THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO Evan Michael Vaughan, B.A. Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS May 2012 APPROVED: Geoffrey Wawro, Major Professor Robert Citino, Committee Member Donald Mitchener, Committee Member Richard McCaslin, Chair of the Department of History James D. Meernik, Acting Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Vaughan, Evan Michael. The Development of Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean: The American Contribution and the Bombardment of Durazzo. Master of Arts (History), May 2012, 91 pp., 75 titles. The Entente powers began World War I without any formal anti-submarine countermeasures. However, the Entente developed countermeasures through trial and error over time. Success was moderate until America joined the war. With America came the arrival of subchasers to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. This highly specialized vessel helped turn the tide against U-boats. A true counter to the U-boat threat in the Mediterranean did not come until October 2, 1918 with the bombardment of Durazzo. This thesis discusses the development of Entente anti-submarine capabilities and illustrate how America's contribution led to success. A detailed analysis of the rarely discussed bombardment of Durazzo is included using archival documents. Copyright 2012 by Evan Michael Vaughan ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would not have been able to make this thesis possible if it were not for the following individuals: My father, Michael Vaughan, M.D., who ultimately made it possible for me to get my master's. My major professor, Dr. Geoffrey Wawro, who has dedicated his time in helping me gain my master's. Professors Robert Citino and Donald Mitchener for being a part of my committee and guiding me through several classes. A special thanks to the individuals who helped me at the Washington Navy Yard and National Archives. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...........................................................................................................v NOTE TO THE READER ............................................................................................................. vi THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ...............1 Appendices A. U.S. FORCES AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ..............................80 B. CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ..........................82 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................................87 iv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page 1. The Otranto Barrage ..........................................................................................................18 2. Subchasers 227 and 324 .....................................................................................................31 3. Hydrophone........................................................................................................................33 4. Subchasers and USS Leonidas AD-7 .................................................................................36 5. American Subchasers anchored at Corfu, Greece, 1918....................................................38 6. Durazzo, Albania ...............................................................................................................43 7. Allied intelligence map of Durazzo pinpointing coastal batteries .....................................44 8. Two phase Italian and British bombardment of Durazzo ..................................................49 9. Captain Nelson in white shaking hands .............................................................................55 10. S.C. 129’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo .................................60 11. S.C. 215 and S.C. 128’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo ...........63 12. Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo (Commander in this photograph) ........................................................71 v NOTE TO THE READER For the purpose of clarity, the following German terms appear in their English equivalents. Kapitänleutnant ......................Lieutenant-Commander Linienschiffsleutnant..............Lieutenant Oberleutnant ...........................Lieutenant Junior Grade Mittelmeerdivision .................German Mediterranean Division vi THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO Scholarship on the First World War as a naval war has tended to focus on large surface actions, such as Jutland and the struggle for the Atlantic shipping lanes. Considerably less attention is given to the Mediterranean Theater and even less to the submarine war in this theater. The literature on naval warfare, whether scholarly - Richard Hough's The Great War at Sea, Paul Halpern's A Naval History of World War I and The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918, and Arthur Marder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, or popular, Robert Massie's Dreadnought - has focused on large surface engagements or the submarine war in the Atlantic. Little attention has been paid to the strategic and tactical problems posed by submarines in the Mediterranean, which was a strategically vital front and theater in the war. Even more obscure is the Entente and American anti-submarine effort in the Mediterranean that developed throughout the war. However, as illustrated in Lawrence Sondhaus' The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918, a very important part of the war for the Entente and Central Powers was played out in the Mediterranean Theater between U-boats and anti-submarine vessels. Most works that cover anti-submarine warfare during World War I, such as Dwight Messimer's Find and Destroy: Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I devote a very small portion to the Mediterranean Theater. Furthermore, very little is written on the Otranto Barrage and the American subchasers that were part of this theater. In fact, Robert M. Grant's U-boat Hunters only mentions the Otranto Barrage as a note in his list of German submarines sunk during the war. The discussion of the American subchasers is so limited that the sources that do mention these vessels often quote the same sources. The memoirs of Ray Millholland, The Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage, and Hillary Ranald Chambers Jr., United States 1 Submarine Chasers, are the two most referenced sources that cover these American vessels. In addition, archival material is hardly ever presented when discussing the subchasers. By far the least discussed among historians is the Allied bombardment of Durazzo on 2 October 1918. Lawrence Sondhaus only devotes half a paragraph in Navies of Europe to this raid. Furthermore, Arthur Marder does not mention the bombardment of Durazzo once in his five volume opus, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Through the extensive use of archival material and primary and secondary sources, this analysis focuses on Entente and later Allied, anti-submarine warfare against Central Powers U-boats in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, with an emphasis on the American effort and the bombardment of the Austrian Port at Durazzo. Both the Entente and Central Powers were dependent on this area for troop movements, operations, and most important, supply convoys. Using the Mediterranean Sea to move supplies and personnel was much more feasible than land means because alliances among both sides meant that certain land routes were no longer usable. The Entente used the Mediterranean to move troops and supplies from North Africa, France, Egypt, Greece, and Italy to support operations in the Balkans, Dardanelles, and the Western Front. In addition, Great Britain relied on the Suez Canal for passage to India, Australia, and New Zealand. During the opening months of the war, the Entente enjoyed relatively risk-free use of the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas. The arrival of German submarines in 1915 limited this freedom. During the early months of the war, before Entente naval surface operations increased in the Mediterranean, the Central Powers used the Mediterranean to move supplies and troops to the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Dardanelles. However, as the war unfolded, the 2 Central Powers relied more on land routes to move troops and supplies around this theater of operations. 1 The full potential of the U-boat and the importance of anti-submarine warfare were not understood at the start of hostilities in 1914. German and Austrian U-boats would become the Central Powers' main naval presence in the Mediterranean. The addition of the German U-boats to the Austrian vessels already in the Adriatic caused the Entente Powers to become much more cautious and concerned about their sea lines of communication. This led to the Entente's anti- submarine warfare effort against marauding German and Austrian U-boats. While the Entente would develop various countermeasures to the U-boat threat, the high loss of shipping would continue to increase until 1918.2 Action within the Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea began soon after World War I started on 28 June 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Italy, although a member of the Triple Alliance, declared its neutrality on 3 August and did not join the