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Home , Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, Vostok 2018

NO. 26 JUNE 2019 Introduction

Partnership on the High and ’s Joint Naval Manoeuvres Michael Paul

On the occasion of the 70th founding anniversary of China’s national navy, a big naval parade with more than 30 Chinese ships sailed off the coast of Qingdao. A few days later, on 29 April 2019, the “Joint 2019” Russian-Chinese bilateral naval exercise began. In numbers, China’s navy now has the world’s biggest fleet – also thanks to decades of Russian naval armament. From Beijing’s point of view, however, the Chi- nese armed forces have a serious shortcoming: a lack of operational experience. Here, too, Moscow fills some gaps. Since the first joint manoeuvre in 2005, cooperation has increased at many levels. Sino-Russian sea manoeuvres now also serve as a menacing signal of support for China’s claims in the or in the Sino-Japanese disputes in the . Moscow and Beijing use the joint naval exercises to set geopolitical signals. Despite all historic mistrust, Sino-Russian cooperation seems to rest on a relatively stable foundation of partnership. But maritime cooperation and coordinated partnership must not lead to an alliance.

Joint exercises benefit China in various time security, and develop capabilities for ways. The country primarily wants to “offshore operations”. secure its long sea routes because the ex- Chinese and have port-orientation of China’s economy makes now carried out more than 25 bilateral, it increasingly dependent on and vulner- increasingly complex joint exercises in able to maritime security. China is also the which naval, land, and air assets were com- world’s largest importer of crude oil. Its bined. Bilateral exercises at sea began in navy is therefore supposed to secure trade 2012, signalling similar geopolitical am- and energy supplies. It has a lot of catching bitions and promoting the implementation up to do when it comes to operating in seas of maritime strategies. In addition, bilateral beyond its own coastal . China has military exercises enable a process of learn- been involved in anti-piracy operations in ing and the exchange of operational and the Horn of since 2008, but apart strategic concepts. They can both demon- from that, the navy has little experience strate military readiness and enhance op- with operations outside . Maritime co- erational experience, thus improving operation with Russia helps China imple- operational flexibility and readiness for ment its maritime strategy, enhance mari- future deployments. Geographically, the

Chinese-Russian naval exercises since 2012

Year Date Host – Operational Area Scope 2012 22–27 April China – China: 18 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 13 aircraft, 5 helicopters Russia: 7 warships (incl. 3 suppliers), 4 helicopters 2013 5–12 July Russia – Sea of China: 9 warships (incl. 2 submarines, 1 supplier), 3 helicopters Russia: 13 warships (incl. submarine), 3 aircraft, 2 helicopters 2014 20–26 May China – East China Sea China: 8 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 7 aircraft, 4 helicopters Russia: 6 warships, 2 aircraft 2015 11–21 May Russia – China: 2 frigates and 1 supply vessel Russia: 2 warships 20–28 August Russia – China: 7 warships, 5 aircraft, 6 helicopters, 21 am- phibious vehicles Russia: 18 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 3 aircraft, 9 amphibious vehicles 2016 12–20 September China – South China Sea China: 12 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 11 aircraft, 8 helicopters Russia: 5 warships (incl. 2 suppliers), 2 helicopters and amphibious vehicles 2017 21–28 July Russia – Altogether 13 warships with helicopters (Ka-27) and bombers (Su-24) 18–25 September Russia – Sea of Japan and A total of 13 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 4 on-board Sea of helicopters, and 4 submarine combat aircraft (ASWs) 2018 11–17 September Russia Large manoeuvre “Vostok 2018” with tactical naval exercises 2019 29 April – 4 May China – Yellow Sea and China: 7 warships (incl. submarine) East China Sea Russia: 5 warships (incl. submarine)

exercises have covered different sea areas, the Sea of Japan (2013, 2015, 2017). On 29 with each country acting as host in differ- April, “Joint Sea 2019” started on China’s ent waters. Yellow Sea coast as the latest iteration of Three of the exercises took place in the the annual naval exercise. Chinese home region: in the Yellow Sea (2012), in the East China Sea (2014), and in the South China Sea (2016). Four exercises Manoeuvres in the were carried out in Russian operational Chinese Home Region areas: in the Mediterranean Sea (2015), in the Baltic Sea (2017), and in the Sea of The joint exercises began in April 2012 in Okhotsk (2017). Several Sino-Russian ma- the Yellow Sea, a marginal sea of the Pacific noeuvres have also been held in an area largely surrounded by China and the where both have strategic interests, namely Korean Peninsula. The Bohai Gulf belongs

SWP Comment 26 June 2019

2 to the Yellow Sea and forms the sea-side conducted with mixed formations of ships access to Beijing, in the south of the East and included missile and artillery strikes China Sea. The regularly against sea targets from various distances deploys ships in these waters and conducted and defence against submarine attacks. annual exercises with South for In the South China Sea joint sea manoeu- decades until President Donald Trump vres focussing on amphibious operations suspended them in 2018. These manoeu- were conducted in 2016. China claims nearly vres, repeatedly criticised by China, were 90 per cent of the South China Sea, includ- one of the reasons for the start of Sino- ing the Paracel (occupied by China Russian exercises in 2012. With 25 war- since 1974, claimed by Vietnam) and the ships, China and Russia demonstrated their Spratly Islands (some occupied by China, strength in geostrategic competition with but disputed with Malaysia, the Philippines, the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and disputed with also against the background of the endur- Brunei and Indonesia as regards territorial ing conflict. waters). The naval manoeuvres in Septem- Led by the flagship of the Russian Pacific ber 2016 took place two months after The Fleet, a convoy entered the East China Sea Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration on 18 May 2014. The ships moored in the rejected China’s claims. From the court’s Wusung naval port near Shanghai. This point of view, the “historical” rights de- marked the beginning of another joint fleet clared by China did not justify territorial manoeuvre. The presence of presidents Vla- claims, and none of the features in the dimir Putin and Xi Jinping underlined the Spratlys qualify them as “islands”, accord- importance of the exercises. Beijing had ing to maritime law. In addition, the court previously declared its support for Russia’s had criticised the creation of artificial stance in the Ukraine crisis; Moscow had islands. President Putin declared before the assured its support for contentious Chinese start of the exercise that Russia supported claims. The latter refer to the Japan-con- China’s position in not recognising the trolled , which China claims ruling from The Hague. The establishment as the Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese navy’s and militarisation of artificial outposts by operations in the waters around the Sen- China had aroused international protest. kaku/Diaoyu Islands have increased since Russia strengthened China’s back with its Japan violated the status quo – from a willingness to engage in joint military ma- Chinese point of view – and placed the noeuvres in the area. The “demonstration islands under its own administration. In of unity” had a special quality, as it in- 2012, seven Chinese warships had passed cluded amphibious operations, that is, it the Miyako Strait. China thus indicated to was intended to deter neighbouring states Japan that its navy would extend its forces with similar claims. China sent the largest to the Pacific to “defensively protect” for- contingent, including state-of-the-art war- eign trade and oil routes, as Chinese admiral ships (052C and 052B destroyers and three Yin Zhuo explained. The “Air Defence 054A frigates). Russia sent two of its largest Identification Zone”, proclaimed by China but oldest destroyers from its . in 2013, was another sign that Beijing Both communicated for the first time via a wanted to take control of the East China common command information system. Sea. In April 2014, the largest amphibious manoeuvre to date between the United States and took place on Manoeuvres in the Korea’s south-east coast. The Sino-Russian Russian Home Region manoeuvres in May 2014 demonstrated the ability and willingness of both naval powers After all the exercises had taken place in to maintain a strong stance in East Asian the Pacific, China signalled its support for waters. Joint exercises on the high seas were Russia by sending its ships in the Mediter-

SWP Comment 26 June 2019

3 ranean and visiting the Russian saw it as Beijing’s response to the presence coast in May 2015, although itself of British and French ships in its own mari- had not been visited. Its annexation had time backyard, the South China Sea. triggered international protest and sanc- In the second half of 2017, the sea ma- tions and isolated Russia. By announcing noeuvres continued in the Sea of Japan. that they would be holding joint exercises They were then extended to the north, into in the South China Sea in 2016, Beijing and the , which lies between the Moscow linked the two highly controversial and the processes in the spirit of mutual support. in the North Pacific. From the Russian point Russia returned to the Mediterranean in of view, such manoeuvres support the legal 2015 as a maritime power. This included claim to the Sea of Okhotsk, which Moscow not only the reactivation of the traditional closed in 2014 for foreign shipping and base in Sevastopol on the south-western tip fishing following a decision by the Commis- of Crimea, but also of the Russian naval sion on the Limits of the . base in the Syrian port of Tartu. This is the Some argued that this could strengthen Chi- only naval base for Russian warships in the nese efforts in the South China Sea to pur- Mediterranean and the only military base of sue its own interpretation of the Law of the the Russian Federation in “distant foreign Sea for that area. countries”. Russia mainly sent ships of the A similar common interest was shown in Black Sea Fleet into the exercise, which tra- the exercises in the Sea of Japan, which lies ditionally operates in the Mediterranean between the , the Rus- Sea from Sevastopol, as the Imperial Rus- sian of , and the Korean Pen- sian Navy used to. insula. Geostrategically, this sea space is China, for its part, demonstrated blue-sea as important for China as it is for Russia, capabilities and emerging interests of its which has in its home port for own in the Mediterranean. In the Belt and the Russian Pacific Fleet. This can be seen Road Initiative – China’s multidimensional from the fact that three exercises took place foreign and economic policy instrument – in the area between 2013 and 2017. With the Greek port of Piraeus has geopolitical their manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan, Rus- significance as an important part of the sia and China were sending a clear message maritime Silk Road. In 2016, the state- to Japan, especially after the exercise in owned Chinese shipping company COSCO 2013, when five Chinese ships first crossed took over 51 per cent of the port company the Soya Strait between in north- and intends to acquire a further 16 per cent ern Japan and the Russian island of - of the shares in 2021. Piraeus is intended lin. The 2015 exercises included amphibi- to serve as the logistical bridgehead for ous operations, which was also an unmis- China’s activities in . takable signal to Tokyo in the context of the In July 2017, China came surprisingly island disputes with Beijing and Moscow. close to one of the most turbulent fault Such complex operations also demonstrate lines in the East-West relationship. For the the high level of maritime cooperation. first time, a Chinese ship convoy – accom- panied by 18 Russian ships of the Baltic Fleet – carried out manoeuvres in the Bal- China’s and Russia’s tic Sea. The warships met in the waters off Maritime Capability Profiles: the enclave of Kaliningrad. Afterwards, the Unequal Partners Chinese ships continued their voyage to St. Petersburg. Some observers spoke of it as While China is eager to establish a sphere being a signal from Beijing, which wanted of influence in what it calls the San Hai, to be perceived as a great naval power, or “Three Seas” – the South China Sea, the and also as a gesture of support for Russia, East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea – the which was isolated from the West. Others People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy is de-

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4 veloping capabilities for offshore operation, After a quite successful military reform, that is, the high seas. The concurrent objec- Russia has efficient, battle-tested armed tives are securing maritime interests (the forces, but it has declined as a maritime protection of sea lines of communication, power. Moscow therefore declares the the realisation of territorial claims in the return of its navy to the ranks of the lead- maritime periphery, and finally naval ing naval powers as a national goal. To this supremacy in the Western Pacific) and the end, the and the Atlantic are to form security of the communist regime. General operational focal points. The annexation of Liu Huaqing, as Commander of the Navy Crimea, and thus the regaining of the sea- (1982–1987), used the national interest in port Sevastopol, also improved the ability to maritime resources as an argument for be present in the Mediterranean. According building a modern navy. The national goal to the new naval doctrine of July 2017, of recovering “lost territories” in the South naval forces are to be created that can also China Sea also served at that time to justify operate in distant areas of the world’s the transition in doctrine from coastal . They are intended to prevent the defence to “active defence”. The develop- dominance of the US navy and other naval ment of the maritime strategy was further powers and to secure second place in the advanced by experiences in the 1990s, world (“by combat characteristics”) for their when the Beijing leadership had to recog- own navy. In quantitative terms, however, nise the weaknesses of its armed forces, the is already in third place. especially during the crisis in the Taiwan While China has two aircraft carriers and Strait in 1995/96. a third is under construction, the only Rus- In just over two decades, the PLA navy sian carrier, “Admiral Kuznetsov”, was has mustered one of the mightiest navies called the “most marauded warship in the in the world. In numbers, China now has world”. Only a quarter of the Russian fleet the world’s biggest fleet. It is also growing of more than 200 ships – mainly made faster than any other major navy. The num- up of Soviet-era surface ships – are fit for ber of ships or the total tonnage is useful blue-water operations. Only in the construc- for assessing the capabilities of a fleet in tion and operation of submarines does relation to its tasks. However, it is not suf- Russia remain a peer leader – and thus in ficient to compare its capabilities with a position to put the US navy and NATO’s those of another navy, such as that of the anti-submarine capabilities under pressure. United States. Today, the Chinese navy has more than 300 warships, whereas the num- ber of US ships in recent years has been From the “Comprehensive between 270 and 290. Now China wants to Strategic Partnership of enable its naval forces more quickly for far- Coordination” to the Alliance? seas operations and build more destroyers, frigates, and submarines. By 2030, it is Moscow and Beijing came together in the estimated that the PLA navy will consist early 1990s under similarly difficult con- of up to 550 naval assets: 450 surface ships ditions. The violent suppression of the and 99 submarines. More and more, the uprising on Tiananmen Square in June Chinese navy will become equal to the US 1989 had massively damaged China’s repu- navy, both quantitatively and even qualita- tation in the world. The European Union tively, if armament, training, and maritime and the United States imposed an arms exercises are continued as before. But only embargo, which is still in force today. years after the end of the modernisation Russia suffered from the consequences of process in 2035 will the capabilities of Chi- the collapse of the in 1991. na’s navy on the high seas and in the highly In this phase of weakness, both wanted to complex operation of aircraft carrier groups counter the growing influence of the United come close to those of the US navy. States. This effort to restore a balance of

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5 power (“balancing”) is a central explanation with a Russian submarine for the first time. for the emergence of alliances, according to And the interaction is still growing, as can classical alliance theory. be seen from the fact that Chinese airborne After the first reciprocal state visits in reconnaissance now regularly transmit data 1992 and 1994, a “Strategic Coordination to Russian ships. Only in the nuclear do- Partnership” was declared in April 1996. main does Russia remain on par with the This was followed by a “Joint Declaration United States and superior to China. But on a Multipolar World and the Creation here, too, Beijing is likely to expect support of a New International Order” in 1997 and from Moscow in the construction of stra- a “Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and tegic submarines, among other things. Friendly Cooperation” in 2001, in which Pragmatic cooperation is beneficial for consultations were agreed in the event that both because it avoids the uneasy com- either side saw its security interests being promise between obligation and sovereign- threatened. The last border disputes were ty. Therefore, a formal alliance is unneces- settled in 2004. In January 2017, in China’s sary – an alliance with a guarantee of White Paper on Asia-Pacific Security Co- military assistance in times of conflict can operation Policy, Russia was described as a even negatively affect relations with other “priority in diplomacy”. In December 2017, countries and harm one’s own political the Chinese Ambassador to Russia, Li Hui, interests. In the event of a crisis or conflict, declared that the “comprehensive strategic the alliance partner would limit the range partnership of coordination” between of political options, while the appearance of China and Russia had a special position in a Sino-Russian military alliance could have a diplomacy with major powers. And Russian threatening – and even escalating – effect. President Putin explained in April 2019: Moreover, they are unequal partners with “Our military and military-technical co- different goals. The dream of the great re- operation points to the high level of trust. juvenation of the Chinese nation virtually Russia and China hold regular joint exer- prohibits voluntary self-restriction, as would cises and share our accumulated experience be required by an alliance. Russia’s role as in military development.” a great power, on the other hand, benefits Contrary to the official characterisation from the partnership because it underscores of China and Russia as equal partners, Chi- that Russia is not just a regional power. In na’s dominant role in economic relations, the long term, only Beijing is able to con- which will presumably continue to develop tain its common rival, the United States, to Russia’s disadvantage in the coming and the transatlantic alliance. This is an decades, is becoming clear. Moreover, China advantage for Moscow, which is why it has is not as dependent on Russian energy sup- “fed the dragon”. In this respect, the Krem- plies as Russia is on China as a buyer and lin is nolens volens striving less for balancing investor in the energy sector. However, than for leaning towards a state with higher there is (still) one decisive exception to the power potential (“bandwagoning”). An rule of Chinese superiority, namely Russia’s alliance would make it even clearer that experience as a military power. Russia con- both are not equal partners. tinues to have an operational and techno- logical lead in important areas of naval warfare, such as submarine operations, the Perspectives use of long-range bombers at sea, and mine warfare. Whereas manoeuvres in the past With its ongoing naval modernisation pro- were often limited to anti-terrorist exer- gramme, Beijing has long since overtaken cises, they now include combined air de- Moscow, both in claiming a leading role as fence, missile and artillery operations, anti- a great maritime power and in its imple- submarine warfare, and amphibious opera- mentation. Since the collapse of the Soviet tions. In 2017, a Chinese lifeboat docked Union, Russia has failed to restore its blue-

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6 water fleet. Instead, the navy usually of crews and ships or rather to not expose navigates in the brown-water areas of the themselves to the partner navy. Maybe only Atlantic’s and Pacific’s marginal seas, deficiencies should be concealed. securing its interests in the “near abroad”. Nevertheless, the Russian navy is a China, on the other hand, will expand its valuable model for China. The shortage of global naval capabilities. Two aircraft car- surface vessels is compensated by distrib- riers, additional type 055 guided weapon uting cruise missiles across the fleet, in- destroyers, and smaller warships are to be cluding submarines, thereby significantly completed in the next years. Russia has a increasing combat strength. The continued combination of small warships such as proliferation of offensive missile capabili- frigates and corvettes as well as submarines ties among ships and submarines remains equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles. These perhaps the most significant new develop- are suitable for threatening land targets up ment of Russia’s naval capabilities, also in to 2,000 kilometres away, as was the case in terms of an effective anti-access/area denial the Syrian conflict. Moscow therefore has strategy (A2/AD). Complementary to this, respectable naval capabilities to safeguard the Chinese navy is the world leader in the its national security interests, and its maritime deployment of ballistic missiles. modernisation projects will enhance blue- Politically sensitive areas not only proved water capabilities, even though it will not to be no obstacle to joint exercises, but be able to project global maritime power seem to be part of the planning because like China in the future. they gave them higher symbolic value. The Russia uses the joint exercises as an alter- 2014 manoeuvres took place in the East native means of projecting power, whereas China Sea at a time when the Sino-Japanese China uses them to advance and implement island disputes threatened to escalate. Dur- its own . China’s rise as a ing the exercises in the Black Sea in 2015, naval power is to be seen as part of an ex- Europe was still shocked by Russia’s annexa- traordinary transformation. In modern his- tion of Crimea. The 2016 manoeuvres were tory, it is the only example of a land power held in the South China Sea, where the becoming a hybrid land and sea power. The militarisation of newly erected Chinese out- fact that a land power develops sea power posts was just beginning. touches the established sea power’s most Are Russia and China on the way to a sensitive nerve. But so far, China has con- military alliance, or are they simply using sistently adhered to this highly complex, a mutually beneficial partnership? In fact, quite expensive, and risky geostrategy. neither the functionality of military co- In addition to military-technical coopera- operation nor its potential should be under- tion and military-to-military dialogue, mili- estimated. Attention should focus not only tary exercises have established themselves on China and Russia as individual coun- as an important element in further develop- tries, but also on the impact of their evolv- ing the partnership. In August 2005, almost ing military partnership. In the end, the 10,000 Chinese and Russian soldiers from respective self-interest does not necessarily the air force and navy took part in the first make Moscow and Beijing allies. Even with- major joint manoeuvre, the “peace mis- out formal alliance relations, they enjoy sion”. In view of the smouldering Taiwan advantages that otherwise only close allies crisis, this first joint manoeuvre already had do, as illustrated by the Vostok exercises in considerable political significance. Over 2018. These include a learning process on time, the manoeuvres became more diverse both sides as well as a certain degree of and complex. However, it remains uncer- interoperability that – as in NATO – is tain whether some exercises for air defence only viable so long as it is maintained and and submarine combat were carefully practised. orchestrated so as to guarantee the safety

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7 Russia seems more concerned with main- taining strategic nuclear capabilities as well as ground and air forces for operations in the “near abroad” than rebuilding its fleets. China, as a rising maritime power with ex- tensive economic interests around the globe, is building a blue-water navy with carrier groups and expeditionary capabilities. A “degree of mutual complementarity between the two militaries” does not auto- © Stiftung Wissenschaft matically mean military engagement in the und Politik, 2019 event of conflict. But the combination of All rights reserved Russian combat experience and advanced strategic weapons with Chinese sea power This Comment reflects makes a quite impressive force. the author’s views. It is up to Beijing to enhance strategic The online version of stability by creating transparency in its this publication contains naval strategy and future fleet armament. functioning links to other Beyond maritime arms control, not only SWP texts and other relevant Brussels and Washington, but also Moscow sources. and Beijing must be interested in confi- SWP Comments are subject dence- and security-building measures to to internal peer review, fact- avoid crisis instability, even if their chances checking and copy-editing. of success currently can be regarded as For further information on quite low. our quality control pro- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ quality-management-for- swp-publications/

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2019C26

(Updated English version of SWP-Aktuell 24/2019)

Dr Michael Paul is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 26 June 2019

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