Windcat 9 and REPORT NO23/2013 NOVEMBER 2013 REPORT
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ACCIDENT REPORT ACCIDENT SERIOUS/LESS SERIOUS MARINE CASUALTY SERIOUS/LESS SERIOUS MARINE floating target by the wind farm passenger transfer catamaran thewindfarm passengertransfer by target floating Combined report on the investigation of the contact with a ofthecontact witha reportCombined ontheinvestigation while transiting Donna Nook Air Weapons Range in the Range inthe Weapons Donna NookAir while transiting with turbine I-6, in Sheringham Shoal Wind Farm Wind withturbine I-6,inSheringham Shoal south-west approaches to the River Humber theRiver Humber to approaches south-west the investigation ofthecontact of the investigation H on 21 November 2012 on 21November on 21 November 2012 on 21November NC Island Panther A R Windcat 9 Windcat N B and IO T A REPORT NO G TI S 23 INVE /2013 NOVEMBER 2013 T DEN I C C A NE RI A M Extract from The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 – Regulation 5: “The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.” NOTE This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 14(14) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame. © Crown copyright, 2013 You may re-use this document/publication (not including departmental or agency logos) free of charge in any format or medium. You must re-use it accurately and not in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and you must give the title of the source publication. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. All MAIB publications can be found on our website: www.maib.gov.uk Windcat 9 cover image courtesy of Windcat Workboats Limited For all enquiries: Marine Accident Investigation Branch Mountbatten House Grosvenor Square Southampton Email: [email protected] United Kingdom Telephone: +44 (0) 23 8039 5500 SO15 2JU Fax: +44 (0) 23 8023 2459 CONTENTS Page GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ACRONYMS AND TERMS FOREWORD BY THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MARINE ACCIDENTS i PREFACE ii WINDCAT 9 1 SYNOPSIS 2 Section 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 3 1.1 Particulars of Windcat 9 and accident 3 1.2 Background - Lynn and Inner Dowsing Wind Farm 4 1.2.1 Development and operation 4 1.2.2 CREL control room functions 5 1.2.3 Operation and maintenance 5 1.3 Background - Donna Nook Air Weapons Range 5 1.3.1 Range configuration and transit arrangements 5 1.3.2 Target 3 7 1.4 Narrative 7 1.4.1 Grimsby Fish Dock to LID Wind Farm 7 1.4.2 Events leading up to the contact 11 1.4.3 Post-contact phase 15 1.4.4 Recovery 17 1.5 Environmental conditions 18 1.6 Damage sustained by Windcat 9 and Target 3 18 1.6.1 Windcat 9 18 1.6.2 Target 3 18 1.7 Regulations and guidance 21 1.7.1 Vessel 21 1.7.2 Crew qualifications requirements 21 1.7.3 Hours-of-work provisions 23 1.7.4 Keeping a safe navigational watch 23 1.8 Operating pattern and crew details 24 1.8.1 Operating pattern 24 1.8.2 Master 24 1.8.3 Deckhand 24 1.8.4 Trainee master 24 1.9 Overview of Windcat 9 24 1.9.1 General description 24 1.9.2 Survey and inspection 25 1.10 Wheelhouse layout 26 1.11 Simrad GB60 Glass Bridge System Chart Plotter 26 1.12 Windcat Workboats 28 1.12.1 Company organisation 28 1.12.2 Windcat Workboats Limited 29 1.12.3 WWL Safety Management System 29 1.12.4 Overview of the WCS recruitment process 29 1.12.5 Independent audit of WCS 29 2.6 Passage monitoring 46 2.6.1 Passage monitoring from LID Wind Farm – general 46 2.6.2 Visual cues 47 2.6.3 Radar 47 2.6.4 Use of lookouts 47 2.6.5 Conclusion 49 2.7 Passage planning 49 2.8 Primary means of navigation 49 2.9 Chart issues 51 2.9.1 WWL’s paper chart correction procedures 51 2.9.2 Identification of DNAWR Target 3 53 2.10 Personal factors 53 2.11 Working patterns 53 2.12 Training and qualifications issues 53 2.12.1 Industry-specific training 53 2.12.2 Qualifications issues 54 2.12.3 Master coded vessels <200gt CoC and implications 54 2.13 Induction procedures 55 2.14 Training procedures 55 2.14.1 CREL and SESRED’s training procedures 55 2.14.2 WWL’s training procedures 56 2.15 WWL’s assessment procedures and related documentation 56 2.15.1 Assessors 56 2.15.2 Assessment procedure 57 2.15.3 Assessment documentation 57 2.16 The master’s lack of qualification 58 2.17 WCS – independent audit findings 58 2.18 WWL – audits and risk assessments 58 2.18.1 Full vessel and mini audits procedures 58 2.18.2 Risk assessments 60 2.19 Industry training, guidance and promulgation of safety lessons 60 2.19.1 Training 60 2.19.2 Guidance 60 2.19.3 Promulgation of safety lessons 61 ISLAND PANTHER 62 SYNOPSIS 63 Section 3 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 64 3.1 Particulars of Island Panther and accident 64 3.2 Sheringham Shoal Wind Farm 66 3.2.1 Wind farm background 66 3.2.2 Passenger transfer vessels 66 3.2.3 Wind farm entry and exit zones, and approved route 66 3.3 Narrative 70 3.3.1 Events leading up to the contact 70 3.3.2 Contact with turbine 72 3.3.3 Emergency response 73 3.3.4 Injuries and vessel damage 74 3.4 Environmental conditions 76 3.5 Regulations and guidance 76 3.6 Crew 77 3.6.1 Night master 77 3.6.2 Night deckhand 77 3.6.3 Day master 77 3.6.4 Day deckhand 78 3.7 Vessel background 78 3.7.1 Vessel and safety equipment 78 3.7.2 Vessel propulsion controls 78 3.7.3 Navigation equipment and charts 79 3.8 Navigation practice 79 3.8.1 Primary means of navigation 79 3.8.2 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea requirements 80 3.8.3 MCA guidance 80 3.8.4 Charts 80 3.8.5 Passage planning and monitoring 80 3.9 Island Shipping Ltd 82 3.9.1 Background 82 3.9.2 Master recruitment, induction and assessment 82 3.9.3 Safety management 83 3.10 Sheringham Shoal Wind Farm operations 83 3.10.1 Statoil/Statkraft and Rheidol control 83 3.10.2 Scira safety management 83 3.11 Turbine I-6 84 3.11.1 General 84 3.11.2 UK Requirements for lighting of turbines 84 3.11.3 Lighting of turbine I-6 86 3.12 Organisations involved with offshore renewable energy passenger transfer vessels 86 3.13 Industry guidance 86 3.14 Industry training 86 3.15 Similar accidents 86 Section 4 - ANALYSIS 87 4.1 Aim 87 4.2 Fatigue 87 4.3 Accident overview 87 4.4 Navigation practices 87 4.4.1 Passage monitoring 87 4.4.2 Passage planning 88 4.4.3 Primary means of navigation 88 4.4.4 Paper chart corrections 89 4.5 Crew qualifications, training and guidance 89 4.5.1 Industry requirement 89 4.5.2 Adequacy of qualification 89 4.5.3 Higher qualifications 90 4.5.4 Relevant industry training and guidance 90 4.5.5 Promulgation of safety lessons 91 4.6 Island Panther safety management 91 4.6.1 General 91 4.6.2 Induction and training 91 4.6.3 Navigation practices 91 4.6.4 Emergency response by crew 92 4.7 Wind farm management 92 4.7.1 Turbine lighting 92 4.7.2 Navigation warnings and defect reporting 92 4.7.3 Risk assessments of small craft operations within the wind farm 93 Section 5 - CONCLUSIONS 94 5.1 Safety issues directly contributing to the accidents that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations 94 5.2 Other safety issues directly contributing to the Windcat 9 accident 96 5.3 Safety issues not directly contributing to the accidents that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations 96 5.4 Other safety issues not directly contributing to the accidents 97 Section 6 - actions taKen 98 Section 7 - recommendations 102 FIGURES Figure 1 - Chartlet showing features of Donna Nook Air Weapons Range Figure 2 - Donna Nook Air Weapons Range – Target 3 Figure 3 - Modified version of chart plotter route to Lynn and Inner Dowsing Wind Farm planned on 27 May 2012 Figure 4 - ABP Humber River Services radar recording – 21 November 2012 Figure 5 - Route passing through “Tommy Target” guard zone Figure 6 - ABP Humber River Services radar recording – 21 November 2012 showing proximity of Fastnet Tern to Windcat 9 Figure 7 - Windcat 9’s AIS track showing distances to DZ1 buoy and to Target 3 at 1709 Figure 8 - Windcat 9’s AIS track showing speed over the ground and course over the ground at 1711:14 and at 1711:45 Figure 9 - Passenger cabin at the time of the impact Figure 10 - Windcat 9 stable with a 12-15º list to port Figure 11 - Composite image of the hull shell plating damage Figure 12 - Composite image of the external damage Figure 13 - Target 3 general damage Figure 14 - Target 3 damage showing displaced bitts and lifting eye Figure 15 - Windcat 9 – general arrangement drawing Figure 16 - View through the wheelhouse forward window Figure 17 - Positions of key navigation equipment Figure 18 - Routes stored on the chart plotter’s log file Figure 19 - Windcat 9 - historical AIS tracks for the period 14-18 November and 20 November 2012 Figure 20 - Diverging reciprocal route passing through Target 3’s guard zone Figure 21 - AIS tracks showing positions 1.5nm from Target 3 and DZ1 buoy Figure 22 - Paper chart, Voyage Planning Form data and chart plotter tracks Figure 23 - Chart correction annotations on Admiralty chart 107 – Approaches to the River Humber Figure 24 - Chart corrections Figure 25 - Sheringham Shoal Wind Farm Figure 26 - Regina Baltica