NWIRP Dallas Is an Aerospace Manufacturing Complex Constructed in 1941 As Part of the U.S

I NTEGRATED C ULTURAL R ESOURCES M ANAGEMENT P LAN HISTORIC CONTEXT INTRODUCTION NWIRP Dallas is an aerospace manufacturing complex constructed in 1941 as part of the U.S. World War II Industrial Mobilization Program. Known as Plancor #25, NWIRP Dallas initially consisted of 85 buildings and structures spread out over 153 acres in rural Dallas County, near the city limits of both Dallas and Grand Prairie, Texas. The original project owner, the DPC, was a governmental body assigned to fund and build a variety of industrial facilities across the United States that produced essential military goods for World War II. North American Aviation Inc. leased the government- owned plant from 1941 to August 1945, producing nearly 30,000 aircraft of three different types for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. NWIRP Dallas has been leased to six different tenants over the past six decades: North American Aviation, TEMCO, Chance Vought Aircraft Corporation, LTV, Northrop Grumman, and Vought Aircraft Industries. Today, the complex consists of 343 resources on 314.66 acres. NWIRP Dallas has a complicated but important history that details the role it played during the Second World War and its significance throughout the Cold War. Its history is not only the story of an aircraft plant but also of the growth of Dallas County and the aircraft industry in North Texas communities. WORLD WAR II In the mid-1930s, there were definite signs that the peace established in Europe following World War I was tenuous. The first indication of trouble appeared in 1933 when Germany elected Adolf Hitler as its Chancellor and demanded equality with France and England, not disarmament. Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and secretly began to rebuild its military, a clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles. In an effort to renew its strength and demonstrate its power, Germany turned to every available technological advance in weaponry to ensure that it would never again be subjugated by Britain, France and the West. On 10 March 1935, Germany’s Defense Minister Herman Göring formally announced his country’s military rearmament program, which included all the latest technological developments in ships, tanks, guns, ammunition, and aircraft. Britain likewise began to rearm, and by the end of the year, all the major European powers and Japan had begun remilitarization programs. It was not only Germany’s aggressive acts and rearmament that threatened peace in Europe; it was also the emergence of dictatorships in Italy, Spain, and Japan. All four countries appeared to NAVAL WEAPONS INDUSTRIAL RESERVE PLANT DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS PAGE 8-1 I NTEGRATED C ULTURAL R ESOURCES M ANAGEMENT P LAN prefer force, propaganda, and fear to effect political change and gain power. Germany took full advantage of its early military preparedness by participating in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39 and annexing both Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. The performance of the German military machine, especially the air force, or Luftwaffe, sent a clear message to Great Britain and France that they had underestimated Germany’s strength. The presence and large numbers of the German airforce in Spain and Czechoslovakia gave Europeans the perception that the Luftwaffe was much larger than anticipated. Following the events of 1936–38, Great Britain, France, and other European allies began to rearm at a frantic pace. In order for European nations to achieve military supremacy over Germany, they would need help. France and Great Britain turned to the United States and its mass-production capability as early as 1935 in hopes of achieving military preparedness, but quickly found out that what they needed most—aircraft—was difficult to procure. America had been the leader in aviation since the late 1910s, but its industry had never mass produced aircraft. For decades, American aircraft companies fabricated each individual plane virtually by hand for a small and elite domestic and foreign market. The number of orders from European nations overwhelmed burgeoning aircraft and engine manufacturers. Fortunately for the aircraft industry and unfortunately for Europe, current American isolationist policy and neutrality laws required belligerent nations to pay cash for military goods, leaving the industry a brief period of time to prepare for the production demands of a large-scale, world war. It was only in May 1939 when a loose— but public—diplomatic alliance developed between the dictatorships of Germany, Japan, and Italy that American leaders began to display and share France and England’s concerns for world peace and stability. The combined strength of the Axis coalition, the quick pace of overseas developments, and the defense needs of European allies provoked American leaders to develop a plan of action and turn away from its isolationist stance toward military preparedness. Any plan developed by the United States would have to balance and integrate foreign requirements and domestic needs without sacrificing or straining productive capabilities, resources, materials, facilities, and manpower. In May 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the first steps toward mobilization when he ordered his Assistant Secretary of War PAGE 8-2 NAVAL WEAPONS INDUSTRIAL RESERVE PLANT DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS I NTEGRATED C ULTURAL R ESOURCES M ANAGEMENT P LAN and Assistant Secretary of the Navy to create a War Resources Board to manage the $11 billion defense budget and the newly formed Industrial Mobilization Program. Once planning had begun, the President declared a state of unlimited national emergency in an effort to prepare the American people for the demands of mobilization, which involved an unprecedented level of defense production. The Industrial Mobilization Program called for major changes within the country’s economic and governmental structure and altered the relationship between the private enterprise and the government, forcing them to coordinate activities in order to meet common goals (Kane 1995: 29; Vatter 1985: 10; U.S. Civilian Production Administration 1947: xiii). The Industrial Mobilization Program’s main goals were the nation’s speedy transition from peace to war and back to peace. The program evolved through three major phases: The initial defense period, 1939–41, was characterized as the period when the United States was not actually at war but was compelled to rearm and help its allies, and itself, through weapons production and materials for defense. The second phase occurred from December 1941 until August 1945, and was characterized as the war period, when the entire American economy was directed toward winning the war through the procurement and production of ships, submarines, guns, ammunition, tanks, and aircraft. Finally, the third phase, from August 1945 to December 1947, was characterized as the transition period from World War II to the Cold War (U.S. Civilian Production Administration 1947: xiii, 3). INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: THE DEFENSE PERIOD, 1939–41 The President and a new managing agency, the Office of Production Management, began implementation of the Industrial Mobilization Program in the summer of 1939, prior to Germany’s invasion of Poland. The first step of the program was the formation of the National Defense Advisory Committee, or NDAC. Legislation allowing for the formation of NDAC can be traced to the Army Appropriation Act of 20 August 1916, in which NDAC assumed the responsibility of coordinating industries and resources for the country’s national security and welfare (U.S. Civilian Production Administration 1947: 22). President Roosevelt invoked the law on 29 May 1940 in response to conflicts in Europe and the Far East. The key players of NDAC included the secretaries of War, Navy Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, Office of Production Management, and seven at-large members. The President served as head and final arbitrator of NDAC, but he also relied closely on the NAVAL WEAPONS INDUSTRIAL RESERVE PLANT DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS PAGE 8-3 I NTEGRATED C ULTURAL R ESOURCES M ANAGEMENT P LAN advice of its permanent and at-large members. The Army Appropriation Act allowed the President to nominate seven civilian members with “special knowledge of some industry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource, or otherwise specially qualified” (U.S. Civilian Production Administration 1947: 23). Roosevelt’s selections included industry officials, international dignitaries, economists, and financial experts to manage and run the entire program. The President decided that only three members of NDAC needed to serve the Commission on a full-time basis: Danish-born William S. Knudsen, former president of General Motors Corporation (GM), advised on industrial production; Lithuanian-born Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, advised on employment; and Edward R. Stettinus, who was associated with the United States Steel Corporation, advised on industrial materials and was former chairman of the War Resources Board. Stettinus also had family connections with two of the biggest and most influential businesses in America—E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc. and J.P. Morgan & Company (U.S. Civilian Production Administration 1947: 19, 20). The remaining members of NDAC—the commissioners on prices, farm products, transportation, and consumer interests—served only part-time positions. Most of NDAC’s powers were de jure or de facto, and came either directly from the President or through the Office of Production

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