Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Winter 2016

Operation “Retribution”: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria, 2015-16 Brian Glyn Williams and Robert Souza

Dr. Williams is Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth and the author of Counter-Jihad. The American Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (University of Pennsylvania Press, November 2016). He previously worked for the CIA’s CTC in Afghanistan and in Kabul for the Army’s Information Operations. Mr. Souza is an assistant managing editor at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy in Washington, D.C., and a research analyst for the Center for the Study of Targeted Killings.

eptember 30, 2016, marked the It soon became widely apparent, first anniversary of Russian Presi- however, that the Russians had conflated dent Vladimir Putin’s decision to ISIS with CIA-backed rebels and various involve his nation militarily in the other anti-Assad Sunni rebel forces with no SSyrian conflict on the side of Moscow’s known connection to ISIS, creating the false longtime ally, the Assad regime. Accord- narrative of a united terrorist monolith that ing to initial Russian Defense Ministry needed to be eradicated in order to preserve statements and Putin himself, the mission stability in Syria. In the process, Putin was had the primary objective of joining the able to successfully “shift the sands” of the U.S.-led coalition in fighting ISIS. Russia’s conflict and bolster the endangered Assad chief of staff of the Presidential Executive regime while simultaneously cultivating Office at that time, Sergei Ivanov, using his image domestically as a strong leader: an alternative name for ISIS, laid out his able to stand up to the West, project power country’s official objectives on September abroad, and support an embattled ally 30, 2015: “The military goal of the opera- against international jihadists. The operation tion is strictly to provide air support for the has been consistently portrayed in Russia as [Syrian] government forces in their fight an unmitigated success in “inflicting heavy against Islamic State.”1 The Mufti of Ka- losses on Syrian terrorist groups.”3 There zan (the head of Russia’s Tatar communi- seems to be little doubt among observers ty) and members of the Russian parliament that Putin’s venture into the Mideast has lined up to support Putin’s campaign in reshaped the war in Syria, but has it been a Syria, described as a “prophylactic against success in the larger strategic sense? terrorist organizations” that was necessary What follows is an effort to evaluate to “destroy ISIS at its root.”2 the first year of this still-unfolding military © 2016, The Authors Middle East Policy © 2016, Middle East Policy Council 42 Williams / Souza: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria

campaign, with the aim of assessing the al Fatah (the Army of Conquest) — con- validity of the Russian claims of success. cern grew in Moscow over possible threats to this asset. In addition to his interest in BACKGROUND defending this facility, Putin feared the Russia has long been a key supporter chaos stemming from the overthrow of of the Syrian Baathist Socialist regime. strongmen in the region, having noted the Hafez al-Assad, father and predecessor of turmoil that swept over Libya and Iraq fol- current President Bashar al-Assad, spent lowing U.S. intervention. He also felt the years in the Soviet Union learning to fly need to show the world, and his own audi- MIG-15s and MIG-17s as an officer in the ence at home, that Russia stood by its al- Syrian armed forces. The elder Assad sub- lies. When the Arab Spring demonstrations sequently seized control of Syria in a coup shook the region in 2011, Putin claimed in 1970 and brought to power his ethno- the United States had abandoned its ally, religious group, the Alawites (15 percent President Hosni Mubarak, in Egypt. But of Syria’s population, they adhere to a Putin decided to stand by his ally, Assad, syncretic offshoot of Shiite Islam). Having when civil war broke out between the designated himself president, Assad fol- ruling Alawites and dozens of Sunni rebel lowed the model of a Soviet single-party groups. state, with an all-pervasive network of Putin feared the threat to Assad from intelligence agencies that kept the restless an alliance of Sunni rebel groups, the Sunni majority in check.4 aforementioned Army of Conquest, ad- In 1971, the Assad regime provided vancing on the Alawite coastal homeland. the USSR with a naval facility in Tartus, The Sunni alliance, which threatened both on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. It remains the Russian naval facility and Assad, had there today, Russia’s sole military facility conquered Idlib Province in northwestern outside the former Soviet Union. Mos- Syria soon after its formation in March cow’s basic docking facility, however, is 2015. Putin was alarmed when these Sunni not big enough to be designated a “base”; rebels began to encroach on the Alawite instead it is described as a “Material coastal stronghold in southern Latakia Technical Support Point.” The Russian (for three years the Sunni rebels had held facility consists of two floating piers and northern Latakia). an Amur-class floating workshop. It is At this time, the Iranians, unwavering not capable of supporting any of Russia’s allies of the Assad regime since the 1979 major warships — frigates, destroyers or Islamic Revolution, warned Putin that its one comparatively small aircraft carrier. Assad was going to fall and that they did This Material Technical Support Point can not have the means to save him. In July in no way be compared to massive U.S. 2015, the commander of the Quds Force, naval and aerial facilities in the Persian an elite extraterritorial special-forces arm Gulf, which host 20 aircraft carriers, for of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Major example. General Qassem Soleimani, visited Mos- Still, as the threat to Assad mounted in cow to make his case for Russian involve- 2015 amid the bloody civil war — posed ment in Syria. He explained that the Sunni by a new alliance of non-ISIS Sunni rebel rebel advances were endangering not only groups in northwest Syria known as Jaish their joint ally Assad, but Russia’s military

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assets at Tartus. A senior Assad official re- of one in 10 Syrians and caused the near- called, “Soleimani put the map of Syria on collapse of the Assad regime was to come the table. The Russians were very alarmed, as a surprise to those who had expected and felt matters were in steep decline and Putin to fail in his “quixotic” adventure. that there were real dangers to the re- gime.”5 Soleimani was able to convince his RUSSIAN OFFICIAL Russian hosts that their involvement was INTERVENTION essential. In early September 2015, Russia Putin agreed that Assad needed to be deployed artillery units and advanced T-90 bolstered as a bulwark against “terror- “Vladimir” main battle tanks and flew ists,” lumping all Sunni rebel groups into in approximately 2,000 Russian military this category alongside ISIS.6 Tellingly, personnel to the Hmeimim base. They later Putin directly blamed the United States deployed at Hmeimim S-400 “Triumph” for “creating the conditions in which the anti-aircraft missiles with a 250-mile range [ISIS] terrorist state was born”: “Tens of to defend these assets. Most important, thousands of militants are fighting under the Russians also dispatched to the base the banners of [ISIS]. Its ranks include approximately 50 fighters and bombers former Iraqi servicemen who were thrown (primarily Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack out on to the street after the [U.S.] invasion planes, new Su-34 Fullback medium of Iraq in 2003.”7 bombers, and Su-24 Fencer fighter jets) After Soleimani’s visit, Putin was and several Mil 24 Hind attack helicopters. convinced of the need to robustly protect These air assets would later be bolstered his Syrian ally, save the Russian facility by larger Tu-22M3 Backfire, Tu-160 at Tartus, and prevent the rise of jihadist Blackjack, and Tu-95MS Bear strategic groups of the sort that had taken power in bombers, from a base in Mozdok, capital post-Hussein Iraq, post-Qadhafi Libya and of the Russian Caucasus republic of North parts of Syria. In addition, Putin would Ossetia, and eventually from western Iran. be projecting Russia back onto the world Then, on September 30, in a move that stage after its widely condemned 2014 caught America and its allies by surprise, annexation of Crimea and incursions into the Russians began an intensive bombing the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine. The campaign, informally known as Opera- idea of supporting Assad against CIA- tion Vozmezdiye (retribution), against backed Sunni rebel groups must have had what they claimed were ISIS targets in a strong appeal. Syria. However, the initial Russian strikes Having decided on intervention, on appeared to be against the Army of Con- August 26, 2015, Russia and Syria signed quest in the northwest and the capital a formal agreement in Damascus granting of Idlib province. A member of a U.S.- Russia access to Syria’s Hmeimim airbase backed Sunni rebel brigade operating in near regime-controlled southern Latakia.8 Talbiseh the day after the initial strikes ob- The pieces were thus in place for the pro- served, “The [Assad] regime has bombed jection of Russian power for the first time this area many times before, but not heavy beyond the borders of the former Soviet like yesterday. … We knew there would be Union. What resulted from this unexpected bombing from Russia, but we didn’t think intervention in a war that had cost the lives it would be like this.”9

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The Obama administration did not survived a direct missile strike, leading initially seem to be worried by Putin’s a Russian Ministry of Defense website intervention in Syria. One official said, to proclaim the tanks “death proof” after “If he wants to jump into that mess, good the video of the failed attack went viral luck,” while another sarcastically said, online.12 But the Russians adjusted and in- “Knock yourself out.”10 President Obama, stead began using Mil 24 Hind attack heli- who had thus far refused to insert U.S. copters, which could not be brought down personnel into Syria to support the Sunni by TOW missiles. In essence, the Hinds rebels, clearly provided vital saw Putin’s With Putin conflating all Sunni rebel “airborne involvement groups with ISIS, the conflict gradually artillery” as doomed. support and On October came to resemble a proxy war between suppression 2, he stated, Russia and the United States, despite fire for Syrian “An attempt efforts to “de-conflict” the crisis and make army advan­ by Russia and ces. Footage Iran to prop sure Russian and U.S. planes did not fly in was widely up Assad and the same airspace. posted online try to pacify at the time by the population is just going to get them the Syrian government depicting Russian stuck in a quagmire, and it won’t work. Hinds strafing rebel positions with mis- And they will be there for a while if they siles in support of their troops.13 don’t take a different course.”11 The CIA-backed Sunni rebels, who But the White House soon became were forced to retreat, requested anti- concerned about the intervention, as it aircraft missiles to shoot down Russian was negatively affecting moderate groups and Syrian jets and attack helicopters, but in the northwest supported by the United they were not delivered for fear of escalat- States and its Arab and Turkish allies. ing the proxy conflict further. The CIA, by With Putin conflating all Sunni rebel contrast, had had no qualms about provid- groups with ISIS, the conflict gradually ing Stinger shoulder-fired ground-to-air came to resemble a proxy war between “manpad” missiles to the mujahideen in Russia and the United States, despite ef- Afghanistan in the 1980s, where they forts to “de-conflict” the crisis and make proved to be the ultimate equalizer, down- sure Russian and U.S. planes did not fly ing Soviet jets and helicopters. One Free in the same airspace. The U.S.-backed Syrian Army fighter bemoaned the lack of Free Syrian Army (previously marginal- anti-aircraft missiles: “We can have most ized in the Army of Conquest) initially of the weapons we want. But nothing to fought back ferociously against a Russian- shoot down the planes.”14 As a result, the backed Syrian army ground offensive in previously advancing Sunni rebels were the northwest using American-supplied forced on the defensive and began to TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, retreat from northern Latakia, which they wire-guided) missiles to destroy Russian- had held for three years, and parts of Idlib. built Syrian tanks in October 2015. One Meanwhile, Putin announced he had Russian T 90 tank did beat the odds and arranged an intelligence-sharing agreement

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with Iran, Iraq and Syria. It appeared as rative that he was waging counterterrorism if the demoralized Syrian regime, which in Syria. White House spokesman Jack had been low on manpower, would be Kirby bluntly stated: bolstered by an alliance of Russia, Hezbol- lah and Iran (although at roughly this time Greater than 90 percent of the strikes that we’ve seen them take to date have an Iranian brigadier general advising the not been against ISIL or al-Qaida-af- Assad regime was killed fighting in the filiated terrorists. They’ve been large- east, as were several Russians, demonstrat- ly against opposition groups, groups ing the risks of involvement in the war). that want a better future for Syria and On October 3, 2015, Hezbollah and don’t want to see the Assad regime Iran expanded their roles in the conflict by stay in power. So whether they’re hit deploying fighters to the Hama and Homs by a cruise missile from the sea or a provinces in western Syria — two strategi- bomb from a Russian military aircraft, cally important locations for augmenting the result is the same: that Assad Assad’s strongholds along the coast — to continues to get support from Russia. Assad continues to be able to have at prepare major ground offensives backed 15 his hands the capability of striking his by Russian airstrikes. On October 7, own people, including those who are pro-Assad forces from Iran and Hezbollah opposed to his regime. And that’s not carried out their first major coordinated a good future for Syria.18 ground assaults on Sunni rebels in western Syria under the cover of Russian war- Obama personally discussed the issue planes.16 On that day, Russia also stepped with Putin in a February 2016 phone call, up the bombing campaign, firing 26 new and the White House later reported in an Kalibr cruise missiles at Sunni rebel targets official statement that “President Obama in Aleppo, Idlib and Raqqa from warships emphasized the importance now of Russia 900 miles away in the Caspian Sea. It soon playing a constructive role by ceasing its became apparent that Syria was a testing air campaign against moderate opposition ground for Moscow’s new state-of-the-art forces in Syria.”19 Putin was not, however, military technology, including the Su-34 swayed by Obama. A Kremlin statement “Fullback” fighter bomber, the Mi-35M indicated it would continue its aerial cam- attack helicopter, and the Kalibr cruise paign against the Nusra Front and “other missile, later fired from Russian warships terroristic groups” in the northwest. in the Mediterranean as well.17 Republican politicians used the Rus- By mid-October 2015, with the as- sian intervention to attack Obama for “sur- sistance of Russian, Hezbollah and Iranian rendering the Middle East to Putin,” even allies, Assad’s forces began to stabilize as they criticized the Kremlin’s aggression. and regain lost territory. By this time, it Senator John McCain, who had visited had become clear that the vast majority of moderate rebels in Syria and called for the Russian bombings were in the northwest creation of a no-fly zone to protect them, against the Army of Conquest alliance of was particularly incensed: “Mr. Putin is not Sunni rebel groups threatening the Assad interested in being our partner. He wants regime from territories they had recently to shore up the Assad regime, he wants to conquered in Idlib. The White House made establish Russia as a major power in the it clear it had not bought into Putin’s nar- Middle East, he wants to use Syria as a

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live fire exercise for Russia’s modernizing a horrific extent, and they were bombing military.”20 all the frontlines that we are on. We had to Undeterred by such criticism from withdraw from the area because it would Washington, which began to mount in Oc- have been suicide to stay. The destruction tober, the Russians went on to launch air cannot be described, even the trees have attacks on the CIA-backed rebels in Hama been burned as a result of this scorched- and Homs provinces to the south of Idlib. earth policy.”23 At the time, non-ISIS Sunni The Russian Ministry of Defense described rebels began to post harrowing, close-up one attack on footage online this region by Having perpetrated the deadliest of Russian a squadron of disaster in Russian aviation history, ISIS aircraft drop- massive stra- ping bombs tegic bombers gloated by posting a picture on its online on civilians making the magazine, Dabiq, of the small bomb that in towns long flight to brought down the plane. ... ISIS justified controlled by Syria from their forces in southern Rus- its action as a response to the Russian the northwest sia: “During airstrikes in Syria. as they fired a massive back, often airstrike today, 14 important ISIL [ISIS] from truckbeds mounted with anti-aircraft targets were destroyed by 34 air-launched guns.24 cruise missiles. The targets destroyed in- Still, Russia officially claimed to be clude command posts that were used to co- conducting pinpoint strikes on ISIS targets. ordinate ISIL activities in the provinces To support its claims, the Russia Ministry of Idlib and Aleppo, munition and supply of Defense released YouTube videos of depots in the northwestern part of Syria.”21 several airstrikes purported to be against There was, however, a problem with ISIS.25 But the videos were scrutinized by this statement: ISIS did not have forces in investigative journalists using a collab- Idlib or the areas of Aleppo that were tar- orative verification platform to match the geted. Among the Russians’ targets in this locations seen in the YouTube videos with northwestern region were actually several satellite images, as well as ground-level U.S.-backed Sunni groups in the rebel alli- photographs. 26 The journalists were able ance, such as the Free Syrian Army, Sham to conclude that Russia’s claims contained Legion, Jund al Aqsa, Jaish al Sunna, Ah- numerous elements of Soviet-style dis- rar ash Sham and Division 13. One U.S.- information. Most of the areas identified backed Sunni rebel leader whose position lacked a known ISIS presence, thus con- was bombed by Russian aircraft bemoaned firming what many had already suspected: the toll of the airstrike: “We are on the Russia was primarily bombing Sunni rebel front lines with Bashar al-Assad’s army. groups with no known connection to ISIS. We are moderate Syrian rebels and have It must be stated that, among these no affiliation with ISIS. ISIS is at least 100 groups being targeted in the northwest, kilometers from where we are.”22 Another was the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, Sunni rebel stated, “The Russian airstrikes which had been declared a “Foreign Ter- for more than a month had intensified to rorist Organization” by the U.S. State De-

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partment.27 This allowed Putin to claim his by NATO, despite Russian protests to the forces were engaged in a counterterrorism contrary.30 campaign. However, the Nusra Front was The two Russian pilots in the downed allied with several moderate Sunni groups aircraft, Konstantin Murakhtin and Oleg that considered it to be an effective, local Peshkov, ejected from the bomber and Syrian-dominated fighting force against attempted to parachute to safety. Pesh- Assad and not as fanatical as the foreign- kov, however, was shot dead by vengeful led ISIS (the Nusra Front officially broke Turkmen rebel forces as he descended; its ties to al-Qaeda in late July 2016 and his body was found riddled with bullets. renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al Sham, the To compound matters, Alparslan Çelik, a Front for the Conquest of the Levant). Turkish citizen belonging to a national- For all Putin’s successes on the battle- ist group known as the Boz Kurts (Grey field against what he described as “terror- Wolves), claimed responsibility for killing ists,” by late October 2015, the risks he the Russian pilot — in retaliation for the was running in Syria began to materialize. bombing of Turkmen civilians.31 The other On October 31, an ISIS affiliate in Egypt’s Russian pilot was rescued by Russian Sinai Desert claimed responsibility for special forces, who, despite losing an Mi 8 blowing up a Russian charter plane flying helicopter and a Russian marine to a rebel from the resort town of Sharm el Sheikh TOW missile during the search, were able to St. Petersburg, killing all 224 people on to follow his radio beacon and save him.32 board. Having perpetrated the deadliest While the shoot down came as a shock disaster in Russian aviation history, ISIS to many observers, who saw it as an over- gloated by posting a picture on its online reaction, those who knew the region saw it magazine, Dabiq, of the small bomb that as a direct response to Moscow’s repeated brought down the plane. In the publication, aerial bombardment of Turkish-supported ISIS justified its action as a response to the Syrian Turkmen rebels operating in Russian airstrikes in Syria, which it termed northern Syria’s Jabal al-Turkmen region. “a rash decision of arrogance.”28 Putin These rebels, whose long-repressed ethnic responded by declaring, “Our military group is essentially Turkish, claimed, “The operation with aviation in Syria should not Russians were heavily bombing Turkmen simply continue, it should be intensified so villages before the downing of the plane. that the criminals understand that revenge Thousands of Turkmen families have been is unavoidable.”29 Media in Russia began driven to the [Turkish] border.”33 Prior to casting the campaign in Syria as one of the downing of the jet, Turkey had warned revenge or retribution. Russia that “the Russian side’s actions Then, on November 24, a Turkish were not a fight against terror, … they air-force F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24 bombed civilian Turkmen villages and “Fencer” fighter-bomber that had strayed this could lead to serious consequences.”34 for 17 seconds into the southern Turkish As late as November 20, 2015 (four days province of Hatay. The Turkish newspaper before the downing of the Russian jet), Millet reported that the trespassing Rus- Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu sian plane had been warned before it was had described northern Syria’s Turkmen as shot down that it was about to cross the “kardeşlerimiz” (our brothers), stating, “If Turkish border, a contention supported the Russian Air Force and army are fight-

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ing Daesh [ISIS] then they should fight was just chaos. There was a primary school Daesh.”35 nearby, and children were running out Putin personally vowed “revenge” for absolutely terrified. … There were bodies the downing of the jet, which he described everywhere, decapitated and mutilated.”39 as a “stab in the back” by Turkish “terror- On October 20, the Sarmin field hospital ist accomplices.”36 On the following day, in suburban Idlib was struck by Russian Turkey’s Sabah newspaper reported that warplanes, killing 13 people, including seven drivers were killed in the bombing two medical staff. “I wish I could say that of an aid convoy traveling from Turkey targeting a hospital in Syria is unique, but into Syria near the border town of Azaz.37 is not,” said Dr. Mohamed Tennari. “The Russia followed up this bombing with a field hospital I direct in Sarmin has been large-scale attack in the Idlib province on hit by airstrikes more than a dozen times November 29. — by the Syrian government and now But the Kremlin’s air offensive soon by the Russian government.”40 Britain’s gained a reputation for the lack of discrim- Guardian was to report in March 2016 that ination it had used in Chechnya. In the sec- Russia’s indiscriminate bombing had killed ond Chechen conflict, 1999-2009, Russian approximately 2,000 civilians in Syria.41 bombers had callously obliterated whole In early December 2015, the Russians neighborhoods in the capital of Grozny stepped up their involvement and began to drive out rebels. They also had ample preparations to expand operations by open- experience in using Hind attack helicopters ing a second major airbase in Syria. They to strafe villages suspected of sheltering deployed reinforcements to al-Shayrat Chechen boyeviks (fighters).38 airbase near Homs, which already housed It quickly became obvious that the many attack helicopters in its fortified han- Russian forces did not have close-air- gars. The base was bolstered by military support advisers on the frontlines in Syria personnel, increasing the number of Rus- of the sort the Americans had embedded sian troops in Syria from the initial 2,000 with anti-ISIS Kurdish forces operating in to roughly 4,000, (slightly fewer than the Syria’s northern Hasaka Province and on 5,000 military personnel Obama deployed the front in Mosul, Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq to bolster Iraqi and Kurdish Pesh- in Iraq. Instead of having spotters on the merga forces in their offensive against ISIS ground calling in precision bomb strikes, by the fall of 2016). Many of these troops the Russian air force defaulted to a clumsy were guard personnel involved in protect- strategy of indiscriminately bombing ing the aircraft used to provide close air whole neighborhoods and towns under support for Syrian troops. Sunni rebel control. Meanwhile, the Russian campaign Following the pattern set by the “rub- to tilt the balance in favor of Assad ap- bleization” of Grozny, a Russian airstrike peared to weaken the U.S.-backed rebels on a crowded market in Ariha, a town con- in Aleppo Province sufficiently for ISIS to trolled by the Army of Conquest, killed at make some advances in the northern areas least 44 people and wounded scores more. of the region.42 The Russian air campaign A witness at the scene recalled, “In just a also allowed Syrian government troops to few moments, people were screaming, the clear Sunni rebels out of the Alawite home- smell of burning was in the air and there land in northern Latakia. In February 2016,

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Russian aircraft continued their momen- Assad regime, allowing it to maintain tum, supporting regime troops and allied control over the western corridor, where Hezbollah and Iranian fighters, encircling most Syrians lived. It also fulfilled Putin’s neighborhoods of eastern Aleppo that had goal of preventing the fall of Damascus to been controlled by Sunni rebels since 2012. jihadists and allowed Assad to go on the In the process, the revived Assad forces offensive from Daraa to Hama and Homs were able to cut off the rebels’ supply lines to Aleppo and Latakia. to the Turkish border at Bab al-Salameh, In addition to propping up the Syr- their most successful offensive of the war. ian army and bolstering its rather limited This decisive offensive also broke a ground offensives, Putin’s incursion also three-year siege of several pro-govern- quashed any discussion of a no-fly zone or ment neighborhoods in the area, causing “safe zone” north of Aleppo. The United a panicked flight of Sunni refugees to States and Turkey had been discussing Turkey. As plans to keep the Russians The United States and Turkey had been Syrian air- and Syrian air discussing plans to keep Syrian air-force force planes forces indis- out of a 60- criminately planes out of a 60-mile zone between mile zone be- bombed rebel Aleppo and Turkey. ... With Russian tween Aleppo areas, caus- fighter-bombers active in and around and Turkey ing hundreds to protect of civilian Aleppo, such a plan might have led to Sunni rebels casualties, the U.S.-Russian aerial confrontations. and civil- Syrian army ians north of starved rebel-controlled neighborhoods. Syria’s largest city. With Russian fighter- While the Russian bombing was, more bombers active in and around Aleppo, often than not, indiscriminate, it could also such a plan might have led to U.S.-Russian be deadly accurate. A Russian airstrike just aerial confrontations, so it was shelved. prior to this, for example, killed Zahran Al- This proved a tremendous boon to the loush, a powerful Sunni rebel commander Syrian army forces, which, by spring 2016, who led a major fighting force known as captured some of the area that would have the Army of Islam on December 25, 2015. been included in the no-fly zone and cut As Russian involvement expanded in off the rebels’ supply line to Turkey, the the north, Russian-backed Syrian army Azaz Corridor. forces were also able to go on the offen- From the fall of 2015 to the winter of sive against Sunni rebels belonging to the 2016, Operation Retribution reshaped the moderate alliance dominated by the Free battlefield in western Syria. However, it Syrian Army in the south around Daraa. did not have much impact on ISIS, which Most important, the Syrian army was able controlled a swath of territory stretching to take over the Damascus-Daraa road in from the Turkish border at Tarabulus to its February 2016, by gaining control of the capital at Raqqa in the central Syrian des- towns of al-Shaykh Maskin and Uthman. ert to the Iraqi frontier at Abu Kamal. Prior In both north and south, the Russian in- to the Russian intervention, Assad’s forces tervention thus propped up the crumbling were said to have been so depleted that the

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government was weighing a retreat from player in the Middle East and achieved a Damascus to the coastal heartland of the seat at the table for peace talks in Geneva Alawites near Latakia and Tartus.43 While in March 2016. Then Putin surprised the the Syrian army at one time comprised White House and announced on March 14, 220,000 troops (many of whom were 2016, that the Russian military’s goals in Sunni conscripts led by Alawite command- Syria were “on the whole accomplished” ers), it had dwindled to an Alawite-led core and that he would withdraw his “main of 65,000 personnel.44 forces.”46 The announcement seemed to It became clear that a second Russian signify that Russia would not permanently goal appeared to be to establish “facts on back Assad with its air force, although it the ground” that would allow Assad to was unclear when or if a complete with- negotiate from a new position of strength drawal would take place. when peace talks commenced. This could While President Obama called the be done by destroying or weakening the five-month Russian intervention in Syria more moderate Sunni rebel groups, effec- a “blunder,” Putin’s limited campaign tively leaving the American-led coalition seemed to demonstrate that intervening with a stark choice: supporting Assad or in Syria did not necessarily have to be a ISIS “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As slippery slope leading to a quagmire. Putin previously stated, Putin’s calculus seemed had seemingly put both his troops and his to be to reassert his country as a major advanced T-90 battle tanks on the ground, player on the world stage following its reconfigured the battlefield, then quickly March 2014 invasion of the Crimean Pen- called for their withdrawal with only a few insula, and he thought his role in shaping casualties. This suited the Russian pub- the U.S.-led coalition’s choices in Syria lic, strongly supportive of their president, would help achieve that objective.45 but harboring memories of the disastrous Despite a few setbacks and tension Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. with Assad, Russian support succeeded History would show, however, that in bolstering his regime, allowing it to Putin’s mission was not yet accomplished. make modest gains on the ground that Despite his official order for the with- were temporarily frozen by a Russian- and drawal of troops, Russia remained very American-backed ceasefire signed on Feb- much involved in a protracted war in ruary 27, 2016. This cessation of hostilities Syria. In fact, Russia gradually found itself between almost 100 Sunni rebel groups enmeshed in a lingering battle against ISIS and the Assad regime (it did not include fighters in Syria’s vast eastern desert and ISIS or the Nusra Front) led to deliveries Sunni rebels trying to break the siege of of humanitarian aid to hundreds of thou- Aleppo in the northwest. sands of people in besieged zones. But with ISIS and the Nusra Front outside the MISSION ACCOMPLISHED? parameters of the ceasefire, its impact was Even as Putin announced that major limited beyond Aleppo; the Nusra Front operations in Syria were over, reports was active in the northwest as an ally of began to emerge of continued Rus- many moderate Sunni groups. sian involvement. Pavel Felgenhauer, a Having buttressed the faltering Assad military analyst based in Moscow, stated regime, Putin inserted himself as a major that there had been no real Russian with-

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drawal: “Some of the attack planes, yes, as the set for a 2015 film featuring the were flown back to Russia, others were execution of 25 Assad-regime soldiers by flown back to replace them; new advanced an ISIS firing squad. The stark contrast helicopters, gunships. But everything between the medieval ISIS atrocities and else stayed. The ground crews mostly, the the beauty of the Russian concert was logistics, the stockpiles of weapons. So resonant with symbolism. Putin clearly that was mostly a diversional PR move.”47 intended to portray Russian intervention in It soon became apparent that these resid- Syria as a mission civilisatrice. Seizing the ual Russian moment for forces had a “Listen O Putin, we will come to you in all it was new mission, worth, Putin most notably, Russia, we will kill you all in your homes, proclaimed support for a Allah willing.” ... Thus far, there have, his “hope for Syrian ground however, only been four small ISIS- Palmyra’s offensive in inspired attacks in Russia. revival as the eastern the heritage desert. This of the whole time Russia was finally involved in fight- of humanity, but also as hope that our ing, not against CIA-backed rebels in the contemporary civilization will be relieved northwest, but against ISIS. from this horrible disease, international On March 27, Russian forces assisted terrorism.”50 the Assad regime in recapturing from ISIS Having liberated Palmyra, located in the city of Tadmur, home to the ancient the heart of the desert, Russian ground ruins of Palmyra. While ISIS, in the thir- forces established a new base just to its teenth issue of Dabiq, would proclaim vic- west. The military assets there consisted tory over Syrian forces backed by Russian of mine-clearing equipment and dozens of aircraft, they were ultimately defeated by fighting vehicles, in addition to armored the heavy firepower of the allied forces.48 personnel carriers to help protect the site Syrian government troops on the ground from potential attack. While these assets were backed by Russian airpower as they were purportedly for defensive purposes drove ISIS forces from the “bride of the vis-à-vis ISIS, Russia also deployed a desert,” as Palmyra was known. Approxi- sophisticated Pantsir-S1 air-defense system mately 400 ISIS fighters were killed in this with the capacity to both launch missiles offensive, one of the group’s worst defeats and fire cannons at incoming planes.51 since its humiliation by YPG Kurds backed But the Russian presence proved to be by U.S. bombers in the border town of a magnet for ISIS attacks, and on the eve- Kobane in November 2015.49 ning of July 8, ISIS launched a coordinated To celebrate this victory, a Russian assault on Palmyra. During the attack, symphony orchestra led by renowned what appeared to be a state-of-the-art Rus- conductor Valery Gergiev was flown in sian Mil MI-35M Hind E attack helicopter to perform a surprise concert in a second- was shot down. The next day, Pravda century Roman amphitheater in the heart and Lenta RU, popular Russian-language of ISIS-ravaged Palmyra. While under newspapers, confirmed that the advanced ISIS control, the amphitheater had served helicopter had been destroyed, resulting in

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the death of two Russian “military in- from Sunni rebel groups and laying siege struction pilots,” Ryafagat Habibullin and to rebel controlled areas around Aleppo, Yevgeny Dolgin.52 this caused a humanitarian crisis. As many Colonel Habibullin, who had the quali- as a quarter of a million people faced star- fication of “pilot-sniper,” was, however, vation due to the Russian-Syrian encircle- much more than just a military instruction ment of their neighborhoods. pilot. He had participated in the Georgian In response to international condem- civil war during the 1990s, the war in nation, Russia claimed to have opened Chechnya from 1994-2002, and again in “humanitarian corridors” in early August Georgia during the 2008 Russian invasion. 2016 to allow civilians to leave the be- While in Chechnya, Habibullin’s Mi-24 sieged city. According to the pro-Assad was shot down by a DShK anti-aircraft Syrian state news agency, SANA, “scores gun, and he was the lone survivor.53 In of families” left rebel-controlled neighbor- 2012, Putin personally visited the military hoods in eastern Aleppo via the corridors base Habibullin commanded in the Kras- and a number of rebels began turning nodar region of Russia to award it with themselves and their weapons in.56 Sources an Order of Kutuzov on the hundredth on the ground, however, claimed to have anniversary of the Russian Air Force. visited the crossings but to have seen no There Putin declared, “Your unit has been such activity, nor any sign that the corri- on combat duty serving our Fatherland dors had even been opened.57 for the past 60 years. Its victories are truly As the Syrian-Russian siege of Aleppo legendary and heroic.”54 unfolded, on August 1, another Russian Habibullin was considered to be one helicopter, this time an Mi-8 “Hip,” was of Russia’s most experienced pilots and a shot down over the city, killing all five legend in Russian army aviation, but Syria on board. While no group immediately would be his last war. On the evening of claimed responsibility, video footage soon July 8, ISIS released a YouTube video of emerged showing dozens of fighters chant- an explosion that seemed to disable the ing “Allahu Akbar” around the flaming tail rotor of his helicopter as it spun out of wreckage.58 control and the two pilots plunged to their There was other bad news for Russia deaths. The Moscow-based Conflict Intel- as well. Putin’s involvement in fighting ligence Team, which investigates Russia’s ISIS (in Palmyra) earned his nation the involvement in Syria, was able to match wrath of the terrorist group. On July 30, the landscape in the video to a Google 2016, ISIS released a nine-minute video in Earth landscape model, confirming that the which a Russian-speaking fighter threat- video was filmed just east of Palmyra, as ened Putin directly: “Listen O Putin, we ISIS claimed.55 will come to you in Russia, we will kill Since then, Russia has been heavily you all in your homes, Allah willing.” involved in supporting Syrian government The Russian-speaking, masked militant offensives against rebel-controlled areas in also urged Muslims to mobilize for jihad the east of Aleppo in the late summer and against the nonbelievers and launch attacks fall of 2016. While the Assad regime, with on Russian soil.59 support from Russian air strikes, has been Thus far, there have, however, only effective in rolling back the offensives been four small ISIS-inspired attacks in

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Russia. This is despite the fact that the In response to these developments, on Soufan Group, a New York-based intel- August 16, Russia began using long-range ligence consulting firm that tracks foreign Tu-22M3 Backfire and Sukhoi-34 Full- fighters who have joined ISIS, has found back bombers flying from an Iranian base that 2,400 Russian citizens have joined known as Shahid Nojeh, 30 miles north of the group and represent a “blowback” Hamadan in western Iran. The mission: to threat.60 The first terrorist attack involved a carry out what the Russian Defense Min- shooting incident in the city of Derbent in istry described as “group massed strikes the insurgency-plagued southern Muslim on militant positions” in Aleppo, Deir republic of al-Zour and 61 Dagestan. Iran’s constitution unequivocally bans the Idlib. The The second following involved the establishment of foreign military bases on day, a second beheading Iranian soil. Not even the shah had dared wave of of a Rus- to allow Americans to deploy military Sukhoi-34 sian child forces in combat from his country. bombers took by a Muslim off from the nanny to Iranian base protest Putin’s bombing campaign and imi- and conducted a raid against ISIS in Deir tate an ISIS beheading of what it called a al-Zour. According to the Russian Defense “Russian spy” in Syria. The third involved Ministry, “The planes carried the maxi- an attack on traffic police in Moscow in mum payload of high explosive fragmen- August 2016 by two axe- and gun-wield- tation bombs OFAB-500. … As a result ing Chechens who had sworn allegiance to of the strike, two command centers and ISIS. The fourth involved an October 23, large field training camps of [ISIS] near 2016, attack on police in the town of Nizh- Deir el-Zour were destroyed. More than ny Novgorod by two terrorists pledged to 150 militants, including foreign mercenar- ISIS; both were shot dead. ies, were killed.”62 Russia Today further Meanwhile, the Russian-Syrian al- added, “The core benefit for the Russian liance’s gains in the northwest around Air Force is a drastic reduction in flying Aleppo remained tenuous. In August 2016, time to terrorist targets in Syria.”63 the Sunni rebel alliance led by Nusra Front The closer location of the Iranian suicide bombers claimed to have broken bases to the Syrian battlefields enabled the a Syrian army siege of the eastern part of Russian strategic bombers, considered too the city that had been supported by regular heavy to be accommodated by the Russian Russian aerial bombardments, effectively airstrips in Syria, to carry larger payloads turning the tables once again on Assad and (including incendiary bombs, whose use his allies. This breakthrough victory was a in civilian areas is banned) than is possible major boost for the Army of Conquest in from distant Russia.64 The trip was 1,000 Aleppo, and the alliance pledged to keep miles shorter than from the airfields in fighting until they recaptured the entire North Ossetia in the Caucasus. city. Alliance leaders announced at the The Russian-Iranian arrangement time, “We will not rest until we raise the appeared to be temporary; Iran’s constitu- flag of conquest over Aleppo’s citadel.” tion unequivocally bans the establishment

54 Williams / Souza: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria

of foreign military bases on Iranian soil.65 bombed Syrian military personnel who Not even the shah had dared to allow were attacking these very ISIS forces. Americans to deploy military forces in Coalition spokesmen claimed that the air- combat from his country. The agreement craft called off their attacks on what they was fraught with tension; Iranians even thought was an “ISIS tank position” once alluded to Moscow’s occupation of Iranian Russian officials notified the Coalition’s territory after World War II. The agreement Combined Air Operations Center that the appeared at least officially to fall apart a targets were actually Syrian military. But week after it began. The Iranians claimed by then it was too late. According to the on August 22, 2016, that it had been secret Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, and that Moscow’s public announcement at least 90 Syrian soldiers lost their lives had been “ungentlemanly.”66 Russia’s in the bombing.67 The Russian Defense Interfax news agency on August 22 quoted Ministry wasted no time in condemning Moscow’s ambassador to Tehran, Levan the attack: “We consider what happened Dzhagaryan, as confirming that all of Rus- as a natural result of the persistent refusal sia’s warplanes have been withdrawn from of the United States from [sic] the estab- Iran. He said, however, that he did “not see lishment of close cooperation with Russia any reason” why the Russians could not in the fight against ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra use the Iranian base again in the future. [Jabhat Fateh al-Sham] and other affiliated Meanwhile, Russia and America tried terrorist groups.”68 to patch up their differences in regard to Two days later, on September 19, a the war in Syria. After bloody fighting in UN/Red Crescent aid convoy delivering the summer of 2016, which exacerbated food relief to a rebel-held area near Aleppo the worst humanitarian crisis of the twen- was targeted in an airstrike, destroying ty-first century, months of U.S.-Russian 18 vehicles and killing at least 20 people. peacemaking efforts culminated in an am- The UN subsequently suspended all of bitious deal initiating a nationwide cease- the much-needed aid deliveries to Syria. fire. Under the terms of the deal, all parties The Americans blamed the Russians, but would refrain from both air and ground Moscow denied involvement. Their deni- attacks — except for Syrian government als were, however, undermined when the attacks on ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al- tailfin of a Russian bomb was found in the Sham (formerly the Nusra Front) — so crater of one of the bomb strikes on the that humanitarian aid could reach Aleppo convoy, and footage of a Russian drone and other besieged territories unimpeded. monitoring the convoy was released. It would also allow the United States and As Russia continued to indiscriminate- Russia to organize a Joint Implementation ly bomb Sunni eastern Aleppo, on October Center in the vicinity of Amman, Jordan, 3, the U.S. State Department officially from which the two countries could begin suspended efforts to both implement the a bilateral military campaign against ceasefire with Russia and organize a joint agreed terrorist targets. military-coordination body. The State But on September 17, 2016, U.S. and Department cited Russia’s “failure to abide Coalition aircraft that were targeting ISIS by international law” as the primary reason militants on Al-Tharda Mountain, near for the collapse. The State Department Deir ez-Zour in eastern Syria, accidentally also declared that “Russia and the Syrian

55 Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Winter 2016

regime have chosen to pursue a military in western Syria. The New York Times course, inconsistent with the Cessation captured the new conventional wisdom of Hostilities, as demonstrated by their in a front-page article on August 6, 2016: intensified attacks against civilian areas, “Military Success in Syria Gives Putin Up- targeting of critical infrastructure such as per Hand in U.S. Proxy War.” hospitals, and preventing humanitarian aid Among other successes, Putin shored from reaching civilians in need.”69 up the embattled Assad regime and even As the tensions between Moscow and helped it go on the offensive in small, Washington heated up, Putin deployed the rebel-controlled areas in the east, south and entire operational Northern Fleet to the north of Aleppo. In the process, he pre- Mediterranean in mid-October 2016. This vented the CIA-backed Sunni rebels from was, however, more of a saber-rattling pro- advancing further into southern Latakia paganda gesture than a projection of real and bolstered the Assad regime as it faced might. The outdated aircraft carrier that the real prospect of losing much of north- formed the core of the seven-ship battle western Syria and retreating to the Alawite group, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was a relic coastal homeland. This was Putin’s pri- from the Cold War and was unable to serve mary objective and it led to such ancil- as a significant platform for deploying lary successes as the strengthening of the Russian aircraft to Syria. Assad regime’s hand in peace negotiations, the shelving of American-Turkish plans CONCLUSION for a “safe zone” north of Aleppo, and a These events are still unfolding on strengthening of ties with Tehran. shifting sands, but they indicate some of After declaring an official end to the risks that might have been foreseen military operations (no doubt as a sop to from Putin’s bold decision to enter the Russians who feared a drawn-out Afghan- fray in Syria, such as a rise in tensions style quagmire) in March 2016, Putin with America and such regional allies as legitimized his continued operations by Turkey. From the counterterrorism per- helping the Syrian army recapture the spective, Putin’s military campaign would UNESCO World Heritage site of Palmyra certainly seem to have been fraught with from ISIS. The Russian leader could now risks. His involvement in Syria put his push the official Russian narrative that he nation squarely in the terrorists’ cross- was involved in the war on ISIS as well as hairs. Most notably, it led to the retaliatory the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, which downing of the Russian civilian airliner in Russian aircraft had regularly targeted in Sinai, Russia’s deadliest air disaster. But the northwest. Putin was finally waging there were also unforeseen benefits: the counterterrorism, instead of a counterin- growing alliance with Tehran that led to surgency campaign such as the one he had a historic, if seemingly temporary, agree- carried out in the northwest against non- ment on the basing of Russian bombers. ISIS Sunni rebels. But despite the risks and setbacks, the Not surprisingly, Iran’s Press TV par- consensus among both Russian and West- roted the Kremlin’s line, regularly touting ern observers initially seemed to be that their Russian allies’ success against what Putin’s decision paid off; he had achieved the Iranians called the “Takfiri terrorists” his narrow objectives on the battlefield (the strain of Sunni Islamism that encour-

56 Williams / Souza: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria

ages war on other Muslims they claim are Russia runs the risk of being dragged into “non-Muslims”).70 Syria’s official news a prolonged fight in Syria that it cannot agency, SANA, similarly published a bar- afford if it wants to decisively beat the rage of stories describing Putin’s support so-called “terroristic groupings” in this in the war on “ISIS-Nusra Wahhabi terror- region. Decisively beating the Sunni rebels ists,” and Assad supporters thrilled to the would entail Moscow’s becoming involved images of Russian aerial bombardments of in exactly the sort of “boots on the ground” their Sunni enemies.71 quagmire Obama predicted and that the For all the proclamations from the Russian people don’t have the stomach for. Kremlin that it was a major player in the For the time being, however, the Rus- war on ISIS, however, maps of Russian sian public seems to be behind Putin’s pre- airstrikes by the Institute for the Study of dominantly air-based venture in Syria that War clearly showed that the vast major- has resulted in only a handful of Russian ity of its airstrikes were in a corridor in deaths. Vladimir Ryzhkov, a prominent the west stretching from Aleppo in the Russian opposition politician, summed up north to Daraa in the south, far from ISIS’s the sense of pride many of his countrymen strongholds in the north and east.72 And felt in the Russian involvement in Syria: for all the fact that Moscow’s efforts were “Russian military officials are clear- focused on this region, the reality was that ly showing the Americans that we have the Moscow’s intensive bombing campaign same planes, the same smart bombs. We was not decisive and did not end the rebel- can carry out the same military campaign lion by such non-ISIS Sunni rebel groups as you.”74 The head of the International as Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) and Committee in Russia’s upper house of Jabhat Fateh al Sham (the former Nusra parliament, Alexei Pushkov, boasted: “I’m Front). As of this writing, the battle lines certain that the military capabilities dis- in Syria have not shifted dramatically since played by Russia were a shock to the U.S., Putin launched his campaign; the war is which apparently believed that only the still stalemated. To compound matters, Pu- United States and NATO can wage such a tin’s campaign in Syria, designed to break war.”75 Polls in Russia at the beginning of Russia out of its isolation, has instead the campaign showed that 70 percent of further alienated him from the world, due Russians backed Putin’s campaign. One to the high civilian death toll in Aleppo pensioner in Red Square, Natalia Nikolae- and elsewhere. vna, summed up the feeling of many of her It must also be stated that the Assad countrymen: “[President Putin] is doing regime’s extremely limited territorial gains everything right. He’s raised Russia from paled in comparison to those of the U.S.- its knees.”76 backed Iraqi government and Kurdish Whether Putin’s domestically popular forces in neighboring Iraq (the Pentagon (for now) gamble in Syria proves to have announced that ISIS had lost 45 percent a lasting effect on the ground or is merely of its territory in Iraq by the spring of ephemeral remains to be seen; the war in 2016) and YPG Kurdish forces operat- the northwest around Aleppo is still in flux. ing in northern Syria with U.S. support.73 But at least the previously isolated leader With the Sunni rebels far from defeated can take consolation in the fact that he and still in control of much of the west, has made sure his country has a veto over

57 Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Winter 2016

any future ceasefire or peace deal in Syria. United States, the leading economy of the This small victory and his defense of his world.”78 As with his widely condemned embattled client have, however, come at annexation of the Crimea and incursion enormous cost in regard to Moscow’s far into the Donetsk region of Ukraine, it more important relations with America and would seem that the wily leader from St. the West. Igor Zevelev, former director of Petersburg, who came to power promising the MacArthur Foundation’s Russia office, to make Russia great again, did not fully summed up the damage to Russian-Amer- consider the impact his application of brute ican relations caused, to a considerable force in Syria would have on his vitally extent, by Operation Retribution, “It’s not important relations with the West. Thus a Cold War….It’s a much more dangerous far, however, it would seem that his widely and unpredictable situation.”77 condemned gambit in the deserts of the In October 2016, Putin discussed in Mideast — which has incurred the wrath the newspaper Pravda the rapid deteriora- of critics ranging from the United Nations tion of Russia’s relations with America to the White House to the leaders of the stemming from the Syrian intervention: Arab Gulf states to ISIS — has, for all its “We have never wanted that to happen. On narrow, tactical successes on the ground, the contrary, we wanted to have friendly been a failure in the wider strategic sense. relations with such a great country as the

1 “Russian Parliament Unanimously Approves Use of Military in Syria to Fight ISIS,” Russia Today, Septem- ber 30, 2015. 2 “‘Peacemaker Decision’: The Reaction to the Agreement of the Federation Council on the Use of Armed Forces in Syria,” TASS Russian News Agency, September 30, 2015, http://tass.ru/politika/2303457. 3 “Farewell to Arms: Real Results of Russia’s Air Campaign,” Sputnik, March 20, 2016. http://sputniknews. com/middleeast/20160317/1036467551/russian-operation-syria-results.html. 4 “Why Russia Is in Syria,” Washington Post, September 11, 2015. 5 “How Iranian General Plotted Out Syrian Assault in Moscow,” Reuters, October 6, 2015. 6 “Obama’s Call to UN to Fight ISIS with Ideas Is Largely Seen as Futile,” New York Times, September 30, 2015. 7 “Clash of Words in Speeches to General Assembly,” New York Times, September 29, 2015. 8 “Agreement on Placing Russian Air Group in the SAR Is Concluded for an Indefinite Period,” RIA Novosti (Russia), January 14, 2016. 9 “After Denying Claims They’re Killing Civilians, Russia Has Launched Fresh Airstrikes in Syria,” VICE News, October 1, 2015. 10 “U.S. to Putin: Welcome to the ISIS Quagmire,” Daily Beast. September 29, 2015. 11 “Press Conference by the President,” WhiteHouse.gov, October 2, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/2015/10/02/press-conference-president. 12 “Death Proof: Russia’s T-90 Survives Missile Strike in Syria.” Sputnik, March 27, 2016. 13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5O5Xn1RwZU. 14 “Syrian Rebels Decry Airstrikes,” The Guardian, October 11, 2015. 15 “Iran Expands Role in Syria in Conjunction with Russia’s Airstrikes,” Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2015. 16 “Russia Has Ground Troop Battalion, Advanced Tanks in Syria: U.S. NATO Envoy,” Reuters, October 7, 2015. 17 “Missile Ships Zeliony Dol and Serpukhov Performed Launches of Kalibr Cruise Missiles against Facilities of the Jabhat al-Nusra Terrorist Grouping in Syria,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, August 19, 2016, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12093238@egNews.

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18 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, October 7, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ dpb/2015/10/248005.htm. 19 “Readout of the President’s Call with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” WhiteHouse.gov, February 11, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/14/readout-presidents-call-president-vladimir- putin-russia. 20 “U.S. Senator Blasts Truce Deal, Says It Serves Putin’s Purpose,” Radio Free Europe, February 14, 2016. 21 “Russian Warplanes Destroy 140 Terrorist Targets in Syria,” Sputnik, November 18, 2015, http://sput- niknews.com/middleeast/20151117/1030173378/russian-syria-operations-isil-targets.html#ixzz3rm5RsJnb. 22 “Syrian Rebels Say Russia Is Targeting Them Rather Than ISIS,” New York Times, October 1, 2015. 23 “Top 5 Ways Putin Has Won Big in Syria and Why Europe Is Embracing Him,” Informed Comment, Janu- ary 26, 2016. 24 See, for example, the harrowing footage here on YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1BvzF_ WCmVg. 25 See, for example, this footage that appeared on Russian Today: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DI6n_ TCj9-Y. 26 “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria,” Atlantic Council, April 2016. 27 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085. htm. 28 “ISIS Publishes Photo of What It Says Is Bomb that Downed Russian Plane,” CNN, November 19, 2015. 29 “Russian Airstrikes in Syria Will Continue, Intensify — Putin.” Sputnik, November 17, 2015, http://sput- niknews.com/world/20151117/1030243860/syria-russia-putin-airstrikes.html. 30 “Plane Shot Down on Syrian Border,” Millet (Turkey), November 24, 2015. 31 “Turkey Detains Alleged Killer of Russian Pilot Downed over Syrian Border,” Russia Today, March 31, 2016. 32 “FSA Video Claims Russian-Made Helicopter Hit with U.S.-Made TOW Missile near Su-24 Crash Site,” Russia Today, November 27, 2015. 33 “Russian Raids Repeatedly Hit Turkmen Areas, Russian Data Shows,” Reuters. November 27, 2015. 34 “Turkey Summons Russian Envoy over Bombings in Syria,” Al Arabiya, November 20, 2015. 35 “Intense Attacks on our Turkmen Brothers,” TRT Haber (Turkey), November 20, 2015. 36 “Putin on the Downed Su- 24: We Have Been Stabbed in the Back by the Terrorist Accomplices,” Pravda, November 24, 2015. 37 “Russian Airstrike Targets Aid Convoy in Northwestern town of Azaz, 7 Killed,” Sabah (Turkey), Novem- ber 25, 2015. 38 For a history of the two Russian-Chechen Wars, see Brian Glyn Williams, Inferno in Chechnya: The Rus- sian Chechen Wars, the Al Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings (University Press New England, 2014). 39 “Syria: Russia’s Shameful Failure to Acknowledge Civilian Killings,” Amnesty International, December 23, 2015. 40 “Press Release: Two Medical Staff Killed in Russian Airstrikes on Sarmin,” Syrian-American Medical Society (SAMS) Foundation, October 22, 2015. 41 “Russia’s Airstrikes Killed 2,000 Civilians in Six Months,” The Guardian, March 15, 2016. 42 “Islamic State Fighters Make Significant Gains in Syrian Areas Bombed by Russia,”New York Times, October 10, 2015. 43 “By Focusing on Syria, Putin Is Catering to an Audience at Home,” New York Times, September 27, 2015. 44 Charles Lister, The Syrian Jihad (Oxford University Press. 2016), 30. 45 Brian Glyn Williams, The Crimean Tatars, from Soviet Genocide to Putin’s Conquest (Oxford University Press. 2015). 46 “Vladimir Putin Announces Unexpected Withdrawal of Russian Troops from Syria,” Slate, March 14, 2016. 47 “A Russian-Guided Tour of Syria’s Second War,” CBC News, May 4, 2016. 48 Dabiq 13 (hosted by the Clarion Project), http://www.clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13-the-rafi- dah.pdf, 16. 49 “Islamic State Driven out of Syria’s Ancient Palmyra City,” Reuters, March 28, 2016. 50 “In Syria, Russia Plays Bach Where ISIS Executed 25,” New York Times, May 5, 2016.

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51 “Russia’s Military in Syria: Bigger than You Think and Not Going Anywhere,” CNN, May 9, 2016. 52 “‘VCS RF Ready to Answer,’ the Islamic State ‘for the Loss of Two Pilots,’” Pravda, July 11, 2016, http:// www.pravda.ru/news/accidents/11-07-2016/1306309-vertolet-0/; and “Names of Russian Helicopter Pilots Killed in Syria,” Lenta.RU, July 9, 2016. 53 “How Russia Tried to Cover Up Death of Putin’s Best Helicopter Ace in Syria,” Euromaidan Press (Ukraine), July 11, 2016. 54 “Ceremony Decorating the 393rd Air Force Base with the Order of Kutuzov,” Kremlin.Ru (Russia), June 14, 2012. 55 “Was the Russian Mi-35M Destroyed by Friendly Fire?” Conflict Intelligence Team (Moscow), July 10, 2016. 56 “Scores of Families Besieged by Terrorist Groups Get Out of Aleppo Eastern Neighborhoods,” Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), August 2, 2016. 57 “More Humanitarian Corridors to Open in Besieged Aleppo, Russia Says,” CNN, August 1, 2016. 58 “5 Dead as Russian Helicopter Shot Down in Syria,” CNN, August 1, 2016. 59 “Alleged ISIS Video Threatens Putin, Russia with Attacks,” Russia Today, August 1, 2016. 60 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” The Soufan Group, December 15, 2015, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFight- ersUpdate3.pdf. 61 “Iran and Iraq Become Open Allies in the War on ISIS,” Izvestiia, August 16, 2016, http://izvestia.ru/ news/627352#ixzz4I95YeCof. 62 “Tu-22M3 Long-Range Bombers and Su-34 Tactical Bombers Took Off from the ‘Hamedan’ Airbase and Carried Out a Concentrated Airstrike on Objects of the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra Terrorist Groupings in the Provinces of Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Idlib,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, August 16, 2016, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12092929@egNews; and “Russian Planes Took Off from Iranian Airdrome to Eliminate 150 Militants in Syria,” TASS Russian News Agency, August 17, 2016. 63 “Russian TU M33 Backfire Long Range Bombers ISIS from Iran’s Hamadan Airfield,” Russia Today, August 16, 2016. 64 Russian aircraft were filmed on Russia Today armed with incendiary bombs and these were reported to have been dropped in Aleppo. For the footage, see http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=59e_1466274309. 65 “Russia Sends Bombers to Syria Using Base in Iran,” New York Times, August 16, 2016. 66 “Iran Slams Russia for Publicity on Airbase Use in Syria,” Daily Sabah (Iran), August 22, 2016. 67 “164 Killed Yesterday 17/09/2016,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 18, 2016. 68 “War of Words after U.S. Strikes Kills Regime Troops,” CNN, September 18, 2016. 69 “Suspension of Participation in Bilateral Channels With Russia Established to Sustain the Cessation of Hos- tilities in Syria.” U.S. State Department press conference, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262704. htm. 70 For a typical example of the perspective from Tehran, see the state-run Iranian Press TV account: “Russian Airplanes Pound Daesh in Eastern Syria,” Press TV, August 14, 2016, 71 “Russian Strategic Bombers Destroy Terrorists’ Positions in Eastern Holms,” Syrian Arab News Agency, August 8, 2016. 72 “Russian Airstrikes in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, June 3-28, 2016, http://www.understanding- war.org/sites/default/files/18%20%2028%20JUN%20Russian%20Airstrikes_0.pdf. 73 “Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Area of Influence, August 2014 to April 2016,” U.S. Department of Defense, http:// www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0814_iraq/docs/20160512_ISIL%20Areas%20of%20Influence_ Aug%202014%20through%20Apr%202016%20Map.pdf. 74 “The U.S. May Not Like Russia’s Involvement in Syria, but Russians Are Good With It,” PRI’s The World, October 19, 2015. 75 “Game Changer: Russia’s Actions Drastically Changed Situation in Syria,” Sputnik, December 25, 2015, http://sputniknews.com/world/20151225/1032317355/syria-russia-us-turkey-reaction.html. 76 “The U.S. May Not Like Russia’s Involvement,” op. cit. 77 “Russia, U.S. Move Past Cold War to Unpredictable Conflict,” CNN, October 18, 2016. 78 “Putin Describes the Smell in Russian Relations with the West,” Pravda, October 12, 2016.

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