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Statement Before the Disarmament Commission by Jayantha Dhanapala Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations

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Statement Before the Disarmament Commission by Jayantha Dhanapala Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations List of Disarmament Commission documents concerning nuclear disarmament 2000 Session - Statement before the Disarmament Commission by Jayantha Dhanapala Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations 2001 Session - Statement before the Disarmament Commission by Jayantha Dhanapala Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations 2003 Session - Statement before the Disarmament Commission by Jayantha Dhanapala Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations Working Papers - A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.1: Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament (Chairman’s working paper) 2006 Session - Statement before the United Nations Disarmament Commission by Nobuaki Tanaka under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations 2012 session: - Opening Remarks by Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs - Statement by Claire Elias, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations - Statement by Regina Maria Cordeiro Dunlop, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations - Statement by Octavio Errazuriz, Permanent Representative of Chile on behalf of the community of Latin American and Carribean States (CELAC) - Statement by Zhang Jun'an Head of the Chinese Delegation - Statement by Sin Son Ho, Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations - Statement by Shin Dong-Ik, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea - Statement by the Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations - Statement of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations - Statement by the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations - Statement by Mr. Vipul, Permanent Mission of India - Statement by Desra Percaya, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) - Statement by Eshagh AI Habib, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations - Statement by Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations - Statement by Byrganym Aitimova, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations - Statement by Raza Bashir Tarar, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations - Statement by Vitaly ChurMn, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations - Statement by Niclas Kvarnstrom, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations - Statement by Serge A. Bavaud, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations - Statement by John A. Bravaco, Permanent representative of United States to the United Nations - Statement by Pham Ving Quang, Permanent representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations 2013 session: * Working Papers - A/CN.10/2013/WG.I/WP.1 : preventing the use of nuclear weapons (Working paper submitted by the United States of America ) - A/CN.10/2013/WG.I/WP.2 : Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation of nuclear weapons (Working paper submitted by the Chair) - A/CN.10/2013/WG.I/WP.3: General guiding elements for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (Working paper submitted by the Chair) - A/CN.10/2013/WP.1 : Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons (Working paper submitted by Egypt ) * Statements - Statement by the Chair, Christopher Grima, Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations - Statement before the Disarmament Commission, Angela Kane High Representative for Disarmament Affairs - Statement by permanent mission of Nigeria to the United Nations on behalf of the African Group - Statement by Djamel Moktefi, Permanent representative of Algeria to the United Nations - Statement by the Argentine Republic to the United Nations - Statement by the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations - Statement by Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations - Statement by the Chinese delegation to the United Nations - Statement by permanent mission of Cuba to the United Nations on behalf of the community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) - Statement by Ambassador Shin Dong-Ik, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations - Statement by Xavier Lasso Mendoza, Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations - Statement by Mootaz Ahmadein Khalil, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations - EU Statement by Colm Ó Conaill, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations - Statement by the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations - Statement by Sujata Mehta, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations - Statement by Golamhossein Dehghani, Permanent representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations - Statement by. Mr. Kazuyoshi Umemoto, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations - Statement by Byrganym Aitimova, Permanent representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations - Statement by Ambassador Hussein Haniff, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malaysia to the United Nations - Statement by Mr. Yusra Khan, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) - Statement by Ms Sewa Lamsal Adhikari, Permanent mission of Nepal to the United Nations - Statement by Ambassador Masood Khan, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations - Statement by Ri Rong Il, Permanent Representative of the DPKR to the United Nations - Statement by. Mr. Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations - Statement by Voctoria Gonzalez Roman, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations - Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations - Statement by. Paul Seger, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations - Statement by United Kingdom to the United Nations - Statement by John A. Bravaco, Permanent representative of United States to the United Nations - Statement by Pham Ving Quang, Permanent representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations Statement before the Disarmament Commission Statement before the Disarmament Commission By Jayantha Dhanapala Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations United Nations Disarmament Commission United Nations New York, NY 10017 26 June 2000 Introduction Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, I begin by congratulating you and your bureau and by pledging the full co-operation and substantive support of the Department of Disarmament Affairs for your efforts throughout the important deliberations ahead. I appreciate this opportunity to address the Commission at its first plenary meeting of the new millennium -- on a date that also marks the 55th anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco. In his opening remarks on 24 April to the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that much of the established multilateral disarmament machinery has started to rust. He file:///G|/S%20drive/ddaweb-2004/speech/undc2000.htm (1 of 7) [08/26/2008 11:21:48 PM] Statement before the Disarmament Commission said that this condition was due not to any inherent flaw in the machinery itself but to the apparent lack of political will to use it. A month before, in issuing his Millennium Report, the Secretary-General stressed that “the United Nations was intended to introduce new principles into international relations, making a qualitative difference to their day-to-day conduct.” These observations frame the proper context within which we must begin our deliberations tDDAy. For I am confident that this Commission will have no problems with either rust or obsolescence if its members never lose sight of the collective interests that bind all nations, including the most universal interest of all, the survival of our planet in an age of rapid political and technological change. History is replete with examples of institutions that have failed due to the ascendancy and ultimate triumph of parochial national interests over the common good of humankind. Bitter tragedies all too often result from maximalist approaches to national security, including the pursuit of regional or international supremacy. Such approaches typically are pursued at the expense of common security and set the stage for arms races that can impoverish entire nations. Our task, therefore, must be to learn from this history. We must re-dedicate ourselves to the collective solution of some of the gravest problems on the international security agenda. As the Secretary-General has suggested, we must re-affirm our joint commitment to make a genuine qualitative difference as a result of our work. The goal here is not simply to produce a paper consensus, but to discover paths to solve concrete problems in an all-too real world. We must in particular build some momentum behind solutions that can be constructively pursued elsewhere in the UN disarmament machinery, ultimately the Conference on Disarmament. The 2000 Agenda of the UNDC The first issue on this year’s agenda concerns ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament, a priority that dates back not just to the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in 1978, but to the first General Assembly resolution
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