bined arms reconnaissance IAV, and FSCS performing recon- rect effects such as artillery-de- mission. naissance as part of an internetted livered smart munitions or close ! Provide insights into the combined arms team, proved an ef- air support (CAS). value added by those sys- fective force on the battlefield. This tems in selected scenarios. force was able to conduct its re- IAV and FSCS. The IAV and ! Demonstrate the utility of connaissance mission, keep the FSCS offered a combination of a both manned and unmanned initiative, dominate the enemy, and wide search area, rapid search reconnaissance systems. move through the zone at will. sensors, and superior mobility, ! Supply criteria to determine and they operated with cavalry The situational awareness pro- scouts. The FSCS proved the the appropriate mix of sys- 2 vided by the robust C network fo- more capable of the systems. tems within reconnaissance cused the effort of the squadron’s organizations. Without a doubt, they were the organic reconnaissance systems, source of sustained situational ! Identify the synergies that and permitted these systems to occur when the reconnais- awareness within their areas of maneuver with less risk. As the operation. Their enhanced sensor sance systems are truly squadron combined its systems’ interoperable. packages facilitated their ability capabilities with the external ISR to detect the enemy at extended ! Contribute insights regarding network, the resulting situation the best C2 solutions. ranges, which often influenced awareness led to “self-synchroni- the squadron’s scheme of ma- TRAC-Lee, working in conjunc- zation” of the squadron’s battlefield neuver. Due to the diminished tion with the respective system pro- operating systems, which both observation capability of aerial ponents, identified four major enhanced the effectiveness of the reconnaissance platforms in issues. They studied these issues reconnaissance effort and further complex terrain, the squadron under a range of battlefield environ- minimized risk for the squadron. needed the IAVs and FSCSs to mental conditions and identified As designed, the 2007 scenario reconnoiter those areas. The sys- each system’s strengths and included use of the TUAV, IAV and tems, especially the FSCS, al- weaknesses within those specific Comanche while the 2010 scenario lowed the squadron to employ environments. The major issues included use of the TUAV, FSCS lethal indirect and direct fires on included: and Comanche. Each of these the enemy, based on their detec- ! How should Comanche, IAV, systems brought some degree of tion capabilities. Just as with the FSCS, and the TUAV inter op- unique reconnaissance capability TUAV, the IAV and FSCS, with erate as a combined arms re- to the squadron. When employed their laser-designation capabili- connaissance capability? simultaneously on the synthetic ties also served as “sensors” for ! What operational TTP will battlefield, these reconnaissance armed aerial platforms such as IBCT RSTA ground and air re- systems proved to be an extremely the Comanche and Air Force connaissance systems em- capable force. CAS.

January-September 2001 61 Endnote TUAV. The TUAV proved to be serve wider areas from a given operating location. In addition, im- 1. The U.S. Army plans to replace the a responsive reconnaissance sys- less capable IAV with the FSCS tem, minimizing risk to soldiers, proved sensor and laser between 2007 and 2010. providing detailed information re- performance would permit the garding focused areas, and offer- TUAV to achieve observation and ing a powerful capability as an direct effects from a greater stand- Mr. Mike Ley is currently a doctrine effective platform. The squadron off range. writer in the Doctrine Division, Direc- commander and his staff—prima- There are tremendous syner- torate of Combat Developments rily the S2 and fire support officer gies between Comanche, IAV, (DCD), in the U.S. Army Intelligence (FSO)—capitalized on the TUAV’s FSCS, and the TUAV. This com- Center and Fort Huachuca. He re- ability to assist in mission comple- bined arms force, leveraging tired from the Army in 1990. While on active duty, he served two tours tion. In particular, the TUAV was shared situational awareness, as a military advisor in the Republic useful in both the aerial reconnais- proved to be highly synergistic. of Vietnam. He also served as a Pol- sance and targeting roles. The S2 When higher echelon C2, commu- ish linguist at Field Station Berlin. He often deployed the TUAV well nications and computers, ISR was the Operations officer for the ahead of follow-on reconnaissance assets, and tactical reconnais- 265th Army Security Agency (ASA) assets to paint the picture of the sance systems were all using the Company and was the S2 for the 2/ zone of action. It effectively pro- same COP, self-synchronization 503d Infantry Battalion, 101st Air- vided critical information on ma- occurred as various elements of borne Division (Air Assault). He also neuver routes, danger areas, and the force reacted to a given situ- served as the Operational Test Of- ficer, at the U.S. Army Intelligence the final reconnaissance objec- ation. This synchronization ren- and Security Board, and an Inde- tives. However, the Mapping, Chart- dered the enemy initiative ineffective, pendent Evaluator, at the Fort ing, and Geodesy Utility Software making it a desirable feature during Huachuca Directorate of Combat Environment (MUSE) simulations future operations. The second effect Developments. He was the Collec- limited TUAV sensor performance of interface between higher ech- tion Management Liaison Officer for to threshold capabilities. This level elon and tactical assets is the the Third Republic of Korea (ROK) of sensor performance forced the constant ability for the tactical Army and later worked as a software TUAV to fly close to named areas assets to tune their actions to the test engineer on both the All-Source of interest (NAIs) and detected current situation. Finally, linking Analysis System (ASAS) and on the Hunter UAV project. He has a degree enemy systems, thus exposing the external ISR assets with tactical in Cartography from Ohio University, TUAV airframe to additional risk. reconnaissance systems cre- Athens. Readers may contact Mr. Ley Improved sensor performance ated an environment in which via E-mail at michael.ley@hua. would improve detection capabili- commanders could react swiftly army.mil or telephonically at DSN ties and permit the TUAV to ob- and directly.✹ 879-0979.

! The Army should continue movement toward internetted forces, tied to a near real-time shared situation awareness. The resulting agility and synergistic cooperation gives a unit combat power greater than is achievable by any other means. ! The Army should aggressively pursue further development and acquisition of advanced tactical reconnaissance platforms. The Comanche, IAV, FSCS, and TUAV all offer unique and powerful capabilities that will dramatically enhance reconnaissance effectiveness and directly affect the outcome of future Army operations. The Army should further develop each of these systems with a clear intent to incorporate automated and semi-automated data feeds into the C2 network. ! Development of advanced TUAV sensors should continue, particularly those efforts that provide the TUAV a wide-area search capability and improve its ability to observe from standoff positions. The Army should also consider providing the TUAV operator an aided target detection capability, similar to those planned for the Comanche and FSCS. ! Finally, any follow-on studies and model development efforts should better address ISR and information dominance issues.

Figure 1. Recommendations for Improving IBCT Reconnaissance.

62 Military Intelligence HUMINT Collection During Peace Operations (continued from page 17) Forms 2745 are available to each sponsibilities for local police, ties and go into the “booth” better MPs, soldiers, the criminal in- soldier in the unit who may detain prepared for questioning. The most suspects. vestigation division (CID), intelli- important lessons learned we can gence collectors, U.N. police, Conclusion share on peace operations include— and the units.✹ In the fog of operations, we can ! Work continuously with units to overlook routine and simple tasks. ensure that they understand the Efficient processing of EPWs and de- proper procedures to use in per- tainees improves the ability of sonnel detention and the rapid Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary HUMINT collectors to provide crucial evacuation of detainees to the Barnett is currently the CI Team Leader, intelligence information that aids in- rear. B Company, 101st MI Battalion. He telligence analysis. By standardiz- ! Obtain a legal opinion of what served as Chief, OCE, for TF Falcon ing reporting procedures, TF 101 MI HUMINT Collectors can and from March through June 2000. CW3 enabled HUMINT managers to focus cannot do based on the rules of Barnett holds a Bachelor of Liberal Arts on mission requirements and im- engagement (ROE) and the Law degree from the University of New York Regent’s College and is a graduate of proved asset management. The G2 of War. the Federal Bureau of Investigation had better information on the num- ! Prepare a standing operating National Academy. Readers may con- ber of persons detained and the rea- procedure (SOP) or memoran- tact him via E-mail at barnettg sons for detention. Our intelligence dum of agreement (MOA) that @hq.1id.army.mil and telephonically system could respond much faster delineates criminal investigation at 0931-889-7215 or DSN 350-7215/ to the questioning of HVT personali- and intelligence collection re- 7309.

Objective Force Needs High-Speed Strategic Lift and Leader Development

by Jim Caldwell FORT MONROE, VA. (TRADOC News Service, 18 July 2001) – Strategic high-speed air and sealift will be essential to get the Army’s Objective Force to a theater of operations within the 96-hour deployment goal. The current chain of command—brigade, division, corps, and echelons above corps—will still be necessary on the dispersed battlefields of the future. The second Transformation Wargame held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 22-27, showed that the Army must retain and develop these two areas to make Army Transformation a reality. “This objective force would be a force that would be combat-configured, ready to fight off the ramp,” said Bill Rittenhouse, director of wargames at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) headquarters. Rittenhouse oversees staging the annual wargames. Objective Force units can operate widely dispersed because of powerful ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) communication networks. Commanders can concentrate devastating direct and indirect fires on enemy targets without massing forces. The scenario for the wargame, called Vigilant Warriors 01, is set in 2015, with the countries of Iraq and Iran united to form the Independent Republic. The Republic is ready to go to war with Syria and Turkey, who have dammed the Euphrates River, threatening its water supply. Syria and Turkey, as allies, call the United States for help. TRADOC has published initial findings in the “Army Transformation Wargame 2001 booklet. Anyone interested may read or downloaded the report at: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/whatnew.htm. TRADOC Analysis Command is performing an in-depth study of the wargame. Their results will be published later this summer as the Army Transformation Wargame Integrated Analysis Report.

January-September 2001 63 PROPONENT NOTES

The Office of the Chief, Military In- Noncommissioned Officers Acad- MI Branch has been extremely telligence (OCMI), website con- emy (NCOA), Futures, and OCMI successful in brokering the MI tains timely information on briefed the Commanding General Corps position with incentive mon- proponent issues ranging from en- of the U.S. Army Intelligence ies for our soldiers. This year, how- listed career management field Center and Fort Huachuca ever, the Army has taken a (CMF) overviews by military occu- (USAIC&FH) on the proposed significant decrement in incentive pational specialty (MOS) to warrant implementation of the 98 CMF money, and we are no longer able officer current and archived news- merger. Major General John D. to shift incentive money from one letters. The address is http:// Thomas, Jr., concurred with pro- MI MOS to another MI MOS. Now, huachuca-usaic. army.mil/ocmi/. ceeding to merge the functionality all Army MOSs compete for the We regularly update this site, and of MOS 98J (Electronic Intelli- same shared funds. it has undergone recent improve- gence [ELINT] Interceptor/Analyst) One of our greatest concerns is ments. Please add our site to your (the technical ELINT functions) the issue involving Star MOSs. As “favorite” resources for the latest in- with 98K (Signals Collection/Iden- of December 2000, we have 10 of formation on the MI Corps. tification Analyst) creating the new our 13 MI MOSs listed as Star Enlisted Actions multimode MOS, 98Y. Additionally, MOSs for the Sergeant and/or Staff We have completed the first year the 98J operational ELINT func- Sergeant ranks. Only 96U (Un- of the new century. It seems just a tions will merge into MOS 98C manned Aerial Vehicle [UAV] Op- short while ago that I joined OCMI (Signals Intelligence [SIGINT] Ana- erator), 97E (Human Intelligence and stepped into a rapidly paced lyst). Collector), and 98G (Cryptologic environment undergoing some radi- There is still a great deal of coor- Linguist) MOSs are not listed as cal changes. We had just com- dination necessary as we discuss Star MOSs. Leaders must take a pleted the Functional Review and changing each affected billet with close look at their respective or- the Functional Assessment Analy- the appropriate major Army com- ganizations and determine whether sis. The new Tactical Unmanned mands. The effective date of imple- the Specialists and Sergeants in Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) had just mentation will follow in an NOFC their units who are eligible for pro- been selected after undergoing a published in the October 2001 pe- motion based on time-in-grade and “fly-off” here at Fort Huachuca. The riod. Follow-on considerations to time-in-service are deserving of OCMI’s lifecycle managers were create the multifunctional MOS are that next promotion. If so, units putting the final touches to the Mili- ongoing with further details not yet must board these soldiers for pro- tary Occupational Classification ironed out. A team from Fort motion to assist in filling those Structure (MOCS) for implementa- Huachuca will visit and apprise the authorizations. If commanders tion upon the publication of the field of these changes specifically board these readily eligible sol- Notification of Future Changes and how they affect the CMF and diers, the Army would select them (NOFC). We had settled on an MI the soldiers holding those MOSs. for promotion almost immediately force structure embedded within (within 90 days) to fill those vacant OCMI continues to work with MI authorizations. the Initial Brigade Combat Team. Branch, the School House, and the A great deal has happened in the field on all MOS issues including Lifecycle managers will work the last year and much more is sure accessions, training, retention, in- next MOCS inputs through March to follow. centives, and promotion issues re- 2001. Some of the issues we ex- Many of you have already heard lated to Star MOSs1. All 13 of our pect to address in the current about the MI Corps vision of the fu- MI MOSs have incentives for enlist- MOCS cycle (beyond the 98 CMF ture and the changes that are forth- ment, reenlistment, or both to as- merger recommendations dis- coming within the 98 CMF. On 11 sist in our endeavors to provide cussed above) are— December 2000, the 111th and commanders and senior enlisted ! Changes in duty title for the 112th MI Brigades, including the leaders qualified soldiers to the field. 33W (Electronic Warfare/Inter-

64 Military Intelligence cepts Systems Repairer) MOS can reach him via E-mail at Officer Actions as recommended by the Criti- [email protected] During recent years, the Army cal Task Site Selection Board and telephonically at (520) 533- has undertaken several initiatives CTSSB). 1174 or DSN 821-1174. to reduce field grade officer and ! Modification of the 33W grade captain authorizations to meet structure as a result of the Warrant Officer Actions Defense Officer Personnel Man- TUAV fielding. The Office of the Deputy Chief agement Act ceilings. On 7 Sep- ! Additional skill identifier (ASI) of Staff for Personnel has ap- tember 2000, the Army Vice Chief S9 concerns and requirements proved a proposal from the OCMI of Staff approved several proposals we develop as the 11-week Na- to establish a new warrant officer to include the downgrade of 164 tional Imagery Association MOS 350U (TUAV Operations Modified Table of Organization and Course for the 96D (Imagery Technician). The feeder MOS will Equipment battalion S2 positions. Analyst) MOS. be 96U. The TUAV Operations Specifically, the Army identified the ! A new ASI that will replace the Technician will be the primary following battalion S2 positions for old ASI of 2T for the 10-week advisor to the Commander on all downgrading to lieutenant: Avia- Tactical Exploitation System aspects of TUAV employment tion, Engineer, Field Artillery, Air (TES) Course. and operation. The final details Defense Artillery, Military Police, ! Structure changes affected by on personnel authorizations are Signal, Military Intelligence, and the fielding of the TUAV and undergoing completion, and we Psychological Operations, Civil Common Ground Station expect that the March 2001 War- Affairs, and regimental support (CGS) systems. rant Officer Accession Board will squadrons of the Armored Cavalry In all, the last year was ex- make the first selection. The U.S. Regiments. The Department of the tremely busy. This year does not Army Recruiting Command Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Op- appear any different as we forge (USAREC) is currently accepting erations and Plans sent implement- ahead with the changes for the applications for MOS 350U TUAV ing instructions in a message future. I would like to take this Operations Technecian. date-time group 310422Z October opportunity to formally bid fare- All current information on appli- 2000. well to OCMI’s 33W Career cation procedures and prerequi- The POC for officer actions Lifecycle Management Noncom- sites is available on the U.S. Army is Ms. Charlotte Borghardt. You missioned Officer (NCO), Master Recruiting Command homepage at can reach her via E-mail at Sergeant John Zehmisch, who http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/ [email protected], retired, and hail his replacement, warrant/Warrant.htm. Readers with and by telephone at (520) 533- Sergeant First Class Roger questions can also call Chief War- 1188 or DSN 821-1188. Bonesteel. rant Officer Five Rex Williams via Endnote The primary point of contact E-mail at rex.williams@hua. 1. A Star MOS is one for which the Army (POC) for enlisted actions is Ser- army.mil and telephonically at finds itself short authorizations in either geant Major Antonio Moreno. You (520) 533-1183 or DSN 821-1183. the SGT or SSG ranks.

Contributing Editors and Proofreaders

We thank the following officers for their many contributions to the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin for January-September 2001. They all worked in the MIPB Office while on casual status. We wish them all the best in their classes and their follow-on assignments!

Contributing Editors: CPT Robert S. Davidson, Jr., CPT Brian E. Jackson, CPT Timothy W. Johnson, and CPT Thomas H. Nguyen.

Editing, Proofreading, and Other Contributions: CPT Felix J. Almaguar, CPT Lakisha H. Anderson, 2LT Jason R. Campbell, 2LT Laurel M. Denniston, CPT Adam T. Fain, 2LT Robert D. Giuliano, CPT Joshua A. Grimm, CPT Demetrius “Mac” McClarty, CPT Maura K. McGrane, 2LT Susan M. Meggars, 2LT George P. O’Malley, 2LT Cory D. Poppe, CPT Mark G. Reardanz.

January-September 2001 65 SLY FOX

by Sergeant First Class (RWS), we are developing and As the Army and MI transition Eddie D. Shope transitioning our training to support into the digitized world, we at the new system. Beginning with AMAB will continuously evolve our The new Chief of the All-Source AMAC 01-003 (4 June through 30 training to support the future needs Analysis System (ASAS) Master July 2001), all RWS training will fo- of our MI soldiers. If you have any Analyst Branch (AMAB) is Ser- cus on the Block II RWS. We are questions about our course, geant First Class Shope. My pre- also accepting candidate nomina- please review our website at decessor, Master Sergeant tion packets from the combat URL (uniform resource locator) Kristine Sleighter, is now “stand- maneuver brigades that will be 138.27.202.66 or contact us by ing up” the digital tactical opera- fielding the Block II RWS. More of choosing “E-mail: AMAP” at this tions center (TOC) in Rowe Hall, the training will focus on site. at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The interoperability between the bri- digital TOC replicates a brigade gade S2 and the division analysis TOC with all of the Army Battle and control element (ACE). We Sergeant First Class Eddie Shope is the chief of the All-Source Analysis Command Systems (ABCSs). have already begun training and System Master Analyst Branch. You What is new with the ASAS Mas- assigning Master Analysts to the can contact him through the AMAB ter Analyst Course (AMAC)? With maneuver brigade S2 shops and website, via E-mail at eddie.shope@ the ongoing fielding of the ASAS the supporting military intelligence hua.army.mil, and telephonically at Block II Remote Workstation (MI) companies. (520) 533-4652 or DSN 821-4652. Ranger MI Officers and Those Interested The 75th Ranger Regiment is seeking top quality, highly motivated, branch-qualified military intelligence officers for service in the Regiment. You do not have to be Ranger-qualified to apply. The Regiment periodi- cally has openings for lieutenants and captains at the battalion and regimental level to include a major’s position at regiment. Duty positions include battalion assistant S2 (AS2), battalion S2, regimental AS2 and S2, MI Detachment (MID) commander, and regimental intelligence collection manager. Prior service in the regiment or special operations community is not required. Duty positions are with 1st Ranger Battalion at Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia; 2d Ranger Battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington; and 3d Ranger Battalion and the Regimental Headquarters at Fort Benning, Georgia. As a member of the 75th Ranger Regiment S2, you would have the opportunity for advanced schooling such as Airborne School, Jumpmaster School, Pathfinder, and Ranger School. Furthermore, you will routinely work with other Special Operations Forces units and have the latest technology at your disposal. As an MI officer, you will serve an integral role in the planning and execution of Ranger operations in both the conventional and special operations arena for missions spanning the globe. Interested Military Intelligence officers may send— ! Updated Officer Record Brief (ORB). ! Department of Army (DA) official photograph. ! DA Form 4187 requesting this assignment. ! Letters of recommendation. ! Copies of academic and officer efficiency reports (AERs and OERs, respectively). ! Copy of Army physical fitness test (APFT) scorecard. ! Letter of intent. Interested officers may contact the Regimental Assistant S1, Captain Carl Bergmann via E-mail at [email protected], telephonically at (706) 545-5124 or DSN 835-5124, or by facsimile at (706) 545-5830 or DSN 835-5830. You can write him at Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, ATTN: RAS1 (CPT Bergmann), Building 2834, Infantry Brigade Loop, Fort Benning, GA 31905. RANGERS LEAD THE WAY!

66 Military Intelligence

DISTANCE LEARNING

Fort Huachuca Distance Learning Office Supports the Soldiers

available. We have just fielded the by Thomas Daley examples of the matrices, tem- Ground Surveillance System Train- plates, and checklists important to ing (GSST) lessons which will be a the intelligence professional. Send The Fort Huachuca Distance Learn- 96R (Ground Surveillance System us your best stuff. Let us know how ing Office serves as the steward for Operator) MOS qualification course you have incorporated the material the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and for U.S. Army Reserve and U.S. Army into your job, and why it will help your Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) Dis- National Guard soldiers. The GSST fellow soldiers. We will post it, host tance Learning (DL) program. The DL lessons will join the 33W (Electronic it, and make sure you get the credit Office oversees the development and Warfare/Intercept Systems Repairer) for the contribution. release of DL products to support a Basic Noncommissioned Officers wide variety of military occupational Course and Advanced Noncommis- Do you know of a great site or re- specialties (MOS) and disciplines. sioned Officers Course courseware source that already exists? Point us Defined as “learning occurring in as one of our largest courses.One of to the right site or download and E- which the instructor and student are our best resources for ideas and mail it to us. You can contact us at: separated by space and possibly support is the soldier with the expe- USAIC&FH, ATZS-FDR-TA (Distance time,” DL presents challenges never rience to know what works. You can Learning Office), Fort Huachuca, AZ before encountered by traditional in- play a part in the development of one 85613-6000. Please visit the DL site structional methods. of our newer initiatives; an electronic at www.intel.army.mil, or E-mail us The DL Office website at resource to support MI analytical at [email protected]. www.intel.army.mil currently hosts skills, intelligence preparation of the Tom Daley is a Training Specialist more than one hundred different prod- battlefield, and the military decision- in the Fort Huachuca Distance ucts addressing prerequisite, sus- making process. We are developing Learning Office. Readers can reach tainment, and informational blocks courseware to strengthen those skills him via E-mail at [email protected] of instruction. We invite you to check for soldiers at all levels. We will make and telephonically at (520) 538-1012 out our site and see what we have available on our website a library of or DSN 879-1012.

The 902d MI Group Needs Reservists for Training Opportunities The 902d Military Intelligence Group and its subordinate units need highly motivated and physically fit MI soldiers from the Reserve Component (RC) to participate in a variety of training opportunities. Tours vary in length. A limited number of Individual and Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA/DIMA) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) augmentation positions are also available. The Group’s subordinate elements include the 308th and 310th MI Battalions and the Foreign Counterintelligence Activity. The 902d is looking for RC noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the grades of E5 through E8 with a military occupational specialty of 97B (Counterintelligence Agent) and RC warrant officers with a MOS of 351B (Coun- terintelligence Technician). The 902d MI Group’s headquarters is at Fort Meade, Maryland; however, it has subordinate elements in various locations across the continental United States. These locations include Forts Monroe, Bragg, Gordon, Knox, Benning, Leonard Wood, Monmouth, Leavenworth, Bliss, Hood, Huachuca, Lewis, Campbell, Sill, Carson, Devens; Rock Island Arsenal, Redstone Arsenal, Detroit, Atlanta, Orlando, White Sands, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Los Alamitos, California. Interested personnel should contact Ms. Helen Flowers-Hayes, the 902d MI Group’s Reserve Affairs Officer, at (301) 677-4301/3897 or DSN 923-4301/3897. Come join the MI soldiers in the 902d MI Group who are truly “the quiet professionals.”

January-September 2001 71