B-25J Bombers in Final Assembly at the Kansas City Plant, 1944
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B-25J bombers in final assembly at the Kansas City plant, 1944. 244 KANSAS HISTORY “WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” Kansas City’s Bomber Plant, 1941–1945 by Richard Macias he B-25 bomber played a critical role in America’s World War II arsenal, serving in several theaters of the war, from North African deserts to Pacific Ocean expanses. Although a conventional bomber, this versatile aircraft also was utilized for airborne artillery and as a low altitude strafer. Many of Tthese B-25s were produced in North American Aviation’s Kansas City, Kansas, facili- ty, and this article describes the origin and development of that defense plant, as well as the principal achievements of its employees, who made vital contributions to the war effort. The Second World War began in Europe in September 1939 when Adolf Hitler’s Germany attacked Poland. The attacker’s superiority in both numbers of men and quality of materiel resulted in a swift victory. In the spring of 1940 Hitler’s forces oc- cupied Denmark; Norway was next to fall, primarily due to German control of the air over the fighting zone. Then on May 10, 1940, Germany launched its biggest offensive yet by striking at France and the Low Countries of Holland, Belgium, and Luxem- burg. The German land forces advanced swiftly, utilizing tanks and other motorized elements, and striking with its main weight from the Ardennes Forest, which the Al- lies least expected. The German air force (Luftwaffe) attacked forward Allied airfields, destroying aircraft on the ground and putting bases out of service. In one instance, on Richard Macias holds a bachelor's degree in general studies from the University of Kansas. A longtime Kansas City area firefighter, his research interests include World War II aviation, particularly the American and British con- tributions toward the Allied victory. Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 28 (Winter 2005–2006): 244–261. “WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 245 the second day of the offensive, an entire British bomber n the summer of 1940 Congress passed large army and squadron near Rheims, France, was wiped out before its navy appropriation bills, a supplemental defense bill, first mission could be flown.1 The Luftwaffe swept the I and a tax law to help pay for it all. Concurrently, the skies of opposing planes; on May 14 alone eighty-nine Al- Airplane Division of the National Defense Advisory Com- lied fighters and bombers were shot down. The German mittee (NDAC) reported the expansion that would be nec- air arm also provided close support to the army, as demon- essary to accomplish the president’s plane production strated near Sedan, France, when the French posts on the goal. A 200 percent increase in factory floor space and a 400 Meuse River were subjected to a terrible pounding by percent rise in the labor force was needed.5 Private and for- bombers and dive-bombers.2 Within days seven panzer di- eign investment accounted for a modicum of expansion. visions had broken through the Ardennes sector and were But manufacturers, uncertain of the emergency’s length, closing on the English Channel ports, effectively cutting were hesitant to borrow money to cover large construction off the better part of the Allied armies. In little over three costs. To facilitate the necessary expansion, the govern- weeks from the first German attack on May 10, the Low ment ultimately provided most of the needed capital. Sev- Countries were overrun, the British Expeditionary Force eral aircraft companies received federal money to enlarge and other Allied soldiers were leaving the continent from or build new facilities. In addition, War Department and Dunkirk port, and France was headed toward certain de- NDAC officials proposed that the government’s Defense feat. Plant Corporation finance all new construction to further President Franklin D. Roosevelt watched the events in increase capacity. These government-owned facilities Europe, as he did the ominous developments in the Far would then be rented to private manufacturers. Another East where Japan moved against China. Cognizant of approach suggested that the government build and own America’s low level of military preparedness, in light of plants, stock them with machines and tools, and engage a these threatening events, the president believed the nation contractor to operate the plant. Such facilities were to be- must modernize and expand its armed forces. And events come known as government-owned, contractor-operated in Europe had demonstrated that air power had to be a pri- (GOCO) plants.6 mary component. FDR knew the Luftwaffe had played a U.S. Army Air Corps (AAC) administration developed decisive role in the Allied defeat in Norway and that its su- a plan to build two such GOCO plants. The target produc- periority in both numbers and technology was having a tion goals were two hundred medium bombers per month profound impact on the combat in continental Europe.3 On in one factory and one hundred heavy bombers per month May 16, 1940, the president asked Congress for an increase in the other. The AAC chief, General Henry H. Arnold, and in defense spending. He also said he would “like to see this NDAC commissioner, William S. Knudsen, decided these nation geared up to the ability to turn out at least 50,000 plants should be built in the interior of the country. In- planes a year.” To appreciate the scope of the proposed creased security was the primary reason for this decision. program, it must be noted that in 1939 a total of 5,856 air- The second was the government’s desire to distribute the craft had been produced in the United States. President economic benefits of plant construction and operation as Roosevelt envisaged an airplane industry that would meet widely as possible. Since the majority of the nation’s air- American defense needs and fill future orders expected to craft plants were on the coasts, locating new capacity in the come from the Allied powers.4 interior could draw upon new sources of labor, power, transportation, and the like.7 A Plant Site Board traveled to several locations in the 1. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II (New York : DaCapo Press, 1994), 114–15. Midwest. In the autumn of 1940 the board finished its sur- 2. Ibid., 117–19. 3. Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill and Roosevelt : The Complete Cor- respondence: I Alliance Emerging (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 37; Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret 5. Irving Brinton Holley Jr., United States Army in World War II, Spe- Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: cial Studies: Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), 419; “British Had To Retreat,” Kansas City (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 293. Times, May 9, 1940. 6. Ibid., 294–301. 4. “To Meet Brutal Force,” Kansas City Star, May 16, 1940; John B. 7. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in Rae, Climb to Greatness : The American Aircraft Industry, 1920–1960 (Cam- World War II: VI. Men and Planes (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force bridge: MIT Press, 1968), 81. History, 1983), 311. 246 KANSAS HISTORY The December 7, 1940, Kansas City Times, announces that Kansas City will be home to one of the government’s warplane assembly plants. veys and forwarded them to General Arnold, who then telegram: “Have inspected Fairfax site and it is okay. Air- conferred with Commissioner Knudsen. They selected port small but suitable for immediate needs with improve- Omaha, Nebraska, as the location to build the Martin B-26 ments.”10 Prompt action allowed survey work to began in two-engine plane; the Consolidated B-24 four-engine as- December 1940, and in January 1941 the War Department sembly was to take place in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Upon fur- and North American signed the necessary contracts. ther study and reflection, however, officials decided more Muskogee Iron Works of Muskogee, Oklahoma, won the sites were needed. The demand “threatened to impose an bid to supply approximately five thousand tons of struc- impossible strain on the local resources” of Omaha and tural steel. In February the Kansas City, Kansas, govern- Tulsa alone, so AAC and NDAC officials recommended ment purchased Fairfax Airport, which satisfied an AAC two more GOCO plants.8 Fort Worth, Texas, would help requirement for free use of the airport to test the complet- make the B-24, and Kansas City, Kansas, would produce ed bombers. The federal government subsequently fi- the B-25 two-engine bomber. A front-page headline in the nanced airport improvements to accommodate such test- Kansas City Times of December 7, 1940, read “BIG BOMBER ing.11 From its Inglewood, California, headquarters and PLANT FOR CITY.” The plant was to be operated by home plant, North American submitted a preliminary list North American Aviation.9 of needed equipment and machinery for Kansas City. Fed- The AAC’s chosen plant site was in the extreme north- eral officials bought just over eighty-five acres from the east part of Kansas City. The area, known as Fairfax Indus- Kansas City Industrial Land Company, which constituted trial District, comprised light industrial and agricultural the land for the plant and the right-of-way between the site manufacturing. The specific construction site was a seven- and the airport.12 ty-five-acre alfalfa field adjoining Fairfax Airport, a pri- The groundbreaking ceremony occurred on March 8, vately owned airport with two asphalt runways. North 1941.