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The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: an Analysis of Its Historical and Strategic Significance

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The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: an Analysis of Its Historical and Strategic Significance The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance by Robert Joe Mahoney B.S. May 1981 United States Air Force Academy M.A. October 1994 Webster University M.S. June 2001 National Defense University A Dissertation Submitted to The Faculty of Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 31, 2009 Dissertation Directed by Ronald H. Spector Professor of History The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Robert Joe Mahoney has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of 13 November 2008. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance Robert Joe Mahoney Dissertation Research Committee: Ronald H. Spector, Professor of History, Dissertation Director William H. Becker, Professor of History, Committee Member Stephen P. Randolph, Professor of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2008 by Robert J. Mahoney All rights reserved iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work would not have been possible without the support of the leadership of the two military universities I have had the privilege to be a part of. Lieutenant General Francis Wilson, the President of National Defense University and Major General (ret) Donald Gardner, the President of the Marine Corps University both afforded me an opportunity to undertake this adventure and an inspirational environment in which to labor. My colleagues at both the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Marine Corps War College were extremely encouraging, helpful and generous with their time. I would especially like to thank Dr Joseph Goldberg, Dr Jerre Wilson and Dr Edward O’Dowd for their assistance and for acting as sounding boards. My dissertation committee, Dr Ronald Spector, Dr William Becker and Dr Stephen Randolph deserve special note. The final product was shaped by their guidance and expertise. Many donated their time and efforts to aid the process. Notable was one of the wounded veterans of the invasion of Koh Tang, former Marine Corporal Tim Trebil. The Gerald R. Ford Museum in Ann Arbor, MI, provided a vast list of materials that was rich in content, including many records of interviews of the military participants of the battle of Koh Tang and the seizure of the Mayaguez . The Marine Historical Archives at the Gray Research Center and the Marine History Division at Marine Base Quantico Virginia both had a wealth of information and some very eager and knowledgeable researchers, most notably Kimberly Adams and Annette Amerman. The Air Force Historical Research Agency in Maxwell AFB, AL afforded me the opportunity to spend countless iv hours searching through their many related documents they had and provided me with valuable records and invaluable help. Once again, their archivists, especially Mr Ennis were extremely helpful. Also helpful were the Air Force Historian’s office at Bolling AFB; the National Security Archive at George Washington University; the Library of Congress and the Naval Historical Center in Washington DC. Dr Patrice Scanlon of the USMC Leadership Communication Skills Center provided invaluable guidance and encouragement. My colleague and the CIA Chair at Marine Corps University, LtCol Jim Davis, USMC (ret) and the Golf Company Commander at Koh Tang, not only spurred my interest in the subject, but put me in touch with some surviving members of the operation that had information never before brought to light. His inspiration was invaluable. Most importantly and finally, I wish to thank my entire family for their unfailing support during this project, including my parents, Bob and Vurble, and my children, Robert, Michael and Amanda. Most of all, I want to thank my wife Martha without whom no achievement would matter. v ABSTRACT of “The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance” The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance The 12 May 1975 Cambodian seizure of the American merchant cargo ship, SS Mayaguez began an intense four day international crisis with significant historical ramifications. This crisis was the first direct international military challenge to US power since the end of the Vietnam War and was being faced by President Ford, the first (and only) non-elected president of the United States. It was the first test of the president’s role as commander-in-chief since the enactment of the 1973 War Powers Act, which was intended to limit presidential power. The Ford administration’s reaction was swift and violent and achieved its stated goals of enhancing US prestige and rescuing the ship and crew. However, an analysis of the events reveals that the end result was largely a matter of extreme good fortune. The two American goals were at times in conflict. The US forces came dangerously close to killing the 40 man Mayaguez crew they had been sent to rescue and the Marines that landed on Koh Tang Island were nearly annihilated by a large Cambodian force on the island that was unexpected by the invading Americans. The analysis presented here reveals the reason for the failure of the correct intelligence to reach the invading American force. It reveals the nature of the good fortune that allowed the US to rescue the ship and crew and boost its prestige. It details the decision-making process from the National Security Council through the operational levels down to the tactical forces. And it shows how this short but intense crisis helped spur the most radical restructuring of the Department of Defense since its inception in 1947. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . iv ABSTRACT . vi TABLE OF CONTENTS . vii MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS . ix INTRODUCTION . 1 PROLOGUE . 16 PART I: 12 MAY: THE CRISIS BEGINS Chapter 1: Mayaguez Seized, Crew Taken . 32 Chapter 2: Ford moves into action . 40 Chapter 3: Initial Military Response 12 May 1975. 53 PART II: 13 MAY ACTION AND REACTION-TENSION MOUNTS Chapter 4: May 13-The Mayaguez and Crew Move to Koh Tang . 59 Chapter 5: NSC Morning Meeting 13 May . 62 Chapter 6: Intelligence Reporting 13 May. 72 Chapter 7: Ford’s Military Options and 13 May Buildup . 76 Chapter 8: A Brush with Disaster- Mayaguez Crew Almost Killed . 83 Chapter 9: NSC late meeting 13 May . 87 Chapter 10: Mayaguez Crew to Mainland then Moved 13-14 May. 102 PART III: 14 MAY BUILDUP TO THE STORM Chapter 11: Forces Assemble C2 Established . 107 Chapter 12: 14 May Tactical Planning and Intelligence. 112 Chapter 13: Congress Weighs In -14 May Hearing . 127 Chapter 14: 14 May NSC in Overdrive. 132 Chapter 15: Congressional Leadership Approves . 149 Chapter 16: Ford's Dinner . 154 PART IV: 15 MAY ASSAULT AND RECOVERY Chapter 17: Assault on Koh Tang Phase I. 160 Chapter 18: Recovery of the Mayaguez . 175 Chapter 19: Thursday May 15, Mayaguez Crew Released . 180 Chapter 20: Attacks on Kompong Som . 190 Chapter 21: Ford Celebrates-Orders Cessation . 194 Chapter 22: Second wave and Extraction . 197 PART V: AFTERMATH Chapter 23: Final NSC Meeting . 222 vii Chapter 24: Secretary of Defense Schlesinger . 227 Chapter 25: International and Domestic Reactions . 230 Chapter 26: Congressional Reaction . 233 Chapter 27: Defense Restructuring . 246 Chapter 28: The Mayaguez, Crew and Koh Tang Island Aftermath . 249 PART VI: ANALYSIS Chapter 29: Strategic Leadership Analysis . 250 Chapter 30: Operational and Tactical Level Analysis . 267 Chapter 31: Intelligence Analysis . 291 CONCLUSION . 308 MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS . 312 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 327 APPENDIX: Maritime Warning System . 338 viii MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1: Mayaguez Capture Area . 312 Figure 2: SS Mayaguez 13 May 1975 . 313 Figure 3: Location of US Forces 12 May 1975 . 314 Figure 4: Command Relationships . 315 Figure 5: Koh Tang Island . 316 Figure 6: Local Area Map . 317 Figure 7: Destroyed Helicopters on East Beach (Knife-23 and -31) . 318 Figure 8: Koh Tang Island at 0830 . 319 Figure 9: SS Mayaguez and USS Holt . 320 Figure 10: USS Holt Tied Alongside SS Mayaguez . 321 Figure 11: USS Holt Towing SS Mayaguez . 322 Figure 12: Ford and Advisors Celebrate Release of Mayaguez Crew . 323 Figure 13: Post-Strike Photos of Damage in Kompong Som Area . 324 Figure 14: Post-Strike Photo of Ream Airfield near Kompong Som . 325 Figure 15: Mayaguez Operation Communications . 326 ix INTRODUCTION I must say with all the certainty of which I am capable: No adversaries or potential enemies of the United States should imagine that America can be safely challenged; and no allies or time-tested friends of the United States should worry or fear that our commitments to them will not be honored because of the current confusion and changing situation in Southeast Asia. We stand ready to defend ourselves and support our allies as surely as we always have… The military strength of this nation depends as it always has, on its economic strength and the will power and self-discipline of its people. The credibility of the United States in this world, both among our allies and our adversaries depends upon their assessment of our moral, economic and military strength and staying power. All three of these elements are essential. President Gerald R. Ford 1 San Diego California, 3 April, 1975 From 12 to 15 May 1975 the last chapter of the United States’ military involvement in Indochina—a hostage situation and rescue operation often referred to as the “ Mayaguez incident” –unfolded. Elements of the Khmer Rouge Navy operating former US Navy “swift boats” halted, boarded and seized an American civilian cargo ship, the SS Mayaguez in international waters in the Sea of Thailand near islands claimed by the Cambodian government.
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