B-25J Bombers in Final Assembly at the Kansas City Plant, 1944

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B-25J bombers in final assembly at the Kansas City plant, 1944.

244 KANSAS HISTORY “WE ALL HAD A CAUSE”

Kansas City’s Bomber Plant, 1941–1945

by Richard Macias

he B-25 bomber played a critical role in America’s World War II arsenal, serving in several theaters of the war, from North African deserts to Pacific Ocean expanses. Although a conventional bomber, this versatile aircraft also was utilized for airborne artillery and as a low altitude strafer. Many of Tthese B-25s were produced in North American Aviation’s Kansas City, Kansas, facility, and this article describes the origin and development of that defense plant, as well as the principal achievements of its employees, who made vital contributions to the war effort. The Second World War began in Europe in September 1939 when Adolf Hitler’s Germany attacked Poland. The attacker’s superiority in both numbers of men and quality of materiel resulted in a swift victory. In the spring of 1940 Hitler’s forces oc- cupied Denmark; Norway was next to fall, primarily due to German control of the air over the fighting zone. Then on May 10, 1940, Germany launched its biggest offensive yet by striking at France and the Low Countries of Holland, Belgium, and Luxem- burg. The German land forces advanced swiftly, utilizing tanks and other motorized elements, and striking with its main weight from the Ardennes Forest, which the Al- lies least expected. The German air force (Luftwaffe) attacked forward Allied airfields, destroying aircraft on the ground and putting bases out of service. In one instance, on

Richard Macias holds a bachelor's degree in general studies from the University of Kansas. A longtime Kansas City area firefighter, his research interests include World War II aviation, particularly the American and British contributions toward the Allied victory.

Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 28 (Winter 2005–2006): 244–261.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 245 the second day of the offensive, an entire British bomber n the summer of 1940 Congress passed large army and squadron near Rheims, France, was wiped out before its navy appropriation bills, a supplemental defense bill, first mission could be flown.1 The Luftwaffe swept the I and a tax law to help pay for it all. Concurrently, the skies of opposing planes; on May 14 alone eighty-nine Al- Airplane Division of the National Defense Advisory Com- lied fighters and bombers were shot down. The German mittee (NDAC) reported the expansion that would be nec- air arm also provided close support to the army, as demon- essary to accomplish the president’s plane production strated near Sedan, France, when the French posts on the goal. A 200 percent increase in factory floor space and a 400 Meuse River were subjected to a terrible pounding by percent rise in the labor force was needed.5 Private and for- bombers and dive-bombers.2 Within days seven panzer di- eign investment accounted for a modicum of expansion. visions had broken through the Ardennes sector and were But manufacturers, uncertain of the emergency’s length, closing on the English Channel ports, effectively cutting were hesitant to borrow money to cover large construction off the better part of the Allied armies. In little over three costs. To facilitate the necessary expansion, the govern- weeks from the first German attack on May 10, the Low ment ultimately provided most of the needed capital. Sev- Countries were overrun, the British Expeditionary Force eral aircraft companies received federal money to enlarge and other Allied soldiers were leaving the continent from or build new facilities. In addition, War Department and Dunkirk port, and France was headed toward certain de- NDAC officials proposed that the government’s Defense feat. Plant Corporation finance all new construction to further President Franklin D. Roosevelt watched the events in increase capacity. These government-owned facilities Europe, as he did the ominous developments in the Far would then be rented to private manufacturers. Another East where Japan moved against China. Cognizant of approach suggested that the government build and own America’s low level of military preparedness, in light of plants, stock them with machines and tools, and engage a these threatening events, the president believed the nation contractor to operate the plant. Such facilities were to be- must modernize and expand its armed forces. And events come known as government-owned, contractor-operated in Europe had demonstrated that air power had to be a pri- (GOCO) plants.6 mary component. FDR knew the Luftwaffe had played a U.S. Army Air Corps (AAC) administration developed decisive role in the Allied defeat in Norway and that its su- a plan to build two such GOCO plants. The target produc- periority in both numbers and technology was having a tion goals were two hundred medium bombers per month profound impact on the combat in continental Europe.3 On in one factory and one hundred heavy bombers per month May 16, 1940, the president asked Congress for an increase in the other. The AAC chief, General Henry H. Arnold, and in defense spending. He also said he would “like to see this NDAC commissioner, William S. Knudsen, decided these nation geared up to the ability to turn out at least 50,000 plants should be built in the interior of the country. In- planes a year.” To appreciate the scope of the proposed creased security was the primary reason for this decision. program, it must be noted that in 1939 a total of 5,856 air- The second was the government’s desire to distribute the craft had been produced in the United States. President economic benefits of plant construction and operation as Roosevelt envisaged an airplane industry that would meet widely as possible. Since the majority of the nation’s air- American defense needs and fill future orders expected to craft plants were on the coasts, locating new capacity in the come from the Allied powers.4 interior could draw upon new sources of labor, power, transportation, and the like.7 A Plant Site Board traveled to several locations in the 1. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II (New York : DaCapo Press, 1994), 114–15. Midwest. In the autumn of 1940 the board finished its sur- 2. Ibid., 117–19. 3. Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill and Roosevelt : The Complete Cor- respondence: I Alliance Emerging (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 37; Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret 5. Irving Brinton Holley Jr., United States Army in World War II, Spe- Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: cial Studies: Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), 419; “British Had To Retreat,” Kansas City (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 293. Times, May 9, 1940. 6. Ibid., 294–301. 4. “To Meet Brutal Force,” Kansas City Star, May 16, 1940; John B. 7. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in Rae, Climb to Greatness : The American Aircraft Industry, 1920–1960 (Cam- World War II: VI. Men and Planes (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force bridge: MIT Press, 1968), 81. History, 1983), 311.

246 KANSAS HISTORY The December 7, 1940, Kansas City Times, announces that Kansas City will be home to one of the government’s warplane assembly plants. veys and forwarded them to General Arnold, who then telegram: “Have inspected Fairfax site and it is okay. Air- conferred with Commissioner Knudsen. They selected port small but suitable for immediate needs with improve- Omaha, Nebraska, as the location to build the Martin B-26 ments.”10 Prompt action allowed survey work to began in two-engine plane; the Consolidated B-24 four-engine as- December 1940, and in January 1941 the War Department sembly was to take place in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Upon fur- and North American signed the necessary contracts. ther study and reflection, however, officials decided more Muskogee Iron Works of Muskogee, Oklahoma, won the sites were needed. The demand “threatened to impose an bid to supply approximately five thousand tons of struc- impossible strain on the local resources” of Omaha and tural steel. In February the Kansas City, Kansas, govern- Tulsa alone, so AAC and NDAC officials recommended ment purchased Fairfax Airport, which satisfied an AAC two more GOCO plants.8 Fort Worth, Texas, would help requirement for free use of the airport to test the complet- make the B-24, and Kansas City, Kansas, would produce ed bombers. The federal government subsequently fi- the B-25 two-engine bomber. A front-page headline in the nanced airport improvements to accommodate such test- Kansas City Times of December 7, 1940, read “BIG BOMBER ing.11 From its Inglewood, California, headquarters and PLANT FOR CITY.” The plant was to be operated by home plant, North American submitted a preliminary list North American Aviation.9 of needed equipment and machinery for Kansas City. Fed- The AAC’s chosen plant site was in the extreme north- eral officials bought just over eighty-five acres from the east part of Kansas City. The area, known as Fairfax Indus- Kansas City Industrial Land Company, which constituted trial District, comprised light industrial and agricultural the land for the plant and the right-of-way between the site manufacturing. The specific construction site was a seven- and the airport.12 ty-five-acre alfalfa field adjoining Fairfax Airport, a pri- The groundbreaking ceremony occurred on March 8, vately owned airport with two asphalt runways. North 1941. Kindelberger and Kansas governor Payne Ratner American’s president, James H. Kindelberger, noted in a were among more than five thousand participants and

8. Holley, United States Army in World War II, 306–8. 9. General Arnold to Assistant Secretary of War Patterson, Novem- 10. James H. Kindelberger telegram to unidentified, December 2, ber 27, 1940, Materiel Division, Colonel A. J. Lyon Project Files 1939–1941, 1940, Lyon Project Files. Book 48, Government Owned Factories, RG 18, National Archives, Wash- 11. General Brett to Don C. McCombs, February 6, 1941, ibid.; “Vote ington, D.C.; “Big Bomber Plant For City,” Kansas City Times, December 7, For Fairfax,” Kansas City Times, February 12,1941. 1940. 12. “Fairfax Acres To US,” Kansas City Star, February 27, 1941.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 247 spectators in attendance.13 Within days the first graders, skeleton of ten bays was complete, and sheet steel workers tractors, and pile drivers arrived on site, and fifty men began to deck the roof.15 In May construction of the last of started work. The firm of McDonald, Tarleton, and Patti of the fourteen standard-width bays and the final assembly Saint Louis and Kansas City won the general contractor bay began. bid and shared responsibility for the construction with the That same month Kindelberger stated that the first air- U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. A Pittsburgh, Pennsylva- craft parts from California, where B-25 assembly was al- nia, firm was awarded the contract for sheet steel for the ready under way, were being prepared for shipment. H. V. roof and sidewalls. By the end of March the initial founda- Schwalenberg, the newly appointed Kansas plant manag- tion piles were driven and being filled with concrete, and er, announced that a dozen key men from North American the first structural steel began to arrive. in California would arrive soon to facilitate the start of op- Washington approved the list of machines and pro- erations. An additional 140 skilled men were training as duction equipment and assigned a high priority to the pro- supervisors and also were slated to join the Kansas City curement.14 By April workmen were using five pile drivers; staff. At the end of June 1941 the plant was approximately they poured concrete caps atop the piling clusters, which 70 percent complete, and the awaited parts began to arrive. set the foundation lines, and started the concrete walls. The AAC and North American signed contract W535 AC They laid the floor with sand, then gravel, and finished 19341 for the purchase of 1,200 B-25D aircraft. The D suffix with a top layer of reinforced concrete. At this time ap- denoted planes to be built in Kansas City.16 proximately four hundred men were on the job construct- In early July North American employees began con- ing the plant. structing jigs—frames into which individual pieces are The factory superstructure would comprise fourteen joined together to make a plane’s component parts in a single-story bays of 50-foot width and 1,050-foot length, prompt, consistent manner. Also in July plant construction along with a final assembly bay 32 feet high, 200 feet wide, crews completed the structural steel erection, and began to and 750 feet in length. On April 7, 1941, the crew erected the first structural steel, and within a week they had assembled two bays and part of a third. By month’s end the 15. “Bomber Steel Up,” ibid., April 7, 1941; “Speed Up On Big Plant,” ibid., April 22, 1941; “Air Plant Tempo Gains,” ibid., April 30, 1941. 16. W. F. Volandt to General Echols, June 28, 1941, 452.1 Airplanes: 13. “Hail Air Place,” ibid., March 8, 1941. Bombers, Central Decimal Files 1939–1942, RG 18, National Archives; 14. “Speed Up Plant Tools,” ibid., March 29, 1941. “Bomber Parts In,” Kansas City Star, June 26, 1941.

248 KANSAS HISTORY (Left) Plans for the “Bomber Assem- bly ‘City’” appeared in a February 1941 issue of the Kansas City Star, and a groundbreaking ceremony for the Kansas City plant was held March 8, 1941.

(Right) By the summer of 1941, with the plant 70 percent completed, the first B-25D aircraft were under construction. Pictured here is ongoing production in the final assembly bay, ca. 1942.

fit large sliding doors in the north end and east wall of the in production in November, the principal assemblies for final assembly bay.17 The completed aircraft could be rolled which had been shipped from Inglewood. Employees of out these doors in preparation for initial flight tests. The North American’s Kansas division then numbered about AAC now controlled Fairfax Airport under a fifty-year six hundred and were expected to increase to ten thousand lease with the local government; construction crews were when production reached its peak.21 enlarging and improving the airport. When the work was Built as a “blackout “ building, the plant had no win- finished, the field contained four concrete runways, each dows, and steel canopies and a one-foot-thick concrete 150 feet wide with a mean length of 5,725 feet.18 wall sheltered its doors. One-foot-thick concrete formed Construction workers, now numbering nearly five the curtain walls as well. The exterior paint, roof treatment, hundred, completed the sheet steel siding and connected and concrete apron color were designed to blend into the underground electrical service. In September they hung landscape. Floor space was more than one million square fluorescent lighting and completed the first major jig. Sub- feet, and unlike most buildings of the time, it was air-con- contractors gradually installed equipment and machinery ditioned. The complex also comprised five small ancillary in the large plant.19 Auto companies joined the airplane in- structures, such as a power house and police quarters. The dustry by making some parts and sub-assemblies; Fisher government’s cost for the materials, labor, equipment, and Body of General Motors, primarily the Memphis, Ten- machinery totaled well over eleven million dollars.22 nessee, division, supplied the Kansas City plant. In mid- In August 1941 Kindelberger had announced that the October 1941 the plant was 91 percent complete, and AAF plant dedication would take place when the first bomber representatives moved into their offices.20 Three B-25s were was completed, which he had expected to occur at the end of the year. Officials planned an elaborate three-day dedication to start on January 9, 1942, including an open house 17. “In Bomber Plant,” Kansas City Star, July 7, 1941; “Big Plant’s where thousands were expected to attend. But these plans Doors Up,” ibid., July 13, 1941. 18. “Fairfax To Army,” Kansas City Times, June 7, 1941; “Rush Big Fair- fax,” Kansas City Star, June 18, 1941; “Runways at Fairfax Almost Done,” Kansas City Kansan, May 24, 1942; North Ameri-Kansan, April 28, 1944. 19. “Move Plane Tools In,” Kansas City Star, September 25, 1941. 20. “A Bomber Part Start,” Kansas City Times, October 16, 1941; Air- 21. “Bomber Tide Near,” Kansas City Star, November 14, 1941. craft Expansion Program: Recap of Essential Facilities Data, October 15, 22. North American Skyline 2 (October 1941): 9, 35; Aircraft Expansion 1941, 004.4, Firms and Factories, box 65, Central Decimal Files 1939–1942. Program: Recap of Essential Facilities Data, January 1, 1942, 004.4, Firms In June 1941 the Army Air Corps reorganized as the Army Air Forces. and Factories, box 65, Central Decimal Files 1939–1942.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 249 On December 8, 1941, the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor, hundreds of local residents lined up to join the work force at the Kansas City plant. By the autumn of 1943 employment had reached 23,500.

changed soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, High and Vocational School; the Kansas classes utilized the December 7, 1941, and U.S. entry into the war. Officials old Sumner High School building at Ninth and Washing- thought it best to focus on production, so a conservative ton, later known as the National Defense Training School.25 ceremony was held on December 23, 1941, to mark com- The local school districts offered training classes in pletion of the first bomber to roll from the plant.23 The first basic aircraft sheet metal work. Funded by the federal gov- test flight occurred on January 3, 1942. ernment, the classes were free to students except for the purchase of a small toolkit. Men wanting to take the class t the beginning of 1942 the plant had 1,358 em- had first to apply to their state employment office. If they ployees.24 A number of these were skilled workers passed a battery of tests, the candidates went on for an in- A who had been transferred from the North Ameri- terview. Satisfactory interviews allowed them to enroll in can plant in California, and another small group had at- the twelve-week course, and those who successfully com- tended private aviation schools, but the majority of the em- pleted the course were referred to North American. Class- ployees were local and had just received training. The es in other areas of aircraft production were added later. In school districts of Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, July 1941 eight experienced men had come from North Missouri, already had been offering national defense train- American to join the instructor staff and to guide curricu- ing courses on a small scale before the area was granted lum at the two training schools. By August five hundred the bomber plant. Following the announcement, the dis- men were being instructed in the Kansas school and about tricts asked the company how to prepare people for em- two hundred at the Missouri site.26 The graduates of this ployment. The employment and personnel directors from early training took their place among the ranks of those Inglewood outlined equipment needs for training, and who first staffed the plant. In those early days only men both school boards requested and received funds to pur- eighteen to thirty-five years of age were considered for em- chase the necessary machinery. Training to prepare men ployment in aircraft construction, but employment policies for employment at the bomber plant began at two schools in May 1941. In Missouri students met at the then Manual 25. “To Assist in Starting Plane Class,” Kansas City Kansan, May 22, 1941; “A Bomber School Start,” Kansas City Times, May 26, 1941. Sumner High School and its African American students moved into a new facili- 23. “Hail Bomber No. 1,” Kansas City Times, December 24, 1941. ty at 1610 North Eighth (Eighth and Oakland) in 1940. 24. North American Aviation, Inc.: A Brief History of the B-25 Mitchell 26. “Get Ready For Machine Tool Classes,” Kansas City Kansan, Au- Bomber (Dayton, Ohio: U.S. Air Force Museum), 29. gust 21, 1941; “Air Skill Spurt,” Kansas City Star, July 7, 1941.

250 KANSAS HISTORY The first completed B-25D bomber prepares for its test flight, January 3, 1942. Note the plant employees gathered to wit- ness the event.

changed as the war called more and more men into the lesce a new work force and to receive the remainder of the armed forces. machinery orders. In addition, assemblers encountered As the first of Kansas City’s B-25s emerged from the early Fisher Body parts that did not fit and thus required Fairfax plant, the North American B-25 bomber appeared rework. These teething issues delayed aircraft production in headlines worldwide, as a result of an intrepid mission. and acceptances.29 Nonetheless the Fairfax flight line was A number of AAF crews, led by Lieutenant Colonel James teeming with B-25s undergoing alterations. Early opera- H. Doolittle, had trained with B-25s in short takeoffs and tional reports necessitated the modification of some low level flying. On April 18, 1942, Doolittle’s unit took off Mitchells to meet the special circumstances and needs of from the carrier USS Hornet, attacked targets in Tokyo and their end-users. Certain equipment or armament was three other Japanese cities, and continued its flight west. added, removed, or exchanged, and special preparations They barely reached the Asian mainland; several for specific weather destinations were accomplished. crewmembers were injured, killed, or captured; and all six- Other changes prepared aircraft bound for service with al- teen B-25s were lost. Although the daring raid inflicted lies, such as the British and Russians. Because such alter- only minor physical damage on the enemy, the direct strike ations could not reasonably be effected in the just-started on the Japanese empire demonstrated that the enemy’s assembly process, they were performed on a select number homeland was vulnerable, and it lifted American morale.27 of aircraft after their initial test flights. Many planes on the Meanwhile, back in the Midwest, the B-25 earned a flight line had been built in Inglewood and flown to new name—the Mitchell, for aviation proponent General Kansas City for these modifications.30 William “Billy” Mitchell. But production moved slowly. In May 1942 work started on the foundation of a mod- During the first four months of 1942, the AAF accepted ification center—a dual hangar to be built on the southeast eleven planes from the Kansas plant.28 It took time to coa- edge of Fairfax Airport expressly for facilitating aircraft alterations. Because construction workers needed steel for military items, timber frames were largely used in the con-

27. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: I. Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 29. Robert Gibler, interview by author, June 20, 1989; Don Calkins, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 438–44. interview by author, September 22, 1989. 28. Tom Lilley, et al., Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production Dur- 30. “Army Air Forces Historical Study 62: The Modification of Army ing World War II (Boston: Harvard University, 1947), 97. James Kindel- A/C in the United States,” Reference Collection 1090, 20–26, National berger suggested the new name, which was widely adopted. Archives.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 251 The initial final assembly bay at the Kansas City plant can be seen here stretching out behind the central entrance. The high bay, completed in March 1943, is just visible at the top right.

struction of the center. By October workers completed the With the high bay construction under way, and much modification center, but the ever increasing volume of of the B-29 engineering and equipment procurement in work meant that some alterations continued to be per- progress, the AAF reversed its earlier decision. A memo formed outdoors on the airport apron.31 Subsequently a from Major General Oliver P. Echols to General Henry H. west extension and several outbuildings were added to the Arnold read in part: “Since the B-25 has apparently become modification center. a more useful plane than was anticipated, in that it not only Yet another significant plan involving North Ameri- seems to be a reasonably good medium bomber, but also, can’s Kansas City facility commenced in 1942. The Boeing with gunnery modifications, will lend itself to support of B-29—a new, long-range, heavy bomber—was destined to ground troops. It is believed that circumstances will re- be an important weapon in the Pacific theater. A consor- quire the maximum number of these planes that we can tium, which included Boeing Aircraft Company, set up a build.”32 As a result the AAF cancelled North American’s B- committee to plan for the new plane’s production, and sev- 29 contract but continued the plant addition and tool or- eral companies contracted to build the B-29. In addition to ders, with the plan to increase B-25 production. The plant North American Aviation; Boeing of Wichita; Bell Aircraft addition was completed in March 1943, and by that sum- of Marietta, Georgia; and Glenn L. Martin in Omaha, Ne- mer the high bay was incorporated into the assembly braska, received such contracts. Charged with building process.33 two hundred planes, North American decided that the Meanwhile, B-29 production shifted to the Boeing Kansas City plant could produce the B-29 in conjunction plant in Renton, Washington, but the bombers also were with the Mitchell. In July an addition for this purpose was built in three other locations, including Wichita, which pro- begun on the east side of the bomber plant. Because the duced the largest number. The AAF accepted its first B-29 new bomber was appreciably larger than the B-25, the ad- in July 1943, and in total accepted 1,634 pre-series and pro- dition needed to be expansive. The “high bay,” as it was known, added 370,000 square feet of floor space. It mea- sured 350 feet wide and 1,060 feet in length; the height was twice that of the existing, final assembly bay. 32. Ibid., 28; Major General Echols to General Arnold, June 26, 2942, Series II, box 163, Central Decimal Files 1939–1942. The navy also had requested nine hundred B-25s. 31. North American Aviation, Inc.: A Brief History of the B-25 Mitchell 33. Skyline 4 (July–August 1943): 10–11. See also http://www.boe- Bomber, 30–31. ing.com/history/boeing/b29.html.

252 KANSAS HISTORY duction planes combined. Kansas historian Craig Miner ple assembly plant had grown into a veritable manufac- called the wartime statistics for Boeing-Wichita “stagger- turing facility.35 ing.” The company’s Plant II, where B-29s were manufac- tured, n November 1942 eighty-five B-25s rolled out of the Kansas City facility. By this time plant workers were originally estimated to cost $17.5 million, eventually no longer only young men, as the draft and voluntary absorbed nearly $27 million of taxpayers’ money. I enlistments had depleted this demographic. Employment Tools and fixtures inside were worth $20 million. By opportunities had opened for older men and women, once the end of the war Boeing-Wichita had 3,000,000 officials recognized they would be needed to fill the many square feet of production and storage space . . . and the largest steel trusses ever fabricated (300 ft. long, vacated positions. Women first entered bomber plant jobs 128 tons each) spanning the final assembly bays. in the offices and storerooms, but production classes opened to them as early as March 1942. Classes were of- The plant’s utility usage and costs were phenomenal, fered at the two principal training schools, along with sev- and its eral other sites, such as then Argentine High School in Kansas City, Kansas, and Lathrop Defense Training Center cafeteria was the biggest restaurant in Kansas. . . . in Kansas City, Missouri. Among the subjects offered were Peak employment in December 1943 at Boeing–Wi- basic aircraft sheet metal work, blueprint reading, and chita was 29,795. . . . The company had a golf course, shop math. By autumn 1942 women held 27 percent of the a baseball league, bowling alleys, a private lake, 36 shopping centers and a housing development. Truly jobs at the Kansas City plant. They could be found it was a city within a city, and by itself ranked as one preparing electrical cables, installing fuel lines and carbu- of the major population centers of the region.34 retors, testing propeller governors, and assembling and cleaning machine guns, among other assignments. A No- As previously noted, the first six B-25s completed at vember newspaper item noted that thirty-nine grand- the Kansas City plant had come from Inglewood in major mothers worked in the plant, office, or cafeteria. By the assembly form. The next ninety-four planes were in vari- end of the year women also were working at the modifica- ous stages of assembly and were shipped to the Kansas tion center, and the bomber plant’s already nontraditional City plant or to Fisher Body, but the completed assemblies work force was being augmented by deaf and blind indi- were finalized at Kansas City. Starting with shipment 101, viduals, whom supervisors often placed in electrical as- workers performed approximately 45 percent of the man- sembly or sheet metal work.37 ufacture at Kansas City, with Fisher Body and other sub- In 1941 blues artist Josh White recorded the following contractors completing the remainder. Problems in receiv- lyrics in the song “Defense Factory Blues.” ing machined parts of sufficient quality and quantity caused North American to shift more of the fabrication to “Went to the De-fense factory the Kansas division. As it evolved, the bomber plant un- Trying to find some work to do, dertook approximately 62 percent of the manufacture. Had the nerve to tell me, Fisher Body’s contribution would average 29 percent, in- ‘Black boy, Nothing here for you.” cluding such parts as outer wing panels and fuselage side panels. The remaining content was composed of government furnished equipment, such as engines, propellers, wheels, tires, and instruments. What had started as a sim- 35. “History of North American Aviation Inc. of Kansas: (Govern- ment Assembly Plant No. 2) Kansas City Kansas, June 1941 to 31 October 1943,” appendix to Army Air Forces Material Command: History of the Mid- western Procurement District, 1943, 6–9, 204.4–2 , U.S. Air Force Collection, U.S.A.F. Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; North American Aviation, Inc.: A Brief History of the B-25 Mitchell Bomber, 27, 34. Craig Miner, “The War Years in Wichita,” in Paul K. Stuewe, ed., 28. Kansas Revisited: Historical Images and Perspectives (Lawrence: Division of 36. Lilley, Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World Continuing Education, University of Kansas, 1990), 269; www.boeing. War II, 97; North Ameri-Kansan, March 20, 1942; “Women In Draft Wake,” com/history/boeing/b29.html. Boeing–Renton built more than 1,100 B- Kansas City Star, October 11, 1942. 29 bombers, Bell Aircraft Co. (Georgia) built 668, and Glenn L. Martin Co. 37. North Ameri-Kansan, November 27, 1942; ibid., October 2, 1942; (Nebraska) built 536. ibid., October 23, 1942; ibid., November 27, 1942.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 253 The song’s racial message was all too familiar throughout crimination in the employment of workers in defense in- the nation. African American laborers, to say the least, dustries or government because of race, creed, color, or na- were underutilized at the Kansas City plant, as elsewhere. tional origin.” The order also set up the Fair Employment Before the first training began, Kindelberger had an- Practices Committee to investigate discrimination com- nounced that “Negroes will be considered only as janitors plaints.40 and in other similar capacities.”38 Management provided Subsequently, so as not to risk the loss of their lucra- no plan for their employment as aircraft production work- tive federal contract, North American’s Kansas manage- ers. In fact, according to the Kansas City Star, Kindelberger ment agreed to hire “non-white” workers in accordance to “emphasized that under no circumstances would Negroes their percentage of the population, or 10 percent in the be employed as aircraft workers or mechanics in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Accordingly, some African plant.” Ironically, the building being used to train white Americans were allowed to train for and assume produc- aircraft workers at Ninth and Washington was the former tion jobs over the course of the bomber plant’s operation. home of the city’s African American high school. Kindel- In October 1943 a War Manpower Commission survey re- berger’s position, of course, drew criticism. The mayor of ported that African Americans constituted 5.5 percent of Kansas City, Kansas, wrote to ask Kindelberger to recon- North American’s Kansas division’s labor force; almost sider his policy. In Congress Representative U. S. Guyer half had jobs in Department 47—Service and Janitors. Al- and Senator Arthur Capper, both from Kansas, protested though the survey acknowledged that North American North American’s employment plan. Approximately thir- “employs a high percentage of non-white workers com- ty-five hundred African Americans met in Kansas City, pared to many employers in the Greater Kansas City area,” Kansas’s, Memorial Hall to protest and to discuss a course it went on to state that North American’s hiring perfor- of action. One of the meeting’s principal speakers, Kansas mance “is inconsistent with the extent of such workers’ City Call editor C. A. Franklin, stated, “The Kindelberger availability in the immediate labor market area and indi- attitude is at cross purposes with the democracy we are all cates failure to comply with fair employment standards.”41 seeking to defend.39 As late as March 1944 African Americans constituted only The Kansas City situation was a reflection of a nation- 6 percent of the Kansas division’s labor force. But 1940s al scene. African American labor organizer A. Philip Ran- America was still a largely segregated society, and faced dolph was determined to confront defense industry dis- with ever increasing production needs, the government crimination and to do so he called for a march on did not enforce full compliance in all industries and geo- Washington. The plan was to gather ten thousand demon- graphic regions. At best, the government measures tem- strators in the nation’s capital to call attention to unfair pered defense work discrimination. “Regardless of the labor practice and to specifically appeal for defense jobs, state of supply, an industry which before the war had em- since they were under federal contracts. Randolph set July ployed few Negroes . . . was not likely to increase to any 1, 1941, as the march date. Concerned about a revised esti- great extent its proportion of Negro workers or to train mate that put the number at one hundred thousand them for better jobs.”42 demonstrators and that the march would expose American injustice to the world, President Roosevelt met with the ac- tivist leaders on June 18; they maintained that only a con- 40. Bryan Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, U. S. Army In World War crete measure could cause cancellation of the march. The II: The War Department, The Army, and Industrial Manpower (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), 156–59; Andrew E. Ker- president appointed a committee to find a solution, and its sten, Race, Jobs, and the War: The FEPC in the Midwest, 1941–46 (Chica- recommendations resulted in Executive Order 8802, issued go: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 9–20. For text of Executive Order 8802, see “Presidential Executive Orders, Executive Order 8802,” on June 25, 1941. It established “that there shall be no dis- http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/thelaw/eo-8802.html. 41. Plant Composition and Manpower Utilization Survey, North American Aviation Inc. of Kansas, October 1943, Office of the Regional Di- rector, Kansas City, Missouri, Manpower Utilization Surveys and Case 38. Joshua White, “Best Of Blues: 1936–1941,” Wolf Records, Marr Histories, 1943–1945, 535.2, box 119, RG 211, National Archives, Central Sound Archives, University of Missouri–Kansas City; “Limit Negro Air Plains Region, Kansas City, Mo. Jobs,” Kansas City Star, March 17, 1941. 42. Kansas City Regional Office memo 3/30/44, Eva C. Vaughn file, 39. “Capper and Guyer Hit Bomber Plant Policy on Negroes,” Kansas Regional Files, Kansas City Closed Cases, box 18, RG 228, National City Kansan, March 21, 1941; “3,500 At Negro Meeting,” Kansas City Times, Archives, Central Plains Region; Fairchild and Grossman, The Army and March 31, 1941. Industrial Manpower, 168.

254 KANSAS HISTORY Production classes opened to women in March 1942, but when operations accelerated in 1943, women were especially encouraged to join the work force. By autumn of that year females on the payroll numbered 9,125, which was 39 percent of total employment at the Kansas City plant.

Although North American remained reticent in the hir- approximately 4,000 women worked in America’s aircraft ing of minorities, its production schedules were slated to plants, excluding office and nonfactory jobs; by the middle accelerate in 1943, and the company welcomed other non- of 1943 the number had risen to more than 310,000, which traditional laborers. It especially invited women to its train- equaled 39 percent of the airframe industry labor force.43 ing centers. Course lengths were shortened to six weeks. Other factors also affected production. In January 1943 Eighteen had been considered the minimum age for a absenteeism averaged 8.2 percent, resulting in lost produc- bomber plant job, but now boys aged sixteen and seventeen tivity. North American started a program offering free war became eligible for work there. An added incentive to all, bonds to employees in departments with best attendance. men and women, was that now trainees were paid while This program soon gave way to periodic slogan contests; they learned, sixty cents per hour, which was the starting cash prizes were awarded for the best patriotic slogans that pay at the plant. stressed the importance of being on the job. A gradual de- Women also received general encouragement to work crease of the absentee rate seems to have been the result: it in defense plants through a popular icon. Redd Evans and fell to 5.2 percent in June. A greater problem, perhaps, were John J. Loeb’s song “Rosie the Riveter” described the valu- the ten-hour shifts, six-days per week, which caused work- able contribution a woman could make to the war effort. J. er fatigue, left little time for personal matters, and exacer- Howard Miller further emphasized the message with his bated transportation difficulties. In October 1943 North depiction of Rosie, with the slogan “We Can Do It!” American management responded by introducing a new Whether the effective appeal came from the War Manpow- work schedule. Two shifts worked five days per week, ten er Commission, a song, a poster, or a simple determination hours per day, with a periodic weekday off. B-25 produc- to contribute to the war effort, they responded. Women, of tion kept to schedule, and the absentee rate continued to course, had begun to perform production jobs at the Fairfax drop; by early 1945, it averaged 3.2 percent.44 plant in early 1942. By the autumn of 1943 females on the payroll numbered 9,125, which was 39 percent of total divi- 43. Fairchild and Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower, 173; sion employment; they were working in ninety-eight of the Plant Composition and Manpower Utilization Survey, RG 211. For more one hundred departments. At peak employment women on Wichita, see Judith Johnson, “Uncle Sam Wanted Them Too! Women Aircraft Workers in Wichita During World War II,” Kansas History: A Jour- constituted 40 percent of the work force at Martin-Omaha nal of the Central Plains 17 (Spring 1994): 38–49; Miner, “The War Years in and actually reached 50 percent at Boeing-Wichita. This mo- Wichita,” 269. bilization mirrored the national trend. At the end of 1941 44. North Ameri-Kansan, January 15, 1943; ibid., February 26, 1943; ibid., October 1, 1943; ibid., February 2, 1945.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 255 onserving resources also became critical at the those involved in defense work were accorded a certain pri- Kansas City plant. Workers substituted wood for ority, North American was able to assist employees in ob- C stainless steel in making pilots’ and co-pilots’ seats. taining necessary fuel and tires. But the company also asked Stamped scraps of aluminum sheet took the place of small- employees to do more for the war effort than make air- er needed pieces. Stray rivets and other fasteners that had planes. Workers were encouraged to buy war bonds, give been simply discarded were now collected from the floor blood to the Red Cross, and donate money and clothing for and reused or recycled. Supervisors encouraged employees relief organizations serving those in war-ravaged countries. to submit suggestions that would expedite production or North American issued two employee publications. save materials. By war’s end, division management had ac- The North Ameri-Kansan, a weekly plant newspaper, report- cepted 2,307 ideas, improving plant and modification cen- ed general employee news, training opportunities, social ter operations, and netting the suggestors various amounts events, and sports activities. The news, however, was not in war bonds and stamps.45 always good. Shop safety, a point of vital importance, appeared in such poster slogans as “The Eyes Have It! Goggles Keep Sympathy is felt for Jasper J. Griffin (Dept. 37, nights) ‘em That Way.” During approximately four years of opera- who has taken a leave of absence until February 10. tions, only one production-related death occurred in the Two of his sons were recently killed in Italy. Fairfax plant and modification center: an electric lamp was This week Ruby Kullman (Dept. 34) received a memo- thrust into a fuel tank rich with coating vapors, and the rial tribute and a Purple Heart certificate for her hus- 46 tank exploded, killing a female worker. band, Pfc. Victor W. Kullman, an infantryman, who In the autumn of 1943 employment reached its highest was killed in France. point with approximately 23,500 workers in both the plant and modification center. The higher employment and the Pvt. Jack Layton of the 4th Marine Division, 18-year- additional machinery originally procured for the B-29 plant old son of Mrs. Florence Layton (Dept. 70) was killed increased the productive capacity. In 1943 B-25 production on Iwo Jima Feb. 20. He was a former employee of Dept. 17.48 started with January’s output of 90, increased steadily each month for the most part, and ended with the manufacture The second, bi-monthly publication, Skyline, centered on of 190 in December. For the year the Kansas plant’s total of North American’s big picture. It contained major company 1,701 eclipsed Inglewood’s production. Besides the planes news, described business and operational procedures, and for the AAF, British, and Russians, the staff at the modifi- offered articles concerning the three plants (the third plant cation center also prepared B-25s for the U. S. Navy (issued operated in Dallas, Texas). The antics of cartoon character primarily to the U.S. Marines) and the Dutch. A number of Willie Wingflap and his friend Poindexter provided humor. the AAF planes were even fitted with a seventy-five mil- The year 1944 brought the beginning of the end for the limeter cannon in the nose. A flight hangar was built north Axis powers, but the B-25 work continued. The AAF’s of the high bay, where planes received gun and turret in- 345th Bombardment Group, then equipped solely with B- stallations, and two concrete enclosures were built along 25Ds, was proving the model’s effectiveness. At that time the Missouri River levee for test firing machine guns.47 the unit operated over New Guinea and surrounding areas. North American employees received some perhaps un- Its attacks on Japanese airfields forced the enemy to vacate expected benefits. Early in the war the Japanese gained con- one base after another, limiting in stages enemy air pres- trol of vast oil and rubber resources, thereby affecting ence in the fighting zone.49 American supply and compelling the federal government In November 1943 Harold R. Raynor became the to ration items such as gasoline and automobile tires. Since Kansas division’s new plant manager. He oversaw the

45. Ibid., August 10, 1945. 46. “War Plant Blast Fatal,” Kansas City Times, December 3, 1943. 47. North American Aviation, Inc.: A Brief History of the B-25 Mitchell 48. North Ameri-Kansan, January 14, 1944; ibid., January 5, 1945; ibid., Bomber, 25; Lilley, Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World April 13, 1945. War II, 97. Sand filled the enclosures to absorb the bullets, and periodi- 49. Lawrence J. Hickey, Warpath Across the Pacific: The Illustrated His- cally it had to be replaced because the firing pulverized the sand into a tory of the 345th Bombardment Group during World War II (Boulder, Colo.: fine powder. International Research and Publishing, 1984), 118–21.

256 KANSAS HISTORY In March 1944 the last B-25D was built, and production began on a new model. On this final B-25D, photographed here, employees taped money and paychecks to the plane, raising more than nine thousand dollars, which was given to Army and Navy Relief.

largest production achievement of the plant’s existence. In firms utilized these and associated methods to attain the 1944 the Kansas City plant produced 3,012 B-25s, an aver- production records.51 age of 251 per month.50 In March 1944 the last of the B-25D models moved Under Raynor’s leadership North American imple- down the assembly line, and production began on a new mented several methods to reach these impressive produc- model. The B-25J incorporated several improvements. tion rates. Engineers applied sub-assemblies, an assembled Armor protection was added for the cockpit, and the bot- unit designed to be incorporated with other units, to the tom turret was no longer installed, for it had proven too Mitchell. Five sections—front, center, rear fuselage, wings, slow and awkward to operate in combat. The top turret was and empennage—were broken down into assemblies, split moved forward to give more front firepower. Package ma- into sub-assemblies, and further divided into component chine guns were added below the cockpit, four on each parts. The employees, therefore, built the planes from the side. Some J models received a solid nose instead of the simplest level to the complex whole. The progressive se- glass enclosure nose; in this solid nose eight machine guns quence of operations increased production. Since much of were placed, making a possible total of eighteen machine the work force was new, with little training or experience, guns per plane. North American put much effort into work simplification. Effective July 7, 1944, North American ceased produc- Each task was broken down into a number of jobs, and tion of the B-25 at the Inglewood plant and focused on each employee or crew was trained to perform a specific building the P-51 fighter. Its Dallas facility also was primar- job or jobs. Thus, workers learned their jobs more quickly ily involved in the production of the P-51 as well as the AT- and were more promptly effective. Throughout the pro- 6 trainer. Thus, from mid-1944 the Kansas City plant was duction process inspectors verified the suitability of the the sole source of B-25s.52 Since the plant operation was run- work before passing it to the next stage; at times the defining at such a high pitch, modifications were incorporated ciency was marked and a rework crew corrected it in the into the assembly process. As a result, the modification cen- following stage. This quality control was two-tiered, North ter was closed in October, and thereafter it was used as an American, then AAF. During the war American aircraft adjunct to the final assembly line.

51. Skyline 4 (July-August 1943): 10, 11; Lilley, Problems of Accelerating 50. Lilley, Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During Aircraft Production During World War II, 40, 41. World War II, 97. 52. “Leads In Bomber,” Kansas City Times, July 7, 1944.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 257 Employees gather at the Kansas City plant to receive the Army–Navy E Award, given to them on October 6, 1944, for excellence in production.

On October 6, 1944, the Kansas City plant received the five deaths; one flight line fatality resulted when a ground Army–Navy E award for excellence in production. The worker walked into a whirling propeller.55 plant’s success was emblematic of the American aircraft in- Completed planes were assigned to one of a number of dustry’s achievement during World War II. President Roo- crew chiefs. Each chief had three aircraft in his charge at sevelt had appealed for 50,000 planes per year; in 1944 U.S. most times and three to five mechanics in his crew. They production totaled 96,318 warplanes.53 A 1947 study of checked lubricant levels, replaced the engines’ dehydrator World War II aircraft production observed the following plugs with spark plugs, and inspected principal fasteners. about the work force building these planes: The engines were then started, and mechanics inspected carburetor settings, fuel and oil pressures, manifold pres- Many were housewives, farmers, and employees in sure, engine temperature, and propeller functions. Crews service industries ranging from automobile salesmen made adjustments or repairs and monitored engines for to beauty parlor operators. Particularly in the new gasoline and oil leaks. Flight line inspectors worked with plants constructed in the Middle West, a high percent- the crew to double-check each detail. When all was satis- age of the employees had had no previous experience in factory work of any kind. The success of the pro- factory, the flight line foreman was advised, and the test duction program is attributable in considerable mea- pilot and crew chief verified correct operation of all control sure to the ability which these inexperienced men and surfaces—ailerons, elevators, rudders, and trim tabs—and women displayed in mastering their completely new inspected the landing gear. With engines running, instru- wartime jobs.54 ments were checked, and the aircraft proceeded to take-off. A maiden flight lasted about an hour, during which hen a completed aircraft left the final assembly time the engines, propellers, instruments, controls, and au- doors, it was ready for flight testing. Consider- tomatic pilot were tested for proper operation. Upon the W ing the volume of flight line activity and number plane’s return, the assigned mechanics addressed any prob- of test flights, the safety record was excellent—only five sig- lems, or “squawks,” as they were termed. A second flight nificant flying accidents occurred, one of which resulted in was made with the addition of a radio operator. Several ma- neuvers and operations were conducted, including flight on

53. “E For War Work,” ibid., October 7, 1944; Holley, United States Army in World War I, 548. 54. Lilley, Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World 55. “Five Die In Crash,” Kansas City Times, April 27, 1942; “Killed By War II, 75. A Propeller,” Kansas City Star, February 22, 1943.

258 KANSAS HISTORY Every completed aircraft under- went a series of checks and inspec- tions before and during its test flight. All problems were addressed and repaired before it went up again for its acceptance flight. This B-25J bomber, with a standard bombardier nose, was built at the Kansas City plant in 1944–1945.

one engine. One out of every fifty B-25s was flown to the shortened. The test flight office scheduled four pilots to fly Cheyenne Bottoms Gunnery and Bombing Range near to Lockheed in California to check out on the jet.57 Great Bend to test fire the machine guns in flight. Sometimes War news overtook the schedule, however. The Ger- an aircraft would go through a five-hour, high altitude test. mans capitulated on May 7, 1945, and at the end of the Throughout the flight, “squawks” were recorded and ad- month, the AAF made large cuts in plane production, par- dressed by the responsible crew upon return. Once satisfied, ticularly in short-range types not suited to the Pacific the- North American notified the AAF test pilot office. A service ater. Kansas management received its P-80 cancellation pilot and crew chief then took the plane up for its acceptance order and released fifteen hundred employees. The B-25 flight before the government actually “bought” it. The plane schedule was expected to be complete in December, there- was then ready to receive any additional equipment and to fore average monthly employment gradually dropped for be flown by the ferry command to its destination.56 the first six months of the year. War news again changed In January 1945 the Kansas City plant set a production the plans. The Japanese surrendered on August 14, 1945, record: the AAF accepted 315 aircraft, along with 20 spare- and the next day the B-25 contract was terminated.58 part equivalents. For the next three months production re- In his farewell message to the employees, Harold R. mained high while a new venture began. The Lockheed P- Raynor said, “Men and women of North American Avia- 80 was America’s first operational jet fighter. North tion. The day we have been fighting for since December 7, American offered its Kansas City plant to augment Lock- 1941 has come at last. The world is finally freed of the fear heed’s production, and the War Department approved. In of aggression and we can now go back to our peacetime February 1945 two Lockheed representatives came to pursuits.”59 At that time North American’s Kansas division Kansas City to liaison with North American engineering had approximately 7,600 employees. In little more than a and production staff, and in April Lockheed shipped a P-80 week the firm laid off 4,680. The remaining workers dealt to the bomber plant for study. While work began on build- with paperwork, finished special projects and spare parts ing jigs for the new plane, workmen cleared space for P-80 for the AAF, completed work on the planes ready to leave production in the high bay, and the B-25 assembly line was

57. North Ameri-Kansan, August 17, 1945. 58. North American Aviation, Inc.: A Brief History of the B-25 Mitchell 56. North Ameri-Kansan, April 14, 1944; Skyline (May–June 1943): 2, 3; Bomber, 29. ibid. (September–October 1944): 18-19. 59. North Ameri-Kansan, August 17, 1945.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 259 Following the end of the war Gen- eral Motors leased Kansas City’s former bomber plant and began manufacturing Buicks, Oldsmo- biles, and Pontiacs. Automobile production continued at this site until 1987.

final assembly and those on the flight line, and began the plant was essentially cleared of all aircraft production mat- job of preparing the machines, tools, materials, and parts ter, and automobile industry personnel began setting up for disposition.60 shop. In October 1949 the U.S. Air Force terminated its The federal government’s Reconstruction Finance Cor- lease on Fairfax Airport, and the city of Kansas City, poration (RFC) set up a depot in the Fairfax district to sell Kansas, regained control of the facility. machinery, tools, and similar material to peacetime indus- The reconverted factory finished its first automobile in tries and the public and thereby partially recoup the gov- June 1946, and for the next forty or so years it produced ernment’s war costs. Some of the bomber plant items were Buicks, Oldsmobiles, and Pontiacs. During the Korean War sent to the depot, while others were transferred for gov- the factory was utilized in the dual role of manufacturing ernment use elsewhere. Such materials as aluminum sheet automobiles and F-84 Thunderstreak aircraft.62 In 1960 and steel goods went to reclamation centers, and spare air- General Motors purchased the plant. In 1985 the company plane parts were dispatched to maintenance depots. Sev- announced its plans to build a new auto assembly plant on enty-two incomplete but flyable B-25s were accepted under the Fairfax Airport property and closed the former airport. the contract and flown elsewhere for sale to the public. Soon after, the modification center was razed, and automo- During this demobilization the federal government bile production at the former bomber plant ceased in May classified the plant, modification center, and associated 1987. In less than two years the building that had been a properties as available for lease. Transcontinental and setting of such importance during World War II was gone.63 Western Air leased the modification center, whose first use Now only an empty lot remains, although the street sign would be in servicing its airliners. On November 7, 1945, it nearby stands as a faint reminder, despite its misspelled was announced that General Motors had signed a five-year designation: Kindleberger Road. lease for the former bomber plant.61 By December 1 the

60. Telegram of War Manpower Commission, August 25, 1945, Office of the Regional Director, Kansas City, Missouri, Regional Central Files 1943–1945, 533.05/03, Entry 269, box 19, RG 211; “Speed Bomber Wind- 62. George R. Bauer, A Century of Kansas City Aviation History: The Up,” Kansas City Star, August 24, 1945; “B-25 Tools Out,” Kansas City Dreamers and the Doers (N.p.: Historic Preservation Press, 1999), 85. Times, September 28, 1945. 63. “Fairfax Decision Based on Economics,” Kansas City Times, July 61. “TWA to Center,” Kansas City Star, October 24, 1945; “Rush Car 16, 1988; “GM’s Old Fairfax Plant Burns,” Kansas City Star, January 19, Plant,” ibid., November 7, 1945. 1989.

260 KANSAS HISTORY t the start of the war the Axis position of strength, rights movement gathered momentum and built upon which had been built from years of rearmament, wartime changes to realize better the promise of America. A resulted in a string of victories. Airpower played a The physically challenged also were given an opportunity major role, as evidenced by the Japanese attack on Pearl to demonstrate their abilities in the workplace. During the Harbor and the sinking of the British warships Prince of war the bomber plant was one of the largest production Wales and Repulse; the Luftwaffe’s tactical support of the employers in the Kansas City area; it invigorated the local German army proved markedly effective in the 1940 economy with more than $160 million in payroll. The em- blitzkrieg in western Europe. The tide turned as Allied rear- ployees earned good pay, which was much appreciated in mament and manpower steadily drew near and then an America still suffering from the effects of the Great De- eclipsed that of the adversaries. Pilot and crew training and pression. Of 59,337 total employees, approximately 55,000 the production of more and improved types of aircraft fa- had trained for and then garnered valuable work experi- cilitated Allied victories, which culminated in the triumph ence at the Fairfax facility.67 These workers gained knowl- over the Axis. The B-25 played an important role. It was edge and skills that prepared them for many peacetime oc- flown in every major front of the war and was a vital cupations. The conversion of the Fairfax defense plant to weapon of U.S. forces and several of its allies. peacetime use as an automobile manufacturing facility pro- When Mitchell production ended in August 1945, 6,608 vided a more prosperous life to thousands of workers, and, B-25s had been built in the Kansas City plant, along with of course, benefited the entire metropolitan area. 947 spare part equivalents. It is truly a remarkable accom- Finally, North American Aviation, along with Boeing, plishment when one considers that “the B-25 contains Beech Aircraft, and Cessna Aircraft of Wichita, the Kansas 165,000 separate parts, not counting 150,000 rivets or the Ordnance Works near Parsons, and Sunflower Ordnance engines, instruments, and other equipment.”64 Besides the near Lawrence, had a profound impact on the Kansas econ- production total, by war’s end 3,985 airplanes had been ser- omy, labor force, and industrial complex. Together they re- viced at the Fairfax modification center. This work saved made the Sunflower State, giving it a truly mixed economy. field maintenance personnel, resources, and time, resulting Not only were record numbers of Kansas workers—some in the Mitchell’s prompt and effective use against the 74,500—involved in aircraft manufacture (up from 1,480 in enemy.65 February 1940), but they were making high wages for the Interviews with many Kansas division defense plant time. In 1940 such workers averaged $25.01 per week; in workers reveal two common threads defining their ap- 1945 the figure had increased to $55.68. In the state “virtu- proach to the bomber plant experience: work ethic and pa- ally no one was employed in manufacturing ordnance in triotism. The employees were “really dedicated to what 1941; by early 1945 the two plants employed more than they were doing” and “did their best.” Their common goal eighteen thousand workers.” In January 1940 Kansas was was “to beat the Axis.” “We all had a cause to work for,” home to 447,000 square feet of airframe plants; four year and that purpose was simply, “Let’s build these planes and later it had 6,155,000 square feet.68 North American’s facili- win this war!”66 ties, of course, were converted to different peacetime uses, North American employees helped accomplish this but others, such as Wichita’s Cessna and Boeing, remained and more. After the war most women returned to their major players in America’s aircraft industry. North Ameri- more traditional roles, but the war experience laid the foun- can’s Kansas division was but part of our state and nation- dation for women’s later advancement into diverse jobs al history, but it was an important one. North American and that previously had been closed to them. African American its employees worked together for a common cause and gains were incremental, but throughout the nation the civil helped win the war.

64. North Ameri-Kansan, August 17, 1945; Lilley, Problems of Accelerat- ing Aircraft Production During World War II, 37. 67. “Contribution to Peace,” Kansas City Star, August 19, 1945. 65. AAF Historical Study 62, Statistics. 68. Peter Fearon, “Ploughshares into Airplanes: Manufacturing In- 66. Concha Macias, interview by author, July 26, 1988; Ralph Mar- dustry and Workers in Kansas During World War II,” Kansas History: A shall, interview by author, May 1, 1989; Roy Corriston, interview by au- Journal of the Central Plains 22 (Winter 1999/2000): 300–2; William Glenn thor, October 15, 1988; Lillian Shaver, interview by author, September 18, Cunningham, The Aircraft Industry: A Study in Industrial Location (Los An- 1989; Edward Roebuck, interview by author, July 15, 1988. geles: Lorrin L. Morrison, 1951), 203–9, 213.

“WE ALL HAD A CAUSE” 261