Russia in Review: August 4 – August 17 By Mason Clark August 19, 2021 Russia Cements Military Presence in Central Asia and Sets Conditions to Recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s Government Kremlin messaging on Afghanistan since August 15 has balanced praise for the Taliban’s supposedly “peaceful” takeover of Kabul with cautious rhetoric about officially recognizing the Taliban, which is still formally designated as a terrorist organization in Russia. Zamir Kabulov, the Kremlin’s special representative for Afghanistan, stated on August 16 that the Kremlin “prepared the ground ahead of time” to work with “the new government of Afghanistan.”1 Kabulov said that Russia has retained its embassy in Kabul with security cooperation from the Taliban and praised the Taliban for taking over security in the capital extent, meet unstated good-governance “absolutely peacefully.”2 requirements. The Kremlin previously called on the Taliban to “prevent the spread of tensions” The Kremlin is officially predicating recognition beyond Afghanistan’s borders during meetings of the Taliban on the Taliban’s ability to prevent in Moscow in early July.3 Kabulov said Russia jihadist attacks in Central Asia and, to a lesser does not see “a single direct threat to our allies in Central Asia” from the Taliban itself but noted on August 16 that regime change can Organization (CSTO) announced on August 16 create “a niche for other international terrorist that it will hold an exercise designated “Cobalt- organizations.”4 The Kremlin has additionally 2021” in Tajikistan “in the coming months” but paid lip service to requiring the Taliban to meet did not specify a date or the participants.11 The undefined standards of governance but will Kremlin-dominated CSTO has previously likely focus on security concerns. Russian declined Tajik requests for military Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia is in deployments to the border with Afghanistan. no hurry to recognize the Taliban but also The Kremlin maintains that Russian and claimed that the Taliban has expressed the partner forces are sufficient to secure the border desire to have a government “with other with Afghanistan but retains the option to political forces” and continue the functions of deploy the CSTO’s rapid reaction force if the Afghan state.5 Kabulov said that Russia will needed.12 The Kremlin likely seeks to secure likely remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist bilateral ties and direct Russian basing in organizations if the Taliban “continues to Central Asian states, rather than immediately behave peacefully.”6 Russian rhetoric suggests leverage the multinational CSTO force. that Moscow is seeking unspecified concessions from the Taliban before recognizing it. Those The Kremlin will likely officially concessions will likely go beyond assurances recognize the Taliban and will expand about containing terrorism and good Russian basing and military operations governance. in Central Asia to combat potential jihadist threats. Russia’s demands Russian and partner forces are incentivize the Taliban to prevent third-party increasing the frequency of joint military jihadist groups from attacking neighboring exercises in Central Asia and are states. However, the Taliban is unlikely to preparing for a Collective Security Treaty completely control Afghanistan’s borders, and Organization (CSTO) exercise in the jihadist groups and criminal networks are coming months. Russian and partner forces highly likely to proliferate in Tajikistan, conducted several major exercises in August Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states. The prior to the fall of Kabul. Over 2,500 Russian, Kremlin will likely accept a level of insecurity in Tajik, and Uzbek troops conducted joint the region above what the United States and its exercises to practice preventing militants from allies would normally tolerate and recognize the crossing the border at a training ground in the Taliban as the legitimate government of Khatlon region of Tajikistan, approximately 20 Afghanistan. The Kremlin may additionally seek kilometers from the Afghan border, from to secure economic concessions such as access August 5-10.7 Roughly 1,500 Russian and Uzbek to mineral resources from the Taliban in troops conducted concurrent joint exercises in exchange for recognition. The Kremlin will also Uzbekistan from August 2-7.8 Russian and prioritize preventing potentially destabilizing partner forces announced several additional refugee flows from Afghanistan. The Russian exercises following the fall of Kabul on August military has prepared for several years for the 15. Approximately 1,000 troops at Russia’s 201st potential of a renewed jihadist threat to Central Military Base in Tajikistan began snap exercises Asia following a US withdrawal from on August 17 that are ongoing as of August 19.9 Afghanistan.13 Russian military deployments in The Kazakh military raised its state of readiness Central Asia are in large part responses to this and began readiness checks on August 16 and legitimate threat. However, additional Russian notified reservists of possible deployment, basing and further military cooperation with following Tajikistan’s previous mobilization on Central Asian states will support the Kremlin’s July 22.10 The Collective Security Treaty campaign to integrate the militaries of the former Soviet Union under Russian structures successfully advancing its campaign to and improve Russian force-projection secure international security capabilities. partnerships to offset the limits of Russia’s growing but limited military footprint.18 1. All four of Russia’s military districts conducted concurrent 2. Russian forces deployed to Belarus international military exercises in for the Zapad-2021 exercises in early August, demonstrating the early August that could become Russian military’s increasing part of a permanent military operational capacity. Russian forces presence in that country. Russia held three exercises with Chinese, deployed the 60th Command Brigade of Laotian, and Indian forces August 1-13. the 1st Guards Tank Army to Belarus on Approximately 13,000 Russian and August 4.19 The 60th Communication Chinese troops participated in the joint Brigade is the command and control (C2) Russian-Chinese strategic exercise element of Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army “Interaction 2021” in the Ningxia Hui – the premier conventional unit of the region of northwestern China from Russian Army.20 The deployment of this August 9-13.14 The Russian and Chinese C2 element to Belarus indicates the likely defense ministers observed the joint participation of the 1st Guards Tank Army conventional operations by Russian and in Zapad-2021. The 60th Chinese motorized infantry and aviation Communications Brigade could units.15 Russian and Laotian forces held additionally serve as the primary C2 the joint “Laros-2021” exercise in the element of a permanent Russian Primorsky region of eastern Russia from deployment to Belarus following Zapad, August 11-19.16 Five hundred personnel as previously forecasted by ISW.21 from both states practiced counterterror Several additional Russian and operations in the second iteration of the Belarusian units deployed to their Laros exercise since 2019, which the designated training grounds for Russia’s Kremlin intends as a regular joint Zapad-2021 exercise since ISW’s exercise. Finally, Russian and Indian previous publication on Zapad forces held a similar joint “Indra-2021” preparations on August 5.22 Elements of exercise in the Volgograd region of the Belarusian 19th Motor Rifle Brigade southern Russia from August 1-13.17 Five deployed to an unspecified training hundred personnel practiced ground in western Russia on August 11 counterterror operations and exchanged and conducted preparatory exercises best practices from prior operations. The with Russian forces on August 17.23 Russian military’s ability to conduct Elements of the Belarusian 60th major international exercises in the Communications Regiment additionally Southern and Eastern Military Districts deployed to Russia’s Mulino training concurrent with large-scale exercises in ground on August 16. The Belarusian 6th Central Asia commanded by the Central and 11th Motor Rifle Brigades, Military District and preparations in the unspecified logistics units, and several Western Military District for the Zapad- air force and air defense units held 2021 exercises demonstrate its exercises to prepare for Zapad in Belarus increasing readiness and operational August 3-12.24 flexibility. The Kremlin is additionally 3. Russia’s ruling United Russia party Iraq, to the borders of Lithuania, Latvia, is leveraging individually popular and Poland in an effort to destabilize its Russians to reverse the party’s neighbors and reverse EU sanctions declining approval ahead of enacted on Belarus since June 2021 in Russian Duma (parliament) response to the Belarusian government’s elections scheduled for September forcible detention of journalist Roman 17-19. The top five candidates on United Protasevich.27 Latvia announced a state Russia’s parliamentary list participated of emergency in its regions bordering in the opening of a new United Russia Belarus on August 10, and Lithuania headquarters in Moscow on August 9 and announced a program on August 13 to billed themselves as “Putin’s Team.”25 give migrants trafficked from Belarus The top five candidates are Foreign 300 euros and a flight to their home Minister Sergey Lavrov, Defense countries.28 Lithuanian border guards Minister Sergey Shoigu, Moscow