Vostok-2018: Another Sign of Strengthening Russia-China Ties. Not an Alliance, but Defense Cooperation Is Growing

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Vostok-2018: Another Sign of Strengthening Russia-China Ties. Not an Alliance, but Defense Cooperation Is Growing NO. 47 NOVEMBER 2018 Introduction Vostok-2018: Another Sign of Strengthening Russia-China Ties Not an Alliance, but Defense Cooperation Is Growing Brian G. Carlson Russia’s recent Vostok-2018 military exercises, in which China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) participated for the first time, were another milestone in the increasingly close defense relationship between the two countries. Only a few years ago, Russia used these and other exercises to prepare its forces for the possibility of war with China. Now, at a time of strain in both countries’ relations with the West, China’s par- ticipation is a sign of the value that both sides attach to their relationship. The two countries are not about to form a military alliance, but their growing defense coopera- tion is likely to have a significant impact on global politics in the coming years. Russia held its quadrennial Vostok (East) armored vehicles. China and Mongolia, military exercises September 11–17. The which also participated, became the first two most notable aspects of Vostok-2018 countries outside of the former Soviet were its projected size and China’s partici- Union to join the Vostok exercises. Russia pation. Sergei Shoigu, the Russian defense and China have been holding joint military minister, announced in August that the exercises for more than a decade – includ- exercises would feature 300,000 military ing joint drills under the auspices of the personnel, 36,000 tanks and armored Shanghai Cooperation Organization since vehicles, more than 1,000 aircraft, and 80 2005 and joint naval exercises since 2012 – ships, making these exercises the largest on but this was the first time that China had Russian territory since the Soviet Union’s joined a domestic Russian military exercise. Zapad-81 exercises in 1981. The actual size Although the PLA contingent was small, of the exercises appears to have been con- its presence signaled both China’s desire siderably smaller, as Shoigu’s figures for to learn from Russia’s recent military ex- personnel reflected entire brigades and perience and the growing strength of the divisions rather than the particular battal- defense cooperation between the two ions and regiments that actually partici- countries. pated. The PLA sent 3,200 military personnel as well as 30 aircraft and 900 tanks and Military Aspects eastern regions against a potential invasion by China. On the final day of that year’s In a change from previous practice in the exercises, Russian forces simulated a tacti- Vostok series, the Russian military divided cal nuclear strike against an invading force. its forces into two groups, which simulated In 2013, after the conclusion of Russia- fighting each other rather than an imagi- China joint naval exercises in the Sea of nary opponent. The blue “west state,” play- Japan, five Chinese warships left the exer- ing the role of NATO, featured the Central cises and sailed into the Sea of Okhotsk. Military District and the Northern Fleet. Russia responded by calling snap exercises The red “east state” comprised the Eastern in the Russian Far East. Although these Military District and the Pacific Fleet. The exercises were not part of the Vostok series, red team repulsed the blue team’s incur- they were the largest land and sea exercises sion, then counterattacked and pushed in the region, up to that point, since the the opposing force deep into blue territory. end of the Cold War. During 2014, as the In the naval component of the exercises, West imposed sanctions on Russia follow- the Pacific Fleet defended itself against am- ing the annexation of Crimea, Russia in- phibious assaults by the Northern Fleet. In tensified its diplomatic outreach to China. the exercises’ strategic nuclear component, Nevertheless, the Vostok-2014 exercises Tu-95MS bombers flew into a US air defense held that summer were oriented toward the identification zone near Alaska, prompting defense of the Russian Far East against an US F-22 fighters to scramble and escort invasion by a state actor – a role that could them as they retreated. only be played in the real world by China. Meanwhile, Chinese forces joined their The situation was strikingly different this Russian counterparts for drilling in the Tsu- year. Although the exercises may have gol combined arms training area, located served to remind China about Russia’s mili- near the border with Mongolia, where they tary capabilities, Russia went out of its way practiced air-to-ground coordination, air- to signal that this was not their purpose. borne assault, and coordinated air-artillery Instead, Russia sought to reassure China. At strikes. The Russian and Chinese forces a time of close diplomatic relations, invit- conducted joint firing operations and tested ing China to participate in such large-scale their forces’ interoperability. exercises so close to its border seemed an The Russian military’s main purpose appropriate courtesy. Russia thereby con- in these exercises was to improve its com- veyed a clear message that it does not view mand-and-control capabilities. The exer- China as a military threat to its eastern cises posed formidable challenges in this regions. Beyond reassurance, Russia also area. For example, the military command enlisted China’s participation in order to had to oversee the movement of forces underscore the message that it was sending across long distances to the Eastern Military to the West by holding large-scale drills District as well as joint operations by multi- simulating conflict with NATO. ple services. Because the Vostok-2018 exer- China also sought to achieve several cises were held east of the Ural Mountains, military objectives by participating in the the OSCE’s Vienna Document did not apply. exercises. Vostok-2018 was an opportunity This meant that Russia was under no obli- for the PLA to participate in drills focusing gation to invite OSCE observers or to report heavily on the command and control over to NATO on the content of the exercises. combined arms operations – a crucial com- Despite being conducted in the Russian Far ponent of any potential military conflict East, Vostok-2018’s scenario clearly simu- with the United States and its allies in the lated military conflict with NATO. Asia-Pacific region. The exercises were also This represents a significant change. As an opportunity for the PLA, which has not recently as 2010, the Vostok exercises ap- fought an armed conflict since 1979, to peared to simulate the defense of Russia’s study Russia’s military, particularly lessons SWP Comment 47 November 2018 2 from its recent combat experience in Syria. vanced weapons systems to China, most Strategy and tactics that the Russian mili- notably the S-400 air defense system and tary has employed in that conflict featured Su-35 fighter jets. The United States recently prominently in Vostok-2018. imposed sanctions on a Chinese defense company for purchases of Russian weapons, adding to the growing tensions in both Political Implications countries’ relations with the United States. Russia and China may have intended to Through the Vostok-2018 exercises, Russia use the Vostok-2018 exercises to influence and China sent a clear signal to the United the course of events on the Korean Pen- States and its NATO partners. Their message insula. Although their interests on the was that, if the West continues to apply peninsula are not identical – with China what they consider to be undue pressure, primarily focused on the maintenance of then they will increase their own level of North Korea as a buffer, and Russia more bilateral cooperation – including defense interested in the strategic and economic coordination – in response. Although the benefits to be gained from reunification two countries continue to stress that they or closer integration between North and have no intention to form a military South – China and Russia have neverthe- alliance, some Russian analysts suggest less closely coordinated their diplomacy on that Vostok-2018 may have been partly an this issue in recent years. Both countries attempt to work out the technical details of have sought to limit pressure on the North an alliance in advance while leaving open Korean regime and secure a reduced US the possibility of such an arrangement in military footprint in Northeast Asia in the future. Even if it falls short of a formal return for steps toward denuclearization military alliance, increased military co- by the regime in Pyongyang. operation by Russia and China could have Although no publicly available evidence significant implications for global politics. suggests that the Russian and Chinese mili- Vostok-2018 is another in a series of taries have developed joint operational milestones reflecting a strengthened Russia- plans, some analysts suggest that the China relationship, especially since the Korean Peninsula and Central Asia are the onset of the Ukraine crisis. After this crisis two regions most likely to be included in erupted, Russia and China increased their any such plans. The Vostok-2018 exercises diplomatic coordination on a range of issues, may have been intended as a display of including North Korea and cyberspace, and Russian and Chinese military power in struck important deals in the arms and Northeast Asia in anticipation of the pos- energy spheres. The downturn in US-China sible outbreak of armed conflict on the relations since the beginning of Donald Korean Peninsula. In advance of an ex- Trump’s presidency has given China addi- pected second meeting between Trump and tional reasons to strengthen its cooperation North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Russia with Russia. and China are continuing their close diplo- The level of defense cooperation between matic coordination with North Korea. Russia and China is rising steadily. In 2016, the two countries held joint naval exercises in the South China Sea just weeks after Growing Russia-China Ties and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Implications for the West Hague ruled against China’s expansive claims in that contested body of water.
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