note n°07/2017

2 March 2017

Antoine Vagneur-Jones Research Fellow, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique

War and opportunity: the and the Syrian conflict

Abstract rorist measures, a military campaign has The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a largely been launched in TIP’s old Pakistani Uyghur jihadi movement advocating the stomping grounds and ’s support for independence of the Chinese province of Uyghur has diminished. Yet, in , has become embroiled in the Syrian the face of such hurdles, TIP’s involvement in civil war. Having long been active in shows how jihadi groups can ’s tribal areas, the group has knitted strengthen their networks and raise their close ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Emirate international profile by waging war abroad. of (previously known as the ). Most of its combatants in Syria Résumé fight under Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, a jihadi Prônant l’indépendance de la province organisation which controls large swathes of chinoise du Xinjiang, le Parti islamique du territory in the country’s northwestern Turkestan (TIP), groupe djihadiste majori- regions. From deploying troops in northern tairement composé de combattants ouïghours, Latakia to participating in the battle for s’est immiscé dans la guerre civile syrienne. , TIP has combined its military com- Longtemps actif dans les régions tribales du mitment to the Syrian conflict with consistent Pakistan, le mouvement a noué des liens efforts to publicise its activities online. But a étroits avec Al-Qaïda ainsi que l’Émirat isla- number of developments threaten TIP’s exis- mique d’Afghanistan (antérieurement connu tence. has strengthened its antiter-

sous le nom des ). La plupart de ses fighters published by the Soufan Group paid combattants en Syrie luttent sous la houlette them little heed 3. This is likely due to the de Jabhat Fatah Al-Sham, organisation djiha- methodological difficulties encountered in diste qui contrôle de vastes pans de territoire analyzing their presence in Syria, stemming dans le nord-ouest du pays. Ayant déployé ses from both a lack of reliable statistics as to their troupes dans le Nord de Lattaquié et participé numbers and paucity of sources regarding à la bataille pour Alep, le TIP a su conjuguer their activities on the ground. Yet the breadth son engagement militaire envers le conflit of their operations across multiple governo- syrien à des efforts soutenus en vue de média- rates, alongside the fact that there are more tiser ses activités en ligne. Un certain nombre in their native province in China than de développements menacent cependant la there are in Tunisia (and twice as many as in pérennité même du TIP : la Chine a renforcé ) 4, renders their presence worthy of sa politique anti-terroriste, une campagne note. militaire a été lancée dans son ancien terrain Composed of hailing from China’s d’opérations au Pakistan et le soutien de la Xinjiang province, TIP’s combatants have Turquie pour le séparatisme ouïghour s’est vu played an active role on a number of fronts, réduit. Face à de tels obstacles, la présence du having played an instrumental part in the TIP en Syrie démontre néanmoins comment 2015 offensive against regime forces les groupes djihadistes parviennent à renfor- before taking part in heavy fighting in nor- cer leurs réseaux tout en accroissant leur thern Latakia and Aleppo in late 2016 5. The notoriété sur le plan international. group’s arrival in Syria has notably allowed it to foster connections with a range of jihadi ~ ~ ~ ~ movements under Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra). While US airstrikes and regime forces zeroing in on Having lost control of all borders bar that Idlib-based rebel groups, Turkey has come shared with Lebanon, the Syrian government under increasing Chinese pressure to take a has been unable to stem the inflow of fighters hard stance on Uyghur separatism. TIP’s fate arriving from abroad. Despite its domestic thus hangs in the balance. That said, and roots – and the fact that groups fighting the despite the fact that, in the wider scheme of regime remain predominantly made up of things, its contribution to the conflict cannot Syrians – the has attracted be said to be more than marginal, TIP’s enga- large numbers of foreign fighters, diverse in gement in the Syrian theatre has raised its both their motivations and origins. In May profile in jihadi circles and widened its net- 2016, the head of the ’ Counter work. This increases the probability that it will - Committee claimed that just under continue to engage in transnational jihadi 30,000 international combatants were present activity well beyond the civil war’s conclusion. in both Syria and Iraq 1. Many of the conflict’s most powerful actors rely on their presence – they are thought to make up over half of IS’ Uyghur separatism and the rank and file 2. Responding to widespread emergence of TIP consternation regarding the threat of domestic Uyghurs are native to the Xinjiang Uyghur attacks by returning jihadi fighters, Western Autonomous Region (XUAR), a Chinese pro- media and academics have largely focused on vince in the country’s northwest, conquered by combatants stemming from European coun- the Qing dynasty in 1759. A Turkic, largely tries as well as fighters arriving from Arab Sunni ethnic group, China’s Uyghurs number states (Tunisia and Jordan have received par- over 11 million, constituting around 0.8% of ticular attention). the country’s population 6. As a whole, their Recent scholarship has, however, broadly 3. Richard Barrett et al, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated overlooked the role of Chinese nationals of Assessment on the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria Uyghur extraction fighting for the Syrian wing and Iraq”, The Soufan Group , Dec 2015. of Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), one of the 4. DV Buyarov et al, “Demographic Situation in only large, unified and non-Arab muhajireen Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Area in the Last Quarter (jihadi foreign fighter) groups fighting the of the Twentieth Century”, Global Media Journal , 24 Syrian regime. A much-cited report on foreign June 2016. 5. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Factions of North 1. Cynthia Koet, “UN: 30,000 foreign fighters in Syria Latakia”, Syria Comment , 10 Dec 2015. and Iraq”, Politico , 7 Nov 2016. 6. Yitzhak Shichor, “See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak 2. Zachary Laub, “The Islamic State”, Council on No Evil: Middle Eastern Reactions to Rising China’s Foreign Relations , 10 Aug 2016. 2

living standards are significantly lower than in vince’s northeast, are treated more leniently most Han-majority provinces. Tuition and than those of such southern cities as school fees, poor job prospects and language by virtue of their historical lack of resistance policies that place those with a poor grasp of to Chinese rule 13 . As a result, attitudes among Mandarin at a disadvantage have all contri- Uyghur communities towards Chinese rule, as buted to low levels of attainment at Uyghur well as the degree to which various entities schools 7. In addition, tensions abound regar- identify with pan-Turkism or to the wider ding relations with the central government, Islamic ummah , differ throughout the pro- with human rights groups deploring instances vince. Referring to the minority of Uyghurs of religious repression and heavy-handed actively seeking to secede from China, Van counter-terrorism initiatives 8. Targeting vio- Wie Davis of the Asia-Pacific Center for lent extremism and terrorism, the most recent Security Studies stresses that there is “no series of “strike hard” operations, launched by single Uyghur agenda”, the goals of such the Chinese government in May 2014, has groups running the gamut from being granted been particularly criticized by advocacy orga- a greater degree of autonomy with China to nisations 9. Allegations – much-publicised by establishing a separate state 14 . both international human rights groups as Founded in 2006 in the Af-Pak border region well as Uyghur jihadis – range from the impo- by Uyghurs who had fled from China in the sition of restrictions on fasting to incidents of 1990s 15 , TIP’s leadership has always been 10 extrajudicial torture . Penn State University’s based outside of Xinjiang. While the organi- Kiliç Buğra Kanat bemoans the absence of an sation’s genesis remains unclear, the Chinese effective communications mechanism between government describes the group as a new the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and manifestation of what it referred to as the East Uyghurs, arguing that it prevents the emer- Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), to gence of any form of dialogue between the two which it has attributed over 200 attacks bet- 11 parties . ween 1990 and 2001 16 . Yet doubt has been cast Although a number of Uyghur separatist cells on the link between TIP and ETIM. Cited by are active across the province, the degree to the Council for Foreign Relations, Omer which a single, overarching separatist move- Kanat, senior editor of ’s ment can be said to be active across Xinjiang Uyghur service, argues that TIP may have in has been called into question. Most separatists fact developed as an offshoot of the Islamic call for the creation of “East Turkistan”, whose Party of Turkistan, renamed from the Islamic territory would encompass the XUAR’s, Movement of 17 , a jihadi movement roughly approximating that claimed by past active in the Pakistan’s Federally Administe- attempts to found an independent state. While red Tribal Areas (FATA) region which, suppor- the “First East Turkistan Republic” proved ted by bin Laden’s training facilities and seed little more than a flash in the pan, collapsing a funding, emerged during the Afghanistan few months after being declared in November War 18 . While commentators, media agencies, 1933, a second republic, this time supported governments and the UN tend to conflate the by the USSR, emerged in 1944 before being two organisations, the majority of Uyghur subsumed into the newly-formed People’s combatants fighting in Syria do so under the Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. As argues a report drafted by the Council on Foreign Movement (ETIM)”, Council on Foreign Relations , Relations, it is important to recognize the 4 Sep 2014. heterogeneous nature of Uyghur unrest across 13. Colin Mackerras, China's Ethnic Minorities and Xinjiang 12 . Residents of Turpan, in the pro- Globalisation , London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 118. Uyghur Crackdown”, Griffith Asia Quarterly 3(1): 62- 14. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic 85, 2015. p. 62. Separatism in Xinjiang, China”, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies , Jan 2008. 7. Timothy A. Grose, “The Xinjiang Class: Education, Integration, and the Uyghurs”, Journal of Muslim 15. Beina Xu et al, “The Islamic Minority Affairs 30(1): 97-109, 2010. p. 106. Movement (ETIM)”, Council on Foreign Relations , 4 Sep 2014. 8. “China: Religious Repression of Uyghur Muslims”, , 12 Apr 2005. 16. Andrew McGregor, “Will Xinjiang’s Turkistani Islamic Party Survive the Drone Missile Death of its 9. “China 2015/2016”, Amnesty International , 2016. Leader?”, The , 12 Mar 2010. 10. “China: Religious Repression of Uyghur Muslims”, 17. Beina Xu et al, “The East Turkestan Islamic Human Rights Watch , 12 Apr 2005. Movement (ETIM)”, Council on Foreign Relations , 11. Kiliç Buğra Kanat, “The Securitization of the Uyghur 4 Sep 2014. Question and Its Challenges”, Insight Turkey 18(1): 191 18. David Malet, “Foreign Fighters: Transnational -218, p. 215. Identity in Civic Conflicts”, Oxford, Oxford University 12. Beina Xu et al, “The East Turkestan Islamic Press, 2013, p. 190. 3

TIP’s banner. being released for lack of evidence 24 . The Since it threatened to target the 2008 group was particularly active in the tribal Olympics, TIP has positioned itself at the head regions bestriding the Afghan-Pakistani of the separatist cause. Dozens of attacks have border; its then-leader was been committed in its name, including the killed by an US drone in Pakistan’s FATA. detonation of a in Tiananmen Similarly, TIP’s current commander, Abdul Square and a spate of stabbings in . Haq, was reported to have met his end in TIP’s activities have spread beyond China’s in North Waziristan four years borders, with the organisation blamed for later in 2010 before reemerging in May such attacks as a suicide bombing on the 2014 25 . TIP’s activities, including running a Chinese embassy in , carried out on training camp in close cooperation with Al 30 August 2016 19 . TIP’s primary objective, as Qaeda and a number of Islamic Emirate of stated in the 19 th edition of its -language Afghanistan (IEA, previously known as the “Islamic Turkistan” ( Turkistan al-Islamiya ) e- Taliban) groups, among which it is described publication published in April 2016, is “the as wielding considerable influence 26 , appear to establishment of an Islamic caliphate vindicate Chinese allegations regarding the according to the book and the Sunnah ”20 . In predominantly Uyghur group’s involvement part two of its “Blessed are the Strangers” with international terrorist networks. TIP’s video series, TIP distinguishes itself “from all headquarters are said to be located in Mir Ali, manner of democracy, nationalism and close to the border with Afghanistan 27 , and its patriotism” 21 . The organisation broadcasts cooperation with the local IEA group is bulletins and videos in Arabic, Uyghur, buttressed by having pledged bay'ah (a formal Mandarin and occasionally Urdu. Published oath of allegiance to a leader) to Mullah by its media agency, Sawt al-Islam , such Omar 28 . content alternates between lauding the Moreover, the ninth episode of al-Qaeda accomplishments of TIP fighters and leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s “Islamic Spring” perpetrators of terror attacks in its name on video series explicitly recognises Mahsum as a the one hand, and criticising the movement’s noteworthy jihadi leader, praising ETIM’s enemies (notably the Chinese, Russian and struggle against the Chinese “atheist” Syrian governments) on the other. It and its occupier 29 . The video lauds the presence of affiliated media organisations (such as the TIP members in Syria, highlighting their Turkish-language Doğu Türkistan Bülteni ) cooperation with the then-al-Nusra front (now play fast and loose with the facts, from JFS), which, until recently, operated on behalf claiming that in China are sold “Halal pork” 22 of al-Qaeda in Syria. In addition to Abdul to contending that Chinese slaughterhouses Haq’s open support for al-Zawahiri 30 , the UN process Uyghur fetuses to be sold on for claims that the TIP leader has been a member popular consumption 23 . of al-Qaeda’s shura majlis (executive council)

24. Beina Xu et al, “The East Turkestan Islamic TIP’s international jihadi Movement (ETIM)”, Council on Foreign Relations , network 4 Sep 2014. Charlie Savage, “U.S. Frees Last of the Chinese Uighur Detainees from Guantánamo Bay”, The Facing a change in domestic priorities follo- New York Times , 31 Dec 2013. wing the combined with 25. Bill Rogio, “Turkistan Islamic Party emir thought increased cooperation on antiterrorism with killed in 2010 reemerged to lead group in 2014”, FDD’s China, the US labeled ETIM a terrorist The Long War Journal , 11 Jun 2015. organisation in 2002, with 22 of its alleged 26. Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda appoints new leader of forces members being held in Guantanamo before in Pakistan’s tribal areas”, FDD’s The Long War Journal , 9 May 2011. 19. Olga Dzyubenko, “Kyrgyzstan says Uighur militant 27. Rohan Gunaratna and Stefanie Kam, Handbook of groups behind attacks on China’s embassy”, Reuters , Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific , Singapore, World 7 Sep 2016. Scientific Publishing, 2016, p. 494. 20. “Who are we?” [ Man nahnu ], Islamic Turkistan 28. “Turkistan Islamic Party Fighters Killed in Syria”, [Turkistan al-islamia ], 19 Apr 2016, p. 2. The Line of Steel , 19 Jul 2015. 21. “Blessed Are the Strangers #2”, Jihadology , 26 May 29. Thomas Joscelyn, “Zawahiri praises Uyghur 2016. jihadists in ninth episode of ‘Islamic Spring’ series”, FDD’s The Long War Journal , 7 Jul 2016. 22. “25 ‘Radical’ Hui Muslims taken into Custody [ 25 Müslümanını ‘Radikal Olmak’ Suçlaması İle 30. Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Turkistan Tutukladı ]”, Doğu Türkistan Bülteni , 11 Nov 2015. Islamic Party leader criticizes the Islamic State’s ‘illegitimate’ caliphate”, FDD’s The Long War Journal , 23. “Blessed Are the Strangers #2”, Jihadology , 26 May 11 Jun 2016. 2016. 4

since 2005 31 . Potter of the University of 2015 that reports concerning Uyghur fighters Michigan notes that he played a mediation in Syria described large numbers entering role between warring IEA factions – proof of through the notoriously porous Turkish bor- the considerable influence he then wielded 32 . der 38 . On social media, supporters of the In addition, the rivalry between JFS and IS Syrian regime routinely highlight their presen- has come to the fore, with Haq’s echoing the ce as proof of the uprising’s exogenous roots. former’s stance by describing Abu Bakr al- Many sources cite the adhesion of Uyghur 33 Baghdadi as “illegitimate” , while fighters to IS. Eager to underscore its inter- hagiographic articles about such influential al- national reach, the jihadi group released a Qaeda members as Abu Musab al Suri have video in June 2015 showcasing its mobi- been published in TIP’s aforementioned lisation of fighters hailing from Xinjiang, the 34 magazine . There is thus little doubt that the veracity of which was buttressed by a Euro- group has been part of al-Qaeda’s network for pean Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) some time. Whether TIP’s position in this report which estimated that it currently fields regard has since changed, notably following around 200 Uyghur fighters, most of whom JFS’ rebranding and supposed split from al- travelled from China through and Qaeda, carried out in late July 2016 due to Turkey 39 . Others cite figures as high as 300 40 . pressure from Gulf-based donors, remains to Such statistics pale before the number of be seen. It is however certain that, upon Uyghur fighters affiliated with groups close to entering the Syrian theatre, TIP combatants al-Qaeda. Citing numbers originally published were able to count on the cooperation and by the East Turkistan Education and Soli- support provided by al-Qaeda. darity Association, a media agency promoting the separatist cause, The News claims TIP in Syria that a total of 2,000 to 2,500 TIP combatants are currently fighting in northern Syria 41 . Following the outbreak of the civil war, infor- More tentative, the aforementioned ECFR mation as to Uyghurs fighting in Syria was not report puts the number of Uyghurs in Syria at long coming. In October 2012, Chinese major several thousand, adding that most have general Jin Yinan stated that TIP was taking joined Jabhat al-Nusra (JFS) 42 . Unlike fighters advantage of the Syrian conflict to obtain travelling from Western or many Arab coun- experience and a broader recognition of their tries, however, there is little in the way of cause 35 . TIP formally announced its involve- official statistics documenting the departure of ment in the Syrian conflict in December 2012 Uyghur jihadis from either Xinjiang or in the twelfth edition of its “Islamic Turkistan” Pakistan’s FATA; while TIP’s presence in Syria e-magazine 36 . In March 2014, TIP released a is undoubtedly significant, no definitive figu- video in which Abdul Haq restated his orga- res exist as to the precise numbers it has nisation’s military presence in Syria 37 . Howe- mustered. ver, despite a steady flow of information detailing their arrival in force, it was not until Due to TIP’s long-standing ties with al- Qaeda 43 , its fighters have largely fought under 31. “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: the aegis of JFS 44 . It is but one of many QDe.088 Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement”, United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs: 38. Michael Clarke, “Uyghur Militants in Syria: The Sanctions , 7 Apr 2011. Turkish Connection”, The Jamestown Foundation , 4 32. Philip B. K. Potter, “: Growing Feb 2016. Threats with Global Implications”, Strategic Studies 39. Mathieu Duchâtel, “Terror overseas: under- Quarterly (Winter 2013) 7(4): 70-92, p. 75. standing China’s evolving counter-terror strategy”, 33. Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Turkistan European Council on Foreign Relations , 26 Oct 2016, Islamic Party leader criticizes the Islamic State’s p. 4. ‘illegitimate’ caliphate”, FDD’s The Long War Journal , 40. “Over 100 Chinese Fighters Have Joined Islamic 11 Jun 2016. State in Syria”, New America , 25 Jul 2016. 34. “The Syian experience [ Al-tajriba al-souria]”, 41. “Uyghur “Jihadis” Role in Syria War”, The Levant Islamic Turkistan [ Turkistan al-islamia ], April 2016, News , 19 Apr 2016. pp. 27-28. 42. Mathieu Duchâtel, “Terror overseas: understanding 35. “Jin Yinan: America Wants to Overthrow Bachar’s China’s evolving counter-terror strategy”, European Regime [ Mei xiang tuifan Bashaer zhengquan ]”, CNR , Council on Foreign Relations , 26 Oct 2016, p. 4. 1 Nov 2012. 43. Christian Shepherd, “Syria-based Uyghur militants 36. Islamic Turkistan [ Turkistan al-islamia ], 12 Dec linked to Chinese embassy bombing”, Financial Times , 2012, p. 3. 7 Sep 2016. 37. Bill Rogio, “Turkistan Islamic Party emir thought 44. Mohanad Hage Ali, “China’s proxy war in Syria: killed in 2010 reemerged to lead group in 2014”, FDD’s Revealing the role of Uyghur fighters”, Long War Journal, 11 Jun 2015. English , 2 Mar 2016. 5

contingents of muhajireen to do so. JFS fields desecrating churches 52 and executing Chris- the largest contingent of foreign fighters after tian civilians reported throughout Idlib pro- IS, with 30% of their rank and file consisting vince 53 . Thence, TIP fighters have been at the of international combatants 45 . Primarily active forefront of the fighting in Latakia, claiming in northwestern Syria, the organisation con- 30 “martyrs” on 27 November 2016, fallen trols an estimated 7,000 fighters in the Idlib during fighting in the Jabal Turkman region 54 . region alone 46 . Its success is partly down to the Also active in the Sahl al-Ghab plains west of skill with which it brought existing jihadi , the group’s military activities in movements under its command structure. JFS northwestern Syria are thought to have come allows such adherents to remain structurally at a total cost of 300 men 55 . From April independent, offering them both a degree of through to May 2016, TIP launched a series of latitude in carrying out their own operations military operations south of Aleppo. In while strengthening its influence in areas November and December of the same year, a beyond its immediate control 47 . In addition, number of Twitter accounts reported TIP’s despite the difficulties inherent to coordi- marked presence during the battle for Aleppo, nating disparate and heterogeneous actors on with the organisation claiming to have carried the field, Cafarella argues that the looseness of out a significant number of “martyrdom ope- these alliances ensures that such groups retain rations” against encroaching regime forces. their camaraderie and command structure, TIP’s media wing heavily publicized its invol- increasing their effectiveness in the field 48 . vement in the battle for the “1070 Apart- One such peripheral ally, TIP has operated ments” project, a housing development in alongside JFS throughout its involvement in southwestern Aleppo which was the site of the Syrian theatre. The group’s Twitter pages bitter fighting between the and have been regularly updated with the names JFS. According to the Syrian News Center, a and photos of well over 20 Uyghur fighters regime-backed news channel, TIP appears to killed in Syria 49 . They have risen to especial have been one of the last groups to have left 56 prominence during the battle for Jisr al- the city and its surrounding areas . Two trai- Shughur, a town historically opposed to the ning camps operated by TIP have been Assad regime wrested from regime control identified by the Long War Journal, an during the April-June 2015 Northwestern American website which reports on jihadist Syria offensive. The operation, part of a activity, specifying that one is located in Idlib broader campaign to seize a number of while the other is either in Idlib or Latakia. In strategic positions straddling the Hama and addition, one of the two is known to be dedi- 57 Idlib governorates, involved an estimated 700 cated to training child soldiers . There are no Uyghur fighters joined by a number of reports of TIP activity on the southern front. Islamist factions, including the then-al-Nusra Further reports have surfaced regarding the front and Salafist brigade Ahrar al-Sham. The colonisation of abandoned settlements, group is thought to have lost over twenty whereby groups of foreign fighters, their soldiers over the campaign’s course 50 . families in tow, have taken over villages whose Upon taking the town, TIP produced a video of Christian or Alawite populations have long 58 a local church steeple bearing its flag 51 , with since fled , alongside settling down in villages additional accounts regarding its practice of 52. Metin Gurcan, “How the Islamic State is exploiting Asian unrest to recruit fighters”, Al-Monitor , 9 Sep 45. Charles Listen, “Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra”, The 2015. Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic 53. “Islamist Faction Accused for the Execution of a World: Analysis Paper 2, Jul 2016, p. 35. Man and his Wife on the Outskirts of Jisr al-Shughur 46. “Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)”, Counter [I’dam rajul wa zawjatuhu bi rifi Jisr al-Shoghour wa Extremism Project , Dec 2015. ittihamat li fasil islami bi tanfidh al-i’dam ]”, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights , 14 Jan 2016. 47. Jennifer Carafella, “Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: An Islamic Emirate for al-Qaeda”, Institute for the Study 54. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Factions of North of War ( Security Report 25) , Dec 2014, Latakia”, Syria Comment , 10 Dec 2015. pp. 16-21. 55. “Syria : numerous Chinese Uyghurs are fighting in 48. Ibid. Syria [ Syrie : de nombreux Ouïghours chinois combattent en Syrie ]”, Jean-René Belliard analyse le 49. “Turkistan Islamic Party Fighters Killed in Syria”, Proche-Orient, 30 May 2016. The Line of Steel , 19 Jul 2015. 56. Video published on Tishreen Newspaper’s [ Sahifat 50. Ibid. Tishrin ] Facebook page, 22 Dec 2016. 51. “ Ṣawt al-Islām presents a new video message from 57. “Jihadist training camps in Iraq and Syria”, FDD’s Ḥizb al-Islāmī al-Turkistānī [Turkistan Islamic Party] Long War Journal , Nov 2014. in Bilād al-Shām: ‘Conquest of Jisr al-Shaghūr’”, Jihadology , 1 May 2015. 58. “Uyghurs and the Changing Demographics of 6

controlled by JFS 59 . They are reported as to frame the uprising as an alien incursion and having taken over much of the town of Jisr al- thus shore up claims that it alone represents Shughur. Such accounts, however, have been the country’s indigenous population. Professor transmitted by pro-regime news sources such of political science at California State Uni- as the Beirut-based satellite television channel versity, As’ad AbuKhalil argues that Western Al Mayadeen, which have likely exaggerated media has in turn shied away from commen- the extent to which Uyghurs are engaging in ting on the role of TIP fighters in lifting the any form of long-term repopulation of north- siege of Aleppo, for fear of detracting from western Syria. It must be noted that TIP, “the narrative of the secular democratic whether through its propaganda or decla- rebellion” 64 . rations, has never cited the colonisation of captured territories as one of its aims. Lastly, TIP’s relative laxness regarding the enfor- Promotion of the Uyghur cause cement of Sharia law has been highlighted as Parallels can be drawn between international having increased the local population’s tole- combatants currently active in Syria and those rance of their presence 60 . who fought in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979- 89), notably the “” rallied to fight While TIP is far from being a major player in the USSR by Abdullah Azzam’s Services Bu- the Syrian theatre, it has deployed its fighters reau ( maktab al-khidamat ). Hegghammer across the country and contributed to a num- recounts how the establishment of a commu- ber of significant operations. The commitment nity of foreign fighters in Peshawar, backed by with which it has entered the war stands testa- a sympathetic pan-Hijazi activist network, laid ment to the conflict’s symbolic pull. While the the organisational and ideological foundations motivations of individual jihadi fighters are so for the conduction of jihadi operations well varied as to evade broad generalisations, the past the Afghan War’s conclusion 65 . Likewise, arrival of myriad noncoethnic groups to join whether through the forging of ties or the the conflict is testament to the pull of a accumulation of experience, the Syrian struggle framed as relevant to “all Muslims as crucible will equip such groups as TIP to a broader transnational community” 61 . In broaden their international operations once addition to their proven combat effectiveness, the dust has settled, capitalising on the role the arrival of Uyghur foreign fighters is they played to better pursue their own agenda. symbolically powerful. From IS to JFS and its The conflict’s network-building potential is allies, jihadi groups tend to frame the likely to be all the more amplified by the fact presence of Chinese nationals in their ranks as that the presence of foreign fighters in Syria proof that they represent the ummah in its dwarfs that of Azzam’s Afghan Arabs. entirety, that their cause has rallied fighters from across the globe. Similarly, Arabic- Similarly to the Afghan Arabs’ adroit use of language Russian 62 and regional, pro-regime 63 modern media to market their cause 66 , TIP media agencies go to great lengths to highlight has been capitalising on its presence in Syria the presence of Uyghur combatants, in order to promote its separatist mission and under- line its jihadi credentials. It has experienced Syria’s Idlib Province”, The Foreign Military Studies some success in doing so, with Shichor Office 5(1), Nov 2015, p. 15. contending that online jihadi posting have “Three new ethnic groups which have become part of Syria’s demography [ Thalath qawmiat jadida dakhalat taken up the East Turkistan issue with al-tarkiba al-sukania fi souria ]”, Zaman al-Wasl , particular fervour 67 . As mentioned above, it 11 Oct 2015. has been increasing awareness as to the 59. “Idlib, jihadi capital: preparations for the big battle Xinjiang separatist movement as well as its [Idlib ‘asima “al-jihadin”: tahdirat lil ma’raka al- military exploits through its Sawt al-Islam kubra ]” Al-Alam , 23 Dec 2015. media division, regular tweets as well as a 60. Mohanad Hage Ali, “China’s proxy war in Syria: Revealing the role of Uyghur fighters”, Al Arabiya 64. As’ad AbuKhalil, “Chinese Jihadis among the English , 2 Mar 2016. fighters in Aleppo”, The Angry Arab News Service , 8 Aug 2016. 61. David Malet, “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts”, Oxford, Oxford University 65. Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Press, 2013, p. 190. Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of ”, International Security 35(3): 33-94. 62. “Chinese newspaper: Uyghur extremists are fighting in Syria [ Sahifa sinia: al-mutatarrifin al- 66. Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan, The “Afghan Arabs” uwighour yuqatiloun fi souria ]”, RT , 29 Oct 2012. Media at Jihad , Islamabad, ABC Printers, 1999. 63. “Chinese Uyghurs… ‘Erdogan’s new inghimasis’ [ Al- 67. DV Buyarov et al, “Demographic Situation in sinioun al-uwighour… “Inghimasiou ardoughan” al- Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Area in the Last Quarter judud ]” Al-Manar , 19 May 2015. of the Twentieth Century”, Global Media Journal , 24 June 2016. 7

number of uploaded videos. Although, as has of support from abroad 73 , mean that, for the been mentioned, it periodically releases hour- time being, the Chinese government likely has long videos in Uyghur as well as content in bigger fish to fry. various other languages, the fact that much of Regardless, the continued presence of Uyghur TIP’s propaganda is published in Arabic foreign fighters in Syria is far from certain. suggests that the organisation is seeking to “Turkic ethnic solidarity with the Syrian rally support throughout the Muslim world, Turkmen” has been cited as a vehicle through aiming to secure its position within a which TIP might wield influence in such transnational “imagined community” that is regions as North Latakia 74 . Yet there is little in the internationalised Sunni jihadi movement. the way of evidence suggesting that local A wider recognition as to their legitimacy and Uyghur fighters are engaging in any form of combat effectiveness is essential to their meaningful cooperation, whether with local continued funding and support from Muslim Turkmen or their largest military sympathetic sponsors beyond al-Qaeda, an faction, the Syrian Turkmen Brigades. History issue of central concern as shown by TIP’s shows that foreign fighters settling in conflict- reported reliance on other organisations when ridden regions are often driven away, either 68 operating in Syria . through indigenous upheaval or intensified military pressure. Simpson, formerly on the TIP’s future in Syria faculty of the US Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College, argues that “foreign fighters are TIP’s propaganda indicates that the more effective in the conflict’s beginning but movement’s ultimate goal remains the that their relationship with the local popu- liberation of Xinjiang. Any move to take the lation erodes over,” notably citing the case of fight back to its homeland after leaving Syria, the tribal sahwa (or awakening) against al- however, will face steep odds. As has been Qaeda forces in the al-Anbar governorate from noted, far from relying on China-based late 2005 to mid-2007 75 . Most recently, the networks, TIP’s leadership has long been Pakistani military – cooperating with Pashtun implanted in North Waziristan 69 , meaning tribesmen – drove out Uzbek militants belon- that its decision-making mechanisms are ging to such organisations as the Islamic fundamentally dislocated from Xinjiang. Yet Movement of Uzbekistan. The ongoing Zarb-e- even this base of operations is far from secure. Azb operation has received strong support At China’s behest, the Pakistani military has from the area’s population, bringing into focus applied increased pressure on the organisation foreign fighters’ vulnerability to the fickle through its Zarb-e-Azb operation, launched in sympathy of local tribal networks 76 . June 2014 70 , which forced many fighters to relocate to the Syrian theatre; China, mean- With IS’ hold over Mosul and Raqqa loosening while, has developed world-class standards of by the day, combined with the regime’s recent airport security 71 . In addition, there are takeover of Eastern Aleppo, the focus of the reports that many fighters have sold off their fighting has shifted to Syria’s northwestern houses before moving from Xinjiang 72 . regions, increasing the pressure applied to Worries that TIP is poised to ravage the PRC, such groups as JFS and Ahrar al-Sham. The therefore, seem overblown. The fact that the US Department of Defense confirmed that its most effective domestic attacks by Uyghur airstrikes are actively targeting JFS on No- militants on Chinese soil have been carried vember 18 2016; a campaign aiming to remove out by local groups, independent of any form the organisation’s senior leaders is thought to have been underway since October of the same 68. Mohanad Hage Ali, “China’s proxy war in Syria: 77 Revealing the role of Uyghur fighters”, Al Arabiya year . On 1 January 2017, a drone strike killed English , 2 Mar 2016. 73. Zia Ur Rehman, “ETIM’s presence in Pakistan and 69. Rohan Gunaratna and Stefanie Kam, Handbook of China’s growing pressure”, Norwegian Peacebuilding Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific , Singapore, World Resource Centre , Aug 2015, p. 5. Scientific Publishing, 2016, p. 494. 74. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Factions of North 70. Scott Stewart, “Assessing recent militant attacks in Latakia”, Syria Comment , 10 Dec 2015. China”, Stratfor Global Intelligence , 29 May 2014. 75. “The Foreign Fighter Problem: A Conference 71. Mathieu Duchâtel, “Terror overseas: understanding Report”, Foreign Policy Research Institute , Oct 2009, China’s evolving counter-terror strategy”, European p. 2. Council on Foreign Relations , 26 Oct 2016, p. 12. 76. “Tribal elders of North Waziristan assure support to 72. Syrie : de nombreux Ouïghours chinois combattent Zarb-e-Azb: ISPR”, Pakistan Today , 21 Jun 2014. en Syrie [ Syria : numerous Chinese Uyghurs are fighting in Syria ]”, Jean-René Belliard analyse le 77. “Syria Situation Report: November 19 - December Proche-Orient, 30 May 2016. 2, 2016”, Institute for the Study of War , Dec 2016.

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a TIP leader – also one of JFS’ top brass – Abu Uyghurs fleeing Chinese rule since the 18 th Omar al-Turkistani. Two days later, an air- century 83 , Turkey has a long history of strike (whose perpetrators remain unknown) harbouring separatists advocating East carried out on January 3rd 2017 struck JFS’ Turkistan’s independence. Since the end of the Idlib headquarters, killing at least 25 of its , spurred by both an inclusive brand members. of ethno-nationalism as well as the creation of 84 Moreover, having declared his plan to cut off five Central Asian states , Turkey sought to Idlib-based rebels’ supply lines and push them reassert itself within the pan-Turkic sphere. back to Turkey 78 , Assad will be vying for This included offering those migrating from influence with an increasingly assertive Xinjiang such benefits as “financial support, 85 Erdogan. Such is the anticipated military housing, and citizenship” , providing an envi- pressure on the region that the UN envoy, ronment within which separatist movements Steffan de Mistura, has warned that Idlib could operate freely, backed by a Turkish could become the next Aleppo 79 . The need for electorate sympathetic on account of a shared greater rebel unity has been highlighted on a faith and a common Turkic heritage. Further- number of occasions. A scaled-down version more, right-wing, pan-Turkic solidarity exerts of Saudi preacher Mohammad al-Moheisini’s considerable pressure on the Turkish ill-fated “Ummah Initiative”, a fatwa was government, with Uyghurs afforded special promulgated by 17 Islamic scholars on 31 consideration due to their description as 86 December 2016, urging groups active in Idlib, “ancient forefathers of the Turkish nation” . including TIP, to place their troops under a As mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyib Erdogan common, centralised leadership 80 . Nearly a described East Turkistan as “the cradle of month later, JFS, bolstered by a number of Turkic history, civilization and culture”, defections from rival group Ahrar al-Sham, declaring that “the martyrs of Eastern Tur- 87 merged with four other Islamist and jihadi kistan are our martyrs” . Since acceding to groups to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham 81 . The the presidency, he has likened China’s reac- apparent unification of several opposition tion to the Ürümqi riots of June 2009 to the 88 organisations under a single banner may perpetration of genocide . A final sticking strengthen their hold over Syria’s north- point concerns Turkish passports found on western regions. Yet, facing the likely return of those responsible for the 2014 Kunming terror these territories under regime control, jihadi attack, seized as they attempted to flee by way groups such as TIP will be impelled to relocate of Indonesia. or suffer heavy losses. Of central importance Nonetheless, Shichor notes that Turkey, wary will be the degree to which Turkey would be of antagonising China, has progressively willing to subject itself to international oppro- reduced its support for Uyghur separatism. brium by harbouring fleeing TIP fighters. Throughout the last two decades, increasing Chinese investment and arms sales have pressured Turkey to temper its stance, leading The role of Turkey to the wholesale removal of official support for From the thousands Turkish boots on the pro-East Turkistan organisations and official ground in Syria to claims made by the Syrian recognition that Xinjiang is part of China ambassador to China that Erdogan has been (though unlike many Central Asian countries, granting Uyghur fighters safe passage to Syria 82 , Turkey’s position on TIP is of central 83 Michael Clark, “The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on China’s Foreign Policy: The Case of Xinjiang and the importance. Having served as a safe haven to Uyghur”, China Report 53(1): 1-25, p. 8. 78. Ilya Arkhipov and Donna Abu-Nasr, “Assad Says 84. Heinz Kramer, “Will Become Turkey’s Aleppo Assault Is Springboard to Retake Rest of Syria”, Sphere of Influence”, Perceptions 3(4), Mar-May 1996, Bloomberg , 14 Oct 2016. p. 2. 79. “Aleppo battle: What next for the evacuees?”, BBC 85. Yitzhak Shichor, “Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur News, 21 Dec 2016. Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations”, Policy Studies 53, 2009, p. 11. 80. “Seventeen scholars in Syria have published an Islamic verdict which obligates rebel factions in Syria 86. Yitzhak Shichor, “See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak to go ahead with a merger and unite”, liveuamap , 1 Jan No Evil: Middle Eastern Reactions to Rising China’s 2017. Uyghur Crackdown”, Griffith Asia Weekly , 3(1), 2015, p. 77. 81. “Northern Syria… Factions join Ahrar al-Sham while others join Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham [ Shamal al- 87. Michael Clark, “The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on souri… Fasa’il tindam ila Ahrar al-Sham wa ukhra li China’s Foreign Policy: The Case of Xinjiang and the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham ]”, Orient Net , 29 Jan 2017. Uyghur”, China Report 53(1): 1-25, p. 9. 82. Lin Meilian, “Xinjiang terrorists finding training, 88. “China, Turkey: friends or foes?”, Al-Monitor, Jun support in Syria, Turkey”, Global Times , 1 Jul 2016. 2015. 9

Turkey has refused to extradite Uyghurs to the ultimate expulsion of its fighters out of Syria PRC). Turkey’s dependence on Chinese eco- drawing closer by the day. Lastly, a rappro- nomic largesse will only continue to grow – chement between China and Turkey leaves November 30th 2016 saw the conclusion of TIP cornered. Yet, despite this grim appraisal the first lira-yuan currency swap 89 . Moreover, of TIP’s future prospects in Syria, the group’s the arrest of 100 Chinese Uyghurs using false activities have demonstrated the paradoxical passports in Ataturk Airport in May 2016 benefits little-known jihadi movements can signals a change of tack; in the wake of the draw from their commitment to conflicts. The attempted coup d’état of July 2016, an peripheral nature of the movement’s military increasingly isolated Turkey, disillusioned impact notwithstanding, the civil war provi- with the West, is striving to improve relations ded the opportunity to raise awareness of the with China. Given the CCP’s marked concerns Uyghur separatist cause among transnational regarding TIP’s activities, the movement’s jihadi networks. TIP has devoted significant fighters are unlikely to be welcome in Turkey resources towards this end, whether through once driven out of northwestern Syria. This is its presence in key military campaigns, Sawt al rendered all more certain by JFS’ description -Islam service or frequent publications of Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield as a through social media. Although the results of veiled attempt to spread American influence 90 , these efforts remain to be seen, TIP has as well as much-publicised claims that the IS- certainly capitalised on a chance to raise its affiliated gunman responsible for an attack on international profile. an Istanbul nightclub on January 1st 2017 was In addition, having rubbed shoulders with a Uyghur. Malet notes that statelessness fuels jihadi groups stemming from across the globe, 91 transnational jihadi movements . With from Chechnya to Morocco, fighting alongside nowhere to call home, TIP’s combatants are JFS’ muhajireen battalions has offered TIP the unlikely to revert to a civilian lifestyle, opportunity to widen its international net- wherever they end up. work. The Syrian melting pot is likely to have the same effect as the Afghan conflict, which Conclusion birthed a new generation of transnational jihadis by fostering terrorist networks and Renewed Chinese anti-terrorism initiatives, opening up new sources of funding. With combined with the continuation of Pakistan’s foreign fighters in Syria more numerous, operations in North Waziristan, call into diverse and effective than the Azzam’s Afghan question the extent to which TIP can return to Arabs, the results are likely to be all the more carry out operations in Xinjiang or the FATA. dramatic. The fact remains that, however TIP This is all the more pertinent due to the fares throughout the future fighting across intensification of the civil war in areas where it Idlib, the movement’s military capabilities will maintains a combat presence, with the emerge substantially weakened. And yet, as with many other contingents of foreign 89. “Turkey, China conclude first lira-yuan swap deal”, , 9 Dec 2016. fighters, through the acquisition of combat experience and having burnished its jihadi 90. Alex MacDonald, “Former al-Qaeda affiliate urges Syrian rebels to oppose Turkish invasion”, Middle East credentials, the Syrian quagmire will have Eye , 23 Sep 2016. endowed TIP with new partners, 91. David Malet, “Foreign Fighters: Transnational strengthening its ability to assert itself on the Identity in Civic Conflicts”, Oxford, Oxford University world stage. ◊ Press, 2013, p. 194.

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