Operation “Retribution”: Putin's Military Campaign in Syria, 2015-16
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Winter 2016 Operation “Retribution”: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria, 2015-16 Brian Glyn Williams and Robert Souza Dr. Williams is Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth and the author of Counter-Jihad. The American Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (University of Pennsylvania Press, November 2016). He previously worked for the CIA’s CTC in Afghanistan and in Kabul for the Army’s Information Operations. Mr. Souza is an assistant managing editor at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy in Washington, D.C., and a research analyst for the Center for the Study of Targeted Killings. eptember 30, 2016, marked the It soon became widely apparent, first anniversary of Russian Presi- however, that the Russians had conflated dent Vladimir Putin’s decision to ISIS with CIA-backed rebels and various involve his nation militarily in the other anti-Assad Sunni rebel forces with no SSyrian conflict on the side of Moscow’s known connection to ISIS, creating the false longtime ally, the Assad regime. Accord- narrative of a united terrorist monolith that ing to initial Russian Defense Ministry needed to be eradicated in order to preserve statements and Putin himself, the mission stability in Syria. In the process, Putin was had the primary objective of joining the able to successfully “shift the sands” of the U.S.-led coalition in fighting ISIS. Russia’s conflict and bolster the endangered Assad chief of staff of the Presidential Executive regime while simultaneously cultivating Office at that time, Sergei Ivanov, using his image domestically as a strong leader: an alternative name for ISIS, laid out his able to stand up to the West, project power country’s official objectives on September abroad, and support an embattled ally 30, 2015: “The military goal of the opera- against international jihadists. The operation tion is strictly to provide air support for the has been consistently portrayed in Russia as [Syrian] government forces in their fight an unmitigated success in “inflicting heavy against Islamic State.”1 The Mufti of Ka- losses on Syrian terrorist groups.”3 There zan (the head of Russia’s Tatar communi- seems to be little doubt among observers ty) and members of the Russian parliament that Putin’s venture into the Mideast has lined up to support Putin’s campaign in reshaped the war in Syria, but has it been a Syria, described as a “prophylactic against success in the larger strategic sense? terrorist organizations” that was necessary What follows is an effort to evaluate to “destroy ISIS at its root.”2 the first year of this still-unfolding military © 2016, The Authors Middle East Policy © 2016, Middle East Policy Council 42 Williams / Souza: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria campaign, with the aim of assessing the al Fatah (the Army of Conquest) — con- validity of the Russian claims of success. cern grew in Moscow over possible threats to this asset. In addition to his interest in BACKGROUND defending this facility, Putin feared the Russia has long been a key supporter chaos stemming from the overthrow of of the Syrian Baathist Socialist regime. strongmen in the region, having noted the Hafez al-Assad, father and predecessor of turmoil that swept over Libya and Iraq fol- current President Bashar al-Assad, spent lowing U.S. intervention. He also felt the years in the Soviet Union learning to fly need to show the world, and his own audi- MIG-15s and MIG-17s as an officer in the ence at home, that Russia stood by its al- Syrian armed forces. The elder Assad sub- lies. When the Arab Spring demonstrations sequently seized control of Syria in a coup shook the region in 2011, Putin claimed in 1970 and brought to power his ethno- the United States had abandoned its ally, religious group, the Alawites (15 percent President Hosni Mubarak, in Egypt. But of Syria’s population, they adhere to a Putin decided to stand by his ally, Assad, syncretic offshoot of Shiite Islam). Having when civil war broke out between the designated himself president, Assad fol- ruling Alawites and dozens of Sunni rebel lowed the model of a Soviet single-party groups. state, with an all-pervasive network of Putin feared the threat to Assad from intelligence agencies that kept the restless an alliance of Sunni rebel groups, the Sunni majority in check.4 aforementioned Army of Conquest, ad- In 1971, the Assad regime provided vancing on the Alawite coastal homeland. the USSR with a naval facility in Tartus, The Sunni alliance, which threatened both on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. It remains the Russian naval facility and Assad, had there today, Russia’s sole military facility conquered Idlib Province in northwestern outside the former Soviet Union. Mos- Syria soon after its formation in March cow’s basic docking facility, however, is 2015. Putin was alarmed when these Sunni not big enough to be designated a “base”; rebels began to encroach on the Alawite instead it is described as a “Material coastal stronghold in southern Latakia Technical Support Point.” The Russian (for three years the Sunni rebels had held facility consists of two floating piers and northern Latakia). an Amur-class floating workshop. It is At this time, the Iranians, unwavering not capable of supporting any of Russia’s allies of the Assad regime since the 1979 major warships — frigates, destroyers or Islamic Revolution, warned Putin that its one comparatively small aircraft carrier. Assad was going to fall and that they did This Material Technical Support Point can not have the means to save him. In July in no way be compared to massive U.S. 2015, the commander of the Quds Force, naval and aerial facilities in the Persian an elite extraterritorial special-forces arm Gulf, which host 20 aircraft carriers, for of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Major example. General Qassem Soleimani, visited Mos- Still, as the threat to Assad mounted in cow to make his case for Russian involve- 2015 amid the bloody civil war — posed ment in Syria. He explained that the Sunni by a new alliance of non-ISIS Sunni rebel rebel advances were endangering not only groups in northwest Syria known as Jaish their joint ally Assad, but Russia’s military 43 Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Winter 2016 assets at Tartus. A senior Assad official re- of one in 10 Syrians and caused the near- called, “Soleimani put the map of Syria on collapse of the Assad regime was to come the table. The Russians were very alarmed, as a surprise to those who had expected and felt matters were in steep decline and Putin to fail in his “quixotic” adventure. that there were real dangers to the re- gime.”5 Soleimani was able to convince his RUSSIAN OFFICIAL Russian hosts that their involvement was INTERVENTION essential. In early September 2015, Russia Putin agreed that Assad needed to be deployed artillery units and advanced T-90 bolstered as a bulwark against “terror- “Vladimir” main battle tanks and flew ists,” lumping all Sunni rebel groups into in approximately 2,000 Russian military this category alongside ISIS.6 Tellingly, personnel to the Hmeimim base. They later Putin directly blamed the United States deployed at Hmeimim S-400 “Triumph” for “creating the conditions in which the anti-aircraft missiles with a 250-mile range [ISIS] terrorist state was born”: “Tens of to defend these assets. Most important, thousands of militants are fighting under the Russians also dispatched to the base the banners of [ISIS]. Its ranks include approximately 50 fighters and bombers former Iraqi servicemen who were thrown (primarily Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack out on to the street after the [U.S.] invasion planes, new Su-34 Fullback medium of Iraq in 2003.”7 bombers, and Su-24 Fencer fighter jets) After Soleimani’s visit, Putin was and several Mil 24 Hind attack helicopters. convinced of the need to robustly protect These air assets would later be bolstered his Syrian ally, save the Russian facility by larger Tu-22M3 Backfire, Tu-160 at Tartus, and prevent the rise of jihadist Blackjack, and Tu-95MS Bear strategic groups of the sort that had taken power in bombers, from a base in Mozdok, capital post-Hussein Iraq, post-Qadhafi Libya and of the Russian Caucasus republic of North parts of Syria. In addition, Putin would Ossetia, and eventually from western Iran. be projecting Russia back onto the world Then, on September 30, in a move that stage after its widely condemned 2014 caught America and its allies by surprise, annexation of Crimea and incursions into the Russians began an intensive bombing the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine. The campaign, informally known as Opera- idea of supporting Assad against CIA- tion Vozmezdiye (retribution), against backed Sunni rebel groups must have had what they claimed were ISIS targets in a strong appeal. Syria. However, the initial Russian strikes Having decided on intervention, on appeared to be against the Army of Con- August 26, 2015, Russia and Syria signed quest in the northwest and the capital a formal agreement in Damascus granting of Idlib province. A member of a U.S.- Russia access to Syria’s Hmeimim airbase backed Sunni rebel brigade operating in near regime-controlled southern Latakia.8 Talbiseh the day after the initial strikes ob- The pieces were thus in place for the pro- served, “The [Assad] regime has bombed jection of Russian power for the first time this area many times before, but not heavy beyond the borders of the former Soviet like yesterday. … We knew there would be Union.