Document of The World Bank

Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR00003341

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-48710)

ON A

Public Disclosure Authorized CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 9.7 MILLION (US$15 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO

SAINT LUCIA

FOR A

HURRICANE TOMAS EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROJECT Public Disclosure Authorized March 27, 2015

Public Disclosure Authorized Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience Global Practice Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective March 27, 2015)

Currency Unit = Eastern Caribbean Dollar EC$1.00 = US$0.37 US$ 1.00 = EC$2.70

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

CCRIF Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility CDB Caribbean Development Bank DMP II Second Disaster Management Project DVRP Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project ECLAC United Nation’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean EMF Environnent Management Framework EMP Environnent Management Plan ERDMP Emergency Recovery Disaster Management Project ERL Emergency Recovery Loan ESSAF Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework EU European Union FM Financial Management FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Product GoSL Government of Saint Lucia GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism HTERP Hurricane Tomas Emergency Recovery Project ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IFR Interim Financial Report IPR Internal Procurement Review JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency QAG Quality Assurance Group MoE Ministry of Education and Culture MoF Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and National Development MoH Ministry of Health, Wellness, Family Affairs, National Mobilization, Human Services and Gender Relations MoIPS&T Ministry of Infrastructure, Port Services and Transport MoPD Ministry of Physical Development, Housing and Urban Renewal MTR Mid-Term Review N/A Not Applicable NCB National Competitive Bidding NEMO National Emergency Management Organization

NSDC National Skills and Development Center OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States OM Operations Manual OP/BP Operational Policy/Bank Procedure ORAF Operational Risk Assessment Framework PAHO Pan American Health Organization PCC Project Coordination Committee PCU Project Coordination Unit PDO Project Development Objective PPCR Pilot Program for Climate Resilience RPS Regional Partnership Strategy SDR Special Drawing Rates TBD To Be Determined

Vice President: Jorge Familiar Country Director: Sophie Sirtaine Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein Project Team Leader: Tiguist Fisseha ICR Team Leader: Ali Alwahti

SAINT LUCIA Hurricane Tomas Emergency Recovery Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 16 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 24 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 25 6. Lessons Learned...... 28 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...... 29 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 30 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...... 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 40 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 43 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 46 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...... 47 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 48 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...... 59 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...... 60 Annex 10. MAP…………………………………………………………….……………62 Annex 11. Photographs of Sites………………………………………………………....63

A. Basic Information

Saint Lucia Hurricane Country: St. Lucia Project Name: Tomas Emergency Recovery Loan Project ID: P125205 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-48710 ICR Date: 03/24/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: SAINT LUCIA Original Total XDR 9.70M Disbursed Amount: XDR 8.53M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 9.70M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and National Development Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 11/12/2010 Effectiveness: 08/30/2011 08/30/2011 10/09/2013 Appraisal: 12/13/2010 Restructuring(s): 03/27/2014 Approval: 03/10/2011 Mid-term Review: 04/01/2013 05/06/2013 Closing: 03/31/2014 09/30/2014

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status:

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 10 10 General education sector 20 20 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 15 15 Health 15 15 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 40 40

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Natural disaster management 80 80 Other urban development 20 20

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Sophie Sirtaine Francoise Clottes Practice Anna Wellenstein Guang Zhe Chen Manager/Manager: Project Team Leader: Tiguist Fisseha Niels B. Holm-Nielsen ICR Team Leader: Ali Alwahti ICR Primary Author: Ali Alwahti

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to support the recovery and reconstruction of the Recipient in the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) no revision

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Number of people with access to rebuilt and rehabilitated safe, selected basic Indicator 1 : services (transport, education, health) affected by Hurricane Tomas. Total No. of daily users TBD 24,645 35,141

Students 10,000 5,127 6,080 Value quantitative or Hospital and health center TBD 145 145 Qualitative) patients

Bridge users TBD 19,373 28,916 Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 10/09/2013 09/30/2014 Targets met. Bois D'Orange bridge was operational 2 months after closing, Comments adding 27,416 daily users. The PP reported baseline of 10,000 for students, but (incl. % indicator actually refers to zero baselines for all categories. Targets were revised achievement) in October 2013 Improved national and local risk management and risk reduction systems and abilities for future natural hazards through studies and assessments, the review of Indicator 2 : the National Disaster Management Plan, and capacity building for Government staff. Value quantitative or 0 2 1 Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 09/30/2014 Comments (incl. % Target not met. Indicator target not revised. achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Number of staff from the Ministry of Physical Developments and NEMO trained Indicator 1 : in GIS analysis tools Value (quantitative 0 TBD 24 18 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 10/09/2013 09/30/2014

Comments (in Target partially met. cl. % achievement) Number of studies and assessments undertaken, including the review of the Indicator 2 : National Emergency Management Plan Value (quantitative 0 4 5 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 09/30/2014 Comments Target met and exceeded. Studies include 3 hydraulic studies, the review of the (incl. % NEMP and the Geodetic survey. achievement) Indicator 3 : Number of Communication equipment procured Value (quantitative 0 324 320 320 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 10/09/2013 09/30/2014 Comments (incl. % Target met. Targets were revised in October 2013. achievement) Indicator 4 : number of bridges rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 6 2 2 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 10/09/2013 09/30/2014 Comments Target met. The second bridge was completed after close of Project. Targets (incl. % were revised in October 2013. achievement) Number of schools facilities rehabilitated or rebuilt, and equipped, with due Indicator 5 : attention to resilience sustainability. Value (quantitative 0 27 10 11 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 10/09/2013 09/30/2014 Comments (incl. % Target met and exceeded. Targets were revised in October 2013. achievement) Number of health facilities rehabilitated or rebuilt, and/or equipped, with due Indicator 6 : attention to resilience sustainability. Value (quantitative 0 5 4 4 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/2011 03/11/2011 10/09/2013 09/30/2014 Comments (incl. % Target met. Targets were revised in October 2013. achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 06/29/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 01/30/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.64 3 10/12/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.64 4 07/10/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.24 5 03/06/2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.88 Moderately 6 10/28/2014 Moderately Satisfactory 12.83 Unsatisfactory

H. Restructuring (if any)

ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions 10/09/2013 S S 6.74 Revision of results framework. 03/27/2014 S MS 8.88 Extension of Closing Date.

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Country Context. In 2009, Saint Lucia’s economic growth was severely impacted by the global downturn. Real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted sharply after expanding on average by about 3 percent during the previous 5 years. Growth was mainly based on the development of the tourism sector, which required substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) in related construction. The recession in the United States and Europe that started in 2008 contributed to lower tourism arrivals, FDI inflows, and remittances.1 It was during these already challenging economic conditions that Hurricane Tomas hit the island in October 2010.

2. Saint Lucia is highly exposed to adverse natural conditions. Hurricane Tomas produced exceptionally high rainfall for 24 hours, which triggered widespread flooding and numerous landslides, particularly in the central and southwestern segments of the island, which is characterized by mountainous terrain, rivers and flat valleys. 2 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimated the total economic impact (damage and losses) on the economy at US$336.2 million, or 43.4% of the country’s GDP - nine times its agricultural GDP, three times its tourism GDP.3 Infrastructure sector was the most heavily affected, representing 43% of the total impact. The social sectors and the productive sectors also suffered significant damage.4

3. Government Strategy. Due to the losses caused by the hurricane, the Prime Minister of Saint Lucia declared a “State of National Emergency” on November 2, 2010. The Government of Saint Lucia (GoSL) immediately adopted a series of relief measures and launched emergency repair works. Emergency repair works were initiated in the form of temporary fixes to protect damaged structures from further exposure and to restore services. The Ministry of Communications, Works, Transport and Public Utilities (MCW)5 completed debris removal from landslides on roads and bridges within days, enabling the reopening of primary roads to allow movement around the island. Water supply capacity took several weeks to be restored to its pre-hurricane level6.

4. Ministries rapidly completed their damage assessments and, in many cases, began the process of prioritization of investment activities. The GoSL engaged with a number of donor and multilateral agencies to identify funding sources such as the European Union (EU), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the Japanese International

1 IMF St. Lucia: Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation p. 4. 2 PAD. 3 United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Macro Socio- Economic Damage Assessment report (December 2010). 4 PAD. 5 After the 2011 elections, several Ministries have changed their names including this one to Ministry of Infrastructure, Port Services and Transport (MoIPS&T). 6 PAD.

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Cooperation Agency (JICA). In addition, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) was triggered and US$3.2 million was paid out to Saint Lucia under the program. The management and coordination of the overall Hurricane Tomas recovery effort was carried out by a designated Disaster Recovery Committee within the Ministry of Finance.

5. Rationale for Bank Involvement. The Bank had experience engaging in Disaster Risk Management in Saint Lucia through the Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management Project (ERDMP-P070430) (1998-2003), and the Saint Lucia Disaster Management Project II and Additional Financing (DMP II-P086469) (2003-2011). Moreover, at the time of Hurricane Tomas, the GoSL led by the Ministry of Finances, Economic Affairs and National Development, was in the process of identifying and preparing a disaster and climate risk management program, the Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project (DVRP) (P127226) (2012-2019) to be financed by IDA and the Pilot Project for Climate Resilience (PPCR). In addition to physical risk reduction activities, the project was expected to improve Saint Lucia’s capacity to reduce risks to natural hazards and climate change in its development planning and programs by creating capacity to measure hazard risk and integrate these measures in development policy and planning. This DVRP was approved by the Board on June 4, 2014.

6. This 2011 Hurricane Tomas Emergency Recovery Project (HTERP) in the amount of SDR 9.5 million (US$15 million equivalent) was approved by the Board on March 10, 2011, signed on June 3, 2011, and effective on August 30, 2011. The HTERP was processed under the Operational Policy/Bank Procedures 8.00 as some of the damage called for immediate action to rehabilitate and secure public buildings and infrastructure. Though the project was not foreseen before the disaster, it was still consistent with the World Bank Regional Partnership Strategy (RPS) FY2010-2014 with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (Report No. 53762-LAC), which focused on two strategic objectives: i) building resilience and ii) enhancing competitiveness and stimulating growth over the medium term. In line with the RPS objectives, this project would provide immediate support for rehabilitation and recovery following Hurricane Tomas, and focus on activities contributing to vulnerability and risk reduction through a combination of works and institutional development activities, complementing those supported by the ERDMP and DMP II projects, and DVRP.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

7. The 2011 Financing Agreement and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) state that “The objective of the Project is to support the recovery and reconstruction of the Recipient in the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas.” This objective was to be achieved through investments in school and health buildings, bridge rebuilding, retroactive financing for emergency expenses and capacity building in disaster risk management. Table 1 shows the key indicators presented in the Emergency Project Paper (EPP).

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Table 1: Key Indicators and Revised Indicators Original PDO Indicators-Targets Revised Indicators-Targets Number of people with access to rebuilt and rehabilitated safe selected basic services (transport, All targets revised, but no education, health) affected by Hurricane Tomas. indicators revised:

Total No. of daily users-TBD 24,645 Students-10,000 5,127 Hospital and health center patients-TBD 145 Bridge users-TBD 19,373

Improved national and local risk management and risk reduction systems and abilities for future natural hazards No revision. through studies and assessments, the review of the National Disaster Management Plan, and capacity building for Government staff. (Number of government-produced policies and plans that integrate hazard risk information.)-2

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

8. The PDO was not revised. Several indicator targets were established after loan approval and some adjusted during implementation. Rehabilitation costs of schools and other infrastructure were underestimated during the accelerated preparation period, meaning that, for example, fewer schools (11 schools rather than the original 27 planned) could be rehabilitated with available project funding. Thus, the target for number of student daily users was revised downward. Targets were also set for health and bridge rehabilitation. The second PDO indicator target, number of government policies with hazard risk information produced, was not changed.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries,

9. The primary beneficiaries of the HTERP were the main users of the infrastructure that the project sought to rehabilitate: students in public schools, users of primary health and hospital care services, and people traveling across bridges. It was not possible to accurately estimate the number of expected beneficiaries during the aftermath of hurricane Tomas. Thus most targets were established at the mid-term review (MTR). By the time of the ICR mission, targets for daily users of this infrastructure had been met or exceeded: bridges – 28,916 actual vs. 19,373 target, health centers –145 actual vs. 145 target, and schools –6,080 actual vs. 5,127 target.

10. There were also beneficiaries in the government who received support to perform their DRM responsibilities more effectively through training and new equipment, in particular, the Ministries of Infrastructure, Port Services and Transport (MoIPS&T), Physical Development, Housing and Urban Renewal (MoPD), the Ministry of Health,

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Wellness, Family Affairs, National Mobilization, Human Services and Gender Relations (MoH), the Ministry of Education, Human Resource Development and Labor (MoE)7, as well as the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO).

1.5 Original Components

11. The project had four original components:

Component 1: Support for Early Recovery (US$1.5 million or 10 percent of total Credit at appraisal). This component aimed to support the early recovery of the Recipient’s key economic sectors from the impact of Hurricane Tomas, through the provision of goods, technical advisory services and emergency operating costs. It included a retroactive financing for emergency expenses and capacity building in disaster risk management.

Component 2: Institutional Strengthening and Hazard and Risk Analysis (US$1.5 million or 10 percent of total Credit at appraisal). Building on previous capacity building support under earlier, completed projects in Saint Lucia (ERDMP and DMP II) and complementing the proposed DVRP, this component aimed to strengthen the institutional capacity at the national level including, the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and National Development (MoF), the MoHULG, the MoPD, and the NEMO to, inter alia: (a) evaluate and integrate natural hazard and climate change risks reduction into national development policy and decision making processes using geo information; (b) carry out various risk assessments and impact evaluation studies in highly affected areas and specific sectors; and (c) review the National Disaster Management Plan and improving disaster management capacity.

Component 3: Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Damaged Critical Public Infrastructure (US$11 million or 73 percent of total Credit at appraisal). This component’s objective was to carry out selected reconstruction and rehabilitation activities of damaged infrastructure in the Recipient’s transport, health and education sectors.

Component 4: Project Management and Monitoring Support (US$1 million or 7 percent of total Credit at appraisal). This component’s objective was to strengthen and develop the institutional capacity of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) for Project management and execution, including procurement, financial management, monitoring and supervision of Project activities, through the acquisition of goods, provision of technical advisory services, training, and operating costs.

7 After the 2011 elections, the MoPDE and MoHULG became the Ministry of Physical Development, Housing and Urban Renewal (MoPD), the MoE became Ministry of Education, Human Resource Development and Labor

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1.6 Revised Components

The components were not altered during project’s life span.

1.7 Other significant changes

12. Project Restructuring. The Project had two restructurings. The first restructuring accommodated the findings from the Mid-Term Review (MTR) held in May 2013. The MTR highlighted cost overruns and shortfalls in funding of several project activities and as a result these were cancelled and transferred to the DVRP under preparation. The works for the new Dennery Hospital (estimated at US$ 1.7 million) and the new Dennery Infant School (estimated at US$ 1.48 million) were both dropped and funds were transferred to cover cost overruns for the Bois d’Orange bridge (whose cost estimate more than doubled from the appraisal estimate to US$ 4.1 million). The balance was used to cover cost overruns for the Dennery Temporary Facility (additional works and demolition of existing structures), the geotechnical investigations and site preparation for the new Dennery Hospital; and the works for Vieux Fort Campus B, National Skills and Development Center (NSDC) expansion, Georges Charles Secondary school, and other schools that the MoE assessed and identified after the MTR.

13. The restructuring also included revisions to and establishment of target values for the project development objective level indicators and related intermediate indicators8:

a) Target values for indicators were reduced to reflect a reduction in the number of infrastructure investments in the transport, health and education sectors. Specifically: (i) number of bridges reduced from 3 to 2 (intermediate indicator), with a defined final target value of 19,373 average daily users (PDO indicator); (ii) number of schools reduced from 27 to 10 (intermediate), with a reduction in the number of beneficiaries from 10,000 to 5,127 (PDO); and (iii) number of health facilities were reduced from 5 to 4 (intermediate), with an accompanying revision in the unit of measure of the target, previously number of average annual patients to the number of average daily patients, resulting in a defined final target value of 145 average daily patients (PDO).

b) Target value remained at 2 for government-produced policies, while the related intermediate result indicator (component 2) increased from 2 to 4 studies and assessments undertaken (which included the review of the National Emergency Management Plan). The increase in the number of studies was made possible by lower-than anticipated costs per plan. These plans included (i) Review of the National Disaster Management Plan; (ii) Flood risk Assessments for Soufriere; (iii) Flood Risk Assessment for Dennery; (iv) Flood Risk Assessment for Fond St Jacques; and (v) the geodetic survey.

8 During implementation and after the MTR as activities were processing at a fast pace, the baseline for all indicators was established

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c) Target value for intermediate indicator for emergency communications equipment was reduced slightly from 324 to 320.

14. A second restructuring was processed in March 2014 to extend the Project closing date for another six month from March 31, 2014 to September 30, 2014.The extension was needed to accommodate the completion of a key infrastructure facility for which after project effectiveness additional hydraulic surveys were identified to be critical to conduct prior to the investments9; and to complete key geodetic and flood and hydraulic surveys that were necessary to support and inform proposed works under the DVRP that was under preparation.

15. At the project closing, the Government and the World Bank agreed to include pending works and equipment in the Saint Lucia Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project, which was approved on June 4, 2014. These included: (i) the rehabilitation of Bois d'Orange Bridge; (ii) designs for rehabilitation/retrofitting of schools and health facilities; and (iii) the flood and hydraulic study for Soufriere, Fond St. Jacques and Dennery.

By Closing date, the un-disbursed amount of SDR 1,349,312.26 was cancelled from the Loan.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

16. Project Preparation. In response to the GoSL’s request for support in the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas, the World Bank conducted a rapid damage assessment mission in early November 2010 followed by an emergency project appraisal mission in December 2010. Outcomes of the missions were complemented by the United Nations’ ECLAC Macro Socio-Economic Damage Assessment report released also in December 2010. The Bank missions’ activities included: i) a rapid assessment of the direct damage; ii) identification and technical discussions on priority recovery activities to be financed; iii) institutional capacity assessments (fiduciary and safeguards) and management of the project implementing agencies; iv) environmental and social safeguard framework development; and v) damage assessment of past Bank-financed disaster mitigation investment projects and review of lessons learned from these projects. The disaster occurred towards the end of the IDA15 cycle, which meant the Bank team had to react quickly to access the last remaining IDA resources in the globally unallocated envelope in order for the Bank to be able to offer Saint Lucia any recovery financing. The HTERP US$15 million Credit represented one of the fastest emergency response projects ever processed in the World Bank Group. This was also the largest Bank-financed project in the portfolio of Saint Lucia.10

9 Completion of the feasibility study for the Bois D’Orange bridge discovered damages (change in the river’s morphology ), and technical gaps found on the earlier design (funded by GoSL financing prior to the HTERP inception) done by FDL Consult Inc. led to the decision to conduct these additional Hydraulic surveys.

10 There was no Quality Assurance Group (QAG) review of the project.

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17. The emergency context under which the project was designed and the evolving context during implementation posed many challenges that the Bank team pro-actively addressed by incorporating best practices such as designing the project with retroactive financing enabling an early disbursement of 10% of project resources, allowing flexibility to adjust project activities as more details were available, strengthening and providing technical support to Implementing Agencies, and ensuring project infrastructure were rehabilitated with higher construction standards.

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

18. Assessment of the project design. At the time of design, the PDO was relevant and consistent with the Regional Partnership Strategy for the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) FY 2010-14 (approved on May 3, 2010) which included “building resilience” as its first strategic objective. Immediately after the hurricane, the GoSL declared a national State of Emergency on October 31, 2010, adopted a series of relief measures and launched emergency repair works. The GoSL’s medium- to long- term recovery strategy was focused on the repair and rehabilitation of damaged structures and the elimination of potential dangerous exposures and debris created by the hurricane. Initial government efforts were designed to stabilize the situation with temporary patches and other protective measures to restore services and guard against worsening damages.

19. The project was prepared and designed as a framework project with the intent to provide financing as quickly as possible in support of Saint Lucia’s effort to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure and stabilize high-risk areas. From a financing point of view the Bank team needed to act quickly to secure additional IDA financing for Saint Lucia from the last remaining parts of the IDA15 global funds since all of Saint Lucia’s IDA15 resources had already been allocated at the time. From a technical point of view, the intention was to assist Saint Lucia to reconstruct damaged infrastructure to higher standards, and to improve on some of the institutional weaknesses that had been made evident by the disaster. As a framework project it was expected that the project team would need to support the government to finalize many details of project planning and prioritization during project implementation, including supporting the design of specific works.

20. The project design balanced short emergency recovery and longer term risk reduction and management DRM. The project aimed to address the immediate and short- term recovery needs of the Government through the retroactive financing under component 1, which financed emergency operating costs such as debris removal, etc., It also supported medium and long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts through component 3 and longer term capacity building efforts for disaster prevention through component 2.

21. At project design, cost estimates of major infrastructure to be financed were made on the basis of the little available information and were quite general in nature. The need for quickly preparing the project, and the changes to the physical site conditions caused by the hurricane introduced additional uncertainties for the cost estimates. Accordingly,

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project design included a contingency fund to address shortcomings arising from implementation. It is important to note that in such emergency projects, which are prepared in a short time-frame and before detailed sector damage assessments have been conducted, the targets could not be defined. Once detailed damage assessments have been completed and reconstruction costs are better known, the targets can be finalized during project implementation11.

22. Implementation arrangements. The Project followed the same institutional arrangements used under the ERDMP. A PCU housed in the MoF planned project activities as well as carried out and monitored the project’s procurement activities and contract management process. Financial management and supervision of project activities was also carried out by the PCU at the MoF. The MoF supervised six beneficiary ministries/agencies (MoE, MoH, MIPS&T MoPD, and NEMO) who in turn provided technical support to the PCU. The project design incorporated lessons learned from previous emergency response operations in Saint Lucia and the Caribbean region financed by the Bank and best practices. These include having an adequately staffed PCU at effectiveness in place to help ensure efficient and effective implementation.

23. Procurement was to be carried out in accordance with World Bank’s guidelines with flexibility in the procurement of works, goods, and consultant services as stipulated in OP/BP 8.00 for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies.

24. Adequacy of government’s commitment. Project coordination was an important design aspect, considering that this was a project managed by one PCU in the Ministry of Finance, involving several ministries. Based on past experience with the previous two Bank-financed DRM projects in St. Lucia, a structure of designed focal points in each of the respective Implementing Agencies was established. These focal points were assigned to work closely with the PCU to ensure good communication, accountability and timely implementation. This structure balanced the need for coordination with the small size of Government in St. Lucia and the cross cutting role the Ministry of Finance plays in a wide range of government actions.

25. Assessment of risks and mitigation measures. Overall project risk was rated medium at appraisal. “Implementing Agency Risk” (rated medium) included: “complications in coordination of project activities across various agencies and levels.” The ICR mission confirmed that MoE and MoH technicians, particularly, as well as beneficiaries (teachers, nurses) have been engaged in the various phases of the infrastructure rehabilitation and were generally satisfied with the works. “Project Design Risk” was rated low and associated with losses in damaged infrastructure due to delays in

11 The guidance note on Results Framework and M&E from OPSPQ (Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note, OPSPQ, November 10, 2014) states that at concept note stage, baselines and tentative targets are not required, but that the team would take actions to collect baselines and develop reasonable targets during implementation. The team indeed focused during the first year of implementation to define these targets.

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implementation. The ICR mission confirmed that the rehabilitated infrastructure did not suffer additional damage due to implementation delays. However, a 2012 flood of smaller-scale and the December 2013 flood caused some changes to site conditions that negatively impacted original cost estimates and in some cases slowed implementation of planned works.

26. The “Implementing Agency Risk” with regard to the capacity of the PCU to manage, with an increase of its portfolio, a large project size and amount of civil works was identified at design as a medium. Mitigating measures included the project financing part of the PCU’s project management costs, hiring a procurement specialist with a civil engineering background, and improving Financial Management and Bank safeguards supervision capacity.

27. “Project Stakeholder Risk” (risk that users of schools, health clinics and bridges would be dissatisfied with the reconstruction and rehabilitation works) was rated medium because activities to be financed under the project were already identified and that their scope or location would not warrant change during implementation.

28. A procurement capacity assessment of the PCU was carried out during project preparation with an overall risk assessment of “moderate”. The assessment recommended hiring additional procurement staff, particularly a senior Procurement Officer, and increasing procurement training opportunities to strengthen the PCU’s capacity to handle additional procurement activities and responsibilities in view of heavy civil works activities. In addition, the Bank team reviewed the potential risk of lack of competition for larger civil works contracts by existing qualified contractors in Saint Lucia. It was then recommended that under National Competitive Bidding (NCB) processes, the PCU would take measures to encourage domestic contractors to participate in NCB bidding for civil works, while expanding advertisement of such bidding opportunities in the Caribbean region.

29. “Social and Environmental Risks” were rated low and associated with environmental damage which may result from poor site management during construction. Mitigating measures taken into consideration to address these risks included (i) the demonstrated institutional capacity for safeguards enforcement of the GoSL’s management of previous Bank projects, with the Bank providing targeted “refresher” training to further strengthen safeguards capacity within the implementing agency, as well as regular Bank supervision to ensure adherence to World Bank safeguard policies, national environmental policies and building codes; and (ii) an Environment and Social Screening Assessment tool has been developed that provides guidance on how to handle all issues that may arise during implementation. It is important to note that, though temporary or permanent land acquisition was not anticipated, as a good practice the team triggered OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement as a precautionary measure and to allow flexibility during implementation given the design of the project as a framework project.

30. No social and environmental safeguards- related risk was highlighted. It is however worth noting that the PCU very adequately managed asbestos issues at the start

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of works at the Ave Maria Primary school and Dennery Hospital (more details about this under Safeguards section). Finally, risk related to “Project Delivery Quality” (failure of the completed works to resist hurricanes) was rated low. As stated above, even though no major disaster of the scale of Hurricane Tomas, which was a 1:500 year rainfall event, occurred during implementation. The works were designed to withstand a 1:100 event. The December 2013 disaster was such a case (1:100 year flood event), and none of the reconstructed facilities sustained any damages. It is then safe to conclude that the rebuilt infrastructure confirmed the low rating of this risk.

2.2 Implementation

31. During the project implementation the key events which most affected the project were the following:

32. (i) Cost overruns of major works activities. Flood events of 2012 and December 2013 and the introduction of additional design elements during implementation for some sites contributed to increased cost of infrastructure to be financed. Additional design elements included: (i) comprehensive retrofitting interventions, which include ancillary work such as installing adequate drainage systems, enhancing water storage capacity, slope stabilization interventions on school compounds, and improving safety of access paths to some of the rehabilitated buildings by installing foot bridges; (ii) additional works to enhance the functionality of some of the facilities (eg: Dennery Health Facility); (iii) newly discovered damages following completion of feasibility studies (eg: the change in the river’s morphology at Bois D’Orange) and structural assessments of some of the buildings (ex. additional structural damage that was discovered at the Dennery Health facility); (iv) further damages to infrastructure during implementation, as a result of other flooding events; and (v) to a lesser extent, inflation. Based on the various assessments done during supervision before and after the MTR, a general view is that a 20%, instead of 10%, should have been dedicated for this contingency. Part of the increase in costs for the Bois d’Orange bridge was due to the choice of a design for the bridge that would require lower maintenance cost over time. It is also worth noting that the GoSL financed the rehabilitation of some of the schools that were dropped by project at restructuring, through its own budget.

33. (ii) Implementation Arrangements: Early project implementation was impacted by the November 2011 general elections and subsequent changes in the mandate of some ministries participating as implementing agencies and the high turn-over of key-staff at these ministries throughout project implementation. Particularly, roles and responsibilities were not sufficiently delineated, leading to early coordination challenges for the PCU. Through the change, civil works from the Ministries of Health and Education was transferred to the Ministry of Infrastructure and some technicians at the various implementing agencies were of the opinion that the shift would improve the quality of works as the MoI had the required technical staff for implementation and technical supervision. It was seen as a positive change that would impact positively on implementation, though it also raised some issues.

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34. Coordination among these stakeholders was an issue, particularly for large structures such as the NSDC that needed coordinated efforts from several line ministries on the works that required particularly heavy technical assistance for structural condition survey and preparation of detailed designs. Technical capacity was also an issue as MoH had stronger technical capacity to implement activities with qualified technical staff, than MoE. As a result of the weak technical capacity at these implementing agencies, and clear coordination among them, implementation of component 3 started late and at different pace among the three sectors. For example, by March 2012, works in the transport sector was progressing at a slow pace with bidding processes of two bridges to be launched by June 2012. In the health sector, however, contracts for rehabilitation were awarded and works were underway. As for the education sector, activities were progressing at a very slow pace with works underway only for the NSDC and Bocage school. The PCU helped address the coordination issues for the more complex technical projects by hiring an engineer based at the MoP.

35. It is important to note that during implementation, concrete efforts were made to hire an Engineer within the PCU to support project execution. The hiring proved unsuccessful due to the limited pool of interested qualified local engineers. As a result, and in view of the continuous implementation challenge (ex: delays in submitting technical documents to the PCU for the bid process; several technical reviews and revisions required from the Bank on bid documents and frequent contract variations, etc.) the Bank team and the PCU agreed to hire a technical consultant on a retainer contract for continuous support to the line Ministries. This helped to improve the quality of bid documents, quick turnaround time of bid documents following Bank review, as well as enhance quality of works supervision.

36. The Bank was proactive and extensive in addressing these issues. The Bank team conducted an implementation workshop in June 2012 that included participants from all IAs, consultants and representatives from the private sector. In addition, the MoI assigned an engineer to be based at MoI to serve as an interface with the PCU, while the Bank team conducted multiple capacity building initiatives addressing all aspects of project implementation, such as fiduciary, environmental and social safeguards, and technical. The project then took up a faster implementation towards the last year with significant increase in disbursement.

37. By November 2012, the GoSL and the Bank conducted a technical mission to assess implementation progress of the civil works component, followed by a MTR in March 2013 during which the project’s progress in reaching its goals and necessary changes to enhance implementation were evaluated. With the cost overruns and the time remaining in the project, it was agreed that the reconstruction of the new Dennery Hospital, Dennery Infant School, and Choc Bridge would be transferred to the DVRP.

38. The GoSL could have been more pro-active during implementation to address technical aspects of some infrastructure that necessitated permanent collaboration and information sharing between IAs. For example, the works for the NSDC, which is under the MoE, required heavy TA for preparation of a structural condition survey and preparation of detailed designs. As noted earlier, the MoE was technically weak and

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needed to coordinate efforts with technicians at the MoI on the design and implementation of the works after the Government’s restructuring of the IAs. The ICR mission highlighted delays on the implementation of this work that underline the weak inter-agency collaboration. Likewise, implementation delays of the rehabilitation of the Bois d’Orange bridge was not the result of lack of commitment but rather a combination of emergency conditions, capacity constraints (particularly the lack of engineering expertise) and the fact that HTERP was, for Saint Lucia a very large project that was multi-sectoral and required a great deal of cross ministry coordination. With regards to the flood risk assessment, the implementation delay resulted from the weak collaboration from and between various stakeholder agencies in providing timely inputs and review of deliverables during the different stages of the study.

39. To complement and enhance supervision, the bank team mobilized Trust Funds resources and activities from GFDRR (that financed the DALA), and DVRP preparation funds, which contributed to (i) enhance the quality of project implementation and likely outcomes; and (ii) demonstrate strong performance of the Bank in leveraging resources in response to the low capacity of the island.

40. Finally, discussions and site visits during the ICR mission revealed general satisfaction and appreciation among main stakeholders (GoSL technicians at ministry level, teachers, nurses), particularly for school facilities and health centers. Stakeholders were satisfied with the infrastructure improvements, but expressed some concerns for the sustainability in the absence of a Government maintenance strategy.

41. (iii) Procurement. Despite the mitigating measures put in place at project design to ensure smooth procurement, implementation faced significant challenges between project effectiveness and May 2012, primarily due to lack of technical and procurement capacity to prepare bidding documents and/or review designs, and manage and supervise the works, in particular within the Ministry of Education. Moreover, challenges continued throughout implementation and by April 2013 GoSL was of the opinion that Bank’s procurement procedures were complex for the context of a microstate and did not take into account certain realities in its qualification criteria and argued for an adjustment of the procedures to adapt to the small-island context. This is in addition to the noted technical weaknesses at some IAs, such as the MoE. In an initial response, the Bank conducted a procurement Workshop for local consultants, suppliers and building contractors in May 2012, with a focus on bid and proposal preparation as an immediate response. Another Regional Fiduciary Workshop was held in Grenada in June 2012, followed by a Bank Internal Procurement Review (IPR) in June 2012.

42. As for the broader issue of complex procurement procedures for a microstate, Bank Senior Country Management and Procurement representatives met with Government counterparts in April 2013 to agree on measures to improve implementation which included i) adjustment to the Bank’s procurement thresholds to better respond to this context, ii) putting in place a tracking mechanism for No objection requests, iii) providing hands-on support to IAs, and iii) aligning Bank Procurement Policies with OECS market conditions.

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43. Overall, despite the various challenges faced during implementation, adjustment in scope and the tardy launch of the works sub-component, the project successfully rehabilitated two major bridges and critical health and education facilities, and commissioned technical assistance and training that would strengthen the country’s DRM capacity. With the exception of the risk assessment study and the Bois D’orange bridge, the project successfully completed all activities by project closing. This was accomplished with a very short preparation period and implementation of three and a half years.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

44. The results framework in the appraisal document had relatively few indicators and was simple to implement, as might be expected for an emergency reconstruction project under BP 8.0. Still, the framework could have done a better job in a couple of areas of capturing the impact of the project. The 2013 restructuring did revise targets but could have gone further to strengthen the framework with additional indicators, including measuring the benefits of the retroactive financing and user benefits from the rehabilitated infrastructure.

45. Design. The PDO indicators provide an indication of the scope of benefits from the project by measuring daily users of rehabilitated infrastructure. For example, the indicator “the number of daily users of rehabilitated and safe infrastructure and buildings”, was appropriate. While most schools selected for rehabilitation were functioning after the hurricane, they were not necessarily safe. The same was true for the health centers, especially some of Dennery’s health services. In addition, the main bridge that was destroyed (the Bois d’Orange bridge) had a temporary bypass in which vehicles could pass by with moderate inconvenience, but that bypass would not survive multiple weather events as would the new, more resilient bridge. Part of the rehabilitation efforts also included long-neglected major maintenance on health and education buildings, as well as replacement of damaged furniture and equipment. Implementing a satisfaction survey might have offered one way to improve results measurement and capture the safety aspect of building back better (though time might have been too short to establish a meaningful baseline). A structural survey taken after the 2013 Christmas trough could have provided further information on resilience.

46. Intermediate indicators might also have been improved. For example the indicator for equipment support to NEMO was a single number to describe items of all different types (from flashlights to communication equipment) such that it was not possible to know whether it was a good result or not. The number of volunteer emergency responders equipped by the project, for example, would have given a sense of improved preparedness. The number of government-produced policies, a PDO level indicator, was another indicator that was output oriented and could have been refined during project restructuring, giving a better idea as to what type of policy was contemplated. The results framework also did not capture the impact of Component 1- Support for Early Recovery.

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47. Implementation and utilization. Most of the intermediate indicators of the results framework were useful for tracking physical progress which fed back into project management. The PCU followed contract and processing milestones to determine when PCU intervention was needed. Accordingly, the PCU would hire technical expertise to ensure adequate review of construction designs as needed. The restructuring did improve the results framework by establishing targets for the first time for some of the indicators which originally did not have targets and by reducing targets for others (to adjust mainly to the reality that the costs of rehabilitation were higher than originally estimated).

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

48. The project was classified as a “Category B” and triggered the policy on Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01) with no large-scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts. All works focused on rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure damaged during the Hurricane which were small-scale, and generated only minor and localized environmental impacts, which were easily identified, mitigated and managed.

49. Consistent with the Procedural Guidelines for OP/BP 8.00 operations, an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) was prepared during implementation to ensure compliance with the World Bank’s safeguard policies.

50. An Environmental Management Framework (EMF) that was already developed by the PCU under the DMP II was also used under this project. During implementation, various tools developed under DMP II, including site screening, public consultations and information dissemination, inclusion of Environmental Management Plans (EMP) in bidding documents and supervision of environmental aspects during construction, were applied to all investments. The EMF was an integral part of the ESSAF and was outlined in the Operations Manual of the project.

51. Although the project had not expected to impact critical natural habitats at design, the Natural Habitats Policy (OP 4.04) was triggered as a precaution and to permit flexibility in the activities financed by the project. The ESSAF also included screening procedures to ensure that potential sub-projects would not involve unprecedented or significant conversion of natural habitats.

52. Likewise, during project preparation, land acquisition and resettlement were not anticipated since most of the works related to the repair and rehabilitation of existing structures. However, the Involuntary Resettlement Policy (OP 4.12) was triggered as a precaution and to allow flexibility should temporary (during the construction phase) and/or permanent private land be needed once feasibility studies and designs were finalized and the scope of works better defined. As for the Dennery hospital and the Dennery infant school, both of which are new constructions, the PAD highlighted that the hospital facility would be rebuilt on its current location and the school would be relocated and constructed on unoccupied public land already identified by the Government.

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53. During implementation, a school and a hospital rehabilitation work required asbestos removal (Ave Maria Primary and Dennery Temporary Facility). The PCU, under the guidance of the Bank team, addressed the issue quickly and effectively by putting in place plans and procedures for Asbestos Removal, tools that became standards for other Bank’s projects. To support compliance with Environmental and Social Safeguards, the PCU used a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) that was prepared for the DMP II. The PCU and the Bank carried out several training workshops between May 2012 and August 2013, aimed at enhancing stakeholders’ understanding of the Bank’s Environmental and Social safeguards policies for effective management of safeguards during project implementation.

54. Financial Management (FM) and Procurement: There were no major Financial Management issues during implementation. The PCU had an adequate control environment and provided adequate oversight while implementing project activities. From the onset of the project, financial management staff at the PCU was provided "hands on training" in preparing Financial Management Reports (FMRs)/Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) including preparing a short summary of progress reports, as well as guidance on preparing simplified IFRs formats. In addition, Capacity Building activities during implementation helped to streamline Bank procedures and processes for improved project implementation. For example, in June 2012, the Bank conducted a workshop that targeted technical staff from the various implementing ministries, as well as representatives from the Audit Department, the Accountant General’s Department and the Central Tenders Board. The workshop reviewed the project’s implementation arrangements, financial management and procurement processes, including the project’s procurement plan and contract administration.

55. Procurement was cited in earlier supervision and implementation progress reports as one of the main reasons for the delayed start in implementation of infrastructure works. In one instance, with regard to the school works, it was noted that delays were experienced due to “lags in approval for use of individuals in procurement activities and bids submitted by individual contractors.” The issue was in reference to the GoSL’s opinion that Bank’s procurement procedures were complex for the context of a microstate and did not take into account certain realities in its qualification criteria, and argued for an adjustment of the procedures to adapt to the small-island context. The Bank team however noted that these were for several small shopping contracts and had no impact on the overall implementation. As explained in earlier sections of this ICR, mitigating measures, agreed through discussions between Bank management and the GoSL, enabled the adaptation some procurement guidelines to the context. Specifically, the Bank: (i) increased World Bank Procurement thresholds for Small Island Development States; and (ii) allowed locally registered individuals to bid as contracting firms, in line with St Lucia’s Commercial Code that allows individuals to register as firm. The training workshops provided in June 2012 and those that followed throughout 2013 proved to be an effective step to improving quality of bids.

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2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

56. At the project closing, all the major works (with the exception of the Bois d’Orange bridge) and technical assistance activities were completed and approved by the PCU and the MIPS&T and the MoPD. In addition, two assessments (the flood and hydraulic assessment for Soufriere, Fond St. Jacques and Dennery) and the procurement of selected office equipment were also pending completion. The Government and the World Bank agreed to include the pending works and equipment in the Saint Lucia Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project, which was approved on June 4, 2014.

57. Providing continuity to the efforts of the HTERP, the Bank supports vulnerability reduction in Saint Lucia through the DVRP project. Scaling up the impact of the HTERP, DVRP focuses on expanding rehabilitation to other critical infrastructure as well as strengthening GoSL capacity to analyze and manage disaster risk. HTERP prepared feasibility studies and designs for some of the works to be implemented under the DVRP (ex; Dennery Infant School, Soufriere Hydraulic Assessment). The DVRP has a total financing of US$68.0 million: including US$17.0 million from the IDA Crisis Response Window in emergency response to the December 2013 floods, and US$27.0 million from the Strategic Climate Fund to support the Saint Lucia National Strategic Program for Climate Resilience.

58. The DVRP incorporated HTERP implementation lessons. These include the establishment of a Project Coordination Committee (PCC) by the MoF to foster communication and coordination between implementing agencies and key government stakeholders; and the hiring of a Civil Works Coordinator/engineer by the PCU who would be responsible for approving technical aspects of bidding documents, and ensuring the appropriate construction best practices are being utilized. Close to $1 million has been allocated for TA for capacity building and institutional strengthening of the MIPS&T for improved implementation under the DVRP. The DVRP also included budget contingencies of 20% for potential increases in project scope for all planned civil works.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Objectives: High

59. The PDO to support the recovery and reconstruction of Saint Lucia in the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas, was general, but appropriate. It provided a framework for the Government and the Bank to work together over next three years and adjust to changing recovery and reconstruction needs. The objective remains valid as the reconstruction from Hurricane Tomas and the subsequent December 2013 Christmas trough is ongoing and additional measures to improve DRM are progressing. The Regional Partnership Strategy for July 2009—June 2014 noted that natural disasters (which later occurred in 2010 and 2013) posed a major risk. The HTERP responded to this risk and incorporated building improved resilience, which was one of the RPS’ two strategic objectives. This objective was to be pursued by protecting and improving

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human capital and by strengthening climate resilience. HTERP pursued this strategy through rehabilitation of education and health infrastructure, by improving these infrastructures, and by building capacity in DRM.

Design: Substantial

60. The design of the project as a framework was appropriate to the context as it facilitated rapid support following the hurricane as well as flexibility to adjust project activities as more detailed information became available. Furthermore, the support across line ministries is best practice in risk reduction which requires measures not only by lead DRM agencies, but in all aspects of development. Some of the project activities focused on longer term benefits, such as those of Component 2, institutional strengthening and hazard and risk analysis. The key information in the studies and the update of the EMP under component 2 also made the activities critical to reconstruction and recovery. It was also appropriate for HTERP to include DRM capacity building given its importance to building capacity of government for better risk management over the medium term. Furthermore, the HTERP was able to leverage capacity building efforts begun under a previous DRM project. As stated earlier, the design of the results framework could have been stronger to better measure project results.

Implementation: Substantial

61. Implementation of the program as designed continued to be relevant. As the rehabilitation works got underway, it became clearer that the works were going to be more costly than originally envisioned, particularly with the objective of building back better. The higher costs were not anticipated due to the lack of detailed data on the works and experience in resilient construction in St. Lucia at the time of project approval. Infrastructure repairs would have been less costly if traditional standards had been applied, but that would not have improved resilience of the structures. This choice during implementation to rehabilitate with higher construction standards and for the largest activity under the project to achieve lower maintenance costs, helped keep relevance of the project to a substantial level. With cost estimates changing, there was a need to shift resources within the infrastructure component (component 3). This resource shift translated into a greater share of resources to bridges (49 percent of total US$10 million HTERP infrastructure investment compared with 31 percent planned), from health and education (combined 51 percent compared with 68 percent planned). Thus, there was a trade-off between health facilities, school coverage and other infrastructure. The team was able to assure all works would be completed by including pending activities in the new DRVP loan.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

PDO: Substantial

Results Framework Evidence

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62. PDO indicators. The project substantially achieved its objectives based on the targets in the revised and updated results framework. Note that this ICR is not using a split rating because it was not possible to establish reasonably accurate outcome targets for infrastructure rehabilitation by the time of approval, which was shortly after a major natural disaster. Reductions in indicator targets should be evaluated in that context.

63. In the category of daily users of health centers, schools and bridges, by the date of the ICR, all of the revised indicator targets were achieved. The use of the rehabilitated infrastructure is evidence of reconstruction and recovery when considering that St. Lucians will be able to use the facilities for additional years than would otherwise be the case because of better resilience of the structures. The new infrastructure was tested by heavy rains in December 2013 (the Christmas trough) and, with the exception of one instance of flooding, there were no reports of significant damage. In the case of new government-produced policies which integrate hazard risk information, the target of two policies was partially met. The underlying studies including the review of Emergency Management Plan for NEMO, the three hydraulic studies and the geodetic survey, on which policies were to be based, were all completed, thus meeting the intermediate indicator for studies. The studies were not completed until the end of the project and so there has not been enough time to go through a policy process that incorporates the newly completed studies.

64. Intermediate indicators. Of the six intermediate indicators five of the targets were met. Output targets for equipment delivered, numbers of schools and health centers rehabilitated and bridges built were all met, as were studies completed. Only the training target for staff of the MoPD and NEMO in GIS analysis tools fell short (18 versus 24). This was not a significant shortfall as the key stakeholders at MoPD and NEMO did receive training. The record of intermediate indicator targets met is also consistent with the project meeting its objective.

Additional Evidence beyond the Results Framework

65. Additional evidence, beyond that in the results framework, that supports a substantial rating

66. Component 1-Support for Early Recovery. Component 1-Support for Early Recovery provided substantial, timely support for post-hurricane clean-up, equipment rental and general budget support, particularly for staff overtime, to ease the fiscal impact of the surge in government expenditures. Discussions with government staff validated that this fully disbursed retroactive financing of the cost of emergency cleanup activities freed US$1.5 million of government resources to better address longer term recovery from the hurricane. This impact directly supports the PDO.

67. Component 2-Institutional Strengthening. The NEMO component accomplished several tasks that were necessary for effective emergency response and, thus, to sustain recovery and reconstruction. The review of the NEMP was a massive undertaking and the consultancy focused on actions related to hurricane, flooding and

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natural disaster response. The existing plan had not been reviewed in its 12-year history. Locations of hospitals, police, fire and ambulance, as well as chain of authority had changed. These practical items and standard operating procedures have been updated and approved by NEMO and sent to Cabinet. This review and update of the plan means that that there will be much better response to emergencies in the future. The equipment provided also supports improved response. Volunteer training and equipment such as radios, batteries and repeaters that were provided by the project also expanded St. Lucia’s emergency response capacity. The geodetic study funded by the project for the MoPD provides essential information for determining sites for future buildings based on vulnerability to natural disasters. The flood risk studies for three areas will similarly help reduce risk exposure to natural disasters.

68. Component 3-Infrastructure Rehabilitation. The benefits to education were the improved learning environment for primary and secondary students, the extended life and greater resilience of 11 school buildings. The project fixed both hurricane damage and pre-existing repair needs, while building back better. In terms of improved resilience, in addition to hurricane standard roofs and windows, the project also provided drainage protection to the schools in the form of retaining walls and concrete water channels, which, although increasing cost, more importantly improved resilience. Schools also received new water tanks, improving their functionality as emergency shelters. The four health centers were rehabilitated including new hurricane standard roofs and windows. The main investment in health infrastructure went to the Dennery health center where several buildings were rehabilitated and major equipment purchased. The rehabilitation also improved the functionality of the Dennery facility, to which a room for community outreach was added. Health and education rehabilitations accounted for more than one- third of project resources.

69. The building of the two bridges supported both reconstruction and recovery by ensuring reliable traffic flow for future years. The Cresslands bridge was completed during the project. While Cresslands is not a heavily traveled bridge, the detour for some could take up to 45 minutes. The Bois d’Orange bridge was completed shortly after project closing. This bridge is a connector between Castries and Gros Islet, the fastest growing portion of the country and one critical to economic growth and employment. This bridge has an estimated daily traffic of 27,000 vehicles. This bridge alone would serve about 20 percent of the entire population of Saint Lucia (assuming one use per day). The building of this bridge was delayed mainly because of a lack of in-country engineering capacity and hydraulic studies but also because the supplier initially provided the wrong type of steel for the bridge (adding several months to the delay). Engineering expertise was brought in to help local engineers with appropriate designs, including reviews by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The bridges accounted for about one- third of total project resources. Overall, this component reduced the risk of infrastructure failure and directed a substantial portion of benefits to vulnerable people (including children who are 18 percent of users) and people in communities of higher poverty rates (Soufriere and Dennery-Section 3.5)

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70. Component 4-Project Management. The PCU improved its capacity to manage projects having developed a much deeper understanding of FM and procurement processes and practices, through both specific training and project implementation experience. It has also come to appreciate the need for engineering expertise in project management, particularly the evaluation of bids and construction designs. The Bank is using the same PCU for the much larger follow-on project, the Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project (DVRP). This improved capacity will help sustain St. Lucia’s post- Tomas reconstruction and recovery.

Annex 2 provides a comprehensive summary of the outputs of the four components which further supplements the project results framework.

3.3 Efficiency

Efficiency rating: Modest

71. Returns and unit costs. The ICR has carried out a partial economic analysis based on the bridge and school physical investments of the project which account for 63.5 percent of total project expenditures. The economic internal rate of return, which is based on avoided cost, from education and bridge investments are 10.37 percent and 29.98 percent, respectively. See Annex 3 for the approach and assumptions of the analysis. It was not possible to produce detailed unit cost comparisons in the St. Lucia context. However, the per square foot cost of the Bois d’Orange bridge (approximately US$950 per square foot) was discussed with the engineer who reviewed the bridge design and who maintained that the cost was at the high end of the range for similar bridges, but was justifiable, given higher construction costs in remote islands.

Table 2: Present Value and EIRR for Bridges and Schools Investments (US$) Bridges Schools Percent of total project costs 36.7% 26.8% Present value of Costs @ 12% 5,528,504 3,117,874 Present value of Benefits @ 12% 12,622,033 3,580,771 Net Present Value @ 12% 7,093,529 -462,897 EIRR 29.98% 10.37%

72. Other implementation factors that need to be assessed include the moderate delay between approval and effectiveness and the delay in the completion of the Bois d’Orange bridge rehabilitation and resulting cancelation of the remaining project funds, the related extension of the project closing date, and downward revision of a PDO indicator target. With respect to the reduction in the physical target for schools (from which the daily user target was derived), while the revision at restructuring was a sharp reduction from the original target, it was a far more realistic target and more appropriate to the work that needed to be done. As explained previously, rehabilitation estimates are difficult to make accurately until work begins and the true damage can be assessed. In addition, the project took a strategic decision to improve resilience in fewer schools, rather than to

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cover more schools, but leave them vulnerable to extreme weather. The same reasoning was applied to bridge construction.

73. The interval between approval and effectiveness, when financial resources could actually be disbursed, might have been shorter given that it was an emergency project. The 5.5 months delay was due in part to country requirements to approve funding (three months was standard for parliamentary approval), This track record was taken into account in project design in the inclusion of retroactive financing. The retroactive financing proved useful in getting resources to the government promptly after effectiveness. Moreover, time was not wasted during this period (March to September 2011), because the project team carried out further activities that were essential to a successful project including preparation and review of documentations for the retroactive financing and procurement packages. The delay in construction of the main bridge was mainly because of the need to do proper designs based on hydraulic studies plus the fact that wrong-sized steel was delivered by the supplier, which, along with time needed to complete other studies, necessitated an extension of the project closing date by six months. The Bois d’Orange bridge was completed shortly (two months) after project closing.

74. The total utilization of project funds reached 89.2 percent by project close which, is a good performance given the context that HTERP was much larger than any other project in St. Lucia’s experience and the project duration relatively short to implement improvements to infrastructure12. The infrastructure component disbursed more than 90 percent, US$10 million out of US$11 million planned, and components 1 and 4 were fully disbursed (US$1.5 million and US$1.0 million, respectively). Capacity building used about 60 percent, or US$0.8 million, of the full US$1.5 million allocation. Approximately 10 percent of project funds were returned to the Bank. Although there were costs that exceeded original estimates on a number of sub-projects, in the end there were not enough sub-projects that could be prepared and implemented to use all funds prior to the HTERP closing date. This was partly because of the limited capacity of the MoE to prepare bankable sub-projects with an accelerated processing timetable under emergency conditions. This negative impact is offset by the fact that the cancelled funds were added to the follow-on DVRP, which finances similar infrastructure investments. Because it was known that the additional funds would not be forfeited, and with a view to stream line Bank support for DRM under one operation, an additional extension of the project closing date was not granted.

75. The overall efficiency rating is modest, reflecting the strong economic return on the bridge investments (about one-third of total project costs), as well as the moderate effectiveness delay in two activities. The moderately unsatisfactory rating of project

12 Disaster Risk Management in Saint Lucia through the Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management Project (ERDMP-P070430-1998-2003-USD 6.04 million), and the Saint Lucia Disaster Management Project II and Additional Financing (DMP II-P086469-2003-2011- USD 10.5 million).

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implementation by the final supervision mission is also consistent with the modest efficiency rating.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

76. With relevance of objectives, design and implementation rated substantial, and a substantial achievement of the PDO and a modest rating for efficiency, the overall outcome rating is moderately satisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

77. The project, through the reconstruction and rehabilitation of key infrastructure ensuring essential services, namely transport infrastructure, schools and health facilities, contributed to reducing the risk of economic loss and negative impact on social development due to infrastructure failure. The complementary efforts of the Bank and CDB resulted in emergency stabilization and clearing works done around the infrastructure impacted by Hurricane Tomas (such as the slides and drains at Colombette, Soufrière, Bexon, Marc and Trois Piton, Barre d’Isle, Millet/Vanard, Bagatelle and the water intakes at Ravine Poisson and Millet) reduced the risk of further landslide and flooding to people living nearby. The hydraulic studies targeted three communities with high risks of landslides and flooding and some of the highest poverty rates in the country: Fond St. Jacques, Soufrière and Dennery (2006 poverty head count percentage is 42.5 for Soufrière, and 34.2 for Dennery, compared to a national average of 28.813.

78. The physical investments were undertaken to ensure the continuity of essential services but also to offer better services, especially to women, children and elderly people. For example, toilets and changing rooms were built at Dennery health facility, as well as a patient waiting area covered by a roof in case of rain; the access road was redesigned to accommodate ambulances; roofs were generally extended in the rehabilitated health centers and schools to offer sheltered areas in case of disaster. Through the specific focus on health centers and schools, next to strategic bridges, the rehabilitation works benefited 35,141 daily users, 18% of which are considered as “vulnerable” - children (in rehabilitated schools) and people in need of health care (in rehabilitated health centers), corresponding to a total of 6,225 daily beneficiaries.

79. Finally, through the provision of emergency communications equipment and training delivered at the local level, the project contributed to (i) the empowerment of the District Disaster Committees, mainly formed by volunteers, and (ii) the strengthening of

13 Data from the Central Statistical Office, Household Budget Survey 2005/2006, where poverty line is defined as EC$13.93 (US$5.22) daily.

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the collaboration between the different users of the equipment (Districts, police stations, fire departments, etc.).

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

80. In spite of the short period of implementation (from 2011 to 2014) the project contributed to institutional change and capacity building within the targeted institutions. At the national level, the MoE, the MoH, the MoIPS&T and the MoPDE have strengthened their technical and managerial capacities, particularly through the experience in resilient works such as the Bois d’Orange bridge, Dennery health facility and the health facilities in general that followed PAHO’s guidelines with the objective to provide more and better health care services as well as better access. These examples played a critical role in raising awareness about the appropriate standards to be applied to build back better. Planning and implementation capacities also increased significantly throughout the project as a result of technical trainings (such as on GPS/GIS) and operational training sessions on procurement, financial management, and safeguard issues delivered to the ministries or agencies involved in project implementation, and in some cases contractors. Over that period of time, the integrated vision of risk assessment that the GoSL was supporting, grew stronger within the technical agencies that were able to better determine and connect the objectives of the analytical studies. For example, a GoSL official interviewed during the ICR mission realized the importance of broadening the scope of the hydraulic studies beyond flooding to include landslides, soils, agriculture and geological characteristics, at the scale of the entire watershed. NEMO also significantly benefitted from the project, gaining technical and managerial capacities, with proper equipment and amenities to conduct its mandate. At the local level, authorities and communities have been sensitized and have strengthened their understanding of disaster risk management.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

81. The level of collaboration between the different institutions involved in disaster risk management increased during the implementation of the project. Furthermore, the project indirectly brought in other relevant entities such as the Central Statistical Office which today plays an active role in the Household Survey, and the Business Survey, two of the key surveys under implementation through the DVRP project, meant to benefit the most vulnerable groups to natural disasters and economic shocks.

82. The design of a fund dedicated to help the most vulnerable groups in case of a natural disaster is underway (the results of the Household Survey are meant to provide data and information and assess the possibility for such a fund).

83. A common point raised through various discussions during the ICR mission is related to the lack of a strong communication strategy to raise public awareness about the project’s objectives and its benefits. This is indeed a key element that the PCU has acknowledged as essential and is being addressed under the DVRP.

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3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

This is a core ICR, as such no beneficiary survey was required.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial

84. Financial and capacity constraints of line ministries may hinder long term maintenance of rehabilitated infrastructure. This is a common problem for public infrastructure in the Caribbean. The MIPS&T is responsible for maintaining all public infrastructures, but its financial capacity is limited compared to the magnitude of maintenance needs. For example, the MoE average maintenance annual budget per school facility is about EC$ 3,500 (about 1,300 USD), which is lower than what would be expected given the routine maintenance activities14. The project however also carefully looked at introducing design elements for the Bois d’Orange bridge, for example, that would reduce maintenance cost over the life of the infrastructure. In spite of this, and due to scarce budget resources, most social facilities rely on revenues through fund-raising activities (e.g. wedding ceremonies and other private events) and on volunteers from the community to manage the general upkeep. Significant challenges in maintenance of buildings once project financing ends were also confirmed by some of the GoSL technicians and donor agencies met during the ICR mission, based on their experience with previous investments. As in most investments in small island states, including Saint Lucia, this is a challenge which cannot be addressed by an emergency recovery loan but requires appropriate financial and policy instruments.

85. Regarding the sustainability of the impacts of the studies, the ICR mission received reports of the studies’ findings already playing a role in decision-making for planning new construction. As already reported, however, because of completion of the studies later in project implementation, it was not possible to confirm that the studies led to new government policies on DRM.

86. Demands for coordination across line ministries pose a risk. For example, need for better coordination between the PCU and MIPS&T, and between MIPS&T and MoE during technical supervision of the rehabilitation works for the NSDC which has undergone some changes in the works without MIPS&T’s formal approval, was highlighted during the ICR mission. The ICR noted that under the DVRP, an Infrastructure Maintenance policy and a Bridge Maintenance management System will be developed and implemented, as well as a technical assistance of close to US$ 1 million to support strengthening of the Ministry. The Project’s efforts for improved disaster risk data management face similar challenges. The collaboration and exchange of information among Ministries and agencies would benefit from further institutionalization taking

14 Discussions with School Principal and MoE technician during site visit at Piaye school.

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advantage of the Geonode hosted at MoPD that was financed under the project, and should be set beyond the project’s framework.

87. The December 2013 flood provided good evidence of resilience of project works. Most of the rehabilitated infrastructure withstood the December 2013 Christmas Trough storm. However, the poor siting of some facilities may reduce the effectiveness of resilience investments. For example the Marigot school and the Dame Pearlette Louisy locations in a low lying land and prone to flooding, may remain at risk due to its highly exposed location or to design which might not be adequate to overcome extreme events. To ensure that sustainability of the infrastructure is secured, the GoSL should devolve capital investments for maintenance.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory

88. OP8.0 states, “The Bank recognizes both the inherent risks involved in working in emergency situations, including the risks and lost opportunities associated with a delayed response, and the critical importance of speed, flexibility, and simplicity to an effective rapid response.” Bank performance is rated in this context and in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster of a scale greater than any other in the history of Saint Lucia.

89. Despite emergency, post-hurricane conditions, the Bank team worked well with the government to design a project that helped rebuild critical infrastructure in health, education and bridges, while also providing critical equipment, training and technical support to improve disaster risk management. The project design included retroactive financing of government activities, which followed best practice for post-disaster situations.

90. The Bank was fast on the scene after the hurricane and performed a quick damage assessment, in collaboration with the Government. It worked with the government to identify damaged schools and health centers, as well as a number of critical bridges that were severely damaged. The Bank also helped identify key areas of needed capacity building. The Bank team also worked closely with other donors, including the Caribbean Development Bank to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity of reconstruction support to Saint Lucia. The project design included retroactive financing of government activities, which followed best practice for post-disaster situations.

91. There were minor shortcomings in the planning of the project, particularly in the areas of project costing and the results framework (described earlier). These shortcomings can be understood because of the rapid response time by the Bank with minimal time for preparation, poor data available immediately following a disaster and the fact that this was designed as a framework project. It is difficult to get reasonably

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accurate cost estimates for rehabilitation vs. new construction because often the extent of the disrepair cannot be seen by scanning the surface of the damage, which is all that is possible during a quick assessment. Faced with the dilemma between responding rapidly to the urgent needs of reconstruction, and conducting necessary pre-engineering activities to better define the scope and estimates of project activities, which require lengthy efforts, the Bank team rightly decided to move quickly with preparation 15 on the basis of preliminary project cost estimates, with the inclusion of budget contingencies for all works activities to address potential shortcomings arising during implementation. Despite this effort to reduce the risk of shortfalls, the dramatic changes to the physical site conditions caused by the hurricane introduced additional costs beyond the anticipated.

92. The other area where quality at entry could have been improved is the Results Framework, which could have included specific targets, but was weak due to the unavailability of sufficient information to define project scope and support an accurate estimate.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

93. The quality of the supervision is rated Satisfactory on the basis that the Bank team conducted regular and close supervision, with frequent missions to the island and regular follow up via conference calls with counterparts, which kept the project moving forward, despite implementing agency capacity issues and the post disaster challenges. The TTL was in frequent contact with the Director of the PCU and most of the staff at the involved line ministries, including the Permanent Secretary of Finance, Infrastructure, and Physical Development, to help them manage and implement the project, solve technical problems related to civil works planning and to move procurement processes. Procurement, FM, and Safeguards specialists as well as a Civil Engineer regularly joined missions and provided training in Bank procedures to the PCU and other implementing agencies’ staff, which proved very useful for the project implementation. The Bank further provided additional procurement as well as technical training for local contractors, consultants and suppliers that would bid in Bank-financed activities. Supervision missions identified and documented implementation issues, and Aide-memoires were frank in highlighting concerns and implementation challenges.

94. With support from the Bank team, the GoSL made an official request to the U.S. Embassy for technical assistance from the United States Army Core of Engineers (USACE). In this regard, an engineer was mobilized to provide essential inputs for bridge design. Overall, the supervision helped Saint Lucia implement an unusually large project

15 As indicated earlier, from a financing point of view, the Bank team needed to move quickly to secure additional IDA financing for Saint Lucia from the last remaining parts of the IDA15 global funds since all of Saint Lucia’s IDA15 resources had already been allocated at the time.

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(compared to previously funded projects) in a relatively short time of three and a half years.

95. A number of implementation issues arose related both to country capacity and Bank procedures, particularly in the area of procurement, but also FM (related to Financial Management Reports that were later simplified), and safeguards (case of dealing with asbestos at the start of infrastructure works that was also addressed successfully). In each area, the issues were resolved with close supervision support and counterpart training that was geared to the specific needs of the staff. This was the case for addressing procurement challenges, as discussed earlier in this ICR.

96. A moderate shortcoming was missing the opportunity to improve the results framework during the first restructuring. After two years of implementation it would have been possible to do more than change targets for indicators when the framework needed a more fundamental revision to include indicators that would produce better evidence of the achievement of the PDO.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory.

97. The Bank performed well under the circumstances following the hurricane, and addressed most supervision challenges through regular supervision, training and flexibility, and adapted to the context of a small island state. With the quality at entry and supervision ratings both satisfactory, the overall Bank performance is satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

98. MoF/PCU. The Government of Saint Lucia was actively involved in the identification/prioritization and preparation of project activities, facilitated by the PCU. The Government further remained committed during the project’s life. The MoF carried out its responsibilities and provided office space and other support to the PCU. The PCU carried out its functions competently within its expertise. Implementing agencies reported that the PCU was helpful in easing the processing of activities, in particular, that it took on the burden of processing requirements. It was not however able to compensate for the lack of engineering expertise in some of the ministries when it came to screening contracts for rehabilitating buildings and infrastructure. Recognizing this, the PCU took action and hired consultants to assist with technical reviews and supervisions.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

99. Implementing agencies were the MIPS&T, MoE MoH, and NEMO and the MoPD. The Ministries of health and education performed reasonably well in working with the infrastructure ministry, even with the challenge of the government reorganization in 2012, to communicate infrastructure needs and develop a rehabilitation

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plan. The performance of the agencies was moderately satisfactory with allowances for low capacity in technical areas such as architecture and engineering. The MoH performed well in specifying its needs. The MOE had a more challenging task of specifying needs as there were more schools in need of repair than health centers. NEMO used all funds and completed its outputs by project closing, although with some delay. The Ministry of Physical Development also completed its activities, again with some delays, but before project closing. The PCU highlighted the fact that, overall, the institutional capacity of the implementing agencies to draft key technical documents such as Terms of References was weak and sometimes non-existent. To address this capacity gap, the PCU hired a civil engineer consultant to provide support to MoF, in particular to provide support to the MoE with the school rehabilitation/retroffiting sub-component.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

100. With government and implementing agencies performing reasonably well during the project and acquiring capacity to take on a larger follow-on project, the overall rating is moderately satisfactory.

6. Lessons Learned

101. Components designed to meet immediate liquidity needs are critical parts of post-disaster response. Countries often face inadequate liquidity to meet the sudden surge of needs after a natural disaster. The HTERP demonstrated the value of a significant infusion of resources to keep critical services going, post-disaster. This support allows other planned development activities to continue.

102. Climate resilient retrofitting entails comprehensive interventions that should be accounted for in initial designs. This is a lesson from the earlier project (DMP II), and was reinforced in HTERP. Retrofitting requires repair of damages as well as addressing the risk, such as drainage, slope stabilization, and water storage. HTERP addressed all of these aspects in health centers and schools.

103. Projects, including emergency projects like HTERP, that finance major rehabilitation of infrastructure, need to allow sufficient time for completion of work; three years is generally too short a time period. HTERP financed bridge reconstruction which is a major undertaking from design to completed construction, particularly when the objective was to build back better. It was a learning experience for St. Lucia and though good progress was made during the project, and the rehabilitated bridges was completed two months after closing.

104. Initial estimates of rehab/retrofitting work costs need to be made carefully/conservatively to avoid major adjustments to the physical scope of the project down the road. HTERP’s emergency nature led to cost estimates that were too low necessitating substantial readjustment of the project’s rehabilitation program after project approval.

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105. Maintenance planning and budget needs to be part of rehabilitation work. HTERP did not include sufficient emphasis on maintenance of improvements and other aspects of school and health facilities. This is a focus that is taken up more systematically in the DVRP

106. Bank procurement procedures need to take better into account the limitations of the small island state context. Bank procurement procedures should incorporate the realities of project implementation in small island state with a very small population. Thus, contractor qualification criteria need to be adapted and tailored to the reality that foreign bidders are not likely to compete for bids.

107. Preparation of Rapid Emergency projects face constraints, such as undefined scope of project activities and broad cost estimates due to lack of readily available data and pre-engineering studies. This makes it difficult to set specific baselines and targets in the Project Results Framework at project design. As such, definition of indicator targets should be finalized once the project’s scopes are confirmed, even if this is done during implementation stage.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

No issues were raised.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not Applicable

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Not Applicable

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions)

C 1 Support for Early Recovery 1.5 1.494 99.6 C 2 Institutional Strengthening, 1.5 0.848 56.6 Hazard and Risk Analysis C 3 Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Damaged Critical Public Infrastructure, 11.0 10.003 90.9 Goods, Works & Consultant Services C 4 Project Management 1.0 1.040 104.0

Total Baseline Cost 15.0 13.386 89.2

Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 15.0 13.386 89.2 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 15.0 13.386 89.2

(b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00 International Development IDA 15.0 13.386 89.2 Association (IDA)

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1 - Support for early recovery

Component 1 retroactively paid for emergency expenditures that followed the disaster, avoiding the diversion of financial resources from other budgets.

Table A: Outputs for Component 1

Output Description This was possible through the fast supply of goods such as fuel and materials. Component 1 financed the following items: Emergency stabilization Fuel (43,348L) works Reno mattresses (48 units) Gabion baskets (877 units) Boulders (15,296 t) Component 1 financed equipment rental for clearing WASCO intakes at Ravine Poisson and Millet, clearing slides and drains at Colombette, Soufrière, Bexon, Marc and Trois Piton, Barre d’Isle, Millet / Vanard, Bagatelle: Excavators Trucks Emergency clearing Backhoe loaders works Rock breakers Graders Rollers Tractors Bulldozers Lights Component 1 paid for some staff overtime, from different Manpower increased in government agencies such as: key Government WASCO agencies MCWT and PU Others

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2 - Institutional strengthening and hazard and risk analysis

Component 2 financed analytical work contributing to better knowledge of the hazards and risks, policy work through the review of the National Emergency Management Plan (NEMP), training activities as well as goods to strengthen the country disaster management capacity.

Table B: Outputs for Component 2

Output Description The assessments were carried out in 3 highly affected areas: 3 hydraulic assessments Dennery village for flood risk reduction Soufrière Fonds Saint Jacques The NEMP is composed of 26 plans, and Component 2 financed the review of 20 of them including the update of the standard operational procedures. These include :

Agencies SOPs (Volume 1 : Agencies of the National Emergency Management Organization Volume 2 : Standing Operating Procedures for the national Emergency Operations Centre) EOC SOPs Emergency Housing Policy DANA Policy DANA Plan Flood Plan GOSL circular on Continuity of Government Information Management in Emergencies and Disasters Review of the National Plan Emergency Management Hazard Mitigation Policy Plan . Hazard Mitigation Plan . Hazard Mitigation Action Plan . Oil Spill Plan . Relief Distribution Plan . Emergency Shelter Policy . Emergency Shelter Plan . National Plan for transportation in Disasters . Guidelines for a National Systematic Shutdown . Saint Lucia Hospitality Crisis Management Plan and Concepts of Operations . National Hurricane Plan . National Telecommunications Plan

This work included large consultations across the institutions and throughout the country. It has gone through

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the first steps of approval and is now being submitted to the Cabinet for final approval before 100 CD copies are burnt and distributed. The study generated high quality data with a high level of accuracy that will serve as fundamentals in all sectors for Geodetic survey and all mapping exercises and development projects. It came geodetic network with: adjustment the delivery of GPS training to 12 staff from MOPD the purchase of GPS software the development of pre-field survey methodology report GPS training to MOPD as mentioned above Data capture training to MOPD (2 batches) Trainings Training on how to use the emergency communications equipment to NEMO and to the District Disaster Committees (composed largely of volunteers) NEMO got equipped with new and complementary emergency communications devices, some of them being distributed to 18 District Disaster Committees: Base station radios Hand-held VHF radios VHF repeaters Batteries, antennas, chargers Emergency Communications The selection of equipment was made so that it would be Equipment compatible and complementary to what NEMO was already using, and with the objective of having in the near future a national integrated system designed for multi-users (districts, police stations, fire departments, etc.).

Telecommunications equipment was procured for Saint Lucia Fire Services.

Improvement in NEMO got equipped with: NEMO’s office A fire alarm for the warehouse (equipment) CCTV for the warehouse and for the rest of the compound Chain saws and associated training Projects and 3 laptops Book ends Tint windows Vehicle Amenities (kitchen utensils, washing machine, dryer) Software licenses The component also paid for Geonode hosting.

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3 - Reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged critical public infrastructure

Component 3 financed reconstruction and rehabilitation works in the health, education and transport sectors. Some of the select damaged public infrastructure were entirely reconstructed and rehabilitated, others benefited from partial support either through works or provision of equipment.

Table C: outputs for Component 3 in the health sector

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of 4 health facilities

# Output Description 1 Dennery Hospital: The facility was significantly damaged after the reconstruction of the hurricane and was not functional until the repair facility, retrofitting and and improvement works were completed. These equipping the hospital include: roof repairs (lifted up and extended), asbestos removal, improvement and extension of administration area, improvement of waiting area including construction of roof and toilets, shower/changing room for patients, improvement of access way.

The works required substantial TA for structural assessment, geotechnical investigations, architectural services and mechanical and electrical improvement designs. They also resulted from consultations with the staff from the hospital.

The facility was equipped with: 6 emergency couches, 4 water tanks (for a total capacity of 4,000 gallons), 1 generator (but still to be installed), medical equipment, office equipment, office furniture. 2 Entrepot Health Center: The roof was repaired and extended, and rehabilitation of the hurricane-resistant windows and doors were facility installed.

The works required structural assessment and architectural review. 3 Etangs Health Center: The roof was repaired and extended, and rehabilitation of the hurricane-resistant windows and doors were facility installed. Drainage works provided

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The works required structural assessment and architectural review. 4 Jacmel Health Center: The roof was repaired and walls were extended up rehabilitation of the to the roof. Hurricane-resistant windows and doors facility were installed. 5 – Victoria Hospital: AC units and medical supplies equipment were goods provision of equipment procured for the pediatric ward. only

Table D: outputs for Component 3 in the education sector

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of 10 schools

# Output Description 1 Ave Maria (Castries) The rehabilitation works consisted in roof and primary school: ceiling repairs, as well as asbestos removal. rehabilitation 2 Ciceron secondary A retaining wall was built along the water course school: rehabilitation adjacent to the school where landslides occurred after the hurricane. 3 Dame Pearlette An improved computer lab was built, involving Louisy combined the extension of the upper floor (moving the lab school: rehabilitation from the ground floor to the first floor) and significant electrical works. There were some repairs done to the fence in the back.

Some school supplies were provided to the school. 4 Bocage combined The works consisted in: the construction of school: rehabilitation drains, ceiling repairs, electrical works, the replacement of roof and roof members for 3 buildings, toilet fixtures and door, fencing repairs, culvert repair.

1 pedestal for water tank was provided 5 Bexon primary The main access road was raised, and the school: rehabilitation component also financed the construction of drains and of a footbridge. 6 Marigot combined Some heavy cleanup works were undertaken after school: rehabilitation the hurricane, then a drainage system was developed and built (as an alternative option to a retaining wall between the school (low field) and the upper parts of land surrounding the school).

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7 La Croix Maingot The works consisted in the construction of a combined school: gabion retaining wall (about 100m long, 2m high rehabilitation and 1m thick) and some drainage improvements works. 8 Vieux Fort Campus Some repairs were done on the roof, doors and A: rehabilitation windows at Campus A.

The campus also was provided with school supplies. 9 Piaye secondary Some repairs were done to doors and partitions. school: rehabilitation 10 (partial NSDC: rehabilitation The works consisted in repairing and financing and expansion works rehabilitating the roof, and building a reinforced through this concrete mezzanine floor. They included project) excavation works, concrete and structural steel works, carpentry and joinery works, plaster and other works including wall finishes.

They required particularly heavy TA for structural condition survey and preparation of detailed designs.

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Contribution to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of 9 other schools

# Output Description 11 Dennery infant The project financed the design study for school: TA provided rehabilitating the school. in support of school rehabilitation 12 Babonneau Gabion baskets were installed through this secondary school: component (which paid for 18% of the contract rehabilitation works amount) 13 George Charles The school was also provided network and secondary school: electrical services. rehabilitation works 14 Saint Mary’s College: equipment 15 Vieux Fort Comprehensive secondary school: These schools benefited from the procurement of equipment network and electrical services. 16 Micoud secondary school: equipment 17 Soufrière secondary school: equipment 18 Canaries infant and primary: equipment These schools were provided with school 19 Anse la Raye infant supplies and primary: equipment

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Procurement of goods for the Ministry of Education to the benefit of schools and daycare centers in need

# Output Description 1 Replacement of Procurement of furniture, computers, appliances, damaged items in general equipment, learning materials for daycare schools and daycare centers centers 2 Procurement of Procurement of emergency management furniture, furniture and equipment, computers, licenses, school supplies, materials resource materials, instructional and reading material from the Red Cross, Oxford University Press, Anne LD French

Table E: output for Component 3 in the Transport sector

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of 2 bridges

# Output Description 1 Cressland Road reconstruction with new right of way. Reconstruction of a wider bridge (concrete box culvert designed to take up to 12 times the amount of water compared to the previous bridge) including upstream and downstream installation of drains and boulders to support the river bank defense and facilitate runoff 2 Bois d’Orange Reconstruction of a higher and wider bridge with 2x2 lanes including 2 for future use. The works included road works (backfilling, drainage), the installation of girders for the bridge, river protection works upstream and downstream. They also included the deviation and complete change of the section of the water pipe running along the bridge (works undertaken by the water utility).

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4 - Project management and monitoring support

Apart from staff time (for the project coordinator, the procurement and M&E officer, the FM officer, the procurement and contract management officer, the project assistant for FM, the project assistant, the administrative officer, the engineer), Component 4 financed workshops, other training and equipment.

Table F: outputs for Component 4

# Output Description 1 Development of The component financed: project management A performance audit, and monitoring A peer quality assurance review; capacity of For the Audit Department: specific training, with government agencies quickbooks and associated supplies, IDEA/Caseware involved in training, staff retreat; implementation A regional workshop on open source technologies and web mapping for MODP staff; Training on fiduciary aspects of project management: to PCU, Ministries of Health, Education, Sustainable Development, Infrastructure, Accountant General 2 Provision of goods The following were provided to the different for the improvement agencies: of administrative and Furniture and equipment for NEMO and PCU, such technical capacity of as photocopier, printer, vehicle, laptops and scanners government agencies for PCU; involved in Survey equipment and printer for the Survey’s implementation Department at MOPD; Computers for the Architectural Department at MODP; Survey equipment for the Ministry of Infrastructure

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Summary of HTERP Costs and Benefits The HTERP incurred costs and created benefits through five categories of activities: 1. Bridge building—Cresslands and Bois d’Orange bridges; 2. Rehabilitation of eleven (11) schools and equipment; 3. Rehabilitation of four (4) health-facilities equipment; 4. Disaster Management Capacity Building, including GIS capacity building, the Review of the National Disaster Management Plan, three Hydraulic Assessments for Flood Risk Reduction, a geodetic survey and Emergency Communication Equipment; and 5. Retroactive financing of emergency expenditures. The total actual cost of categories 1, 2 and 3 is US$10.0 million (compared with US$11.0 million appraisal estimate): Health—US$1.508 million, Education—US$3.580 million and Bridges—US$4.913 million. This analysis quantifies the benefits of categories 1. and 2. (63.5 percent of project expenditures). The method used to quantify benefits from the rebuilt bridges is the avoided method, which considers the costs of traveling alternative routes and is based on additional kilometers traveled, cost of fuel, value of the time to travel those kilometers and the probability of a destructive event. For schools and health centers the benefits are the value of the extended life of the assets.

Key Assumptions used in the Economic Analysis General:

Probability of destructive event similar to Hurricane Tomas = 0.125 An exchange rate of 2.6882 was used for all conversions between EC$ and US$.

Bridges Cost and Traffic Data

Bois d’Orange Bridge

4 options presented plus do nothing. Single Span, 4-lane option chosen.

Cost for 4 lane version estimated at:

Base cost $EC9.345 million Contingency (10%) $EC0.9345 million Total $EC10.280 million VAT (15%) $EC1.542 million

Actual Cost $EC11,106,682.12 (from procurement plan) US$4,131,709.74 Without VAT US$3,592,791.08

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With average daily traffic of 23,683 recorded in 2011, plus 5% growth rate since 2011, total traffic = 27,416 vehicles daily, of which:

Cars 59.0% Minibuses 19.3% Pick ups 15.4% Trucks 4.1% Other 2.3% ______100%

Source: Hurricane Tomas Recovery Project Bois D’Orange Bridge Design, Main Report, FDL Consult Inc., Castries, St. Lucia, September 2012.

Cresslands Bridge

Actual cost $EC3,304,260.63 (US$1,229,172.17, without VAT = US$1,068,845.37)

Source: Procurement documents

Traffic—850 average daily traffic (based on 3% growth rate since 1999):

Cars 40.0% Mini-bus 33.0% Pick-up 26.0% Truck 1.0% ______100%

Source: Twin Box Culvert and River Training Works—Design Report, November 2011

Total costs for both bridges was US$4,661,642.45 (without VAT), about one third of total project expenditures.

Traffic volume data on the two bridges before and after rebuilding: Cresslands 1,500 users per day, Bois d’Orange 27,000. School Assumptions Enrollment in the 10 schools after rehabilitation was 6,080 students per day. Benefits were based on estimated school value, the probability of an extreme weather event and value of furniture, books, etc. Note that schools also serve as emergency shelters and that

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being built back better with weather resilient roofs and windows, they will not only preserve the value of the school building, they will also be more resilient to extreme weather and serve as more reliable shelters. The four health facilities record an average 145 daily users after rehab. Their repairs consisted mainly of new hurricane proof roofs and windows. They also received some basic diagnostic equipment. These benefits are not assessed in this analysis. Other non-quantifiable benefits MoPD and NEMO staff training in GIS analysis tool (18 officials, 24 more planned), the updating of the National Emergency Management Plan, and supply of basic communication equipment improves St. Lucia’s capacity to deal with future natural disasters. Likewise, hydraulic studies will help lower risk through better siting of new construction. Net Economic Benefits of bridge and school improvements The table below summarizes the results of the economic analysis covering 63.5 percent of project expenditures. Present Value and EIRR for Bridges and Schools Investments (US$) Bridges Schools Percent of total project costs 36.7% 26.8% Present value of Costs @ 12% 5,528,504 3,117,874 Present value of Benefits @ 12% 12,622,033 3,580,771 Net Present Value @ 12% 7,093,529 -462,897 EIRR 29.98% 10.37%

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Sr. Disaster Risk Management Niels Holm-Nielsen LCSUW TTL Specialist Disaster Risk Management Tiguist Fisseha LCSUW DRM Consultant Damage Ana Campos García Civil Engineer Consultant LCSUW Assessment Disaster Risk Management Rossella Della Monica LCSUW DRM Consultant Disaster Risk Management Damage Marc Forni LCSUW Consultant Assessment Ana Daza Language Program Assistant LCSUW Operations Disaster Risk Management Zuzana Tomkova LCSUW Editor Consultant Rocío Manrique Temporary - Program Assistant LCSUW Operations Sr. Disaster Risk Management Jose C. Joaquin Toro L. LCSUW DRM Specialist Sr. Financial Management M. Mozammal Hoque LCSFM FM Specialist M. Yaa Pokua Afriyie Sr. Social Development Social SDV Oppong Specialist Safeguards Yingwie Wu Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPT Procurement Environmental Anjali Acharya Sr. Environmental Specialist LCSEN Safeguards Regional Sr. Structural Engineer Bertrand Mazur Council of Engineering Consultant Guadeloupe Edith Ruguru Mwenda Sr. Counsel LEGAF Legal Miguel-Santiago Sr. Finance Officer CTRFC Disbursement Oliveira

Supervision/ICR Lead Disaster Risk Niels Holm-Nielsen GSURR DRM – TTL Management Specialist Disaster Risk Management Tiguist Fisseha GSURR DRM – TTL Specialist Melanie Simone Disaster Risk Assessment Risk GSURR Kappes Specialist Consultant Assessment

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Sr. Data Management Specialist GIS and Data Bishwa Raj Pandey GSURR Consultant Management Christopher J. Chung Operations Analyst Consultant GSURR DRM Disaster Risk Management Rossella Della Monica LCSUW DRM Consultant Margaret P. Barrett Operations Analyst Consultant GSURR Operations Ana Daza Language Program Assistant GSURR Operations Patricia Acevedo Program Assistant GSURR Operations Sr. Financial Management M. Mozammal Hoque GGODR FM Specialist Sr. Financial Management David I. GGODR FM Specialist Tatiana Cristina O. de Finance Officer WFALN Disbursement Abreu M. Yaa Pokua Afriyie Sr. Social Development Social GSURR Oppong Specialist Safeguards Sr. Environmental Specialist Environmental Michael J. Darr GENDR Consultant Safeguards Plamen Stoyanov Kirov Sr. Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement Sr. Technical Specialist Seyoum Solomon GGODR Procurement Consultant Subhash Seth Sr. Civil Engineer Consultant LCSDU Engineering Sr. Technical Specialist Gerald E. Meier LCSDU DRM Consultant Edith Ruguru Mwenda Sr. Counsel LEGAM Legal Sr. Structural Engineer Daniel E. Thirion GSURR Engineering Consultant Beatriz Pozueta Mayo Sr. Coastal Engineer Consultant GSURR Engineering b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs) Lending

FY11 8.20 34,822.74 Total 8.20 34,822.74 Lending:

Supervision/ICR

FY11 2.86 12,711.70

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FY12 26.68 147,747.53 FY13 17.77 77,617.10 FY14 18.98 94,833.07 FY15 11.49 49,924.19 Total Supervision: 77.78 382,833.59 Grand Total: 85.98 417,656.33

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Not Applicable

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not Applicable

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Summary

Performance Ratings Bank: Satisfactory Borrower: Satisfactory Attainment of Objectives: Moderately Satisfactory Project Design: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Performance Assessment: Satisfactory

(Overall, the objectives of the project were met therefore, general performance can be considered satisfactory.

Overview

On October 31, 2010, Hurricane Tomas passed just 29 miles (46.7 km) south of Saint Lucia inflicting heavy damage to the infrastructure, health and education sectors among others. Major damage and destruction was recorded to the capital infrastructure especially the transport network (roads and bridges), schools and health facilities. Therefore, in the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas, there was urgent need for the Government of Saint Lucia (GoSL) to restore the country’s essential damaged services and to rebuild the infrastructure to an upgraded standard that reduced future vulnerability to natural disasters.

The World Bank responded to the GoSL request for assistance, and conducted a damage assessment in November 2010 and an emergency project appraisal mission in December 2010 and effectiveness of the Project by August 31, 2011. The objectives of these missions included: rapid assessments of the damage inflicted on the island, technical discussions and identification of recovery priorities for financing under the project; an assessment of the institutional capacities among the proposed implementing agencies; definition of the environmental and social safeguard framework; and a damage assessment of past Bank-financed disaster mitigation projects and an examination of the lessons learnt from these projects.

Financing under this project was provided on an emergency basis to avoid the usual time lag between the end of the relief period and reconstruction. The cost of the appraised project activities totaled US$15 million.

Project Objective

The project’s development objective was to support the recovery and reconstruction of the GoSL in the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas and to provide financing on an emergency basis for critical imports and rehabilitation activities in key social and infrastructure sectors throughout the island.

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The project activities included: • Strengthening the GoSL ability to analyze, assess, and integrate natural hazard and climate change risk reduction into national development policies and decision-making processes; and

• Rehabilitating damaged and vulnerable transport, health, and education infrastructure affected by the passage of Hurricane Tomas.

The project became effective on August 30, 2011, with defined outcomes based on the following:

• Number of people with access to rebuilt and rehabilitated safe selected basic services (transport, education, health) affected by Hurricane Tomas: • Improved national and local risk management and risk reduction systems and capabilities to manage future natural hazards through studies and assessments, the review of the National Disaster Management Plan, and capacity building for staff of the Government agencies.

The Project design was appropriate and implementing arrangements were consistent with other Bank financing investments implemented by the GOSL. The Bank worked along with the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the GOSL in the Project design to determine its comparative advantage and to ensure that activities for funding were not duplicated. The Bank focused on rehabilitation of schools, health centres and bridges while the CDB focused on the damaged road infrastructure.

The Bank was quick to respond to the GOSL request for funding and negotiations of the Project were held in February 2011(four months after the passage of Hurricane) with the Bank. Within six months of negotiations the Project became effective which included approval by the Parliament and issuance of the Legal Opinion by the Attorney General.

The Project design was kept simple to allow a quick transition to the implementation stage and as such allowed retroactive financing to the GoSL, the inclusion of new project activities and reallocation of project funds among components and sub components. Operational experience was consistent with design of the Project in its components and priorities as per the national investment plan of Government were met. The components and for the more part the related activities were met.

Component 1 - Support for Early Recovery included retroactive financing to the GOSL of much needed funds. The process was simplified for the GOSL to claim and recover monies spent on overtime and fuel for vehicles and equipment. These funds were to be used subsequently to meet other expenditures / costs relating to damages caused by the Hurricane not funded by external partners. This simplified process used by the Bank for verification and acceptance of invoices for reimbursement enabled quick disbursement. The application for reimbursement was made on December 4, 2011 and paid on December 8, 2011 (four months after effectiveness of the Project).

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Component 2 which sought to improve the institutional capacity and Hazard and Risk Analysis framework of the Project was partially met. Through this initiative the GOSL commissioned a hydraulic and flood assessment of the Fond St Jacques, Soufriere and Dennery areas while the CDB financed a similar study for Bexon (Castries South Western Region). A review was also undertaken of the existing Disaster Management Plan and training was provided to Disaster Committees, while critical equipment and supplies including emergency communications equipment were procured for NEMO to strengthen its capacity to respond effectively to disasters.

Component 3 related to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the damaged critical public infrastructure and was allocated 73% of Project funds. The improvement to schools including replacement of damaged furniture and equipment, health facilities and bridges allowed the GOSL to provide improved health care services and quality education. At rehabilitated health spaces expanded services were offered such as public education and awareness. Financing was also obtained from the private sector including philanthropies for the rehabilitation of some of the schools complemented by funds from the national budget.

Project Management and Monitoring Support was implemented under Component 4 and included support to the Government agencies involved in Project implementation, the line Ministries, Audit Department and the PCU. To this end, Survey Equipment was procured for the MCWT&PU and MOPD while Computers and Printers were also procured for the MOPD. In addition, various training workshops were held for Contractors, Suppliers and Consultants on Bid preparation while other training including procurement and technical workshops were organized for PCU and line Ministries.

Project Implementation Arrangements

The Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, Planning and Social Security (Department of Planning and National Development) was responsible for implementation of the Hurricane Tomas Emergency Recovery Project through the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and various Government Ministries - (Works, Education, Health, and Physical Development and NEMO.

Restructuring

Over its life the project was restructured twice; a) to revise the targets based on Project realities and b) to extend the closing date by six months to September 2014. Reallocation of project funds was also done after accurate estimates were made available. Through this exercise the GOSL was able to the construct two major bridges; one such bridge was re-estimated at US$4.1 from US$1.5. In addition, low levels of preparedness for some civil works activities caused the GOSL to transfer these activities including the Construction of the Dennery Polyclinc, Dennery Infant School, Dennery Primary School to the DVRP.

Design

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The HTERP came soon after the Second Disaster Management Project (SDMP) allowing a broad understanding of the project objectives based on local context. The Bank team visited project sites, assessed work to be done and was able to mobilize resources quickly. During Appraisal the Bank worked alongside the technical teams of the line Ministries in carrying out a damage assessment which was used to inform project design.

The project was processed under the Operational Policy/Bank Procedures 8.00 as an Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) in response to the passage of Hurricane Tomas. This policy was triggered upon the formal request from the GOSL for assistance under the streamlined ERL with simplified procedures as the most appropriate instrument to quickly respond to the immediate needs of Saint Lucia following the disaster.

Generally, the project had clear and straight forward objectives to rebuild the damaged infrastructure and component 1 allowed for retroactive financing of works undertaken immediately following the passage of the hurricane. There was innovation built into the project design using the earlier SDMP investments, thus including climate resistance and resilience aspects of development into the scope. Physical development was addressed from a macro perspective and the feedback between the stakeholders on strategic issues improved design and gave rise to the Geodetic surveys and Geodetic Adjustment.

Environmental and Social Safeguards

There was full compliance with the Environmental and Social safeguards. The project followed the framework developed for implementation and ensured that the environmental clauses were included in the works contracts. The Cresslands Bridge was one activity in which the PCU prepared and monitored a Plan to ensure compliance with Safeguards, engaging beneficiaries, residents, community and agricultural officers with assistance from the MOPD. The Ave Maria School and the Dennery Hospital (temporary location) were the flagship projects demonstrating effective safeguards practice in the disposal of asbestos and medical waste. Both of these utilized the in country systems and were effective due to sound contract management practice including supervision.

Implementation Experience

With most of the Country’s infrastructure damaged after the Hurricane and the need to restore economic activity in a speedy manner Agencies focused on the execution of other capital initiatives which included the reconstruction/ rehabilitation of bridges and the restoration of the Barre des Lisle (major Highway linking the north to the South of the Island). Some of these capital investments were funded from the National Budget, the Caribbean Development Bank and by friendly countries. This posed a challenge to the implementation of the Project as the same public technical officers were involved with all aspects of the projects which translated to slow disbursement of loan funds.

General Elections took place in the first year and had a challenging effect on implementation due to restructuring of implementing ministries and staff reassignments. Changes in the administration, shifted portfolios and staffing were made within line

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ministries especially key agencies like the MOPD and MCWT&PU. The Sustainable Development Unit which was pivotal to providing technical assistance to the physical planning processes of the MOPD was transferred to a new agency. With the loss of the Unit and a Chief Physical Planner the MOPD relied heavily on technical assistance from the Bank in defining the activities for implementation. The Bank assisted the GOSL in developing a road map for implementation which included the execution of a geodetic survey and related adjustments, hosting of the Geonode and training of staff in GIS as a precursor with full roll out under the DVRP. Despite the challenges faced the MOPD successfully executed these activities with support from the Bank and other Consultants.

Project funds were utilized to allow technical officers and staff of the Attorney General Chambers, Audit, Accountant General and Central Tenders Board to participate in training and get familiar with Bank Procedures. The Bank assisted by identifying grant funding to expand participation. The Bank Technical Team was technically solid but not procurement accredited / certified and therefore relied heavily on the Bank Procurement Staff for clearances.

While Implementation progress defined by disbursements was initially slow and delayed at about 20% of overall budget near mid-term there were ongoing activities related to the refocusing of component 3 and re-scoping of the works for schools. This was necessary as project costs had escalated with the introduction of VAT on inputs at a rate of 15% and further wear and tear to damaged infrastructure including the Dennery Hospital / Health Centre from heavy rains in May, August and October 2011. Despite these setbacks the Project was able to successfully draw down the funds identified for Component 1. Therefore, implementation progress should have also incorporated 1) the challenges that caused increases to project estimates, scope and time, 2) the utilization of human resources, 3) development of an appropriate prequalification framework for the use of contractors under Shopping procedures and pre-bid meetings held with Contractors, Suppliers and 4) time spent for Bank Missions which is significant.

There were challenges to manpower of the Saint Lucia Team caused by diverted time from primary activities with organization of Bank missions for the HTERP toward the preparation for DVRP. However, by the Mid-Term Review of May 2013 GOSL and the Bank were able to agree on more realistic activities for completion including the restructuring of project activities. With a revised implementation plan significant improvements were recorded and commitments grew to 42% of allocations.

Site visits by both the PCU and Consultants engaged confirmed that the MOE scope of works concentrated on the damages caused by the Hurricane and not necessarily on the accumulated deterioration of the infrastructure from weather related phenomena prior to and since Hurricane Tomas. Therefore, Consulting Services were engaged to undertake a comprehensive investigation and evaluation of six schools namely, Bocage Combined, Vieux Fort Campus A, Ave Maria primary, Vieux Fort Campus B, Piaye Secondary and Marigot Secondary schools to ensure that investments to be undertaken would be better informed. As a result, the process of reallocation of funds among the schools was undertaken.

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These detailed investigations and discussions with the Education Sector further confirmed that the funding allocated was insufficient to adequately redress the scope as the school infrastructure had been further damaged from the heavy rains of 2011 and 2012, and the poorly defined scopes from the preparation and appraisal stage of the project resulted in huge costs overruns. The situation was similar for works identified within the Health Sector.

As a result of the comprehensive assessment done of the NSDC, Vieux Fort Campus A and Campus B; the GOSL noted and agreed that the problems identified at these schools would not be fully addressed and would therefore require interventions under the DVRP. For example works tendered for Vieux Fort Campus B focused on the fencing which was cancelled.

Consequently, the Bank agreed for these critical civil works investments Choc Bridge, Dennery Polyclinic, Dennery Infant and primary schools, NSDC works, Soufriere Hospital, completion of the Hydraulic Flood Assessment and other civil works relating to schools and health facilities form part of the Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project. Having committed to providing quality services in improved spaces the GOSL also supplemented some of the rehabilitation works from the National Budget and also obtained private sector assistance with rehabilitation of the Morne du Don Combined School.

Additionally, the transfer of the Works portfolio from the Health and Education ministries to the Infrastructure Agency took time to operationalize and created a bottleneck that contributed to delays. Procurement delays for the Marigot School works exemplifies this point, whereby the process began in May 2012 yet a contractor was mobilized onsite in December 2013. The Health Ministry got guidance came from its technical staff complement within the Planning Unit assisted by the MOPD Architectural Section.

The US$3.4m allocation for Bridge Rehabilitation was inadequate for construction of all of the priority bridges. During project negotiations the MCWT&PU had identified Cresslands, Bois d Orange and Choc Bridges as priority. Original cost estimates [PAD] US$1.5m for the Bois d Orange Bridge Rehabilitation had not incorporated the cost of including climate resilience elements (earthquake and hydrology) and therefore the funds allocated for other bridges had to be reallocated. The actual construction cost for this bridge increased to 30% above the entire allocation for the Bridge Rehabilitation component. This bridge was affected by delays in granting no-objection to the first small works contracts that continued for six months. Independent consulting services were engaged to provide a detailed review of the designs for rehabilitation of the bridge by the GOSL prior to submission to the Bank. The GOSL undertook the rehabilitation of the other bridges with support from other financiers using semi PPP approaches. The GOSL met the cost of constructing the by-pass road to enable the rehabilitation of the Bois d’Orange Bridge.

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Despite these delays the Project was able to turn these cases into positive/successful achievements, such as the utilization of individuals for works contracts, strengthening of the prequalification system for works contracts under shopping procedures and the use of technical assistance from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Through the engagement of the USACE there was transfer of knowledge and the GOSL is keen in utilizing the services of the USACE in the review of the Choc Bridge designs and capacity building for the MCWT&PU.

A key activity under Component 2 was the hydraulic flood assessment of Dennery, Soufriere and Fond St Jacques. The results would inform works planned for the Dennery Primary School and Soufriere Hospital. However, the time frame for this Study was impractical, linked to the end of the Project rather than to the actual time required for a comprehensive study. Delays in this activity created challenges downstream for the Dennery Primary and Infant Schools and Soufriere Hospital exacerbated by late submission of key data from agencies and more time than expected by the agencies and stakeholders to review and comment on deliverables.

Achievements

The GOSL revised the Results Monitoring Framework to reflect the updated targets, and decisions made to effectively implement the project given the limited timeframe.

Risk Assessment

Project Stakeholder Risks: The risk was minimized and there were no changes in the location of service. The project was sufficiently flexible to allow improvement in scope to better meet stakeholders/users needs.

Implementing Agency Risks: Turnover of key staff positions at the agencies in particular the MCWT&PU was high during the Project implementation. The Permanent Secretary and Chief Engineers were changed three times and there were delays for more than three months each year in the contract renewal of the assigned Project Engineer The planning function of the MCW&PU was weak and led to redesigns and cancellation of contracts by the Agency (Bexon Footbridge, Babonneau retaining wall, George Charles Secondary, Ciceron Retaining Wall, and Sir Arthur Lewis Community College). The Project Engineer that was identified as focal point for the Project had minimal technical leadership, guidance and support.

Design: i) Delays in project implementation could lead to greater losses related to already damaged infrastructure. There were many revisions to the procurement plan but not sufficient to prevent implementation delays; ii) Conflict arose from the requirement to integrate natural hazard and climate change risk reduction yet speedily rehabilitate affected infrastructure to functional levels. Significant new cost elements were introduced through the revision of scope of Component 3 that affected implementation i.e. for schools that required restoration works to also function as Hurricane Shelters and bridge designs adjusted to withstand hazards. iii) Conflict between the GOSL and Bank

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procurement rules/guidelines for Contracting of Individuals under “Shopping” procedures was an initial challenge and resulted in delays in the commencement of six works contracts. This risk was not foreseen as under previous investments Saint Lucia had contracted individuals within one month of effectiveness of a previous Bank financed Project issuing 42 works contracts using Shopping procedures. This situation proved that the Bank’s procurement team was not fully knowledgeable of the local context and associated Laws.

Social & Environmental: There was general consensus that the measures adopted were adequate and effective and served as refresher training and lessons learnt as a result of safe removal of asbestos and medical waste removal.

Delivery Quality: The project utilized Consultants and design improvements particularly in the schools resulted. These changes led to superior quality and created opportunities for learning in the case of the Piaye school where classroom doors specified failed to withstand stress tests from the student population in quick time.

Borrowers Performance

Project Coordination and Management

The arrangements for coordination and management were similar to past projects. Periodic changes to staff negatively impacted performance including reporting from uncertainty regarding the roles and responsibilities of key players and their lines of authority. The project attempted to create mechanisms (absence of the steering committee) for the agencies to hold regular meetings to allow the Lead Agencies to develop synergies across their activities. However, given the slow rate of implementation it may be perceived as a steep climb up learning curve by all involved.

PCU Performance

The coordination and implementation of the HTERP was similar to previous investments enabling seamless execution of project deliverables. The implementation arrangements entailed a shared responsibility among and between the MCWT&PU, Health, Education, MOPD and Finance entities therefore, to meet the reporting requirements the PCU obtained the status of project activities by meeting regularly with Agencies. In place of a Project Launch at mid-term an orientation was held with agencies to outline the reporting requirements, present safeguards and to detail the Agency roles and responsibilities.

The PCU staff possessed the required competency in procurement and financial management but performance could have been enhanced with on staff engineering expertise. Efforts to recruit this engineering expertise were unsuccessful as persons with the required skill set were not interested. PCU created opportunities for dialogue with stakeholders, beneficiaries and the Bank to support the project implementation efforts. Other interventions included the involvement of the Physical Planning Officers, District

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Education Officers, Principals, Nurses, residents and other end users in the review process to resolve and minimize design problems for the schools and health facilities.

The Contractors benefitted tremendously from Bank facilitated training and pre-bid meetings in climate resilience building techniques and preparing responsive bids. Early in the project the PCU facilitated workshops on contract management for technical staff of Agencies to enhance implementation and their understanding of the GOSL Finance Act (which includes the Procurement and Stores Regulations) and the relevant Bank policies.

Executing Agency Performance

The assessments/ identification of activities to be included in Component 3, especially from the education and health sectors executing agencies were deficient (scope of works). Once these deficiencies were identified, adjustments were made to the earlier assessments to the general satisfaction of all parties. Also during implementation, the sector agencies incorporated natural hazard and climate change risk reduction strategies into the decision- making processes.

During project implementation MIPS&T took over Component 3 activities from the Health and Education Agencies and this change affected overall project implementation and adversely the NSDC sub-project, where the project went to partial completion with decisions taken by parties other than the Beneficiary / Implementing Agency. The Engineer assigned by the Ministry of Infrastructure as the Lead Agency did not match the level of input required to address all the technical, administration and contractual issues that arose, therefore human resource utilization was seen as a weakness in implementation by that agency.

Fiduciary Assessment

The Project Coordination Unit (PCU) within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning carried out the fiduciary management of the Project and the Project submitted the Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs) on a quarterly basis as well as the annual audits were conducted.

Bank Performance

Over the life of the project, the Bank provided the needed technical support during preparation and assisted the GOSL in remaining on target with the implementation strategy. In a collaborative and consultative process the Bank agreed to the implementation of new procurement option that widened the thresholds, required the prior review of fewer contracts. The document entitled “Making procurement work in the OECS countries” aimed to allow for greater flexibility within the existing Bank Procurement Guidelines.

Following the Mid Term Review, the bank intensified implementation support missions and agreed to the reallocation of funds to meet shortfalls under the Project. The Bank

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teams’ conducted periodic comprehensive supervision missions resulting in the development of a valuable working relationship and improved project implementation over time. During the missions, all stakeholders were engaged in meaningful discussions which provided greater understanding of issues and requirements by most stakeholders.

Lessons Learned

. More attention is required in the preparation of projects, to include the economic, country context and stakeholder requirements; . Authority to be exerted within Fiduciary agency to move the project along when impediments are flagged . Need for a good information system to track status of activities during the stages of procurement and to be used for updates to the procurement plan. This will identify performance, delay points, improve efficiency and identify wastages. . In addition to the assessment of the fiduciary unit a more in depth assessment should be undertaken of the capacity of the executing agency ; . Inclusion of technical assistance to assist the Borrower to develop design standards and encourage the use of national standards. This should be supported by training to improve capacity and the establishment of a community of practitioners to formulate standards at the regional level, if possible . . Coordinate better with similar projects in the Region, by sharing experiences . Technical staffing commitments/ guarantees is required from the agencies to minimise performance constraints especially of the infrastructure components at preparation stage. . A Stakeholder Group should be defined to develop direct monitoring mechanisms for the supervision of infrastructure works based on existing capacity and impact on project timelines and deliverable to support the work of the PCU . Project funding should be available for the upgrading of Agency’s and the PCU capacity in support of the procurement process for the preparation of bid documents and review of designs ; . Greater attention is required in the preparation of technical information (scope of works and estimates). . An open line of inter-agency communication supported by scheduled briefings, maintaining good relationships among project personnel is necessary; possibly these can be achieved through a communication strategy for future projects . Implementing Agencies should impart knowledge of the projects goals and objectives to staff. . The involvement of all stakeholders from project conception to completion is a key contributor to success for better coordination within the agency and among other Ministries (Project Officers) to facilitate smooth implementation and avoid conflict.

Sustainability

The high level of acceptance by the various parties and stakeholders on the quality of works for example Dennery Health Facility and the Bocage Combined schools suggests a level of long term sustainability in this Project. The country will continue to reduce its

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susceptibility to disasters as the infrastructure is rehabilitated/reconstructed incorporating climate resilience into designs for all civil works

Sustainability of infrastructure was not clearly defined and classed as weak since maintenance plans was not a project deliverable and investments designs should include a sufficient level of robustness supplemented by defined maintenance plans to maximize components useful life. Despite this, the Bank has committed to assisting the GOSL with the development of an Infrastructure Maintenance policy and development of a Bridge Maintenance Management System as part of the DVRP. It would be useful for HTERP investments to be included in this exercise.

Technical Officers from the MOPD, MCWT&PU and a community of practitioners were exposed to the development of standards. The PCU played a key role in coordinating the project despite its inherent deficiencies. It was therefore wise to strengthen PCU capacity through Component 4 to build institutional sustainability and ensure continued success and aid institutional memory for future Bank projects.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

International Monetary Fund, April 2010, St. Lucia: Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 10/92

The World Bank, May 2010, Regional Partnership Strategy for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) for the Period FY2010-2014, Report No. 53762-LAC.

The World Bank, February 2011, Hurricane Tomas Emergency Recovery Project, Emergency Project Paper, Report No: 59604-LC.

The World Bank, November 2010, Saint Lucia, Review of World-Bank-Financed Disaster Risk Management and Infrastructure Projects in the Aftermath of Hurricane Tomas, Assessment of Selected Structural and Non-structural Activities.

United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), February 2011, Saint Lucia Macro Socio-Economic and Environmental Assessment of the Damage and Losses Caused by Hurricane Tomas, LC/CAR/L.286.

The World Bank, June 2011, Hurricane Tomas Emergency Recovery Project, Financing Agreement, Credit No: 4871-LC.

Implementation Status and Results (ISR) Reports of June 2011, January 2012, October 2012, July 2013, March 2014, and October 2014.

Aide Memoires of December 2010, June 2011, September 2011, November 2011, March 2012, May and June 2012, November 2012, May 2013, and August 2013.

Gov. of Saint Lucia, Ministry of Communications, Works, Transport & Public Utilities. Bois d’Orange Bridge. Design Report. FDL Consult Inc. – December 2011.

Saint Lucia, Flood Event of December 24–25, 2013, Joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment. Report by the Government of Saint Lucia and the World Bank - March 2014.

ICR Report No: 27951, Saint Lucia through the Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management Project (ERDMP-P070430), April 8, 2004

ICR Report No: 02286, the Saint Lucia Disaster Management Project II (DMP II- P086469), August 29, 2012.

Government of Saint Lucia, Ministry of Communications, Works, Transport & Public Utilities, Bois d’Orange Bridge DESIGN REPORT, December 2011.

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Government of Saint Lucia, Office of the Budget, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, Planning & Social Security; “Budget Summary 2014-2015”, official Website: opm.govt.lc.

Government of Saint Lucia, Office of the Budget, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, Planning & Social Security; Central Statistical Office “Household Budget Survey 2005/2006”; official Website : opm.govt.lc.

Government of Saint Lucia, “BUILDING THE PILLARS FOR ECONOMIC SUCCESS, RESILIENCE AND FISCAL STABILITY” Budget Statement 2014; delivered by THE HON. DR. KENNY DAVIS ANTHONY, PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FINANCE, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, PLANNING & SOCIAL SECURITY TO SUPPORT THE APPROPRIATION BILL FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 2015; official Website: opm.govt.lc.

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Annex 10: Map

SAINT LUCIA: Hurricane Tomas Emergency Recovery Project

Source: Map Action

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Annex 11. Photographs of Selected Sites

Site visits to Health Facilities

Dennery Hospital: reconstruction of the facility, retrofitting and equipping the hospital

Photo 1. Roof repaired Photo 2. Administration area improved and extended (requiring structural assessment, asbestos removal, lifting up and extending the roof)

Photo 3. Waiting area improved, with the Photo 4. Emergency access way improved construction of roof and toilets, shower/changing room for patients, cashier and reception boots

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Entrepot Health Center: rehabilitation of the facility

Photo 7. Roof lifted up, repaired and extended Photo 8. Roof extended to protect waiting patients from the rain, and hurricane-resistant windows and doors installed

Photo 9: Main entrance

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Site visits to School Facilities

Ave Maria (Castries) primary school: rehabilitation

Photo 13. Roof and ceiling repaired Photo 14. Roof and ceiling repaired, involving asbestos removal

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Marigot combined school: rehabilitation Photo 20. Location of the school in a low lying 16 Photo 21. Drainage system built around part of land and prone to flooding the school (photo 1)

Photo 22. Drainage system built around part of Photo 23. Drainage system built around part of the school (photo 2) the school (photo 3)

16 Climate Change Adaptation Planning in Latin American and Caribbean Cities, Final Report: Castries, Saint Lucia, ICF GHK in association with King’s College London and Grupo Laera, financed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Gobierno de Espana, the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/LAC/Climate%20Change%20Adaptation%20Planning%20for%20Cas tries_FINAL.pdf)

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La Croix Maingot combined school: rehabilitation Photo 26. Gabion retaining wall constructed Photo 28. Gabion retaining wall constructed (about 100m long, 2m high and 1m thick) (photo 3) (photo 1)

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Site visits to bridges

Cressland bridge Photo 29. Road reconstructed with new right Photo 30. Bridge reconstructed with greater of way width (concrete box culvert designed to take up to 12 times the amount of water compared to the previous bridge)

Photo 31. Drains, gabions, boulders installed Photo 32. Drains, gabions, boulders installed to support the river bank defense and facilitate to support the river bank defense and facilitate runoff (photo 1) runoff (photo 2, downstream)

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Bois d’Orange bridge BEFORE THE WORKS

Photo 36. Reconstruction of a higher and Photo 37. Reconstruction of the bridge with wider bridge (with visible river protection 2x2 lanes including 2 for future use. works downstream on this photo)

Photo 38. River protection works (upstream on Photo 39. Deviation and complete change of this picture) the section of the water pipe running along the bridge (works undertaken by the water utility).

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