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Dredging and Disposal Plan
DREDGING AND DISPOSAL PLAN PORT OF OLYMPIA MARINE BERTHS 2 & 3 INTERIM ACTION DREDGING Contract No.: 2008-0011 Project No. MT0601 Submitted To: Port of Olympia Attn: Rick Anderson 915 Washington Street NE Olympia, WA TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 Dredging ..................................................................................................................... 1 Trans-loading ............................................................................................................. 1 Material Barge ............................................................................................................ 2 Dredge Bucket ............................................................................................................ 3 Dredge Sediment Disposal ........................................................................................ 3 Working Hours .......................................................................................................... 3 Position & Progress Surveys .................................................................................... 3 Dredge Navigation ...................................................................................................... 4 Survey Boat ................................................................................................................ 4 Water Quality BMP’s ................................................................................................ -
Roy Williamson
#214 ROY A. WILLIAMSON: USS PYRO Steven Haller (SH): My name is Steven Haller and we're at the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel in Honolulu, Hawaii. It's December 5, 1991, at about 3:30 PM. And I have the pleasure to be speaking with Mr. Roy A. Williamson today. We're doing this tape as a part of the USS ARIZONA Memorial and National Park Services' oral history program, in cooperation with KHET-TV, Honolulu. Mr. Williamson was on the ammunition ship, PYRO, at the time of the attack. He was twenty-five years of age and was a Carpenter's Mate, First Class. So I want to thank you very much for joining us and taking the time to share your memories. Let's see, how did you get in the Navy? Roy A. Williamson (RW): Back during the depression, whenever there was no -- there was jobs, but no money, and I saw a sign on the corner, says, "Come join the Navy and see the world," and I went in and, and they were only taking a couple of 'em a month from Oklahoma. And I went out and passed the examination, and they told me that if you don't get called within a month or within six months, then come back and take it over again to keep on the list. And yet I was called within six months, before the six months was up, and went into the service and spent four years in the Navy, and then got out and they told me that since the war was like it was, or would be coming up probably, that I was draft age and if I didn't ship over, they would draft me. -
The Pine Cone, Autumn 1953
25 CENTS * Skowhegan • F ish R iver C hain • A Community College (A privately supported, state-wide, non-partisan, non-profit organization for the promotion and development of Maine's agricultural, industrial and recreational resources.) 1953 AUTUMN 1953 crJ’it l la cr^AAue: Page Portland’s Community College .. Harold Lawrence 3 A Roving School Finds a Home Outdoors In Ma i n e ...........................John C. Page, Jr. 9 A Summary of The Season Past Maine Communities: Sk o w h e g a n ............................... Richard A. Hebert 14 A round the Cracker Ba r r e l ..................Ruth Harvey 23 Maine People and Places Fish the F ish River Chain ........ Owen M. Smith 28 Impressions on Aroostook Fishing Minstrelsy of Ma i n e ..................Edited by Dan Kelly 32 The Poet’s Comer A utumn Sc e n e ........................ Edna A. Hurd Back Cover THE PINE CONE AUTUMN, 1953 VOL. 9, NO. 3 Published Quarterly by THE STATE OF MAINE PUBLICITY BUREAU PORTLAND - AUGUSTA - KITTERY - BANGOR - NEW YORK Main Office: 3 St. John St., Portland 4, Maine GUY P. BUTLER WILLIAM A. HATCH Executive Manager Editorial Manager (Printed in Maine on Maine-made Paper) Portland’s Community College Portland Junior College, a roving school in search of a home for the first half of its twenty-year existence, finally found haven in the historic old Deering Estate on the out skirts of Maine’s largest city. Here the story of this unique school’s building is told by Portland Junior’s registrar. By Harold Lawrence t all began in the midst of the de This is a private, non-profit corpora I pression of the early thirties. -
Design Type: VC2-S-AP5 Official Number: APA-168
USSGage Design Type: VC2-S-AP5 Official Number: APA-168 1- w u.. ~ 0 IJ) <( z t!) 0::: > GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS DURING THE CLOSING YEARS OF WORLD z~ WAR II, MILl T ARY PLANNERS REQUESTED ~ Q ~ w BUILDER: OREGON SHIPBUILDING CORP. THAT THE MARITIME COMMISSION <~ Q 0 "'~ <w BUlL T: 1944 CONSTRUCT A NEW CLASS OF ATTACK z w~ 11 Q ~ 0 LOA: 455'-0 TRANSPORTS. DESIGNERS UTILIZED THE w ~ 11 z BEAM: 62'-0 NEW VICTORY CLASS AND CONVERTED IT CX) "'u "~ 11 "'I- ~ -w ~ DRAFT: 24'-0 INTO A TROOP TRANSPORT FOR THE U.S. IW ~ ~ z <I~ 0 SPEED: 18 KNOTS NAVY CALLED THE HASKELL CLASS, ~ a._w z< ~ 0 <tffi u PROPULSION: OIL FIRED STEAM DESIGNATED AS VC2-S-AP5. THE w ~ w ~ z w~ iii TURBINE, MARITIME COMMISSION CONSTRUCTED 117 ~ zw ~ z t!)~ w SINGLE SHAFT ATTACK TRANSPORTS DURING THE WAR, <t~ 5 ~ t!)[fl w ~ DISPLACEMENT: 7,190 TONS (LIGHTSHIP) THE USS GAGE AT ANCHOR IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY, CIRCA 1946 PHOTO# NH98721 AND THE GAGE IS THE SOLE REMAINING l: u ~ 0 (/)~ ~ ~ (/) w 10,680 TONS (FULL) SHIP AFLOAT IN ITS ORIGINAL X ~ ::J ~ w • ~ CONFIGURATION. "u COMPLEMENT: 56 OFFICERS w ~ 9 ~ ~ ~ 480 ENLISTED Q w u ~ 11 .. 0 <:::. or;.·• ..,..""' 0 THIS RECORDING PROJECT WAS ~ ARMAMENT: I 5 /38 GUN w ' ~ ' Seattle, WA COSPONSORED BY THE HISTORIC AMERICAN ~ I 40MM QUAD MOUNT .. >- ' I- 4 40MM TWIN MOUNTS -~!',? _. -::.: -::; -:..: ~: :- /" Portland, OR ENGINEERING RECORD (HAER) AND THE 8 .~~ - -·- ----- --.. - It N z 10 20MM SINGLE -·- .- .-··-· -··- ·-. -· -::;;:::::-"···;:;=····- .. - .. _ .. ____ .. ____\_ U.S. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION (MARAD). ffi u - ...-··- ...~ .. -··- .. =·.-.=·... - .... - ·-·-····-.. ~ · an Francisco, CA :.:: > 1 MOUNTS 9 aJ!,. -
The Heroic Destroyer and "Lucky" Ship O.R.P. "Blyskawica"
Transactions on the Built Environment vol 65, © 2003 WIT Press, www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 The heroic destroyer and "lucky" ship O.R.P. "Blyskawica" A. Komorowski & A. Wojcik Naval University of Gdynia, Poland Abstract The destroyer O.R.P. "Blyskawica" is a precious national relic, the only remaining ship that was built before World War I1 (WW2). On the 5oth Anniversary of its service under the Polish flag, it was honoured with the highest military decoration - the Gold Cross of the Virtuti Militari Medal. It has been the only such case in the whole history of the Polish Navy. Its our national hero, war-veteran and very "lucky" warship. "Blyskawica" took part in almost every important operation in Europe throughout WW2. It sailed and covered the Baltic Sea, North Sea, all the area around Great Britain, the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. During the war "Blyskawica" covered a distance of 148 thousand miles, guarded 83 convoys, carried out 108 operational patrols, participated in sinking two warships, damaged three submarines and certainly shot down four war-planes and quite probably three more. It was seriously damaged three times as a result of operational action. The crew casualties aggregated to a total of only 5 killed and 48 wounded petty officers and seamen, so it was a very "lucky" ship during WW2. In July 1947 the ship came back to Gdynia in Poland and started training activities. Having undergone rearmament and had a general overhaul, it became an anti-aircraft defence ship. In 1976 it replaced O.R.P. "Burza" as a Museum-Ship. -
Submarines in the United States Navy - Wikipedia Page 1 of 13
Submarines in the United States Navy - Wikipedia Page 1 of 13 Submarines in the United States Navy There are three major types of submarines in the United States Navy: ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines, and cruise missile submarines. All submarines in the U.S. Navy are nuclear-powered. Ballistic subs have a single strategic mission of carrying nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Attack submarines have several tactical missions, including sinking ships and subs, launching cruise missiles, and gathering intelligence. The submarine has a long history in the United States, beginning with the Turtle, the world's first submersible with a documented record of use in combat.[1] Contents Early History (1775–1914) World War I and the inter-war years (1914–1941) World War II (1941–1945) Offensive against Japanese merchant shipping and Japanese war ships Lifeguard League Cold War (1945–1991) Towards the "Nuclear Navy" Strategic deterrence Post–Cold War (1991–present) Composition of the current force Fast attack submarines Ballistic and guided missile submarines Personnel Training Pressure training Escape training Traditions Insignia Submarines Insignia Other insignia Unofficial insignia Submarine verse of the Navy Hymn See also External links References https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarines_in_the_United_States_Navy 3/24/2018 Submarines in the United States Navy - Wikipedia Page 2 of 13 Early History (1775–1914) There were various submersible projects in the 1800s. Alligator was a US Navy submarine that was never commissioned. She was being towed to South Carolina to be used in taking Charleston, but she was lost due to bad weather 2 April 1863 off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. -
NCITEC National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness
National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness Final Report 525 The Impact of Modifying the Jones Act on US Coastal Shipping by Asaf Ashar James R. Amdal UNO Department of Planning and Urban Studies NCITEC National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness Supported by: 4101 Gourrier Avenue | Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 | (225) 767-9131 | www.ltrc.lsu.edu TECHNICAL REPORT STANDARD PAGE 1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. FHWA/LA.525 4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date The Impact of Modifying the Jones Act on US Coastal June 2014 Shipping 6. Performing Organization Code 7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No. Asaf Ashar, Professor Research, UNOTI LTRC Project Number: 13-8SS James R. Amdal, Sr. Research Associate, UNOTI State Project Number: 30000766 9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. University of New Orleans Department of Planning and Urban Studies 11. Contract or Grant No. 368 Milneburg Hall, 2000 Lakeshore Dr. New Orleans, LA 70148 12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 13. Type of Report and Period Covered Louisiana Department of Transportation and Final Report Development July 2012 – December 2013 P.O. Box 94245 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9245 14. Sponsoring Agency Code 15. Supplementary Notes Conducted in Cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), Federal Highway Administration 16. Abstract The study assesses exempt coastal shipping defined as exempted from the US-built stipulation of the Jones Act, operating with functional crews and exempted from Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT). The study focuses on two research questions: (a) the impact of the US-built exemption on the cost of coastal shipping; and (b) the competitiveness of exempt services. -
The Third Battle
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPERS 16 The Third Battle Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines N ES AV T A A L T W S A D R E C T I O N L L U E E G H E T R I VI IBU OR A S CT MARI VI Owen R. Cote, Jr. Associate Director, MIT Security Studies Program The Third Battle Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines Owen R. Cote, Jr. Associate Director, MIT Security Studies Program NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island Naval War College The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the Newport, Rhode Island Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies President of the Naval War College consider of particular Newport Paper Number Sixteen interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts. Candidates 2003 for publication are considered by an editorial board under the auspices of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. President, Naval War College Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, U.S. Navy Published papers are those approved by the Editor of the Press, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the President Provost, Naval War College Professor James F. Giblin of the Naval War College. Dean of Naval Warfare Studies The views expressed in The Newport Papers are those of the Professor Alberto R. Coll authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Naval War College Press Editor: Professor Catherine McArdle Kelleher Correspondence concerning The Newport Papers may be Managing Editor: Pelham G. -
English Comes from the French: Guerre De Course
The Maritime Transport War - Emphasizing a strategy to interrupt the enemy sea lines of communication1 (SLOCs) - ARAKAWA Kenichi Preface Why did the Imperial Japanese Navy not aggressively develop a strategy to interrupt the enemy sea line of communication (SLOC) during the Second World War? Japan’s SLOC connecting her southern and Asian continental fronts to the mainland were destroyed mainly by the U.S. submarine warfare. Consequently, Japanese forces suffered from shortages of provisions as well as natural resources necessary for her military power. Furthermore, neither weapons nor provisions could be delivered to the fronts due to the U.S. operations to disrupt the Japanese SLOCs between the battlegrounds and the Japanese home island. Thus soldiers on the front were threatened with starvation even before the battle. In contrast, the U.S. and British military forces supported long logistical supply lines to their Asian and Pacific battlegrounds. However, there are no records indicating that the Imperial Japanese Navy attempted to interrupt these vital sea lines. Surely Japanese officers were aware of the German use of submarines in World WarⅠ. Why did the Imperial Japanese Navy not adopt a guerre de course strategy, that is a strategy targeting the enemy merchant marine and logistical lines? The most comprehensive explanation indicates that the Imperial Japanese Navy had no doctrine providing for this kind of warfare. The core of its naval strategy was the doctrine of “decisive battles at any cost.” Under the Japanese naval doctrine submarines were meant to contribute to fleet engagements not to have an independent combat role or to target anything but the enemy fleet. -
The Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence
Remembrance Series The Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence Photographs courtesy of Library and Archives Canada (LAC) and the Department of National Defence (DND). © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada represented by the Minister of Veterans Affairs, 2005. Cat. No. V32-84/2005 ISBN 0-662-69036-2 Printed in Canada The Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence Generations of Canadians have served our country and the world during times of war, military conflict and peace. Through their courage and sacrifice, these men and women have helped to ensure that we live in freedom and peace, while also fostering freedom and peace around the world. The Canada Remembers Program promotes a greater understanding of these Canadians’ efforts and honours the sacrifices and achievements of those who have served and those who supported our country on the home front. The program engages Canadians through the following elements: national and international ceremonies and events including Veterans’ Week activities, youth learning opportunities, educational and public information materials (including on-line learning), the maintenance of international and national Government of Canada memorials and cemeteries (including 13 First World War battlefield memorials in France and Belgium), and the provision of funeral and burial services. Canada’s involvement in the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, and Canada’s efforts during military operations and peace efforts has always been fuelled by a commitment to protect the rights of others and to foster peace and freedom. Many Canadians have died for these beliefs, and many others have dedicated their lives to these pursuits. -
Neptune's Might: Amphibious Forces in Normandy
Neptune’s Might: Amphibious Forces in Normandy A Coast Guard LCVP landing craft crew prepares to take soldiers to Omaha Beach, June 6, 1944 Photo 26-G-2349. U.S. Coast Guard Photo, Courtesy Naval History and Heritage Command By Michael Kern Program Assistant, National History Day 1 “The point was that we on the scene knew for sure that we could substitute machines for lives and that if we could plague and smother the enemy with an unbearable weight of machinery in the months to follow, hundreds of thousands of our young men whose expectancy of survival would otherwise have been small could someday walk again through their own front doors.” - Ernie Pyle, Brave Men 2 What is National History Day? National History Day is a non-profit organization which promotes history education for secondary and elementary education students. The program has grown into a national program since its humble beginnings in Cleveland, Ohio in 1974. Today over half a million students participate in National History Day each year, encouraged by thousands of dedicated teachers. Students select a historical topic related to a theme chosen each year. They conduct primary and secondary research on their chosen topic through libraries, archives, museums, historic sites, and interviews. Students analyze and interpret their sources before presenting their work in original papers, exhibits, documentaries, websites, or performances. Students enter their projects in contests held each spring at the local, state, and national level where they are evaluated by professional historians and educators. The program culminates in the Kenneth E. Behring National Contest, held on the campus of the University of Maryland at College Park each June. -
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress September 16, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL32665 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship goal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal. The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring a smaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier of large unmanned vehicles (UVs). On June 17, 2021, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that presents the Biden Administration’s emerging successor to the 355-ship force-level goal. The document calls for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large UVs. A September 2021 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the fleet envisioned in the document would cost an average of between $25.3 billion and $32.7 billion per year in constant FY2021 dollars to procure.