Exploring metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region

Roger Barres

Urban Studies: Master’s (Two-Year) Thesis Tutor: Peter Parker Spring Semester 2021

Exploring metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region

Roger Barres

Urban Studies: Master’s (Two-Year) Thesis Tutor: Peter Parker Spring Semester 2021

Summary and information For the first time in history, more people in the world live in urban areas than in rural areas. Almost half of this world urban population now live in metropolitan areas, which are becoming central spaces of world economic and social activity, and where major global challenges happen and should be tackled.

Metropolitan areas are defined by urban spaces of integrated mobility flows and markets, but also by high institutional fragmentation and political decomposition. This fragmentation interferes in decision-making processes leading to difficulties for the design and implementation of adequate responses to metropolitan problems. In this context, the study of how metropolitan areas should be governed is gaining relevance in the field of urban studies, among other fields.

The normative debates about metropolitan governance has been framed by three traditions. From the 60s to the late 80s these debates were restricted to the ‘old regionalism’ dialectics between the metropolitan reform and public choice scholars. More recently, new regionalism recognize in flexible and cooperative governance instruments the most effective way to deal with metropolitan problems. From this perspective metropolitan areas are governed by complex governance relations between diverse actors through multiple and concurrent instruments, in the form of policy networks, voluntary cooperation, strategic planning, and so on.

The Öresund Region is a metropolis that spans from eastern Denmark to southern Sweden, and includes cities such as Copenhagen and Malmö. While it has been largely referenced and praised as an example of cross-border metropolitan area, there is little evidence on how it is governed or which are the main governance instruments or who are the actors involved in the policy-making process.

Taking an original approach to the study of metropolitan governance, this paper represents a first attempt to identify and understand the main features of metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region as a system, in a polycentric and multilayered cross- border metropolis.

The results suggest that metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region is very ambiguous, with several agents acting in different and non-coincident scales, strongly focused in hard policies and development policies in contrast to social and environmental policy areas. Also, there are persistent barriers to cross-border governance despite the favorable context. And finally, there is a relevant democratic governance deficit, in terms of social actors’ participation and involvement in the metropolitan decision-making process.

These first results recommend to go forward with further research in this issue. Particularly to grasp about governance networks operatives, policy-making processes, and citizens’ political orientations to, ultimately, propose improvements for a more effective, comprehensive and democratic governance in the Öresund metropolitan region.

Key words: metropolitan area, city-region, metropolitan governance, urban politics, cross-border metropolitan region, democratic governance, Öresund region

1 Table of Content

Summary and information 1

Introduction, aim and problem 3

Theory and method 5 Metropolitan governance: schools of thought 5 Cross-border metropolitan governance 7 Method 8

Defining and delimiting metropolitan areas: the Öresund Region 12 The OECD definition of functional urban areas 13 Eurostat and national statistical agencies definitions: SCB and DST 14 Contrasting definitions 16 The Öresund Region as a cross-border metropolitan region 18

Metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region 26 Metropolitan governments in the Öresund Region 26 Metropolitan agencies in the Öresund Region 27 Vertical coordination in the Öresund Region 32 Voluntary cooperation in the Öresund Region 33

The Öresund’s metropolitan governance ‘system’: features and deficits 37

Conclusions and discussion 44

References 46

Appendices 52 Appendix A 52 Appendix B 55 Appendix C 57

2 Introduction, aim and problem

Current research in the field of urban studies very frequently starts with a similar claim: world population is more urban than ever; or the process of urbanization in the world is steadily growing. Nowadays, a majority of the world population is already living in urban areas. In 2030 it is predicted that the urban population will rise up to 60%. And, by 2050, 75% of the world population will be urban (UCLG, 2016; UN, 2018; UN Habitat, 2017).

Among the urban population, 41% is currently living in city-regions or metropolitan areas. Metropolitan regions are urban areas defined by socioeconomic flows and political fragmentation, in which a core city and its hinterlands are connected by some functional tie, in terms of commuting flows, labor markets, etc. They have become spaces in which central social and economic activities are constructed (Rodríguez-Pose, 2008) and are gaining relevance as spaces in which major global challenge–social, economic and environmental– should be tackled (Glaeser, 2011; Tomàs, 2016).

Taking into account the increasing centrality of metropolitan regions, they have become a very relevant topic for the academia, urban elites and policy circles. Specifically, whereas the challenges posed by the metropolitan phenomena are diverse, the debate on how they should be governed is gaining relevance in the field of urban studies (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Purcell, 2007; Savitch & Vogel, 2009).

The relevance of this studies is rooted in the fact that metropolitan regions are, by definition, fragmented spaces. Metropolization is characterized by processes of urbanization cutting across defined institutional and territorial boundaries, either local, regional or national boundaries. There is a divergence between the functional urban area that forms the metropolitan region and the several diverse public institutions that operate in this area. This institutional fragmentation and political decomposition ultimately interfere in the decision- and policy-making processes (Le Galès, 1998; Heinelt & Kübler, 2005), in simple words: “governmental fragmentation leads to difficulties regarding the formulation and implementation of adequate policy responses to metropolitan problems (Kübler & Schwab, 2007, p. 473).

The Öresund Region, also known as Greater Copenhagen, has been widely referenced and publicized as one most innovative and dynamic metropolitan regions in Europe (Hospers, 2006; Nauwelaers et al., 2013; OECD, 2015). In fact, it has been identified as a metropolitan region in terms of clustered economies, research and education, housing market or even culture and identity (Lund Hansen, et al., 2001; Greve & Rydbjerg, 2003; Garlick et al., 2006; Lögfren; O'Dell et al., 2011).

The construction of the Öresund bridge in 2000 represented a breaking point in the social, cultural and economic integration of the Danish and Swedish shores (Wichmann Matthiessen, 2004; Lögrofren, 2008; O’Dell et al., 2011; Nauwelaers et al., 2013). Since then, the metropolitan region is generally considered to include the urban area of Copenhagen and the areas of Malmö and Lund in Sweden and has been generally publicized as a best-practice of cross-border integration (Nauwelaers et al., 2013).

Having said that, the Öresund Region is still an ambiguous concept. In territorial terms it is generally accepted that includes the capital city of Copenhagen and its suburbs and

3 spans until the urban area of Malmö and Lund, in the southern part of Sweden. But there is still no clear definition of its limits and the communities included in.

In parallel, and more important to this research, despite its recognition there is an important lack of knowledge and understanding about its governance model. Particularly; which actors are involved and which excluded in the policy-making and decision-making process in this Region? Which policy areas, if any, are designed and implemented at the metropolitan scale? And ultimately, there is something such a metropolitan Öresund Region and how it is politically constructed? The aim of this research is to provide an initial and, to my knowledge, first-time exploration of the governance system in the Öresund metropolitan region.

In addition, I will take a special look into the democratic governance in the Öresund Region. Whereas research on metropolitan governance has traditionally focused in the most effective and efficient ways of organizing metropolitan areas, several authors have recently noted the necessity to look at the democratic legitimacy and performance of metropolitan arrangements (Hamilton, 2004; Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Purcell, 2007; Kübler, 2012; Zimmermann, 2014). In this sense, the study of metropolitan governance, and particularly in fragamented cross-border urban areas, might be relevant in order to understand the broader democratic sources and performance in urban development.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. In the first section I will present the most relevant theoretical approaches to metropolitan governance, their focus of study and their normative goals. Finally, I will present my methodological approach to the study of metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region.

Second, I will discuss the definition and delimitation of metropolitan regions. Since there is not a single definition of metropolitan or city-regions I will present the most common definitions, how they differently fit in the case of the Öresund Region. These delimitations will be the base for the further analysis of the metropolitan governance scheme in the Region.

Third, I will present the analysis of the Öresund Region from a metropolitan governance framework perspective. To do so, I identify the most relevant institutions and arrangements of metropolitan governance in the cross-border region and in each country, and I study their main features in terms of objectives and areas of intervention, membership, organization and representation.

Fourth, I will present the main results of the identification and description of the metropolitan governance structures and I will discuss some of the most relevant deficits and challenges.

Last, I summarize a set of conclusions and present some unsolved questions that require further research in the future.

4 Theory and method In the study of metropolitan regions, the debates about how they are governed is one of the most recurrent. These debates are controversial due to opposite visions, encountered interests, and contested normative conceptions of how metropolitan areas should be organized and governed, and which goals should they pursue. Traditionally these debates have been framed from the perspective of three schools of thought: the metropolitan reform, the public choice school and new regionalism (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Savitch & Vogel, 2009).

Metropolitan governance: schools of thought

During the 60s and 70s, the expansion of welfare state systems facilitated optimistic views on the capacity of governments to provide public goods and services (Keating, 1995; Tomàs, 2017b). In this context, the metropolitan reform school gained relevance. Metropolitan reform scholar saw in the existence of a large number of independent municipalities as the main obstacle to the efficient and equitable provision of public services and resources in metropolitan areas. The main mechanism to surpass the fragmentation was the consolidation of governmental structures at the metropolitan level (Sharpe, 1995; Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000). Therefore, metropolitan areas should become a single political-administrative unit through the creation of a metropolitan government with a high degree of autonomy and competences.

From this perspective, the superiority of consolidated metropolitan governments shall be understood from the capacity of consolidated metropolitan governments to meet principles such as territorial equality, effectiveness and democratic legitimacy through the direct elections of representatives (Sharpe, 1995; Tomàs, 2017b).

In the late 70s and the 80s, amid economic crisis and the rise of Thatcherism the metropolitan reform model lost momentum. Many of the most iconic metropolitan governments created in the previous years were abolished: Greater London, Greater Copenhagen Council, Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, Rotterdam… (Sharpe, 1991; 1995; Anders et al., 2002). Big metropolitan governments were criticized for being imposed models from upper-tier levels of government that hampered local autonomy and as highly centralized and excessively bureaucratic structures that created inefficient policies and processes (Bish & Ostrom, 1973; Tomàs, 2012).

In this context public choice approach emerged. Contrary to the reformist approach, public choice scholars argued that fragmentation was, in fact, positive for an effective provision of public goods and services. In such fragmented areas, people, seen as consumer-voters, would look for the most suitable place of residence in terms of services, taxes, etc. (Tiebout, 1956). Municipalities would have incentives to compete between them to attract residents, which ultimately would have a positive effect over the quality and efficiency of public services and goods (Ostrom et al., 1961; Bish & Ostrom, 1973). They also argue that small governments could be more effective and democratic than to big consolidated metropolitan governments since they were more responsive to the local needs (Bish & Ostrom, 1973).

More recently, in the 90s emerged a new school of thought, new regionalism, as a middle ground alternative to ‘old’ regionalism dialectics, between the metropolitan reform and

5 public choice schools (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Tomàs, 2012; 2017b). As we will see, this transition from ‘old’ to ‘new’ regionalism is closely linked to the ‘shift from government to governance’ (Kübler & Schwab, 2007, p. 474), which would raise parallel debates.

New regionalism emerged among scholars, particularity in the US, aware of the problematics derived from urban sprawl and spatial specialization. These scholars developed new conceptions about center-periphery interdependences and the need of joint action, social cohesion and redistribution in metropolitan regions (Rusk, 1993; Downs, 1994; Swanstrom, 2001).

Furthermore, new regionalism emerged in an era in which the globalization process, accompanied with a weakening of the nation-state (Barber, 2013), situated cities as economic and social global centers (Sassen, 1991; Glaeser, 2011). New urban hierarchies are created and cities compete for global capital, shifting their focus to business promotion and attraction, and entrepreneurialism, and regional development and global competition have become organizing principles for city-regions and metropolitan regions (Harvey, 1989, Le Galès, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; Jonas, 2012). Among them, metropolitan regions emerge and compete as global poles of economic and social production (Lever, 2001).

While new regionalism also recognizes strong metropolitan governance as necessary, in contrast to the metropolitan reform school that does not mean that it requires institutional consolidation. In contrast, new regionalism advocates for more flexible and less institutionalized forms of cooperation. From this perspective, metropolitan governance capacity is characterized by interdependence and cooperation, and it can be reached through policy networks and more flexible mechanisms of voluntary cooperation (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Kübler & Schwab, 2007).

Due to the particular institutional fragmentation of metropolitan regions cooperation is crucial in order to produce and provide public service and goods. This being said, institutional fragmentation usually comes with collective action problems that might hinder effective cooperation (Feiok, 2007; 2013; Ostrom, 2011). Specifically, some authors argue that the particularities of local communities are major explanators of institutional collective action in metropolitan contexts (Thurmaier & Wood, 2002; Feiock, 2009; Bel & Warner, 2015; Hawkins, 2017; Tavares & Feiock, 2018). There is a consensus that factors such as socio-economic homogeneity among communities (Tsebelis, 2002; Feiock, 2013; Tavares & Feiock, 2018), governmental organization similarity, cooperation tradition, and inter-institutional trust (McEvily et al., 2003; Feiok, 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2007), are among the most relevant factors of institutional collective action in metropolitan contexts.

In this respect, current research in metropolitan governance focuses in the interdependencies, roles and resources of policy networks involved in the policy-making and decision-making processes at the metropolitan scale.

Also, similar to the debates that governance theory have raised, new regionalism has contrasting views about democracy (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Kübler & Schwab, 2007). From an optimistic point of view the participation of a wide variety of actors in governance networks is an opportunity for citizen empowerment, state pluralization and

6 associative democracy, and may encourage more pluralistic and dialogic approaches to policy-making (Hirst, 1994; Sørensen & Torfing, 2005; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Bevir, 2010).

Several authors recognize that the coexistence of various mechanisms and legitimacies is key to democratic governance. For instance, Sørensen and Torfing (2005; 2009) note that democratic governance arrangements should rely on both direct and indirect democratic representation. They identify four main factors of democratic legitimacy: first, the control by democratic elected representatives that make sure that policy produced respond to the popular will represented by a political majority. Second, decision-making must rely on representative membership of the directly affected people and organizations, and reflect or take into account their diversity of interests, preferences and opinions. Third, governance activity must be hold accountable to a wider group of the indirectly affected. Finally, any governance arrangement must function through internal democratic rules and norms.

And Zimmermann (2014) points out at three main sources of democratic legitimacy in metropolitan governance: input legitimacy, output legitimacy, and throughput legitimacy. First, input legitimacy is given by both political representation through electoral processes and by the direct participation of groups and individuals in decision-making processes and their capacity to determine outcomes. In this sense, input legitimacy embraces representative democracy and mechanisms of participatory democracy or direct democracy. The second source of legitimacy is given by institutional action and its ability to respond to solutions to the needs of citizens. Finally, the third source makes reference to the ability to incorporate all relevant actors, beyond institutional actors, in the governance processes and it is defined by openness and inclusiveness, accountability, and transparency (Schmidt, 2013; Zimmermann, 2014).

In contrast, similar to the critiques raised against governance, there is a pessimistic view that worries about the centrality of effectiveness and efficiency and the dominance of market interests over democratic factors such as citizen participation and accountability (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Kübler & Schwab, 2007). From a democratic theory perspective, and in contrast to Zimmermann’s argument, this view sees a tension between the diverse sources of legitimacy; particularly between the seeking of effectiveness, that is output legitimacy, and citizen participation, thus input legitimacy (Dahl, 1994; Scharpf, 1999 in Kübler & Schwab, 2007). The incorportaion of private actors in poliy networks may have impact over the agenda setting and policy outcomes, in terms of prioritizin private interests, and may reduce democratic accountability due to the difusion of representative institutions inside networks (Mayntz, 1998; Papadopoulos, 2003 in Kübler & Schwab, 2007).

Cross-border metropolitan governance

All these challenges and interferences that metropolitan governance may face are even more demanding in cross-border contexts; besides highly fragmented contexts, cross- border metropolitan areas embedded in multi-national settings, formed by different domestic institutions which are characterized by contrasting political settings and cultures, different languages and policy paradigms (ESPON, 2010, p. 11).

While metropolitan governance research has been relatively scarce in the study of cross- border regions, policy networks literature has shown a strong interest (Sohn et al., 2009;

7 Nelles & Durand, 2012; Dörry & Decoville, 2013; Walther & Reitel, 2013; Sohn & Giffinger, 2015).

As Walther and Reitel note, the study of cross-border metropolitan regions is relevant for the at least three reasons (2013: 219). First, it forces to rethink a counterintuitive relationship between border spaces and the city as a node and center of accumulation and social interaction. Second, cross-border metropolitan regions have emerged as privileged spaces of globalization. And, third, these regions are among the most benefitted of the European integration process.

Policy network approach aims to understand actor relations and interdependences that shape policy-making processes and outcomes, focusing in identification of the key actors involved (Walther & Reitel, 2013). It has become a widely used approach in urban politics in general, but it has shown especially useful in the analysis of cross-border metropolitan regions “in the face of the fragmented territorial settings, diverging interests and dispersed resources” (Sohn & Giffinger, 2015, p. 1191). In contrast, governance research has looked at cross-national institutions and arrangements, but less on the interrelation between these and other local, regional and national actors.

That being said, new regionalists perspectives provide a very suitable framework to fill a gap between metropolitan governance literature and the analysis of cross-border metropolitan areas. Following Sohn and Giffinger (2015), cross-border metropolitan regions cannot be fully understood by the identification of fixed institutions. Instead, they are characterized by the proliferation of initiatives and institutional frameworks for cooperation in which public and private develop diffuse forms of governance based on multilateral connections between heterogeneous actors.

In this research I am particularly interested in the analysis of metropolitan governance applied to both national and cross-border metropolitan regions. As I will present, the urban areas at both sides of the Öresund should be understood as a system with multitiered interactions in either the cross-border context and each national one–Denmark and Sweden.

In order to do so, in this paper I have identified and analyzed metropolitan governance considering both institutions and policy networks with a metropolitan scale. In the next section I will present the methodology by which I have identified them and which factors I will take into account for the analysis of governance schemes.

Ultimately, the study of the Öresund Region is relevant from at least two perspectives. First, while the Öresund Regions has been widely referenced, to my knowledge this is the first analysis of its governance model, and, more generally, it contributes to a better understanding of metropolitan governances in the Nordic context. And second, it tries to bridge a gap in the study of metropolitan governance in cross-border contexts.

Method

I take a new regionalist approach to metropolitan governance. Through the revision of academic articles and books, policy papers, reports, and institutional websites I identify governance structures and networks that operate in the region, and describe determining factors of each in their role in a general system of governance.

8 First, in order to identify structures of metropolitan governance, I delimit the extension of the metropolitan region. For this I would evaluate the delimitations of the Öresund Region based in existing definitions. As a concept, metropolitan area or city region is loosely defined; there is a diversity of concepts and definitions, and the delimitation of a single metropolitan regions is often ambiguous. In the case of transnational city regions the existence of more than one sovereignty, with their particular institutional and political models, may add extra ambiguity.

Taking this in mind, prior to the definition of the metropolitan governance system, and in order to limit the focus area, I conduct a comparative analysis of the territorial delimitations of the Öresund Region. I contrast the most common and used methodologies and definitions of metropolitan regions and propose a delimitation for the case of the Öresund Region that sets a framework for the study of actors and institutions.

Then, I use an approach of metropolitan governance models for the identification of metropolitan actors. Metropolitan governance is usually operationalized following the principles of the three theoretical schools; for instance, Eklund (2016) classifies three models of metropolitan governance as consolidated, fragmentated and regionalization. Conversely, the Metropolitan Research Institute (2018) distinguishes between more institutional and consolidated vs. procedural arrangements. Here I will use the approach developed by Tomàs (2015; 2016; 2017a).

Tomàs defines metropolitan governance models by the interrelation of several elements, including fragmentation, competencies and powers, and political representation and democratic legitimacy. First, metropolitan governance can be characterized by diverse levels of fragmentation; in a context of institutional simplicity only one or few institutions operate at the metropolitan level. Otherwise, high fragmentation is given when a large number of structures have diverse competencies in a single metropolitan region.

Second, metropolitan institutions can have competencies and power over different areas, and more importantly they may be single- or multi-purpose entities. Metropolitan structures most usually have competencies in hard policies, and particularly, territorial planning, transport and environmental policies. Other areas in which they generally intervene are the ones related to economic development, particulary wealth generation and employment promotion, through policies meant to attract investments and skilled labour in a globalized economy, in line with the views of metropolitan regions as actors in global competition (Le Galès, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; Jonas, 2012).

Finally, Tomàs notes that metropolitan governance can vary in its democratic scope, from more exclusive forms of representation to more inclusive ones. From non-direct representation, traditional representative democracy to more pluralistic and participatory modes of democratic governance.

Taking into account all these elements Tomàs identifies four main models of metropolitan governance (2015; 2016; 2017a): metropolitan governments, metropolitan agencies, vertical coordination and voluntary cooperation.

• Metropolitan governments: governmental structures at the metropolitan level created expressly to deal with metropolitan problems. They ideally have own and exclusive competences, high or medium fiscal autonomy and a degree of

9 democratic legitimation through they direct election of representatives. They can be single-level–after the merge of municipalities and the consolidation of a metropolitan city government, e.g. London–or two-levels–maintaining municipalities plus a supra-municipal body of government, e.g. Hannover, Barcelona.

• Metropolitan agencies: sectorial agencies with a medium degree of institutionalization created to manage a single service, such as regional planning, public transport, environment, security and policing, etc.–e.g. Birmingham, Frankfurt.

• Vertical coordination: existing governments at the supra-municipal level, such as regions, counties or provinces, that provide de facto metropolitan policies and services even though they are not metropolitan in their territorial scale–e.g. Brussels, Madrid.

• Voluntary cooperation: the lowest institutionalized model, based on voluntary and flexible cooperation among municipalities or between public and private agents through governance networks, inter-municipal associations, political platforms, strategic planning, etc.–e.g. Hamburg, Helsinki.

From here, my particular view is that these are not exclusive models. From a new regionalist perspective, a diversity of model structures can coexist in a single territory. Moreover, we can expect that in cross-border metropolitan regions the existence of two or more sovereign nations, and their respective institutional models and legal frameworks, lead to the coexistence of diverse governance structures at both the national and transnational levels.

Tomàs’ model is suitable to identify and classify organizations and arrangements of metropolitan governance. Therefore, I use this classification as a tool for the identification of structures, entities, organizations of metropolitan governance and their levels of institutionalization. It is relevant to note that, in order to narrow the number of cases, I have chosen to look only at stable and enduring structures of governance, that are still active today.

Having said that, in this paper I am particularly interested in the analysis of metropolitan governance as a ‘system’. In order to do that I have taken into consideration policy networks and network governance approaches. Thus, I have followed a policy network approach in the aim to identify and understand actor relations and interdependences that shape policy-making processes and outcomes (Walther & Reitel, 2013; Sohn & Giffinger, 2015), And second, from the network governance literature, focused on the assessment of networks performance and their policy impact, I try to describe internal factors such as membership and number of participants, typology of actors involved, competences and procedures (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005; 2007; 2009; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Kenis & Provan, 2009).

In these terms, I take an approach in which governance structures are defined by both their internal features–membership and actors roles, policy outcomes, rules and procedures–and their position and role in the metropolitan governance ‘system’. I analyze the following dimensions:

10 • Scale: either if it is a governance structured that spans to the cross-border metropolitan scale or the national scale, and its territorial extension–which communities are included;

• Type of organization: how is formally defined each governance structure, public agency, PPP, association…;

• Areas of intervention: in which policy or policies domains are involved each governance structure;

• Membership and organization: what kind of actors are members of each governance structure and how they operate internally.

In sum, my approach to metropolitan governance takes into account both a classification of governance structures based on the scale and policy areas of intervention, but also other organizational characteristics, mainly actors involved, rules and roles.

More importantly, my perspective on the metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region, based on new regionalist and network approaches, is that diverse institutional models of metropolitan governance coexist as part of a broader ‘system’ of metropolitan governance (see figure 1). Only if we look at them together, will we be able to have a comprehensive approach of metropolitan governance.

Figure 1. Metropolitan governance framework

Metropolitan governments coordination

Scale Vertical Type of organization Areas of intervention

agencies Membership

Metropolitan Metropolitan

Voluntary cooperation

Source: own elaboration.

11 Defining and delimiting metropolitan areas: the Öresund Region There is not a single definition of metropolitan regions. In addition, the diversity of definitions includes several relevant factors: economic, housing or labor market ties between core city and hinterlands, social and cultural dominance by the core, one single core or polycentric regions… (for a review see Rodríguez-Pose, 2008). It is also frequent the find confusion and interchange of many concepts: global cities, urban agglomerations, city-regions, functional urban areas… In particular, metropolitan regions, city-regions and functional urban areas are commonly used as synonymous. Yet, usually these differences are just a matter of size (Le Galès, 2002; Lidström, 2012).

Having said that, among all the definitions there is a minimum common denominator: the existence of a core city surrounded by hinterlands and connected by functional ties. In statistical terms these functional ties usually take form of commuter flows or regional labor markets (Bennet, 1985; Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; Nordregio, 2016). From this basic definition there are many methodological approaches. In the European context, among the most relevant the OECD has developed a methodology to define functional urban areas (FUA). The European statistical office, Eurostat, has elaborated a list of European metropolitan regions and many countries have own methodologies to identify and delimit metropolitan regions thorough their statistical agencies. It is relevant to note that there are also other methodological approaches that have focused on urban agglomerations instead of metropolitan regions1, the main difference being that the former does not consider existing administrative boundaries to identify and the latter take into account either the municipality or other administrative divisions to define limits.

That being said, there is a clear methodological gap between those methodologies and the definition of cross-border metropolitan regions. Political sciences tend to look at sociopolitical phenomena through a statist lens; that is the nation-state as the basic unit of research. The urban and metropolitan dimensions do not escape from this. At first glance, this might have two simple answers. First, the urban phenomenon, and particularly metropolization, are so highly determined by state institutions and national dynamics that they rarely cut across national borders. While, there is evidence of the effects of national borders in both individual and institutional behavior, cross-border metropolitan integration is not uncommon in Europe (Blatter, 2003; Reitel, 2006; Sohn et al., 2009; Bartz & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2012; Durand & Nelles, 2012; Walther & Reitel, 2013; Nelles & Durand, 2014; Sohn & Giffinger, 2015).

The second explanation is that the methodologies used to empirically analyze urbanization and metropolization are still constrained national borders and policies that they fail to explain these processes in transnational spaces. For instance, national statistics on employment do not consider cross-border commuting (Nordregio, 2016).

In the following section I will present the most common definitions of metropolitan areas, and contrast them in the case of the Danish and Swedish areas in the Öresund Region. Based on these definitions I will propose a common delimitation of the whole cross- border region that will guide the analysis of the governance system.

1 For an example see https://www.scb.se/contentassets/48ad89a072bd4779bf19cd94d06a7130/poster_creating-urban- geographies_statistics-sweden.pdf [16/05/2020]

12 The OECD definition of functional urban areas

One of the most used definitions of metropolitan areas is OECD functional urban areas (FUA) classification2. This methodology defines functional urban areas based on two groups of municipalities with specific commuting flows (OECD, 2013; Nordregio, 2016; Dijkstra, Poelman, & Veneri, 2019):

a) urban cores, consisting in high-density urban clusters with more than 50,000 inhabitants and 1,500 inhabitants/km2

b) and their hinterlands; commuting zones with at least 15% of the employed residents working in a core.

From these definitions the OECD categorize four classes of FUA:

1) Large metropolitan areas: urban cores and their hinterlands with a population above 1.5 million people.

2) Metropolitan areas: population between 500,000 and 1.5 million people.

3) Medium-sized urban areas: population between 200,000 and 500,000 people.

4) Small urban areas: population between 50,000 and 200,000 people.

From this methodology, Nordregio (2016) identifies only two large metropolitan areas in the Nordic countries–Stockholm and Copenhagen–, four metropolitan areas–Helsinki, Oslo, Goteborg and Malmö–, ten medium-sized urban areas and thirteen small urban areas, including Helsingborg (see table 1). In the whole Öresund Region, Nordregio identifies three FUA: Copenhagen, Malmö and Helsingborg.

Table 1. Functional urban areas in the Nordic countries FUA class Sweden Denmark Finland Norway Iceland Total per FUA class Large Stockholm Copenhagen - - - metropolitan areas 2 Metropolitan Goteborg - Helsinki Oslo - areas Malmö 4 Medium- Uppsala Aarhus Tampere Bergen Reykjavik sized urban Odense Turku Stavanger areas Aalborg Trondheim 10 Small urban Linköping - Oulu Kristiansand - areas Örebro Jyväskylä Tromsø Västerås Lahti Helsingborg Kuopio Norrköping Jönköping Umeå Borås 14 Total per country 12 4 7 6 1 30 Source: Nordregio (2016).

2 See https://measuringurban.oecd.org [11/04/20]

13 The OECD methodology identifies Copenhagen as one of the two only large metropolitan areas in the Nordic countries. The Copenhagen urban area has a population of over 2.2 million people across 37 municipalities from two regions, Hovedstaden (“The Capital Region”) and Zealand. However, a relevant share of the metropolitan population that is concentrated in the city of Copenhagen (28.2%), while the following bigger cities slightly represents a 3-5% of the regional population (see appendix A1).

In Sweden, the OECD method identifies Malmö as a metropolitan area, formed by 14 municipalities and with a population of almost 770,000 inhabitants (see appendix A2). Its urban core is formed by Malmö and Lund, which together have a population of over 460,000 inhabitants, representing 60.5% of the total population of the metropolitan region. Malmö alone represents over 44% of the metropolitan population. In contrast to the Copenhagen region, while Malmö-Lund is not as monocentric by the fact that it has two core cities, it is a much more concentrated area.

The OECD methodology also delimits medium- and small-sized urban areas. In this case it identifies Helsingborg as an independent medium-sized urban area of more than 204,000 inhabitants. The urban core in the Helsingborg municipality and three hinterland municipalities: Höganäs, Åstorp and Bjuv (see appendix A3). In this case, the population of the core city represents more than 70% of the total population.

Eurostat and national statistical agencies definitions: SCB and DST

Another common classification of metropolitan areas is the one provided by national statistical agencies. There is not a common definition of metropolitan regions among national classifications so comparative analysis might face some problems. In this case, Statistiska centralbyrån or SCB is the Swedish statistical agency and Danmarks Statistik or DST in Denmark.

DST uses Eurostat’s definition of metropolitan regions. In this case, Eurostat makes use of the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) classification as the basic unit to delimit metropolitan regions. In particular NUTS-3, which in Sweden correspond to the regions and in Denmark to the provinces3. Therefore, Eurostat defines a metropolitan region as a single NUTS-3 region or a group of NUTS-3 regions in which 50% or more of the population lives in an urban area of at least 250,000 inhabitants (Eurostat, 2019).

In this model in Sweden there are four metropolitan regions: Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö and Uppsala, that respectively correspond to the regions of Stockholm, Västra Götaland, Skåne and Uppsala. And in Denmark there are four metropolitan regions Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense and Aalborg, that correspond to the provinces of Copenhagen city, East Jutland, Funen and North Jutland. By this methodology in the Öresund region there is one metropolitan area: Greater Copenhagen which corresponds to the Byen København (“Copenhagen city”) province. It is formed by 18 municipalities with a total population of over 1.3 million people. Almost half of the total population is concentrated in the city of Copenhagen (see appendix A4).

3 DK011 Copenhagen city; DK012 Copenhagen region; DK013 North Zealand; DK014 Bornholm; DK021 East Zealand; DK022 West and South Zealand; DK031 Funen; DK032 South Jutland; DK041 West Jutland; DK042 East Jutland; DK050 North Jutland. See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background [10/04/20]

14 Typology of metrolitan regions (at the level of NUTS 3) (¹) Figure 2. Metropolitan regions at the level of NUTS-3 in Europe

Canarias (ES) Guadeloupe (FR)

0100 025 Martinique (FR) Guyane (FR)

020 0100

Réunion (FR) Mayotte (FR)

020 015

Malta Açores (PT)

010 050

Madeira (PT) Liechtenstein

020 05

Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN-FAO © Turkstat Cartography: Eurostat - GISCO, 08/2016

Capital metropolitan regions 0200400600800 km Metropolitan regions Non-metro regions

Source: Eurostat.

The Swedish statistical office has its own model for delimiting metropolitan regions. They define metropolitan areas from mobility and commuting flows, and collaboration in 4 planning(¹) Based on population between grid from municipalities 2011 and NUTS 2013.. They identify three metropolitan areas in Sweden: GreaterSource: Eurostat, Stockholm, JRC and European Greater Commission Gothenburg Directorate-General and for Greater Regional Policy Malmö. In this case, Greater Malmö is formed by 12 municipalities (see appendix A5). It is the smallest of the three Swedish metropolitan areas with a total population of 733,000 inhabitants concentrated in Malmö (46.5%) and Lund (16.8%).

4 See https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/regional-statistik-och-kartor/regionala-indelningar/funktionella-regioner-och- kommungrupper/ [10/04/20]

15 Contrasting definitions

In comparative terms, the OECD method defines bigger, more fragmented, less concentrated5 metropolitan regions. For the Copenhagen region the differences between the two definitions are very significant (see table 2). The OECD identifies Copenhagen as a region with +900,000 inhabitants and +19 municipalities than Eurostat–and DST. In spatial terms it extends over more municipalities in the Region Sjælland and it is less concentrated: the relative weight of Copenhagen is lowered by the coexistence of a bigger number of municipalities and, particularly, medium-size cities such as Roskilde, Holbæk or Helsingør.

Table 2. Method comparison for Copenhagen N municipalities Population 2019 Fragmentation Concentration OECD-Nordregio 37 2,209,139 1.7 28.2 Eurostat (DST) 18 1,320,629 1.4 47.2 Diff. (OECD-DST) +19 +888,510 +0.3 -19.0 Source: own elaboration from DST.

In the Swedish case, the differences between the two methods are not that significant (see table 3). In the OECD definition the Malmö urban area has two more municipalities, Sjöbo and Hörby, and +35,000 inhabitants. However, in comparison to Greater Malmö defined by SCB it is slightly a more fragmented region, and the weight of the most populous municipalities is a somewhat lower.

Table 3. Method comparison for Malmö N municipalities Population 2019 Fragmentation Concentration OECD-Nordregio 14 767,780 1.8 44.4 SCB 12 733,037 1.6 46.5 Diff. (OECD-SCB) +2 +34,743 +0.2 -2.1 Source: own elaboration from SCB.

Eventually, comparing the two metropolitan regions is not surprising that the Copenhagen region is bigger than Malmö, both in terms of number of municipalities and population– over 1 million people more on average. However, they are quite comparable in terms of concentration (46.0 on average), except for the OECD definition of the Copenhagen area, and also similar with regard to fragmentation (1.6 on average).

But most importantly, it is interesting how a seemingly objective definition of a metropolitan region can vary so greatly. That has direct implications for how appropriate governance might be viewed.

5 Fragmentation makes reference to administrative division of a region, calculated by: n municipalities/metro population*100,000; Concentration is the relative weight of the most populous municipality, calculated by: city population/metro population*100

16 Figure 3. Delimitations of urban areas in the Öresund Region

Source: own elaboration from Nordregio, DST and SCB.

17 The Öresund Region as a cross-border metropolitan region

Now, it is clear that none of the most used methods to identify and delimit metropolitan areas takes into account the transnational scale and they are blind to cross-border metropolitan regions. This is due mainly to the lack of national statistics on employment that consider cross-border commuting (Nordregio, 2016). Fortunately, and contrary to the most common lack of cross-border commuting data, the Ørestat project, and particularly Öresundsdatabasen6, collects and harmonizes socioeconomic data for the Öresund Region.

The data available in Öresundsdatabasen shows that commuting in the Öresund region7 has been a story of success, especially in the period 1997-2008, when the number of commuters grew year by years. The opening of the Öresund bridge in 2000 represented a breaking point in these flows (Wichmann Matthiessen, 2004; Nauwelaers et al., 2013). Cross-border commuting reached its peak in 2008 with over 25,000 commuters. However, the outbreak of the financial crisis stopped this tendency and started a steady decline (figure 4).

Figure 4. Commuters and other income recipients in the Öresund Region (1997-2015)8

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

From SW to DK From DK to SW

Source: own elaboration from Öresundsdatabasen.

Commuting patterns in the Region has always been characterized by uneven flows from each country; the amount of commuters from Sweden to Denmark is consistently a vast

6 The Öresundsdatabasen is an open database with border regional statistics for the Öresund region that contains comparable, harmonized and unique cross-border statistics. It was built thanks to European Interreg funds: Örestat I, Örestat II and Örestat III, which ended in 2013. See http://www.orestat.se [13/04/20] 7 Öresundsdatabasen defines the Öresund Region as an area comprising all the municipalities in Skåne, Region Hovedstaden and Region Sjælland. See http://www.orestat.se/sites/all/files/sb_geo_uk_endelig.pdf [13/04/20] 8 The units of the statistics are commuters and income recipients. Commuters are Danish residents and whose primary job (in November) is situated in the Swedish part of the Öresund Region or conversely. Income recipients are persons who have a secondary job or who have earned income during the year in the other country. See http://www.orestat.se/sites/all/files/comparability_study_comuters_in_the_Öresunds_region_uk_2015.pdf [13/04/20]

18 majority of the total commuters. The factors of this trend are varied, and includes Danes moving to Skåne to take advantage of cheaper housing while retaining their job in Denmark, and Swedes attracted to the labor market and work conditions in Denmark (Nauwelaers et al., 2013).

In 2015, the last year with full-year data available9, there were over 18,000 regional commuters in the Öresund. A vast majority (91%) of the cross-border commuter went from Sweden to Denmark. However, even in the areas with more cross-border out- commuters–Malmö, Helsingborg or Vellinge–, they slightly represents 3-7% of the total employed residents (see figure 5).. This numbers are away from the 15% threshold stablished by the OECD, therefore Malmö might be considered more a core of its own region than a hinterland of Copenhagen.

Figure 5. Share of out-commuters from Skåne to the Danish part of the Öresund Region, by municipality (2015)

15% 14% 13% 12% 11% 10% 9% 8% commuters

- 7% 6%

% out % 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0%

Bjuv Lund Höör Eslöv Sjöbo Hörby Ystad Osby Malmö BurlövSkurupSvedala Lomma Klippan ÅstorpSvalöv Båstad Vellinge Perstorp HöganäsKävlinge Tomelilla Bromölla LandskronaTrelleborg ÄngelholmHässleholm Helsingborg Staffanstorp Örkelljunga Simrishamn Östra Göinge Kristianstad Skåne municipalities

Source: own elaboration from Öresundsdatabasen.

Total mobility flows –registered commuting plus others such as cargo, tourism, etc.– is also be relevant to grasp the level of integration of the region. In 2019 over 12 million train passenger and 7.5 million vehicles crossed the bridge. The trend has been clearly positive since the opening of the bridge showing the key relevance of this infrastructure for the Region.

From these data it is also clear that cross-border commuting is especially sensitive to particular events and crises. For instance, the 2008 crisis clearly affected the number of cross-border commuting flows. Also, ID checks and border controls introduced in 2014 due to the refugee crisis prolonged travel time resulting in fewer rail-way passengers from

9 The last data available is from 2015 since the data exchange between Sweden and Denmark meet some problems that still persist.

19 2015-2016 but a rising in car travels over the bridge10. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions introduced in both Denmark and Sweden has reduced in 60-70% the rail-way and car travels in the bridge during spring 202011, and it will probably have long-term effects in the Region.

Figure 6. Volume of rail-way passengers and vehicles* at the Öresund bridge (2001-2019)

14.000

13.000

12.000

11.000

10.000

9.000

8.000

7.000

6.000 in thousands 5.000

4.000

3.000

2.000

1.000

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Rail-way passengers Bridge traffic

*Includes: cars, MC, minibus, coaches and trucks and vans from 6m. Source: own elaboration from Øresundsbron.

Yet, despite the processes of globalization and European de-bordering has favored cross- border flows of goods, capital and people, it is also true that borders still represent important barriers to commuting flows (Greve & Rydbjerg, 2003; Schmidt T. , 2005). Even the most favorable contexts for the free movement of workers such as the European Union and the Schengen Area face specific difficulties that adds costs to cross-border commuting.

In regions such as the Öresund, in which socio-economic and cultural differences are relatively low, and there are long-standing cooperation agreements, there are still important barriers that favor immobility. The most relevant ones: time and transport costs12, language, and lack of information/transparency about the consequences of commuting in terms of taxes, benefits, pensions, etc. (Greve & Rydbjerg, 2003; Löfgren, 2008).

In sum, both physical and non-physical barriers to commuting makes it difficult to define cross-border urban areas in the same terms by the thresholds described above. In this sense, authors like Schmidt (2005) suggest that in terms of identifying cross-border metropolitan regions, cross-border commuting cannot be compared to commuting patterns in a domestic context.

10 See https://www.Öresundsinstituttet.org/fact-sheet-the-effects-of-the-id-and-border-checks-between-scania-and- zealand/ [19/04/20] 11 See https://www.Öresundsinstituttet.org/fakta-pendlingen-over-sundet/ [19/04/20] 12 The train route between Hyllie and Copenhagen Airport is one of the most expensive in Europe. See https://www.thelocal.com/20181205/oeresund-commuters-protest-10-percent-fare-hike [13/04/20]

20

The Region might be then defined by a cores-peripheries configuration. The main core is Copenhagen, with 40% of the population and a great majority of the in-commuting flows in the whole region. But there are also core-periphery relations in other areas of the region –i.e. Malmö-Lund as the core of western Skåne region. In this sense, it is also relevant to understand the Öresund Region as a multilayered urban system with multiple cores.

Some authors argue that a single urban core can be substituted by multiple cores, creating a polycentric urban region (Parr, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; ESPON, 2010). Polycentric urban regions can be simply defined as “a set of neighboring but spatially separate urban centers, existing as some identifiable entity” (Parr, 2004, p. 231). An “identifiable entity” might be delimited by a maximum distance between the centers (Bailey & Turok, 2001) or by high levels of economic interaction and specialization (Parr, 2004). Hence, the Öresund Region might be understood as a polycentric and multilayered cross-border metropolitan region formed by a regional core, Copenhagen, and sub-cores, Malmö-Lund and Helsingborg13 (see table 4).

Table 4. Öresund urban region N municipalities Population 2019 % population

Copenhagen area 37 2,209,139 68.2 Core 17 1,332,152 41.1 Hinterland 20 876,987 27.1 Malmö-Lund area 14 767,780 24.7 Core 2 464,297 14.3 Hinterland 12 303,483 9.4 Helsingborg area 6 264,531 8.2 Core 1 145,968 4.5 Hinterland 5 118,563 3.7 Total 56 3,241,450 100.0 Source: own elaboration.

From this perspective, the Öresund metropolitan region cannot be seen solely by the relation between the regional core and hinterlands, but by multilevel ties between diverse urban cores and their hinterlands. That is a metropolitan region with 3.2 million inhabitants, almost 20% of the combined population of Sweden and Denmark, the most populous in the Nordic countries14.

As Nelles & Durand (2014, p. 106) argue, cross-border metropolitan regions are particularly relevant to the because functional integration presents governance challenges

13 I include Helsingborg in this definition since it is key in both the relations between Skåne and Denmark in northern Öresund as well as part of the urban continuum in Skåne’s western coast. However, in the diverse definitions of the urban areas, the urban continuum between Malmö area and Helsingborg’s is broken by Landskrona (pop. 46,090), despite being the 6th most populous municipality in the region and highly dense (2,500/km2). Data suggests that this break in the urban continuum has an explanation in the data analysis, but it is not very accurate when it comes to explain commuting flows. Landskrona is a municipality with a high share of out-commuters (48%) but they have split destinations, mainly between Malmö and Helsingborg (OECD, 2012. Territorial Review: Skåne). This has an effect over the delimitation of urban areas in Skåne, which I suggest to include Landskrona and Svalöv (pop. 14,268) as part of a urban continuum going form from Skurup to Höganäs. 14 Greater Stockholm is 2.4 millions (SCB, 2019).

21 simultaneously across a wide variety of policy areas that necessitate some form of coordination, typically involving a combination of local political authorities across national boundaries.

In this sense, metropolitan governance in cross-border regions may take a particular end in which integration is crucial. Integration is understood as the process of reduction of structural differences–social, political, economic, cultural–between the territories. Decoville et al. (2010) for instance identify indicators of cross-border integration, including the most used commuting, but also GDP per capita, mobility and migration or language differences. To reach a more complete view, I include here other socioeconomic variables (see table 5).

Table 5. Key figures (2019)15 Municipality Danish part of Swedish part of Öresund Region the Öresund the Öresund Population growth rate (base 2000) 11.5 22.0 14.8 Foreign population rate* 10.4 8.9 9.9 Ageing index 107.9 101.1 105.4 House price index (base 2006)† 101 164 133 Unemployment rate 5.4 9.9 6.9 Female unemployment rate 6.1 10.1 7.4 Youth unemployment rate 10.6 19.9 13.5 Upper-education rate‡ 31.2 23.4 28.6 Regional GDP growth (base 2000)§ 15.9 16.1 15.0 * By citizenship (different from Danish or Swedish). † For one-family house, data from 2018. ‡ Data from 2018 § Regional GDP per capita, 2000-2016. Source: own elaboration from Öresundsdatabasen.

The Swedish part of the region has traditionally presented higher levels of unemployment–especially among women and youth–, less educated population, and poorer levels of economic performance (see figures 7 to 14). However, in the last decades Skåne has experienced some relevant changes. Its growth in terms of population almost doubled the Danish. The demographic structure has also changed. Particularly, ageing has been one of the main demographic trends in all the Nordic countries, and one major future challenges in the whole region (Nordregio, 2020). In the Öresund Region, nowadays Denmark has a larger ageing population than Skåne (see figure 8).

Also GDP growth has been slightly higher in the Swedish part, even though the GDP differences are still significant between the two regions (see figure 14). However, while GDP is the most commonly used indicator for measuring and comparing economic performance it is an increasingly discussed indicator for it does not take into account variables such as substantiality or inequalities of such economies. Thus, beyond GDP there are a diversity of other indicators and indexes that measure human and economic development. Since 2016, Nordregio proposes the Regional Potential Index (Nordregio, 2016). RPI includes nine socio-economic indicators relevant to the analysis of regional development including the share of urban population, migration rate, education and

15 For comparative reasons I use data from Öresundsdatabasen which defines the Region as Skåne, Hovedstaden and Zealand.

22 employment or R&D investment per capita. In 2019, Hovedstaden ranked 2nd and Skåne 24th among 66 regions in the Nordic countries (Nordregio, 2020).

In the last decade there is also an increasing inequality trend that has affected the Öresund Region and the Nordic Region as a whole. In particular, income inequalities have grown more in Denmark, specifically in Copenhagen and its suburbs, but it also remains high in Swedish cities such as Malmö, Helsingborg, Lund and Vellinge (Nordregio, 2020). Moreover, since the opening of the bridge many Danes working in Copenhagen find the Swedish part of the region attractive to live in. In the period 2000-2007 many people moved from Denmark to Skåne (see figure 9).

These patterns have been described by Decoville et al. (2010) as a model of integration by specialization, in which cross-border commuting from the periphery to the core is combined with opposing residential flows. A trend that was rapidly countered by the 2008 crisis but some side effects persisted. The housing market integration is one of the most relevant effects of metropolization at the cross-border scale, with particular effects in the Swedish side: the house price in Skåne is experiencing a more accentuated and rapid growth than in the Danish side, a growth that has endured even after the financial crisis (see figure 10).

In a context in which borders still represent barriers to mobility, cross-border metropolitan regions have to be understood from multiple perspectives. That is, mobility and integrated markets are important but not the only factors; there are other sociopolitical factors of regional building. For instance, integration patterns, imagined spaces, institutional arrangements, policy networks… As we well see in the following sections, the Öresund Region have to be understood from this multilayered perspective (see different approaches to the Öresund as a metropolitan region in Maskell & Törnqvist, 1999; Wichmann Matthiessen, 2004; Schmidt, 2005; Hospers, 2006; Löfgren, 2008; Decoville, et al., 2010).

In sum, for the analysis of metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region I take an extensive, polycentric and multilayered definition of the metropolitan region. This definition includes the core area of Copenhagen, and the Swedish areas of Malmö-Lund and Helsingborg. For this, the identification and analysis of metropolitan governance in this paper takes into account the institutions, entities and networks that operate at the national level, both in the Copenhagen and in Skåne, and the ones between them.

23 Figure 7. Population growth rate, 2000-2019 Figure 8. Ageing index, 2000-2019

25 120

110 20

100 15 90 10 80

5 70

0 60

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Danish part Swedish part Oresund Region Danish part Swedish part Oresund Region

Source: Öresundsdatabasen. Source: own elaboration from Öresundsdatabasen.

Figure 9. Migration inside the Öresund region, 2000-2019 Figure 10. House price index (2006 base), 2000-2018

6000 180

160 5000 140 4000 120

3000 100

2000 80 60 1000 40 0 20

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Migration from Denmark to the Swedish part of the Oresund Region Migration from Sweden to the Danish part of the Oresund Region Danish part Swedish part Oresund Region

Source: Öresundsdatabasen. Source: own elaboration from Öresundsdatabasen.

24 Figure 11. Unemployment rate, 2000-2019 (first quarter) Figure 12. Youth unemployment rate, 2000-2019 (first quarter)

12 25

10 20

8 15 6 10 4

5 2

0 0

2000Q12001Q12002Q12003Q12004Q12005Q12006Q12007Q12008Q12009Q12010Q12011Q12012Q12013Q12014Q12015Q12016Q12017Q12018Q12019Q1 2000Q12001Q12002Q12003Q12004Q12005Q12006Q12007Q12008Q12009Q12010Q12011Q12012Q12013Q12014Q12015Q12016Q12017Q12018Q12019Q1

Danish part Swedish part Oresund Region Danish part Swedish part Oresund Region

Source: Öresundsdatabasen. Source: Öresundsdatabasen.

Figure 13. Female unemployment rate, 2000-2019 (first quarter) Figure 14. Regional GDP per capita (thousand euros), 2000-2016

12 55

10 50

8 45

6 40

35 4

30 2

25 0 20 2000Q12001Q12002Q12003Q12004Q12005Q12006Q12007Q12008Q12009Q12010Q12011Q12012Q12013Q12014Q12015Q12016Q12017Q12018Q12019Q1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Danish part Swedish part Öresund Region Danish part Swedish part Oresund Region

Source: Öresundsdatabasen. Source: Öresundsdatabasen.

25 Metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region Following Tomàs’ classification of metropolitan governance models–metropolitan governments, metropolitan agencies, vertical coordination and voluntary cooperation–, in this section I will present an in-depth description of the most relevant examples of metropolitan governance structures in the Öresund Region. For that I will use the territorial delimitation of the Region presented above, so I take into account both national –in Denmark and Sweden– and transnational metropolitan arrangements.

Metropolitan governments in the Öresund Region

The first general finding is that there are no metropolitan government structures in the Öresund Region, neither cross-border nor national. As part of the Nordic and north European model of local government Sweden and Denmark share several features. Both are highly decentralized countries which give to the local and regional governments a great amount of power and resources. After various waves of municipal reforms and amalgamations starting in the 70’, both Sweden and Denmark have built a territorial model characterized by a low municipal fragmentation–low number if medium-sized municipalities (see table 6).

Table 6. Models of local government and municipal fragmentation Country Typologies of Number of Total population Municipal local government municipalities fragmentation* France Franco 36,658 67,848,156 54.0 Spain Franco 8,124 47,329,981 17.2 Germany Middle European 11,313 83,122,889 13.6 Sweden Nordic 290 10,367,232 2.8 Denmark Nordic 98 5,825,337 1.7 UK Anglo 419 66,796,800 0.6 * Number of municipalities per 100,000 inhabitants. Source: own elaboration.

In particular, municipalities are key agents of welfare provision (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991; Bennet, 1993; Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006). They are responsible for a wide range of welfare services, including childcare and primary education, social services and utility services– water and sewer, waste management, etc.–and they have a significant fiscal autonomy in accordance (Sellers & Lidström, 2007). Regions, therefore are weak in terms of authority in contrast to other European regions, but are relevant public services providers, including healthcare and public transport (Schakel et al., 2018; Berg & Oscarsson, 2018). High decentralization has favored the position of local and regional government to develop cross-border initiatives (Greve & Rydbjerg, 2003).

The existence of a low fragmented municipal system in which local governments concentrate a great amount of responsibilities and resources has prevented the creation of metropolitan tiers of government. Instead, it has favored other means to provide metropolitan policies (Lidström, 2005; 2011; Eklund, 2016; Tavares & Feiock, 2018).

In Sweden, there has not been a comprehensive metropolitan policy at the national scale. Instead, metropolitan governance arrangements have been developed through “spontaneous and self-organizing attempts dominated by local governments” (Eklund, 2016, p. 1), and most commonly in the form of voluntary cooperation arrangements.

26

Table 7. Municipalities in Sweden and Denmark Sweden Denmark N municipalities 290 98 Municipal competences Social services Social services and healthcare Pre-, primary and secondary Pre- and primary education education Adult education Planning and construction Environment Environment Utility services Utility services Leisure and culture Emergency services and civil def. Employment policies and benefits Housing Economic development Leisure and culture Transport infrastructure Energy Employment policies Economic development N regions 21 5 Regional competences Healthcare Healthcare Public transport Public transport Regional development Regional development Culture Environment Training Education Tourism Source: own elaboration from SKR, KL, and the Danish Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior (2014)

In Denmark, the case of Copenhagen has been more complex. First of all, due to the fact that it concentrates 1/3 of the Danish population, the consolidation of a metropolitan authority in Copenhagen has been usually challenged by other parts of the country (Andersen et al., 2002). Nevertheless, in the last decades there have been several attempts to create metropolitan structures. After diverse experiences of voluntary cooperation between municipalities, the first metropolitan authority was created in 1974: The Greater Copenhagen Council. It was limited in competences and weak in its organization (Bruun, 1995; Andersen et al., 2002). In 1989, under the climate dominated by Thatcherism and the rational choice approach, it was finnaly abolished. A decade later, after several attempts to change the administrative structures, a new metropolitan structure was created in 2000: The Greater Copenhagen Authority. Again, as Anderson et al. (2002) note, the new authority shared some of the same weaknesses of the Council and only 7 years later, as part of the Danish Local Reform in 2007, it was abolished again.

Nowadays, neither Sweden nor Denmark have a comprehensive model of consolidated metropolitan governments but has relied metropolitan policies and services to other existing structures of governments, cooperation agreements or partnerships. Correspondingly, in both Malmö and Copenhagen, and the whole Öresund Region, metropolitan governance has been managed through a diversity of regional governments, public agencies, PPPs and cooperation networks.

Metropolitan agencies in the Öresund Region

Metropolitan agencies are sectorial public or semi-public organizations that produce or deliver metropolitan policies. They usually focus in the so-called hard policies: waste management, water and sewer management, regional planning and transport. The Öresund Region is not an exception. Even though there is a great diversity of

27 arrangements and platform that work in a variety of sectors, the main fixed sectorial organizations that operate in the region are focused in transport and infrastructures.

Mobility and public transport, as seen previously in this paper, is a regional competency in both countries. Some of the transit operators are part of the regional administration. For instance, Region Skåne has its own public operator, Skånetrafiken16, led by the public transport committee. Skånetrafiken was founded in 1999 after the merging of the transport authorities in Kristianstad and Malmö counties. Is responsible for urban and regional buses and the interurban railway system Pågatåg.

However, the most common arrangement in public transport in Sweden is the sectorial agency owned by a regional administration. This is the case, for instance, of Halland where the transit company, Hallandstrafiken AB17, is 100% owned by the regional administration. It operates in all the municipalities in the regions except in the northern municipality of Kungsbacka, where public transportation is under the responsibility of Västtrafik, the region agency in Västra Götaland. Hallandstrafiken is mainly responsible for traffic and urban buses, while railways are procured by other regional agencies with Hallandstrafiken support: Skånetrafiken, Västtrafik and Jönköpings länstrafik.

On the Danish shores of the Öresund, the situation is slightly different. There also exists a transport agency, Movia18, but it has an inter-regional scope. The agency was founded in 2007 as part of the municipal reform and replaced various regional agencies such as HUR Trafik in Hovedstaden, VT in the former West-Zealand County, and STS in Storstrøms County, in southern Zealand. Nowadays, Movia is a public partnership between the two regions–Hovedstaden and Zealand–and their 45 municipalities, with the exception of Bornholm municipality which maintains a local public operator, BAT. Movia is responsible for the regional bus system and certain railways, and is governed by a Board of Directors and a Supervisory Board. In the latter all the 45 municipalities are represented by one member. The Board of Directors is appointed by the Supervisory Board. The Board of Directors is the agency’s executive body and is formed by 9 members: one representative from the city of Copenhagen, one from each region and six representatives from the rest of the municipalities in the area.

Movia and Skånetrafiken are the regional transport agencies in each part of the Öresund. However, there are cross-border agencies which represent some of the most significant metropolitan arrangement in the Region.

Historically, mobility across the sound had been maritime. The Helsingør-Helsingborg ferry route, that connects the narrowest part of the Öresund, had been the main connection point between Sweden and Denmark. Once the largest Swedish port by number of passengers, nowadays is losing relevance in favor of the bridge. However, it still is a key connection in the northern part of the region, with 6-7 million passengers per year, accounting for 30% of international ferry traffic in Sweden (Passagerrederierna, 2012; 2015). The route has been operated by private companies such as Scandlines or Sundbusserne.

16 https://www.skanetrafiken.se 17 https://www.hallandstrafiken.se 18 https://www.moviatrafik.dk

28 Having said that, the Öresund bridge is the single most relevant infrastructure for regional integration and mobility in the Öresund Region. Built in 2000, it is considered the starting point of the development of the Öresund Region (Löfgren, 2008). Besides, the most relevant examples of cross-border agencies are the ones operating in the Öresund bridge: the Øresundbron Konsortiet and Øresundtåg.

Øresundbro Konsortiet is the owner of the infrastructure, including the highway, railway, tunnel and toll station. It is mainly responsible for managing the toll station, the traffic center and the costumer center. It is a joint company owned by a Danish company, Sund&Bælt Holding A/S, and a Swedish company, SVEDAB AB. These two companies are owned by the Danish and Swedish states respectively.

Øresundtåg AB is the train network that operates across the bridge, between Helsingør in Denmark and Gothenburg, Kalmar and Karlskrona in Sweden. Thereby, besides Hovedstaden and Skåne regions, Øresundtåg is connecting an extensive area in Sweden that includes the regions of Halland, Västra Götaland, Blekinge, Kronoberg and Kalmar. Conversely, in Denmark only provides service to the coastal municipalities of the sound (see figure 15).

Figure 15. Øresundtåg map

Source: own elaboration from Øresundtåg.

The company is a public venture that involves the six regional transport agencies in Sweden and a national Danish agency, the Danish Transport, Construction and Housing Authority (see figure 16). It is responsible for the coordination and management of the train system including traffic management, sales and maintenance.

29 The train service is operated differently in each country. In Denmark is manned by the public company DSB and in Sweden by the international private company Transdev. However, from December 2020 the Swedish national train operator SJ will operate the services in Sweden and till Østerport in Copenhagen19.

Figure 16. Øresundtåg AB partners

Source: Øresundtåg.

Another relevant case of cross-border agency is the Copenhagen Malmö Port (CMP)20. The CMP is a unique case of an organization operating two ports in different countries. It was founded in 2001 when the ports in both Malmö and Copenhagen merged due to new context brought about by the opening of the bridge. CMP is a PPP owned by a Danish public company, By & Havn, the City of Malmö, and various private owners. A majority of its shares (75%) are owned by the cities of Copenhagen and Malmö (see figure 17).

Figure 17. CMP ownership

Source: own elaboration from CMP.

19 “SJ selected for Öresundståg operating contract”. (2019, May 23). Railway Gazette. Retrieved from https://www.railwaygazette.com/passenger/sj-selected-for-öresundståg-operating-contract/48590.article 20 http://www.cmport.com

30 Besides transport and mobility, there are also diverse cross-border organizations and platforms focused in the promotion and development of the labor market in the Öresund Region. For instance, the EURES network Cross-Border Øresund, with a focus in life science professionals, and specially the Øresunddirekt.

As seen before, the lack of transparency and information have been among the most significant barriers for cross-border commuting in the Region. Øresunddirekt is precisely a service meant to tackle these deficits. It is an employment and information service created in 2000 that combines two sections: an information center in Malmö, a communication team in Copenhagen (Øresunddirekt.dk) and, since 2019, also a pop-up branch from the Malmö office in Helsingborg. Its primary goal is to facilitate job and business information, particularly from the Danish labor market to residents in Sweden. Only in the Malmö office they serve over 25,000 users annually and Øresunddirekt.dk have more than 70,000 visitors every month21. Formally, it is a public partnership funded mainly by national services and agencies from both countries, the Nordic Council of Ministers, but none local and only one regional administration: Region Skåne (see figure 18).

Figure 18. Øresunddireckt partnership

Source: Øresunddirekt.

There is another organization that is worth mentioning which has been granted a singular role in the promotion of regional development in the Oresund: Øresundsinstituttet. It is a cross-border knowledge center that manly through publications and conferences is aimed to increase awareness of the Öresund Region among public and private organizations in the Nordic countries. Currently it has more than 100 partners22 and, whereas is a non- profit privately-led organization, various public institutions are also members. Among them the regions Hovedstaden and Skåne, the Universities of Malmö and Lund, and 11

21 https://www.Öresunddirekt.se/se/om-oeresunddirekt 22 https://www.Öresundsinstituttet.org/medlemskap/lista-medlemmar/

31 municipalities: Copenhagen, Malmö, Helsingborg, Lund, Helsingør, Hässleholm, Landskrona, Trelleborg, Ëslov, Kävlinge and Svedala.

Finally, whereas there have been other relevant cross-border experiences in other areas, they have not lasted. Among them, the Øresund University, a partnership of 14 higher education universities, and the Øresund Science Region network, which brought together regional authorities, businesses and universities (Garlick et al., 2006). Until 2010, these organizations were dedicated to the economic development of the whole region, through the creation of a strong knowledge-based economy. Under their umbrella various clusters and platforms where created: the Medicon Valley, the Øresund Environment Academy, the Øresund Food Network, Øresund Logistics, Diginet Øresund, the Øresund IT Academy, and Nano Øresund. Among them, Medicon Valley is still operative: a life science cluster that brings together the private sector with public universities in both Denmark and Sweden–Malmö University, Lund University and the University of Copenhagen–and the regions Hovedstaden and Skåne.

Vertical coordination in the Öresund Region

In the absence of metropolitan tiers of government in both Sweden and Denmark, regional administrations are responsible for some tasks that surpass local boundaries. In particular, regions in the two countries are responsible for healthcare, including managements of hospitals, public transport and regional development. As Tomàs highlights, in these cases the regional territory is larger than the metropolitan area, and policies are not specifically metropolitan but are diluted into regional ones (2015, p. 9).

In Sweden there are 21 regions. They have been assiduously modified since the first reform in 1999, when a pilot reform merged Malmö and Kristianstad counties into the Skåne Region (Mccallion, 2008; Berg & Oscarsson, 2020). Nowadays, all the 21 regions have the same set of responsibilities, including healthcare, public transport, regional development and other voluntary services such as culture, skill training and tourism. They also have a certain degree of fiscal autonomy since they are responsible to collect 10% of the income tax–the other 90% being a local tax.

The regions are ruled by a directly-elected regional county, which members range from 55 in Jämtland to 149 in Skåne, Västra Götaland and Stockholm, home of the 3 most populous cities in the country. The regional executive–regional board or regionstyrelse– is a plural organ elected by the council.

In Denmark, after the 2007 municipal reform, the number of municipalities was cut from 270 to 98 and 13 counties were transformed in 5 regions. The regions have powers in healthcare, traffic and public transport, regional development, environmental planning and coordination and secondary education. Contrary to the Swedish ones, Danish regions do not levy taxes but are financed by local and national grants. Each region is governed by a directly-elected council of 41 members and the Chairman is elected among their members.

The Öresund Region includes three regions: Hovedstaden and Zealand in Denmark, and Skåne in Sweden. In addition, Region Halland, whereas is not part of any statistical definition of metropolitan areas in Sweden, it is part of some governance arrangements in the region–i.e. Greater Copenhagen Committee, Øresundtåg.

32 In the Swedish part of the Öresund Region, Skåne is the southernmost and third most populous region in Sweden, with over 1,3 million inhabitants. It is formed by 33 municipalities, but the population is highly concentrated in the eastern cost, and particularly in the cities of Malmö, Helsingborg and Lund, which together concentrates 45% of the total population (see appendix B1). For the 2018-2022 term Region Skåne is run by a liberal-conservative coalition. After the 2018 elections, even though the Social Democratic party won the elections with 27.3% of the vote and 41 seats, the regional board is headed by the Moderates supported by an alliance between the Moderates, Liberals, the Center Party and the Christian Democrats.

Halland is a smaller region. In total it has 330,000 inhabitants and only six municipalities (see appendix B2). It is located in the western coast of Sweden, north from Skåne and south from Västra Götaland. As in the case of Skåne, Region Halland is run by the Moderate party but it is supported by a liberal-conservative-green alliance.

In Denmark, Hovedstaden and Sjælland are the two regions that operate as vertical coordination metropolitan institutions. Both were created after the Danish municipal reform in 2007, which reduced the number of municipalities, and abolished the Greater Copenhagen Authority and the fourteen traditional counties, creating the actual five regions.

Regions Hovedstaden is formed by 29 municipalities. It is the most populous region in Denmark, counting 1,8 million inhabitants, almost 1/3 of the total Danish population. It is also home of the state capital, Copenhagen, which also concentrates over 34% of the region’s population (see appendix B3). For the period 2017-2021, the regional council is led by the social-democrats (13 councilmembers) with the support of the Conservative People’s Party (5) and the Social-Liberal Party (3).

Finally, Region Zealand is formed by 15 municipalities and a total population of over 830m inhabitants (see appendix B4). As in Region Hovedstaden the administration is led by the social-democrats (14), the People’s Party (6) and the Social-Liberals (10).

Voluntary cooperation in the Öresund Region

The last model of metropolitan institutions identified by Tomàs include low- institutionalized, flexible and voluntary arrangements of political cooperation between municipalities, and between municipalities and other non-public actors. New regionalism scholars have praised low-institutionalized and voluntary cooperation arrangements as the most suitable for metropolitan contexts (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005), and particularly for cross-border metropolitan regions.

In addition, there is an extensive literature that suggests that in the Nordic countries the strong tradition of local autonomy, consensual policy-making, and organicist state- society relations favors cooperation arrangements (Loughlin & Peters, 1997; Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006; Hall, Kettunen, Löfgren, & Ringholm, 2009; Tavares & Feiock, 2018). Moreover, historial ties, institutional similarities between countries and a long tradition of international cooperation have shaped the context favorable to cross-border collaboration.

In the Öresund Region, the main cooperation arrangements at the metropolitan scale are the MalmöLund Region in Sweden, the Copenhagen Metropolitan ‘Finger Plan’ and

33 KKR in Denmark, and the Greater Copenhagen Committee, as the major organization operating at the cross-border level between Sweden and Denmark.

The MalmöLund Region–MalmöLundregionen in Swedish–is a cooperation network between 12 municipalities in Skåne. The 12 member municipalities are the same that SCB identifies as Greater Malmö. In that sense, and in contrast to the regional administration in Skåne, MalmöLund Region has a more proper scale for metropolitan policies.

As a voluntary network it has no formal powers and is very limited in resources. Its main purpose is political cooperation in regional development, focusing in the following priority areas for the period 2019-2023: digitalization, infrastructure and planning, skills training, climate adaptation and energy efficiency, and attraction of business23. It is led by a board with two representatives from each municipal council, the mayor and a member of the opposition. Malmö and Lund mayors share the chairmanship of the board, alternating annually. However, all the decisions are made by consensus and participation in specific projects is on a voluntary basis.

In Denmark, KKR are the associations of municipalities in each region. They operate under the umbrella of the Danish municipalities association (KL). All the municipalities in the region are members of their regional KKR –i.e. KKR Hovedstaden has 29 member and KKR Zealand 17 members. In this sense, they represent the same scale than the regional governments. Each municipality is represented in a KKR by the mayor but also by other parties’ councilmembers in a way that the composition corresponds to the distribution of votes in the local elections. They function as an arena for municipal cooperation and agreement in key regional issues, mainly in those areas of activity in which the regionals governments have powers: healthcare and social care, infrastructures and mobility, environment, regional development and education. Through their representation, they are also the voice of municipalities in national politics and other regional forums, like the Greater Copenhagen Committee.

Having said that, the most enduring experience of metropolitan collaborative governance in the region has been the ‘Finger Plan’. Starting in 1947 the ‘Finger Plan’ is an urban plan that sets the strategy for urban development and mobility infrastructures in the metropolitan area of Copenhagen. Due to its success and positive impacts it has had continuity over the years in diverse regional plans (for a historical review see Sørensen & Torfing, 2019). It has been largely considered a policy success due to its “well-balanced metropolitan planning” that has successfully “avoided both urban sprawl overly dense and chaotic urbanization” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2019, p. 218). This contrasts significantly with the absence of a comprehensive planning strategy in the whole Öresund Region.

The success of the ‘Finger Plan’ in contrast with the various failed attempts to create a consolidated metropolitan authority has therefore led some authors to note that the Copenhagen metropolitan area “may exist as a spatial phenomenon but not as an organizational entity” (Metropolitan Research Institute, 2018, p. 38). The ‘Finger Plan’ is considered “a major asset in global competition in which the quality of the urban environment is a key parameter in the effort to attract highly qualified people and innovative businesses” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2019, p. 234).

23 MalmöLund Region, Vision 2019-2023. See https://www.malmolundregionen.se/wp- content/uploads/2019/09/MalmöLundregionen-VP-2019-2023-Eng.pdf [18/04/20]

34 In this case, the metropolitan area defined by the ‘Finger Plan’ embrace a population of 2,1 million and 34 municipalities, including all the municipalities in Region Hovedstaden–except Bornholm– and six cities from Region Zealand (see appendix C1).

At the cross-border scale, the Greater Copenhagen Committee (GCC) is the most relevant case of cross-border fixed political cooperation organization in the region. GCC expressly highlights its metropolitan character as it is presented as “a metropolitan region that spans Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden”24.

The current GCC was created in 2016 but it replaced another organization, the Öresund Committee. The Öresund Committee was also an organization for political cooperation created in 1993 but much more limited in its territorial extension25. Yet, cross-border political cooperation in the Öresund area has existed since the 1960s, with the Öresund Council and Öresund Connect (Greve & Rydbjerg, 2003).

Nowadays the area of activity of the GCC expands beyond the limits of any of the previous definitions, embracing four regions–Skåne and Halland in Sweden, and the Capital and Zealand in Denmark–, 85 municipalities and a population of 4.3 million people (see table 8).

Table 8. Greater Copenhagen Committee Region Country Municipalities Total population 2019 Region Hovedstaden Denmark 29 1,821,202 Region Skåne Sweden 33 1,365,964 Region Zealand Denmark 17 836,738 Region Halland Sweden 6 330,310 Denmark 46 2,657,940

Total Sweden 39 1,696,274 Total 85 4,354,214 Source: own elaboration from Greater Copenhagen, SCB and DST.

GCC has a strong focus in regional development, growth and employment goals, with an accent in creating an environment to attract investors, business, tourisms, skilled labor and students. To this end, one of the primary activities of the GGC is the development and management of an international branding strategy under the name of “Greater Copenhagen”, despite some initial reluctance from Malmö and Skåne (Crouch, 2015).

As part of its goals, GCC is an active organization influencing national politics in both countries to developed regional infrastructures and introduce changes in the legislation that favors economic and labor integration in the region.

The activities of the organization are mainly organized through bi-annual action plans, that translate into several projects, campaigns and studies, including the Öresund Metro26

24 https://www.greatercph.com/about [19/04/20] 25 The member of the Öresund Committee were: Region Hovedstaden, Region Zealand, Region Skåne and the municipalities of Bornholm, Copenhagen and Frederiksberg in Denmark, and Landskrona, Lund, Helsingborg and Malmö in Sweden. 26 See https://Öresundsmetro.com/en [08/05/2020]

35 or international campaigns for business and investment attractions in sectors such as game and tech, life science, logistics or food industry27.

GCC is administered by a small secretariat and is headed by a political board. The Board is formed by 18 representatives from the four regions, including regional presidents, mayors and councilmember. The distribution of positions in the board is stable: the Chairman is the Mayor of Copenhagen and there are two vice-chairman, which are the presidents of Zealand and Skåne. Among the rest of the members there are the presidents of the Region Hovedstaden and Halland, and the mayors of Malmö, Lund, and Helsingborg. Danish municipalities are only represented by the KKR presidencies of both Zealand and Hovedstaden (see table 9).

Table 9. Greater Copenhagen Board members Position Representing Chairman Mayor Copenhagen (DK) President Region Zealand (DK) Vice chairman President Region Skåne (SE) President Region Hovedstaden (DK) President Region Halland (SE) Vice President Region Skåne (SE) President KKR Zealand (DK) President KKR Hovedstaden (DK) Mayor Malmö (SE) Mayor Lund (SE) Members Councilmember Region Sjælland (DK) Vice President KKR Hovedstaden (DK) Mayor Helsingborg (SE) Mayor Kristianstad (SE) Councilmember Region Hovedstaden (DK) Mayor Östra Göinge (SE) Vice President KKR Zealand (DK) Mayor Hässleholm/Landskrona/Trelleborg (SE)* * Rotative. Source: Greater Copenhagen.

27 https://www.greatercph.com/campaigns [12/08/20]

36 The Öresund’s metropolitan governance ‘system’: features and deficits In this section I give a general perspective of the main features and deficits of metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region. I have Identified 15 institutions of metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region. Among these, the most frequent (8/15) are metropolitan agencies, that is public entities or PPPs that manage and provide one single public service at the metropolitan scale.

Public transport and transport infrastructures are the primary areas of intervention, including regional public transport–Movia, Skånetrafiken–, cross-border mobility– Øresundbron and Øresundtåg–, and the port. In addition, there are three agencies focused on the economic and labor development and integration: the cross-border employment agency Øresunddirekt, Medicon Valley, that promotes the region as a world leader in the life science sector, or the Øresundsintituttet intended to bring awareness of the region both locally and globally.

I have identified up to five cooperation networks or associations in the Region. Three of them have a national scale, that is they operate in either Sweden–MalmöLund Region–or Denmark–KKR, Finger Plan. And the only cross-border association is the Greater Copenhagen Committee.

Their areas of interventions are urban planning in the case of the Finger Plan, economic development in the case of the MalmöLund Region. For the GCC and KKR, they are entities that represent the interests of local and regional governments and are spaces for institutional debate between municipalities. While KKR is mainly focused in regional powers, GCC has a preferent focus in economic development and competitiveness, and regional integration.

In concurrence with the academic literature, as part of the Nordic model, there are not consolidated metropolitan government structures. Alternatively, in both Sweden and Denmark, traditional metropolitan policies are provided by either regional authorities– vertical coordination–or cooperation networks. Notably shows that sectorial agencies are the most frequent model, particularly at the cross-border level.

As expected, hard policies are one of the major areas of intervention of most metropolitan entities, particularly, transport and planning. However, we can observe that the second most frequent policy areas are related to economic development and competitiveness, including the GCC as the key player in the international promotion of the Region, the metropolitan network of economic promotion in the Malmö-Lund region, the cross- border employment agency Øresunddirekt, the Medicon Valley cluster or the awareness activities of the Øresundsintituttet.

We can also observe the scale of intervention of these organizations. Remarkably, structures of metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region are evenly distributed between the cross-border and the national scale. From and institutional perspective, and in quantitative terms, we can see a significant level of cross-border integration. Otherwise, among metropolitan governance structures in a single country, with the only exception of MalmöLund Region and the Copenhagen ‘Finger Plan’, they have a regional focus. That is, their area of intervention is larger than the metropolitan, hence policies are not specifically metropolitan but are diluted into regional ones.

37 Table 10. Öresund Region’s metropolitan governance system Governance Name of the Scale Type of organization Areas of intervention Membership model organization/entity Metropolitan - - - - - governments Movia National (Denmark) Public agency Public transport Regions and municipalities Skånetrafiken National (Sweden) Regional administration Public transport Region Øresundbron Konsortiet Cross-border Public consortium Transport infrastructures Public (state) companies Regions (in Sweden) and a Øresundtåg AB Cross-border Public venture Public transport national agency (Denmark) Municipalities, public companies Copenhagen Malmö Port Cross-border PPP Transport infrastructures Metropolitan and private agencies International org., national Øresunddirekt Cross-border Public agency Employment promotion agencies and regional government Municipalities, regions, Øresundsintituttet Cross-border Association Promotion Universities, public and private companies Economic development and competitiveness, Regions, public universities, Medicon Valley Cross-border Network Research private sector Healthcare, Public Transport, Economic Region Hovedstaden National (Denmark) Regional government - development and competitiveness Vertical Healthcare, Public Transport, Economic Region Skåne National (Sweden) Regional government - coordination development and competitiveness Healthcare, Public Transport, Economic Region Zealand National (Denmark) Regional government - development and competitiveness MalmöLund Region National (Sweden) Association Economic development and competitiveness Only municipalities Healthcare, Public Transport, Economic KKR National (Denmark) Association Only municipalities Voluntary development and competitiveness Local, regional and state Cooperation Finger Plan National (Denmark) Planning initiative Urban planning authorities Greater Copenhagen Cross-border Association Economic development and competitiveness Municipalities and regions Committee Source: own elaboration.

38 Last, from a network governance perspective it is vital to look at the typology of actors involved in each governance structure and in the system as a whole. Notably, the most relevant institutional actors of metropolitan governance are regional governments. Regions are directly or indirectly involved in most of the metropolitan governance structures. In some policy areas, Regions are the competent authority for metropolitan policies such as transport or development policies. But, more importantly, they are key players in other structures of metropolitan governance.

For instance, Regions are involved in transport agencies–Movia, Øresundtåg AB–, or economic and employment promotion–Øresunddirekt, Øresundsintituttet, Medicon Valley–. Particularly, up to four Regions are members of the GCC–Hovedstaden, Zealand, Skåne and Halland–, and the two vice chairmanships are entitled to the regional presidents of Zealand and Skåne.

While it is not unexpected, it is interesting to note the important presence of state agencies or administrations in most of the cross-border agencies; either ministries, national agencies or services, such as in the case of Øresunddirekt or Øresundtåg AB, and state companies, like the Øresundbron Konsortiet.

In contrast, local governments, while they are also transversally represented, and they maintain relevant policy areas, they do not have the prominent presence expected in a metropolitan governance system. Municipalities are less involved in cross-border agencies and in most cases they are represented alongside other superior levels of government. There are only two networks in which only municipalities are members: MalmöLund Region and the KKR–the latter case as a regional arena of cooperation.

To a lesser extent, there are other private and public organizations that take part in the governance system in the Öresund Region, including public and private companies or universities. Having said that, there is a highly significant absence of civic society representation in the governance system in the Öresund Region.

This description allows to highlight four defining features of the metropolitan governance system in the Öresund Region: a scalar and territorial ambiguity, a confirmation of a Nordic model of metropolitan governance but persistence of border barriers, a strong focus in development policies and business attraction, and a weak development of democratic governance principles, in terms of social actors’ participation and involvement in the metropolitan decision-making process.

First, there is not a single nor clear definition of the Öresund Region. In parallel to the various statistical definitions of metropolitan areas in both Sweden and Denmark, the institutionalization of a metropolitan region is far from clear. In each country we can find superposing governance structures with no coincidence between them about the extension of a clear urban region. At the cross-border level this ambiguity is even stronger (see figure 19).

This fragmentation and the multiplicity of governance entities working in a complex network is the essence of the new regionalism approaches to metropolitan governance, making the case of the Öresund Region an example of it.

39 Figure 19. Greater Copenhagen Committee and statistical delimitations of the metropolitan region

Source: own elaboration from Greater Copenhagen, SCB and DST.

40

However, it could also be a consequence of the lack of recognition of the metropolitan phenomenon with an effect, not only in the identification and definition of the metropolitan region, but in the building of comprehensive metropolitan structures and the metropolization of policies. In contrast, regional governments, as part of recent administration reforms, are the central actors in the coordination and implementation of supra-municipal policies, like urban planning and transport planning.

Second, in line with the academic literature about typologies of local government, neither Denmark nor Sweden, as part of a Nordic type, have developed comprehensive models of consolidated metropolitan structures. Instead they have favored other instruments dominated by local and regional governments, such as cooperation networks, associations, agencies and partnerships (Lidström, 2005; 2011; Eklund, 2016; Tavares & Feiock, 2018). This analysis shows that this pattern replicates at the cross-border scale.

Despite the strong and long-standing cooperation in the Nordic region and the de- bordering process in the EU context, there are still important strong national barriers and a lack of cross-border metropolitan policy coordination or regulation. In this sense, it is relevant to note that while urban and regional dimensions have gained great relevance in the EU agenda (González & Fedeli, 2015), the significance and role of metropolitan actors in the European policy system is still very limited (Tomàs, 2017a; Metropolitan Research Institute, 2018).

That is especially relevant in areas such as labor market regulation and, more importantly, social and environmental policy areas, which are among the most challenging metropolitan problems in the region. For instance, we have seen the effects of the metropolization process in the Region over the housing market, cross-border mobility during the refugee crisis and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic, or environment- related problems28.

This goes in line with the institutional collective action literature that identifies legal and institutional limitations, divergence in political structures and the nature of goods and services among the most decisive factors for institutional cooperation in metropolitan areas (Williamson, 1981; Loughlin & Peters, 1997; (Bel & Warner, 2015; Feiock, 2007; 2009; 2013; Tavares & Feiock, 2018).

Third, besides the regionalization of traditional hard policies, there is a strong focus on economic development and competitiveness in the metropolitan governance system in the Öresund Region. Particularly, at the cross-border level, in which agencies like Øresunddirekt, Øresundsintituttet and Medicon Valley but more importantly the GCC are focused on the attraction of investment, business and high-skilled labor.

This reinforces the general conception of new regionalist approaches to metropolization as processes embedded in global economy dynamics, and strongly focused on business attraction and entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989; Lever, 2001; Le Galès, 2002;

28 In the summer of 2020 became public that By & Havn has planned to dump large amount of untreated sewage into the Sound, which appeared as a regular practice for many years when undertaking construction. That makes a good example of the lack of coordination authority or regulation in environmental issues in the Region, and brings out the lack of transparency and public attention of such issues at the regional scale. See https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/skane/utslappen-i-oresund-danmark-ar-varst [20/12/20]

41 Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; Jonas, 2012). Conversely, some would argue that this might be a particularity of cross-border areas since loosely organized cooperation territories are suitable for competitive issues, whereas welfare functions demand strong institutional arrangements (Blatter, 2008 in Zimmermann & Feiertag, 2018, p. 21).

In the case of the Öresund Region, it has clearly been conceived and built from this perspective. This is supported not only by the characteristics of the metropolitan ‘system’ that has been built in the recent years, but other dynamics that are taking place in each side of the sound. This is particularly clear in the case of some urban planning projects in the region, which are characterized by:

a combination of new places for elite consumption and housing, new prime office locations, elite playgrounds and gentrifying parts of the inner city that are connected through excellent (new) transport means […] It is a network of places that is simultaneously plugged into the global scale (through its prime connection to Copenhagen airport) and creates a new local city-regional scale that is speedier, slicker, smoother, more classy and more exclusive than the rest of the local built environment. (Baeten, 2012, pp. 32-33)

Fourth, the metropolitan governance system is mainly partnered by governmental institutions, regional and local governments and also national agencies. And to a lesser extent public and private corporations. Notably, none of the identified structures of metropolitan governance are participated by any civic or social actor.

In this respect, some authors argue that cross-border governance structures tend to be co- opted by elites and regional bodies and reproduce management processes by traditional tiers of government (Nelles & Durand, 2014). Others, in contrast, argue that the participation of local elected officials in these governance structures might be a sufficient source of democratic legitimacy (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005).

However, from a democratic governance perspective, I would argue that the metropolitan governance ‘system’ in the Öresund Region presents a democratic deficit. As I have pointed out previously in this paper, there are two contrasting approached to democracy by new regionalism, an optimistic and a pessimistic (Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Kübler & Schwab, 2007).

The case of the Öresund Region is more aligned with a pessimistic view in which governance structures mostly represent institutional and private actors, and there is an evident exclusion of social and civic agents. Taking into account that some of these governance structures set the vision for the region and they plan vital infrastructures and projects, the lack of direct participation of civil society actors may have relevant impacts over the metropolitan agenda and decision-making processes.

Thus, among the many challenges metropolitan governance in the Öresund Region has the incorporation of civic actors in the existing governance structures or the strengthening of civic leadership at the metropolitan scale appears critical. In particular, through the participation of social agents and civic organizations in the main spaces of intermunicipal and cross-border cooperation, such as the Greater Copenhagen Committee, new and more inclusive strategic regional planning platforms, or the creation of new entities, forums, or

42 social councils of metropolitan civic cooperation that might set up agendas or determine decision-making processes in the existing arrangements.

Having said that, we have not enough information about the sources of the exclusion of civic actors in the governance processes and arrangements in the Region. It might well be due to a nonexistence of the type of agents at the metropolitan scale. The fragmentation of metropolitan areas may not facilitate the consolidation of shared values and identities, that is a metropolitan demos, which might be even more challenging in cross-border areas. Also, the lack of a clear delimitation of the Region and the ambiguity about how it is structured and governed may make mobilization more difficult, and a cause of a lacking regional demos.

Having said that, recent research has shown that in city-regions, due to patterns of mobility and mobile experiences and identities, the role of the municipality as the main local polity is being challenged (Lidström & Schaap, 2018); for instance, in other Swedish metropolitan areas, there is evidence of regional thinking and political interests that surpasses local communities (Lidström, 2006; 2010; 2012; Eklund, 2016). Also, in the Öresund Region, ethnographical research has argued about the construction of new imagined space after the building of the bridge and the consequent strengthening of the relations between the two shores of the sound (Hospers, 2006; Löfgren, 2008). But there is not enough evidence about the existence of political orientations, or an Öresund identity whatsoever. This might be a necessary step in order to build metropolitan civic movements, networks or organizations. And, ultimately, building civic and social leadership with a capacity to set up new metropolitan agendas and views, more control and accountability, and determine decision-making processes in a new, more open and more inclusive, metropolitan governance system for the Öresund Region.

43 Conclusions and discussion Despite it has been usually publicized as an example of an innovative and successful metropolitan regions in many fields, in fact the Öresund Region is still very unknown. There is not a clear and unique definition of its territorial dimension; there are diverse and contrasting functional definitions which do not resemble any institutional or political arrangement. Furthermore, as I have tried to show the Region is characterized by patterns of metropolitan integration in a polycentric and multilayered space, which embrace inter- local, intra-regional and cross-border interactions.

In this context, this exploration of metropolitan governance has revealed a complex system in which institutions and networks operate in a non-comprehensive way. The Öresund Region’s governance system is characterized by, not only territorial ambiguity, but for fragmented actors operating in a sectorized manner. While this could be an effect of border barriers or a true expression of new regionalist approaches to metropolitan governance and a ‘Nordic way’ to deal with metropolitan issues, there are profound implication for the design and implementation of policy responses to metropolitan problems.

Among these implications I have highlighted the strong focus of the existing metropolitan arrangements on infrastructures, mobility and economic development issues, in a race to compete globally with other urban areas for the attractions of capitals and high-skilled labor. In contrast I have detected a general lack of intervention and cooperation in social and environmental policies.

Also, there is a preeminent role of institutional actors in the governance system. Alongside some private and public companies, the vast majority of the actors involved in metropolitan governance are regional governments, municipalities and state agencies, but without any social or civil actor. While this may be a sufficient source of legitimacy, from a democratic governance point of view it represents a democratic deficit by a notorious exclusion of the affected population and low accountability.

This paper, as it is stated in the title, represents a first exploration of these issues in the Öresund Region. In my view, the results show a fruitful area of research, not only for the case itself but for the study of metropolitan governance, cross-border metropolis, and urban studies in general.

Among many possible further researches, I would suggest that there unsolved questions around policy-making in cross-border metropolitan areas. While in this paper I have focused on existing and somewhat formalized structures of governance, I have not taken a more straightforward policy network approach, that is: how they operate internally and among them for the formulation and implementation of policies. That could be better done by the analysis of specific policy networks; for instance, Kübler and Schwab (2007) have looked at problem areas–water supply, public transport, social services for drug users and cultural amenities–for the study of swiss metropolitan areas.

Another relevant line of inquiry is the study of citizen orientations and political views towards metropolitan areas and governance. Lidström, among others, have followed this line with significant results for other Swedish metropolitan areas (see Lidström, 2006; 2010; 2012; Eklund, 2016; Lidström & Schaap, 2018). The case of Öresund Region has

44 never been analyzed in these terms and it is particularly interested for its cross-border nature and the effects of transnational demoi.

In this line I find particularly stimulating in depth scenario research about democratic governance in the Öresund Region. That is, exploring how diverse actors and arrangements improve the democratic performance of metropolitan governance in the region.

Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge that this essay has been written during an unexpected and unprecedented event: the COVID-19 global pandemic. In this case, it has already affected the whole urban and metropolitan phenomenon through drastic changes in mobility patterns and social, economic and political agendas. But, more importantly, it will have enduring consequences that will change how we understand urban life. In this sense, new questions appear about the future construction of the Öresund Region.

This has been an early exploration of the Öresund Region. It has thrown some light on how the Region is politically and institutionally build, and it has presented some challenges for the near future. However, it is clear that this should not be the only approach to the issue and further research is needed in many other topics and from diverse methodological approaches. All that with the aim to get better understanding about governance, democracy, or policy-making in cross-border metropolitan areas, and, ultimately, build a more effective, comprehensive and democratic governance in the Öresund.

45 References

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51 Appendices

Appendix A

Table 1. Copenhagen functional urban area Municipality Region* Population 2019 % population Core municipalities Copenhagen H 623,404 28.2 Frederiksberg H 103,960 4.7 Gentofte H 75,176 3.4 Gladsaxe H 69,681 3.2 Lyngby-Taarbæk H 55,790 2.5 Hvidovre H 53,416 2.4 Høje-Taastrup H 50,686 2.3 Ballerup H 48,458 2.2 Tårnby H 42,984 1.9 Rødovre H 40,052 1.8 Brøndby H 35,397 1.6 Herlev H 28,786 1.3 Albertslund H 27,877 1.3 Ishøj H 22,946 1.0 Glostrup H 22,615 1.0 Vallensbæk H 16,654 0.8 Dragør H 14,270 0.6 Hinterland municipalities Roskilde Z 87,577 4.0 Holbæk Z 71,297 3.2 Helsingør H 62,567 2.8 Køge Z 60,675 2.7 Rudersdal H 56,509 2.6 Greve Z 50,267 2.3 Hillerød H 50,998 2.3 Frederikssund H 45,332 2.1 Egedal H 43,335 2.0 Gribskov H 41,195 1.9 Furesø H 41,069 1.9 Fredensborg H 40,819 1.8 Faxe Z 36,513 1.7 Ringsted Z 34,725 1.6 Sorø Z 29,834 1.4 Lejre Z 27,775 1.3 Allerød H 25,646 1.2 Hørsholm H 25,007 1.1 Solrød Z 23,065 1.0 Stevns Z 22,782 1.0 Total 2,209,139 100.0 * H for Region Hovedstaden; Z for Region Zealand. Source: Nordregio (2016) and DST.

52 Table 2. Malmö functional urban area Municipality Population 2019 % population Core municipalities Malmö 340,802 44.4 Lund 123,495 16.1 Hinterland municipalities Trelleborg 44,992 5.9 Vellinge 36,460 4.7 Eslöv 33,667 4.4 Kävlinge 31,536 4.1 Lomma 24,782 3.2 Staffanstorp 24,778 3.2 Svedala 21,654 2.8 Sjöbo 19,116 2.5 Burlöv 18,449 2.4 Höör 16,691 2.2 Skurup 15,731 2.0 Hörby 15,627 2.0 Total 767,780 100.0 Source: Nordregio (2016) and SCB.

Table 3. Helsingborg functional urban area Municipality Population 2019 % population Core municipalities Helsingborg 145,968 71.5 Hinterland municipalities Höganäs 26,680 13.1 Åstorp 15,999 7.8 Bjuv 15,526 7.6 Total 204,173 100.0 Source: Nordregio (2016) and SCB.

Table 4. Greater Copenhagen by DST Municipality Population 2019 % population Copenhagen 623,404 47.2 Frederiksberg 103,960 7.9 Gentofte 75,176 5.7 Gladsaxe 69,512 5.3 Lyngby-Taarbæk 55,410 4.2 Hvidovre 53,281 4.0 Greve 43,088 3.3 Tårnby 42,509 3.2 Rødovre 39,907 3.0 Ballerup 39,442 3.0 Brøndby 35,219 2.7 Herlev 28,756 2.2 Albertslund 27,692 2.1 Glostrup 22,509 1.7 Ishøj 20,835 1.6 Rudersdal 20,014 1.5 Vallensbæk 16,109 1.2 Furesø 3,806 0.3 Total 1,320,629 100.0 Source: DST.

53 Table 5. Greater Malmö by SCB Municipality Population 2019 % population Malmö 340,802 46.5 Lund 123,495 16.8 Trelleborg 44,992 6.1 Vellinge 36,460 5.0 Eslöv 33,667 4.6 Kävlinge 31,536 4.3 Lomma 24,782 3.4 Staffanstorp 24,778 3.4 Svedala 21,654 3.0 Burlöv 18,449 2.5 Höör 16,691 2.3 Skurup 15,731 2.1 Total 733,037 100.0 Source: SCB.

54 Appendix B

Table 1. Skåne municipalities Municipality Population 2019 % population Malmö 340,802 24.9 Helsingborg 145,968 10.7 Lund 123,495 9.0 Kristianstad 84,975 6.2 Hässleholm 52,072 3.8 Landskrona 45,844 3.4 Trelleborg 44,992 3.3 Ängelholm 42,177 3.1 Vellinge 36,460 2.7 Eslöv 33,677 2.5 Kävlinge 31,536 2.3 Ystad 30,331 2.2 Höganäs 26,680 2.0 Lomma 24,782 1.8 Staffanstorp 24,778 1.8 Svedala 21,654 1.6 Simrishamn 19,269 1.4 Sjöbo 19,160 1.4 Burlöv 18,449 1.4 Klippan 17,651 1.3 Höör 16,691 1.2 Åstorp 15,999 1.2 Skurup 15,731 1.2 Hörby 15,627 1.1 Bjuv 15,526 1.1 Båstad 14,978 1.1 Östra Göinge 14,963 1.1 Svalöv 14,167 1.0 Tomelilla 13,534 1.0 Osby 13,320 1.0 Bromölla 12,909 0.9 Örkelljunga 10,241 0.7 Perstorp 7,526 0.6 Total 1,365,964 100.0 Source: SCB.

Table 2. Halland municipalities Municipality Population 2019 % population Halmstad 101,613 30.8 Kungsbacka 83,511 25.3 Vardberg 63,811 19.3 Falkenberg 44,890 13.6 Laholm 25,569 7.7 Hylte 10,916 3.3 Total 330,310 100.0 Source: SCB.

55 Table 3. Hovedstaden municipalities Municipality Population 2019 % population Copenhagen 623,404 34.0 Frederiksberg 103,960 5.7 Gentofte 75,176 4.1 Gladsaxe 69,681 3.8 Helsingør 62,567 3.4 Rudersdal 56,509 3.1 Lyngby-Taarbæk 55,790 3.0 Hvidovre 53,416 2.9 Hillerød 50,998 2.8 Høje-Taastrup 50,686 2.8 Ballerup 48,458 2.6 Frederikssund 45,332 2.5 Egedal 43,335 2.4 Tårnby 42,984 2.3 Gribskov 41,195 2.2 Furesø 41,069 2.2 Fredensborg 40,819 2.2 Rødovre 40,052 2.2 Bornholm 39,572 2.2 Brøndby 35,397 1.9 Halsnæs 31,271 1.7 Herlev 28,786 1.6 Albertslund 27,877 1.5 Allerød 25,646 1.4 Hørsholm 25,007 1.4 Ishøj 22,946 1.3 Glostrup 22,615 1.2 Vallensbæk 16,654 0.9 Dragør 14,270 0.8 Christiansø* 90 0.0 Total 1,835,562 100.0 *Bornholm municipality. Source: DST.

Table 4. Zealand municipalities Municipality Population 2019 % population Roskilde 87,577 10.5 Næstved 82,991 9.9 Slagelse 79,073 9.5 Holbæk 71,297 8.5 Guldborgsund 60,930 7.3 Køge 60,675 7.3 Greve 50,267 6.0 Kalundborg 48,681 5.8 Vordingbord 45,816 5.5 Lolland 41,615 5.0 Faxe 36,513 4.4 Ringsted 34,725 4.2 Odsherred 33,122 4.0 Sorø 29,834 3.6 Lejre 27,775 3.3 Solrød 23,065 2.8 Stevns 22,782 2.7 Total 836,738 100.0 Source: DST

56 Appendix C

Table 1. Copenhagen metropolitan area (‘Finger Plan’) Municipality Region* Population 2019 % population Copenhagen H 623,404 30.1 Frederiksberg H 103,960 5.0 Roskilde Z 87,577 4.2 Gentofte H 75,176 3.6 Gladsaxe H 69,681 3.4 Helsingør H 62,567 3.0 Køge Z 60,675 2.9 Rudersdal H 56,509 2.7 Lyngby-Taarbæk H 55,790 2.7 Hvidovre H 53,416 2.6 Hillerød H 50,998 2.5 Høje-Taastrup H 50,686 2.5 Greve Z 50,267 2.4 Ballerup H 48,458 2.3 Frederikssund H 45,332 2.2 Egedal H 43,335 2.1 Tårnby H 42,984 2.1 Gribskov H 41,195 2.0 Furesø H 41,069 2.0 Fredensborg H 40,819 2.0 Rødovre H 40,052 1.9 Brøndby H 35,397 1.7 Halsnæs H 31,271 1.5 Herlev H 28,786 1.4 Albertslund H 27,877 1.3 Lejre Z 27,775 1.3 Allerød H 25,646 1.2 Hørsholm H 25,007 1.2 Solrød Z 23,065 1.1 Ishøj H 22,946 1.1 Stevns Z 22,782 1.1 Glostrup H 22,615 1.1 Vallensbæk H 16,654 0.8 Dragør H 14,270 0.7 Total 2,068,041 100.0 * H for Region Hovedstaden; Z for Region Zealand. Source: DST.

57