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Home , 9th Marine Regiment, Cold War, Fall of Phnom Penh, Fall of Saigon, Forward air control, Gulf of Tonkin incident

The 1975 : An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance

by Joe Mahoney

B.S. May 1981 Academy M.A. October 1994 Webster University M.S. June 2001 National Defense University

A Dissertation Submitted to

The Faculty of Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

January 31, 2009

Dissertation Directed by

Ronald H. Spector Professor of History

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Robert Joe Mahoney has passed the Final Examination for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy as of 13 November 2008. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance

Robert Joe Mahoney

Dissertation Research Committee:

Ronald H. Spector, Professor of History, Dissertation Director

William H. Becker, Professor of History, Committee Member

Stephen P. Randolph, Professor of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Committee Member

ii

© Copyright 2008 by Robert J. Mahoney All rights reserved

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the support of the leadership of the two universities I have had the privilege to be a part of. Lieutenant

Francis Wilson, the President of National Defense University and Major General (ret)

Donald Gardner, the President of the Marine University both afforded me an opportunity to undertake this adventure and an inspirational environment in which to labor. My colleagues at both the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Marine

Corps College were extremely encouraging, helpful and generous with their time. I would especially like to thank Dr Joseph Goldberg, Dr Jerre Wilson and Dr Edward

O’Dowd for their assistance and for acting as sounding boards.

My dissertation committee, Dr Ronald Spector, Dr William Becker and Dr

Stephen Randolph deserve special note. The final product was shaped by their guidance and expertise.

Many donated their time and efforts to the process. Notable was one of the wounded veterans of the invasion of , former Marine Corporal Tim Trebil. The

Gerald R. Ford Museum in Ann Arbor, MI, provided a vast list of materials that was rich in content, including many records of interviews of the military participants of the battle of Koh Tang and the seizure of the Mayaguez . The Marine Historical Archives at the

Gray Research Center and the Marine History at Marine Base Quantico both had a wealth of information and some very eager and knowledgeable researchers, most notably Kimberly Adams and Annette Amerman. The Air Force Historical

Research Agency in Maxwell AFB, AL afforded me the opportunity to spend countless

iv hours searching through their many related documents they had and provided me with

valuable records and invaluable help. Once again, their archivists, especially Mr Ennis

were extremely helpful. Also helpful were the Air Force Historian’s office at Bolling

AFB; the Archive at George Washington University; the Library of

Congress and the Naval Historical Center in Washington DC. Dr Patrice Scanlon of the

USMC Leadership Communication Skills Center provided invaluable guidance and

encouragement.

My colleague and the CIA Chair at Marine Corps University, LtCol Jim Davis,

USMC (ret) and the Golf Company Commander at Koh Tang, not only spurred my interest in the subject, but put me in touch with some surviving members of the operation that had information never before brought to light. His inspiration was invaluable.

Most importantly and finally, I wish to thank my entire family for their unfailing support during this project, including my parents, Bob and Vurble, and my children,

Robert, Michael and Amanda. Most of all, I want to thank my wife Martha without whom no achievement would matter.

v ABSTRACT of “The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance”

The 1975 Mayaguez Incident: An Analysis of its Historical and Strategic Significance

The 12 Cambodian seizure of the American merchant cargo , SS

Mayaguez began an intense four day international crisis with significant historical ramifications. This crisis was the first direct international military challenge to US power since the end of the War and was being faced by President Ford, the first (and only) non-elected president of the United States. It was the first test of the president’s role as commander-in-chief since the enactment of the 1973 War Powers Act, which was intended to limit presidential power. The Ford administration’s reaction was swift and violent and achieved its stated goals of enhancing US prestige and rescuing the ship and crew. However, an analysis of the events reveals that the end result was largely a matter of extreme good fortune. The two American goals were at times in conflict. The US forces came dangerously close to killing the 40 man Mayaguez crew they had been sent to rescue and the that landed on Koh Tang Island were nearly annihilated by a large Cambodian force on the island that was unexpected by the invading .

The analysis presented here reveals the reason for the failure of the correct intelligence to reach the invading American force. It reveals the nature of the good fortune that allowed the US to rescue the ship and crew and boost its prestige. It details the decision-making process from the National Security Council through the operational levels down to the tactical forces. And it shows how this short but intense crisis helped spur the most radical restructuring of the Department of Defense since its inception in 1947.

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

ABSTRACT ...... vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... vii

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS ...... ix

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

PROLOGUE ...... 16

PART I: 12 MAY: THE CRISIS BEGINS Chapter 1: Mayaguez Seized, Crew Taken ...... 32 Chapter 2: Ford moves into action ...... 40 Chapter 3: Initial Military Response 12 May 1975...... 53

PART II: 13 MAY ACTION AND REACTION-TENSION MOUNTS Chapter 4: May 13-The Mayaguez and Crew Move to Koh Tang . . . . 59 Chapter 5: NSC Morning Meeting 13 May ...... 62 Chapter 6: Intelligence Reporting 13 May...... 72 Chapter 7: Ford’s Military Options and 13 May Buildup ...... 76 Chapter 8: A Brush with Disaster- Mayaguez Crew Almost Killed . . . 83 Chapter 9: NSC late meeting 13 May ...... 87 Chapter 10: Mayaguez Crew to Mainland then Moved 13-14 May. . . 102

PART III: 14 MAY BUILDUP TO THE STORM Chapter 11: Forces Assemble C2 Established ...... 107 Chapter 12: 14 May Tactical Planning and Intelligence...... 112 Chapter 13: Congress Weighs In -14 May Hearing ...... 127 Chapter 14: 14 May NSC in Overdrive...... 132 Chapter 15: Congressional Leadership Approves ...... 149 Chapter 16: Ford's Dinner ...... 154

PART IV: 15 MAY ASSAULT AND RECOVERY Chapter 17: Assault on Koh Tang Phase I...... 160 Chapter 18: Recovery of the Mayaguez ...... 175 Chapter 19: Thursday May 15, Mayaguez Crew Released ...... 180 Chapter 20: Attacks on Kompong Som ...... 190 Chapter 21: Ford Celebrates-Orders Cessation ...... 194 Chapter 22: Second wave and Extraction ...... 197

PART V: AFTERMATH Chapter 23: Final NSC Meeting ...... 222

vii Chapter 24: Secretary of Defense Schlesinger ...... 227 Chapter 25: International and Domestic Reactions ...... 230 Chapter 26: Congressional Reaction ...... 233 Chapter 27: Defense Restructuring ...... 246 Chapter 28: The Mayaguez, Crew and Koh Tang Island Aftermath . . 249

PART VI: ANALYSIS Chapter 29: Strategic Leadership Analysis ...... 250 Chapter 30: Operational and Tactical Level Analysis ...... 267 Chapter 31: Intelligence Analysis ...... 291

CONCLUSION ...... 308

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS ...... 312

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 327

APPENDIX: Maritime Warning System ...... 338

viii

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Mayaguez Capture Area ...... 312

Figure 2: SS Mayaguez 13 May 1975 ...... 313

Figure 3: Location of US Forces 12 May 1975 ...... 314

Figure 4: Command Relationships ...... 315

Figure 5: Koh Tang Island ...... 316

Figure 6: Local Area Map ...... 317

Figure 7: Destroyed on East Beach (Knife-23 and -31) ...... 318

Figure 8: Koh Tang Island at 0830 ...... 319

Figure 9: SS Mayaguez and USS Holt ...... 320

Figure 10: USS Holt Tied Alongside SS Mayaguez ...... 321

Figure 11: USS Holt Towing SS Mayaguez ...... 322

Figure 12: Ford and Advisors Celebrate Release of Mayaguez Crew ...... 323

Figure 13: Post-Strike Photos of Damage in Kompong Som Area ...... 324

Figure 14: Post-Strike Photo of Ream Airfield near Kompong Som ...... 325

Figure 15: Mayaguez Operation Communications ...... 326

ix INTRODUCTION

I must say with all the certainty of which I am capable: No adversaries or potential enemies of the United States should imagine that America can be safely challenged; and no allies or time-tested friends of the United States should worry or fear that our commitments to them will not be honored because of the current confusion and changing situation in Southeast . We stand ready to defend ourselves and support our allies as surely as we always have… The military strength of this depends as it always has, on its economic strength and the will power and self-discipline of its people. The credibility of the United States in this world, both among our allies and our adversaries depends upon their assessment of our moral, economic and military strength and staying power. All three of these elements are essential.

President Gerald R. Ford 1 , 3 April, 1975

From 12 to 15 May 1975 the last chapter of the United States’ military

involvement in Indochina—a hostage situation and rescue operation often referred to as

the “ Mayaguez incident” –unfolded. Elements of the operating

former US Navy “swift boats” halted, boarded and seized an American civilian cargo

ship, the SS Mayaguez in international waters in the Sea of near islands claimed by the Cambodian government. The forty man crew was removed from the ship by

Cambodian forces and effectively disappeared. The resultant four-day episode was considered and treated as a crisis of strategic importance by President and his closest advisors. They determined that, against the backdrop of recent failures in the area, US resolve and military strength had to be shown in the face of this challenge. The

US reaction was immediate and violent.

1 “Where US Stands after Vietnam Debacle,” US News &World Report , 14 , 27.

1 The affair’s short duration and relatively small casualty figures belie the

importance of the episode. 2 Research shows the event was a landmark in several ways.

First, the Mayaguez incident was the first direct foreign challenge to American power since the end of the and more specifically the first test of the Ford presidency. The international and domestic stakes were high. Internationally, the era was marked by the height of the , with the US involved in a fledgling diplomatic relationship with and a cooling détente with the . The collapse of

South Vietnam and the loss of to communist forces had both occurred less than a month before the Mayaguez seizure and had raised concerns of US strength

amongst both allies and adversaries. Domestically, Ford’s power position was less than

strong. Watergate had shamed the office of the president and the un-elected Ford had

assumed the presidency less than a year before, on 9 August 1974 in the wake of Richard

Nixon’s resignation. Ford then quickly touched off a political firestorm by pardoning

Nixon a month later. 3 With the capture of the Mayaguez, President Ford was faced with

a challenge to American international power while meeting perhaps larger challenges at

home.

The Mayaguez crisis had constitutional implications. In another episode of the

continuing constitutional struggle between the executive and legislative branches, this

operation was the initial test of the 1973 War Powers Act as well as the 1973 Case-

2 The cost of the operation, counting the missing Marines and the twenty-three airmen killed on May 13th, was forty-one American lives lost and over fifty wounded. There were also an estimated one hundred Cambodian dead. See Chapters 7 & 17-22. 3 Bob Woodward, Shadow, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) provides a detailed account of the unpopularity of the pardon.

2 Church Amendment which forbade US involvement in SE Asia .4 It proved to be the first scene in a drama that continues to play out to this day with US Constitutional power issues being raised constantly over the present situation in the . As president,

Ford would have to use all of his legislative experience to negotiate the difficult political terrain.

Third, the Mayaguez incident provided a brief glimpse into the infancy of a technological shift in warfare and . communications advances allowed for the first time a US President and the high ranking members of his civilian and military staffs to speak directly to a combatant on the battlefield halfway around the world. This capability has yielded debatable advantages as time has passed.

Fourth, the crisis exposed critical weaknesses in the US military’s ability to plan and operate jointly, or with more than one service. Operational errors occurred and lack of interoperability was apparent when tasked units from the different services attempted to combine in a short time period and operate seamlessly in a trying combat environment.

The military’s performance in this and other operations such as and Operation

Eagle Claw, the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, spurred the beginning of the most radical organizational and operational transformation in the Department of Defense and the military services since their inception in the National Defense Act of 1947. The

Mayaguez incident planted a seed in the mind of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

General David C. Jones that eventually bloomed and resulted in the landmark Goldwater-

Nichols Act of 1986, which restructured the Department of Defense and the US military. 5

4 The 1973 War Powers Act and the Case-Church Amendment were attempts by Congress to limit Presidential authority to wage war, especially in . They will be cited and discussed more fully in the body of the paper. 5 General Jones later became the Chairman of the under Presidents Carter and Reagan.

3 Despite its significance at the time of its occurrence, the Mayaguez crisis has faded from collective memory and become a largely forgotten footnote in history. The of the crisis is incomplete. There are very few books that describe the events in any detail and only two that focus solely on the crisis itself. The few works that do exist tend to focus on a very narrow aspect of the crisis either at the strategic or tactical level. This study is a small step toward expanding scholarly understanding of the

Mayaguez crisis in the broader context of the Cold War and correcting its treatment as a footnote for those who fought and died for their country in the Mayaguez rescue operation. The study ties together the different levels of political and , operations and tactics and attempts for the first time to provide a holistic account of the crisis and answer previously unanswered questions.

This investigation focuses largely on the decisions made during the four days of the Mayaguez crisis and the results of those decisions at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical; from the National Security Council (NSC) down to the on-scene commanders of the airmen, sailors, soldiers and marines, and also the of the

Mayaguez . It recounts the situational context, the diplomatic and military action and analyzes the objectives, events and outcomes of this brief but intense US crisis. It also analyzes and evaluates the operational structure of the forces that implemented the decisions of the US leadership and the intelligence community’s performance during the crisis. Finally it reinforces the position that this seemingly small event had significant consequences.

4 Existing Scholarship

There are few books that directly address the Mayaguez incident, while many

have some reference to the episode as a part of a work of larger scope, such as the

Kissinger and Ford biographies. The bibliography includes many of these books, some

of which are used for contextual material. The following are important works on the

topic that merit mention.

John Guilmartin’s 1995, A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh

Tang is the most recognized and detailed work on the incident. 6 A retired Air Force

and former air rescue , Guilmartin focused mainly on the

operational and tactical levels while presenting a gripping account of the battle for Koh

Tang. His expert knowledge of the joint warfare involved and the technical aspects of the

helicopters provided a basis for an astute analysis of the operational art of war applied in

the instance of the Mayaguez crisis. Dr Guilmartin, at the time on loan to Point

from State, was very helpful in offering advice and steering the initial efforts of the

study. It was evident the study could add to his body of work with material that had

become available since his book was written, particularly in the use of the National

Security Council meeting minutes to analyze the strategic decisions that were made by

President Ford and his advisors.

The Last Battle, a 2001 work by Ralph Wetterhahn, coincidentally also a retired

US Air Force pilot, relies on Guilmartin’s work for much of the book’s account of the

actual battle. 7 Wetterhahn’s three main contributions to the literature were his use of

some of the newly released (at the time) NSC meeting minutes from the Ford library, his

6 John Guilmartin, A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1995). 7 Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2001).

5 alternative description of the battle of Koh Tang from a Cambodian combatant’s point of

view and his attempt to solve the mystery of the whereabouts of three Marines that were

after the battle. After traveling to Cambodia and interviewing former

Cambodian servicemen, Wetterhahn concluded the three Marines were taken captive

after weeks in hiding and executed on the Cambodian mainland. That assertion is

disputed by their former colleagues and others.

Roy Rowan, a Time reporter, wrote a compelling narrative of the crisis, The Four

Days of Mayaguez, mainly from the perspective of the captured crew. 8 He was able to interview the entire Mayaguez crew at length immediately after the incident and incredibly had his book in print by July of 1975, only two months after the close of the action. Both Guilmartin and Wetterhahn utilized Rowan’s book as a primary source to provide an account of the Mayaguez crew’s situation during the crisis. This study uses a combination of Rowan’s account and the Captain of the Mayaguez , Charles Miller’s statement to the US House of Representatives Committee on and its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs Hearings in July 1975.

Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean

Confrontations , a 1978 study by Richard Head, Frisco Short and Robert McFarlane (later a Reagan National Security Advisor), used a model to investigate crisis decision making in the cases of the Mayaguez incident and a deadly 1976 confrontation at the Korean demilitarized zone. Their study reached several conclusions which included the idea that in the two listed cases a behavioral change from normal activity during a crisis situation diminished bureaucratic territorialism and increased the propensity for the President to take personal charge of the situation. As a Marine Major assigned to the NSC staff at the

8 , The Four Days of Mayaguez, (New York: WW Norton & Co., 1975).

6 time of the Mayaguez situation, McFarlane had an insiders view and access, but

presented a rather stylized and optimistic account of the NSC decision-making. It was

evident throughout the Mayaguez incident that bureaucratic territorialism was still a

major factor. 9 However, Crisis Resolutions authors’ insights proved helpful as

background reading material.

Christopher Lamb’s book, Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez

Crisis, takes a slightly different approach by employing several political

science/international relations models to analyze the decision-making processes involved

at the National Security Council level during this crisis. It concerned itself with four

decision-making models: the rational actor model; the bureaucratic politics model; the

crisis resolution model used in the previously described Crisis Resolution ; and the belief-

system model, which was the model Lamb adopted in his work. This book, a version of

his dissertation, uses the historical episode as a case study with which to illustrate the

effectiveness of the models. It is a useful work with which a reader could contrast the

account presented here. Particularly noteworthy is Lamb’s discussion of the definition of

a crisis and how the preconceptions of Ford and the other NSC members shaped the

perception of the situation. 10

Another publication, Thinking in Time, a 1986 book subtitled, The Uses of History

for Decision Makers uses over a dozen historical case studies to analyze strategic

decision making and decision makers’ sometimes flawed historical analogies. 11 The book

9 Richard Head, Frisco Short and Robert McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978). 10 Christopher Lamb, Belief Systems andDecision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis, (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1989). 11 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers , (New York: The , 1986).

7 is not about history per se, but about the uses of history. The analysis of the Mayaguez

incident and other historical case studies provides the reader a framework from which to

understand how to use past lessons to apply to present situations and the drawbacks of

misapplication. In this case, the authors point to President Ford and other members of the

NSC rapidly adopting the 1968 Pueblo incident as a model for action for the 1975

Mayaguez incident. The authors concluded the senior leaders did not adequately explore

the likenesses and the differences of the two situations, which led to flawed decision-

making.

Two other volumes are similar to Thinking in Time in that they have a short, but

valuable on the Mayaguez incident. John R. Greene’s biography Gerald R. Ford presents a political analysis of the episode and describes Ford’s resulting eleven point climb in the polls as evidence the Mayaguez crisis provided a political boost for the president. 12 Walter Isaacson in his 1992 book Kissinger analyzed the crisis using

Kissinger as a central character and noted the seemingly decisive action rallied the nation

around the embattled president. 13

A rather exhaustive search of the University Microfilms International (UMI)

dissertation database provided surprisingly few dissertations or theses that dealt with the

capture and rescue of the Mayaguez. In fact, only three had a title or abstract that came

close: Conflict and Reform: The Evolution of Special Operations in US National

Security Strategy by Richard Harris in 1988 and Perilous Options: Special Operations as

an Instrument of US by Lucien Vandenbroucke that both used the

Mayaguez as a case study for the history of special operations; and Collision or

12 John R. Greene, Gerald R. Ford , (Lawrence KS: University Press, 1995). 13 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger , (New York: Touchstone, 1992).

8 Collusion? The Congress, the President, and the Ambiguity of War Powers by William

Raymond that analyzed the through a series of case studies that

included the Mayaguez.

Primary Sources Exploited

The account and analysis of the Mayaguez crisis presented in this work relies

almost entirely upon primary sources, some of which were unavailable to previous

authors. Although the recent historiography is limited regarding the Mayaguez, there is

an abundance of primary sources available for research, including memoirs, military

situation reports, military messages, and military after action reports, independent

analyses, meeting minutes, political messages and correspondence, written and taped

interviews, oral histories, and personal accounts.

The most notable acquisition was the NSC meeting minutes which were

extensively exploited in this study. The previously Top-Secret minutes were declassified

in 1996, which prevented them from being used by all the previous authors with the

exception of Wetterhahn, whose emphasis in The Last Battle was placed largely on the battle for Koh Tang Island and not strategic decision-making. This work is the first to explore in-depth the strategic decisions and decision process through the meeting minutes. The minutes provided a first-hand account of the voiced opinions and recommendations of President Ford and his most senior advisors. Access to the minutes provided the researcher with a rare opportunity to be a “fly on the ” and witness the debates, the logic, the illogic and the insightful and less-than-insightful statements of the most powerful American political figures of the time. The conversations of the decision-

9 makers painted a portrait of Ford’s leadership and management styles and the

unvarnished positions of those around him.

It was also instructive to compare and contrast the NSC meeting minutes with the

accounts detailed in the memoirs of the two central strategic actors, President Ford and

his Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Dr . President

Ford’s account of the crisis in A Time to Heal was unsurprisingly positive in its description of the account. 14 His description, however, was on the whole rather balanced

and provided additional insights into the difficulty of the decisions he faced. It also

further explained his frustration with his perception of the defense community’s apparent

lack of responsiveness to his orders during the crisis. Kissinger’s 1999 Years of Renewal

encompasses an account of the entire Ford presidency and includes a chapter on the

incident titled, “Anatomy of a Crisis: The Mayaguez” that goes into minute detail on his

views on the events as they unfolded. 15 Kissinger, also unsurprisingly was more sharply

opinionated than President Ford, clearly criticizing the performance of the intelligence

community and the military and more specifically the Acting Chairman Gen David Jones

and the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Kissinger’s account served as a portal

into understanding the ongoing bureaucratic in-fighting for which he was so well known.

It was also more specific with regard to dates and times than Ford’s account, which

proved useful in cross-referencing the reported timelines of actions during the incident.

This study drew extensively on several after action reports. Urey Patrick’s Center

for Naval Analyses report entitled, The Mayaguez Operation provided a well structured

14 Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal , (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). 15 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999).

10 description and analysis of the operational and tactical levels of the military action. 16

Obtained from the Marine Corps Historical division archives, the report also provided a bibliography of messages and situation reports that was further exploited in this study.

As customarily occurs after a military action, the command responsible in this case,

Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) ordered an after-action report 17 and an

Inspector General investigation of the operation which were not only detailed but also provided a gateway to further information to research. 18 also provided a report to CINCPAC reporting mainly on the US Air Force’s operational support.19 In the face of the criticism of the performance of the civilian and military intelligence community, the Central Intelligence Agency also directed the intelligence community to review its actions. 20 Although portions of the CIA report were redacted, all of those reports provided valuable information to piece together a complete crisis analysis.

Equally important were the US House of Representatives Committee on

International Relations and its Subcommittee on International Political and Military

Affairs Hearings, 94 th Congress 1st session, “Seizure of the Mayaguez ,” Parts I, II and

III 21 and Part IV, the Government Accounting Office report commissioned by the

16 Urey W Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 1977). 17 Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) Command History 1975 Appendix VI—The SS MAYAGUEZ Incident. (: CINCPAC Command History Branch, 1976), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency Archives, Maxwell AFB AL (AFHRA). Hereafter cited as CINCPAC Command History. 18 CINCPAC Inspector General Memo 00106-75, “SS Mayaguez Seizure” from Brigadier General Johnson to Gayler, 17 Nov 1975. Vietnam War Subjects, Mayaguez File, Marine Corps History Division Archives, Quantico VA, (MCHD). Hereafter cited as CINCPAC IG Memo. 19 HQ PACAF DCS/Plans and Operations report, Assault on Koh Tang , 23 June 1975, 7, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Collection, AFHRA. Hereafter referred to as Assault on Koh Tang. 20 Central Intelligence Agency, Post-Mortem Report: An Examination of the Intelligence Community’s Performance Before and During the Mayaguez Incident of May 1975, 8 Aug 1975, Gray Research Center Archives, Quantico VA (GRC). Declassified with portions redacted. Hereafter cited as IC Report. 21 House Committee on International Relations and Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs Hearings, Seizure of the Mayaguez , Parts I, II and III , 94 th Cong., 1st sess., May, June, July and October, 1975. Hereafter cited as IR Committee pt I, II, or III.

11 committee. 22 The first group of reports aided in confirming the Congress’ relationship with the , as did the Confidential White House Memo for Record that reported on the congressional leadership meeting with President Ford of th .23 The

GAO report (Part IV) which was published over a year after the crisis was critical of the operation and therefore helped point toward areas of further investigation. Embedded in the IR committee report was the testimony of Capt Charles Miller of the SS Mayaguez, which along with Rowan’s book was the main source of the crew’s situation as reported in this study. 24

Of the oral histories encountered, General Jones, the Acting Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs 25 and Lieutenant General Burns, the on-scene operational level commander of

USSAG/7AF provided the most pertinent information. 26 Jones was the more thoughtful and Burns definitely the more outspoken of the two. Two other first-hand accounts were very useful.

Three Marine officers central to the battle for Koh Tang, Col James Johnson, Lt

Col Randall Austin, and Maj Quinlan co-authored a detailed narrative of the assault on

Koh Tang, which balanced the accounts provided by outside agencies. 27 Also important

22 House Committee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs Hearings, 94 th Cong. 2nd session, Seizure of the Mayaguez , Part IV Reports of the Comptroller General of the United States, Hereafter cited as Reports of the Comptroller General. 23 White House memorandum for record, “Subject: The Mayaguez Incident,” 16 May, 1975, GRC. Hereafter cited as White House Memo, 16 May. 24 Capt Charles Miller’s congressional testimony documented in US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs Hearings, 94 th Cong. 2nd session, Seizure of the Mayaguez , Part IV Reports of the Comptroller General of the United States. Hereafter cited as Miller Testimony. 25 David C. Jones (General USAF), interviews by Lt Col Maurice Maryanow and Dr Richard H. Kohn, 5 Aug and 15-17 Oct 1985 and 13-14 Mar 1986, Washington DC, JCS Collection, AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Jones interview. 26 John J Burns (Lieutenant General, USAF) interview by Hugh N Ahmann, 8 Jun 1984, PACAF Collection, AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Burns interview. 27 James Johnson, Randall Austin and David Quinlan, The Koh Tang Mayaguez Operation, undated, Mayaguez File, MCHD. Hereafter cited as Johnson, Austin and Quinlan.

12 in the study was “Mayday for the Mayaguez ,” a series of first hand descriptions from the commanders of two of the central to the rescue operation and the commander of the

Mayaguez boarding party. 28 These accounts also allowed an evaluation of the reports written by external sources. There were literally dozens of other interviews, situation reports and messages from the Ford library, the Air Force Historical Research Center, the

Marine Corps University History Division, or the Gray Research Center Archives that were utilized and were invaluable in the compilation of this study. They are listed in the footnotes and bibliography.

These sources allowed the study to form a more comprehensive account of the crisis and analysis of the decision-making than has been previously presented. Each of the existing major works on the subject discussed earlier concentrated on one area of the incident, mainly on the battle itself or the NSC decision-making process. This study attempts to present a broader view and within the narrative to tie together many different aspects of the incident in order to give the reader a sense of the various and at times competing interests involved and to illustrate and evaluate how the decisions made at the

National Security Council level shaped the decisions and execution down to the troops on the ground. In other words, this is the first work that ties policy, strategy and execution together while keeping the reader aware of the time pressures involved.

The study adds to the historical knowledge of the incident in several other ways.

It is the first in-depth synchronization of the NSC meeting minutes and Ford and

Kissinger’s accounts of the incident in their memoirs. The accounts provide a valuable glimpse into the political, diplomatic, informational and military issues that were

28 James Messegee and others, “’Mayday’ for the Mayaguez ,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, (Nov. 1976), 240-258.

13 considered and discussed. It is the first to show that, contrary to popular opinion, there were diplomatic efforts taken in parallel to the military response. The study is the first to explore the executive-legislative tensions of the period manifested by the congressional hearings and exacerbated by the fact that the Mayaguez incident was the first test of the

War Powers Act of 1973. The study uncovers the answer to the long unanswered question of why the proper intelligence estimates available to the NSC and others were not passed to the forces executing the attack on Koh Tang Island. The study is the first to tie the Mayaguez incident to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the restructuring of the US military. It also is the first to examine the ramifications of the counterfactual

“what if” the crew of the Mayaguez had been killed by US forces or if the Marine force had been annihilated on the beaches of Koh Tang.

This four-day crisis proved to be a valuable case study in national security decision making. The limited time frame and scope of the operation allowed an in-depth hour-by-hour analysis of decisions at many levels. Key US officials were forced to make strategic, operational and tactical life or death decisions with a far from perfect understanding of the situation under a very short timeline. With less than complete intelligence information and in keeping with American practice and tradition, the military forces involved then attempted to execute those decisions. Their performance, while heroic in many individual cases, was not a model to be followed in the future and therefore provided many lessons to be learned. Unfortunately, many of those lessons would have to be relearned several times over before action was taken to correct fundamental flaws in the military system.

14 There are five themes that flow through this analysis. The Mayaguez incident was a crisis of strategic importance because it was perceived as a crisis and responded to accordingly by President Ford and the NSC. Second, the NSC’s strategic priority of showing American resolve in the face of an international challenge and thereby restoring

American international prestige was often in conflict with the NSC’s other stated goal of rescuing the ship and crew. The third theme flows from the second. The decisions made at the strategic level often caused difficulties at the operational and tactical levels in achieving the stated ends or goals and the operational level planning and execution did not rise to the occasion. Fourth, the operation came perilously close to ending in disaster.

It was largely due to good fortune that the crew of the Mayaguez was rescued at all and was not unwittingly killed by US forces. In addition, the Marine force that landed on

Koh Tang came dangerously close to being overrun and annihilated. That would have further damaged US prestige and run counter to the goal of enhancing the US image.

Lastly, it would be expeditious to label the Mayaguez crisis an “intelligence failure” on many levels. But further investigation reveals a far more complex situation. The

Mayaguez operation is a valuable case study in intelligence expectation management and the importance of proper dissemination of information. In other words, many expected too much from the intelligence community and were therefore disappointed at the intelligence reports they received, and even when proper intelligence was prepared, it didn’t reach the proper end users at the critical juncture.

Perhaps most importantly, this study may provide some insights for future decision makers facing crisis situations.

15 PROLOGUE

The mid 1970’s was a period in US history marked by upheaval and uncertainty.

The US was in the midst of the Cold War juggling the international interests of its biggest

Communist adversaries, the Soviet Union and China, and the US’s commitment and ability to aid its allies was in question. There were “hot spots” of conflict around the globe, including the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Domestic issues abounded, including a troubled economy, urban rioting, and a lack of confidence spurred by the shadow and shame of Watergate.

The bipolar strategic context of the Cold War had been the status quo for over 25 years with the US and the USSR entrenched in an uneasy stalemate. was divided by the into the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) states and the

Warsaw Pact states. The US and its NATO allies maintained a perilous balance of power in Europe, deploying less than 100 divisions and 6,000 against over 170 Soviet and

Warsaw Pact divisions with more than 15,000 tanks. 29 The threat of nuclear war hung

over the balance of forces and helped kept the in Europe.

The US and USSR had been involved in détente during the Nixon administration,

but détente’s momentum had slowed considerably with Nixon’s departure. Détente’s

domestic opponents were gaining political strength. A landmark arms reduction treaty

between the US and USSR, SALT I, had been signed, but the US and USSR still had

thousands of nuclear missiles poised to launch at each other.

29 Richard A. Bitzinger, Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1945-1975, (Santa Monica, CS: Rand Corporation, 1989), 24-32, http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2007/N2859.pdf.

16 US rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China had begun in 1971 with

Kissinger’s secret talks with Chou En Lai. The Sino-Soviet split had been bolstered by a

Chinese concern that the Soviet Union would apply the of 1968 that stated the Soviets would apply military force to any communist country not adhering to the Soviet form of . Mao’s China was distancing itself from the Soviet

Union. Thus, the Cold War situation transformed from a bipolar world to one where the

US, China, and the USSR had formed a triangular relationship with a constantly shifting balance. 30

The US’s most staunch ally in the Middle East, Israel, had survived the attacks of

Syria and in the 1973 and with US aid had captured additional territory from its attackers. The tension of the war spiked rapidly, and the US and USSR had raised their nuclear postures and put their missiles, and on a heightened state of alert before the crisis was resolved. Despite Kissinger’s renowned penchant for brokering Middle East peace settlements, his attempts to disengage Israel and Egypt in the Sinai had failed. Ford ordered a complete review of the policy in the region and for the first time in decades, support for Israel, including a $2.5B aid package was in question. 31 An unsteady peace held in the Middle East, with Egypt and Israel sharing a tense border.

The leaders of the Arab in October 1974 voted to replace moderate Jordan at the bargaining table with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Yasser

Arafat. This put the US in a difficult position because it had labeled the PLO a terrorist organization and it was a long-held US position that it would not negotiate with terrorists.

30 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 139-40. 31 “Once Again, an Agonizing Reappraisal,” Time, April 7, 1975, 11, http://www.proquest.com.

17 Also, the of King Faisal, a friend and ally of the US, despite his staunch

anti-Israel stance, raised questions of the reliability of as a Middle East

partner. 32

The number of countries that had nuclear was expanding, with detonating a nuclear device in 1974 and becoming the sixth country to admit to having a nuclear . US relations with India, troubled since 1971, when the US supported

Pakistan in its war with India, soured again when the US lifted its with

Pakistan in 1974. 33 Further complicating matters in the area, the Soviet Union had

extended its naval force into the Indian Ocean. Defense Secretary Schlesinger believed

the Soviet presence to be a serious threat, saying that for the first time the Soviets would

have military power threatening the supply of oil to the US and its European and

Japanese allies. 34

Other areas of the world were unstable. In Northern Ireland, there was an on-

again off-again cease between the government and the Irish Republican (IRA)

that had begun around Christmas 1974. An internal feud between the official IRA and a

splinter group broke out in the spring of 1975 with two deaths and over 20 wounded.

There was fear that the violence would become more widespread. 35 In Cyprus, Greek

Cypriot rebels had overthrown the Makarios government that had favored a balance

between and . Turkey responded by deploying its military to support

Turkish interests in Cyprus. 36 The US and its allies faced Marxist governments in ,

32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 “Where US Stands after Vietnam Debacle,” US News & World Report, April 14, 1975, 28, http://www.proquest.com. 35 “Must It Be Guns Again?” The Economist, , 1975, 9, http://www.proquest.com. 36 “Fighting Erupts on Cyprus Again,” New York Times, Aug 18, 1974, 1, http://www.proquest.com.

18 Central and and there was a serious threat of spread to communism in

Africa, including and .

The international economic landscape was not promising. Time, in its 5 May

1975 edition, spurred by the worldwide , described the global economic situation as having a “darkening outlook.” High inflation and unemployment were exacerbated by rising food, raw material and fuel costs. Five of the top 9 free international economies’ inflation rates were 10% or higher. Italy had an inflation rate of close to 25%. OPEC had once again raised oil prices, exacerbating the situation. 37

World opinion polls revealed that the favorability image of the United States was at a thirty-year low.

The domestic scene was even more bleak. America appeared to have lost its post

World War II momentum. US unemployment was 8%, the highest rate among the major economies. Inflation was reaching double digits. There was a rash of bankruptcies of large firms, including retail giant W.T. Grant and New York requested a loan to prevent defaulting on its obligations. An October 1974 New York Times headline read,

“Major Depression Predicted by 51%, Gallup Poll Says.” 38 There were gasoline shortages accompanied by racial unrest. The 1973-4 Arab oil embargo had turned

America’s attention to developing alternative fuels. 39 Riots had broken out in like

Boston over interracial busing. In the midst of this unrest, the American political system faced perhaps its greatest challenge since the .

37 “A Costly and Worsening Global Slide,” and “Considering the Alternatives,” Time, May 5, 1975, 68-71, http://www.proquest.com. Hereafter cited as “A Costly and Worsening Global Slide.” 38 “Major Depression Predicted by 51%, Gallup Poll Says,” New York Times , Oct 17, 1974, 16, http://www.proquest.com. 39 “A Costly and Worsening Global Slide,” 70.

19 On 8 August 1974, President announced to the public on national

television that he would resign, effective noon the next day, Friday, 9 August, becoming

the first President in US history to resign from office. Nixon stepped down under

enormous political and the threat of impeachment for his role in the wiretapping

of the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate hotel during the 1972

presidential election campaign and the ensuing cover up. Nixon senior advisors John

Mitchell, John Erlichman and H.R. Haldeman were convicted and imprisoned for their

roles in the Watergate cover up and three members of the Nixon cabinet were convicted

and jailed for violating campaign laws during the 1972 campaign. Nixon’s Vice

Presidential running mate, Spiro Agnew had resigned his office while under investigation

for bribery and tax evasion in 1973 and had been replaced by Gerald Ford via

Presidential appointment. As a result, Gerald Ford was sworn in as the President of the

United States on 9 August 1974. 40

President Gerald Ford held the office as the only unelected President in US

history. In his inaugural address, Ford had stated:

My fellow Americans, our long national nightmare is over. Our Constitution works; our great Republic is a government of laws and not of men. Here the people rule. 41

Despite that declaration, the nightmare was not over for the country, nor for

Gerald Ford. On 8 September 1974, Ford pardoned Nixon for his role in the Watergate

conspiracy. He also granted a conditional to Vietnam deserters and draft

evaders. The nation was outraged. A 17 October 1974 New York Times poll showed that

40% rated Ford’s performance as fair or poor. 42 Ford, believing his action was in the best

40 Ford, A Time to Heal, 94-123. 41 Ford, A Time to Heal, 41. 42 “40% in Poll Rate Ford Fair or Poor,” New York Times , Oct 17, 1974, 87, http://www.proquest.com.

20 interest of the country, nevertheless was now also stained by Watergate and would

answer questions regarding his pardon of Nixon until his 2007 death. 43 In 1974-5,

Watergate and the pardon, along with the economy, were in the forefront of the nation’s

mind. After a brief bump in his ratings following his Congressional testimony explaining

his rationale for Nixon’s pardon, Ford’s ratings continued to drop. In December 1974,

his approval rating was 42%. 44 By February, his disapproval rating was over 60%. 45

Although economists and financial experts began to express hope in the spring of

1975 for an economic upturn there was little public trust or confidence in their forecasts.

Pessimism still reigned, with good reason. Unemployment was at 8.7%, auto sales fell

18% in April from the previous year and inflation had made the cost of living rise 27% in

three years while the average wage had only risen 18.8%. 46 In a 17 March 1975 Time

Magazine poll, 77% responded that “Yes, things are going badly for the country.” And

only one in five Americans had confidence in the ability of the President or the Congress

to deal with problems. 47

By May 1975, Ford’s favorable public opinion rating had slipped to 39%. The 14

April 1975 US News and World Report cover story, “Who Runs America?” listed Ford in the top position, followed by Henry Kissinger. The article said of Ford, “The majority of leaders voting to give the top spot to President Ford did so because of the office itself.” 48

Ronald Reagan was mounting a serious challenge within the Republican party for the

43 Ford, A Time to Heal, 176-181. 44 John Herbers, “Ford Rating in Poll Slips to Low of 42%,” New York Times, Dec 26, 1974, 77, http://www.proquest.com. 45 “Poll Finds Ford Standing at New Low with Public,” New York Times , Feb 4, 1975, 17, http://www.proquest.com. 46 “The Upturn: How Soon? How Strong?” Time, May 5, 1975, 67-70, http://www.proquest.com. 47 “The Public: Little Confidence in Ford or Congress,” Time , 1975, 16, http://www.proquest.com. 48 “Who Runs America?” US News and World Report , , 1975, 28-29, http://www.proquest.com.

21 1976 presidential nomination. An April New York Times article voiced concerns that

Reagan could run on a conservative ticket and split the Republican vote. A Harris survey found 21% would vote for Reagan. 49 Ford faced many challenges.

Congress, taking advantage of the decline of the prestige of the presidency, was testing the President’s power. Ford and Kissinger found it difficult to advance or even continue the process of détente with the Soviet Union. Opponents of détente included conservatives that believed Nixon had been too accommodating the Soviets and Chinese; labor leaders that were against with the Soviets and , that were anticommunist on the basis of the Soviet Union’s rights policies. 50 Congress held a significant anti-détente faction, led by Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a Democratic presidential hopeful for 1976 and a fervent supporter of Jewish emigration from the

Soviet states. Congress placed conditions on trade agreements the Soviets had publicly derided and on 10 January 1975, the Soviets announced they would no longer comply with a 1972 trade agreement that was a foundation of détente. Trade between the US and

USSR slowed, Jewish emigration declined and the rhetoric between the countries heated up. 51

Similarly, the SALT II arms negotiations had stalled following a November 1974 meeting at between Ford and Soviet Premier Brezhnev. Jackson, quietly supported by Schlesinger, led members of Congress to oppose the agreements. The

Senate would not ratify SALT II during the Ford presidency. 52

49 “Poll Finds a Reagan Race Could Spoil Ford Chance.” New York Times , Apr 18, 1975, 9, http://www.proquest.com. 50 John R Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 121. 51 Ibid, 121-2. 52 Ibid, 122-124.

22 Congress also battled with Ford over his handling of the Cyprus situation. After

the aforementioned Greek Cypriot rebellion and the Turkish response, President Ford

sided with the long-term US ally Turkey. Congress sided with Greek Americans who

disagreed and proposed legislation an arms embargo on Turkey. Ford, after a lengthy

political battle and over the objections of Kissinger signed the bill. 53 Turkey reacted by

closing all the US military bases in Turkey and threatened to follow Greece in pulling out

of NATO. 54 The entire situation was a significant political setback for Ford, who was

scheduled to meet with NATO leaders in June of 1975.

Congress had placed limitations on Presidential power to wage war with the

enactment of the War Powers Act and the Case-Church Act. Many felt that a

combination of the conduct of the Vietnam War and Nixon’s complicity in the Watergate

scandal was proof that the executive branch had gained too much influence and required

additional checks on its power. The Second Indochina War, more commonly known as

the Vietnam War, had ended for the United States with its withdrawal of all US military

forces in 1973. More than 56,000 American servicemen and women had died and the US

had spent more than 150 billion dollars to prevent the states in Indochina from falling to

communism. 55 After the many years, lost lives and billions of dollars spent, the vast

majority of Congressional leaders were opposed to sending additional funding or forces

to Vietnam or Cambodia. In the months prior to April 1975, Congress refused Ford and

Kissinger’s pleas to increase aid to and Cambodia. Meanwhile, the end

was near for the US supported regimes in those countries.

53 Ibid, 119. 54 “On the Edge of the ,” The Economist, Feb 15, 1975, 11, http://www.proquest.com. 55 “Where US Stands After Vietnam Debacle,” 27.

23 In March 1975, North Vietnamese forces invaded South Vietnam, breaking the cease fire agreement. South Vietnam’s major northern cities Hue and swiftly fell and President Thieu withdrew the South Vietnamese forces closer to Saigon. Ford and Kissinger implored Congress for a $300 million aid package to help South Vietnam survive. Congress answered by not answering; they recessed without addressing the request. 56 In April 1975, US naval forces were dispatched to conduct a massive sealift that by 10 April had resulted in over 130,000 US and South Vietnamese being evacuated from the Northern provinces being overrun by North Vietnamese forces and deposited in the relatively safe areas of South Vietnam. That relative safety would not last. 57

Cambodia was also under communist attack. The US had aided the Cambodian government in its battle with communist forces since 1970. But by April 1975,

Communist forces controlled all of Cambodia with the exception of the of

Phnom Penh. The fall of the Sihanouk government was imminent. On 12 April,

Washington ordered the US Seventh Fleet forces stationed off the Cambodian coast to initiate Operation EAGLE PULL. In less than five hours, Marine and Navy forces safely evacuated 276 American and Cambodian refugees from via helicopter with no casualties. All other Americans had left Cambodia earlier. 58 On 17 April 1975,

Phnom Penh fell to the communist Khmer Rouge forces.

In Vietnam, Washington ordered the US Embassy to reduce the American presence in Saigon to 1,250, the estimated number that could be evacuated by helicopter

56 “Once Again, an Agonizing Reappraisal,” 10-11. 57 Edward J. Marolda, By Sea, Air and Land, US Naval Historical Center, Chapter 5, “The Final Curtain,” http://www.history.navy.mil/seairland.htm. 58 Ibid.

24 in a single day. Transport planes were ferrying out thousands of refugees from Saigon's

Tan Son Nhut Airport—the first of about 200,000 South Vietnamese to leave the

country. 59 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and his Pentagon advisors pushed for an all

out evacuation of American allies, but Kissinger and Ford specified an orderly

withdrawal. There were delays approving visas for the South Vietnamese through the

Justice Department and the Ambassador to Vietnam, advocated an even

slower departure rate to avoid a panic. Therefore, while increased the

military airlift flights, the Embassy, under specific orders from Ambassador Graham

Martin did not fill them. The planes departing Saigon were not full, leaving many South

Vietnamese to a dismal fate.60 Ford was displeased, stating later, "It burned me up." 61

With the fall of South Vietnam fast approaching, the US encouraged South

Vietnamese President Thieu to resign. After initially resisting, Thieu complied and delivered a resignation speech that was “bitter and recriminatory.” In it he railed against the US, the American public, Congress and Kissinger explicitly. He blamed his country’s military defeat on Washington defaulting on its promises to continue to support and provide aid to South Vietnam. 62 He promptly fled the country into exile.

At that point, the US began Operation FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of the remaining US civilians in Saigon. Beginning in the early morning of 29 April 1975, over

1,300 US citizens and 5,500 Vietnamese were evacuated by helicopter from the US

Embassy in Saigon in approximately 19 hours. The Saigon airport was closed due to and mortar fire. Meanwhile, the US Navy was supporting a major sea evacuation

59 Evan Thomas, “The Last Days of Saigon,” , 1 May 2000, http://www.newsweek.com/id/83901. 60 Kissinger, Days of Renewal, 529-537. 61 Thomas, “The Last Days of Saigon.” 62 “Preparing to Deal for Peace,” Time, May 5, 1975, 13, http://www.proquest.com.

25 with a huge flotilla of combat and transport ships. The US ships carrying over 50,000

refugees were joined by a fleeing South Vietnamese Navy group of over 25 ships

carrying over 30,000 additional South Vietnamese refugees. 63 Two American Marines

were killed by gunfire at the Tan Son Nhut airport and two more lost their lives in a

helicopter crashed. Ambassador Graham Martin was one of the last Americans to leave

Saigon. 64 Less than two hours later, North Vietnamese forces entered Saigon.

Millions of Americans watched as the tragedy of Saigon was played out. The

images of over-loaded US helicopters departing the rooftop of the American Embassy,

landing on aircraft carriers and then being pushed into the sea were burned in the minds

of the American public and especially the governmental leadership. As the last

remaining US embassy personnel were evacuated thousands of desperate South

Vietnamese were left behind. A Time magazine article noted:

With incredible suddenness it was over, not only Viet Nam’s agonizing Thirty Years’ War, but also a century of domination. The massive, 20 year American struggle to build a stable non-Communist government in South Viet Nam was finally and definitively ended, an all but total failure. When Communist soldiers in Saigon fired salvos into the air and shouted, “Victory! Victory!” the stubborn, inextinguishable dreams of and his heirs in were fully realized. 65

The formerly massive US military presence in SE Asia was greatly reduced. The

US force in Vietnam, which at its height comprised of hundreds of thousands of soldiers,

sailors, airmen and marines and countless naval ships was gone. All that remained in its

place were a few thousand airmen and Marines in Thailand. 66 The South

Treaty Organization (SEATO) was, in reality, nonexistent.67 US allies, including

and South , and Americans began to question American commitment and power.

63 Marolda, By Sea, Air and Land, 3. 64 John W. Finney, “Ford Unity Plea,” New York Times, , 1975, 1, http://www.proquest.com. 65 “The End of a Thirty Years’ War,” Time, May 12, 1975, 8, http://www.proquest.com. 66 CINCPAC Command History , 1. 67 SEATO disbanded on Feb 20, 1976.

26 An April 1975 US News and World Report article compared the 1950 in Korea with the US withdrawal from Vietnam, adding that Korea was “the first phase in decline of American might in Asia.” The same article captioned a picture of troops boarding a ship to leave Vietnam as “Quitting South Vietnam.” 68

Ford would say in a later interview with Newsweek , “It was one of the saddest

days in my life. To see the United States literally kicked out, beaten by the North

Vietnamese. It was a tragedy in my own mind.” Ford was “proud” that they were able to

rescue and South Vietnamese that they did, but he was not pleased that

tens of thousands of South Vietnamese allies were left behind to die or be imprisoned. 69

The Ford administration had concerns that the setbacks in SE Asia and the Middle

East were sapping its diplomatic power. According to Time magazine, China appeared

to be growing “skeptical of US strength and resolve; when Kissinger asked the Chinese

for assistance in getting Prince to help negotiate an end to the

Cambodian war, they did not even reply.” Ford was determined to demonstrate that he

was in command of foreign policy and that the US was not “resigning from the world.” 70

European members of NATO were concerned that the US would not honor its

commitment to treat an attack on a NATO state as an attack on the US. It was not

because of the US withdrawal from Indochina and the subsequent fall of South Vietnam

and Cambodia. Many had felt the US should have left sooner. It was because the War

Powers Act limited the power of the President to commit forces in a conflict to no more

than 60 days. An apprehensive NATO Foreign Minister stated, “The US umbrella over

68 “Where US Stands,” 28. 69 Thomas, “The Last Days of Saigon.” 70 “Once Again, an Agonizing Reappraisal,” 11.

27 Europe can be closed by Congress when it was most needed.” 71 Also worrying

European leaders was the possibility that the communist takeover occurring in Portugal would lead to similar results in Italy and . 72 A failed right wing coup in March

1975 led to a left-wing junta takeover of the country in the following days. 73 Europe and the US watched anxiously while an internal struggle raged between democratically elected socialists and the communists backed by the military. 74

The appeared to be validated in many leaders’ minds. One of those was Ford, who stated:

There is a great deal of credibility to the domino theory. I hope it doesn’t happen. I hope that other countries in Southeast Asia—Thailand, the —don’t misread the will of the American people in the leadership of this country, to believe we’re going to abandon our position in Southeast Asia. We are not. 75

Ford’s transition to President had been rather abrupt. Ford had to shape his group of advisors under what were, to say the least, very unusual circumstances. In the first few weeks of his presidency, Ford had replaced almost the entire Nixon domestic policy staff.

However, due to his relative inexperience in foreign policy, Ford made his foreign policy staff changes more slowly. The NSC was his central forum for foreign policy decision- making. The members of the NSC are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of

State, and the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency acting as statutory advisors. The National

Security Advisor and other senior members are usually present, depending on the nature of the situation being discussed. In May of 1975, Ford had an NSC that was basically the one that Nixon had left him, with the exception of Vice President ,

71 “Europe: Sliding, Sliding, Sliding?” Newsweek, May 26, 1975, 47, http://www.proquest.com. 72 New York Times, Editorial, 17 Feb 1975, 20. 73 “The Change in Europe’s Map,” The Economist, 22 Mar, 1975, 13, http://www.proquest.com. 74 “Portugal: We Won,” Newsweek, May 12, 1975, 66, http://www.proquest.com. 75 “Where US Stands.” 28.

28 whom Ford had appointed in December of 1974. The Secretary of State was Henry

Kissinger, the Secretary of Defense was James Schlesinger, the Director of the CIA was

William Colby and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General George

Brown. 76

President Ford’s leadership style was much different from that of his predecessor,

Nixon. While both used the NSC as their closest circle of advisors, Nixon made his decisions alone and announced them to the members of the NSC. Ford preferred a more collaborative approach to decision-making and a much more hands on approach to the execution of the decisions. Kissinger provided his personal insight:

(Ford’s) approach to decision-making was almost diametrically the opposite of his predecessor’s. Nixon was fascinated by strategic options and devoted a great deal of his time to studying and discussing them. Details of execution bored him, and he followed negotiations only in the most general way (his spinmeister’s version notwithstanding). Ford by contrast would settle on goals in one or two crisp meetings in which everyone responsible for implementing the decision was given an opportunity to express his views. Afterward he would permit himself no second thoughts.

Ford was far more intimately involved in the execution of policy than Nixon ever was. Nixon’s intricate maneuvers proved uncongenial to Ford, who, though eager to identify his choices when action was called for, was not given to studying long-range, hence conjectural options. And he preferred oral to written presentations. Nixon’s elaborate system of interdepartmental geographic groups at the assistant secretary level fell into disuse. Interdepartmental deliberations were now handled at the deputy secretary level in the Senior Review Group or in its crisis management equivalent, the Washington Special Actions Group, whence they moved directly to the National Security Council. And they were usually triggered by the need to reach some decision…77

Ford neither feared controversy among his advisors, nor objected to having his preconceptions challenged…He would make himself available for discussion—as Nixon almost never did—with the officials who were being overruled. 78

Although he had served in Congress for almost 30 years and despite his extensive political background, Ford was relatively inexperienced in . He recognized this fact and relied heavily on the advice of his NSC, and especially Henry Kissinger.

76 For a more comprehensive discussion of the members of the May 1975 Ford NSC, see Kissinger, Years of Renewal, and Ford, A Time to Heal. 77 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 171. 78 Ibid, 172.

29 Kissinger continued to exert control over the foreign policy of the US. The strength of his position was evidenced by his dual position as both Secretary of State and National

Security Advisor. Kissinger however had lost his most ardent supporter and alter ego,

Richard Nixon. The two had forged a relationship, perhaps unique in American political history, strengthened by Nixon’s nearly paranoid introversion and Kissinger’s seemingly insatiable ambition.

Kissinger had survived the with his reputation largely intact, however his power was coming under question. But there were those inside the new Ford administration, most notably Chief of Staff that believed Kissinger’s central role in foreign policy diminished Ford’s political power and made him look less

“presidential.” One of the Ford transition team’s recommendations was to relieve

Kissinger of his role as National Security Advisor. Kissinger was also taking unexpected political heat from Congress over his complicity in the Nixon administration’s ordering of the CIA to attempt to depose the democratically elected Marxist government in

Chile. 79 Kissinger still had significant stature in May 1975, but Ford was determined to follow his instincts and diminish Kissinger’s influence.

Ford was renowned for his amiability and ability to work with anyone. Within

Ford’s own National Security Council, however, was an exception, Secretary of Defense

Schlesinger. Ford and Schlesinger had not gotten along since Ford had taken office. Ford simply did not feel comfortable with Schlesinger. He found Schlesinger “imperious” and condescending and felt Schlesinger doubted Ford’s intellectual capacity. As Vice

President, Ford had not agreed with Schlesinger’s handling of Congressional relations.

As President, Ford disagreed with Schlesinger on several issues, notably détente.

79 Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, 120.

30 Schlesinger was an outspoken opponent of détente. Ford had wanted to dismiss

Schlesinger since the beginning of his administration, but did not want to create a larger

political problem for himself by appearing soft on communism and making Schlesinger a

martyr for the anti-détente group. 80

Ford also believed Schlesinger did not follow orders and at times was “downright

insubordinate.” 81 Shortly after Ford had taken office, the news reported that Schlesinger

had cautioned the Joint Chiefs to check presidential orders with him before execution.82

Ford’s antipathy for Schlesinger would increase following the Saigon evacuation in April

30, 1975. Ford later revealed:

At the time of the evacuation from Vietnam…in the four or five days leading up to the actual evacuation, I had ordered the evacuation of as many Vietnamese civilians, military, et cetera (as possible) along with our US personnel. I later found out that many of those planes that I though were being loaded were flown out empty—and that, according to my sources, that order came from Schlesinger. 83

The reactions to the events in the Sea of Thailand in May 1975 would be shaped by the assumptions and predispositions of the members of the NSC. Those in turn were shaped in part by the pressures at all levels, international, domestic, political and personal, imposed by the context of the times on the members of the Ford cabinet and ultimately on Ford himself. All those pressures would come to bear in the days of May

1975.

80 Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, 121. 81 Thomas M. DeFrank, Write it When I’m Gone. (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 92. 82 Ford, A Time to Heal, 322-323. 83 DeFrank, Write it When I’m Gone , 92.

31 PART I: The Drama Unfolds May 12 1975 84

Chapter 1: Ship Seized and Crew Taken

In the wake of our humiliating retreat from Cambodia and South Vietnam in the spring of 1975, our allies around the world began to question our resolve. “America—A Helpless Giant,” ran the headline over a page-one editorial in the respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The British were concerned. So, too, were the French. Our friends in Asia were equally upset in the Middle East, the Israelis began to wonder whether the US would stand by them in the event of a war. As long as I was President, I decided, the US would not abandon its commitments overseas. We would not permit our setbacks to become a license for others to fish in troubled waters. Rhetoric alone, I knew, would not persuade anyone that America would stand firm. They would have to see proof of our resolve. The opportunity to show that proof came without warning. Gerald Ford 85

We thought we were at last free to turn to healing the nation’s wounds when Indochina suddenly reached out and, like a drowning man, dragged us back into the vortex. Henry Kissinger 86

The US merchant cargo ship Mayaguez sailed toward Sattahip, Thailand on a northwest course in the off the western side of the lush tropical island of

Poulo Wai, about sixty miles south/southwest of the Cambodian mainland. 87 Most of its

39 man crew had been on the ship less than a year. It was Monday, 12 May 1975, 2:18 p.m. or 1418 local time. 88 As the Third Mate took a bearing off Poulo Wai, he spotted a small craft with a red flag approaching from the island. He reported the sighting to the ship’s captain, Captain Charles T. (Charlie) Miller, who had been counting the crew’s

84 The account of the whereabouts and situation of the crew of the Mayaguez is largely derived from two sources: Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, which was principally fashioned from interviews with members of the crew of the Mayaguez immediately after their release and remarkably published within three months of the actual event; and Capt Charles Miller’s congressional testimony cited as Miller Testimony. 85 Ford, A Time to Heal, 275. 86 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 547. 87 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 17. 88 The times described in this account can be confusing. Times described will be in Eastern Daylight savings time (EDT), local Cambodian time (G) or Greenwich mean time (Z). 24 hour annotations will be used. Cambodia was 11 hours ahead of Washington DC in May 1975, so it was 3:18 a.m. in Washington DC when the Mayaguez was seized. (Z) time was 4 hours ahead of EDT.

32 pay. 89 The Captain, who had taken over the Mayaguez on 27 January 1975, less

than 5 months before, climbed to the bridge from his cabin and looking through his

binoculars saw a gray approaching at about 20 nautical miles per hour (knots).

The gunboat fired three bursts and then a rocket across the bow of his ship.

After an initial thought of attempting to evade the gunboat, followed by a subsequent

realization a rocket could sink the ship, Miller called the engine room to bring the

Mayaguez to “All Stop.” Several members of the crew were on the deck and saw the

boat and heard the gunfire. When the rocket was fired, they all thought they’d been hit.

The news of the attack quickly spread through the ship and the crewmembers knew there were no weapons aboard for defense. 90

Captain Miller ordered an SOS distress signal to be sent out. The ship’s radio

man broadcast the SOS twice, marking the ship’s position at 1418 hrs at 09 degrees 48

minutes North and 102 degrees 53 minutes East. The calls were acknowledged by a

Norwegian and an English ship. 91 As the 10,485 ton ship coasted to a stop, the crew

lowered a rope to the gunboat that had pulled alongside and whose occupants pointed its

twin 50 caliber machine guns at the Mayaguez. Seven armed, black pajama-clad

Cambodians climbed from the gunboat onto the Mayaguez and motioned for Miller to follow the gunboat to Poulo Wai Island. The Mayaguez steamed at half-speed while the

crew sent another “Mayday” distress signal which was picked up by Philippine and

Australian ships. Captain Miller slipped into his cabin to destroy the secret documents all

American vessels carried and hide the payroll. 92 As the Mayaguez dropped anchor off

89 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 17-19. 90 Ibid , 21-31. 91 Ibid , 34. 92 Miller testimony, 249.

33 the island shortly before 1700, twenty more armed Cambodians boarded the ship. Twice,

the Cambodians demanded that the crew sail the Mayaguez to Kompong Som harbor on the Cambodian mainland, and twice the Mayaguez raised anchor to sail. But Captain

Miller, wary of being lost on the mainland and hopeful of being found at sea, managed both times to persuade his captors into keeping the ship near the island. 93 Meanwhile, several of the crew contemplated a rebellion. 94 (See Figure 1)

------

The US merchant ship SS Mayaguez (See Figure 2) was a owned by

US Sea-Land Service, Inc., a subsidiary of RJ Reynolds Industries. The crew of the

Mayaguez operated a regularly scheduled shuttle service between , Sattahip,

Thailand and ; feeding container ships in Sea-Land’s West Coast/ service. 95 Although most of the crew was new to the Mayaguez , the ship was anything but new; the black hull of the Mayaguez was dimpled and rusted. Only the bridge and the boat deck were kept orderly, the rest of the ship was strewn with equipment. 96 While the ship was outwardly unimpressive, its history was interesting.

The Mayaguez was the fourth incarnation of the same ship. Christened the White

Falcon on April 12, 1944, she was one of a fleet of cargo ships hastily constructed in three months during WWII. In 1947, Grace Lines bought the ship as war surplus, changed its to Santa Eliana and had used her to haul machinery to Venezuela for

12 years. Then in 1959, she was sent to Shipbuilding and Drydock

Corporation for modification into a container ship. The ship’s hull was cut in two just

93 Miller testimony, 249. 94 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 55-56. 95 CINCPAC Command History , 3. 96 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 25.

34 forward of the deckhouse and a new 45-foot section was inserted, stretching her to 504

feet. Sponsons were added to the ship’s sides widening it to 74 feet. 97 Finally a second

bridge was tacked on for added height to see over the containers. But before the Santa

Eliana could be used for the new role, containerized shipping became the central subject

of a labor dispute with dockworkers and the ship was put in mothballs. Sea-Land bought

the Santa Eiliana and after more modification, renamed her Sea and then finally

Mayaguez in honor of the port city in Puerto Rico where she began her cargo runs. In

September 1974 she began Asian runs from Hong Kong to Sattahip to Singapore. The

Mayaguez had left Saigon on April 21 st 1975 intending on making more runs, but Saigon

fell 9 days later. 98

Any historical case study must be undertaken in context, and the May 1975

Mayaguez incident is no exception. Phnom Penh Cambodia had fallen to the Communist

Khmer Rouge on 17 April 1975 and the North Vietnamese captured Saigon, South

Vietnam less than two weeks later, on 30 April 1975. The United States had conducted

massive operations EAGLE PULL and FREQUENT WIND respectively in order to

evacuate all US military and diplomatic personnel from those two countries. The fall of

each was so precipitous that the evacuations undertaken were hasty and dangerous. The

formerly massive US military presence in SE Asia was greatly reduced from its high in

1969-72 during the Vietnam War. There was no longer a Military Advisory Command-

Vietnam (MAC-V) with a four star US Army General like or

Creighton Abrams in command. The US Vietnam War force of nearly a million soldiers,

97 Sponsons are projections from the sides of a watercraft, for protection, stability, or the mounting of equipment such as armaments or lifeboats, etc. They extend a hull dimension at or below the waterline and serve to increase floatation or add lift when underway. 98 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 49-50.

35 sailors, airmen and marines and countless naval ships was gone, leaving in its place a few thousand airmen and Marines in Thailand under Air Force Lieutenant General John

Burns who commanded the US Support Activities Group and

(USSAG/7AF) from Nakhom Phanom Air Base Thailand.99

The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet was the largest force in the area, but it was scattered around the Pacific. There also were Marine units stationed in the Philippines and on Okinawa Japan. A Seventh Fleet Amphibious force, 76, had assisted in the evacuations of Phnom Penh and Saigon. After the Saigon evacuation, the amphibious force remained off the coast of South Vietnam until late on 2 May, collecting, redistributing, and consolidating the evacuee load and assisting various South

Vietnamese vessels in distress. The amphibious force arrived at Subic Bay, Philippines on 3 and 4 May and had offloaded approximately 80,000 evacuees.100 The forces were in the process of reconstituting on 12 May. 101

At 0718Z (0318 EDT) on 12 May 1975, Mr. John Neal of the Delta Exploration

Co in Indonesia received the radioed Mayday call from the US Merchant ship

Mayaguez and relayed it to the US embassy.102 The American embassy sent a message to

CINCPAC, the National Military (NMCC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) at the Pentagon in Washington DC, the White House, the National Security

Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the State Department and the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) among others that was received at 0514 on 12 May.

99 CINCPAC Command History , 1. 100 CTF 76 021330Z, May 75, untitled, MCHD. Throughout this study, unless otherwise indicated, all messages have a date, time, group (DTG) of May 1975. 101 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 25. 102 CINCPAC Command History , 3.

36 The CINCPAC staff immediately contacted the JCS and discussed the military assets

available to survey the scene. 103

Prior to the May 12 Seizure

According to intelligence reports at the time, the first indication that the new

Cambodian Communist government might pose a threat was received on 4 May 1975

(eight days prior to the seizure of the Mayaguez ) when the USS Gridley advised

CINCPAC that it had heard merchant ship communications that reported the capture of a

Korean tanker by a “unidentified communist ship” in the general vicinity of Poulo Wai

Island. This was in turn relayed by the CINCPAC Intelligence Center (IPAC) in

Honolulu, to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon and then

to the CIA Operations center along with a number of operational command and

intelligence centers within the Department of Defense (DoD). On 5 May, CINCPAC

advised the NMCC of several reports that a Korean tanker had been fired upon but not

stopped. The next day, a “semi-official” Korean wire service release stated the South

Korean ministry of transportation had been ordered to alert all Korean shipping in the

South China Sea to the dangers of Communist attacks. The State Departments’

intelligence arm, INR, was the only intelligence agency that published a report of the

incident in an intelligence publication that could reach high-level readers. A number of

principals were briefed orally. 104

103 CINCPAC Command History , 3. 104 IC Post-Mortem Report, 4.

37

The Day of Seizure (May 12)

The initial CRITIC 105 message concerning the Mayaguez situation was issued by the US embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia at 0503 EDT on 12 May. It read as follows:

MR JOHN NEAL, DELTA EXPLORATION CO HERE IN JAKARTA RECEIVED FOLLOWING MAYDAY INFO FROM US SHIP MAYAGUEZ . “HAVE BEEN FIRED UPON AND BOARDED BY CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES AT 9 DEGREES 48 MIN N/102 DEGREES 53 MIN E. SHIP BEING TOWED TO UNKNOWN CAMBODIAN PORT.

MR NEAL SAID MSG WAS SENT BY CREW IN SHIPS RADIO ROOM WHICH WAS NOT BY CAMBODIAN TROOPS, RADIO FREQUENCY IS 12421 MG. TIME OF INCIDENT WAS FEW MINUTES BEFORE 1530 LOCAL JAKARTA TIME (0430 EDT). 106

Very shortly after this message was sent, the Jakarta Embassy sent another

CRITIC report:

MR NEAL STILL IN CONTACT. VESSEL UNDER OWN POWER FOLLOWING ONE GUNBOAT (NFI) TO SHIHANOUKVILLE. PROCEEDING VERY SLOW. SHIP OWNED BY SEA LAND. NO CASUALTIES. CREW DOES NOT FEEL TO BE IN IMMEDIATE DANGER. TROOPS ON BOARD DO NOT SPEAK ENGLISH. CREW STANDING BY FOR ANY INST. 107

The Embassy sent a third CRITIC message, stating that Mr. Neal had lost contact with the Mayaguez at 0530 EDT. Only twenty-five minutes later, at 0555 EDT, the

Defense Attaché Office (DAO) attached to the Embassy in Manila, sent a fourth CRITIC message:

MR DELAS REYES RADIO OPERATOR IN MANILA (DZC-13) REPORTS RECEIVING RELAYED TRANSMISSION FROM BRINKER HOSS (AN OIL RIG OWNED BY PHILSUN OIL COMPANY) INDICATING CONTAINER SHIP MAYAGUEZ (WFZK) BEING TOWED

105 The CRITIC system was put into effect on 21 July 1958. Field reporting personnel were directed to prefix the indicator CRITIC to all messages containing “Critical intelligence” defined as "information indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which affects the security or interests of the United States to such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the President." It was arranged that messages carrying this indicator would receive simultaneous electrical dissemination to all the main US Intelligence agencies and to the Strategic and the Tactical Air Commands. Information obtained the CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent- csi/vol4no2/html/v04i2a03p_0001.htm. 106 IC Post-Mortem Report , 7. 107 Ibid.

38 BY CAMBODIAN TROOPS TO KOMPONG SOM. LAST INDICATED LOCATION: 00948N/10253E .108

The final CRITIC concerning the Mayaguez , this one from Jakarta, was transmitted at 0650 EDT.

IN GOING OVER INCIDENT, MR NEAL STATED THAT ACTUAL TIME OF BOARDING AS REPORTED BY SHIPS RADIO WAS 0718Z (0318 EDT). (NOTE EARLIER MR NEAL INDICATED INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST PRIOR TO 0830Z [0430 EDT]. IT NOW APPEARS THAT SHIP WAS IN TROUBLE FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR BEFORE MAYDAY CALL RECEIVED BY MR NEAL). SHIP REPORTED PLACE OF INCIDENT NEAR PULUA KOH QUAI (ISLAND OF KOW WAI). PROBABLE LAST PORT, HONG KONG, AND INTENDED DESTINATION THAILAND (POSSIBLY SATTHIP).

MR NEAL CLOSED DOWN TRANSMITTER APPROX 1000Z [0600 EDT] AFTER REPEATED UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO RAISE SHIP SINCE APPROX 0900Z (0500 EDT) 109

The addressed Washington area operations and watch centers had all received the first CRITIC message by 0515 EDT on 12 May. With the exception of the National

Security Council, NSC, who notified the Deputy Director for Operations at 0517, none awakened their principals immediately to inform them that an American merchant ship had been seized by the Cambodians. They instead deemed it would be desirable to await further information. Also, the timing of the notifications made it reasonable to wait to brief the principals during the normal morning briefing times. The CIA, DIA, and the

State department principals were all briefed, as was the President by 0800 EDT. The

NMCC notified the Service operations centers at about 0530 EDT and the Director of

Operations (J-3) at 0640 EDT and the White House Situation Room briefed Lt General

Brent Scowcroft, the Deputy National Security Advisor at 0730. 110

108 Ibid. 109 IC Post-Mortem Report , 9. 110 Ibid, 10.

39 Chapter 2: Ford Moves into Action

At 0740 EDT on May 12th, 1975, Deputy National Security Advisor Brent

Scowcroft began his daily morning consultation with President Gerald Ford by reporting to the President that an American merchant ship, the SS Mayaguez, had been seized in international waters off the coast of Cambodia. Scowcroft noted the initial information was “very sketchy,” but there were reports that the Cambodians were towing the ship toward the port of Kompong Som. The daily routine was interrupted and Ford ordered

Scowcroft to quickly arrange a meeting of the National Security Council to decide on a course of action. 111

At about the same time, the first man to hold both positions of Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Dr Henry Kissinger was attending a routine, twice a week staff meeting comprised of 20-25 people: the Assistant Secretary, and Undersecretaries of State and key staff members. The staff members took their turn briefing Kissinger and their colleagues on major trends in the regional areas. J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, who was sitting in for reported that “an American merchant ship has been captured by Cambodians about a hundred miles off the coast and is proceeding into (Kompong Som) under

Cambodian troop guard.” 112 Kissinger, upset that he was learning of the capture in such a casual fashion responded incredulously, “How can that be?” To which, Zurhellen who had just been notified literally two minutes before the meeting responded, “It’s beyond

111 Ford, A Time to Heal, 275-6. 112 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 548.

40 me.” 113 Anyone that has served under a strong leader knows this is a very difficult position to be in and it rarely turns out well for the messenger. With that answer,

Zurhellen either had a lot of confidence or was not very astute .

Kissinger, displaying his famous impatience, then proceeded to grill the

unfortunate Zurhellen to no avail. He simply had no more information. Kissinger ended

the meeting with, “I know you damned well cannot let Cambodia capture a ship a

hundred miles at sea and do nothing.” He then directed a call to the Deputy National

Security Advisor, Gen at the White House to find out what information

he had on the subject. 114 Although it took some time to gather enough information to accurately assess the situation, Kissinger had undoubtedly already decided that prompt military action was called for; his task now was to ensure it occurred.

The first NSC crisis action meeting was held in the Cabinet Room in the West

Wing of the White House at 12:05pm on 12 May 1975. President Ford had quickly assembled his formidable staff, which included Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,

Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James

Schlesinger, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General David

C. Jones (the Chairman, General George S. Brown was in Europe), and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Mr. . Also present were Deputy

Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements,

White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy National Security Advisor Lt.

General Brent Scowcroft and also from the NSC W.R. Smyser. 115

113 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 548. 114 Ibid . 115 National Security Council Meeting Minutes, 12 May 1975, 1. Gerald Ford Library. Hereafter cited as NSC 12 May.

41 President Ford preferred a collaborative approach to decision making, inviting

dissenting views and maximum participation by those present, but also demanding

brevity. 116 Therefore, the meetings were intense and tended to last only approximately an

hour each. The group wasted no time getting to business. CIA Director Colby began by

briefing an outline of the situation based on early reports. The US container ship

Mayaguez was seized by the Khmer Communists at approximately 2:15 pm local time

about seven or eight miles off the coast of a Cambodian island of Poulo Wai in the Gulf

of Thailand. The ship was able to transmit at least two messages that were picked up and

relayed, but communications were quickly cut off. The ship was intercepted while

enroute to a Thai port from Hong Kong and at last report was being escorted to the port

of Kompong Som by a Khmer gunboat. Colby explained the US had no hard information

on why the Khmer Communists seized the ship, but stated a Panamanian charter vessel

had also been seized the week prior but was subsequently released. Colby noted that

Poulo Wei was being contested between the Cambodian and Vietnamese communists and

would “provide an early test” for their future relations. The center of the dispute was the

potential of rich oil deposits in that area of the gulf. There was also evidence that some

forces had landed on at least one of the islands in the area. 117

When President Ford asked Colby what the best estimate of the location of the

ship, he answered that it had been proceeding under its own steam and could have

reached mainland Cambodia by that time. Schlesinger added that when he left the

Pentagon, the ship was only about 10 miles from the port in Kompong Som. 118

116 Ford, A Time to Heal, 276. 117 NSC 12 May, 1-2. 118 NSC 12 May, 3.

42 Ford decided that with those facts agreed upon, the group should begin to

deliberate policy. 119 The President quickly asked for response options. The initial

answers were solely limited to military options. Schlesinger outlined two overall

approaches, active and passive. He stated the US could assemble forces, seize a small

island as a hostage or consider a . He pointed out that all the options would be

“scrutinized by Congress.” Schlesinger also stressed that they did not have a clear

picture of the situation or the motives behind the seizure and how good the Cambodians’

communications were in handling this type of thing. The Cambodians had already seized

and released two other countries’ ships: a Panamanian, a Philippine (actually a Korean)

and now an American. Rumsfeld asked if this situation constituted an act of to

which Schlesinger answered, “Yes.” 120

Kissinger, who had listened to this point, spoke emphatically,

As I see it, Mr. President, we have two problems: The first problem is how to get the ship back; the second problem is how the US appears at this time. Actions that we would take to deal with one of these problems may not help to deal with the other. For example, I think that if they can get us into a negotiation, even if we get the ship back, it is not to our advantage. I think we should make a strong statement and give a note to the Cambodians, via the Chinese, so that we can get some credit if the boat is released. I also suggest some show of force. 121

Kissinger went on to stress that the issues extended to international perceptions of

US resolve and will. He added that if the US failed to respond to the challenge, it would

be a serious blow to its prestige around the world and strongly advocated acting. 122

The discussion switched to the forces that were available in the area and their

distances from the Mayaguez incident. Any operation in Southeast Asia faced a number

of obstacles due to Indochina’s collapse. Thailand had already asked the US to vacate

119 Ford, A Time to Heal, 276. 120 NSC 12 May, 4. 121 NSC 12 May, 5. 122 Ford, A Time to Heal, 276.

43 bases in the country and the Philippines would refuse permission for ground and air

forces to use bases for a rescue operation. 123 Schlesinger noted the USS

Coral Sea was on its way to and would take about two to three days to get to

the area. Ford, who was a WWII Pacific theater naval officer, asked if there was

anything at Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines. General Jones offered that the

USS Hancock a helicopter carrier and other vessels were on station there, but would take

at least a day and a half to reach the incident area. 124 Ford later called the military

situation and our ability to respond “discouraging” because the closest US forces were

the wrong type and quantity needed for the operation he envisioned. 125

Kissinger reemphasized his main point of sending a message, noting that

Cambodian financial assets were already blocked, so economic pressure would

accomplish little if anything. He added, “Perhaps we can seize a Cambodian ship on the

high seas. But I think what we need for the next 48 hours is a strong statement, a strong

note and a show of force.” Seeking a quid pro quo, he asked if they could find where

Cambodian ships were around the world. He was informed by the defense team that the

Cambodians didn’t have a navy and had no merchant ships to speak of. Colby offered

that the Cambodians might have some small coastal vessels, but that was about all. 126

A telling event occurred next. Clements offered that there was a “real chance that

this is an in house spat.” There had been significant oil discoveries in the area and he

thought that was “what the fuss” was “all about.” The President immediately, and

123 Kissinger, Years of Renewal , 553. 124 NSC 12 May, 5. 125 Ford, A Time to Heal, 276. In an interview conducted ten years later, General Jones said, “The Mayaguez operation was one of these situations where it was necessary to use whatever was available.” See Jones interview. 126 NSC 12 May, 6.

44 uncharacteristically, shut that avenue of discussion down, stating, “That is interesting, but

it does not solve our problem.” He had already agreed with Kissinger’s assessment of the

situation and issued his first directive, “I think we should have a strong public statement

and a strong note. We should issue orders to get the carrier turned around.” He added

that the administration should issue the statement voicing its objection to Cambodia’s

actions to the press before they got the story from elsewhere. Kissinger, referring to the

possible struggle between Vietnam and Cambodia, added that they should brief this as an

“outrage,” and that no one should use the US in their quarrels. 127

Harbor mining was the next avenue the group focused on. Kissinger asked if the

Coral Sea had mines on board, and Jones answered in the negative, but stated they “could make arrangements to get them there.” Schlesinger added the mines could arrive within

24 hours and after some discussion, Ford directed that the US be prepared to mine

Cambodian harbors. Jones agreed and suggested that the US assemble the contingency plans as soon as possible and start assembling a task force to go in that direction. He added that Boeing B-52 bombers stationed nearby could handle the situation. Ford summarized his orders:

I think we should turn the Coral Sea around. We should get everything organized in Subic Bay. We should make a strong statement at once before the news hits from other sources. We should also get a full photo run of the island and of the harbor where the ship is. 128

Vice President Rockefeller, not necessarily known as a driving force in the Ford administration, politely asked to speak. He then placed a stake in the ground that became policy and was never seriously challenged:

127 NSC 12 May, 6. 128 Ibid, 7.

45 I think this will be seen as a test case. I think it will be judged in . I remember the Pueblo case. 129 I think we need something strong soon. Getting out a message and getting people ready will not do it. I think a violent response is in order. The world should know that we will act and that we will act quickly. We should have an immediate response in terms of action. I do not know if we have any targets that we can strike, but we should certainly consider this. If they get any hostages, this can go on forever.

Now you can take action before you begin to get protests. I believe the authorities there only understand force. There is an old Chinese saying about a dagger hitting steel and withdrawing when it hits steel, and that is the impression that we should convey. 130

The conversation accelerated and intensified. Schlesinger responded that the

Cambodians already had 39 American hostages. Ford demanded action. Rockefeller asked if there was anything the US could do immediately. Schlesinger and Clements suggested sinking the Cambodian patrol ships, and Rockefeller countered with a recommendation to seize Poulo Wai Island. Once again failing to acknowledge the plight of the Mayaguez crew, Kissinger agreed with Rockefeller and suggested mining

Cambodian harbors, taking the ship or scuttling it. Schlesinger offered to the group the

Cambodians already had the ship and the situation was already similar to the Pueblo incident. 131 Kissinger would later recount the memory of the Pueblo incident was a driving factor in the President’s thoughts and actions, “From the outset, Ford was determined not to permit a repetition of such a sequence of events.” 132

Ford asked how soon the island could be taken. 133 Jones reported there were helicopters in Thailand and it could be done “fairly quickly.” “We cannot do it from

Thailand,” Kissinger interjected. When reminded by Schlesinger that US reconnaissance

129 The USS Pueblo was a surveillance ship seized off the Korean Coast in 1968. The crew was held hostage for over 11 months and the ship was never recovered. It was a great Cold War embarrassment for the United States. See http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-p/ager2.htm. 130 NSC 12 May, 8. 131 Ibid, 9. 132 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 551. 133 Note that on 12 May “the island” refers to Poulo Wai Island. The island referred to would change later during the crisis, but the mission remained basically the same.

46 missions were being flown from Thailand, Kissinger responded that he did “not believe

we can run military operations from there.” 134 Rockefeller pressed again, proposing a series of escalating actions. He stated, “We have to show that we will not tolerate this kind of thing. It is a pattern. If we do not respond violently, we will get nibbled to death.

We can announce these things to make it clear what we are doing.” 135 Schlesinger cautioned that announcing any future steps would cause a response from a Congress which had recently issued the War Powers resolution and the Case-Church amendment, both designed to limit the President’s powers to wage war, especially in SE Asia.136

Ford again summarized the plan to issue statements, send forces to the area and perhaps take the island. He then broached a new subject that would be discussed long after the incident was over, the speed and process of emergency notification. He felt that there must have been a quicker way of finding out about the maritime seizure than almost six hours after it had occurred. Scowcroft agreed, as did Rumsfeld, who had tried to raise the issue earlier in the meeting, but had been ignored. Kissinger offered that he had been told as an aside during his regular staff meeting. Schlesinger called the delay a

“bureaucratic issue” and Colby offered to develop a recounting of the sequence of the notification. Rumsfeld asked if the US could notify other ships of the danger and Jones responded, “We will see.” 137 The end result of these and other similar questions along those lines would be a restructuring of the warning system. 138

134 Kissinger was concerned about losing one of the few US allies remaining in SE Asia. The US and Thai governments had agreed to a total US force withdrawal from Thailand. In Kissinger’s view a continued US presence was perceived as a political threat to the Thai government and conducting military operations from Thailand was even more intolerable to the Thai people. 135 NSC 12 May, 9. 136 Ibid, 10. The Case-Church Amendment to the 1975 Military Authorization Act prohibited US military involvement in Vietnam. See the 1975 Congressional Record. 137 NSC 12 May, 10. 138 See appendix for Maritime Warning Analysis.

47 Refocusing the discussion to the central subject of possible action, Rockefeller again stressed his advocacy of swift and powerful retribution as a method sending a message to the world, stating, “Unless the Cambodians are hurt, this pattern will not be broken.” Kissinger added that there was “no choice” but to issue a statement and that it

“should be very strong.” He advocated issuing an that included a demand of the release of the ship and “serious consequences” to a failure to do so. Agreeing,

President Ford added the message should “point out that this is a clear act of piracy.”

Kissinger, building momentum proposed military action “on a large scale” and that they should focus on the ship, “rather than to seize an island.” He continued, “We should not look as though we want to pop somebody, but we should give the impression that we are not to be trifled with.” Always the artful politician, Kissinger also added that if the ship

“should be released, then we can state that the release is in response to our statement.” 139

Ford, concluding there was a consensus on some sort of strong action turned to the military and asked for “DoD options” by that afternoon. Schlesinger opined that mining would not be a strong enough reaction and would cause the Cambodians “to just sit.” He stated that the actions chosen should put the Cambodians “under pressure” and

“embarrass them.” Kissinger, changed his earlier position and advocated “taking the island rather than mining the port,” and asked for the DoD to find out how “big a battle” it would be. Schlesinger replied that they would have a reconnaissance report by that evening. Kissinger outlined his priorities, “First, what force is required to take the island? Second, what force is required to take Kompong Som and to take the ship and the

139 NSC 12 May, 11.

48 people? On the whole, I would prefer this. Third, what it would take to mine the

harbor.” 140

Schlesinger asked the president about the administration’s limits of authority and

its relationship with Congress. Ford acknowledged that he saw “two problems: first, the

provisions of summer 1973; and second, the war powers.” He added “Regarding the

military options, I would like to know how they would be hamstrung and what we want

to do. I can assure you that irrespective of the Congress, we will move.” (emphasis

added) 141

Another brief discussion on the value of mining ensued; followed by Rumsfeld

and Rockefeller questioning the value of issuing a public warning of military action, and

Kissinger cautioning that the US presence in Thailand was tenuous. Ford then announced

he had decided to move forward on two fronts simultaneously. He told Kissinger to have

the State Department demand the immediate release of the ship and her crew. The

difficulty with that course of action was that the State Department didn’t know to whom

they should serve the demand. The US had no diplomatic relations with the new Khmer

Rouge regime, which had been in power less than a month and had few bureaucratic

structures in place. Kissinger offered that perhaps the Chinese could act as

intermediaries. At the same time, Ford ordered the Coral Sea and other ships to immediately sail at top speed toward the site of the incident. 142 Ford then recapped his

direction:

Within an hour or so, there will be a public statement. Let us make an announcement ahead of time and a tough one so that we get the initiative. Let us not tell Congress that we will do anything militarily since we have not decided. I think

140 Ibid, 12. 141 Ibid. 142 Ford, A Time to Heal, 277.

49 that it is important to make a strong statement publicly before the news gets out otherwise. 143

Rumsfeld offered that they should not demand a release because a demand would

“activate the Congress” and “to demand seems weaker.” Schlesinger shot back, “It is not weak to say that we demand the release,” and Kissinger added, “I would demand.”

Rumsfeld, seeking to save face, replied they should make a demand “perhaps not publicly, but privately.” Kissinger stated, “If Congress takes us on, I think we have a good case.” The President agreed. 144

Rockefeller and Kissinger discussed the situation with respect to US-Thai

relations. Kissinger advocated a reconnaissance over flight of the area, stating, “That we

could get away with, but not bombing.” Rockefeller noted that he thought the US bases

in Thailand were already scheduled to close and asked if they could ask Thai permission

to use the bases. Kissinger responded that the bases weren’t necessarily going to close

and we couldn’t ask permission. Adding to the contextual strategic view, he stated that

Singapore Prime Minister had asked the US to “stay in Thailand as long

as possible to give him time to work on getting the defenses of ready. Bombing

from Thailand will get us out quickly.” He added bombing even from the Philippines

would be trouble. 145

With that, President Ford ended the meeting stating, “This has been a useful

discussion. Thank you. I will look forward to seeing the options.” 146

The first NSC meeting ended at approximately 1245 EDT, 12 May 1975 about 10

hours after the Mayaguez capture. US diplomatic initiatives and communications seeking

143 NSC 12 May, 13. 144 Ibid, 14. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid, 15.

50 the release of the Mayaguez and her crew began immediately following. At 1350, Press

Secretary Ron Nessen issued the following statement from the White House briefing room:

We have been informed that a Cambodian naval vessel has seized an American merchant ship on the high seas and forced it to the port of Kompong Som. The President has met with the NSC. He considers this seizure an act of piracy. He has instructed the State Department to demand the immediate release of the ship. Failure to do so would have the most serious consequences. 147

The release was somewhat unusual because the press corps had largely left the area and Nessen had to scrape up a quorum of reporters. 148

By then, Kissinger was on an airplane to St Louis and Brent Scowcroft was

handling the crisis. Kissinger’s visit was a part of an effort to a new consensus

behind America’s international role after Indochina. The main thrust was that American

leadership remained the key to both peace and progress, and that, “despite recent

setbacks, we would master the tasks before us.” The President decided against cancelling

Kissinger’s thirty-six hour trip due to yet another Indochina “crisis” as Kissinger called it.

Also, time was required to assemble military forces and to await a Chinese response. 149

At 1630, Robert Ingersoll, Acting Secretary of State delivered a message to

Huang Zhen, chief of the Chinese Liaison office (the People’s Republic of China did not

have a formal embassy at the time in the US) demanding the immediate release of

Mayaguez and her crew. Huang Zhen refused to accept the message, but Kissinger was

certain he was bound to report it. Anticipating this, Kissinger had directed George H.W.

Bush, head of the US Liaison Office in (The US did not have a formal embassy in

147 White House statement, 12 May, 1975, Department of State Bulletin, 72, No 1875, June 2, 1975. 148 Ron Nessen, It Sure Looks Different from the Inside, (New York: Playboy Press, 1979), 118-119. 149 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 554.

51 China) to deliver the same message to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Cambodian

embassy there. Bush also delivered a verbal message:

The government of the US demands the immediate release of the vessel and of the full crew. If that release does not immediately take place, the authorities in Phnom Penh will be responsible for the consequences. 150

According to Kissinger, in diplomatic parlance, the language used was the nearest thing to an ultimatum and was a clear message that military action was “likely.” 151

From that point on, the intelligence regarding the location of the ship and crew

was a source of frustration to the President. For the remainder of that Monday there were

contradictory reports sent to the President. First he was told the Mayaguez was steaming

toward the Cambodian mainland. Then she was anchored off Koh Tang Island, thirty

miles from shore. And then later it was reported that she was heading toward the

mainland again. Finally at 2230 that night, Scowcroft called Ford to report that a

reconnaissance plane had located the Mayaguez anchored off Poulo Wai in

of two and that the had sustained damage from small-

arms fire. Three hours later, he called again to say that the ship was less than an hour out

of Kompong Som. At 0230 he reported the ship was dead in the water one mile north of

Koh Tang Island, 25 miles from mainland Cambodia and she was preparing to anchor

there. 152

150 Comptroller General , 67. See also Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 555. 151 Kissinger Years of Renewal, 555. 152 Ford, A Time to Heal 277

52 Chapter 3: Initial Military Response-12 May 1975

The military establishment had recognized the requirement to locate the vessel

and, not waiting for direction from above had responded almost immediately. 153 After

the first message was received notifying them of the Mayaguez incident, the JCS through

the National Military Command Center (NMCC) conferred (by phone) with the

Commander in Chief Pacific forces (CINCPAC) staff and requested CINCPAC launch

reconnaissance aircraft. 154 By the time the last CRITIC message was received at the

NMCC, the J-3 (Joint Staff Director of Operations) had already ordered reconnaissance

of the Mayaguez seizure area. 155 CINCPAC, Admiral Noel A. Gayler, who happened to

be in Washington DC at the time ordered the launch of P-3 aircraft for the Gulf of Siam,

and RF-4s for photo coverage of Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville and the Poulo Wai chain of

islands. 156 was to provide high altitude U-2 photographic

coverage of Poulo Wai at first light. At 0957 EDT (2057, after sunset in Cambodia) on 12

May the first reconnaissance plane, a naval P-3 based at Utapao was launched.157

The P-3 based in Thailand was not kept in a ready alert status, so the aircrew had

to be assembled, briefed and given time to plan the mission, the aircraft had to be

prepared for flight, and any other activities required for takeoff completed. Despite the

fact a P-3 aircraft in the Philippines was on alert and ready to launch, the Thailand-based

aircraft actually arrived sooner than the Philippine-stationed P-3 would have and with

more fuel to loiter in the area due to the distances and flying time to the vicinity of the

153 For a fairly complete timeline of military actions up to 13 May, see pp 6-8 of IR Committee pt I. 154 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 5. 155 IC Post-Mortem Report , 11. 156 Jones Interview, 201. 157 Comptroller General, 72. The GAO questioned why a reconnaissance mission wasn’t launched sooner.

53 seizure involved. 158 After the initial reconnaissance sortie, the P-3 mission was passed to the Commander, Philippine Air Patrol Group (CTG 72.3) who controlled the P-3 aircraft stationed at Cubi Point. 159 To follow up the verbal discussions, the JCS then confirmed

the seizure by message. 160

CINCPAC did not wait for orders from the NSC or JCS to act further. His initial

direction to U.S. Navy surface ships was to order the Escort Harold E. Holt ,

with the Commander of Destroyer Squadron 23 (ComDesRon 23) on board (or

embarked), and the USS Vega, a refrigerator cargo ship located about 100 miles from the

Philippines to proceed to the Poulo Wai area. 161 By 1000 EDT (1400Z) on 12 May, the

two ships were enroute to the vicinity of the Mayaguez seizure with an estimated arrival

time of 12 noon on 14 May (2300 Cambodian time). 162

CINCPAC also ordered the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea and its escorts,

including three , which were steaming toward the Philippines in the South

China Sea to the Mayaguez seizure area approximately 950 miles away. At 1514 on 12

May the ships changed course and sailed at best speed with an estimated time of arrival

of 0300 EDT on 15 May (1400 Cambodian time). At the same time, the guided missile

destroyer USS Wilson was also ordered from en route from the Philippines and expected

to arrive off Koh Tang at 2300 on 14 May. 163

At 1412 EDT on 12 May, CINCPAC Fleet directed Okinawa-based Amphibious

Ready Group B (a configuration of naval vessels designed to support a Marine

158 Comptroller General , 72. 159 IC Post-Mortem Report , 11. 160 JCS 121437Z May 75, GRC. 161 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 26. 162 Comptroller General , 87. 163 Ibid.

54 amphibious assault) to prepare to proceed to the scene. The helicopter carrier USS

Okinawa, which was nearing the coast of the island of Okinawa was ordered to sail to the

Philippines to reconstitute a second Amphibious Ready Group, (ARG A). The USS

Okinawa was scheduled to depart the Philippines with ARG A at 0600 on 15 May and

arrive near the Mayaguez scene at 2300 on 17 May. 164

CINCPACFlt then directed the two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) to complete their assembly as soon as it was feasible and get underway for a possible assault on the Cambodian mainland. Approximately 2 hours later, CINCPACFlt directed the

Commander of Seventh Fleet (ComSeventhFlt) to prepare the a helicopter carrier, the

USS Hancock for departure from Subic Bay as quickly as possible, taking any Marine helicopters and troops that were available. 165 CINCPAC also activated the 9th Marine

Amphibious Brigade (MAB), with initial orders to plan the occupation of the port of

Kompong Som. 166 Marine Corps units were ordered to embark on the Combat Task Force

(CTF) 76 amphibious ships located in Subic Bay, and sail with the Hancock . The

Hancock and the Mobile departed Subic Bay about mid-day of 14 May with their contingent of Marines.167

See Figure 3 for the position of US Forces on 12 May 75.

Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Jones would later recall that there were a number of challenges or problems that confronted decision makers and implementers, especially concerning intelligence gathering. One was the fact that the US had almost completely withdrawn from the Southeast Asia area around Cambodia. There were still

164 Comptroller General , 87. 165 CINCPACFLT 121812Z May75 and CINCPACFLT 122028Z May 75. 166 CTF-79 130148Z May 75. 167 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 26.

55 units in Thailand, but the area was no longer one of emphasis for the US military or US foreign policy since the withdrawal from Vietnam two years earlier. Getting accurate information was extremely difficult, not only on the enemy, but even regarding US forces. For example, there was the case of the USS Hancock which had been ordered to the scene from the Philippines. The JCS received arrival estimates, made plans around that estimate and put events in motion. A day later, Jones found that the estimate that was forwarded to him was based on standard steaming time planning factors for a certain distance for that ship. He also found that one of the propulsion screws on the ship was malfunctioning. Therefore, the ship was operating on only one screw, and it was going at a much slower speed than originally reported. The ship’s crew had thought they could fix it and catch up, but ended up not being able to fix it, and it was to arrive in the area very late. Jones felt there was great pressure to do things within certain timing. 168

Jones also reported there was also a great debate in the government over the top priority in this crisis between rescuing the crew and punitive action against Cambodia.

There were some in the government, and in the military, who wanted to bomb Phnom

Penh with B-52s as punitive action. Acting Chairman Jones was in the group whose priority was rescuing the crew. He believed punitive action was not a prudent course since the actual source of the Cambodian action was in doubt. The US government officials didn't know whether the ship had been seized by pirates or by military members acting independently or as tools of the government. Jones continued:

There were arguments in favor of punitive action phrased in the broader context of the end of the Vietnam War and the US defeat and an effort to rebuild our credibility worldwide. There was quite a discussion that we had lost a little of our manhood in Vietnam. We had to make sure the world understood that we weren't going to put up with any sort of

168 Jones interview, 201.

56 monkey work like this. It was in that larger context that punitive action was addressed. 169

The forces in Thailand became aware of the situation when Lt Gen Ray Sitton,

then Director of the JCS called Gen Burns on the hotline on the morning of May 13 th

(Cambodia time) to inform him of the situation, stating, “The Cambodians have captured

a ship called the Mayaguez, a container ship. It’s down at Poulo Wai Island and you are to take whatever action necessary short of sinking the vessel to keep it from entering a

Cambodian port.” Gen Burns acknowledged the call and began planning actions. 170 This

put into context a phone request Burns had received at 2000 (Cambodia time) the night

before from a Navy Commander at Utapao requesting a fighter escort for a P-3 mission,

which Burns refused because his authority to do so had been revoked. He instructed the

Commander to contact CINCPAC who could delegate that authority back to Burns. He

never heard back. Burns later found the request was to support the P-3 search for the

Mayaguez, but no one had informed him at the time. 171

After his conversation with Sitton, Burns ordered 7AF to set up a communication relay system. The Airborne Command Control and Communications aircraft which normally filled that mission were in the Philippines and would take a day to arrive.

Initially, Burns didn’t have authority to conduct RF-4 photo reconnaissance missions over the islands, since they were Cambodian territory and the airspace above it

Cambodian airspace. 172 This detail had a great effect on the overall mission, because there was no reconnaissance of Koh Tang Island prior to the Marines arriving at Utapao.

169 Ibid, 203. 170 Burns interview, 427. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid, 428-9.

57 The local command had no useful pictures of the island. They had never had reason to

need any before this encounter and on their existing maps, it was an insignificant dot.173

This shortfall would leave the Marines with no idea what they were in for when they attacked the island.

Burns worked to improve his ability to direct military missions and was successful in getting clarification that he was in fact allowed to order reconnaissance and sent RF-4s into the area. Since they were flying from Udorn AB at first, air refueling missions also had to be assigned. This was no simple matter. The base structure in the area was designed to send aircraft north to , not south into the Gulf of

Siam. But by May 13th a “dialogue” between Burns and the Generals and in

Washington and had been established over a secure encrypted teleconference line.

Burns still did not have authority to operate as he had before during the evacuations. 174

However, on a May 13 th conference, CINCPAC gave him decision-making latitude. Gen

Jones participated in the teleconference and was aware of the command relationships.

Burns was alerted to be prepared to take the ship with the only ground forces he had on scene, air [AP]. He tried to find the air police that had previously trained with the Marines and was amazed to find that his experienced personnel were all but gone. There were only 25-30 left that had trained with the Marines. Regardless, he began moving approximately 100 air policemen to Utapao to prepare to take the Mayaguez .175

173 Ibid, 430. 174 Ibid, 429. 175 Ibid, 430.

58 PART II: 13 MAY ACTION AND REACTION THE TENSION MOUNTS

Chapter 4: May 13—The Mayaguez and Crew Move to Koh Tang

There was good reason why the reports to the President had changed during the evening of 12 May in Washington DC. The situation off the coast of Cambodia had changed. The crew of the Mayaguez had spent a fitful night trying to sleep while anchored off Poulo Wai Island. 176 By 2130 Cambodian time, a US Navy P-3

reconnaissance aircraft had located the Mayaguez. While it was too dark for a visual

confirmation, the clearly displayed a ship the Mayaguez ’s size and the P-3 was

taking tracer fire from the patrol boats’ twin 50-caliber machine guns, which provided

additional evidence the ship was the Mayaguez . Four hours later, the P-3 dropped

parachute flares to illuminate the ship and confirmed that the ship was the Mayaguez by

reading its name. 177 The Mayaguez was under almost constant surveillance from then on.

Shortly after dawn on 13 May, the Cambodians signaled for Captain Miller and

crew to weigh anchor and begin sailing to Kompong Som harbor Pier #2. At 0830 local

time (2130 12 May EDT) the Mayaguez began sailing at half speed to the Cambodian

mainland. It moved from Poulo Wai Island over thirty miles past a small dumbbell

shaped 3 mile wide by 5 mile long island named Koh Tang about 25 miles off the

Cambodian coast. There the Cambodians again changed their directions and ordered

Captain Miller to anchor the Mayaguez a mile off the northeast coast of Koh Tang, which

176 Miller testimony, 249. 177 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 70-71.

59 they did at 1318 local (0218 EDT). 178 Shortly after they anchored, several American F-4

Phantom fighter jets strafed and rocketed in front of and behind the Mayaguez. 179

At approximately 1600, a Cambodian Navy Ensign ordered Captain Miller to open the safe in his stateroom and the Cambodians took five thousand US dollars that

Miller had not hidden. Miller was then ordered along with his crew into a Thai fishing boat and another boat that had come from Koh Tang Island along with two gunboats and pulled up alongside the Mayaguez. When the crew was completely ensconced in the

fishing boats, the boats proceeded to a small cove on Koh Tang Island and anchored

approximately 50 yards off the beach. At approximately 1900 two gunboats tied up

alongside the fishing boats and a young Cambodian told the Captain not to worry, that the

Cambodians would not harm the Americans. He wanted to know what was in the

Mayaguez crew rooms and where the arms were kept onboard. He requested the Captain

and two of the crew accompany him back to the Mayaguez. After trying fruitlessly to

convince the Cambodians the Mayaguez had no weapons, Captain Miller agreed and took

his first mate and Chief Engineer. 180

When the small boarding party reached the Mayaguez an hour later, the Captain

and his men had barely made it onto the deck when US jets dropped explosive flares,

brightly illuminating the ship and its occupants. The frightened Cambodians abandoned

their search and rushed the Americans back into the gunboats and to the fishing boats in

the Koh Tang cove where they rejoined the remainder of the crew. All night, US planes

178 Miller testimony, 249. 179 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 83. 180 Miller testimony, 249.

60 circled overhead and the Cambodians fired at them from the gunboats and the island.

The crew slept on the decks of the fishing boats. 181

181 Miller testimony, 250; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 84-88.

61 Chapter 5: NSC Morning Meeting- 13 May

Tuesday 13 May began early for the President. Schlesinger telephoned Ford at

5:52 am and they discussed the Mayaguez situation for over an hour. Ford was

determined not to allow a repeat of the 1968 Pueblo incident where the US reaction was

not quick enough to prevent the transfer of the crew to the Korean mainland where they

had languished in a prison camp for nearly a year. He told Schlesinger to make sure that

no Cambodian vessels moved between Koh Tang and the mainland. 182 In , Thai

premier Kukrit Pramoj had just issued a statement warning that he would not permit the

US to use Thai bases for operations against Cambodia. Ford interpreted the statement as

more political rhetoric than anything else and felt the Thais knew the US needed the base

at Utapao to stage any land or air force operation. Ford called for a meeting of the NSC

to be held at around 1000 that morning. 183

The second of the four Mayaguez crisis NSC meetings was held on Tuesday, 13

May from 1022 to 1117 in the White House Cabinet Room. Henry Kissinger was enroute

to Kansas City for a conference and was represented for the State Department by Under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco and by Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft as

National Security Advisor. 184 Other attendees were the same as the previous meeting.

The President, ready to discuss military options, began the meeting by asking CIA

director Colby for an update. 185

182 Ford, A Time to Heal , 277. 183 Ford, A Time to Heal, 277. 184 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 554. 185 National Security Council Meeting Minutes, 13 May 1975 (1022-1117), Gerald Ford Library, 1-2. Hereafter cited as NSC 13 May 1022.

62 Colby had quite a bit of new information and not surprisingly to some, the initial

reports from the day before had been inaccurate. 186 Colby reported that the Mayaguez

was not in Kompong Som, but at least two US reconnaissance aircraft had spotted the

ship anchored about 30 miles southwest of Kompong Som, off a small island called Koh

Tang. Until late the previous evening, the ship had been held near where it was seized in

the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island, about 40 miles further to the southwest.

Reconnaissance aircraft also reported receiving small arms fire from gunboats and the

Mayaguez itself. Perhaps most important, Colby relayed that the latest US

reconnaissance flights observed the Mayaguez crew being transferred from the ship via a tugboat to Koh Tang island and being led off toward the interior of the island. However, when Scowcroft asked if they were sure it was the crew, Schlesinger answered, “No.” 187

Undeterred by that interruption, Colby continued with his briefing, strongly speculating that the Khmer communists could move the crew to the mainland, but may have intended to keep them on the island until they made some final decisions about the disposition of the crew and vessel. He also reported that the Khmer government had not made a public statement about the incident. Turning his attention to the military threat the Cambodians posed, he stated the Cambodians would attempt to a recapture of the ship, an attack on Cambodian patrol craft or a landing on Koh Tang, but would have few troops or weapons to react. They also would not be able to impede a mining of the

Kompong Som harbor. 188

186 History Channel, “Seized at Sea: Situation Critical,” Mayaguez documentary, 2 Dec 2005. Hereafter cited as Mayaguez documentary. 187 NSC 13 May 1022, 2. 188 NSC 13 May 1022, 3.

63 A disagreement over Kompong Som harbor ensued. Ford and Rockefeller asked

about the amount of traffic the port supported. Twice Schlesinger answered that recent

reconnaissance photos had shown no ships at the port and there had been “no action at

this port for a considerable length of time,” even before the Khmer takeover. Undeterred,

the Vice President argued that the port had been a principal port of entry some years

before, had been used by the Viet Cong, was still the Cambodian’s point of entry and

therefore must be important to the Khmer government. Ford sided with Rockefeller.

After the second exchange between the Vice President and Secretary of Defense,

Rockefeller charged that there had been “a big mistake yesterday.” He went on to say

that Schlesinger’s assertion that the ship was already in Kompong Som denied the option

of trying to prevent the ship from being taken into the harbor. When Schlesinger

clarified that he had said the ship might be in the harbor, not that it was already in port,

Rockefeller once again disagreed. 189 This discussion presaged further distrust among the

members of the NSC.

President Ford, showing his growing frustration stated, “I do think we have to be

certain of our facts.” He had been updated by Scowcroft throughout the night regarding

the ships position and asked the group, “What do we know now? How certain are we of

the facts with which we are dealing?” Colby asserted that they knew the position of the

ship off Koh Tang Island and they had seen people “being off-loaded.” Rumsfeld

challenged how they could “know these things.” To that Jones responded that he had

personally talked to the US commander in Thailand (Gen Burns) who told him that

reconnaissance aircraft had made a positive identification of the Mayaguez . After Jones went on to say that despite US fighter attacks, some Cambodian boats had gotten to the

189 NSC 13 May 1022, 4.

64 Mayaguez and they had seen what appeared to be Caucasians with “their heads between

their legs” on the island. After Rumsfeld asked, “Do we know where the crew, the

Americans and the Vietnamese, are?” Jones repeated, “We saw them go to the island.” 190

Once again, the certainty with which the intelligence was presented was overstated.

The Mayaguez became the center of the discussion. Jones noted that they had instructed the on-scene commanders that they were not to let the ship go to port and were

allowed to take any action necessary, including sinking the ship. He explained that the

US forces would be able to tell when it would be ready to move and could disable the

ship with little chance of hitting people by using the precision of airborne . If

the Cambodians tried to tow the ship, US aircraft would sink the tugboats. Ford agreed

they must take steps to stop the ship if it was moved. 191

Ford’s attention returned to the speed of the flow of information getting to him and the efficacy of the intelligence being provided, asking how the information would get to them and whom the planes would contact. Jones answered the 7 th Air Force Support

Group at Nakhon Phanom (NKP) Royal Thai Air Base 192 would be able to report within minutes, adding that bad weather could effect that. President Ford asked if there were

“people on the ball in the Pentagon” and again how the Pentagon would get the information to Scowcroft and then to him. Scowcroft also expressed his frustration at perceived time lags between reports and their lack of accuracy. Twice more, Ford

190 NSC 13 May, 5-6. 191 Ibid, 6. 192 NKP (Nakhon Phanom) Royal Thai Air Base is located approximately 360 miles north-east of Bangkok and over 550 miles from Koh Tang Island.

65 repeated that he was “very concerned about the delay in reports,” from the Pentagon and that the communications to him must be “the quickest possible.” 193

At the previous meeting, Ford had asked Schlesinger and Jones for military options. The President now asked for their report on those options. Schlesinger briefed that invading and holding Kompong Som, with its 1700 Cambodian forces would require

“many troops,” so the first US objective was to keep the Mayaguez out of the port.

Therefore, he listed two options to recover the ship: 1. attack the ship in approximately

24 hours using Marines and helicopters at Utapao; or 2. wait approximately twelve hours longer until the USS Holt arrived on-scene and use it to perform the boarding. Jones reminded the group that would be approximately 0530 the next day before the Holt arrived. 194

Displaying his previous Navy experience, an extreme level of micromanagement and perhaps a lack of trust in the present Defense representatives, Ford cautioned Jones and Schlesinger not to let the Holt arrive without fuel. Schlesinger brushed off the possible slight and continued that it might be preferable to wait for the Holt since it was manned and trained for boarding and they would have a “dominant force” in the area. He then hedged that waiting would give the Cambodians time to prepare and it might be better to go at first light with the helicopters. They had given instructions to use gunfire on any personnel on the deck to facilitate the landing. Rockefeller questioned, “Even if they are Americans?” Schlesinger answered he did not think there were any Americans on board. 195

193 NSC 13 May, 7. 194 Ibid, 8. 195 Ibid, 9.

66 Schlesinger continued that the force to take Koh Tang was on Okinawa, but could join the 125 Marines already in Thailand in twelve hours. This sparked a detailed discussion on the Marines available. Ford noted the 125 Marines could be used to board the Mayaguez and asked when the Marines from Subic Bay Philippines could get to

Thailand. Jones reminded him the one thousand Marines were leaving from Okinawa and could be in Thailand in a day and the invasion force could use large helicopters to land the Marines on Koh Tang. He noted they did not know what the Marines would face on the island, but that a Cambodian defector had informed them there were about 60

Khmer troops on the island. Jones then stated that he thought it was preferable to have a

“dominant force” that the presence of the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea would offer with its aircraft Marines, helicopters, and escort ships. He reported the US would have

Cambodian translators on the helicopters to “bullhorn” a message to the Khmer troops there that the Marines would attack unless they released the Americans. He added they did not know how the Cambodians might react and that the Cambodians could execute the Americans if they were cornered. 196

After a brief discussion on the Cambodian motivation for seizing the Mayaguez which produced no real answers, the President asked about whether there were gunboats around the ship and if the US was keeping the boats away from the Mayaguez. General

Jones reported there had been boats going back and forth to the ship and that in fact one was tied alongside as they spoke. The US aircraft had not fired upon the gunboats, but had scared some away by firing warning shots around them. US intelligence was also gathering more information via photography, including infrared shots during the night.

196 NSC 13 May, 10.

67 When Ford, asserting himself, said he wanted to see the pictures, Jones replied that they were processed in Thailand, implying the President would not get his desire. 197

Vice President Rockefeller again refocused the discussion, stating “I do not think the freighter is the issue. The issue is how we respond. Many are watching us, in Korea and elsewhere. I think we need to respond more quickly.” He opined the longer the US delayed reacting, the more time the Cambodians would have to prepare and once the

Cambodians had the hostages, they could “twist our tails for months.” He presciently forecast that if the US sent the Marines ashore, they may lose more men than the

Cambodians held hostage. He then recommended sinking any Cambodian boat when it moved. Schlesinger joined in and restated the objectives: 1. to stop the Mayaguez from being taken to Kompong Som; 2. to retrieve the hostages and 3. To attack and sink the

“Cambodian Navy, later, after we have our ship and our people out, in order to maximize the punishment.” He went on to say that since the US didn’t know the Cambodian motivations, sinking their vessels might jeopardize the first two objectives. 198

Ford turned to his trusted Deputy National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft and asked his views. Scowcroft saw two operations (not objectives), the first against the ship and the second against the island. He explained the operations’ urgency lay in stopping the Americans’ transfer to the mainland and the ship to Kompong Som. Continuing, he described the “optimal situation” as positioning the Holt between the Mayaguez and the mainland, but that would not occur for another 24 hours. He wondered aloud if they had that time. Jones responded there were other ways of stopping the Mayaguez from

197 NSC 13 May, 11. 198 Ibid, 11-12. Also, Kissinger in his memoirs characterized Schlesinger (unfairly) as balking at military action, and said Schlesinger favored force for stopping the Mayaguez from reaching port, but did not advocate sinking Cambodian boats. See Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 558.

68 moving to port, but the Cambodians could scuttle the ship, in other words, sink it

themselves. Rumsfeld asked if the Americans could be moved to the mainland to which

Ford noted the Cambodians could be doing that as they spoke. Jones interjected that

Rockefeller had already proposed the solution to that, by sinking all Cambodian boats.

The question of the Thai reaction resurfaced, but with Kissinger’s absence, was quickly dismissed. 199

Returning to the central operational themes, Ford sought clarification on the idea of sinking the gunboats to stop the ship and crew’s movement, a clarification that would become very important later. He also solidified his direction: 1. use aircraft to “stop any boats leaving the island” but not necessarily sink them (emphasis added-this direction would prove pivotal in the very near future); 2. Stop all boats going to the island and 3.

Be prepared to land on the ship the following morning. 200 Jones replied the first was probably executable since the US forces could use searchlights and flares to see if there were any Americans onboard before they sunk the boats. The second was also possible, but the third was described as “very tricky.” The Mayaguez was not designed for helicopter landings. Only one could land on the deck at a time because the massive aluminum containers that covered the ship could not support a helicopter. Marines would have to descend via ropes two or three at a time and then drop 20 feet to the deck, all the while possibly under fire. Ford continued with step four: have the one thousand Marines invade the island. He then asked how soon they could get there. Jones replied they could

199 NSC 13 May 1022, 13. 200 This direction would prove essential in the very near future.

69 launch within ten hours after he left the meeting, and be prepared to attack the next day.

Rumsfeld shot back, “The President wanted it tonight.” Jones replied, “Right.” 201

With the basic plan decided upon, the temporal aspect became the center of

discussion. Ford said his understanding was the landing on the ship could take place that

night. Jones added the island invasion could be 24 hours later, since the Marines on

Okinawa were not on alert and it would be “some hours before the launch.” Ford,

Rumsfeld, Scowcroft, Schlesinger and Jones all then participated in a confusing

discussion reminiscent of Abbot and Costello’s “Who’s on First?” comedy routine

regarding when the Marines and the Holt could be in place. The discussion was made

even more confusing by the time differences between Cambodia and Washington.

Schlesinger finally showed the proposed schedule to the President, which had the

helicopter boarding of the Mayaguez possible at 7:00 pm that night (May 13 th )

Washington time and the Holt arriving 13 hours later. Ford said he thought the first two steps of his plan were executable (stopping the gunboat movement) and asked for a written plan for his next two steps (boarding the Mayaguez and invading the island). 202

The remainder of the meeting brought little new to the discussion, but merits

examination. Rockefeller opened with a series of objections and questions about a land

battle with Cambodia. Marsh reminded the group of the difficulty of complying with the

War Powers Act requirements, which received little response. The President was more

concerned with the timing of the planned assaults. Scowcroft and Jones then again

voiced reservations about the planned helicopter assault and seizure of the Mayaguez.

Schlesinger downplayed their concerns, but warned that hitting the gunboats could

201 NSC 13 May 1022, 14-15. 202 Ibid, 15-16.

70 backfire by resulting in the Cambodians killing the Americans. He then said he doubted that outcome since the US had “the element of surprise.” Ford and Rockefeller agreed the hostages could be killed, with Rockefeller reiterating, “We do not want a land war in

Cambodia.” The President then concluded the discussion with, “Let’s get the facts on the times lined up.” 203 It was clear by then that the US attack was going to occur. It was just a matter of where and when. The leadership of the US was certain of neither the time nor the place and was searching for answers. It would not take them long to make those decisions.

203 Ibid, 17.

71 Chapter 6: Intelligence Reporting 13 May

During the Mayaguez crisis, there were three critical pieces of information among the many President Ford and his military and political advisors needed from the intelligence community: 1. the location of the Mayaguez ; 2. the location and disposition of the Mayaguez’s crew; and 3. the strength of the Cambodian forces on Koh Tang Island and to a lesser extent at Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). After a few hours of confusion, the first question would be fully answered. The same could not be said for the second or third. That situation contributed to the “fog of war,” added to the frustration felt at the highest levels and ultimately and most importantly jeopardized the lives of US military members and the mission itself.

Locating the Ship and Crew

As previously related, US reconnaissance aircraft had reported the Mayaguez as anchored off Poulo Wai Island, and then enroute to Kompong Som Harbor. At about

0230 EDT (1330 in Cambodia) on 13 May, US reconnaissance aircraft reported the

Mayaguez was “dead in the water” at Koh Tang Island, approximately 30 miles from

Poulo Wai. The Mayaguez remained there one mile off Koh Tang Island until recaptured on 15 May (May 14 EDT). 204

Determining the location of the Mayaguez crew was of crucial importance and a central topic in the NSC discussions. Immediately after the Mayaguez was sighted off

Koh Tang, USSAAG/7AF dispatched Lockheed AC-130 gunships to remain overhead the Mayaguez and Koh Tang Island and to activities. Between 0618 and 0827 on

13 May (1718 and 1927 in Cambodia) the COMUSSAG/7AF staff reported the status of

204 Comptroller General , 72.

72 the location of the Mayaguez crew based on oral reports of visual sighting by US

aircrews:

Time Observation

131018Z May Boat which had been tied to starboard side of Mayaguez has started to move toward the island with a lot of people on board. 131024Z May Small fishing-type vessel which was tied to port side of Mayaguez is now moving toward island. The boat appears to have Caucasian personnel on board… 131033Z May Ground fire was received by JUMBO 01 (AC-130) as he made low visual reconnaissance pass near the island. No hits. Personnel are disembarking on the island. 131115Z May Report from KING 22, (AC-130). Two small boats off-loading personnel on island and they are moving toward the interior of the island. 131227Z May Summary of situation. The Mayaguez is still in the water. All personnel appear to have been transferred to the island…both small boats are at the island…205

The aircrews had reported small boats moving between the Mayaguez and the island all night. One of the AC-130 crewmen observing through either the infrared or television scopes reported that it appeared the crew was being taken onto the island.

USSAG attempted to confirm the report, but was unable to do so. However, this report was significant, because that information was used as the basis for decision-making at all levels. Lt Gen Burns later noted in an interview this information was treated as “very hard,” although it was in fact “very squishy.” 206 The above indications led to the conclusion the Mayaguez crew was on Koh Tang Island, prompted the actions taken to isolate the island and the Mayaguez in order to prevent the crew and ship from being

205 CINCPAC Command History , Table, 16-17. 206 Burns interview, 431.

73 taken to mainland Cambodia, thus avoiding a situation similar to the Pueblo affair of

1968.207

Enemy Force Estimates

The initial estimate of Cambodian military forces on Koh Tang was as critical as it was inaccurate. Based on a verbal report by former Cambodian Navy Captain Krisha

(the human intelligence [humint] source) 208 Pacific Command Intelligence sent out a

message that read:

Humint source (former MNK officer) who last visited Koh Tang Island on 17 April 75 noted 18-20 Cambodian military personnel with families on the island. Also number of civilians occupied 30 huts on the island. No gun emplacements, no radar and no airfield. Island is forest covered, has no mountains and is 5 miles long, one mile wide. Beaches sandy on NE side of island and more rocky on NW side of island. 209

A mere three hours later on 13 May, ComIPac sent out a message that estimated that 1 Khmer Communist (KC) Company (90-100 men) reinforced with a heavy weapons squad was on Koh Tang island. The report estimated weapons of such a squad to include two mortars, a recoilless rifle, three different calibers of machine guns, and two rocket launchers. Five small boats were also reported in the area, also armed with mortars, rocket launchers and machine guns. 210 ComIPac also reported that on 13 and 14

May, U.S. aircraft were receiving sporadic automatic weapons fire from Koh Tang, the

Mayaguez , and small boats in the area. The updated ComIPac estimates were communicated to USSAG/7AF in verbal and written form and were received by

ComUSSAG/7AF. 211

207 The Comptroller General report concluded, “There is little information as to why this last report occurred. GAO was not able to determine why the local command reached this conclusion.” After the event, DOD was not able to locate written debriefings of pilots who observed Caucasians being transferred. 208 Maj Raymond Porter, USMC. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General via telephone on 6 and 12 Nov 1975. AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Porter CINCPAC IG interview. 209 COMIPAC 131823Z May 75, AFHRA. 210 COMIPAC 132144Z May 75, AFHRA. 211 Comptroller General , 90.

74 A Secret USSAG/7AF message dated 132210Z May 75 repeated the COMIPAC

messages estimate of 18-20 Cambodian soldiers on the island as reported by the former

Khmer officer. In addition, the message noted movement between the numerous patrol

boats and the island and US aircraft battle damage sustained from enemy fire from the

boats. More importantly, the message stated, “It is likely that the KC have transferred

elements of main force units to Koh Tang, probably no more than a BN (Battalion)

Approx 300 troops.” (sic) It also described the likelihood of heavy weapons also being

deployed. 212 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in an independent assessment estimated possibly a 150-200 man Cambodian force on Koh Tang. 213

As will be shown later, while these estimates would be widely circulated and

briefed to the NSC, the Marine and Air Force units that would make the attacks on Koh

Tang Island only received the initial intelligence estimates of 18-20 "irregulars" on the

island, and that little or no opposition was expected. The command section of the

attacking forces, CTG 79.9, was not a recipient of the USSAG, ComIPac or DIA updated

estimates of increased enemy strength on the island.214 The reason this occurred will be

revealed for the first time later in this study.

212 USSAG/7AF 132210Z May 75, AFHRA. 213 Comptroller General , 91; “JCS After Action Report,” undated, MCHD. 214 Col John Johnson telephone interview by CINCPAC IG, 31 Oct and 3 Nov 1975, AFHRA; Lt Col Randall Austin, CNA interview 2 Mar 76, GRC.

75 Chapter 7: President Ford’s Military Options And the 13 May Military Buildup

President Ford had tasked Schlesinger and Jones with providing him with response options to the seizure of the Mayaguez and her crew. The formerly Top-Secret

DoD paper which presented options to the President first described the situation; the

Mayaguez was anchored off Koh Tang and that there was “evidence that some or all of the Americans have been taken ashore to the island in small boats, which complicates the problem.” It then listed different scenarios with advantages and disadvantages of each. 215

The paper referred to the timing of the response and the consequences of its options were borne out to be quite accurate:

The earliest feasible action is desirable to help forestall the scuttling of the Mayaguez , the removal of the American crew from Koh Tang, a decision by the KC to kill the crew, or time for the Cambodian authorities in Phnom Penh to consider and order any other alteration of the situation to our disadvantage. On the other hand, some delay (until, say, May 16) offers opportunity for assembling ample US forces, improving the prospects of military success, and permitting the diplomatic process to be completed. It may also serve to awe the Cambodians on the island and get their peaceful acquiescence in the return of the ship and crew. 216

Scenario one noted the earliest “feasible opportunity for boarding the ship” was on 14 May and that the boarding had a better chance of success if delayed until 15 May, to coincide with the arrival of the Coral Sea and Holt. The advantages to this scenario were listed as surprise, a high probability of success and the chance that a show of force

“targeted on the ship” could convince the Cambodians that the Americans were serious and could “lead to a peaceful return” of the crew. The disadvantages noted were that by focusing on retrieving the ship so early, they could be increasing the danger to the

215 Top Secret Option Paper “Possible Scenarios for Recovery of Ship and Crew” probably from DoD to President on 13 May 1975 based on the events described. GRC. Hereafter cited as TS Option Paper. 216 TS Option Paper, 1.

76 Mayaguez crew and would be taking military action before “diplomatic remedies” were exhausted. 217

Scenario Two was to “Seize Koh Tang Island at Earliest Feasible Opportunity.”

The mission would commence “at first light” on 15 May when the Holt and the Marine unit from Thailand was available. It recommended preceding the attack with bullhorn warnings from the Holt , dropped leaflets and “US intrusion in the KC communications network by Cambodian linguists.” After the island was seized, the crew of the Holt would board the Mayaguez . The obvious advantage was that this scenario put the

Mayaguez crew at less risk than scenario one. Disadvantages were plentiful: 1. Some

American crewmen could still have been on the Mayaguez and the attack “might incite reprisals against them;” 2. The Mayaguez could be scuttled; 3. Diplomatic remedies were not exhausted; and 4. It was unknown if the crew was on Koh Tang Island. 218

Scenario three, a “Coordinated assault at first light, 16 May” was not overtly listed as the recommended option, but the tone of the paper certainly suggested that it was preferred. This scenario “would permit the marshalling of ample military force on the scene to simultaneously seize the island and recover the Mayaguez .” The Holt would be joined by the Coral Sea , which could be used to conduct helicopter-borne assault operations off its deck. This scenario would also allow additional time for diplomatic action. Having a larger force translated into “lower military risk,” an enhanced prospect of “quick success” and the possibility to “minimize the loss of life.” Disadvantages were

217 Ibid, 1. 218 Ibid, 2.

77 listed as a loss of surprise and a sacrifice of time in which the Cambodians could publicly

rationalize their actions and attempt to negotiate. 219

As a final note, the paper outlined two “add-on military attack options” involving

the use of air power: “Bomb Cambodian Warships involved in Mayaguez Operation.”

(sic) and “Bomb Additional Targets of Military Significance in Cambodia.” The first option involved publicly announcing and privately advising through diplomatic channels on 14 May that unless the ship and crew were released within 24 hours the US would

“undertake concentrated aerial attacks against all Cambodian warships.” The paper stated there was the possibility the Cambodians would acquiesce with a low additional risk to US military assets. On the other hand, the Cambodians could “perceive that they had been backed into a corner without a graceful exit left for them” and execute the crew.

The possibility also existed that the action could be perceived as an over-reaction by the public. 220

The second additional option was recommended if “it were desirable to indicate an escalating scale of violence.” The paper recommended waiting a “reasonable amount of time” after bombing the warships. The advantages of that option was the bombing of

Cambodia “may convince the Cambodian Government of our resolve” and serve as a

“potent warning to other would-be aggressors.” Disadvantages included the likelihood that the bombings would have little impact because the Khmer were used to being bombed and there was a lack of “useful military targets.” Also noted were the probability

219 Ibid, 2. 220 Ibid.

78 of the bombing generating strong public hostility in the US and the questionable legality

of the bombing. 221 The President had his options.

The Military Buildup Continues

As the President received those options, planning related to the various courses of

military action at all levels: the NSC and JCS, Pacific Command and USSAG/7AF,

advanced in parallel with the movement of US forces. COMUSSAG/7AF was tasked to develop, submit for approval, and execute a multi-service air, and surface plan for the recovery of the Mayaguez and an assault on Koh Tang Island in a little over 16

hours. There was not sufficient time for detailed orders.

The initial concept was a simultaneous helicopter-borne attack on the Mayaguez

and Koh Tang Island that relied on using the ground forces that were available in

Thailand. The only ground forces in Thailand consisted of only approximately 125 Air

Force Security Police, who were not trained for such an operation. 222 On 13 May, the

JCS ordered USSAG to move to Utapao AB Thailand all available Air Force helicopters in Thailand and Air Force security police from Nakhom Phanom. The JCS also ordered two platoons of Marines to deploy to Thailand from the Philippines and a Marine

Battalion in Okinawa to prepare for deployment. 223 In response to the JCS orders, Lt

General Burns, Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group, and Commander of the 7th

Air Force (COMUSSAG/7AF), ordered all units to alert and to maximize

their assets and began to assemble helicopters for the mission. 224

221 Ibid, 4. 222 CINCPAC Command History , 21. 223 JCS 131610Z May 75; JCS 131912Z May 75. AFHRA. 224 Burns interview, 430.

79 It was determined early on that helicopter availability would be a limiting factor

in the operation. Two models of the large Sikorsky H-53 cargo helicopter were to be

used in the operations. One was the CH-53 which normally had a primary mission of

passenger and cargo lift. These helicopters, from the 21st Special Operation Squadron,

were designated by the call sign of Knife (K). The other type of helicopter was the HH-

53, normally assigned the primary mission of Search and Rescue (SAR). These

helicopters, from the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, were designated

by the call sign Jolly Green (JG). The HH-53 had an capability and its

body and fuel tanks were heavily armored. The CH-53 did not air refuel and was not

armored, therefore it was more vulnerable to enemy small arms fire.225 The 7AF had 16

helicopters total available in Thailand. Not all 16 were ready for flight, but the

maintenance groups quickly worked to make as many as possible available for use. 226

USSAG/7AF commenced the movement of the 16 helicopters (8 CH-53s and 8

HH-53s) and an estimated 125 Air Force security police to Utapao on the night of 13

May. Tragically, one CH -53 crashed enroute to Utapao at about 2130G (1030 EDT) on

13 May, killing 18 Air Force security policemen and 5 aircrew members.227 Thirteen

other helicopters successfully flew into Utapao on 13 May and 14 May. The final two

helicopters arrived on 15 May. 228 Helicopter availability became even more of a limiting

factor after the loss of that helicopter and crew on 13 May.229

225 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 39. 226 Burns interview, 430. 227 CINCPAC Command History , 23. 228 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 31 229 Burns interview, 430. Note that Gen Burns on page 431 stated he did not think these casualties should be included in the casualty list from the Mayaguez incident, stating it wasn’t “really pertinent.” The author disagrees.

80 Complicating the planning, each helicopter had a capacity of approximately 25

passengers, which meant several iterations of helicopter lifts would have to occur to carry

an attacking force of any size to Koh Tang Island. The distance from U-Tapao to Koh

Tang was about 200 miles, which at normal flight speeds would require a four-hour

round trip and turn around time before a follow-on launch could occur. It was finally

determined there weren’t enough Air Force Security Police forces to execute the mission

on May 13 th . By that time, night had fallen, which precluded any attempt to land on the

Mayaguez .230 The planning began to shift from using Air Force security police to Marine forces for the attacks on the ship and island.

At 2000L (0900 EDT) on 13 May, D Company, from the 1 st Battalion of the 4 th

Marine at the Marine base at Subic Bay, Philippines was alerted to be prepared

to deploy to Thailand . Three hours later, Company D, reinforced with additional Marines,

comprised of 5 officers and 115 enlisted men accompanied by 6 Navy medical personnel

and 6 (MSC) personnel, departed for Utapao aboard an Air

Force C -141 transport aircraft. They arrived at Utapao at 0443L on 14 May (1743 13

May EDT). 231 This unit would later be the boarding party that moved from the Holt to

the Mayaguez .

At 2030L, on 13 May, the 2 nd Battalion of the Ninth Marine Regiment (BLT 2/9)

on Okinawa received orders to assemble their gear and proceed to .

Within six hours, all of its 1,037 personnel were reported as being in ready for

deployment. 232 By 0605L on 14 May (6:05 p.m. 13 May EDT), 15 C-141s began

airlifting BLT 2/9 personnel and cargo. The first aircraft arrived at Utapao at 0930L and

230 Burns interview, 431. 231 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 31. 232 CTF 79 132124Z May 75. AFHRA.

81 the last aircraft landed around 2032L (9:32 a.m. EDT 14 May) .233 Elements of this unit would later be the Koh Tang assault force.

Shortly after midnight on 13 May (131748Z), Lt. General Burns,

ComUSSAG/7AF, issued a Special Supplemental Instruction (SSI) message directing the

AF security police force in place at Utapao retake the Mayaguez by direct helicopter insertion at Cambodian sunrise on 14 May. In this SSI, Burns planned to exercise complete command and control of the operation, while acting under the direction of the

National Military Command Center (NMCC). CINCPAC, Admiral Gayler telephoned

Burns and approved his SSI direction, but with two substantive exceptions: 1) “change

‘USAF Security Police’ to ‘USMC Ground Security Force (GSF) Personnel’ and 2)

"Command and Control will be maintained by CINCPAC who will be acting under direction of JCS (NMCC)." ComUSSAG/7AF then issued a with the two changes and CINCPAC followed with a formal message. Also, the Commander of

Seventh Fleet directed all Navy and Marine Corps units assigned to the Mayaguez operation to support ComUSSAG/7AF. 234

The attack had become a joint Navy, Air Force and Marine operation. While the forces directed to carry out the attacks were better trained and equipped than the initial orders specified, the operation was increasing in complexity. The sunrise 14 May attack would also later be postponed. While events continued to accelerate, General Burns began to attempt to set up a command and control structure for the operation. A discussion of the resultant command and control organization established for the operations will occur in later chapters.

233 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 31. 234 COMUSSAG 131748Z May 75, AFHRA; CINCPAC 132051Z May 75, AFHRA; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation, 42-4.

82 Chapter 8: A Brush with Disaster The Mayaguez Crew is Almost Killed

Contrary to the military intelligence reports sent to Washington, not a single member of the Mayaguez crew had in fact set foot on Koh Tang Island. Although Capt

Miller and the crew had been advised by a French-speaking Cambodian that they would be returned to the Mayaguez, at 0600 on Wednesday, 14 May (1900 EDT) they were transferred to a Thai and departed the protective cove near Koh Tang

Island under escort of two Cambodian gunboats. The crew huddled on the forward deck near the bow of the boat while the Thai crew steamed them toward their destination, the

Cambodian port of Kompong Som near Sihanoukville. 235 The Cambodians stationed only two guards forward and eight more aft, which tempted some of the crew to contemplate overpowering the guards near them and utilizing their weapons to attack the other guards. While those thoughts and others occupied the minds of the crewmembers, they were not prepared for what happened next.

Unbeknownst to them and based on direction from President Ford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Jones had given the following instructions to Lt Gen Burns and the US forces near Koh Tang:

It is desired that we isolate island of Kas Tang (sic) by turning boats away that are approaching the island or by turning back any boats that attempt to leave and give evidence of heading for the mainland. Gunfire across the bow is one method that can be used. In view of the direct communications contact with the on-scene commander, immediate report on any movements should be available to Washington. Therefore, the decision to fire on or sink any boats resides in Washington. It is particularly important to get maximum information on any outgoing boat to determine if there are Americans aboard and to report such when requesting authority to sink. Although this will be difficult to accomplish, deck

235 Miller testimony, 250.

83 loading will probably be required on the small boats as they did in taking personnel, believed to be Americans from the ship to the island. 236

Those very specific instructions were vital to the survival of the Mayaguez crew.

The Thai fishing boat carrying the Mayaguez crew and the two gunboats were detected by US aircraft as they departed Koh Tang. It was initially mistaken for a Cambodian gunboat and endured the very real risk of being sunk. 237 However, the orders given to

US pilots had been to “turn back” boats leaving the island and not sink them without

permission. US aircrews were authorized to fire across their bow and use non-lethal riot

control agents and gas bomblets, but not sink the boats.238 Fortunately for the crew the

disciplined fighter pilots complied with those orders. American A-7 and F-4 fighter

aircraft began firing their machine guns and in front of the three boats in an effort

to turn them back to Koh Tang.

Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft received a report at 2010 EDT

13 May describing the situation. He gave orders to engage the boats and sink them if

they didn’t turn around. 239 Of the two gunboats escorting the fishing boat one was sunk

and the other was successfully deterred and turned back toward Koh Tang, leaving the

fishing boat to ply on alone. When the Thai fishing boat crew attempted to turn their boat

around also, the armed Cambodians pointed rifles to the crews’ heads and ordered the

boat onward. The Thai fishing boat continued on course and the US fighter air strikes

236 JCS 131905Z May 75. “Actions Reference SS Mayaguez,” Gerald Ford Library. Note: 1505 EDT. In his interview, Gen Jones stated he had provided these instructions verbally immediately following the 13 May Morning NSC meeting. See also Ford’s direction during the 13 May a.m. NSC meeting, NSC 13 May 1022, 14-15. 237 Burns interview, 432. Lt Gen Burns stated the aircrews had not been trained in boat recognition. 238 White House Memo to Secretary of Defense, “Use of Riot Control Agents in Efforts to Recover the SS Mayaguez and its Crew and Passengers,” MCHD. “Pursuant to Executive Order 11850, US forces are authorized to use riot control agents to save lives in the event an operation is approved to recover the SS Mayaguez and its crew and passengers from the waters off Cambodia.” Also, Burns interview, 432. 239 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 559; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 140-141.

84 became increasingly closer, some within 10-15 yards of the boat. In fact, the strikes

became so close that shrapnel was peppering the deck and two members of the Mayaguez

crew, Myregard and Rappencker were injured.240 The aircraft followed those close gun

attacks by dropping riot control agents (a form of ) twice, with the second attack

landing the explosive canisters directly on the boat deck. The gas had its effect, nearly

disabling the crew. Yet the fishing boat continued on course to Kompong Som. 241 The

situation appeared to be deteriorating for the 39-man Mayaguez crew.

At 0830 (2130 EDT), an aircrew reported to USSAG/7AF the third boat was “a

fishing boat, with possible Caucasians huddled in the bow.” Burns asked via a

communications relay aircraft the number of people observed, and the crew replied,

"There are about 40 people on deck." 242 A-7 aircrews then reported, “approximately 30-

40 people of undetermined race aboard,” while the F-4s reported 30-40 on the boat

“thought possible to be Caucasians.” 243 Pilots observed that the majority of passengers

visible on the boat’s deck appeared too large to be Asians; that no weapons were visible,

and that the passenger’s clothing was brightly colored or white, and appeared unusual—a

black turtleneck and slickers were observed, for example. 244 The pilots asked for

further guidance, should they sink the vessel, allow it to proceed, or follow it into

240 Capt Miller reported later the aircrews did a magnificent job of shooting right in front of them. Miller testimony, 250. 241 Miller testimony, 250; Burns interview, 435; CINCPAC Command History , 17; and Comptroller General , 74. 242 For communication relays, USSAG used the ABCCC (Airborne Command and Control Center) and a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which allowed his command center to speak in clear UHF (-high frequency) versus the almost inaudible static-filled HF (High Frequency) radio. It was not the normal mission of the U-2, but its use proved valuable during this episode. See Burns interview, 433. 243 CINCPAC Command History , 18. 244 Comptroller General , 74. However the pilots were not able to state with 100 percent certainty that the 30 to 40 passengers they observed were actually Caucasian let alone members of the Mayaguez crew. While other aircraft attempted to verify the reports, they could never account for the entire crew on the fishing boat. Those reports supported the conclusion that there were still crewmembers on the island. See also Burns interview, 433.

85 Kompong Som Harbor? The vessel was approaching the three mile international water

limit of the Cambodian coast; US aircraft were not permitted to follow the boat inside the

limit; and Burns had no authority to give that permission. Burns reported to the NMCC

that this vessel would not turn back and asked for direction. 245

At 2148 EDT, Major General John Wickham, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s military aide and later Army Chief of Staff, telephoned Scowcroft and described the situation. 246 The complicating factors of the Caucasians being sighted and the proximity of the boat to the Cambodian coast made this a decision that needed to be made at the highest level. Ford ordered another NSC meeting convene at 2240, the third in thirty-six hours.

245 Burns interview, 434 246 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 559.

86 Chapter 9: 13 May NSC Late Meeting

The NSC assembled at 2240. Ford and Vice President Rockefeller met with

Kissinger, Schlesinger, General Jones, and Colby as the principals. Also present were

Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense William

Clements, Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and White House Chief of

Staff Donald Rumsfeld, who brought Congressional Liaison John Marsh, speechwriter and political advisor Robert Hartmann, General Counsel Philip Buchen and Senior

National Security Council staff member W. Richard Smyser from the White House staff. 247 The discussions at this meeting were often disjointed, confusing, tangential, and confrontational. Lasting a little less than two hours, this was perhaps the most critical of the meetings, because the fundamental strategic and tactical decisions that would be implemented during the crisis were made during this time.

Ford characterized his mood entering the meeting as “not encouraging.” He had received the report of the Air Force helicopter that had crashed in Thailand, killing all twenty-three Americans on board. Also, the diplomatic efforts had not produced any positive effects. The Chinese in Peking (now Beijing) had returned a second message the administration had asked them to give the Cambodians. However, on the positive side,

Chinese Executive Vice Premier , while speaking in Paris had said, “If they (the US) intervene, there is nothing we can do.” In other words, China wouldn’t react should the US decide to use military force. 248 Ford quickly began the business.

247 NSC Meeting Minutes, 13 May, 1975 (2240-0025), 1, Gerald Ford Library. Hereafter cited as NSC 13 May 2240. 248 Ford, A Time to Heal 278 ; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 560.

87 The President didn’t ask CIA Director Colby for the situation update, but rather

asked his trusted aide, Scowcroft, who was armed with pressing information to begin the meeting. 249 Scowcroft referred to the message relayed through the White House

Situation room that US fighter pilots had spotted what appeared to be “Caucasians” aboard a fishing vessel that was escorted by gunboats and was leaving Koh Tang and heading toward Kompong Som Harbor. 250 He then continued that a decision had to be made and there was not much time with which to make it. One escort boat had been sunk and the other returned to Koh Tang. The aircraft had dropped riot control agents on the fishing boat twice, which delayed the boat, but did not stop it. The pilot reported the boat was now six miles from Kompong Som, was not sure that he could disable the boat without sinking it and requested further instructions. The NSC had entered a new era of near real-time satellite communications, where the President could direct the actions of a pilot halfway around the world and receive almost immediate feedback.

Adding to the complexity of the situation, Schlesinger added that the pilot wasn’t certain there were Caucasians aboard. The pilot had used such characteristics as the size of the men on board and the color of their skin to identify them. 251 Scowcroft characterized the ability to identify the passengers as “very tough.” Ford said almost rhetorically that if the hostages got to shore and the US carried out the proposed plan, there would “not be much opportunity for them anyway.” Belying his later descriptions of the situation, Ford appeared to be saying the NSC may have to give up on at least some of the hostages. Kissinger, who had just returned from Kansas City, volunteered the Cambodians would hold the crew for bargaining. Schlesinger countered that he

249 NSC 13 May 2240, 1-2. 250 Ford, A Time to Heal, 278; Kissinger , Years of Renewal, 559-60 . 251 NSC 13 May 2240, 2.

88 thought that “avoiding bargaining chips is less of an objective than being in a position

where the Cambodians could say that the US aircraft killed our own men.” 252

That precipitated a pause with the group. Ford asked “What do we do? Should

we let them go into port?” Schlesinger recommended sinking any other speedboats, but

not the fishing boat, noting they understood “8 or 9” men on board who appeared to be

Americans. He added the pilot thought there might be more on board. It was at this point

the members of the NSC erroneously began to think the Cambodians had split up the

crew. It was an important misunderstanding that would influence many decisions for the

remainder of the Mayaguez crisis. Scowcroft then stated the pilot was reluctant to try to disable the boat by shooting at it without sinking it without further orders.

Ford asked Kissinger for his thoughts. Kissinger, correctly noting that he had not been present for discussions or decisions made earlier in the day, reiterated his position there were two problems, one operational and the other strategic. The former dealt with the crew and the ship and how to affect their release; the latter was the US’s “general posture” which went “beyond the crew and the ship.” He partially agreed with

Schlesinger, noting, “We will take a beating if we kill the Americans.” He added that should they decide to let the fishing boat with at least part of the crew on board to proceed to the mainland, they could not negotiate for their release. 253 Kissinger went on,

“We have a pilot who thinks there may be Caucasians” and concluded, “It would have

been a much better position for us to take that we will simply hit anything that leaves the

island. Now we are debating with the pilot.” Ford agreed, seemingly forgetting his

252 NSC 13 May 2240, 2 253 Ibid, 3.

89 earlier order was to “use aircraft to stop any boats leaving the island…not necessarily

sink them.” He then turned his frustration toward the Defense Department.

Ford asked why his order to stop all boats did not go out until three hours after the

last meeting. Schlesinger and Jones replied the verbal order went out immediately via

telephone and was confirmed later by other means. Ford did not accept that response and

repeated twice more that he wanted to know why his order did not go out immediately.

Even after Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements came to Jones’ defense and told the

President that he was with Jones in the White House situation room immediately after the

morning meeting as Jones gave the order, Ford persisted stating “Let’s find out what

happened. It is inexcusable to have such a delay.” Kissinger later related, “Only extreme

frustration accounts for the usually so equable Ford lashing out at the military

establishment, an institution he truly revered and in which he was so proud to have served

as a naval officer.” 254 The President, his distrust of his defense team apparent, went back to the question of whether to sink the boats or not. 255

Schlesinger and Kissinger recommended immediately destroying all the boats that

remained at the island. Kissinger added that they should attack the Mayaguez , Kompong

Som and the island all at once. He thought “people should have the impression that we

are potentially trigger-happy” and marked the arrival of the Holt in the area as the time

the attacks should occur. When Schlesinger put that time at noon, Rumsfeld reminded

him he had earlier said it would arrive at 0800, to which Schlesinger replied that the Holt

wasn’t traveling as fast as earlier thought. The debate had gotten off track.

254 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 560. 255 NSC 13 May 2240, 4.

90 Scowcroft, his patience wearing thin, reminded the leaders of the world’s most powerful free country that he had to give the pilots a decision on whether to sink the boats or not. President Ford told him to give the order to sink the boats near the island.

As to the boat that reportedly had Caucasians on board, Ford told them to use riot control agents or “other methods” but not to attack it. Marsh spoke up, asking if anyone had considered if the boats near the islands had Americans on them (as had been reported earlier) and asked if perhaps riot control agents should be used on them. Kissinger, growing bolder, said they should sink those boats and “not send situation reports.” After more debate, Kissinger recanted, “We don’t need to decide on the cove right now. We have some time.” 256 Scowcroft left to give the order to the aircrew to not sink the fishing boat, but sink any other in the area, outside of the island. Ford later recalled,

Once I’ve made a decision, I seldom fret about it, but this one caused me some anxiety. If the pilot had been right, crew members were on their way to the mainland where we would have a far more difficult time affecting their recovery. My concern increased during the night as new reports flowed into the Situation Room. Several other patrol craft had attempted to leave the island. When they had ignored our planes’ signals to stop, they had been destroyed. Suppose those vessels had carried crew members from Mayaguez below their decks? There was no way to tell, and that possibility was awful to contemplate.257

Kissinger had a different view of this pivotal decision:

The NSC deliberations were shaped by the impression that the boat approaching Kompong Som carried only part of the crew (if any) and that the remainder (probably the majority) were still on Koh Tang. We were sliding into a position in which much of the President’s time and the NSC’s was taken up with decisions about the movement of individual small boats eight thousand miles away. To avoid this, Ford ordered the destruction of all the boats near Koh Tang, squelching attempts to return to a case-by- case consideration. With this, the NSC could at last turn to how to generate pressures to compel the Khmer Rouge to free the crew and the ship.” 258

The above statement was telling. Kissinger was advocating simplifying the situation by sinking boats, knowing they may contain the Mayaguez crew.

256 NSC 13 May 2240, 5. 257 Ford, A Time to Heal, 278. 258 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 560.

91 The timing and nature of the planned attacks became the center of discussion. At

approximately 2300 Washington time, Ford asked what time it was in Cambodia in order

to baseline the group. Schlesinger answered it was ten o’clock a.m. Ford followed with a request for an update on the distances of US warships from the crisis area. Jones produced a chart that indicated when the key actions of the military’s plan would take place. The Holt was expected to arrive in approximately 14 hours or 1230 Washington time the following day, May 14 th (2330 Cambodian time). The Coral Sea and its escorts would arrive 14 hours after that and Hancock’s arrival time was uncertain due to

mechanical difficulties. The President, again showing impatience with the military’s

responsiveness, pointed out to Jones the Holt was not moving at flank (or maximum)

speed, to which Jones replied the Holt was moving at the best speed it could. The

President again disagreed, to which Jones reiterated that the Navy said the Holt was

steaming at the best speed it could. Joining in, Rumsfeld questioned why he had been

told earlier in the afternoon the Hancock would be in the area by Friday, May 16 th . Jones

replied that the situation was “tenuous” and they were working on a mechanical problem

with the Hancock . Schlesinger added, “There has been a series of mishaps,” noting that

the USS Okinawa also had mechanical difficulties. 259

Ford wanted to know what could be done right away, before daylight ran out on

the Mayaguez. Schlesinger briefed that they had 11 helicopters in Utapao Air Base

Thailand and they could execute an operation to take the Mayaguez itself. He added they

could also land 120 Marines on the island then, but would like to support those available

Marines with the ones on the way from Okinawa. With a report of 100 Cambodians on

the island, Schlesinger stated he would prefer to land with up to 1000 Marines. Ford

259 NSC 13 May 2240, 6-8.

92 asked how long of a delay Schlesinger was asking for. Twenty-four hours was

Schlesinger’s reply. Schlesinger asked to wait to begin the attacks on the first light of

Thursday, May 15 th . The Holt was not in the area yet and when the Coral Sea arrived, it would be able to support the eleven helicopters available at Utapao. 260

Kissinger questioned that if there were only 100 Cambodians on the island, why didn’t they attack it? Ford asked if it was possible to land 120 Marines on the ship and

270 on the island on that day, May 13 th . Jones clarified the planned total helicopter lift capability was 270, with 120 Marines landing on the ship. The remainder of the first wave (150) planned to attempt to land on the island would be composed of Marines from

Okinawa, who were yet not present in Thailand. He informed the Council that it would be hazardous for that first group to land on the island immediately because they would not have time to get reinforcements to the island before dark due to the helicopter ferry time. If it was possible for the landings to commence as discussed, the initial group of

Marines would unadvisedly have to remain overnight against a force of unknown size.

Jones further explained the Coral Sea could provide a platform with which to cycle the

11 helicopters and Marines to the island quicker by giving them a place much closer than

Utapao which was two hours flight time from Koh Tang. Demonstrating the abundant confusion of the moment, Colby, again misunderstood the number of Marines available to attack Koh Tang Island. He asked, “Couldn’t the 270 protect themselves against the force on the island?” Jones again stated they had nothing to confirm the exact number of

Cambodians on the island. 261

260 Ibid, 7. 261 Ibid, 8.

93 Kissinger had listened to the discussion and said that if they sank all the

Cambodian boats in the area he recommended waiting until the Holt and Coral Sea were present, then assemble a force and “really move vigorously.” Ford asked if he felt the time gained by moving immediately wasn’t worth the risk to the mission. Kissinger thought that they could “do more” later. He repeated that it was important the moves were “decisive” and “should look powerful.” Jones, seizing the opportunity to try to persuade the NSC to let the military assemble an overwhelming force, stated the attack would have to be delayed for forty-eight hours to have the correct pieces in place.

Schlesinger interjected that he thought Kissinger was thinking of twenty-four, not forty- eight hours and supported Jones by stating, “We need the morning of the 16 th for a coordinated assault.” Kissinger said rhetorically, “We are talking about 48 hours,” and

Ford noted that would be Thursday night Washington time. 262

Jones told them that on Wednesday night the Coral Sea would be able to provide a “good force” with total of five ships and its fighters, but would not be in position to cycle Marines until very late in the night. Colby with confidence stated that although there were 2000 Cambodian troops estimated in Kompong Som, there was not a large force on the island. Ford asked, “Can we figure with 100?” Colby said yes, but revealed the estimate was a guess, stating, “The KC have just arrived in power. They have probably not had time to man the island more fully.” Clements, who had been mostly quiet to this point, broke ranks from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs, by offering, “In the time frame you are talking about, there will not be an island worth taking. All the Americans will be gone.” He went on to say that they would get

262 Ibid, 9.

94 the Mayaguez with this plan, but that was not what mattered. It was a pivotal moment in

the discussions. 263

The President agreed that it seemed they should wait “at a minimum” for the Holt and the next full daylight cycle and asked if it was the unanimous view that they should withhold action until after the Coral Sea had a full day on-scene. Schlesinger concurred, and Kissinger added he was “leery” of lowering the Marines onto the ship from the helicopters. But Colby and Clements pushed for the earlier action immediately after the

Holt’s arrival. Schlesinger waffled, offering that it was a “close call;” there was the pressure of time, and it was possible the Cambodians could decide to execute the hostages. He added that if there was token resistance on Koh Tang, the Marines could handle it. If not, they could hold out until more Marines could land the next day. Colby and Clements continued to advocate an early attack. 264

It was Kissinger who strongly dissented with the rapid attack. He once again attempted to persuade those present to view the crisis through a strategic lens:

We should not look as though people can localize an issue. We have to use this opportunity to prove that others will be worse off if they tackle us, and not that they can return to the status quo. It is not just enough to get the ships release. Using one aircraft carrier, one destroyer and 1,000 Marines to get the ship out is not much. I think we should seize the island, seize the ship, and hit the mainland. I am thinking not of Cambodia, but of Korea and of the Soviet Union and of others. It will not help you with the Congress if they get the wrong impression of the way we will act under such circumstances.

As for the 270 Marines, it had several components. There is the advantage in speed. The problem is if anything goes wrong, as it often does, I think against 100 KC, you would lose more Americans because you do not have overwhelming power. I am assuming we will not negotiate. We must have an unconditional release. On balance, I would like to get a more reliable force. 265

263 NSC 13 May 2240, 9. 264 Ibid, 10. 265 Ibid, 11.

95 Clements was not deterred, arguing for the Holt to lead the attack and Colby

joined in that he advocated the Marines land that day. The President seemed swayed and

proposed landing the Marines once the Holt arrived and bombing the airfield at Kompong

Som. Schlesinger pointed out that until the Coral Sea arrived, the only aircraft available were in Thailand, which was opposed to any US military operation. Kissinger agreed.

Despite the advice of his most senior advisors, the President pushed for launching the

Marines at Utapao immediately. Jones urged “against going” during the present daylight cycle and explained the logistical difficulties involved. The Marines were landing at

Utapao as the meeting progressed; the helicopter pilots were tired; nobody had been

“mated up yet;” and the operation hadn’t been planned. He noted the operation would be

“difficult,” especially since the Marines and helicopters could not follow up the attacks that day. Schlesinger added that the time required to transmit and receive the orders, and prepare the launch would use up almost all the daylight left. Ford finally relented, ruling out any action on the present daylight cycle. 266

Alternatives continued to be debated, which Kissinger later characterized as

controversial. 267 Ford wanted assurances that the Holt would in fact arrive the next day

and the Coral Sea would be available the cycle after that. After a brief discussion

Kissinger and Schlesinger both advocated waiting until first light of May 16th in order to

run three operations simultaneously: against the ship, the island and the mainland. Ford

conceded that situation provided “maximum capability,” but ordered that forces in

Utapao be prepared to operate as soon as the Holt arrived. Noting that they had no idea

what steps the Cambodians might take, he wanted the flexibility to make a decision later,

266 NSC 13 May 2240, 11-12. 267 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 561.

96 but to have the ships, Marines, helicopters and even B-52 bombers from ready to

move within 24 hours. He also said they may want to wait. Schlesinger said the military would be “prepared to go on the morning of the 15 th .” 268

The discussion became very tactical for a time, with the meeting members often debating issues out of their areas of expertise. There was a discussion amongst the group whether it was better to use the aircraft off the Coral Sea than B-52’s and whether it was

even politically tenable to use the B-52’s. When Kissinger noted that the use of B-52’s

could send a strong message, Schlesinger stated the bombers were a “red flag” to

Congress. He also pointed out they might generate a lot of undesired casualties since

they were not as accurate as the fighters. Kissinger would later note:

This was a valid argument and Schlesinger presented it trenchantly. Unfortunately, his spokesman, Joseph Laitin, missed no opportunity to transform honest disagreements into aspects of a feud between the Secretaries of State and Defense. Newspaper columns kept describing our deliberations in terms of “Dr Strangelove” restrained by the humanistic Secretary of Defense. I was alleged to have advocated indiscriminate B-52 bombings in contrast to Schlesinger, who stood for a more precise “tit-for-tat” retaliation.

The ill will described above was a portent of future friction between the two.

Rumsfeld and Scowcroft noted that the aircraft from the Coral Sea could arrive in the area ahead of the ship while the ship was still enroute. Schlesinger said he needed to check when the fighter-bombers from the Coral Sea would be within range. When asked

about the effectiveness of Navy versus Air Force aircraft, Jones, an Air Force General,

replied navy fighter planes weren’t necessarily more accurate than the Air Force

bombers. The President even discussed the time that would be lost turning the aircraft

carrier into the wind. 269 The discussion had moved off point.

268 NSC 13 May 2240, 12-13. 269 Ibid, 14-15.

97 White House Counsel Philip Buchen had another battle on his mind and returned

the discussion to a strategic level. He saw two problems arising from a legal standpoint:

the Case-Church Amendment and . Ford didn’t agree, saying there was

no problem with international law since the Cambodians had clearly violated it. And as

far as Case-Church’s prohibition of military action in Indochina, the President, a veteran

of Congress, said, “We cannot be concerned in this instance.” Marsh said the reaction to

a paper the NSC staff had generated and circulated regarding Ford’s probable course of

action had received favorable reactions with Congressmen and Senators. Kissinger added

that he believed the “worst stance” would be to allow Buchen’s concern to influence their

decision making process because that would allow anyone to challenge the US and win.

Ford defused the situation by remarking that he and Buchen had “argued for years.”

Buchen added that it was his job to play “devil’s advocate.” The discussion about

Congress was tabled. 270

Clements wanted to refocus the goal on retrieving the Americans and the ship and

expressed the opinion that “dropping a lot of bombs on the mainland will not help us with

the release of the Americans.” In response, Ford then stated what some may have been

thinking but had not voiced aloud:

I think we may have to assume that the Americans were taken from the island and that some were killed. This is tragic, but I think that we have to assume that it happened. Does anybody disagree?

There were no dissenters, only expressions of agreement around the table. 271

While this assumption would later prove to be erroneous, the statement provides clear insight into President Ford’s priorities.

270 NSC 13 May 2240, 15-17. 271 Ibid, 17-18.

98 The group reverted to discussing the tactical aspects of the operation, sinking

Cambodian gunboats and attacking the Cambodian airfield outside of Kompong Som.

Ford reiterated that he thought they should sink any boats that could be used to try to move the Americans, apparently not recognizing the fact he had already ordered as much.

Rumsfeld incorrectly reminded they had agreed to not sink the ones that carried

Americans. Ford then repeated that he wanted to be ready to go in 24 hours, but that the actual action would take place 24 hours after that unless there was an “unusual development.” Kissinger again noted that waiting the extra 24 hours might have a price.

Colby then added that in addition to the airfield, there was an old naval base at Kompong

Som, the Ream Naval Base. The President and others agreed the bombers should hit both targets at Kompong Som. 272

Schlesinger brought the discussion back once again to the debate whether to use

B-52’s or Coral Sea aircraft. Ford repeated they had time for various options, but Jones informed the President that it would take some time to get the B-52’s ready and they would have to launch far in advance of the desired strike time in order to fly from Guam to Cambodia. He also cautioned that there was “lots of press there (Guam).” When

Kissinger asked if the following morning was time enough to ready the Guam bombers,

Jones said he wasn’t sure. Ford asked if there were B-52s anywhere else in the Far East and the answer came back, “Only at Utapao (Thailand).” Ford quickly dismissed that option as politically untenable. There was some discussion amongst the group of trying to hide the preparations on Guam, but Rockefeller chimed in, “Perhaps it would be good to have it get out.” Ford then made the decision and gave the order to prepare the B-52s

272 NSC 13 May 2240, 18.

99 to launch if he gave the order. 273 Kissinger would later report Ford told him that Ford

had actually favored using Navy fighters off the Coral Sea , but had kept the B-52 option open to give the Pentagon every incentive to make sure the Coral Sea arrived on time. 274

The discussion of the press on Guam led to another, larger in scope. Speechwriter

and political advisor Hartmann voiced his opinion that the American public wanted to

know what the administration was going to do. He told the President that this crisis was

the first test of his leadership as the was to . To him, public

perception was more important than actual decisions and the public would judge the

President for his actions, not his intentions. Kissinger did not want the administration to

publicly announce their intentions until after the attacks, because “everybody will be

kibitzing.” Ford disagreed, saying the press should be made aware of the NSC

meeting. 275

Rumsfeld and Kissinger successfully maneuvered the discussion back to the

attacks, with Rumsfeld stating, “The delay worries me.” Kissinger agreed, reversing his

earlier position and recommending attacking the ship, island and mainland in 22 hours.

Concerned with the number of Marines that might be available; Ford asked if there were

any on the Coral Sea . Jones did not know, and Kissinger said that if the Coral Sea could

attack the mainland, it could attack the island to support the invasion. He emphatically

added they had to make sure the attack on the island had a chance of success. He also

knew that by advocating an earlier attack he was diminishing that chance. He admitted

waiting another night would make the situation “,” but he also was concerned that

some event, diplomatic or otherwise would occur that would affect the operation. He

273 NSC 13 May 2240, 19-20. 274 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 562. 275 NSC 13 May 2240, 20.

100 said they must weigh the optimum military time against the optimum political time and that attacking at first light on the 15 th was better for political and domestic reasons.

Rumsfeld in a perfect display of “group think,” speculated they might “just take a walk” on the island since they were not even sure there was anyone there. 276

Ford noted to the group that if Jones went back to the Pentagon that night with the orders, the Council would have details to review the next day. Jones replied everything was already moving with the exception of the B-52s, which would have a six hour flight time to Cambodia. Ford reiterated that no boats should leave or approach the island without being sunk. Buchen stated that they had to get a report to Congress. Kissinger, again rethinking his position, relented and said a “low-key press statement” should be issued at a DoD press briefing telling the truth. He wanted the public to know that some boats had been sunk and pointed out that it was conceivable the Khmers could “cave” and if that happened it should appear to be in response to the US action. Schlesinger and

Kissinger both worried about the Thai reaction as problematic. 277 Kissinger then advocated the White House spokesman make a short announcement at noon the following day explaining: 1. Why they were taking the actions they had planned; 2. That the plan was ordered by the President; and 3. The plan was being executed by the National

Security Council. It would “add to (the President’s) strength.” All agreed and the meeting ended, well after midnight. 278

276 NSC 13 May 2240, 20-21. 277 In his memoirs, Kissinger stated that it was a consensus not to consult the Thai government since in the wake of the , the Thai government had already asked the US to evacuate their Thai bases within a year. See Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 561. 278 NSC 13 May 2240, 21.

101 Chapter 10: 13-14 May Mayaguez Crew to Mainland then Moved

The decisions made quickly by the President and his staff had lasting implications for the Mayaguez crew and for the rescue operation. Had the pilots not complied with the initial order not to sink the boats, the crew would have perished, likely without a trace.

Had the President not withheld the authority to sink the boats from the local command, and not ordered the aircrews to scan the boats for the crew, the crew would also have likely perished. As it was, the fate of the Mayaguez crew was still unknown to the

strategic decision makers and their safety was still in doubt.

The fishing boat carrying the crew of the Mayaguez had been under constant fire from the fighters for hours by the time the word was passed to the pilots to let it proceed to Kompong Som Harbor. Much to the relief of the Mayaguez crew, the attacks suddenly stopped. 279 In addition, the orders from the White House did not change the three mile coastal over flight prohibition. Therefore Gen. Burns as the 7AF commander did not have the authority to allow the aircrews to follow the fishing boat suspected of carrying

Caucasians into the port of Kompong Som on the Cambodian mainland. This resulted in the fighter aircraft and Navy P-3s that had been harassing the Thai fishing boat orbiting at the 3 mile boundary and watching the boat as long as they could, and then losing track of it among the small islands and other boats. Once again, the military was without definitive information regarding the whereabouts of the crew to report to Washington. 280

279 Miller testimony, 250. 280 Burns interview, 434.

102 After the Thai fishing boat episode, there was a report of another gunboat

departing Koh Tang for the mainland. The USSAG/7AF command center received a call

from the NMCC relaying from the White House asking if US aircraft could hit its rudder

with 20-millimeter cannon fire in order to try to disable it without sinking it. The

gunboats, which were US boats left behind after the Vietnam War were mostly fiber

glass, and not of the most sturdy construction. When the US pilot strafed the stern, the

boat caught fire and sank in 10 minutes. After that, Burns was given blanket authority to

allow his aircraft to fire upon and sink any other vessels attempting to leave the island or

reach the island from the mainland. US forces sank a total of seven Cambodian gunboats

over the next two days.281 It is highly probable that damage had a direct effect on the

recovery of the crew.

The Mayaguez crew was effectively lost from that point forward to the US

military and intelligence apparatus. Shortly after the last gas and machine gun attack on

the Thai fishing boat, at approximately 2315 pm EDT, the boat carrying the Mayaguez

crew docked in Kompong Som Harbor.282 What the NSC, the military and Capt Miller had feared and repeatedly attempted to prevent at almost any cost had occurred. The crew of the Mayaguez was on the Cambodian mainland. Or were they?

A Short Time in Kompong Som

When the boat carrying the Mayaguez crew arrived in Kompong Som Harbor, it moored alongside a Cambodian fishing boat tied to a small fishing pier near the main pier where two Chinese commercial freighters were discharging cargo. Armed Cambodians

281 Burns interview, 435. 282 Comptroller General , 74.

103 lined the pier, staring down ominously at the crew. 283 Miller and his crew were

convinced at that point the Cambodians did not plan to return the Mayaguez crew to their ship. 284 Miller later described the scene and his thoughts:

There were approximately two thousand men women and children on the pier and ashore with about 75% carrying arms of one type or another. None of them seemed too happy over our capture and my greatest fear at this time was to be paraded through this mob. 285

A half an hour passed with the crowd and number of guards present growing, when a Cambodian gunboat numbered P133 entered the harbor and pulled alongside the

Thai fishing boat. A brief exchange occurred between the guards on the gunboat and the guards on the Thai fishing boat. Suddenly the lines mooring the fishing boat were cast off and the boat moved south of the harbor and anchored 50-100 yards off a white sandy beach near a military or prison compound. The Cambodian captors quickly fed the

Mayaguez crew and 15 minutes after dropping anchor, the boat was again following

Gunboat P133, this time west, out to sea while American reconnaissance aircraft were visible in the distance. Their destination was Sam Lem, a small lush island at

Latitude: 10° 34' N, Longitude: 103° 16' 0 approximately halfway between Kompong

Som (Latitude 10° 38' N, Longitude 103° 30' E) and Koh Tang Island (Latitude:

10°18'03” N, Longitude: 103°07'06" E). 286

The fishing boat docked near a village of some 40 or so substantial stilt houses and a smelting furnace and sawmill situated at the head of a large bay on the eastern side of the island. A 28 year old Cambodian officer greeted the crew with a handshake and

283 Miller testimony, 250. 284 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 154. 285 Miller testimony, 250. The number of Cambodians present is dubious. Miller had, in an earlier interview with Rowan described “five hundred Cambodians there.” Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 154. Regardless, it was an imposing crowd to the crew. 286 Miller testimony, 250 and Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 155-157.

104 “Welcome to Cambodia” in unbroken English and requested them to come ashore for tea and food. After Captain Miller introduced himself the interpreter informed Miller they were in the compound of the Second Military Command of Kompong Som and that the

First Military Command was in Kompong Som and the High Command was in Phnom

Penh. There were many soldiers present, which further put the crew on edge. 287

The Camp Commander and the interpreter began to interrogate Captain Miller, and the questions were revealing. Asked if his crew contained any CIA, FBI or Navy crewmembers, Miller assured his Cambodian captor the crew were all civilians and the vessel was not armed and did not carry any arms or ammunition in its cargo. 288 The

English-speaker then asked Miller if he could communicate with American aircraft from the Mayaguez. When Miller answered in the negative, the interpreter surprised the

Captain by asking, “Then why did so many planes come? Three of our boats have been sunk and one hundred friendly Cambodian people have been hurt.” 289 The conversation had shifted and Miller took advantage.

As the discussion continued, it became apparent to Miller the situation was urgent for the Cambodians. Realizing the fear the Cambodians had for the American aircraft,

Miller advised the interpreter that the aircraft had come because his ship had not arrived in Sattahip Thailand as scheduled and if the crew was returned to the Mayaguez , they could relay a message through their company office to stop the air attacks. Thinking quickly, Miller added he would only do so if the entire crew was released and the

287 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 160; Miller testimony, 250. 288 Capt Miller in his testimony and in Rowan’s account noted he himself did not know what was in many of the containers on board his ship. The US government simply listed it as “military equipment” or “not otherwise specified.” He did know that of the 274 containers on board, 90 were empty. 289 Miller testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 161-2.

105 Mayaguez was permitted to sail to Thailand within 24 to 48 hours. The interpreter

replied that as they were at Second Command, the local Commander would have to

contact First Military Command in Kompong Som for permission over his American-

made field pack radio. At approximately 1830 hours on 14 May (7:30a.m. EDT), after

the crew had been fed, the Cambodians told Miller that he and eight of the crew could

proceed to the Mayaguez , make the radio call requesting cessation of hostilities and then

would be joined by the rest of the crew in the morning. However, several delays pushed

the departure past sunset. Capt Miller hesitated at the notion of traveling in a gunboat

under darkness in an area where US aircraft had already sunk several Cambodian patrol

craft. His captors agreed and advised Miller they would wait until morning to depart and

assured him the entire crew could then sail to the Mayaguez together. The nine

Mayaguez crewmembers were returned to the village and the entire 39-man crew spent a

nearly sleepless night on a split bamboo floor of a stilt house built over the water. 290

The Captain and crew now knew the American attacks were having an effect on the Cambodians. However, no other US personnel shared that knowledge. Nor did any

American outside the confines of the island of Koh Rong Sam Lem know the location of the crew. Regardless, US planning for attacks on Cambodian forces and territories continued with the information at hand.

290 Miller testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 167-8.

106 PART III: 14 MAY BUILDUP TO THE STORM

Chapter 11: 14 May: Forces Assemble, Command and Control (C2) Established

As 14 May dawned, Marine, Navy and Air Force units, ships and aircraft

continued to rapidly flow into the crisis area in the Sea of Thailand. It was imperative

that clear and effective lines of command and control (C2) were established from the

NSC through intermediate levels to the individual units performing the mission. The

Coral Sea, Holt, Wilson, and Hancock were arriving within the next 24-72 hours;

elements of two Marine , the 1st Battalion of the 4 th Regiment (1/4) and the 2/9,

comprising over 1000 Marines were landing at Utapao on Air Force transport aircraft;

and all the AF helicopter and fighter aircraft units in the Southeast Asia area and B-52

bombers in Guam were alerted. 291 As has been demonstrated thus far in this account,

overall direction of the operation was maintained by the Commander in Chief of US

forces, President Gerald R. Ford and the NSC through the Secretary of Defense James

Schlesinger and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs David C. Jones, with the Assistant

National Security Advisor Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft often acting as an intermediary. The

Joint Chiefs passed direction to CINCPAC, Admiral who maintained

Operational control (OPCON) of all forces involved in the Mayaguez operation.292 The

291 Table III-6, Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 32. 292 The DoD Dictionary defines Operational Control as “the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations.” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/o/03914.html .

107 on-scene military actions were coordinated by and conducted under the direction of the

Commander, US Support Activities Group (ComUSSAG), Lt Gen John Burns, USAF.293

In reality, the command and control structures and processes on the scene were not as clean as drawn on the charts in Washington and . Burns began constructing an ad-hoc command and control structure. But as could be expected of an operation that was planned and executed in a crisis mode, from General Burns’ level down the lines of command and control for the operation shifted and evolved over time.

This was in part due to the changing nature of the situation, political direction, and the military options and forces available as time progressed.

Most of the Air Force and Marine movement would occur through Utapao Air

Base in southern Thailand, which based the 307th Strategic Wing (307SW) commanded by Air Force Colonel George Dugard. That wing did not have the command and control center or the personnel with the proper background to direct the marine and naval operations under consideration. Since the USSAG command center at Nakhon Phanom

(NKP), some 400 miles Northeast of Utapao had established support staff and communications capabilities, and there was limited communication capability at Utapao,

Lt Gen Burns decided to maintain his command at NKP and send senior members of his staffs to Utapao to act as forward commanders and liaisons. 294

Below is a quick reference listing of the on-scene commanders Lt Gen Burns designated and the forces planned for the response:

• 13 May 1200 local. Col R.B. Janca, USAF assumed command of 635 th Combat Support Group, in Utapao. 125 USAF security police under command of Capt C.J. Heubusch, USAF were being deployed to Utapao for helicopter assault.

293 CINCPAC Command History , 9. 294 Burns interview, 440.

108 • 13 May 1900 local. Col Lloyd Anders, Director of Operations of the 56 Special Operations Wing (56SOW), was designated the USAF helicopter mission commander and departed NKP with helicopter units for Utapao. Col Robert R Reed, USSAG/7AF Coordinator and liaison officer for Utapao accompanied Col Anders. • 13 May 1830 local. Brigadier Gen Baxter, USAF Commander 13AF ADVON arrived at Utapao. His mission was to act as a liaison with the 307 SW, which was a subunit of 7AF for the 56SOW, which was a subunit of 13AF. • 14 May 0400 local. CO D (-), Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/4 under Maj R.E. Porter arrived in Utapao from Cubi Point Philippines. • 14 May midmorning. Col John M. Johnson, USMC, Commander Ground Support Force, arrived in Utapao. • 14 May 1126 local. Col Johnson was designated as Commander Task Group 79.9 (CTG79.9) and directed to take OPCON of CO D (-), BLT 1/4 and BLT 2/9 for operations as directed by CINCPAC and USSAG/7AF. • 14 May 1200 local. LtCol Randall Austin, Commanding Officer of BLT 2/9 arrived in Utapao, met with Col Johnson, was given the mission to attack Koh Tang and received an intelligence brief to expect 18-20 Cambodians on the island. 295

Throughout 14 May, Navy and Marine commands looked to ComUSSAG/7AF for tasking. Col Johnson, CTG 79.9 reported to Lt Gen Burns ComUSSAG/7AF by telephone upon his arrival at Utapao and was ordered to direct the arriving Marine units.

Col Johnson was also directed by the Commander of Task Force 79 (CTF 79) to conduct

"contingency operations" as directed by CINCPAC and ComUSSAG/7AF. Later on 14

May, Col Johnson received his mission (by telephone) from Lt Gen Burns to prepare forces to: 1. Seize the Mayaguez ; and 2. Attack Koh Tang Island to rescue the hostages.296

On the same afternoon, CINCPAC directed that ComUSSAG/7AF task Navy and

Marine units. While Navy and Marine units did not report formally to ComUSSAG/7AF,

CINCPACFlt sent a message that instructed Seventh Fleet Navy and Marine units to plan

295 Table summarized from CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75 table, 3. 296 Lt Col Austin interview, 2 Mar 76.

109 on operating "in support of ComUSSAG/7AF” and expected ComUSSAG/7AF to task

and set the timing of various operations. 297

Lt Gen Burns had decided to divide his staff according to background and

specialties and had given initial consideration to having Col Johnson, CTG 79.9, operate

out of NKP, but decided Johnson should be with Lt Col Austin at Utapao. Burns had

been in charge of the evacuations of Saigon and Phnom Penh and had given the Marines

flexibility in their planning and saw no reason to change that modus operandi. 298 He also delegated the role of coordinating with Col Johnson to his Deputy Commander, Army

Major General Ira C. Hunt, who was very experienced in the type of air assault operations under consideration. 299 Col Robert R. Reed was handpicked to be the

USSAG/7AF liaison/coordinator at Utapao and was briefed by the USSAG commander and staff prior to his departure on several issues including the estimate of 18-20

Cambodians on Koh Tang. 300 It was Major General Hunt’s understanding that all requests from the operational troops at Utapao would be handled through Col Reed to

USSAG/7AF and information from the USSAG/7AF staff would be passed through Col

Reed to the assault forces. 301

Marine Corps units at Utapao were organized as follows: Combat Task Group

79.9 (CTG 79.9) headed by Col Johnson, was the Command Group, at Utapao AB

Thailand; Combat Task Unit 79.9.1 was the 2 nd Battalion (Reinforced) of the 9 th

Regiment out of Okinawa under Lt Col Austin that formed the assault elements on Koh

297 CINCPACFLT 141254Z May 75. MCHD. 298 Hunt, Maj Gen Ira A. USA, Deputy Commander, USSAG/7AF NKP Thailand. Telephone interview by CINPAC Inspector General, 13 Nov 1975. AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Hunt CINPAC interview. 299 Burns interview, 440. 300 Reed, Col Robert R., USAF, USSAG/7AF Coordinator/Liaison Officer, Utapao AB Thailand. Telephone interview by CINPAC Inspector General, 31 October and 3 Nov 1975. AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Reed CINCPAC interview. 301 Hunt CINCPAC interview.

110 Tang and Combat Task Unit 79.9.2 under Major Porter, was D Company (Reinforced), from the 1 st Battalion of the 4 th Regiment that formed the Mayaguez boarding party that would move from the Holt to the Mayaguez.302

CINCPAC IG interviews conducted in the months following the crisis revealed that the operation was hastily conceived and executed and the ADVON teams at Utapao were not set up as a single command and control unit, but a series of liaison organizations. Brigadier General Baxter, sent by Lt Gen Burns as the 13 AF ADVON team lead saw his role as a coordination facilitator and did not actively seize control of the situation. 303 Col Johnson, designated commander of CTG 79.9 also was not an active commander, leaving the planning to those executing, LtCol Austin and Maj Porter. With the forces massing at Utapao, this lack of aggressive leadership would affect both the planning and execution of the operation. 304

See Figure 4 for the final Command and Control setup.

302 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 32. 303 Walter Baxter, (Brig Gen USAF) interview by CINCPAC Inspector General 7 Nov 1975, AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Baxter CINCPAC IG interview. 304 John L. Burns, (Lt Gen USAF, Commander, USSAG/7AF NKP Thailand), interview by CINPAC Inspector General 5 Nov 1975. AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Burns CINCPAC IG interview.

111 Chapter 12: 14 May Tactical Planning and Intelligence

The final tactical planning for the assault of Koh Tang began in the early morning of May 14 th , about 15 hours before Marines boarded helicopters in anticipation of the

President’s order to begin operations. As a result of the late NSC meeting on 13 May and military planning coordination, the JCS issued the following message to CINCPAC and

USSAG at 0645Z 14 May (0245 EDT and 1345G):

Higher authority has directed that all necessary preparations be made for potential execution early on the 15 th to seize the Mayaguez occupy Koh Tang Island, conduct B-52 strikes against the port of Kompong Som and Ream Airfield and sink all Cambodian small craft in target areas. 305

CINCPAC and USSAG/7AF planned to seize the SS Mayaguez using the newly- arrived Marines from Cubi Point, Philippines in U-Tapao via helicopter assault; to occupy Koh Tang Island using the Marines from Okinawa in U-Tapao supported by AF

Helicopters and tactical air and naval gunfire; to sink all Cambodian small craft in the target areas of Koh Tang, Poulo Wai, Kompong Som and Ream using aircraft from

Thailand and navy aircraft from the Coral Sea . The commander of Strategic Air

Command (CinCSAC) was to be prepared to conduct B-52 strikes against Kompong Som and Ream from Guam. 306 CINCPAC then tasked COMUSSAG/7AF to provide the detailed planning to JCS by 1300Z 14 May (2000G 14 May). Note that suspense was approximately six hours after message receipt. During this new planning phase, the units that were designated to participate in the assaults provided input to the plan.

305 JCS 140645Z May 75, GRC. Also see Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 33 and CINCPAC Command History , 23. 306 CINCPAC Command History , 23.

112 Tactical Planning

The commander of the Marine Task Group, Col Johnson, arrived in Utapao on the

initial flight from Okinawa at about 2230 on 13 May. Upon his arrival, USSAG/7AF

informed him that the decision had been made to retake the Mayaguez and seize Koh

Tang and hold it up to 48 hours if required. The mission was also to locate any crew

members and rescue them. By midmorning on 14 May, the entire 1000 man 2 nd Battalion

had arrived from Utapao. By noon, Lt Col Austin and his commanders were conferring

with Col Johnson.

Koh Tang, about 30 nm southwest of Kompong Som, is shaped like a pork shop

about 3-1/2 miles long and 1 mile wide at its widest point (see figure 5). No tactical maps

of Koh Tang were available, nor were there any usable photographs of Koh Tang

available to CTG 79 .9 and the Marines on 14 May to aid in the planning of the island

assault. Col Johnson requested photographs from the Air Force unit at Utapao, but there

were none on hand and photo reconnaissance by SR-71 and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft

done at that time would not be timely enough for use for initial planning, due to photo

processing time requirements. 307 Signal intelligence (SIGINT) did not provide any information due to a dearth of transmissions by the Cambodians on the island. 308 The

Marines and Air Force crews were provided an intelligence estimate of 20-25 lightly armed Cambodian “irregulars” defending the island, which will be discussed at length in later sections. 309 Available maps were insufficient for planning an amphibious assault or

307 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 39. 308 CINCPAC Command History , 19. 309 Randall Austin, interview by CINCPAC IG 7 Nov 75, AFHRA; James Davis, interview by CINCPAC IG, 4 Nov 75, AFHRA; Author interview with Davis, Aug 07.

113 to direct fire. 310 Faced with planning an attack on an island of unknown features, the

group decided to improvise.

With the absence of professional aerial imagery, the Marines and Air Force

planners on-scene performed their own reconnaissance mission. Gen Burns arranged for

the Army to provide a small U-21 propeller driven aircraft and six key members of BLT

2/9 including the commanding officer Lt Col Austin, Capt James Davis, G Co

Commander, Capt Mychal Stall, E Co Commander, and Gunnery Sgt McGowin made a

visual reconnaissance over flight of the island on the afternoon of 14 May, returning to

Utapao at 1830G. 311 Capt Davis used a borrowed hand held camera and photographed

the island through the aircraft side window. The reconnaissance aircraft was restricted to

a 6,000-ft, minimum altitude over Koh Tang, presumably because of earlier enemy fire,

but that altitude was likely derived from Commander Messegee’s instruction to the initial

P-3 reconnaissance mission. After that flight, he had directed passes as low as 300

feet. 312 The mission resulted in poor photos, in part because of an amateur doing the

photography, but also because of the 6,000 foot minimum altitude. 313

At a 1930G meeting at Utapao AB, the leadership devised an attack plan based

upon those non-optimal photos taken from Capt Davis’ personal camera and the

intelligence estimate of 18-20 lightly armed Cambodian “irregulars” defending the island.

The over flight had revealed only two possible areas on the island large enough to

accommodate several helicopters at a time without initial preparation of the landing zone.

There were two small beaches visible on the northeast and northwest portions of the

310 CINCPAC Command History , 19. 311 Francis McGowin, interview by CINCPAC IG, 4 Nov 75, AFHRA. Burns interview, 436 312 CINCPAC Command History , 18; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 39. 313 James Davis, interview by author, 15 Aug 2007.

114 island with several small buildings located between. Accordingly, assault plans were

drawn to use the east and west beaches as the helicopter landing zones. 314

After gathering all available information on Koh Tang and selecting the best

landing areas, planners had to optimize the use of the 11 available operating helicopters.

The round trip helicopter flight from Utapao to Koh Tang took four hours, therefore after

the arrival of the first wave of Marines it would be a minimum of four hours before

reinforcements could be brought in. Since each helicopter could be planned to carry a

maximum of 25 fully equipped Marines, three helicopters were allocated to the

Mayaguez boarding mission and the remaining eight helicopters were assigned to insert

175 Marines on Koh Tang. The plan contained a second wave scheduled for

approximately 4 hours later where about 10 helicopters would return with an additional

250 Marines, bringing the total number of Marines allocated against Koh Tang to 425.

Additional waves could be accomplished to bring the final total attacking force to 1000 if

necessary. Attacking Koh Tang with only 175 personnel in the first wave was felt to be a

reasonable risk, given the Marines’ understanding that there were only 18 to 20

Cambodian irregulars on Koh Tang. 315

That final plan consisted of a platoon, embarked in 2 helicopters, landing in the

western landing zone and acting as a blocking force. The bulk of the assault force would

land in 6 helicopters in the eastern landing zone. Simultaneously with the landings on

Koh Tang, 3 Air Force helicopters would land a boarding party on the deck of the

Mayaguez , 1-2 nm northeast of Koh Tang. 316 (See figure 6) The coordinated surprise

attacks would take place at sunrise, 0542G, on 15 May, to take advantage of the rising

314 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 39. 315 Comptroller General , 89. 316 Randall Austin, CNA interview, 2 Mar 76, GRC.

115 sun by placing it in the defenders’ eyes. 317 Col Johnson as CTG 79 .9 proposed the plan

to ComUSSAG/7AF at 2100G who agreed with this concept, advising ComSeventhFlt (at

2215G) that this was his plan and issuing an aircraft schedule at 2351G requiring a

helicopter flow that would simultaneously insert Marine Corps units on Koh Tang and

the Mayaguez at 0542G on 15 May. 318 No written detailed operational plan was prepared due to time constraints. The timeline for the attack was set:

• 0200-Marines assemble • 0300-Marines load on helicopters • 0330-launch time (actual 0400) • 0542-Landing Zone (LZ) arrival time (actual 0605) 319

At about the same time that the Marine and Air Force planners were meeting at

Utapao, at 1954G, on May 14, CINCPACFlt proposed a slightly different plan to

CINCPAC based on the JCS direction. At dawn on 15 May, a Marine boarding party would be delivered by Air Force helicopters were to the Destroyer Escort Ho1t , which by then would have reached Koh Tang Island. The Holt would then pull alongside the

Mayaguez . Planners estimated that the Marine insertion and ship maneuvering would take

about 2 hours. Therefore, at 2 hours after first light, Air Force fighters would drop riot

control agents (RCA), essentially teargas, on the Mayaguez. The Marines would then

board the Mayaguez from the Holt . Air Force helicopters from Utapao would insert the

Marine assault force on Koh Tang concurrently with the Mayaguez boarding. Air Force

fighter units in Thailand would provide tactical air support. The Wilson, which would

317 ComUSSAG/7AF 141651Z, AFHRA. 318 CTG 79.9 141400Z May 75, AFHRA; ComUSSAG/7AF 141651Z, AFHRA. Lt Gen Burns would later say he thought the plan was “risky” but he deferred to the on-scene experts’ collective judgment. He was not aware of the intelligence estimates the planners were using. Burns interview, 441. 319 Austin CINCPAC IG interview.

116 also have reached Koh Tang, would provide naval gunfire support (NGFS) as requested.

The Coral Sea would provide fighter aircraft support as tasked by ComUSSAG/7AF. 320

This proposal at first glance may not seem to be radically different from the first, but it gave the Mayaguez boarding party an increased chance of success and survival.

The previous plan called for the 3 helicopters to hover one at a time in sequence over the deck of the Mayaguez and release their rappelling marines under fire. Although a Marine party had not performed a ship to ship boarding in 150 years, the plan was approved. 321

CINCPAC directed Gen Burns to change his original orders.

Shortly after midnight (0030G) on 15 May, Lt Gen Burns transmitted his plan which tasked Air Force helicopter and tactical aircraft (TacAir) units and Marine Corps units at Utapao with their roles in the Mayaguez recovery and the Koh Tang assault. The plan stipulated that Air Force helicopters would deliver the Marine boarding party to the

Holt at the same time the attack on Koh Tang commenced. The USSAG/7AF plan also directed that the Holt and the Wilson would be employed for gunfire and search and rescue (SAR) support to the extent of their capabilities and that NGFS would be coordinated with fighter aircraft by the Airborne Command and Control

Center (ABCCC).322

Reflecting the Command and Control (C2) arrangements determined during 14

May, the plan also stated that overall conduct of the operation was the responsibility of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) with ComUSSAG designated as the

"on-scene commander." A subsequent paragraph in the plan stated ComUSSAG was the

320 CINCPACFlt 141254Z May 75, AFHRA; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation, 39. 321 Walter Wood (Captain USMC), “Mayday for the Mayaguez” US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976, 248. 322 ComUSSAG/7AF 141730Z May 75, AFHRA.

117 "central coordinating authority" for the operational plan (OPlan). The Airborne Mission

Commander (AMC) in the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) was designated in the plan as the “focal point for all on-scene activities.” ComUSSAG/7AF directed that all requests for action (on-scene) be addressed to the AMC who would validate requests through ComUSSAG/7AF in 7AF TACC. 323 About the time the helicopters departed Utapao for Koh Tang, CINCPAC issued a message formally approving the USSAG/7AF plan. 324

CINCPAC’s midnight changes to ComUSSAG/7AF's plan that directed the helicopters land on the Holt prior to the Mayaguez boarding altered the timing of the

Mayaguez boarding, but did not change the helicopter departure schedule or timing of the attack on Koh Tang. Therefore, the 14 May attack plan that centered on the simultaneous timing of the Koh Tang assault, the Mayaguez boarding, and mainland air strikes lost its synchronicity. Instead, the Koh Tang assault was planned to occur over 1-1/2 hours before the Mayaguez boarding with non-synchronous air strikes on mainland targets. 325

The plan also did specifically direct any preparatory naval or air bombardment of the island.

Some photos of Koh Tang from missions flown after the seizure of the Mayaguez arrived at Utapao several hours before the assault force boarded the helicopters. These photos revealed the existence of a possible antiaircraft site near the eastern landing zone.

Despite a request by Lt Col Austin, the man leading the assault on Koh Tang, there would be no preparatory fire to soften up the island. 326 Lt Gen Burns as the overall commander

323 ComUSSAG/7AF 141730Z May 75, AFHRA. 324 CINCPAC 142112Z May 75, AFHRA. 325 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 39. 326 Austin CINCPAC IG interview.

118 stated the destruction of the site had to be weighed against the potential risk the island bombardment would pose to the Mayaguez crew that was believed to be on Koh Tang. 327

However Burns did authorize the use of riot control agents (which the Marines to his surprise reportedly rejected) and aircraft suppressive fire was authorized to begin as soon as the Marines arrived. 328

Marine planners decided against dropping a “daisy cutter” BLU-82 (at 15,000 lbs the largest US conventional bomb) on Koh Tang unless it was requested by Lt Col

Austin, the assault commander. Also, riot control agents would be dropped on the

Mayaguez before the Marines boarded, but would not be dropped on the Koh Tang landing areas. Since they were available, it was also decided that Cambodian linguists, a doctor and an explosive ordnance specialist would accompany the assault force. 329

It is important to note that every decision made by the planners was based on an intelligence report of 18-20 Cambodian irregulars on Koh Tang Island that was presented to them as they arrived at Utapao. Those estimates were outdated and erroneous. It is beneficial to now describe the intelligence process of 14 May 1975 at Utapao AB

Thailand in order to explain how this occurred.

Tactical Intelligence

There were many intelligence estimates of troop strengths on Koh Tang Island that could have been used in the tactical planning at Utapao AB on 14 May. However, only one of them reached the planners. An account of the events of that day will reveal the reason. Five COMIPAC/USSAG/7AF intelligence estimate messages were issued concerning Koh Tang Island from 13-15 May 1975:

327 Comptroller General 89. 328 Burns interview, 448. 329 Comptroller General , 89.

119 o COMIPAC 131823Z May 75 (140123G). This message estimated 18-20 Cambodian military with families on Koh Tang Island. It was based on a report by a former Khmer Naval officer who last visited Koh Tang Island on 17 April 1975. (see previous chapter) o COMIPAC SSO 132142Z May 75 (140442G). Estimate of one reinforced company of 90-100 troops plus a weapons squad. o COMIPAC 132144Z May 75. (140444G) A retransmission of the above intelligence report with same 90-100 troops. o USSAG/7AF 132210Z May 75 (140510G) This estimate indicated it was likely that the KC had transferred elements of main force units to Koh Tang Island; probably no more than a battalion (approximately 300 troops) equipped with multiple mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and light machine guns. o USSAG/7AF 141535Z May 75 (142235G). Intelligence summary revised the estimated KC strength on Koh Tang Island as probably not exceeding 100; small arms and automatic weapons and some mortars. Also reported anti- aircraft sites and small arms fire on Koh Tang Island. 330

A DIA estimate also was prepared for the NMCC crisis action team on 13 May.

This estimated 150-200 KC on Koh Tang Island with mortars, recoilless rifles, light and

heavy machine guns. This estimate was not sent out of the Washington DC area. 331

The final USSAG/7AF message listed bears more discussion. It also indicated

that while some recent intelligence reports had “revealed the KC are possibly interested

in reaching a political solution to the current impasse,” others “have emphasized recent

KC activity.” 332 USSAG analysts believed the size and the immediacy of the US

response probably caught Cambodian forces ill-prepared. It approximated enemy forces

in the Kompong Som/Ream area as around 4100 troops and gave a detailed account of

Cambodian forces throughout the country. They predicted the deployment of additional

enemy forces to the Kompong Som area, but noted it would take time, which lent some

330 CINCPAC Inspector General Memo 00106-75, “SS Mayaguez Seizure” from Brigadier General Johnson to Admiral Gayler, 17 Nov 1975, 2, AFHRA. Hereafter referred to as CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75. 331 CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75, 2. 332 USSAG/7AF 141535Z May 75, AFHRA.

120 credence to the NSC’s desire to keep an aggressive timeline. They also explored the idea of Cambodia receiving Vietnamese assistance, calling it unlikely, however. 333

Finally, and in retrospect most importantly, the message updated the USSAG staff’s estimate of Cambodian forces on Koh Tang Island. While it stated the “exact strength of enemy forces on Koh Tang Island is unknown;” and repeated the human intelligence source’s 17 April observed number of 18-20 soldiers with no gun emplacements, or airfields on the island it finally noted, “ USSAG analysts believe that the KC troop strength on the island probably does not exceed 100 .” (emphasis added) 334

Upon his arrival, Johnson received the IPAC estimate of 18-20 Cambodian military carrying small arms on Koh Tang Island. Follow-on briefings added women and children that raised the estimate to an outside maximum of 100 on the island, but the troop strength estimate remained at approximately 20. That was the planning factor the

Marines used. 335

The import of the content of these messages was equaled by the incompleteness of their address list. A review of the intelligence messages sent by CINCPAC and

USSAG/7AF revealed that the newly-formed CTG 79.9 was not an addressee on those messages and therefore did not receive the messages directly. The units deployed to

Utapao under CTG 79.9 were not listed as addressees, and as a result did not ever receive this message. As a result, the critical enemy force updates were not sent to those most

333 Ibid. 334 USSAG 141535Z May 75, AFHRA. 335 John M. Johnson, (Col USMC), telephone interview by CINPAC IG, 31 Oct and 3 Nov 1975, AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Johnson CINCPAC IG interview.

121 likely to use them and would necessitate the attacking units’ reliance on the host unit at

Utapao, the 307SW, whose intelligence director was not aware CTG 79.9 existed. 336

Intelligence support at Utapao

Although the 307SW was not tasked to provide intelligence to the deployed forces, Col George Dugard, the 307SW Commander directed Col Merrell, Director of

Intelligence to provide support to the Mayaguez operation as required, to set up debriefing teams and pass classified messages and assist where possible. However, their efforts to pass intelligence to the attack forces “met with little success.” 337 He and Col

Merrell both felt that somehow “units were getting intelligence from other sources” and

Col Merrell had “expressed dismay with the idea that the attacking units were underestimating the forces on Koh Tang Island. 338 Despite these misgivings, the 307 th

Wing leadership attempted to provide updated intelligence estimates to the operational planners.

However, on 14 May, a personality conflict severely and negatively impacted the mission. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on 14 May, Col Merrell the Intelligence Director for the 307SW attempted to brief Brig Gen Baxter (the 13 th AF liaison and highest ranking officer in Utapao during the operation) regarding estimates on the Khmer

Communist force strength on the Cambodian mainland. Tired, distracted and bothered by the interruption at that late hour, Baxter sent Merrell away, telling him that it was busy; that they were concentrating on the Mayaguez at the time and Merrell’s information was irrelevant. Brig Gen Baxter “never saw him again,” admitting he “may have hurt

336 Alfred L. Merrell, (Col USAF), interview by CINPAC IG, 6 Nov 1975. AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Merrell CINCPAC IG interview. 337 George A. Dugard (Col USAF), interview by CINPAC IG 5 Nov 1975, AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Dugard CINCPAC IG Interview. 338 Dugard CINCPAC IG Interview.

122 Merrell’s feelings.” 339 Brig Gen Baxter was also concerned about events in , which unfolding in a manner similar to what had occurred in Cambodia and South Vietnam in the previous month. Operation TALON BLADE, the evacuation of Embassy personnel at , Laos was possibly going to be executed and Brig Gen Baxter’s command would have to support that operation. Baxter thought Col Merrell was supposed to support 13AF ADVON for intelligence on both the Mayaguez and TALON BLADE operations. 340 Col Merrell also tried to brief Col Reed, USSAG/7AF Coordinator on updated intelligence, but Col Reed also informed Merrell his assistance was not needed. 341

After Baxter and Reed’s rebuffs of his attempts to provide information that could have been passed to the attacking Marines, Col Merrell failed to brief either Baxter or

Reed on the updated (increased) Koh Tang Island Cambodian force estimates. 342 Since

Baxter, Reed and Col Johnson were on speaking terms, it is highly likely the estimates would have been passed on to the Marines under LtCol Austin, who executed the attack on Koh Tang. Reed himself briefed the helicopter crews with outdated information. 343

This was a critical lapse in professionalism.

The failure to pass information had implications in every phase of the operation.

While the permanently assigned AF units in Thailand such as the 388TFW received all the intelligence messages including reports of AAA anti-aircraft fire from Koh Tang, the

Marines and aircrews participating did not. 344 The helicopter crews received no

339 Baxter CINCPAC IG interview; Merrell CINCPAC IG interview. 340 Baxter CINCPAC IG interview 341 Merrell CINCPAC IG interview. 342 Merrell CINCPAC interview; Baxter CINCPAC interview. 343 William P. Pannell (LtCol USAF), interview by CINPAC IG 1 Nov 1975, AFHRA. 344 Neil L. Eddens (Col USAF), interview by CINPAC IG 6 Nov 1975, AFHRA.

123 intelligence information upon their arrival at Utapao. They were originally assigned to attack and seize the ship. It was only later they were also made aware of their mission to land Marines on Koh Tang and given an estimate of 18-20 Cambodians on the island.

Col Anders, the 56SOW Director of Operations (second in command) of one of the helicopter units assigned to attack Koh Tang, who did not receive the updated estimate of up to 100 Cambodians on the island until after his helicopters had launched on May 15 th to begin the assault stated:

The intelligence support was extremely poor, almost non-existent. This I feel was caused by several factors: The urgency of response imposed by higher authority, incomplete tasking, i.e., intelligence, intelligence information was not addressed to units directly involved at Utapao and information eventually furnished was incorrect. While incomplete intelligence and information provided was not at the immediate disposal of units directly involved are significant factors, other decisions were of far more consequence. These other major decisions were more of a factor in the loss of lives and equipment. 345

The Marines under Lt Col Austin and Maj Porter assigned to attack Koh Tang and the Mayaguez respectively were not advised of their tasking nor did they receive any intelligence briefings until their arrival at Utapao and then initially got only a verbal estimate of 20-25 Cambodians and their families on the island from Col Johnson. 346 In fact, Maj Porter did not know there would be an assault on Koh Tang until Lt Col Austin arrived. 347 Col Johnson, LtCol Austin and Maj Porter then met with former Cambodian

Navy Captain Krisha who flew in from the Philippines and pointed out the island was very seldom occupied by many troops and he had last visited the island on 15 April.

345 Lloyd J. Anders (Col., USAF), interview by CINPAC IG, 31 Oct, 3-5 Nov 1975, AFHRA. Hereafter cited as Anders CINCPAC IG interview. 346 Austin CINCPAC IG interview. 347 Porter CINCPAC IG interview.

124 They confirmed that information with two Khmers from the camp that verified

the 20-25 Cambodian soldiers on the island carrying only small arms.348

Austin never met with Lt Gen Burns and never went to NKP to discuss the mission. 349 There was simply not time. After their of the island, the 1930G coordination meeting included Col Johnson; Col Anders; Lt Col Austin, his

BLT 2/9 staff and company commanders; Maj Porter, BGen Baxter, and Col Reed

USSAG Coordinator.350 307SW intelligence personnel were not invited to attend. 351 The expected irregular Cambodian force of 20-25 on Koh Tang was again briefed by the battalion intelligence sergeant. Austin’s major concern prior to the assault was devoted to how the Marines could release the crew if the villagers were holding them hostage.

Leaflets and blow horns were discussed as methods to reach the Cambodians on the islands, but were not used in the actual attack

That night (14 May) US forces intercepted a Cambodian radio message of uncertain origin (the USSAG intelligence division had not yet been able to accurately pinpoint the new Cambodian message address structure) that said, "Release the

Americans before we ourselves become the prisoners." That intercept didn't make it through the interpreters and intelligence processing apparatus until after the operation was already under way. 352 This intercept is important, because it occurred the night

before any of the US military attacks other than the gunboat sinkings.

348 Porter CINCPAC IG interview; Austin CINCPAC IG interview; John B. Hendricks (Maj USMC), interview by CINPAC IG 11 Nov 1975, AFHRA. This piece of information is not circulated in other published accounts of the Mayaguez incident. 349 Austin CINCPAC IG interview. 350 Porter CINCPAC IG interview. 351 Merrell CINCPAC IG interview. 352 Burns interview, 449. General Burns agreed with the author’s position and said, “I have never seen that written up very much, the fact that the military activity on and around Koh Tang Island had so intimidated

125 Capt Jim Davis, Company G Commander, one of the first Marines wounded on

Koh Tang and one of the last Marines to leave the island only received the 20-25

numbers until the attack. 353 He would later recall that just as the Marines were boarding

the helicopters, an Air Force airman ran to the door of the helicopter and handed Davis a

package of aerial photos that showed a possible Cambodian buildup on the island. Davis

turned to his senior enlisted man and said, “Gunny, we’re in for a heap of shit.” 354

those people that they said, ‘Release the crew.’ Apparently that is why or it was one of the factors in the central government's sending the crew back the next morning.” 353 Davis CINPAC IG interview. 354 Davis, LtCol James H. USMC (ret) Interview by author. June 2007.

126 Chapter 13: Congress Weighs In: 14 May 1975 Hearing

There is no question the effects of the Vietnam War and Watergate were felt by the actors in the Mayaguez crisis. President Ford and his cabinet were justified in their expressed concern that there would be interest from Congress on the decisions they were making with regard to the Mayaguez and the execution of those decisions. This was the first test of the War Powers Act and its applicability in a real-life crisis scenario. The stage was set for a Constitutional confrontation.

Congressional leaders wasted little time in providing oversight of the process. On

May 14, 1975, less than 48 hours after the Mayaguez was stopped, boarded and seized, the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations subcommittee on

International Political and Military Affairs convened and called to testify representatives of the State Department and Defense Department to explain the situation. Robert Miller,

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Morton I

Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) testified on May 14th and on May 15 th , Mr. Miller was joined by Col

Zane Finkelstein, the legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Honorable John M Maury, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs.

The subcommittee, chaired by Representative Dante Fascell, (D) from Florida was composed of five Democrats, including Mr Fascell; Donald Riegle Jr. from

Michigan; Benjamin Rosenthal and Stephen J. Solarz, from New York; and Roy A.

Taylor from and two Republicans, John Buchanan from Alabama and

Larry Winn from Kansas. Several members from the overarching committee on

127 International Relations participated in the first session along with the subcommittee

members. 355

During the first meeting, the questions and discussion were understandably

focused largely on information gathering. The ongoing episode made it difficult for the

testifying members, largely Mr. Miller on the first day, to answer the questions at a

sufficient level of detail for the committee members’ satisfaction. The committee

members were also not impressed with the seniority of the witnesses the State and

Defense Departments had sent to testify. 356

Mr. Miller and Mr. Abramowitz outlined the events up to that date and issued a

caveat that the situation was rapidly evolving and all of the information presented was

dated. 357 As he spoke of the Mayaguez being moved to Koh Tang Island, Mr Abramowitz reported there were five Cambodian gunboats in the island’s vicinity. He listed the estimated strength of Cambodian forces on the island at “100 Khmer Communists.” but allowed “We may be wrong about the troop size. That is a best estimate.” That estimate was one of several used by the various military levels of command in the planning of the recovery of the Mayaguez and the assault on Koh Tang and did not agree with the intelligence given to the actual forces preparing to strike Koh Tang and board the

Mayaguez ..

The main thrust of questions in the first session was to establish a common understanding amongst the committee members on just what had occurred up to that point of the crisis. In one exchange, Mr. Riegle expressed impatience at the discussion about past events and wanted to get to the current situation. Rep Fascell responded, “I

355 IR Committee pt I, 1. 356 Ibid, 10. 357 Ibid, 2

128 appreciate what you are saying, but just speaking for myself, I don’t even know what

happened on the first day.” 358

As Abramowitz described the attempts to keep the boats from leaving Koh Tang

for the mainland, the description sparked a reaction that would be repeated several times

during the hearings. The representatives, especially Mr. Ryan wanted to known if there

had been any effort to verify with any certainty that there weren’t Americans onboard the

boats the US forces were sinking. In response, Abramowitz answered in the affirmative

and noted that in one case a boat had been allowed to proceed because it appeared there

were “Caucasians on board.” 359 Several representatives would revisit that episode in later discussions and question if the US forces had not endangered the very lives they were trying to save. 360 The Congressmen would ask if it was not possible that US forces had already killed the American crewmen. Representative Harrington clearly verbalized the obvious question:

What you have said is that in an effort to prevent the passage of the Cambodian boats from the island to the mainland, we carried out hostile fire to destroy and to damage a number of ships. How is that consistent with the expressed purpose of insuring the safety of the Americans? We undertook this action without being certain about who was on the ships. 361

Abramowitz answered that the pilots were instructed to do everything possible to prevent the boats from moving out of the area and that tasking “involved obviously a certain amount of risk.” 362 It was not until the later hearings when the fate of the crew

was known that the persons testifying could answer that question with any certainty.

There was a possibility that American planes had destroyed boats that were carrying the

358 IR Committee pt I, 4. 359 Ibid, 9 360 Ibid, 55 361 Ibid, 17 362 Ibid.

129 crew. The pilots that on their own initiative hesitated to sink the fishing boat because

they thought they saw “Caucasians” on board saved the lives of the crew. It was also true

American air attacks, not Cambodian action inflicted the only wounds the members of the

Mayaguez crew suffered.

The Congressmen wanted to know the details of the discussions involved in the

NSC meetings and when Mr. Miller and Abramowitz explained they had not actually attended the meetings, some wanted to send for higher ranking State and Defense department officials to testify. 363

The committee members also wanted clarification on the Cambodian’s claims to

territorial sea rights out to 32 miles from their coastline including the islands they

claimed. The group agreed Mayaguez had been operating under the “right of innocent

passage” whereby a ship is allowed to transit through territorial waters peacefully as long

as it is not participating in or illegal activity. 364 That discussion led to the

Congressmen questioning the mission of the Mayaguez; whether it was carrying any

military cargo, such as arms or ammunition. It was a theme that would be revisited

several times. Each time the answer was the same: the Mayaguez was purely a

commercial vessel, the crew was made up of civilians, with no CIA or FBI personnel on

board and they had no arms or ammunition in the cargo. In fact, there were no

on the ship at all, even for protection. 365

363 IR Committee pt I, 15. 364 Ibid, 11, see also 20-21, 36, and 43. Col Finklestein, who ‘worked law of Sea problems” would in later testimony ( 56) describe innocent passage: “The right of innocent passage prohibits any country from seizing a vessel in innocent passage in territorial seas. The general rule is a commercial vessel, a military vessel, any vessel is in innocent passage if it is passing through the territorial sea as distinguished from fishing, operating and it does not interfere with the peace, security and safety of the coastal state.” 365 Ibid, 11, 28, 50.

130 Mission priorities were questioned. Harrington voiced a probing and perceptive

question, “Were the priorities to save the lives of people who were on board that ship or

to prevent the passage of those surface vessels from going to the mainland?” To which

Abramowitz answered, “We had a number of objectives, saving the lives of the

Americans, recovering the ship and preventing the Cambodians from using the

Americans for quite obviously what appeared to be hostile purposes.” 366 Congressman

Solarz asked why it was so important for the US to prevent the Cambodians from

transporting the crew to the mainland. The reply was the Cambodians would probably

try to use them for a ransom situation. To that Mr. Solarz asked if the Cambodians

couldn’t have done the same thing with the Americans on the island. According to

Miller, access was the difference. It would be easier for the Americans to gain access to

the crew if the crew remained on the island than if they were on the Cambodian

mainland. Also, the rumors of the Khmer Rouge mass murders were surfacing. Rep

Fountain reminded the gentlemen of the point that if the Cambodians were killing their

own people, they would probably not hesitate to kill some of ours. 367

Congress’s interest in the Mayaguez operation had been predicted by Ford and his advisors. It would remain to be seen how strongly Congress would exercise its

Constitutional powers to support or undermine the President’s agenda.

366 IR Committee pt I, 17. 367 Ibid, 19.

131 Chapter 14: 14 May NSC into Overdrive

Despite chairing the late NSC meeting on 13 May and getting to bed after 1 a.m.,

President Ford awoke at his usual 0530 EDT (1630 in Cambodia) on Wednesday 14 May.

Ford’s rising was at approximately the time the Marines from the 2 nd Battalion were

performing their reconnaissance flight over Koh Tang and Capt Miller was discussing a

release with the English-speaking Cambodian. Ford was concerned about the events of

the night before and was pondering the whereabouts of the Mayaguez crew. Were they

on the Cambodian mainland, on the ship, on Koh Tang Island, or dispersed among those

or other locations? Ford later said, “We had to assume a whole variety of possibilities

because we weren’t sure if there were crew members on the fishing boat, and if so how

many there were, and how many were back on the Mayaguez.” Ford was not optimistic on the chances of a full recovery of the crew. 368

At 0744, Scowcroft entered the Oval Office to provide the President with his morning security briefing. There was very little new information other than the news that the carrier Coral Sea was proceeding toward Koh Tang Island at an increased rate and would be available soon. Ford noted, “By morning we knew that the Coral Sea could be utilized rather than relying on other air strikes.” 369

Kissinger met with Ford at 1145, before the NSC meeting planned for later in the afternoon at which the final decision between using Coral Sea aircraft and B-52’s would be made. Kissinger was very concerned about using the large B-52 bombers and the political ramifications involved. During their discussion, Ford revealed that he would order the use of the Coral Sea aircraft if the Pentagon could convince him they could

368 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 172. 369 Ibid, 173.

132 launch a serious attack. The President did not feel confident he was receiving the full support of the military and the Department of Defense, and more specifically the

Secretary of Defense. Kissinger was ready to exploit that lack of faith. Their conversation provides a valuable insight into the President’s as the battle loomed:

FORD: I am disturbed by the lack of carrying out orders. I can give all the orders, but if they don’t carry them out…I was mad yesterday. KISSINGER: This is your first crisis. You should establish a reputation for being too tough to tackle…I see the argument against the B-52s FORD: I think I should say I favor the B-52s unless they can show they can do as much with Tacair (tactical aircraft) KISSINGER: That is a good way to get at the problem. The price will be the same. If you use force, it should be ferociously .370

Kissinger had developed a diplomatic scenario to accompany the “imminent military action.” Ambassador Scali was directed to deliver a letter before the next NSC meeting to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and the UN Security Council calling the seizure of the Mayaguez illegal and a threat to international peace. The letter would state that while the US was pursuing diplomatic release of the ship and crew, if diplomacy failed, the US reserved the right to take appropriate steps, including self defense under Article 51of the UN Charter, which states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United , until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 371

370 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 563. 371 UN Website: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm .

133 Kissinger saw the diplomatic environment as “reassuring,” since it appeared the

Khmer Rouge had no support from any country, least of all China. 372 It is important to recall that since 1971, the United States and Kissinger had been building on a fledgling rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China.

There was a possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough. On the morning of May 14, the US embassy in , , received a report from an unnamed Chinese diplomat

(through a junior Pakistani diplomat in Tehran) that predicted the Cambodian release of the Mayaguez crew “soon.” China was reportedly embarrassed about the situation and was using its influence to affect the ship and crew’s release. Although the report was not ignored by the NSC, the information was considered insufficient to warrant a change of direction with the understanding that “soon” could easily turn into a long time. China also reinforced the administration’s belief they would not support the Khmer Rouge by returning the message George Bush had passed on after thirty hours instead of immediately. Kissinger took this as a sign the Chinese had studied it, did not take exception to its content including the implied impending use of force and suggested when added to Deng Xiaoping’s earlier comments that China would not support the Khmer

Rouge. 373

The President and Secretary of State were confident the proper attention had been paid to diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation. Ford then found it necessary to divert his attention to prepare for his planned evening meetings with the Dutch Prime Minister,

372 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 564. 373 Ibid.

134 Johannes M. den Uyl to discuss the June NATO Summit conference before he chaired the

Wednesday afternoon NSC Mayaguez crisis meeting. 374

The NSC Meets 14 May 1975

The NSC convened from 1552 to 1742 pm EDT ( 0252-0442 15 May in

Cambodia ) once again in the White House Cabinet Room on Wednesday, May 14, the final day of planning for the US response. Previous attendees Ford, Rockefeller,

Kissinger, Schlesinger, Jones, Colby, Clements, Rumsfeld, Scowcroft, Marsh, Hartmann,

Buchen and Smyser were joined by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll and the

Chief of Naval Operations James L. Holloway. 375 As could be expected based on the actions of those present at the previous meetings, and since the larger strategic and operational issues had already been decided upon, the participants in this meeting concerned themselves with the level of detail that a mid-level military planner would normally be involved in.

Ford began the meeting by asking CIA Director Colby to update the council on the situation. Colby provided new information on the status of Khmer naval air and ground forces in the Kompong Som and Koh Tang areas which made the Cambodians sound quite formidable and gave quite a bit of credit to their command and control and logistics organization. He reported at least 24 “ships” (small patrol boats and a chaser) and three large in and around Kompong Som harbor.

The Cambodian air force had six transport aircraft and three T-28 (WWII vintage) fighters at Ream airfield with 100 more near Phnom Penh, approximately 225 km (140 miles) away. There were three to five anti-aircraft batteries on the shore that were

374 Ford, Time to Heal, 281. 375 NSC Meeting Minutes, 14 May 1975, Gerald Ford Library, 1. Hereafter cited as NSC 14 May.

135 regarded as a threat to low-flying aircraft. There were approximately 2,000 Khmer

troops in Kompong Som that could be “quickly augmented by the remaining 14,000

troops scattered throughout southwestern Cambodia.” Colby maintained the available

Cambodian landing craft had the ability to deliver up to a total of 2,400 troops to Koh

Tang Island within four hours of leaving Kompong Som. 376

Colby’s most significant item of information was that the CIA had concluded the

Cambodians had indeed transported some of the Mayaguez crew from Koh Tang to the mainland at Kompong Som at approximately 2300 Washington time the night before, while the NSC was meeting. Kissinger questioned how Colby had arrived at that conclusion. Colby answered the conclusions were derived from the pilot observations of the previous evening and other sources. He continued that by bringing the hostages ashore, the Cambodians had demonstrated an appreciation of “the value” of the crew, which offered hope the crew would be “kept alive by their captors to preserve their usefulness as bargaining chips.” He tempered that hope by adding the captives taken ashore may have been moved inland and there was truly “no way of telling where they may be.” 377

Shifting gears, Colby reported that three gunboats had been sunk around Koh

Tang Island since the last meeting and only one remained near the island. Also, around midnight (Washington time) a US tanker reported that a Swedish-registered ship had been fired upon by a Cambodian boat and had apparently escaped while a Panamanian freighter had been detained for about two hours in the same area. 378

376 NSC 14 May, 2-3 377 Ibid, 3-4. 378 Ibid, 4-5.

136 Ford was more interested in the status of the US forces he had ordered into the

area and asked for an update. Jones reported the destroyer escort Holt was in the area as was the destroyer USS Wilson. Admiral Holloway added that now there were two ships on station before the operations would begin. 379 Instead of applauding the military

leaders for a rapid response, Kissinger and Ford began an accusatory line of questioning,

asking why the ships were not sinking the gunboats, why they weren’t positioned to stop

ship movement to and from the island and what the mission of the Holt and Wilson was if it wasn’t to interdict the gunboats. Jones replied the ships were there to “help in the operations we will conduct.” The President said he had thought they had agreed the Holt would be positioned between the Mayaguez and Koh Tang and concluded, “I am amazed

at this.” Jones countered that he did not recall any such specific instructions being

issued. Ford continued to probe, asking when the Coral Sea , the Hancock or the

Okinawa would arrive. Holloway gave a succinct synopsis, stating the Hancock, loaded

with helicopters, would arrive around noon of the 16 th (Washington time); the Wilson was

two hours from Koh Tang; and the Coral Sea aircraft were already within range, so it was considered on station, as was the Holt. He reported the plan was to put Marines on the

Holt for the Mayaguez boarding, so it was being kept out of sight. 380 This input seemed to momentarily steady the situation.

President Ford asked for Defense Department recommendations. Jones referred to a chart in the room and recommended landing Marines on the Mayaguez and Koh

379 Destroyers of the mid-70’s were designed to sail faster than carriers and , typically over 25-35 knots and were armed with torpedoes and smaller cannon and anti-submarine weapons. A Destroyer Escort (DE) was a smaller, comparatively slower (20-25 knots) warship designed to escort convoys of merchant marine ships in WWII. Its role was primarily anti-submarine warfare, but was also used for protection against small ships and aircraft and smaller attack vessels. See DoD Dictionary website. 380 NSC 14 May, 6-7.

137 Tang Island that night (Washington time) and the attacks had a “high assurance of success.” He added they had the B-52’s on alert, but did not recommend using them, reasoning it was overkill from a targeting standpoint and “mixed” from a political or diplomatic standpoint. The JCS recommended Marines from Utapao be transferred via helicopter at first light onto the Holt . After using two hours to organize the boarding party and to spray the Mayaguez with riot control agents that would incapacitate any hostile occupants for about 10 minutes, the Holt would pull alongside and the Marines would board the Mayaguez and “hopefully seize control of the vessel.” An explosives team would then inspect the ship and it would be either towed or sailed under its own power away from the danger area. 381

Jones next laid out the plan to invade Koh Tang. There was a sufficient amount of tactical aircraft, gunships, fighters, etc. based in Thailand for air support. They had instructions to “minimize fire in case Americans were there, but to protect the people who are landing.” Eight helicopters with 175 Marines aboard would land on the island around sunrise and after a four-hour helicopter round-trip cycle time, the next wave of

235 Marines would arrive, followed by another, “putting over 600 Marines on the island by dark.” Referring to a photo of the island and stating that the Marines had

“reconnoitered it” Jones continued that the preferred landing zone was an open area with trails leading into the woods. He also indicated that the beach was also available. (The beaches would be the actual landing zones.) The objective was to cut the island in two for the 600 Marines to obtain “a good feel for what is there.” He added the US forces could “perhaps withdraw the next day,” via the Coral Sea , which would keep the Marines from returning to Thailand and complicating the diplomatic situation there. The

381 NSC 14 May, 8.

138 alternative route would be through Thailand. He concluded that the plan was the combined recommendation from all the Joint Chiefs. 382

But the President viewed the plan as incomplete. Ford believed there was an issue where he and Kissinger disagreed with Schlesinger and the Pentagon. He felt they shared a primary concern (of course) for the recovery of the ship and her crew. But

Kissinger and Ford strongly believed the US had to do more. Ford explained, “We didn’t want the Cambodians to be in a position to reinforce Koh Tang once our attack began.

We wanted them to know that we meant business, so we opted for air strikes against the mainland as well. Schlesinger agreed that our first priority should be to rescue the ship and her crew, but he was far less eager to use Mayaguez as an example for Asia and the world. He was concerned that our bombing plans were too extensive.” 383 Ford then asked, “What about the Coral Sea and the B-52’s?”

Jones was prepared for the question and answered that there were three targets for the naval aircraft or the B-52’s: the airfield at Kompong Som, the naval port and the civilian port. There was reportedly little of value to target at the airport or the naval port, but the civil port had two ships and 10 patrol craft located along one dock. There were also buildings, petroleum oil and lubricant (POL) storage and other targets in the area.

He reminded the President that the nine B-52s were on alert; would take six hours to fly from Guam and could deliver about 125 standard non-precision bombs, with possible . Admiral Holloway briefed that the fifty fighter aircraft from the Coral

Sea, on the other hand, could deliver over 80 precision guided munitions along with other bombs. Their advantages were the capability to take out key targets without as much

382 NSC 14 May, 9. 383 Ford, A Time to Heal, 279.

139 collateral damage and their location; they could arrive sooner than the B-52s. The B-52s

by contrast would spray a larger area and deliver a more massive attack. He added that

the weather was good for the attack. Kissinger asked how long that part of the operation

would continue if they could keep it up while attacking the island. Jones answered the

attack would last about 8 hours, with an initial attack time of 2250 that night (Washington

time). They would reuse the same aircraft in four cycles from the Coral Sea to attack the mainland while US Air Force aircraft based out of Thailand supported the attack on Koh

Tang Island. 384

From the back of the room, a new voice spoke up. Paul Kennerly, the White

House photographer who had been taking pictures of the NSC deliberations interjected:

Has anyone considered that this might be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just taken it into his own hands to halt any ship that comes by? Has anyone stopped to think that he might not have gotten his orders from Phnom Penh? If that’s what has happened, you know you can blow the whole place away and it isn’t gonna make any difference. Everyone here has been talking about Cambodia as if it were a traditional government. Like France. We have trouble with France; we just pick up the telephone and call. We know who to talk to. But I was in Cambodia just two weeks ago, and it’s not like that kind of government at all. We don’t even know who the leadership is. Has anyone considered that? 385

There was a stunned silence in the room. Kennerly had never before entered the

conversation during a meeting of that kind, and it was entirely unexpected that a thirty

year old photographer would have the temerity to offer an unsolicited opinion. Kennerly

had recently returned from Cambodia and had witnessed the Phnom Penh evacuation.

Ford, who had a close relationship with Kennerly and knowing that Kennerly wouldn’t

have spoken up then unless he felt what he had to say was important, did not object, and

384 NSC 14 May, 11-12. 385 Ford, A Time to Heal, 279.

140 in fact later said he was glad to hear it. 386 But the question, germane or not, had little effect on the path of the discussion.

Ford rephrased his earlier question, asking if that was the Defense Department’s recommended course of action, and whether it was just a matter of time before execution.

Jones assented, adding that they needed to get the orders out as soon as possible and that there was a good communication capability available to follow the operations. The

President told them to “launch both operations as quickly as possible.” Jones estimated it the first three helicopters would be airborne within an hour. (The Marines were in fact climbing into the Air Force helicopters as the discussions were ongoing) Ford noted that would be 40 minutes behind the proposed schedule and Jones said they should still make the timeline. Admiral Holloway left the meeting at that point to communicate the orders. 387

Ford wanted to finish the operational discussion with the plan for the attacks on the mainland, but that would have to wait. The discussion took a complete turn with

Marsh asking “Are you taking the island to get it or the people?” It was essentially a unanimous consensus that they were taking Koh Tang Island to retrieve the crew, however, a rather lengthy debate raged over the timing of the American withdrawal and how it would be announced. (There was an implicit assumption among all present the

Marines would successfully occupy the island) Ford ended that discussion thread by stating, “The point is that we are going there to get our people, not the island.” 388

Jones tangentially returned to the subject of the mainland air strikes by offering that one suggestion was to issue an ultimatum that if the Americans were not released,

386 Ford, A Time to Heal, 280. 387 NSC 14 May, 13. 388 Ibid, 14.

141 there would be air strikes. Rumsfeld interjected a public ultimatum would be a “bad idea,” but if one was issued, it must be specific and be done through a diplomatic initiative. Kissinger noted they already had sent a message to the UN Secretary General,

Kurt Waldheim, and could not find a better way to communicate with the Cambodians.

They also had tried to deliver an ultimatum through Peking, but there wasn’t enough time for a repeat attempt. Schlesinger, following up on Rumsfeld’s earlier statement, asked about a local ultimatum, to which Kissinger had no objection, but said he believed US action should not “be dependent on an ultimatum.” He advocated moving “massively and firmly” and saying that the US was “going to protect the operation to get the people out.” Buchen disagreed, saying that if the crew was not found on the island, then they should issue the ultimatum. Ford did not want to delay, stating they should strike whether they found the Americans or not. Buchen pushed back stating an ultimatum might be the only way to get the crew out. Kissinger disagreed, and advocated instead moving up the air strikes. He said:

I think it is essential in situations of this kind to make clear that it is we who define the hazards. We can argue that we are doing this to protect our operation. What we have to get across to other countries is that we will not confine ourselves to the areas in which they challenge us. 389

Colby added that the Cambodians could move 2,400 troops to the island within 4 hours if they weren’t blocked. Ford recounted the two reasons to speed up the Coral Sea operations: protecting the operation and by using precision munitions, protecting the crew. Ford wanted to use the Coral Sea to attack the Kompong Som area and stated,

“They should not stop until we tell them.” (emphasis added) Buchen cautioned that if the US aircraft “hit buildings, you might hit Americans.” Revealing the snowballing

389 NSC 14 May, 16.

142 momentum and adrenalin present in the situation, Schlesinger brushed him off

speculating, “I think they would have moved the Americans 20 miles inland as soon as

possible.” 390 He could not have possibly known the validity of that statement.

The discussion returned to Ford’s focus, the attack on the Cambodian mainland.

The recommendations were as numerous and as varied as the NSC participants. B-52

crews in Guam had been put on alert in the event the carrier aircraft couldn’t reach the

mainland in time. Rockefeller favored utilizing the B-52s for the attack. Kissinger

preferred carrier strikes if the planes were available, but he was adamant about the need

for a strong response. So was Scowcroft. In Ford’s eyes, Schlesinger didn’t seem to

want any bombing at all. The acting JCS Chairman, General Jones, wanted to hit the

mainland, but didn’t want to use B-52s. The decision was up to Ford. He felt that

Kennerly earlier had made a lot of sense and that massive air strikes would constitute

overkill; therefore it would be better to have navy jets from the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific targets in the vicinity of Kompong Som. 391

Admiral Holloway advised that the first wave of aircraft attacks could support the seizing of the Mayaguez and the invasion of Koh Tang Island. He continued that later waves would hit other targets already discussed, including the airfield and the ports. Ford voiced his desire that the aircraft should attack Cambodian planes, boats and ships.

Schlesinger emphasized they would make a positive identification, with Holloway adding that the first wave of fighters would be able to report on the situation for further strikes.

When questioned how soon the first wave could move, Holloway reported, “Three hours,” or approximately 1900 in Washington. Kissinger warned that the mainland

390 NSC 14 May, 16-17. 391 Ford, A Time to Heal, 280.

143 strikes should not precede the Holt’s boarding of the Mayaguez so Schlesinger and

Holloway agreed to a 2045 or 8:45 pm Washington time launch of the first wave. Shortly more than an hour after the meeting began, Ford started issuing further orders. Holloway then left the room to pass on the orders to the ships through naval chains of command. 392

The first attacks were now less than three hours away and the members of the

NSC were concerned about the risks of the operation. Colby reported there were no changes in the intelligence estimates of the Cambodian force on Koh Tang Island.

Hartmann asked if there any American casualty estimates to which Jones responded that it was hard to make a precise estimate. Schlesinger offered it might be “twenty or thirty” and Clements reminded the group of the political ramifications that “sooner or later you will get a with the 23 already lost.” Schlesinger asked Jones if there would be search and rescue forces available in case some people were shot down over Cambodia.

Jones replied that it was “conceivable” that some would be shot down, and there would be rescue forces present. Rumsfeld wanted to revisit the idea of issuing an ultimatum to the Cambodians. Kissinger reemphasized the proposition of using a bullhorn to warn the occupiers of Koh Tang Island of the intent to invade the island; that they should release the American crew and that no negotiations would be entertained. He also restated that he thought the US must attack to be effective and must not give the impression the attacks would stop. 393

It was again two of the minor actors that made the prescient inputs. Hartmann asked, “How will the Cambodians know what to do if they decide to let our people go?”

Jones repeated that the US ships could use the bullhorn to tell the Cambodians what to do

392 NSC 14 May, 18-19. 393 Ibid, 19-21.

144 and Kissinger added that “The odds are that the people of the island have no orders and will sit tight.” Clements spoke up saying, “I don’t think the Americans are there anyway.” This created a stir in the group, with Kissinger replying, “They could be. We do not know.” Ford noted that they were speculating on how many crewmembers were actually on the boat that reportedly took them to Kompong Som. Colby reminded the group that the pilot said he saw “eight or so” and incorrectly said the pilot had said others were on the Holt , probably meaning the Mayaguez . He also affirmed that all 39 of the crew could fit on the boat in question. Jones noted even if the crew was not on Koh

Tang, there was possibly value in capturing the Cambodians there. Kissinger added that

“The problem is that we do not know that they are not there. Taking the island if they are not there is easier to explain than failing to take it if they are.” He advocated “one clear line,” to which Colby added, “We need to be braced against that pilot.” Schlesinger attempted to bolster the group’s confidence by stating they had “an obligation to get the

Americans or to see if they are there.” 394

Diplomatic risk was also discussed, with a concern about the Thai governmental response again voiced. Rumsfeld asked if the Marines could be recovered on the Coral

Sea and said the preferred option was to not have them return to Thailand. Jones told him that those plans weren’t finalized, but when Kissinger and Ford asked about specific options, Jones apparently finalized the plans on the spot and assured them that the

Marines would not be taken back to Thailand. Ingersoll added that the Marines remaining in Thailand should also be removed as soon as the operation was launched.

Schlesinger disagreed and Ingersoll retorted, “We will have riots tomorrow.” Jones intervened, stating there were 1200 Marines in Utapao and recommended the US airlift

394 NSC 14 May, 21-22.

145 those Marines out once they were no longer needed. Kissinger added, “Then we can

announce that we have withdrawn them.” 395

That agreement ended the discussion of international diplomatic and political risk and led back to domestic concerns, particularly with Congress and the requirements under the War Powers Act. Hartmann began the discourse with a report on the previous night’s actions and the Congressional leaders’ reactions. The afternoon before, on 13

May, White House aides had contacted twenty-one congressional leaders to inform them of the President’s plans to prevent the Mayaguez and her crew from being transferred to the mainland. 396 As directed, the staffers had provided congressional leaders information on the situation and the President’s action thus far. The leaders on the whole had responded that they supported the attacks, but were stating there had not been consultation in accordance with the War Powers Act. Both the House and Senate were holding committee hearings on the affair and wanted more information, but the White

House was offering limited briefings and was depending on congressional leadership for support. The question now was how to proceed with notification and consultation. It was suggested the President call Senator and Speaker of the House Carl

Albert. Hartmann offered two courses of action: bring the leaders to the White House or telephone them. 397

White House General Counsel Philip Buchen had paid close attention to the requirements under the 1973 War Powers Act and kept the President informed. In a Top

Secret Memo dated 14 May 1975 to White House Congressional Liaison Jack Marsh,

Buchen discussed options regarding the need to report within 48 hours of when US armed

395 NSC 14 May, 20-21. 396 Ford , A Time to Heal, 280. 397 NSC 14 May, 23.

146 forces were introduced in the Mayaguez incident and when the clock began for the 48 hour time limit. He determined that the 48 hours began on Tuesday, May 13 at 0615

EDT when US “combat aircraft began action to interdict vessels leaving the Island of

Koh Tang.” In the memo, Buchen also expressed concern about the need to report “the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement” mainly centering on the possible use of B-52s out of Guam. 398

Like a good litigator that knows the answer before asking it, Ford asked Buchen,

“What does the law say?” Buchen answered that the law said to consult with Congress before the introduction of forces and then regularly thereafter. There was also a requirement for a report 48 hours after action. In Buchen’s opinion, the War Powers report was due that night. Kissinger asked when the Mayaguez action began from a

“legal standpoint.” Buchen reiterated it began when the first arrived on scene. Kissinger quickly counseled Ford, “Maybe you should get the leadership in tonight.” Buchen agreed, adding that was the Congressional leaders’ intent. Ford, having decided to do exactly that asked how soon the Congressional leaders could be at the White House. 399

The timing and agenda of that meeting was the focus of the remainder of the NSC session. Marsh offered that the earliest time they could assemble Congressional leadership would be 1830. (It was about 1730 at the time) Rumsfeld interjected the leaders would be complaining that the meeting would not constitute consultation, but they shouldn’t worry about it. Kissinger offered the President should emphasize the history of the diplomatic efforts and the lack of Cambodian response, but should not give

398 Philip Buchen, Memorandum, “The Mayaguez Situation in Connection with the War Powers Resolution” dated May 14, 1975 to Jack Marsh, GRC, 1. Hereafter cited as Buchen Memo. 399 NSC May 14, 23-24.

147 details on the planned strikes. Ford said they would tell the Congressional leaders that they planned on landing on the ship and the island and would not mention the planned mainland strikes. Rumsfeld advocated pre-briefing Ford’s friends in order to have them fight for him. Ford asked Congressional liaison Jack Marsh whom they should invite.

Marsh recommended inviting a spread of the leadership, including the Speaker, floor leaders, Whips, committee leaders and ranking minority members of both houses.

Schlesinger added that Republican leaders should be among the group. 400

Kissinger warned that briefing the leaders before the operation began posed a security risk and they would have to be asked to keep quiet. Rockefeller proposed a ten o’clock meeting. When Ford then asked if it would benefit them to delay, Buchen and

Marsh advised against it, pointing out the law’s requirement to consult before initiation of action. Rockefeller insisted they had already complied with that provision and asked,

“What if the group is opposed? What should the President do?” Kissinger stated he would “go ahead anyway.” Rockefeller said he had met with a business group that very day and they had applauded when Rockefeller told them the President “would be firm.”

Ford said he had received similar reactions. The group decided then to issue a brief press release and inform their allies including the Organization (NATO) members. Agreeing with his legal and political advisors and against the advice of

Rockefeller, Ford decided to meet with the Congressional leaders as soon as possible.

The meeting was set for 1830 that evening, Wednesday 14 May 1975. 401

400 NSC May 14, 24-25. 401 Ibid, 25-27.

148 Chapter 15: Congressional Leadership Approves

Illustrative of the importance the Ford administration placed on its relationship with Congress and the necessity of compliance with the War Powers Act, the President delayed his planned Wednesday evening schedule to meet with a bipartisan selection of

Congressional leaders to inform them of the actions taken up to that point related to the

Mayaguez incident. The meeting, which was slightly delayed due to traffic, took place in the White house from 1840 to 2000 14 May ( 0540-0700 15 May in Cambodia ). Joining

Ford from the NSC was Vice President Rockefeller, Secretary of State and National

Security Advisor Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. Congress was represented by ten senators and nine congressmen: Senators Byrd (D-WV), Case (R-

NJ), Eastland (D-MS), Griffin (R-MI), McClellan (D-AR), Mansfield (D-MT), Scott (R-

PA), Sparkman (R-PA), Stennis (D-MS), Young (R-ND) and Congressmen Broomfield

(R-MI), Cederberg (R-MI), Michel (R-IL), Morgan (D-PA), O’Neill (D-MA), Price (D-

IL), Rhodes (R-AZ), Wilson (R-CA) and Speaker Albert (D-OK). 402

President Ford began, “I thought that it was important that I ask you down here and fill you in on a little of the history of the events this week and tell you of the decisions I made an hour ago. I felt this was the best under the circumstances that I could comply with the War Powers Act and inform you of the actions I feel are necessary to take.” 403 He followed with a brief but thorough and accurate accounting of the sequence of events of the crisis beginning with his notification at his 0740 intelligence briefing on

Monday 12 May 1975. He described each of the NSC meetings, the situation as it stood

402 White House Memorandum for Record, “The Mayaguez Incident (14 May 75 meeting)”, 16 May 1975, GRC, 1. Hereafter cited as WH Memo 16 May 75. 403 WH Memo 16 May 75, 1.

149 at each of those meeting times, and the diplomatic and military courses of action that were decided upon during those meetings. He stressed his direction to keep the

Congressional leadership informed of those decisions during the fluid situation and the lack of information regarding the location of the crew. 404

The previous night’s (Tuesday, May 13 th ) direction to ready two Marine forces to take the Mayaguez and seize Koh Tang Island; to send the US Naval warships Coral Sea ,

Hancock , Holt and Wilson to the area; and put B-52 aircraft on alert were detailed.

Asking those present to keep the information private until after the military actions were complete, Ford then described the orders he gave during the NSC meeting earlier in the day: a simultaneous Marine attack on the Mayaguez and Koh Tang Island and an aerial assault on the Cambodian airfield at Kompong Som and naval base at Ream. (He had earlier planned to omit discussing the third part of the plan) Stressing the point the third attack was to protect the Marines executing the first two, he neglected to mention the punitive aspects of the attacks. 405

When Ford asked Kissinger if he had anything to add, Kissinger drew the legislators’ attention to the diplomatic efforts the NSC and State Department had contributed. Kissinger offered the US had attempted to work through the Secretary

General of the UN in addition to delivering notes to the Chinese Ambassador in

Washington, the Cambodian Embassy in Peking and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in Peking. He emphasized the group should know that all reasonable diplomatic options had been exhausted. 406 Kissinger’s concluding remarks led to a somewhat mild

404 WH Memo 16 May 75, 2. 405 Ibid, 2-3. 406 Ibid, 3-4.

150 response from the congressional delegation, which Kissinger would later characterize as

“unenthusiastic.” 407

House Speaker led off the congressional questions by astutely asking if the Mayaguez crew could have been on one or more of the Cambodian boats that had already been sunk. Ford answered by admitting the members of the NSC weren’t confident in their knowledge of the location of the crew. That followed with a discussion of the episode of the pilot spotting “Caucasians” on one of the boats leaving Koh Tang

Island and their presumed destination of Kompong Som. That information did not bolster the Congressmen’s confidence. 408

Senator Mansfield expressed the greatest amount of vocal opposition during the

meeting. He questioned why the President had ordered an attack on the Asian mainland

given the recent US experience there and the US’s lack of knowledge of the crew’s

whereabouts. In answer, Ford amplified his earlier explanation of having the objective of

protecting the Marine operations on Koh Tang by bombing the mainland with details on

the perceived threat posed by the 2400 Cambodian troops at Kompong Som. Senator

Eastland said he was “for bombing the hell out of them.” 409

Others including Tip O’Neill (later speaker of the House) and Senator Mansfield

questioned the Mayaguez’s mission and cargo. There had been rumors the Mayaguez was carrying weapons. Ford, Kissinger and Schlesinger in sequence described the

Mayaguez as a commercial cargo ship carrying “normal cargo” in regular shipping

lanes. 410 In an interesting sidelight, Ford, echoed Clements’ input at the NSC meeting,

407 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 566. 408 WH Memo 16 May 75, 4. 409 Ibid, 5. 410 Ibid, 5, 8.

151 which Ford had rejected out of hand as not pertinent, by noting that Koh Tang island had been disputed by the Cambodians and Vietnamese over possible oil deposits and the action by the Cambodians was possibly an indication they would “assert their authority.” 411 Senators Byrd and Stennis voiced concern with the administration’s possible lack of sensitivity to Thai reaction and asked about the wisdom of basing the

Marine attacks from Thailand. Ford countered that none of the Marines used in the attacks would return to Thailand, which effectively ended that line of discussion. 412 But it did not end the questions, for this discussion had constitutional power implications.

The requirements and authority limitations delineated in the War Powers Act that had been an underlying theme throughout the discussion became overt at that point, yet the tone of the discussion remained respectful and not argumentative. Speaker Albert informed the President that it had been stated on the floor of the House of

Representatives that morning that the President wasn’t complying with the War Powers

Act. Ford, showing his resolve and his years of experience in Congress, responded that he had notified the Congress and stated, “I believe that regardless of the 1973 law, I have the authority as Commander-in-Chief to take this action.” He went on to say that his administration had “scrupulously” complied with the law. 413 Not all agreed.

Senator Byrd countered with a question, “Why were the leaders of Congress not consulted at least at the time the decision was still being made? We are being told only after the fact…You will be charged with overreacting and it would have been better if the leaders of Congress would have been consulted in advance on this decision.” President

Ford told the senator it was a proper question, but reiterated that he was the Commander-

411 WH Memo 16 May 75, 6 412 Ibid, 5. 413 Ibid, 9-10.

152 in-Chief and under the US government’s separation of powers, he had the authority and

obligation to act. Noting there were differences of opinion in the room on the proper

reaction, he also reinforced his statement of his obligation to protect the Marines

attacking Koh Tang from the Cambodians at Kompong Som. 414 At that point, Senator

Case, the co-author of the Case-Church Amendment prohibiting US military action in

Indochina, voiced his support of the President’s actions. He did not believe that his

amendment applied in this situation because the actions taken were in support of rescuing

American citizens. 415 The meeting concluded with a show of support for the President.

Although later Congressional hearings would be held on the Mayaguez crisis and the executive-legislative tensions exemplified by the War Powers Act would continue to be demonstrated to the present, the debate over the act’s applicability on that day was over.

The US forces were enroute to the attack, and the President was about to have a very strange dinner.

414 WH Memo 16 May 75, 10. 415 Ibid.

153 Chapter 16: Ford’s 14 May Dinner

Dutch Prime Minister Johannes den Uyl was visiting Washington at the time to

discuss the upcoming June NATO summit conference. Ford had met with him for an

hour that morning and was scheduled to join him that evening for a working dinner in the

White House. The meeting with Congressional leaders had unexpectedly dragged on so

long that Ford was forced to repeatedly delay the dinner start a half an hour at a time.

Although it was late, Ford decided to go through the dinner and meet with den Uyl. After

changing into his tuxedo, Ford dined with den Uyl and went through the formality of

welcoming other guests, but he admitted his “mind was on events taking place halfway

around the globe.” 416

Kissinger described the event as “one of the most bizarre and intense evenings of

my experience in government.” 417 Johannes den Uyl was a member of the Dutch pacifist

party and at intervals throughout the dinner he did not restrain himself from stressing that

he did not consider military force the proper method for solving political problems.418

Ford, understandably distracted by the ongoing crisis, attempted to politely ignore his

guest’s rhetoric. He recalled:

Den Uyl seemed irritated I wasn’t giving him my full attention. Many Dutch leaders had been carping at us for years about our involvement in Vietnam and had exhibited a smug satisfaction over the defeat of our allies there. Yet they still expected us to shoulder the major burden of Europe’s and their defense. And here I was responding to an act of piracy by doing everything I could to save American lives. Furthermore, decisive action would reassure our allies and bluntly warn our adversaries that the US was not a helpless giant. This effort if successful would benefit not only the US, but the as well. Den Uyl’s inability to understand that annoyed the hell out of me. 419

416 Ford, A Time to Heal, 281 417 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 566. 418 Ibid. 419 Ford, A Time to Heal, 282. Note that has written several pieces in the 1990’s and expressing much the same frustration with European intransigence.

154 Additionally contributing to the peculiarity of the event, the participants physically present at the dinner continuously rotated. 420 Scowcroft and Rumsfeld made brief appearances; Kissinger came for one course; Schlesinger was late, but stayed through dessert and Ford repeatedly jumped up from the table and left the dining room to receive information on the operation. 421

What occurred during that dinner is an excellent example of the Clausewitzian principle of the “fog of war.” 422 War is a confusing and dynamic environment, and the

Mayaguez incident was no exception. Just as the attack operations were beginning the

Khmer Rouge government broadcast a message over a civilian radio network that suggested the Mayaguez would soon be released. But Ford and Kissinger would not receive notification of the existence of that broadcast, nor its content until more than an hour had passed. The nineteen minute diatribe broadcast from , the Khmer

Rouge Information and Minister had to be translated and understood before its contents reached the decision makers. The broadcast ran on for eight minutes before it mentioned the Mayaguez , stating:

On May 12 at 1400 our patrol cited another large vessel steaming toward our waters. We took no action at first. The ship continued to intrude deeper into our waters passing the Wai Islands eastward to a point four or five kilometers beyond the islands. Seeing that the ship intentionally violated our waters, our patrol then stopped it in order to examine and question it and report back to higher authorities. This vessel sails in the form of a merchant ship code- named Mayaguez flying American flags and manned by an American crew. While they were questioning the ship, two American F-105 aircrafts kept circling over the ship and over the Wai and Tang Islands and Sihanoukville port area. At 0530, May 14, six U.S. F-1105 and F-111 aircraft resumed taking turns and bombing. According to a preliminary report, two of our patrol vessels were sunk. We still have no precise idea of the extent of the damage done, or the number killed among our patrolmen and the American crewmen. 423 (sic)

420 Ford, A Time to Heal, 281 . 421 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 566; Ford A Time to Heal, 281. 422 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1976). Clausewitz described as the uncertainty that inevitably arises during wartime. 423 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 201-2.

155 The broadcast called these military actions “savage, barbarous acts of ,” which, “the Ford administration must bear full responsibility for.” It continued:

The ship came to violate our waters, conduct espionage, and provoke incidents to create pretexts or mislead the opinion of the world’s people, the American people and the American politicians pretending that the Cambodian nation and people are the provocateurs while feigning innocence on their part. We are confident that the world’s people as well as the American people, your and politicians who love peace and justice will clearly see that the Cambodian people—a small poor and needy people just emerging from the US imperialist war of aggression—have no intentions and no wherewithal, no possibility of capturing an American ship cruising the open seas at large. We were able to capture it only because it had violated our territorial waters too flagrantly and had come too close to our nose. The charge leveled by the US imperialists— that we are pirates—is too much. Regarding the Mayaguez ship, we have no intention of detaining it permanently and we have no desire to stage provocations. We only want to know the reason for its coming and to warn it against violating our waters again. Wishing to provoke no one or to make trouble, adhering to the stand of peace and neutrality, we will release the ship, but we will not allow the US imperialists to violated our territorial waters, conduct espionage in our territorial waters, provoke incidents in our territorial waters or force us to release their ships whenever they want by applying threats. 424 (sic)

Meanwhile, the US military operations were underway. The timeline

(Washington time) follows:

o 1907: The nineteen minute message from Khmer Rouge Hu Nim began.

It was not until the end of the broadcast that the Khmer announced the

ship would be expelled.

o 1909: The assault on Koh Tang began.

o 2005: The first aircraft departed the Coral Sea to strike Kompong Som.

o 2015: Scowcroft and Kissinger received a summary of Hu Nim’s

statement.

424 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 203-4.

156 o 2029: President was informed of the broadcast. 425

In Kissinger’s mind, it was too little, too late from the Khmer Rouge. The

Cambodians had had several days and various methods to communicate their decision and had not done so. Military operations were underway, the message was “indirect and ambiguous,” and the Mayaguez was about to be seized. The only remaining decision had to be made whether to bomb the mainland. 426

Conversely, Kissinger believed if the Khmer Rouge had intended to release the crew and then refused to because the bombing continued after the broadcast, congressional reaction would be violent. Kissinger then asked Scowcroft to inform the

NMCC that Kissinger would be doing the very thing he had earlier criticized the

Secretary of Defense and the military for, seeking further presidential guidance and that he would be consulting with Schlesinger momentarily. Noting that planes were already in the air, Kissinger “suggested that the planes from the Coral Sea proceed on course but drop no ordnance until the President had made his decision.” 427 This “suggestion” was pivotal and would have monumental repercussions throughout the crisis and for months if not for years afterwards. Schlesinger’s stock with the president would drop further with this decision.

When Kissinger called Ford at 2030, Ford was about to meet with the Dutch

Prime Minister. Ford decided to proceed with the bombing due to the imprecise nature of the radio message and the fact there had been no official follow-up from Phnom Penh.

425 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 567-8. 426 Ibid , 568. 427 Ibid , 569.

157 Schlesinger subsequently reported “First strike completed.” 428 No bombs had been

dropped on the first wave per Kissinger’s suggestion.

Ford maintained he would not alter any of his directives until he was sure of the

crew’s release. Schlesinger agreed with Ford and when Kissinger called Ford again at

2050, the Mayaguez had been seized, but the crew’s whereabouts remained unknown and

the planes from the Coral Sea were en route to Kompong Som and Ream Airfield. Ford immediately made his decision on the Cambodian mainland bombing, stating, “Tell them to go ahead right now.” 429 Ford assumed the second, third and fourth bombing runs

would take place as planned. 430

At the same time, Kissinger and Ford agreed to end the air attacks as soon as they

knew the crew had in fact been released. The difficulty remained in their inability to

notify the Khmer Rouge of that conditional decision. The only embassies in Phnom Penh

were Vietnamese and Chinese and as stated earlier there was not a Cambodian embassy

in the US. 431 They decided to go through Ron Nessen, White House press spokesman

and the news services. Kissinger had Scowcroft ask Nessen to come to Kissinger’s

office, and Nessen refused. Nessen replied that he did not work for Kissinger and besides

that, if he announced the beginning of hostilities with a simultaneous offer to cease fire, it

would confuse the American public. Kissinger, conceding that Nessen had a point,

nonetheless had Scowcroft literally physically drag Nessen to his office and persuaded

him to issue the following statement at 2115 14 May ( 0815 15 May Cambodia time ):

We have heard a radio broadcast that you are prepared to release the SS Mayaguez . We welcome this development, if true. As you know, we have seized the ship. As soon as

428 Ford, A Time to Heal , 282. 429 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 569. 430 Ford, A Time to Heal , 282. 431 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 569.

158 you issue a statement that you are prepared to release the crew members you hold unconditionally and immediately, we will promptly cease military operations. 432

The US issued response to the May 14 th Cambodian broadcast was thought to

have been sent directly into Cambodia, but according to the GAO report, there were no

Voice of America broadcasts from the time of the Cambodian broadcast

until after the Mayaguez rescue. On May 16, Kissinger in a press conference said that the

US took “drastic communications measures” and broadcast directly into Cambodia.

White House Press Secretary Nessen stated that the US had broadcast its response on a

radio frequency “we knew would be monitored” in Cambodia and that news channels

might be the fastest way to reach the Cambodians.433 In reality, the US leadership only

knew their message had been transmitted, but did not know if it was received.

Additionally, the Marine assault on Koh Tang that was occurring simultaneously

with the dinner wasn’t going well. Apparently not recalling the intelligence estimates of

over 100 Cambodians on Koh Tang briefed on 13 May, both Ford and Kissinger noted

that earlier intelligence reports that estimated fewer than two dozen Cambodians were on

the island were wrong. The eight helicopters that carried about 175 marines flew into

withering fire from 150 to 300 Khmer troops that were dug in and ready to fight. 434

Several had been shot down or had to abort the landing and the Marines that had landed

had not found any of the crew. Meanwhile, the Holt had pulled along side the Mayaguez ,

and the Marines that boarded the ship had not found any crew either. 435 It was a

distressing time for all involved.

432 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 569. 433 Comptroller General , 68. 434 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 567; Ford, A Time to Heal, 281. 435 Ford, A Time to Heal 281.

159 PART IV: 15 MAY ASSAULT AND RECOVERY

Chapter 17: Assault on Koh Tang Phase I

The US attack on Koh Tang Island is briefly described in this account. The reasoning is threefold: 1. For historical clarity; 2. To reveal the consequences of the previously described strategic and tactical decisions; those consequences will also be revisited in the Analysis section of this paper; and 3. A full account of all the action is beyond the scope of this work. For a much more comprehensive and detailed account of the Koh Tang attack and the heroism displayed by many involved, please read Dr John

Guilmartin’s excellent, A Very Short War.

Prelude

As discussed earlier, the primary limiting factor in planning and executing a

surprise attack on Koh Tang and the Mayaguez was helicopter availability. Eleven Air

Force helicopters (6 HH-53s and 5 CH-53s) were deemed ready for the early morning 15

May first wave assault on Koh Tang Island and the Mayaguez . USSAG/7AF had ordered

16 Sixteen Air Force helicopters to arrive on Utapao by 15 May for the Mayaguez

operation. As noted earlier, 23 Air Force personnel were killed when one helicopter

crashed enroute on the night of 13 May. Fifteen helicopters landed at Utapao, but one

had serious mechanical issues and did not fly at all in the operation on 15 May; one

(Knife-51) also had serious mechanical issues but became available to fly after the first

wave departed; one (Knife-52) arrived in Utapao too late to depart in the first wave; and

one (Jolly Green-44) arrived too late for either the first or second wave. 436

436 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 54; 56-SOW Nakhon Phanom 191200Z May 75.

160 Of the eleven helicopters available for the first wave, 3 were required to insert the boarding party on the Holt , which will be further discussed in the next chapter. The first wave assault elements of the Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/9 on Koh Tang were therefore restricted to about 180 personnel due to the maximum carrying capacity of the remaining eight helicopters. The Koh Tang assault plan depended on all 11 helicopters of the first wave being available for a second wave and subsequent waves.

This would allow approximately 240 personnel to be inserted on the island in the second wave, 4 hours after the initial assault elements of the first wave (between 1015 and

1045G). 437

The first wave Marines and aircrews received their final mission briefs in Utapao at approximately 0200 on 15 May (1500 14 May EDT). General Burns gave the Koh

Tang attack and Mayaguez recovery order at 0356G and the eight helicopters (5 CH-53s and 3 HH-53s) carrying the 177 Marines from BLT 2/9 and 3 Army linguists bound for

Koh Tang Island departed Utapao between 0414G and 0425G.438 Six helicopters were planned to insert their Marines on the eastern beach landing zone and 2 helicopters were to deposit their Marines on the western beach landing zone of Koh Tang Island. (See figure 5)

The USSAG/7AF plan did not direct pre-assault air strikes or naval gunfire

(although they were requested by Col Johnson, CTG 79.9), because Gen Burns and his staff reportedly did not want to jeopardize the lives of the hostages presumed to be on

Koh Tang Island. The plan also did not include armed escort for the helicopters by aircraft capable of supplying suppressive fire in or near the landing zones. Aircraft

437 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 54; ComUSSAG/7AF 141651Z May 75. 438 56-SOW Nakhon Phanom 191200Z May 75; CTG 79.9 151138Z May 75; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 54.

161 capable of performing that mission (such as AC-130s and OV-10s) were available in

Thailand, Air Force fighter aircraft were orbiting over Koh Tang and the ABCCC aircraft was on station, yet none were used.439 These decisions would have lethal consequences as the day progressed.

The attack plan also did not provide escort aircraft for the helicopters to clear the long (1 ½ hour) over water insertion flight path. There was not an airborne threat to the helicopter force, but there were numerous boats in the Sea of Thailand. The assault helicopters were subsequently spotted and fired upon by Cambodian gunboats well before they neared Koh Tang Island. 440 Although none of the three groups of helicopters were reportedly hit by the gunboats’ fire, the Cambodians on Koh Tang Island were undoubtedly warned of the assault force’s approach by the gunboat crews. The element of surprise, so vital in the planning was lost early in the execution.

Execution

The Koh Tang assault began as planned near sunrise (approximately 0600G 15

May or 1900 14 May EDT) as the eight first wave helicopters reached the landing areas.

Two (Knife-21 and Knife-22) flew to the western landing zone and three (Knife-31,

Knife-23, and Knife-32) followed closely by the remaining three (Jolly Green-41, Jolly

Green-42, and Jolly Green-43) were assigned to the eastern landing zone. 441 As the force approached the beach landing zones, the men aboard the helicopters were lulled into a false sense of security by a total lack of enemy fire from the islands. 442 The plan appeared to be working to perfection. That would soon change. Phase one of the attack

439 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 55. 440 Austin Interview; Author Interview with Davis, Aug 2007. 441 Assault on Koh Tang, 7; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 57. 442 Assault on Koh Tang , 7.

162 would by necessity morph into six distinct actions, described here as Waves One through

Six.

Wave One—Western Beach

As planned, Knife-21 piloted by Lt Col John Denham, the flight lead, approached

the Western Beach with Knife-22 in trail, each with over 20 Marines ready for combat in

the cargo compartment of their respective aircraft. As Knife-21 landed uneventfully on

the west beach and began unloading its 20 Marines, the helicopter and its occupants were

suddenly showered with furious automatic weapon, mortar and rocket propelled grenade fire emitting from the dense island jungle that ringed the beach, which was less than 25 yards wide at low tide. It was too late for Knife-21 to withdraw to reassess the situation.

The 20 Marines under 2nd Lt Jim McDaniel had offloaded and were heading for the tree line and one of Knife-21’s engines was damaged. With the first blast of fire, Knife-22 had moved away from the beach, but almost immediately returned to provide cover fire for Knife-21 as Knife-21 made a single engine takeoff under heavy fire and headed back to sea. The aircraft barely had enough power to keep itself above the water for approximately a mile before it crashed into the ocean. One of the aircraft from the second eastern shore wave, Knife-32 diverted to Knife-21’s position and attempted to recover the crew of four. Three members of the helicopter crew were recovered, but AF crew chief, SSgt Rumbaugh drowned after the crash. 443

Knife-22, piloted by Capt Terry Ohlemeirer, and carrying the Golf Company

Commander, Capt James Davis, escorted Knife-21 until Knife-32’s arrival and then

returned to the west beach to attempt to reinforce the 20 Marines under Lt McDaniel that

had disembarked. About 150 yards off the shore, Knife-22 encountered heavy fire.

443 Assault on Koh Tang, 7-8.

163 Several men were wounded in the ensuing seconds, including Capt Davis and the helicopter had sustained major battle damage. With one engine out, its rotor blades and instrument panel severely damaged, Knife-22 aborted the landing and limped toward

Utapao, leaking fuel. It barely made landfall and executed an emergency landing on the

Thai coast, where the Marines and flight crew were picked up by another helicopter and returned to Utapao. While the crew and Marines aboard Knife-22 were safe, they had not landed any fighting forces on the island. Knife-22 would not fly again. 444

Wave Two—Eastern Beach

While Knife-21 and Knife-22 were facing withering fire on the western beach, the helicopter flight assigned to the eastern beach, Knife-23 and Knife-31 approached their landing area. They too did not receive fire until they were in a vulnerable landing position on the beach. As Knife-23 piloted by 1Lt John Schram, began its landing, fierce enemy fire gravely damaged the helicopter’s rotor system. Schram attempted to abort the discharge of the Marines and lift the aircraft out of the fire area, but the aircraft barely made it off the ground before it lost an engine and the tail section separated from the aircraft. It then settled rapidly back to the ground and impacted the beach. The 5 AF aircrew and 20 Marines all survived. The Marines under 1Lt Michael Cicere immediately departed the wreckage and quickly established a position in the tree line not far from the aircraft. Three of the aircrew stayed with the aircraft for over fifteen minutes under fire successfully attempting radio contact to warn subsequent helicopters of the heavy resistance before joining the Marines in the jungle. The co-pilot, 1Lt John Lucas

444 Assault on Koh Tang, 8, 1-1.

164 would use his survival radio to call in air strikes over the course of the day. 445 The small

force under Lt Cicere despite being grossly outnumbered would have to hold out alone

for the remainder of the day.

Just before Knife-23 had been shot down, Knife-31 under Maj. Howard Corson

loaded with 20 Marines, 2 Navy Corpsman and 3 other Air Force crewmembers took

heavy fire while approaching the landing zone. The crew valiantly returned fire,

including the copilot 1Lt Richard Vandegeer who shot his M-16 out of the cockpit side

window. 446 The aircraft sustained severe damage and burst into flames. Despite a direct

rocket hit that killed 1Lt Vandegeer, and destroyed most of the cockpit including the

entire instrument panel, Maj Corson managed to settle the aircraft into the surf just yards

off the beach. Eight personnel, including Lt Vandegeer and two USN Corpsmen

immediately perished in the aircraft. Also lost in the crash were all of the radios that

were to be used by Marine forward air controllers to contact the US Air Force aircraft

that were planned to provide air support after the initial landing; a significant material

and tactical loss. 447

Eighteen men were able to abandon the aircraft. 448 Three Marines attempted to

reach the beach and were immediately killed by gunfire. 449 One Marine drowned and another was reportedly seen wading toward the wreckage of Knife-23 before disappearing. He was believed dead. Since Knife-31 was directly under fire, the

445 Randall Austin, (Lt Col USMC), Memo to Commanding officer, 9 th Marine Regiment, “Koh Tang/ Mayaguez Historical Report,” 9 Dec 1975, MCHD, 3. Hereafter cited as Austin memo. Also, Assault on Koh Tang, 11. 446 56 SOW 2411Z May 1975, AFHRA. The message recommended award of to Major Corson, SSgt Hairston, and 1Lt Vandegeer, (posthumous). 447 Assault on Koh Tang, 10. 448 Ibid, 10. 449 Reports differ on whether the Marines were aggressively charging the beach or were dazed, disoriented and burned and shot while attempting to regain their bearings.

165 remaining 10 Marines and three crewmen, using the of Knife-31 as a shield swam

out to sea. (See Figure 7)

There would be many heroic acts by the thirteen survivors, many of whom were

severely burned and/or wounded and who would share the three floatation devices and

inspiration. The Marines did not have life preservers due to aircraft load restrictions. 450

Noteworthy among the survivors was PFC Timothy Trebil, a fire team leader who though

burned, was able to provide encouragement and assistance to weaker swimmers. One of

the Marine survivors was a Forward Air Controller. Lt Terry Tonkin used an Air Force

survival radio borrowed from a helicopter crewman to call in air strikes on the east beach

while treading water for over three hours. 451 The struggling and wounded survivors only

had hope that someone would rescue them. None of the helicopter crews in the following

aircraft reported seeing the floating survivors.

It was now only 0610 (1910 14 May EDT) . Within less than 10 minutes, two of

the precious helicopters (Knife-31 and Knife-23) needed for the planned continuous

assault had been shot down in or near the eastern landing zone and one (Knife-21) had

been destroyed in the western landing zone. On the basis of reports by Lt Lucas on the

eastern beach and Marine Lt Tonkin in the water off the beach, the general positions of

the US and Cambodian forces (other than the Mayaguez crew) were determined and Air

Force A-7 attack aircraft were cleared by the ABCCC to make strafing runs to support

the small contingent trapped on the tree line. 452 The ABCCC declared the eastern zone

450 Assault on Koh Tang, 12. 451 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 15-16. 452 Assault on Koh Tang, 12.

166 closed and all other aircraft in the first wave were diverted to the western zone, which wasn’t reporting as intense fire. 453 There would be no unopposed landings.

Wave Three: Western Beach

Two helicopters, Knife-32 commanded by 1Lt Michael Lackey and Jolly Green-

41 commanded by 1Lt Thomas Cooper carrying approximately 45 Marines constituted the next force to attempt to land on Koh Tang Island. Knife-32 had earlier diverted to rescue the crew of Knife-21, which had crashed in the water a mile off the coast of Koh

Tang and had been redirected back to the island by the ABCCC. At approximately 0640 local, Knife-32 reached the landing zone and despite heavy ground fire and numerous hits including a direct rocket hit, Lt Lackey and crew offloaded 13 Marines. A Marine was wounded on the aircraft (as was an Air Force crew chief, SSgt Morales who suffered a to the chest and a collapsed lung) and did not disembark and an Army interpreter refused to leave the aircraft. Knife-32, badly damaged, was able to limp back to Utapao with its wounded, but the aircraft would not return to duty. Meanwhile Jolly

Green-41 had to abort its attempted landing due to low fuel and departed the area for an air refueling. It would return again for a later insertion attempt. 454 As of 0640, there were 54 men on the island instead of the planned 180; 14 had been killed; three helicopters had been shot down, while a fourth was stranded on the Thai coast and the fifth was severely damaged. Three insertions remained scheduled in the first phase.

Wave Four—Western Beach

Shortly after Knife-32 departed, Jolly Green-41 made another attempt to land on the west beach, but was forced away by fierce fire. Jolly Green-43 under Capt Roland

453 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 15. 454 Assault on Koh Tang, 14.

167 Purser followed Jolly Green-41 into the western LZ while Jolly Green-42 under Lt Phillip

Pacini attempted to insert its Marines south of the beach. Both received stiff opposition

from land-based fire and changed their landing plans. Ironically, Jolly Green-42 returned

to the western LZ while Jolly Green-43 pulled back from the beach and headed south ,

inserting its 29 Marines, including the Assault Command Group under Lt Col Austin

(CTU 79.9.1), at the first available location, a small patch of rocks 1,200 meters south of

the western landing zone (this was not in accordance with the plan). Capt Purser and

Jolly Green-42 was able to offload his 27 Marines on the west beach by 0720, but not

surprisingly, encountered heavy fire and the aircraft sustained major damage, including

over 19 bullet holes in the fuselage. Jolly Green-43 then escorted Jolly Green-42 on its

return to Utapao. 455

Wave Five--First Rescue Attempt—Eastern Beach

At the same time, 0815L, that Jolly Green-41 was attempting to land on the west beach, Jolly Green-13 piloted by 1Lt Charles Greer arrived on scene and attempted to evacuate the survivors of Knife-23 from the eastern beach. A-7 aircraft were not able to locate enemy fire and did not provide suppression fire. Nevertheless, Jolly Green-13 landed on the beach and under heavy fire remained in an exposed position while they waited for the survivors of Knife-23. Lt Greer and crew had visual contact with the survivors, who were pinned down by enemy fire and were unable to reach the aircraft.

The helicopter sustained numerous hits, causing battle damage including a fire in a fuel and a fire in a box of flares. With the survivors unable to board and the aircraft on fire, Jolly Green-13 departed and recovered at Rayong Thailand. It was unable to return to support the operation. Attack and aircraft were able to locate enemy positions

455 Assault on Koh Tang, 16.

168 as a result of Jolly Green-13’s actions however and were able to support the stranded

survivors of Knife-23 with strafing runs and gunship fire for the remainder of the day.456

Wave Five—Western Beach

Lt Cooper and the crew and passengers of Jolly Green-41 were on their fifth

insertion attempt after its second refueling at about 0900G. They were finally able to

offload 22 of their 27 Marines in the western landing zone with some support from A-7

aircraft. The helicopter received more damage about 1000G while attempting to offload

the remaining 5 troops and pick up wounded Marines and finally was forced to depart the

area. After its return to Utapao, Jolly Green-41 would not fly again. 457 At that point, the

first wave of insertions was over.

Thus, the situation on the ground at Koh Tang at 0900G (2300 14 May EDT)

included 131 Marines plus 5 Air Force crew members clinging to footholds in three

different locations, and 13 survivors (10 Marines and, 3 AF crewmembers) from Knife-

31 treading water in the sea a few hundred yards from the eastern beach.

When the Destroyer USS Wilson approached the northern tip of Koh Tang,

observers onboard the ship spotted U.S. military personnel in the water. They were the

survivors of Knife-31, shot down about 0600G. The Wilson recovered them between

0840G and 0933G. 458

Of the 8 helicopters participating in the first wave assault on Koh Tang and the 3

helicopters inserting on the Holt , only 3 were available for the second wave (Jolly Green-

11, Jolly Green-12, and Jolly Green-43). Three of the 8 first wave assault helicopters were shot down by enemy fire and 2 (Jolly Green-13 and Knife-22) made forced landings

456 Assault on Koh Tang, 18. 457 Ibid. 458 Wilson 150220Z May 75; Wilson 150240Z May75, AFHRA.

169 in Thailand while attempting to return to base. The other 3 received battle damage so

severe that despite being able to reach Utapao, they did not fly again. One helicopter that

inserted on the Holt (Jolly Green-13) suffered battle damage about 0810G during a rescue

attempt of Knife-23 personnel in the eastern landing zone. Therefore, 8 of the 9

helicopters involved in the morning assault (89 percent) were either destroyed or were so

severely damaged they could not participate further in the Mayaguez operation. 459

The original Koh Tang assault plan called for 180 personnel to be inserted at two

locations in approximately 10 minutes. Instead, 131 were deposited at three disparate

locations in over 3 hours. It took at least 17 recorded insertion attempts to achieve 6

successful troop offloads. The 49 personnel (27 percent) that were not offloaded

included 20 on Knife-22 which aborted its insertion attempt and performed and

emergency landing on the Thailand coast; 22 on Knife-31 which crashed in the water (10

Marines and 3 Air Force crew were later rescued up by the Wilson); 2 on Knife-32 (1

Marine was wounded prior to offloading and 1 US Army interpreter refused to depart the

helicopter under fire); five on Jolly Green-41 which had aborted its second insertion

attempt after a prior offload of 22 . 460 While the helicopter forces attempted to recover and prepare for Phase II, the Marines already on Koh Tang Island were fighting for their lives. (See Figure 8)

Ground Combat

After the first 15-20 minutes of the attempted insertions of the first wave, there were 40 Marines split between the two landing zones on Koh Tang. The twenty Marines under command of 2 nd Lt Michael Cicere (3rd platoon, Co. G, BLT 2/9) along with five

459 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 56-57. 460 Ibid , 59.

170 Air Force crewmen in the eastern landing zone dug in at the edge of the beach along the

tree line after their helicopter (Knife-23) was shot down in the landing zone. They held

that position for twelve long hours until extracted at 1815G, during which one Air Force crewman and one Marine were wounded. The group was surrounded on three sides and there was constant automatic weapons fire from emplacements north and south of their position. The fire became particularly intense when helicopters approached and no reinforcements were able to land in the eastern LZ for the remainder of the day. 461

The twenty Marines in the western landing zone under the command of 2 nd Lt

James McDaniel also hastily formed a protective perimeter at the dense jungle tree line

on their beach. They held their position for thirty minutes against multiple attacks by a

numerically superior opponent until they were joined by an additional force of forty

Marines which included the G Company , 1 st Lt James D. Keith who

assumed command of the west beach. At about the same time, the Assault Command

Group with the Battalion Commander, Lt Col Austin, his staff and a mortar platoon was

inserted 1200 meters south of the western landing zone. As the command group, they had

been expected to land with the main force and were therefore lightly armed for combat

with only a few rifles and pistols along with the mortars. It was a difficult situation; there

were two groups in the western side: one of 60 men, and one of 29 men, separated by

about 1,200 meters. The 60-man force in the western landing zone established a

defensive perimeter on the beach, in a half-circle shape, some 100 meters deep, under

intense enemy fire, with their backs to the water. 462 Lt Keith began to expand the

461 Michael Cicere, (2 nd Lt, USMC), CNA interview, 14 June 75, GRC. 462 Austin CINCPAC IG interview; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 59.

171 perimeter around the landing zone. Given the situation, it was imperative the two forces

on the western side of the island consolidate.

After insertion, the Assault Command Group to the south started moving north to

link up with the force in the western landing zone, using their mortars to cover their

route. As they advanced north, the Command Group encountered opposition from enemy

log and earthen and fighting holes, apparently manned by from 2-4 personnel

each. Lt Col Austin ordered a patrol to move south from the western landing zone to

make contact with the Command Group. 463

In an attempt to comply, Lt McDaniel led a reinforced squad south against an enemy strong point with a visibility at ground level of approximately five to fifteen feet.

They did not get far before the patrol was hit in the flank by small arms fire and from close range. In the initial exchange of fire, McDaniel and four Marines were wounded and Ashton Loney was killed. McDaniel later noted the enemy was so close, “grenade dueling” became the rule; where the Marines were picking up grenades thrown at them and throwing them back at the Cambodians. They could also hear the Cambodians only yards away, taunting and laughing as some Marines were crying in pain or praying out loud. McDaniel was able to withdraw his squad back to the beach perimeter under cover fire from the remainder of the western beach force The

Cambodians immediately attacked the southern arc of the Marine perimeter, but in continued intense fighting, McDaniel’s group drove them back. 464

About 0900G, 22 Marines (on Jolly Green-41) under 2 nd Lt Richard Zales were inserted in the western landing zone. Lt Keith, noting later that the additional personnel

463 Austin CINCPAC IG interview; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation, 59. 464 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 16B.

172 were badly needed as the situation was critical at the time, directed Zales and his platoon

to the southern “hot spot” to reinforce McDaniel’s depleted platoon. Lt Keith had by

then established solid communications with the Air Force fighters overhead and directed

air strikes onto the areas of most intense Cambodian fire. 465

As effective as the air strikes were, they could not be brought in close enough to

break the determination of the tenacious Cambodians who had closed to within a few

yards of the Marine positions. The Marines on the ground described the fighting in the

western landing zone as “intense and close.” Cambodian forces with automatic weapons

ringed the western landing zone from north to south and the Cambodians and Americans

were lobbing hand grenades at each other "by the dozen." Major John Hendricks, the

battalion operations officer reported seeing what appeared to be a deadly tennis match

with grenades going back and forth. Meanwhile, the lightly armed Assault Command

Group continued to fight its way north, engaging the enemy bunkers one by one. 466

The reception awaiting the Koh Tang Island attack force was much more intense

than almost anyone had expected. The fact the US forces had not prepared the landing

zone by bombing or ship bombardment is an item of discussion in many accounts of the

incident. General Burns later in an interview made the point that later in the day on May

15 th , when US air and sea forces attacked the east beach to support the small force under

Lt Cicere trapped there, the bombardment didn’t seem to affect the Cambodians’ ability

to respond there. 467 That is not an accurate conclusion to draw. In fact the naval

bombardment and air attacks on Cambodian positions later in the day allowed a rescue

465 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 16B; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation, 60. 466 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 17. 467 Burns interview, 452.

173 helicopter to land on the beach and extricate the twenty-one Marines when earlier any helicopter approaching the island had been either shot down or severely damaged.

As the morning wore on, Lt Keith and Lt Col Austin were anxiously awaiting the arrival of the planned reinforcements. Events would unfold that would make their arrival questionable. Meanwhile, the second part of Phase I, the seizure of the Mayaguez itself was occurring.

174 Chapter 18: Recovery of the Mayaguez

After Commander Robert Peterson, USN, the captain of the USS Harold E. Holt was ordered to steam at best speed to the Mayaguez crisis area, the volume of message

traffic providing information on the situation increased rapidly. Onboard the Holt was

also the Commander of Destroyer Squadron 23 (ComDesRon 23), Captain D.P. Roane

and his staff. From the information provided by the messages, mainly from the P-3

aircraft, they knew the Mayaguez was located near Koh Tang Island and the location of

the crew was “sketchy.” 468 The captain of the Holt was also receiving messages

regarding their mission once they arrived at Koh Tang Island. (See Figure 9)

The Holt was to use its own crew to either: 1. Have a landing party board the

Mayaguez and disable the propulsion system or 2. Embark a small crew onto the

Mayaguez and tow her away from the island. They finalized a plan to embark a boarding

party using their ship’s boats and take the Mayaguez by force, fully expecting to have to

fight their way onto the ship. They had received reports of several hostile gunboats in the

area. Their biggest concerns were the amount of resistance they would encounter on the

Mayaguez and the amount of hostile fire they would receive from Koh Tang Island. They

would later find the Mayaguez was out of small arms fire range from the island. 469 They

would also find that plans had evolved during their voyage.

The Marines of Company D, First Battalion of the Fourth Marine Regiment led by

Major Porter and Captain Wood landed in Utapao Thailand at 0505 on 14 May expecting

to execute a six-ship helicopter assault by landing directly on the Mayaguez using their

468 Robert A. Peterson (Commander US Navy), “’Mayday’ for the Mayaguez- the Destroyer Escort’s Skipper,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976, 244-247. Hereafter cited as Peterson. 469 Peterson, 244.

175 full complement of 125 Marines . Two landing points were available, one forward and

one aft and intelligence reports led them to believe there would be approximately 30

Cambodians onboard armed with automatic and anti-tank weapons. Their mission,

originally scheduled for 0610 was postponed three times and then cancelled for that day

due to daylight limitations. They could not execute such an attack in the dark. 470

The ship boarding was drawn up very much akin to a raid, with assault elements,

search elements, an essential dependence on mass, maneuver, violence, and controlled

firepower. The main difference in this operation from a raid was the party did not intend

to withdraw. The six helicopters would drop Marines on the two landing points. The

Marines would first secure the bridge and then the engine room and decks. Since the

Cambodians on the Mayaguez were heavily armed, it was expected that the “price of

success would be dear.” 471

At 2200, Major Porter attended a briefing where he was informed the operation was changing to a joint attack on the Mayaguez and Koh Tang Island. Accordingly, the

Mayaguez boarding helicopter contingent was cut from six to three, necessitating a large

reduction in the Mayaguez assault force. Additionally, it was later decided the Marines would be lifted to the Holt and board the Mayaguez from the Holt. Reveille for the

operation was set for 0230 on 15 May with a liftoff of 0400. 472

When the Holt arrived on scene late 14 May, they were informed that a

detachment of Marines augmented by six Military Sealift Command (MSC) personnel

civilian volunteers to man and steam the Mayaguez, Navy personnel, and a two man Air

470 Walter J Wood (Capt, USMC), “’Mayday’ for the Mayaguez-the Company Commander,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976, 247-251. Hereafter cited as Wood. 471 Wood, 248. 472 Ibid, 250.

176 Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to dispose of any explosive devices or

“booby traps” left by the Cambodians would be flown out to the Holt early on 15 May from Thailand. They were also informed that those personnel would be tasked with boarding and seizing the Mayaguez from the Holt. The Holt was also charged with

blocking and preventing the Mayaguez from reaching the Cambodian mainland if it began to sail. 473

Between 0550 and 0624 on 15 May, three Air Force HH-53 “Jolly Green” helicopters arrived and offloaded the boarding party of 68 personnel: 59 Marines from

Co. D, BLT 1/4, the six-man MSC nucleus crew, 2 Air Force EOD explosive specialists personnel and 1 U.S. Army linguist onto the “incredibly small” Holt helipad approximately 12 nm northwest of Koh Tang Island. 474 The large helicopters were only

able to hover and place one side of their landing gear on the helipad while the personnel

quickly offloaded. 475 The Holt then sounded General Quarters, the preparatory signal for

battle, and started for the Mayaguez , which lay at anchor 15 miles to the east. The crew

and the boarding party then began the last minute planning for the seizure of the

Mayaguez .476

The Holt’s Captain and Executive officer, along with Coast Guard Officer

Lieutenant JG Jim Richardson worked quickly with the newly arrived Marines to

formulate and coordinate contingency plans. They decided to take the Holt alongside the

Mayaguez rather than using small boats as previously planned. That would leave more

personnel aboard the Holt to provide covering fire in case the boarding resistance was

473 Peterson, 244. 474 CTU 79.9.2 160837Z May 75, AFHRA; Wood 250; Peterson, 244. 475 Wood, 250. 476 Peterson, 244.

177 substantial. Also, since they assumed resistance would occur, they coordinated for Air

Force jets to drop riot control agents (tear gas) on the Mayaguez ten minutes before the

boarding and strafe the ship five minutes later in hopes of dampening any resistance. 477

Two other concerns occupied the attack force. First, for the Holt was the difficulty of maneuvering and mooring alongside the Mayaguez. Normally, a ship moors alongside a stable pier or ship moored to a pier, not one swinging freely at anchor.

Fortunately, the decks of the two ships would align fairly evenly. Secondly, a US Marine contingent from a US ship had not boarded another ship in a method like the one planned in approximately 150 years (1826). Nonetheless, the timeline was set and the crew was committed. 478

By 0630, the Holt began moving toward the Mayaguez and at 0710-0715 two Air

Force A-7 fighter aircraft dropped the tear gas canisters precisely on time and directly on the deck of the Mayaguez. 479 As the Holt approached the Mayaguez, CDR Peterson realized they were possibly too close and cancelled the strafing runs due to concerns the air strikes may hit the Holt. As the Holt eased next to the Mayaguez, hundreds of anxious eyes scanned the Mayaguez through the gaseous haze. There was no sign of enemy personnel. The XO of the Holt announced, “Marines over the side” and the 59 Marines initiated the boarding operation. 480 (See Figure 10)

At great personal risk, two of the lead Marines, Cpl Coker and Capt Wood jumped to the deck of the Mayaguez and began attaching the mooring lines thrown from the Holt. They were soon joined by the other 57 Marines. As the Marines boarded the

477 Peterson, 246. 478 Ibid. 479 Wood, 251. 480 Peterson, 246.

178 Mayaguez, sailors passed mooring lines and provided fire cover. Equipped with gas masks, the well-organized Marine detachment under Major R.E. Porter searched out every space of the Mayaguez . He split the boarding party, with part of the force proceeding to the bridge and moving below decks through the gas-filled compartments.

Simultaneously, the remainder of the force began a fore-aft search of the deck and the cargo containers. Within an hour it became obvious the Mayaguez had been abandoned and except for some superficial gear, was undamaged. Abandoned food was found by the assault team, but contrary to popular lore, it was not warm. 481

After declaring the Mayaguez secure at 0822 local (2122 EDT) , Major Porter in a moving ceremony raised the stars and stripes on the ship and the two contingents prepared the ship for towing . The seamen on the Mayaguez used an acetylene torch to cut the ship’s anchor and using a makeshift towing rig, the Holt began towing the ship at approximately 1020L ( 2320 14 May EDT) away from the area where the battle raged. 482

(See Figure 11) With the recovery of the Mayaguez, one phase of the operation was complete. Several others remained, not the least of which was the recovery of the

Mayaguez’s crew, whose whereabouts were unknown.

481 Wood, 251; Peterson, 247. 482 CTU 79.9.2 160837Z May 75, AFHRA; Peterson, 247.

179 Chapter 19: Thursday May 15, Mayaguez Crew Released

SS Mayaguez Captain Charlie Miller awoke from his restless sleep on a shared cot in a village on Koh Rong Sam Lem Island at 0430 pondering his crew’s fate, as well as his own. He was 62 years old and thought he’d had a full life, but he wasn’t ready for it to be over. A guard motioned for him to stay in bed, so Miller waited until daylight to rise. At 0530, Miller roused the crew and all took turns at the water barrel washing their faces and brushing their teeth with their fingers. 483

Miller looked up to find the interpreter and compound commander standing

beside him. “At six o’clock,” said the English speaker, “we will talk to the first

commander in Kompong Som. We will ask him if the high commander in Phnom Penh

has given approval for you and your crew to leave.” Capt Miller was disappointed with

that news. The previous evening the Cambodians had promised the release of the entire

crew. He once again became suspicious and informed his crew of the delay as the

Cambodians used the field pack radio to contact their higher headquarters.” 484

Several members of the crew exhibited their displeasure with the announcement, talking of attacking their captors, but Miller cut them off, saying, “I’m the Captain.

You’re under my command whether on ship or on shore. We’re just going to wait until these fellows hear from Phnom Penh.” At 0630, the English speaker told Capt Miller that

Kompong Som was still waiting for permission from Phnom Penh to release the crew.

483 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 184. 484 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 185.

180 Then at 0700, word was received over the radio to release the crew. Miller surmised that

pressure from the aircraft attacks had secured their freedom. 485

There was one additional matter that had to be taken care of before the crew could

leave. The interpreter informed Captain Miller they had to complete a “manifest.” The

confused Miller, assuming the Cambodian meant crew or cargo lists, asked, “what kind

of manifests?” The English speaker replied “I will tell you what they are and you can

write them down.” As the crew gathered around, Miller asked the Cambodians for their

. The English speaker identified his commander as Chhan, “who is also second

commander in Kompong Som” and himself as “Samkol” and printed their names on the

paper. 486 Samkol began dictating the following manifesto as Miller wrote:

Military Commander Chham Speaker—Samkol

1. 4 ships destroyed and 100 friendly people wounded 2. Cambodian people treated the crew very good and do harm was done to the crew of 40 people 3. The crew respect the country of Cambodia and the 40 crew are responsible for the people and no more damage to the country no bombs shooting no air fly over Cambodia 4. The Cambodian high commander has contacted the international and the 40 crew about the #123 point same as written the international knows the situation very bad for the country Cambodia. 5. 40 crew very friendly to people of Cambodia good friends. 6. The people of Cambodia no like war and want peace and want many friend in the international and have 40 friend in this crew. 7. THE PEOPLE CAMBODIA GOOD FRIENDLY WITH 40 PEOPLES U.S. Signed: CT Miller, for the 40 crew 487

Samkol then handed the signed document back to Captain Miller and instructed him to keep it, insisting it was for the Americans. 488 As a bewildered Captain Miller

agreed and asked if they could go, an unexpectedly precarious situation suddenly

485 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 186-7. 486 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 187. 487 IR Committee Pt II, 248. 488 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 188-190.

181 developed. The interpreter replied the crew had to vote on the manifesto before they

could go. One crewmember loudly refused to accept the manifesto. After a brief but

heated discussion, all 40 crewmembers consented and the interpreter and the commander had a picture taken with Miller. 489

At approximately 0730 in Cambodia (2030 14 May in DC), the same time that

President Ford was being informed by Kissinger about Phnom Penh’s message; the

Mayaguez was being seized by the Marines from the Holt; and Marines were storming the beaches of Koh Tang; unknown to all parties, the crew of the Mayaguez was boarding a Thai fishing boat enroute to freedom. The fishing boat’s name was Sinvari , the same boat that Capt Miller and crew had ridden on through gunfire and gas to Kompong Som and to the military compound at Koh Rong Sam Lem. The crew was Thai; prisoners of the Cambodians for 5 months. There were several armed guards accompanying them in the boat. 490

On board the small boat, Capt Miller worried about the American jets sinking them or the Cambodians changing their minds again. The crew was upbeat; even LaBue, who had refused the manifesto had apologized to the Captain for the disruption. The

English speaker remained behind on the island, and had reminded Capt Miller to contact the American government and “stop the jets.” A second fishing boat full of armed guards paralleled their fishing boat. After the fishing boats got into open water with a straight shot to the Mayaguez , the second fishing boat pulled up on the port side and the Ensign who had originally accompanied the crew on the Mayaguez boarded the Sinvari from the other boat and spoke briefly to the driver. The crew’s mood shifted to somber. Was it

489 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 192-3. 490 Miller Testimony 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 206.

182 yet another delay? Were they going to be killed just as freedom was in reach? Suddenly

the five Thai fishermen were jumping up and down shouting for joy as they had been told

they were being released with the crew. The Ensign and all the guards returned to the

second fishing boat, leaving the Americans uncertain, worried the Cambodians might

machine gun the fishing boat. However, the other boat peeled off and headed back to

Koh Rong Sam Lem. 491

As a precaution, Capt Miller had the crew remove their white clothes and tie them

to bamboo poles in order to have white flags to wave at the planes. At 0845, former

Marine Dave English was the first to spot the Mayaguez and the Holt parked next to it.

No one had seen it. Nor did they see the puffs of smoke emanating from Koh Tang. The crew was startled by the sudden appearance of an aircraft overhead. 492

Shortly after 0900 May 15th (2200 EDT May 14 ) the Airborne Battlefield

Command and Control Center (ABCCC) controllers, displaying initiative and contrary to the blanket order to sink all foreign boats tasked a P-3 to investigate a boat reportedly approaching Koh Tang from the mainland. The P-3 flew over the fishing boat repeatedly, each time at a lower altitude, and was not fired upon. At an altitude of less than 1000 feet, the aircrew was able to discern that the boat held at least 30 Caucasians waving white flags. A hand-held photo of the boat confirmed their visual reconnaissance. On the last pass, the P-3 waggled its wings at the crew and reported its findings to the ABCCC, which relayed the message to ComDesRon 23 aboard the Holt .493 The USS Wilson then became a central figure in the Mayaguez drama.

491 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 209. 492 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 210. 493 Comptroller General , 83; Miller Testimony 251.

183 Destroyer USS Wilson

On Tuesday, 13 May 1975, the Guided-Missile Destroyer USS Henry B. Wilson captained by Commander J. Michael Rodgers, US Navy, was in the enroute from to Subic Bay Naval Station on the island of Luzon in the Republic of the Philippines. The Wilson’s crew had received reports of the Mayaguez situation and was prepared to return to the area where they had been an integral part of Operation

EAGLE PULL, the evacuation of Phnom Penh just weeks earlier. The Wilson had also performed with distinction in Operation FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of Saigon.

The ship’s orders were to proceed at its best speed from that position to the vicinity of the

Mayaguez Koh Tang, report to ComDesRon 23, who was aboard the USS Holt, support the recovery of the Mayaguez and crew as well as provide any assistance to the ongoing operations as needed. Those instructions would be the only formal tasking Commander

Rodgers and crew received during the entire Mayaguez operation. The ship refueled off the coast of the Philippines and steamed at 31 knots, its “best speed” for over 40 hours until it reached Koh Tang Island as dawn broke on 15 May. 494

Along the way, they had received multiple updates, including intelligence messages and messages concerning preparations, tactics and forces being deployed for the Mayaguez operation . Due to those reports and near real-time updates the Wilson received from the Navy P-3 Orion aircraft that were maintaining constant aerial surveillance of the area, Rodgers had a good understanding of the situation. He knew where the Mayaguez was anchored and understood the overall attack strategy and the disposition of hostile gunboats in the area. In addition, the Commander of the US

494 J. Michael Rodgers (Commander, US Navy), “’Mayday’ for the Mayaguez- the Destroyer Escort’s Skipper,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976, 255-258. Hereafter cited as Rodgers.

184 Seventh Fleet had issued a warning to Rodgers that there had been reports of possibly

hostile gunboat activity along the Wilson’s route. The Wilson, which was designed for combat against larger ships at great distances, but was vulnerable to close attack from small boats, deployed its close-in defense team armed with four 7.62 mm M-60 machine guns and hand grenades to guard against gunboat attack. 495

As the Wilson approached Koh Tang Island from the southeast, its radar

displayed the Holt approaching the Mayaguez from the northwest and the helicopter

attack forces approaching the island from the Thai coast. At 0620, the Wilson reported

that it was in the area to ComDesRon 23. At 0700, the ship reached Koh Tang Island and

slowed to 5 knots. As the Wilson cautiously maneuvered around to the north side of the

island, the Holt pulled alongside the Mayaguez and the attack on Koh Tang was in full

swing. Those on the Wilson saw plumes of smoke rising from the downed helicopters on

the east landing zone and Air Force aircraft strafing and bombing enemy positions in

support of the Marines on the island. The USS Coral Sea, which had also recently

arrived in the area, launched aircraft to provide air cover for the Wilson .496

As the Wilson passed within 1000 yards of the northeastern tip of the island, a

lookout reported spotting personnel in the water. There were three groups of men

floating in the sea. They were the survivors of Knife-31, which included Maj Corson, Lt

Tonkin and PFC Trebil. Rodgers deployed the ship’s gig (a small powered boat armed

with a machine gun used for transporting small contingents to shore) manned by

volunteers under the command of Lt JG Fred Naeve to pick up two of the groups while

the Wilson itself maneuvered alongside the third group. Enthusiastic and daring sailors

495 Rodgers, 255-6. An example of that vulnerability is the attack on the USS Cole in Oct 2000, by a bomb laden small boat which severely damaged the ship. 496 Ibid.

185 jumped off the bow of the Wilson directly into the ocean to aid the struggling survivors

and to prevent them from being further swept out to sea. All thirteen remaining

occupants of Knife-31 were rescued and eventually brought aboard the Wilson . The

ship’s chief treated the men in the ship’s engineering berthing section

which had been temporarily converted into a makeshift hospital. The gig continued to

search for other survivors. The Wilson then steamed toward the Mayaguez and Holt , to

affect a rendezvous, but the ship was again diverted. 497

Cdr Jim Messegee’s P-3 surveillance aircraft had been reporting the desperate situation at Koh Tang all morning. At 0940 Cambodian time, the P-3 reported to the Holt

and Wilson that a gunboat was approaching their vicinity. Then the P-3 revised its report

to say the boat was a pleasure craft. The ships’ Captains had been concerned about the

possibility of the Cambodians sending something out to sink the Mayaguez . Capt Roane,

ComDesron 23, on board the Holt ordered the Wilson to intercept the boat in question and prevent it from approaching the Holt and Mayaguez . A short time later, the P-3 crew reported white flags on the boat and then excitedly radioed that they had spotted thirty

Caucasians. 498

The Wilson left the area of the Mayaguez and raced to intercept the fishing boat.

Commander Rodgers heard the radio report from the P-3 of thirty Caucasians waving white flags, but was not taking chances. He did not lower the alert condition of the crew and in a defensive maneuver zigzagged the ship left and right as it approached the boat in question. All available weaponry, including 5-inch guns and missiles, was aimed at the target. Eventually, Rodgers could see the crowded boat and the white flags through his

497 Rodgers, 256. 498 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 211-12; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation, 55; Rodgers, 256.

186 binoculars. Commander Rodgers felt surprise the crew wasn’t on the island as he spoke

into the microphone, “Are you the crew of the Mayaguez ?” The Mayaguez crew waved their flags and jumped and shouted in joy. “Permission to come alongside,” boomed the loudspeakers on the destroyer. It was 1007 on 15 May ( 2107 14 May EDT) .499

The Thai fishing boat Sinvari moved up against the guided missile destroyer

Wilson . The crew, led by Capt Miller climbed up the ladder dropped by the Wilson while

those aboard the Wilson clapped and cheered. After shaking hands, Commander Rodgers

asked Miller, “Are all of your men here?” “Yes sir,” answered Capt Miller, “they’re all

safe.” Thirty nine ecstatic sailors, the remainder of the crew of the Mayaguez, followed

Capt Miller onto the deck of the Wilson where the Wilson’s crew began to administer

needed aid . Onboard the Wilson , Charlie Miller informed Commander Rodgers that he

had promised the Cambodians he would attempt to stop the planes from any further

damage. “You’re too late Captain,” said Mike Rodgers. “They’ve already started

bombing Kompong Som.” 500

The Thais, who had reportedly been held captive for five months requested they

be provisioned and allowed to sail home. The request was swiftly granted and the Thai

fishing boat departed. The Wilson then turned and steamed at high speed to the

Mayaguez, which was being towed by the Holt. At 1145, when the Wilson closed within

a few hundred feet of the Mayaguez , Captain Miller and half of the Mayaguez crew was

ferried back to their freed ship on the same gig that had retrieved the survivors of Knife

31. At 1205, the gig left the Mayaguez and then returned with the remainder of the crew.

The Wilson, its rescue mission complete turned back to Koh Tang Island to support the

499 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez 211-12; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 55; Rodgers, 256 500 Miller testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 215.

187 Marines ashore. Less than seventy two hours after they had been captured, the Mayaguez

crew was once again safely on their ship. 501

The Mayaguez crew found the vessel still heavy with tear gas and 15 Marines, 7

Navy sailors and Military Sealift Command (MSC) officers from the Greenville Victory aboard. Capt Miller took over command while his Chief Engineer initiated the re- ignition of the ship’s boilers. The Holt towed the Mayaguez nine miles out to sea and at

1540, when the Mayaguez was capable of steaming under its own power, the Holt crew

cut the tow line between the ships. The Holt continued to escort the Mayaguez with the intent to remain alongside until the Mayaguez reached the twelve mile international sea

limit from any coast. At 1648 hours, however, CDR Peterson the USS Holt’s Captain

informed Capt Miller that the Holt had been ordered back to Koh Tang Island and Miller would have to take all the people on board to the next port. The Mayaguez then proceeded on course to its original destination, Sattahip, Thailand. 502

At 1815, Miller was radioed and directed to stand by for two Army tug boats to

remove the Marines, Navy and MSC personnel. At 1838, the first tug LT 536 was fast

on the port (left) side amidships. By 1910, all Marines, Navy and MSC personnel were

off the Mayaguez . Miller provided the tugs’ Captains the course and distance to Sattahip

along with some . In return, the tug Captain notified Miller that Mr. Clark,

Sea-Land’s agent in Bangkok had sent a message for the Mayaguez to proceed to

Singapore. At 1920, the ship’s log showed the Mayaguez was full speed ahead on course

to Singapore. The Mayaguez received a reconnaissance aircraft escort for one and a half

501 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 212-13; Rodgers, 256-8. 502 Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, 212-13; Rodgers, 256-8, Peterson, 247.

188 days. However, there were no more incidents involving the ship. 503 The crisis was over for the crew of the Mayaguez.

503 Miller testimony 252, Peterson, 247.

189 Chapter 20: Attacks on Kompong Som

President Ford and the NSC decided on 15 May ( 14 May EDT) not to use Air

Force B-52 aircraft deployed at Guam to attack the Cambodian mainland. They instead ordered the aircraft carrier Coral Sea’s aircraft to strike targets on and around

Kompong Som. The Coral Sea planned four navy fighter/attack aircraft launch waves: at

0700, 0830, 1000, and 1130 with 10 to 12 aircraft per launch. A fifth wave was also

loosely planned as a contingency. 504 The Coral Sea’s first wave launched against

Kompong Som with a target time of exactly 0745 on 15 May. 505 The order was rescinded

by a JCS message one minute before the target time (0744L, 2044 EDT 14 May) due to

the decision made by Kissinger after the Cambodian broadcast. 506 That rescinding order

was then cancelled thirty-four minutes later, after Kissinger had conferred with Ford, but

the aircraft were returning to the Coral Sea low on fuel by that time. The first wave of

aircraft did not drop their armament on Kompong Som. 507 Secretary Schlesinger would

later report the mission as an “armed reconnaissance” much to the chagrin of President

Ford. 508

The ten Navy aircraft on the second wave of attacks launched on time at 0830 and

made the initial attacks on the Kompong Som area at the Ream airfield between 0905 and

0915. They reported expending 5,000 rounds of 20 millimeter cannon ammunition,

dropping 34 500-pound Mark-82 bombs and 14 Mark-20 Rockeye cluster bombs. The

504 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 95. 505 JCS 142203Z May 75, AFHRA. 506 JCS 150044Z May 75, AFHRA. 507 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 95-96. 508 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 562.

190 initial damage report included 22 enemy aircraft destroyed (mostly WW II era trainers)

and several hangers damaged. 509

By 1008L on 15 May, the Mayaguez crew had been rescued. The rescue

notification was accompanied by related questions as it was sent up the chain of

command. At 1002, the commander of the Coral Sea had radioed the 7 th Fleet command

for guidance on striking targets in the Kompong Som area. 510 At 1029 (0329Z 15 May or

2329 EDT 14 May) CINCPAC reported to the JCS that the crew members had told

Wilson personnel that as a “condition for release they promised air strikes would cease.”

CINCPAC, Adm Gayler, asked the JCS through the NMCC if the naval forces should continue air strikes on the Cambodian mainland. The CJCS and Secretary of Defense discussed the situation and at 1044 (2344 14 May EDT) the third and ultimately final strike was ordered. 511

The third Coral Sea wave launched precisely at 1020 and by 1050 its 2 F-4

Phantom II fighter, 6 A-7 Corsair II attack, and 2 A-6 Intruder attack aircraft began to attack Petroleum Oil and Lubricant (POL) targets in Sihanoukville (Kompong Som), the railroad yard, the Kompong Som civilian Port Facility, and adjacent Ream Naval facility.

Using a reported 28 Mk82 bombs, 8 Rockeye cluster bombs and 6 Mark-1 Walleye

“smart bombs,” at least one POL tank was destroyed and others damaged, two warehouses collapsed and several other buildings were damaged or destroyed.512 (See

Figures 13 and 14)

A JCS message issued at 1155 local (0055 EDT) ordered:

509 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 96. 510 Comptroller General , 97. 511 CINCPAC Command History , 27. 512 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 95-6.

191 Immediately cease all operations against related to seizure of Mayaguez. Disengage and withdraw all forces from operation area as soon as possible consistent with safety/self-defense. 513

The fourth strike was cancelled by the above message. Therefore, the Coral Sea changed the mission of the fourth launch of 4 F-4s, 4 A-7s and 2 A-6 aircraft from attacking Kompong Som to providing close air support for the Marines on Koh Tang under the direction of the ABCCC. The ABCCC did order the 4 A-7s to attack and sink a

Cambodian gunboat, but none of the navy aircraft were used for close air support on Koh

Tang. 514 This last wave completed its mission and the aircraft returned to the Coral Sea by 1335 on 15 May. The navy aircraft incurred no combat damage. The last contingency launch was cancelled to clear the carrier deck for helicopter recovery operations and to assist the operations on Koh Tang Island. 515

As often happens, the initial reports of the effectiveness of the attacks were inaccurate. Although initial reports credited air strikes against Ream Airfield with destroying 17 aircraft, later visual analysis concluded there was only 12 aircraft at Ream at the time of the attack and 6 were left unharmed, only 3 were destroyed, 2 were damaged and 1 was previously out of commission. Also, it was verified the refinery that was bombed had been non-functional for years. 516

Those reports did not deter the military and political leadership from defending the bombings. Responding to a reporter’s question about the use of air power against the

Cambodian mainland, the President stated, “I am not going to risk the life of one Marine.

I’d never forgive myself if we didn’t do this and 2400 Cambodians attacked the

Marines.” Secretary Schlesinger agreed and termed the bombings as a “very prudent,

513 JCS 150455Z May 75, AFHRA; CINCPAC Command History , 28. 514 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 95-6. 515 Ibid. 516 Comptroller General , 97.

192 limited use of force, clearly motivated by a desire to protect the Marines on the island.” 517

Admiral Gayler noted “the threat of bombing of the Cambodian mainland did, in fact, influence the Cambodian’s decision to release the crew…” and that impact was verified by the captain of the M ayaguez. 518 That assertion will be discussed further in the analysis section.

The mainland attacks were over, but the ramifications of the cancellations were not. President Ford was not satisfied with the alacrity of the attacks, the fact that two of the four attacks scheduled did not drop ordnance, and his perception the Secretary of

Defense and the military were questioning or even worse ignoring his orders.519 But at that point in time on the evening of 14 May, the President’s attention was clearly on the crew of the Mayaguez.

517 Comptroller General, 96. 518 CINCPAC 131338Z Feb 76, AFHRA. 519 Ford, A Time to Heal, 283. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 570.

193 Chapter 21: Ford Celebrates—Orders Cessation

At 2210 14 May EDT, President Ford ushered the Prime Minister of the

Netherlands out of the State dining room and back to the Red Room for liqueurs and then bid him a good night at 2250. At 2300 Ford returned to the Oval Office along with

Kissinger, Scowcroft, Rumsfeld, Hartman, Marsh, Nessen and Max Friedersdorf, Ford’s

Assistant for Legislative Affairs. Secretary James Schlesinger called the President to inform him that the pilot of a P-3 reconnaissance plane had spotted a fishing vessel sailing toward Koh Tang with Caucasians reportedly on board. Minutes later, at 2308, one minute after Capt Miller and the crew boarded the Wilson , Schlesinger telephoned again with breathtaking news. The USS Wilson had intercepted the fishing vessel and the men waving white flags were the crew members of Mayaguez . The entire crew had been recovered. Ford recalled, “I dropped the phone into its cradle and let my emotions show.

‘They’re all safe,’ I said. ‘We got them all out. Thank God. It went perfectly. It just went great.’ The President, Kissinger, Rumsfeld and the others erupted with whoops of joy.” 520 The President would later recall:

We had all gone through three days of strain and of course it was mounting in its tension. The relief that we received from that news, you know, you just can’t understand or believe what a wonderful feeling it was because everything seemed to have worked including getting the final good results. Unfortunately we didn’t know the loss of life of the Marines that had taken place, but the recovery of the crew, I don’t know it just broke the ice. 521

The picture of the group celebrating in their tuxedos is saved for posterity. (See

Figure 15).

520 Ford, A Time to Heal 283; Kissinger, Years of Renewal , 570. 521 Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 216.

194 Despite the revelry and relief of that moment, there were negative aspects not far beneath the surface. Kissinger recalled:

In my experience, even when a crisis ends amidst elation—as this one surely did—a letdown nearly inevitably follows. First, because the moment of triumph reminds us that foreign policy knows no resting place and that its every success is usually an admission ticket to a new set of decisions. More importantly, the postmortem often reveals some previously unsuspected problems in need of attention. In the case of the Mayaguez, amidst pride in what had been accomplished, there was the nagging feeling that we must not again face a crisis with the procedures and bureaucratic confusion that had beset our conduct in this case. 522

The celebration became a reminder of the lack of rapport between President Ford and Schlesinger. Joseph Laitin, Schlesinger’s spokesman committed a severe breach of protocol by making a public announcement of the return of the crew without consulting the White House. 523 A revelation of that import is without a doubt reserved for the highest official connected with the operation, in this case the President. The premature announcement lessened the drama and the impact of the Presidents subsequent actions.

Despite that distraction, Ford immediately gave orders to the Joint Chiefs that the

Marines on Koh Tang should prepare to disengage as soon as possible. 524 After he changed out of the tuxedo he had worn to the state dinner, Ford walked the short distance to the White House Briefing Room and at approximately 2300 read a brief statement to the American people over radio and TV:

At my direction, the United States forces tonight boarded the American merchant ship Mayaguez and landed at the island of Koh Tang for the purpose of rescuing the crew and the ship, which had been illegally seized by Cambodian forces. They also conducted supporting strikes against nearby military installations. I have now received information that the vessel has been recovered intact and the entire crew has been rescued. The forces that have successfully accomplished this mission are still under hostile fire, but are preparing to disengage. I wish to express my deep appreciation and that of the entire nation to the units and the men for their valor and their sacrifice.” 525

522 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 570. 523 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 570. 524 Ford, A Time to Heal, 283 . 525 Ford Press Release, 15 May 1975, Gerald Ford Library.

195 Finally, Ford sent identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the President

Pro Tem of the Senate explaining the actions of the previous three days in order to attempt to comply with the War Powers Act. Ford, exhausted from the tension, then retired to his residence where he received one more call from Schlesinger. After a brief discussion, Ford then went quickly to sleep and eschewing his normal routine of early rising, hit the snooze button on his alarm the next morning. 526

Kissinger called Ford’s televised announcement “the end of the Mayaguez crisis.” 527 In a sense, Kissinger was correct. The recovery of the Mayaguez and her crew made any further diplomatic, economic or informational efforts unnecessary. The military aspect of the Mayaguez incident was another matter entirely. To the Marines, airmen and sailors still in combat the crisis was far from over. The battle raged even more fiercely than ever on Koh Tang where serious shortages of men, material, daylight and acceptable options were occurring.

526 Ford, A Time to Heal, 283 . 527 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 570.

196 Chapter 22: Second Wave and Extraction

As the fighting continued on Koh Tang, the Marines on the island impatiently

anticipated the arrival of reinforcements. But their wishes would not be granted as

expeditiously as they hoped and a very real danger loomed they might not ever be. The

second wave of Marine landings almost didn’t occur. After the Mayaguez crew was rescued, there was confusion, conflicting orders and a debate over whether there would even be a second wave of landings at Koh Tang. Lt Col Austin, the assault ground commander at Koh Tang recalled that he was told about 1000 or 1030 by the Airborne

Command and Control Center (ABCCC) call sign “Cricket,” in response to his earlier requests for information as to when the second wave would arrive that the second wave would not be inserted. 528

The second wave of eleven helicopters with their transported Marines had originally been scheduled to land on Koh Tang at 1000G 15 May ( 2300 14 May EDT ). 529

However, due to the unexpected punishment the first wave experienced and the loss of

eight helicopters, the five helicopters which comprised the second wave contained only

127 Marines, far fewer than the 280 originally planned to reinforce the first wave. Their

departure time from Utapao was also not according to the original plan and was delayed

from 0800 to between 0900 and 1000. The helicopters carried elements of 2 nd Battalion’s

Company E under Captain Mychael E. Stahl and Company G under Captain James

Davis, whose group had returned to Utapao after aborting the first landing with Knife 22

528 Austin interview. 529 Comptroller General , 93.

197 and landing on the Thai Coast. 530 The two hour flight seemed longer to the Marines aboard the helicopters who were eager to support their on Koh Tang Island.531

Lt Col Austin, the Marine assault commander on the island was still attempting to link his command group with the Marines on the western landing zone when he learned that the reinforcements had not left Utapao as scheduled. He and Lt Keith, the commander of forces on the western beach both emphatically informed the Airborne

Battlefield Command and Control Center that additional forces were definitely required and soon. 532 Neither of the Marines commanding forces on the island had been informed that the crew had been recovered, and they were still attempting to complete their assigned mission to capture the island and rescue any crew members found. However, their most immediate and primary concern was their commands’ ability to survive the current situation. 533

When the entire Mayaguez crew was safely aboard the USS Wilson and the report was broadcast at 1008 L (2108 EDT 14 May) , Lt Gen Burns, 7AF/USSAG, commander

asked CINCPAC and the JCS for instructions: should the assault against Koh Tang be

continued or should the Marines be withdrawn? Burns stated in a situation report that he

was (as of 1035L) attempting to insert additional Marines onto Koh Tang. 534 CINCPAC,

at 1032 verbally authorized the helicopter flow be held up so that suppressive air support

could be used. 535 It should be noted that at 1035G there were no helicopters at Koh Tang

and the first 2 helicopters of the second wave were still some 35-40 minutes from Koh

530 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan 17A ; Assault on Koh Tang, 23. 531 Davis interview by author Dec 07. 532 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan 17A 533 Comptroller General, 93; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan 17A; Mayaguez documentary. 534 ComUSSAG/7AF 150400Z May 75, AFHRA. 535 JCS after action report, no date; 388TFW 151200Z May 75, AFHRA.

198 Tang. It is possible that the ABCCC was referring to the CINCPAC order to stop the

helicopter landings when he informed the ground commander that the second wave

would not be landed.536

At 1110 L (0010 EDT on May 15) the Secretary of Defense ordered the extraction

of the Marines on Koh Tang to occur without further casualties, if possible. Schlesinger

had received reports (apparently from Gen Burns, ComUSSAG/7AF) minutes earlier the

Marine assault force was “reported to be in a good position with the opposition forced

back.”537

There was a struggle between the engaged commander and the staffs in

Washington and Hawaii over whether to hold the island. Burns believed CINCPAC,

Adm Gayler wanted to punish the Cambodians by continuing the operation and holding

Koh Tang Island for the originally planned 48 hours. The Chairman, General Jones did

not agree with continuing the attacks, and as the President had given orders to disengage,

Jones prevailed. 538

Adm Gayler was advised by the JCS at 1120 on May 15 (0020 EDT) that

leadership had no desire for the Marines to capture Koh Tang or to remain on the island

and that an extraction should be prepared. As a result, he ordered Lt Gen Burns not to

land additional Marines on Koh Tang. 539 ComUSSAG/7AF ordered the helicopters sometime between 1120 and 1200 (via the ABCCC) to return to base without offloading the second wave. 540

536 Austin interview. 537 Comptroller General , 93. 538 Burns interview, 455. 539 Comptroller General , 93. 540 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 62.

199 The report, shortly after 1100G, of the Marines being in good position was not the

estimate of the situation of the Marines on Koh Tang. Lt Col Austin, the Assault Ground

Commander had repeatedly asked the ABCCC about reinforcements. Lt Keith, the

Company G Executive Officer and the senior Marine in the western landing zone location during the morning, was also requesting reinforcements. Shortly before 1200G Keith was told by the ABCCC, that reinforcements were available, but they would not be inserted unless the landing zone was secure. He was subsequently informed that the reinforcements were returning to base. Lt Keith then replied his command would be endangered if the reinforcements did return to base, and he reported the landing zone safe in order to persuade the ABCCC to land reinforcements.541

The Marines on the ground saw the need for reinforcements for at least two

reasons. First, as seen by the commanders in the western landing zone, reinforcements

were needed because the situation was critical due to pressure from the enemy, they had

not accomplished a link-up with the other forces on the island and ammunition and other

supplies were running low. 542 Second, the commander of the assault force on Koh Tang

needed reinforcement since, to his knowledge, he still had the mission of searching for

the crew of the Mayaguez . The Assault Command Group and Marines in the other

locations had not been informed that the Mayaguez crew had been recovered by the

Wilson at 1007L.543

As Burns passed the order to the helicopters and the second wave of Marines to return to Thailand, Col Johnson, the commander of the Marine Task Group at Utapao

541 James D. Keith (1 st Lt USMC), taped interview by CINCPAC IG, 9 June 75, Gerald Ford Library, Hereafter cited as Keith interview; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 63. 542 Keith Interview; James McDaniel (2 nd Lt, USMC) 9 June 75, Gerald Ford Library, Hereafter cited as McDaniel interview; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 63. 543 Austin interview.

200 heard the order. Johnson was aware the Mayaguez and crew had been recovered, but was

not aware the Marines on Koh Tang had not been informed of the recovery. 544 While the

bewildered Marines aboard the helicopters questioned the validity of the order, Johnson

contacted Burns and argued that reinforcements were necessary to ensure a safe

extraction of the assault force. Burns agreed and placed the helicopters in orbit off Koh

Tang Island while he re-engaged with Adm Gayler. Burns requested permission to land

the second wave saying that he had doubts the force on the island could cover its own

withdrawal or keep from being overrun overnight if it couldn’t be withdrawn. 545 Gayler

approved the request and informed Washington. 546

The JCS sent a formal message at 1155L (0055EDT) that stated, “JCS directs cease all offensive operations related to seizure of Mayaguez . Disengage and withdraw

as soon as possible consistent with safety and self-defense.” 547 CJCS Jones would later

say:

The first attack was launched toward the island as the crew was in the process of being released, and we got information about that with the attack in process. Why did the attack continue? Once the crew was rescued, and we knew it, then the basic action was to withdraw, but you sort of had to get control of the situation before you could withdraw. Therefore, the judgment was made that you had better land the second group in order to get control of the island. Then you could evacuate everybody, rather than just start evacuating and end up with people left on the island. 548

The conditions of safety and self-defense would only be satisfied with the completion of a second wave arrival. If the second wave had not been inserted, it would have been another four hours (approximately 1600G) before the 5 helicopters could have proceeded to Utapao, offloaded their passengers, refueled and returned to Koh Tang for extraction. The force of less than 100 Marines (excluding the wounded in action (WIA)

544 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 63. 545 Burns interview, 455. 546 Comptroller General 93. 547 JCS 150455Z May 75, AFHRA. 548 Jones interview, 206.

201 and 1 killed in action (KIA)) would have been in the western landing zone for at least those 4 hours unsupported. If the daylight extraction attempt would have failed, or partially failed, a small US Marine force probably would have had to remain overnight facing a larger, irritated Cambodian foe. The second wave would be attempted, but as was shown in the first wave of landings, there was no guarantee it would succeed.

Second Wave Arrives

The second wave reinforcement helicopters arrived at the island nearly simultaneously about 1200L (approximately two hours later than scheduled and six hours after the first wave) and were composed of 5 CH-53 and HH-53 helicopters with a total of 127 troops for insertion. The helicopters were: Jolly Green-42 which was called Jolly

Green-43 on the first wave assault on Koh Tang; Jolly Green-11 and Jolly Green-12 which participated in the insertion on the Holt ; Knife-51 from Utapao, which had been previously unusable due to mechanical problems; and Knife-52 that had arrived that day in Utapao, too late for the first wave. 549

The first 3 helicopters (Jolly Green-42, Knife-51, and Knife-52) attempted to insert their Marines in the eastern landing zone. The other two (Jolly Green-11 and Jolly

Green-12) were slated to deposit 53 troops in the western landing zone. Knife-52 had the least amount of fuel, so it attempted the first insertion. As it approached the eastern beach, heavy enemy fire once again broke out, including 50 caliber machine gun fire from a partially sunken Cambodian patrol boat in the eastern cove. Knife-52 sustained multiple hits, prompting the pilot, 1Lt Robert E. Rakitis to abort the landing and overfly the island. The enemy fire also caused the other helicopters, Jolly Green-42 and Knife-

549 Assault on Koh Tang , 24; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 60.

202 51, to abort their attempts on the eastern landing zone. All further attempts at the second

wave insertions would be to the western landing zone. 550

Knife-51 and Jolly Green-42, supported by the fire of the Marines on the western

beach and Air Force fighter/attack aircraft bombing and strafing runs inserted 47 troops

in the western landing zone and evacuated 5 wounded Marines. Both insertions were

successful despite receiving heavy small arms, machine gun and mortar fire that was

reported to be coming from as close as 50 meters. The 25 troops on Knife-51 were the

troops that had attempted to land on Knife-22 in the first wave, including Capt Davis. 551

Jolly Green-11 and -12 followed with successful offloads of Marine

reinforcements. Jolly Green-11 offloaded 27 Marines and patrolled just offshore to

provide suppressive covering fire for Jolly Green-12, which disembarked 26 Marines and

took wounded from the west beach on board. Both helicopters were damaged. 552

Knife-52, which was following Jolly Green-42 and Knife-51 after aborting its

eastern zone landing, had received major damage (including a bullet hole in a fuel tank)

in its insertion attempt. Hemorrhaging fuel, Knife-52 proceeded to return to base via the

Thailand coast with 27 Marines on board. Subsequently, Knife-52 made a forced landing

near the location of the wreck of Knife-22, which was stranded on the Thai coast after the

first wave. Knife-51 and Jolly Green-12 escorted Knife-52 on the return leg to Utapao via

the Thai coast location of the two downed aircraft and picked up Knife-52’s Marines and

aircrew. Jolly Green-11 and Jolly Green-42 remained in the Koh Tang area. Jolly

Green-42 assumed a search and rescue role after air refueling. Of the 5 helicopters in the

550 Assault on Koh Tang , 24; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 60. 551 Assault on Koh Tang , 24; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 60. 552 Assault on Koh Tang , 26. Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 60.

203 second wave, 4 were able to be involved in subsequent actions. Of the 127 troops

embarked in the second wave, 100 were offloaded, all in the western zone. In the second

wave, 6 of the wounded were evacuated to Utapao (1 on Jolly Green-12 and 5 on K-51).

This brought the total force in the western landing zone and vicinity to 205 personnel

(including the wounded who were not evacuated and the 1 killed). Twenty Marines and 5

Air force crewmembers remained in the eastern zone. 553

The western landing zone linkup occurred about the same time as the second

wave insertion. The area just south and inland of the western beach was still not secure.

By the time of the second wave, the command group of Marines under LtCol Austin had

fought their way to within yards of the landing zone. While decisions were being made

at headquarters about whether there would be a second wave insertion, Austin and Lt

Keith had devised a plan via radio where Lt Zales’ platoon would attack through the

Cambodian positions supported by fire from Lt McMenamin’s mortar platoon that was

attached to the command group and air strikes. 554 The air strikes required careful

instruction due to the close proximity of the enemy to friendly forces.

Since the forward air controller party and its dedicated radios were lost in the first

wave with Knife-31 off the eastern beach, Lt Keith with the western landing zone party

and Capt Barry Cassidy, a forward air controller with the command group, improvised

radio contact with the aircraft to aid in guiding close air support attacks. As aircraft made

runs in a general west-to-east direction, Keith and Cassidy would guide aircraft through

“dummy runs” where they did not drop ordnance or fire their until the A-7

aircraft would bisect the gap between the two Marine groups, placing a wing tip over

553 Assault on Koh Tang , 24; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 60. 554 Assault on Koh Tang , 24; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 18-19.

204 each. The aircraft would then make a “hot run” and attack the Cambodians. After the

last aircraft came off its run, McMenamin’s mortars opened fire and McDaniel’s platoon

laid down suppressive fire to support Zales’ assault. As the platoon assaulted the enemy

strong point, a Cambodian squad was repositioning itself to flank the attacking Marines.

McMenamin and the two Marines with him, Lance Corporals Larry Branson and Robert

Shelton could clearly observe the Cambodians movement and perceived the threat to

Zales and his platoon. Ignoring intense small arms fire, the three Marines charged across

fifty meters of open terrain to attack the Cambodians. Taken by surprise, the

Cambodians retreated into the jungle to the east. The link-up of the main body of Golf

Company with the command group took place at approximately 1245. 555

While the defensive perimeter around the west beach was increased to about 250

meters and consolidated, close air support increased and enemy resistance slowed. The

Marines in the northern perimeter of the western zone led by Staff Sergeants Tuitele and

Burnett overran two enemy bunkers close to the landing zone and were able to suppress

an additional enemy automatic weapon position that had been firing into the zone.

Personnel in the second wave then informed LtCol Austin and the Command Group that

the Mayaguez crew had been recovered. Although Austin had not been told officially, he

deduced that the continued buildup on the island and its seizure was no longer his

command’s mission. 556 In the afternoon, contingency plans were made to either stay for the night; evacuate the island by helicopter; or evacuate his force on small boats

555 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 19B 556 Comptroller General , 94.

205 dispatched from the Holt and the Wilson . In anticipation of staying overnight, Austin requested supplies and ammunition. 557

Communications between LtCol Austin and his commander/liaison at Utapao, Col

Johnson were described as, “at best sporadic.” The Marines activities on the ground

shifted to consolidating their position, destroying captured enemy stores, and requesting

air strikes against enemy positions while the commanders discussed options. After the

arrival of the second wave assault forces, subsequent linkup of the command group and

the west landing zone personnel and the increased air support, Cambodian military

activity decreased notably.558

Golf Company’s senior enlisted Marine, Gunnery Sgt McNemar and Sgt Tutele, the man who had silenced the machine gun position earlier in the day, advanced through enemy lines toward the east beach. Surprisingly enough, there was no opposition.

McNemar approached Capt James H. Davis, the company commander and said,

“Captain, let’s take this damn island.” Davis gave the matter consideration and decided that stretching his command across the island provided too great an opportunity for the

Khmer to counter-attack. He also knew LtCol Austin was considering extraction plans.

Davis said, “Gunny, this is my decision and I’m gonna have to live with it, but we’re not going to take this island.” He would later say that GySgt McNemar never forgave him for that, but followed orders. 559 With the brief reduction in hostile fire, extraction became the focus of the on-scene commanders.560

557 Austin interview; Keith interview; McDaniel interview; Hendricks interview; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 19B. 558 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 19B. 559 James H. Davis, interview by author, Feb 08, Hereafter cited as Davis interview Feb 08; See also Mayaguez documentary. 560 Keith interview; McDaniel interview; Hendricks interview.

206 Extraction From Koh Tang

The central question surrounding the extraction of the US personnel on Koh Tang

was how to accomplish it as swiftly and safely as possible given the paucity of

helicopters available. After the second wave landings described earlier, the task force

had a total of 4 usable CH- and HH-53 helicopters remaining in the operating area. The

closest helicopter reinforcements were aboard the USS Hancock , which had just reported

being almost 36 hours from reaching Koh Tang. 561 There were simply no more in the operating area. Considering each helicopter had a maximum capacity of approximately

25 Marines and with 230 Marines to evacuate under fire rescue, the best case scenario called for at least 2 successful evacuation attempts per aircraft. When the four-hour round trip time and distance to Utapao was factored in, the second group of 105 Marines would be exposed to a numerically superior force overnight or would be forced to attempt a night extraction.

The first attempt at extraction did not fare well. As described earlier, a rescue attempt was made at 0810L or shortly thereafter, for the 25 Marine and Air Force personnel of Knife-23 in the eastern landing zone, commanded by Lt. Cicere. The CH-53 helicopter making the attempt (Knife-52) received major damage and was out of commission on the Thai coast. Without informing or consulting the Marine commanders, the air crews of the 2 helicopters available at Koh Tang, Jolly Green-43 (formerly 42—it had switched call signs) and Jolly Green-11 made another extraction attempt on the eastern beach at approximately 1415L. 562

561 CTF 76 150945Z May 75, AFHRA. 562 Assault on Koh Tang , 26-28; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 64.

207 The coordination and execution of the effort was off. Air Force tactical aircraft

delivered tear gas to suppress resistance, but the drop was imprecise and the wind blew

the gas over the water and away from the Cambodian forces it was targeted against. Jolly

Green-43 piloted by Capt Roland Purser covered by Jolly-Green-11 under Lt Backlund

approached the beach under heavy fire and hovered well to the south of the survivors’

position. The instructions for the ground personnel to “pop smoke” and mark their

position with smoke grenades had apparently not been issued or were forgotten in the

excitement and the crew of Jolly Green-43 did not know the survivor’s exact position.

This attempt was also unsuccessful and resulted in major battle damage to Jolly Green-43

and the wounding of an Air Force crewmember, Sgt Bateson. The helicopter, escorted by

Jolly Green-11 proceeded on one engine to the Coral Sea which was less than 90 miles away and steaming closer to Koh Tang. By late afternoon, 1600L, there were only three helicopters (Jolly Green-11, -12 and Knife-51) available for the planned extractions. 563

However, just as the situation appeared to become untenable, several factors began to change in the favor of the US forces on the island.

Air strikes were by that time being facilitated by the arrival of OV-10 aircraft which were designed for the airborne mission and their pilots trained for combat situations. The OV-10s could loiter over the battlefield for hours and flew slower than the fighter and attack aircraft that had attempted to act as the airborne forward air controllers earlier. This allowed for a more consistent vectoring of attack aircraft and a more constant flow of communication between the ground forces and the aircraft assigned to attack the enemy. Controlling pilots would not have to relearn the US

563 Assault on Koh Tang , 28, 3-1, 4-2; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22.

208 and Cambodian positions after each bombing run. One pilot amongst many, Major Bob

Undorf would prove invaluable in that role through the rest of the battle. 564

Naval support to the island operation increased. The Wilson , Holt , and

ComDesRon 23 had been communicating with the ABCCC throughout the day and the

Wilson , after delivering the Mayaguez crew to their ship, informed the ABCCC that she

could provide naval gunfire support (NFGS) to the forces on Koh Tang Island, a type of

support that had not been utilized previously due to the concern for the safety of the

Mayaguez crew. The ABCCC provided 2 A-7s initially for fire control, and Wilson commenced NGFS about 1330L.565 The Wilson eventually fired over 155 5-inch rounds, attacking targets on the eastern side or northern tip of the island as directed by the

ABCCC. With the arrival of the OV-10s, the Wilson’s effectiveness increased and the 5- inch gun was responsible for destroying a partially submerge swift boat in the eastern cove that had caused significant helicopter damage, a machine gun, and silencing any fire the Wilson received from the island. 566

The extraction options immediately improved when it was decided the extraction helicopters would carry the Marines to the Coral Sea (closing to within 10 miles from

Koh Tang) or the Holt (within 5 miles). The Holt’s helicopter landing pad was not large enough for a CH- or HH-53 helicopter to land on, but a helicopter could hover over the pad and discharge its personnel. The aircraft carrier Coral Sea had a large landing deck, which provided more options for damaged aircraft or helicopters that carried wounded personnel. Regardless of which ship the helicopters returned to, the crews now had a

564 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 21; Davis interview Feb 08. 565 CINCPACFlt 171727Z May 75, AFHRA. 566 Wilson 151803Z May 75, AFHRA.

209 relatively short cycle time to the island. This made extraction feasible, but not

guaranteed. 567

Most importantly, unexpected relief came in the form of additional helicopter

support. A fourth helicopter, Jolly Green-44 piloted by Lt Robert Blough that had been

designated out-of-commission at Nakhon Phanom Air Base, in Thailand joined the

operation. Also, due to the dogged determination of the crew and some singularly

creative repairs performed by the crew and the maintenance personnel aboard the Coral

Sea , Jolly Green-43 was repaired and returned to Koh Tang by 1700L.568 The three helicopters (Jolly Green-12, Knife-51, and Jolly Green-44) arrived in the area from

Utapao within the hour, joined Jolly Green- 11 and -43 and the five helicopter crews began extraction operations. 569 The extraction phase consisted of two separate activities,

the rescue of the 25 Marines and Air Force personnel on the eastern landing zone and the

extraction of the main force of over 200 Marines on the western beach.

East Beach Extraction-Wave 1

By 1800, the ground fire on the east landing zone had not abated, but increasing

tactical air support was being provided. Between 1700 and 2100 hours, over 50 US close

air support attacks would rain down fire on Koh Tang Island. The OV-10 aircraft, call

sign “Nail” were able to pinpoint friendly positions in the neck area separating the two

beaches and began directing successful A-7 and F-4 attacks against enemy positions near

the Knife-23 survivors on the east beach. 570 The forward air controller, Maj Undorf also

567 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 63; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22; Assault on Koh Tang , 24. 568 CINCPACAF 1723402 May 75, AFHRA . Jolly Green-43’s repairs were remarkable. A fuel line had been shot out and the maintenance personnel aboard the helicopter and ship improvised by using a hose out of the ship’s galley. 569 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 64; Assault on Koh Tang , 28; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22. 570 Assault on Koh Tang , 29.

210 requested the Wilson launch its small personnel boat (gig) for support. 571 The Wilson 's commander, CDR Mark Rogers, ordered the gig in the water at 1756G to assist in the recovery of the Knife-23 crew and passengers from the eastern landing zone of Koh

Tang. The boat proceeded under gunship cover to within 300 yards of the beach and the downed Knife-23, where it received fire and returned fire with its 4 machine guns.572 At

1813L, an AC-130 gunship, Spectre-11 also commenced attacks in support of Jolly

Green-11's attempt to evacuate the personnel on the eastern LZ. 573 The Wilson 's gig was driven off by gunfire, but the presence of the gig and its suppressive fire drew fire in return, thus diverting gunfire from Jolly Green-11.574

Despite the sea and air cover fire support increasing markedly, Jolly Green-11 received intense ground fire from all quadrants as close as 50 meters as it landed on the east beach. 2nd Lt Cicere also stated that personnel in the eastern landing zone were not warned of the extraction time and were caught off guard.575 Nevertheless, the Marines and Air Force personnel made an orderly withdrawal, stopping to fire their weapons periodically. Pursuing Khmer fighters attempted to machine gun and hand grenade the helicopter and survivors, but were cut down by mini-gun and rifle fire as they made themselves visible on the open beach. An Air Force photographer on board Jolly Green-

11 reportedly directed fire toward the onrushing Khmer. 576 After a few minutes of furious fighting, Jolly Green-11 lifted off from the eastern landing zone with the

571 Robert Undorf (Major, USAF) interview by Capt Thomas Des Brisay (PACAF/XOAD), 5 Jun 75, AFHRA. Maj Undorf was an airborne forward air controller flying over Koh Tang Island. 572 Wilson 151803Z May 75, AFHAR ; “ Mayday for the Mayaguez ,” 258. 573 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 88. 574 Wilson 210900Z May 75, AFHRA. 575 Michael Cicere, (2 nd Lt USMC), CNA interview, 14 June 75; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 65. 576 Assault on Koh Tang , 30.

211 survivors of Knife-23 and flew to the Coral Sea , which by this time had closed to within

10 nm of Koh Tang. 577 But the action on the east beach was not complete.

One Marine had been reported as having sought shelter in the wreckage of Knife -

23 and the helicopter crews were prepared to affect a rescue. The helicopters briefly maneuvered away from the island as the OV-10s directed fire from the AC-130 and attack aircraft to further soften the jungle area around the wreckage of Knife-23. Jolly

Green-12 and Knife-51 then began the east beach rescue attempt. Jolly Green-12 under

Capt Barry entered a hover over the wreckage and dropped the penetrator, a device attached to a cable that rescue victims can climb on and be pulled aboard a helicopter, while Knife-51 hovered a few yards away, providing cover fire. After two minutes under intense fire, it was determined there were no survivors on board Knife-23 and the helicopters withdrew. Jolly Green-12, having sustained severe damage and a wounded crew member, flew to the Coral Sea. The aircraft would not fly again during the

Mayaguez operation. The Marine reportedly seen earlier on Knife-23 was later reported as killed in action. 578

West Beach Extraction-Waves 2 & 3

Once the survivors of Knife-23 were successfully rescued from the east landing zone, all further operational efforts were shifted to the evacuation of the west beach. The

Wilson’s gig maneuvered to the west beach to provide suppressive fire and provide a back-up rescue capability. 579 In addition, the air strikes called in by Maj Undorf and the other forward air controllers began to concentrate on the western beach.

577 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 65. 578 Assault on Koh Tang , 30; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22. 579 Assault on Koh Tang , 32; “Mayday for the Mayaguez ,” 258.

212 At about the time the survivors of Knife-23 were rescued, an event occurred

which surprised and probably frightened all involved in the ground fighting on Koh Tang,

American and Cambodian alike. The Marines fighting on the west beach were

encountering increased and mortar fire when they saw a US Air Force C-130

“Hercules” fly overhead and drop what appeared to be two pallets of

supplies attached to parachutes. To the Marines’ dismay, the pallets drifted away from

the US lines to the south center of the island. As the “supplies” disappeared below the

tree-line, a tremendous explosion rocked the island and knocked several Marines off their

feet. What appeared to be supplies was actually a BLU-82 bomb, the most powerful

conventional (non-nuclear) weapon in the US inventory with a 15,000 pound payload. In

comparison, most of the other bombs dropped on the island had a 500 pound payload.

The “daisy cutter” bomb, designed to clear landing zones in dense jungle, had been

ordered to be dropped a safe distance from the US lines, but close enough to the Khmer

to stun those it did not kill. The Marines had not been notified of the planned bomb

attack and requested it not be repeated. 580

Another surprise was in store for the Marines on Koh Tang. Despite the fact that

extraction plans had been discussed, no advance warning was given to LtCol Austin, the

ground commander to position his Marines for a rapid extraction. 581 About 1900L, a

helicopter (Knife-51) suddenly appeared, rounding the northern end of Koh Tang.

Knife-51 had provided covering fire during the eastern landing zone extraction and was

low on fuel. Nevertheless, the pilot, Lt Richard Brims informed Austin’s command

580 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 85; “Mayday for the Mayaguez ,” 258. 581 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 65.

213 group there were 4 other helicopters following his.582 Brims was not aware that there

were only 2 other helicopters following him. Jolly Green-11 and -12 had been damaged

beyond repair and were not returning to action.

The sun had already set and darkness arrived when Knife-51 began its extraction

run. Heavy enemy fire once again broke out as the helicopter approached the beach,

including mortar-launched flares and rocket-propelled grenades. But the darkness

affected both sides. Brims had difficulty judging the helicopter’s elevation over the

beach to affect his hover and the USAF close air support aircraft could not see the Khmer

targets that had been marked by the forward air controllers smoke . They did not

drop bombs or strafe the enemy positions. In the absence of covering air fire, the Marines

on the ground provided suppressing fire and muzzle flashes dotted the western side of the

island. The Cambodians also apparently had difficulty seeing the helicopter and the

Marines rushing toward it. Almost all of their heavy fire missed the aircraft and none of

the Marines evacuated were wounded during the extraction. 583

Knife-51 successfully evacuated 41 Marines while amazingly taking minimal

damage. Among the 41 were LtCol Austin and the command group. Capt Davis and

Austin had discussed the situation on the island and Davis had told Austin, “You had the

day shift, I’ll take the night.” Austin agreed to let Davis oversee the final withdrawal. 584

Brims lifted his aircraft off the beach and flew to the Coral Sea to offload the personnel,

refuel, inspect for damage and attempt a return to Koh Tang. 585

582 Austin interview; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 65; Assault on Koh Tang, 32. 583 Assault on Koh Tang , 32 and Atch 1. 584 Davis interview, Feb 08. 585 Assault on Koh Tang , 32; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22

214 Immediately following Knife-51, Jolly Green-43 piloted by Capt Purser returned

from emergency repairs on the Coral Sea and attempted an extraction on the darkened west beach. The Wilson's gig by that time had moved to the western side of Koh Tang where it added suppressive fire supporting the extraction from the western landing zone.

Jolly Green-43, whose crew made the run despite the fact that all of its internal machine guns were inoperative, were supported by the gig’s suppressive fire and continued heavy fire from Marines on the ground. Purser’s crew also fired M-16s out of the aircraft’s windows and doors. Jolly Green-43 lifted off with 54 rescued Marines, more than double the normal combat load configuration. It also suffered minimal damage during the extraction. But there were still over 100 Marines on the west beach to extract and the darkness was now complete. 586 Extraction would not be a simple task.

Jolly Green-44, which had been orbiting while Jolly Green-43 had completed its extraction, flew into the landing zone. The Marine perimeter, which had systematically contracted as the personnel diminished, was by that time completely within 50 meters of the landing zone. The Marines informed the OV-10 forward air controllers of their withdrawal. The controllers, taking advantage of the separation between enemy and friendly positions began strafing the Cambodians, with great effect. Jolly Green-44’s pilot, Lt Robert Blough, lifted off of the beach with 34 Marines, one of which was dangling out of the aircraft while attempting to fire at the Cambodians, and having sustained no damage. 587

In seven minutes, from approximately 1850 to 1857L, 129 Marines had been evacuated from the west beach. Successful extraction of the remainder was not

586 Assault on Koh Tang , 32 and Atch 1; Mayaguez documentary; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 65; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22. 587 Assault on Koh Tang , 33 and Atch 1.

215 guaranteed however. There were no helicopters remaining near Koh Tang Island and

approximately 70 Marines were on the beach arrayed in a rapidly decreasing semi-circle.

Blough decided to facilitate the rapid extraction of the remaining Marines by

depositing the 34 Marines he had just extracted on the USS Holt , which was positioned

just off Koh Tang and much closer than the Coral Sea. The Holt’s landing pad was

however, not designed for a helicopter as large as the HH-53.

Offloading troops on the Holt during the day was a challenge, as demonstrated earlier during the recovery of the Mayaguez. Darkness added exponentially to the degree

of difficulty of the maneuver. Further complicating matters, the helicopter’s landing

lights had been shot out. The only lighting consisted of red landing lights on the pad

itself. Also, due to obstacles presented by the ship’s (unlit) superstructure, the helicopter

had to be brought in at an angle to avoid striking the superstructure with its rotor blades.

It was estimated there was only a two foot clearance between the blades and the

superstructure. Blough had to be given verbal direction by a flight mechanic to locate the

proper position. He made two aborted attempts, and then on the third, he was able to

hover over the landing pad with the main gear just touching and the tail and rear wheels

hanging over the water. The Marines offloaded through the front door (the back was over

the water) and entered the Holt. After the successful offload, Jolly Green-44 departed to

immediately return to the west landing zone. 588

As the final phases of extractions progressed, the situation on the ground became increasingly precarious. Radio contact between the helicopters and the remaining ground force was lost for a distressing period, which ended at approximately 1925 local. The ground commander of the remaining troops, Capt Davis reported his position might be

588 Assault on Koh Tang , 33 and Atch 1.

216 overrun within 15 minutes and two minutes later reiterated the urgency of his situation. 589

The Marines were literally on the beach with their boots in the water. There was no more ground to give. 590 Furthermore, the two on-station forward air controller aircraft were running short of fuel and were handing off the duty to two pilots new to the situation.

One forward air controller, Nail 68, unable to contact the ground forces by radio, made a low-level pass over the beach with his lights on, exposing himself to enemy fire and verified there remained friendly forces to recover. 591

Within five minutes, Lt Blough and Jolly Green-44, assisted by supporting fire from an AC-130 gunship and the Wilson’s gig returned from the Holt and landed near a strobe light set out by the Marines. Under fire once again, Jolly Green-44 loaded 40

Marines on board and departed for the Coral Sea , reporting that there was one load of

Marines remaining on the beach. 592 Knife-51 was enroute.

Knife-51 returned from the Coral Sea as the last realistic hope for the recovery of the over 30 Marines on the ground. The challenge for the pilot, Lt Brims was to find the landing zone. As Knife-51 approached in the darkness, Nail 69, the OV-10 forward air control aircraft circled over the western landing zone, switching his landing lights on and off to guide Knife-51 to the landing zone. Each time he did so, Nail 69 drew enemy fire, which the AC-130 Spectre gunship circling overhead suppressed. In turn, Knife-51 switched his landing lights on and off to facilitate the approach. Many landing illusions can occur at night over water with lights flashing on and off. The water reflects the light, making it hard to distinguish from the stars in the sky. When those challenges were

589 Assault on Koh Tang , 35 and Atch 1. 590 Davis interview, Feb 08. 591 Assault on Koh Tang , 35. 592 Ibid.

217 combined with the muzzle flashes from the enemy and friendly forces and the flares

which were accidentally dropped in the water, the pilot had difficulty locating the small

landing zone. Finally, after three unsuccessful approach attempts, Lt Brims was able to

land Knife-51 on the beach. 593

Despite the supporting suppressive fire from the AC-Spectre gunship, the OV-10

and the Wilson’s gig, along with Knife-51-s miniguns, enemy fire was still directed at the

landing area, although it was significantly less than earlier experienced. After most of the

Marines were aboard the aircraft, and despite darkness and enemy fire, an Air Force

pararescueman left Knife-51 and ran unescorted to the tree line to ensure no Marines

were left behind. He found two Marines still in the area and escorted them to the aircraft.

Seeing their charges aboard, the last two Marines to board the aircraft and to leave were

Gunnery Sergeant McNemar and Capt Davis. 594 The final extraction (by Knife-51) of 29

personnel occurred at 2010L. The last Marines to leave Koh Tang Island departed

approximately 14 hours after the first had arrived. It was a long 14 hours.

It was determined almost immediately to terminate further rescue operations. The

Wilson recovered the gig on the eastern side of Koh Tang at 2025L. Of the 5 helicopters involved in the extraction commencing at 1810L, 3 received major battle damage. 595

The helicopter crews of Jolly Green-44 and Knife-51 deposited the last Marines

on the Coral Sea . It is obvious that during a night extraction under heavy fire, it would

be difficult at best to account for all personnel. Once a proper headcount was made of the

Marines on the Holt, Wilson and Coral Sea, three Marines, Lance Corporal Joseph N.

593 Assault on Koh Tang , 35. 594 Assault on Koh Tang , 36; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 65. 595 56-SOW Nakhon Phanom 191200Z May 75, AFHRA.

218 Hargrove, Private First Class Gary C. Hall and Private Danny G. Marshall, were declared

MIA.

An investigation revealed that the three were members of a machine gun team

from “E Company” that was assigned to the left of Capt Davis’ “G” Company. The last

member of Marine force to see them alive was Sergeant Carl Anderson of Company “E.”

At approximately 2000L, Anderson ordered Hall, Hargrove and Marshall to move to a

new position on Davis’ left and then to board the next helicopter. After that helicopter

had lifted off, and before the liftoff of Knife-51, the final helicopter, Davis, McNemar

and the Air Force pararescueman conducted a search of the beach. Their search failed to

reveal any Marines in the beach area. 596

When it was discovered that the three Marines were missing, R.T.

Coogan, the Task Force 73 commander aboard the Coral Sea convened a meeting to

explore options regarding the missing Marines. LtCol Austin, Capt Davis, Gunnery

Sergeant McNemar and a SEAL team commander met with the Admiral. Coogan asked

the SEAL team commander to take his team in a gig to the island under a white flag the

next day to attempt to find the missing Marines. The commander declined but

volunteered to take his team in on a night raid. That offer was rejected by Coogan as was

an offer by Davis and McNemar to take the gig under the white flag along with a sailor to

drive the boat. Davis and Austin then began a very heated exchange with the Admiral

over the prospect of leaving the men. Davis was especially vocal until Coogan pointed a

finger at Davis and said, “Captain, you don’t talk to me like that.” The conversation was

over. 597

596 HQ Marine Corps Point paper, “ Mayaguez” 31 Jul 1975, GRC. 597 James Davis, author interview Apr 08. This is also detailed in Wetterhan’s The Last Battle, 254.

219 In deliberating on sending a force back to Koh Tang to attempt a rescue, Admiral

Coogan faced a difficult decision. He had to weigh the risking the lives the tired Marines

he had safely aboard the three ships against the possibility that one or all of the three

missing Marines were alive. He had only three helicopters functional and based on the

previous day’s experience, it was doubtful an attack on the island would meet with any

success. He had also been ordered by the Secretary of Defense to cease all offensive

operations. There would be no further landings on Koh Tang Island.

The next morning Commander Rodgers and the Wilson returned to Koh Tang at first light to search for any US survivors on the island. They steamed within a few hundred yards of the island and most of the crew and the Marine and Air Force survivors they had retrieved out of the ocean scanned the island. Smoke, a few and the remains of battle were visible. The only seen were a few Cambodians on the beach who vanished into the trees as they spotted the Wilson. 598

The total US casualties reported for the Mayaguez operation (all at Koh Tang) were 15 killed in action, 3 missing in action, 49 wounded in action and 30 additional

Marines injured by non-hostile causes. The status of the three Marines reported missing in action, Hall Hargrove and Marshall was later changed to “killed in action.”599 These numbers do not include the 23 Air Force security police and crewmen killed in the helicopter crash on 13 May.

On the evening of 15 May, the order was passed to remove all Marine forces from

Thailand. This deployment was completed on 16 May 1975, utilizing Air Force C-141 aircraft. The landing force, embarked aboard the Coral Sea, Wilson and Holt, sailed for

598 Rodgers, “Mayday for the Mayaguez ,” 258. 599 Assault on Koh Tang , 37; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 22A.

220 Subic Bay and arrived there on 20 May 1975. The Marines from 1 st Battalion, 4 th

Regiment that had boarded the Mayaguez were returned to their parent organization upon their arrival at Subic Bay. The elements of the 2 nd Battalion, 9 th Regiment who had landed on Koh Tang were flown back to Okinawa from the Philippines on 21 May. Task

Group 79.9 was deactivated upon the Marine forces’ return to Okinawa. 600

600 Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 23.

221 PART V: MAYAGUEZ AFTERMATH

Chapter 23: The Final NSC Meeting 15 May

The National Security Council met to discuss the Mayaguez situation a final time,

for twenty minutes at 4:00 pm on May 15 th , after the rescue of the Mayaguez and crew.

The primary attendees were largely the same as previous meetings, with the notable

exception of Vice President Rockefeller. Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Jones Colby,

Ingersoll, Clements, Rumsfeld, Hartmann, Scowcroft and Smyser were in attendance. 601

This gathering as could be expected was a self-congratulatory exercise as well as a brief

“lessons learned” discussion and a review of international reaction. What might have not

been expected was Ford and Kissinger’s of the military regarding its

responsiveness.

Colby began with a report on the foreign reaction. There were no Cambodian

reactions to the US military action announced since Cambodian Information Minister Hu

Nimm had made the previously discussed statement on Phnom Penh Radio the night

before during which he “rationalized” the seizure of the vessel. Nimm claimed that the

Mayaguez was on an intelligence mission but stated several times that the Cambodian

government had no desire to provoke the US and the Mayaguez had been halted only for

questioning. In diplomatic protest to the US basing the attacks from Thailand, the Thai

government had decided to expel a member of the US mission in Bangkok and recall the

Thai ambassador from Washington for consultations. 602 Thai newspapers were urging

the government to immediately close all US bases in Thailand and publicize all

601 NSC Meeting Minutes, 15 May 1975, Gerald Ford Library, 1. Hereafter cited as NSC 15 May. 602 Recalling an ambassador is a form of diplomatic protest between governments.

222 agreements between the US and Thailand. Leftist Thai politicians were holding a rally in

Bangkok to demand that all US troops leave Thailand within ten days. The Thai political left reportedly believed it was time to create a political crisis for the US-friendly Khukrit government. Thai military leaders, on the other hand, privately continued to support US actions. 603

The reaction from Communist countries was mixed, but was limited to verbal responses at most. Speaking at a Peking banquet earlier that day, Chinese Vice Premier

Li Xiannian (later President) accused the US of “an outright act of piracy,” and said that

“Cambodia took legitimate measures against the ship to safeguard her state .”

He added that the US elevated the significance of the actions when it bombed Cambodia and “should be condemned by world public opinion.” The newly consolidated

Vietnamese government in Hanoi echoed the piracy claim and noted the US had not

“learned from its defeats in Vietnam and Cambodia.” Soviet, Eastern European, and

Cuban media had run reports on the Mayaguez incident without editorial comment. 604

Western countries and US allies were also not demonstrative in their reactions. A

Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman had stated that a “container ship on open waters must not be subject to seizure” and that his government viewed the US military response as “limited.” Most western countries had little official reaction and the British and West

German press was “generally supportive.” Press reaction from South Korea, Taiwan and

Australia was also “favorable.” Ingersoll added that Ministers from the Organization of

American States “were very pleased.” 605

603 NSC 15 May, 1. 604 Ibid, 2-3. 605 Ibid, 3-4.

223 Ford congratulated Schlesinger and the Defense Department on “a job well done”

and asked for a damage report on the Kompong Som area. Jones said they weren’t

confident the early reports were accurate. He was correct. They were not accurate. He

showed the only photograph they had so far which showed damage to buildings in the

Ream airfield area. Jones also briefed that extensive damage had been reportedly

inflicted on aircraft at the airport. 606 Kissinger asked if any boats had been sunk and

Jones replied that some had been sunk, but they did not know how many.

Kissinger then asked a leading question and Jones took the bait. Kissinger asked

if the US aircraft used in the attack were land aircraft. Jones reported that only naval

aircraft from the Coral Sea were used. He also incorrectly reported that there had been

four waves of aircraft. The first was described as an “armed reconnaissance” meaning

that they did not drop any bombs. Jones added the aircrews had reportedly spotted

foreign shipping in the port and did not want to risk damaging those ships. The other

three waves supposedly went against the airport, oil facilities and support buildings. 607 In

fact, there had only been three total waves of attacks against the mainland with the fourth

being cancelled with the concurrence of Schlesinger. 608 This decision would come back

to haunt the Secretary of Defense.

Moving on to the main operations, Jones reported that the US had landed 240

Marines on Koh Tang and boarded the Mayaguez with 40 more Marines. His initial

report on casualties was also far off the mark. He reported American casualties as one

killed in action, one missing and thirty wounded, considerably lighter than thought the

606 This report was later proven erroneous. The damage to aircraft was minimal. See Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 64. 607 NSC 15 May, 4. 608 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 64.

224 previous night. Three helicopters were reportedly lost and Jones noted heavy battle

damage had occurred to the equipment. He also correctly noted the force had come

dangerously close to running out of helicopters to complete the operation and the Marines

on Koh Tang had almost been forced to spend the night on the island. When asked by the

President, Jones reported all the Marines from the island, the Mayaguez operation and

Thailand were now on the Coral Sea. 609

Kissinger asked Jones how many Cambodians had in fact been on the island, and

Jones admitted they still did not know, but that they “were obviously well armed.” Ford opined that was why the Cambodians had moved the Mayaguez there from Poulo Wai.

Kissinger followed by asking where the crew had been released from and Jones

incorrectly reported Kompong Som. Kissinger used that “fact” to deduce that the

“operation was really centrally controlled.” Jones then related that the Mayaguez crew

had brought a message that asked the US to stop the bombing and the bombing had

stopped “shortly thereafter” even though there were “one or two more runs” planned.

Kissinger had been waiting for this moment. He asked, “How many aircraft were used

altogether?” Jones answered that “about 32 to 40” had been used. Kissinger noted that

there had been 81 aircraft on the carrier. An irritated Ford and Kissinger interrupted the

meeting to step outside the door for about three minutes.

Ford, his face reddening, asked Kissinger if there was any misunderstanding

about Ford’s orders to continue the air strikes on Kompong Som. Kissinger, avoiding the

opportunity to remind Ford that Kissinger had himself initially interrupted the first

wave’s bombing attack, agreed that it was clear Ford had ordered four assault waves.

Kissinger would later state that it was the number of aircraft used overall that was the

609 NSC 15 May, 4-5.

225 main cause of Ford’s consternation and, “this time, the friction was not between

Schlesinger and me. It was President Ford, the Commander in Chief, who felt that he had not been kept adequately informed. He learned of some key decisions only at the final wrap-up meeting and then only by accident. The President had agreed to use planes from the Coral Sea and not B-52s on the grounds that a maximum effort be made, that at least four separate strikes be undertaken and that they not end until he issued a direct order to that effect.” 610

When they returned to the meeting, Ford “coldly” ordered Schlesinger to produce a “full factual report giving a summary and chronology of what happened” to include orders, summary results and “indications of what we did when.” 611

Shifting gears, Ford then asked where the Mayaguez was at that time. Jones

reported the ship was steaming under her own power toward Singapore. Ford noted a

“job well done” and asked to proceed to the next item on the agenda. 612 The NSC action

on the Mayaguez had concluded, but the discussion over the Kompong Som bombings

was far from over.

610 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 571. 611 NSC 15 May, 5; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 571. 612 NSC 15 May, 6.

226 Chapter 24: Secretary of Defense Schlesinger

At the daily morning meeting on 16 May, between Ford, Kissinger and

Scowcroft, Ford was still irate over the issue of the truncated Kompong Som bombings.

He was that the first wave had not used its ordnance. He realized there could have been

“some confusion due to the pause to discuss the Khmer Rouge statement; what rankled

him was that he had never been told of the ‘armed reconnaissance’.” He had been left

with the opposite impression when Schlesinger had had reported, “first strike completed.”

Above all, Ford could not forgive cancellation of the first strike. 613 Kissinger and

Scowcroft did nothing to assuage Ford’s anger:

FORD: My recollection is I told (CNO Admiral James) Holloway to continue the strikes until I said to stop. SCOWCROFT: That is my recollection. And you told Schlesinger. FORD: I want a detailed summary of the orders which went out and any changes that were made. I want an assessment of the operation—including the time sequence of takeoffs and what happened. KISSINGER: You should ask for all the orders that were issued from the beginning of the operation. FORD: That should include the orders from the Pentagon to CINCPAC and from there to commanders on the scene. I want the DOD submission compared with the orders issued in the NSC…Include what happened in the first wave, the second wave, and the other waves after that . It seems to me that what happens in the Situation Room is being bypassed by what goes on in the NMCC. 614

Kissinger, seeming to forget he had participated in the first wave’s bombing

cancellation, later stated, “it was inconceivable that he could have meant that the first

wave be confined to armed reconnaissance in which no ordnance would be expended .”

Kissinger also said with regard to the fourth wave and in fairness to Schlesinger, he might have been acting on the basis of the Nessen statement and taken it upon himself to stop

613 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 572. 614 Ibid.

227 the bombing once the crew and Marines were safe. Kissinger would also grudgingly describe the Pentagon’s technical performance as “impressive,” adding:

Within 48 hours an aircraft carrier, two destroyers, and one thousand marines had already been deployed; an auxiliary carrier was scheduled to arrive a day later in the region where we had previously had no thought of taking any military action. B-52s were on alert, and tactical aircraft were blanketing the area. No other country would have been capable of undertaking so rapid and relevant a deployment .615

Regardless of caveats, Ford never recovered confidence in his Secretary of

Defense. 616 Perhaps most importantly in the strategic sense, Kissinger said the NSC exchanges:

Triggered a new crisis of confidence between the President and his Secretary of Defense which would culminate in Schlesinger’s dismissal five months later. One of the most painful casualties of the Vietnam War was the morale of the Pentagon. The idea of reengaging in Indochina only two weeks after the evacuation of Saigon evoked revulsion. When the Pentagon is less than enthusiastic, it does not reinterpret orders—as the Foreign Service is wont to do—but fulfills them literally without any additional initiative on its part. Given the complexity of military deployments, the practical effect is the same as procrastination. Throughout the Mayaguez crisis, the Pentagon dutifully assembled the forces as it was ordered to do. But it was clearly reluctant, offered no ideas of its own, left it to the civilians to prod it into action, and – remembering the outcry after the B-52 bombing of the Hanoi area—reflexively opposed the use of the strategic bombers.

Most of the communications mix-ups and sloppy intelligence reporting that plagued the Mayaguez crisis happened because the doubts of the Secretary of Defense compounded the trauma of the military. Clements excepted, the Pentagon seemed above all determined never again to be cast in the role of the villain The absence of the Chairman of the JCS, who was away on a trip to Europe, magnified the problem because his stand-ins were reluctant to use the direct access to the President which is the Chairman’s prerogative by law. In this case, the only channel of the White House to the Pentagon was via a Secretary of Defense who was extremely ambivalent about the President’s strategy. 617

Ford’s recollection of the results is revealing:

In the cold light of dawn, two aspects of the Mayaguez affair disturbed me a lot. The first was the number of casualties we sustained: forty-one Americans— including those lost in the chopper crash—were killed during the operation, and

615 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 565. 616 Ford, A Time to Heal, 295; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 573. 617 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 573.

228 another 50 were wounded. This was a high toll, and I felt terrible about it. The second was some high-level bumbling at the Defense Department. The first strike never took place, although we were told it had been “completed.” The Navy jets dropped their bombs into the sea. It’s possible that communications problems may have contributed to the misunderstanding. It’s also possible the planes in the first wave—which I had delayed for twenty minutes—may have run low on fuel. They may have been forced to jettison their ordnance in order to return to Coral Sea. What is harder for me to understand is why the fourth air strike—and I had specifically ordered four—was never carried out. I hadn’t told anyone to cancel that attack. Apparently someone had, and I was anxious to find out who had contravened my authority. The explanations I received from the Pentagon were not satisfactory at all and direct answers kept eluding me. 618

Nominated by Nixon, Schlesinger had become Secretary of Defense on 2 July

1973 at age 44. Despite his relative youth, his academic and government credentials made him appear exceptionally well-qualified for the post. As a university professor, researcher at Rand, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Director of the

CIA, he had acquired an impressive background in national security affairs. On 2

November 1975 Ford dismissed Schlesinger and Schlesinger left office on 19 November

1975. There were more factors involved than the Mayaguez incident. Schlesinger explained the central element in his departure as his budgetary differences with the White

House. Ford was more willing to compromise with Congress on defense spending than

Schlesinger. He would later serve as Secretary of Energy under Carter. 619 Schlesinger was replaced by Donald Rumsfeld, who became the youngest Secretary of Defense in history and remained in the position through the remainder of the Ford presidency. 620

618 Ford, A Time to Heal, 283 619 DoD, “Secretaries of Defense,” http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/. 620 Ibid.

229 Chapter 25: International and Domestic Reactions

As described in the final NSC meeting discussion, there was a mixed reaction on the international front to the US action in the Mayaguez crisis. Basically, the American allies supported the US, while others publicly ignored the event and some condemned it.

Reflecting the relatively warm relationship of the time between the US and USSR,

Pravda, the official Soviet news agency stated the American ship seizure was well within international waters, implying the US reaction was justified. 621 Nonetheless, Kissinger noted the US needed to do some “diplomatic cleanup.” The State Department viewed the

Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian’s public accusation that American conduct amounted to “acts of piracy” as a “face saving” exercise. The US formally protested the remarks and relations with China continued to improve. 622

The Thai government’s public reaction was also not on the surface accommodating. The government formally protested the US military’s use of Thai territory for military action against Cambodia. Speaking about the Mayaguez operation, a

US embassy official even remarked, “It was a ham-handed operation. It would seem that

no one in Washington gave any thought to the Thai feelings.” 623 US diplomats increased

their efforts with Thailand to soothe the ruffled feathers over the use of bases.

Governmental relations soon returned to normal and US military personnel were

withdrawn from the remaining Thai bases within the originally agreed-to year without

further incident. 624 USSAG/7AF completely shut down operations and closed the

621 “Worldgram”, US News and World Report, 26 May 1975, 37. 622 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 574. 623 “Thailand: Another US Ally Lost?” US News and World Report, 26 May 1975, 22. 624 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 574.

230 headquarters on 30 June 1975. General Burns was transferred to Korea. 625 The US was left with no sizable force closer to SE Asia than the Philippines.

Domestic Reaction

The initial domestic results were mixed. Kissinger viewed the reaction of the press during a 16 May press conference as a “disgrace.” He viewed all the questions as tacit accusations in one form or another: that the US infringed on

Thai sovereignty; that American aircraft might have killed the crewmen instead of saving them; that the US government was at fault because it should have warned all ships that incidents were occurring in the area; that the entire action was undertaken as a morale booster for the American public; that the administration had not given diplomacy a chance to work. Kissinger responded rather defensively, “We were not looking for opportunities to prove our manhood, only that it was essential for America’s global role in the wake of the fall of Saigon to establish that there were limits beyond which the US could not be pushed .626

Ford also felt harassed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis:

Predictably, liberals in both the press and Congress were harshly critical of my decisions. In a column entitled “Barbarous Piracy,” Anthony Lewis of intoned: “once again an American government shows that the only way it knows how to deal with frustration is by force. And the world is presumably meant to be impressed.’ In Congress Senator Mansfield and Representative Holtzman assailed me for my alleged failure to observe the War Powers Act. I was supposed to ‘consult’ with lawmakers before responding to the crisis they claimed. Instead I had merely informed them of what I planned to do. Missouri Senator went several steps further. He introduced three separate amendments to the War Powers Act designed to plug its “loopholes” and prevent me—or any President who followed me—from taking the steps I had taken to save American lives. Then he asked the General Accounting Office, the auditing arm of Congress, to determine whether I had ordered the bombing of Cambodia “for punitive rather than defensive purposes.” Such reactions, I thought were hopelessly naïve.

625 Burns interview, 278. 626 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 575.

231 We had recovered the ship; we had rescued the crew, and the psychological boost the incident had given us as a people was significant. As Kentucky Representative Carroll Hubbard, Jr. Chairman of the House Democratic freshman caucus said, “It’s good to win one for a change.” 627

Despite the initial misgivings, the calculated gamble that was the Mayaguez operation paid off handsomely in political capital for the Ford administration. President

Ford and the military were praised for decisive and in response to the

Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez and her crew. A Gallup Opinion Poll conducted in

June of 1975 showed that President Ford’s popularity index rose from 39% before the

Mayaguez incident to 51% after. 628 Another poll showed that 75% of the American public asked approved of his handling of the affair. 629 The front page of the New York

Times reported, “The success generated a moral uplift for the American people, restored a belief in American credibility and demonstrated a strategic resolve worthy of a .” 630 Ford later recalled,

All of a sudden the gloomy national mood began to fade. Many people’s faith in their country was restored and my standing in the polls shot up 11 points. Mayaguez wasn’t the only reason of course; the economy was improving at a rapid rate, but the net effect was that I felt I had regained the initiative and I determined to do what I could with it. I had promised the country that I would keep the federal budget to $60 billion or below. In the two weeks after Mayaguez , when Congress sent up three measures for my signature that would have upped the deficit by more than $2.1B, I didn’t hesitate to veto them .631

627 Ford, A Time to Heal, 283. 628 Gallup Opinion Index-Political, Social and Economic Trends, Report no. 120, June 1975, 12. 629 “Polls Apart: Ford’s Standing,” Newsweek , 4 , www.proquest.net. 630 Phillip Shabecoff, “Ford is Backed,” New York Times, 15 May 1975, 1. 631 Ford, A Time to Heal, 283.

232 Chapter 26: Congressional Reaction

There were many congressional hearings held in 1975 on the Mayaguez crisis, with the main effort led by the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on

International Political and Military Affairs. The subcommittee pursued two separate courses of action to investigate the Mayaguez crisis. The first was a lengthy series of hearings which began formally on May 14, 1975, while the situation was nearing its tensest moments. The hearings included testimony by numerous executive branch witnesses including the Acting Secretary of State and the deputy Secretary of Defense, several Members of Congress and Charles T Miller, the captain of the Mayaguez .632

The second course of action taken by the subcommittee was to request the

Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an in-depth investigation of various aspects of the crisis and to report back to the subcommittee. Those investigations resulted in three reports being generated: “System to Warn US Mariners of Potential

Political/Military Hazards: SS Mayaguez , a Case Study”; “Executive-Legislative

Communications and the Role of the Congress During International Crises” and “The

Seizure of the Mayaguez —A Study of Crisis Management.” 633

15 May Congressional Hearing

632 Comptroller General, v. Those particular hearings were printed under the title “Seizure of the Mayaguez ,” parts I, II, and III. 633 Comptroller General , vi. The combination of these three reports make up part IV of the Mayaguez hearings published by the government printing office. They were submitted to the subcommittee after negotiations with the President’s Adviser for National Security Affairs over the classification levels of parts of the third report. Some parts of that report were deleted, but it was the opinion of the chairman of the committee the classified portions were of such small detail they did not effect the overall report. See appendix for a summary of the results from “System to Warn US Mariners of Potential Political/Military Hazards: SS Mayaguez , a Case Study”

233 On Thursday, May 15, 1975, the full US House of Representatives Committee on

International Relations met in the Rayburn building with the Honorable Thomas E

Morgan presiding. Col Zane E. Finklestein, the legal advisor and legislative assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented the bulk of the testimony. The

Congressmen began by requesting a report on casualties and were told that since the operation ended only about two hours prior, any answers were likely not to be definitive.

The first estimate was one killed in action (KIA), 15 wounded and six missing in action

(MIA). This was shown in the record as later corrected to 15 KIA, 3 MIA and 50 wounded which is only correct for the losses at Koh Tang Island and doesn’t include the

23 killed in the Air Force helicopter crash on May 13 th in Thailand. Morgan asked if any of the Mayaguez’s crew had been wounded, to which Finklestein incorrectly reported in the negative. There were slight injuries to a few members of the crew, ironically from

US attacks. The reports of helicopter losses were also inaccurate, which is understandable, given the short time that had elapsed since the action on and around Koh

Tang and the distance from Washington involved. 634

The committee then turned their attention to the air strikes on the Cambodian mainland with Broomfield and Zablocki asking questions about their necessity.

Broomfield, a Republican applauded the military services while the Democrat Zablocki stated that some had expressed a “concern” the air strikes were an “overreaction.”

Finklestein, who would later characterize the strikes as “essential” summed up what would be the administrations position on the mainland air strikes (although these reasons were not stated in the NSC meetings):

634 IR Committee pt I, 31.

234 The potential enemy had the capability of reinforcing from the places on the mainland that were struck. In the judgment of every military man involved in the situation…everybody I have talked to shares this view—was essential to save the marines on that island. Now you are forced sir to make a judgment between using adequate force and failing to use sufficient force to protect the men on the ground. That judgment is a very close one sir and is part of almost every operation under a general or an operation of this nature under the direct command of the Commander in Chief. That is a tactical decision that is easy sometimes to Monday-morning quarterback. The question has to be what would you do if you were responsible for the men on the ground at the time the decision was made. 635

Mr. Zablocki asked if there had been any American losses in the air strikes on the mainland to which the answer was no. Zablocki, Wilson and other members then made the observation that the action served to let the Khmer Rouge know the US was serious and would “serve as a deterrent to any further intentions of any country, including

Cambodia.” 636

The attention then turned back to describing the action on the island. The

narrative supplied by Finklestein once again had many minor errors, due to its basis on

preliminary reports, which in the military experience of this author are invariably not

entirely accurate. This time, Mr. Fountain congratulated the President on mission

accomplishment. 637

The hearing was marked by disagreements among the committee members. The

committee returned to questioning the lack of warnings prior to the Mayaguez’s capture

with Fountain stating that warnings should have been given and Maury asserting the

maritime community had the information and any warnings would be redundant. Mr.

635 IR Committee pt I, 33-4, 49, 50-51. 636 Ibid, 35. 637 Ibid, 36.

235 Miller from the State Department reiterated the fact that the Mayaguez was traveling in

normal sea lanes. 638

Some committee members questioned the planning and asked who planned the

operation. Finklestein answered that the Commander in Chief of Pacific Command,

Admiral Gayler was principally responsible for the operation and execution. As has been

demonstrated, the NSC and the USSAG/7AF also had major roles in both planning and

execution. Some committee members then proceeded to question why it took over 48

hours to get sufficient forces on the scene. Finklestein answered that the Navy was the

smallest it had been since before and there were places in the world that

would take much longer to reach. 639

A following exchange deserves noting. Congressman Nix asked if it was the judgment of the decision makers that no course of action other than the use of force was open to them. The answer from both Finklestein and Miller was in the affirmative. Next and more importantly, Mr. Biester wanted assurance that under no circumstances was there any use of punitive force in this instance. The answer from Finklestein was neither evasive nor correct, “That certainly is the perspective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sir.” 640

Punitive action was certainly a prime motivation for Ford, Kissinger and other NSC members as evidenced by the discussions previously outlined. Also, the Thai government’s knowledge and approval of operations staged from their territory was questioned many times over the course of the hearings. Relations with Thailand were

638 IR Committee pt I, 36-7. 639 Ibid, 39. 640 Ibid, 42.

236 strained even prior to the event and the Congressmen voiced concern over any further

damage from the operation. 641

The questions returned to the US diplomatic efforts and Miller reported that in

addition to the messages routed through Peking, a message went to the UN around noon,

Wed 14 May and Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had made an appeal for both sides to

stop military action. 642 Mr Guyer asked why “with today’s instant communications” we had so much trouble finding the people in charge of Cambodia and dealing with them.

Miller and Finklestein reiterated there were no diplomatic or military communications with the leadership and had been none for some time, since the coup. 643

Next came a central question that was actually given very little attention at this

time, but would be revisited later. Mr. Winn asked, “Why did you land the Marines on

the island?” Finklestein answered, “We had reason to believe that our people could be in

three places. There could be some on the ship, some on the island and conceivably some

on the mainland. The Marines were landed on the island to protect the ship from mortar

or weapons fire that could have come from the island and to secure any Americans that

might be found on the island.” 644

The operation’s most vocal critic on the committee, Donald Riegle, (D-MI) began

to question the necessity of the entire operation, asking if there was any precedent for US

military intervention for merchant ships. No one could recall any. Riegle then pointed

out the case of the USS Pueblo , where the US did not take such action even in the case of

the seizure of a military ship. He followed that by pointing out that there had been a

641 IR Committee pt I, 35, 43, 59. 642 Ibid, 46. 643 Ibid, 53. 644 Ibid, 47.

237 number of recent seizures of American fishing vessels by South American countries that had occasioned no US response. 645 Col Finklestein correctly pointed out that those fishing vessels did not fall under “innocent passage” since they had been conducting fishing operations at the time of their detention, clearly a violation of international law.646

Riegle lectured on the cost of the operation in American lives lost, Cambodian deaths, the damage to the US government’s relationship with the Thai government and ultimately millions of dollars in military spending. 647 He wondered rhetorically (and probably irrelevantly) if we would have been much more reluctant to engage in the same manner if the had seized the ship. Riegle proceeded:

My concern, and the concern we can’t talk about today is: Was there a way to secure the same objectives with less cost-- that is both near and long-term cost? One of the reasons we have to ask that question is a procedural one; namely how do we respond to situations like this in the future? Also, I think there is an obligation to be able to say to the parents of these seven people that were lost that it is not just a question of somebody being willing to die if they are asked to, but the question of whether these lives were wisely spent. I value those lives as much as I do any of ours in this room. Perhaps there was no other way. On the other hand there may have been. I would have preferred that a way be found to secure the release of the ship and the men, even if it had taken longer, so that we could have saved our own losses. I think that would have been preferable.

I must add one more thing, had this not occurred at a time and under circumstances— post-Vietnam when we were feeling a sense of frustration and national humiliation, we would not have felt such a strong need to assert ourselves military, to prove in the words of former President Nixon that we are not a pitiful helpless giant. Of course we are not, but the use of power and how it is applied are deadly serious questions. 648 IR Committee Hearings June-July 1975

The hearings continued as a series of three on 19 and 25 June, and 25 July

1975. In the first hearing of the series, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Robert Miller returned as the key witness.

645 There had been over 100 seizures of American fishing boats by Ecuadorian officials from 1969-75. 646 IR Committee pt I, 59. 647 The military provided a report to Congress that detailed the financial cost of the operation. See PACOM report, Nov 1975. 648 IR Committee pt I, 60.

238 Three congressmen from other committees, Representatives John Burton,

Elizabeth Holtzman, and Patricia Schroeder, testified before the committee during the second hearing and Captain Charles T. Miller, the Captain of the Mayaguez , was the center of attention as he presented his recollection of the Mayaguez incident on 25 July. 649

The tone of this meeting seems to have been much different than the first.

The Chair of the subcommittee, Dante Fascell, began by stating:

All of us share with the President and the American people a profound sense of gratitude that the release of both the crew and vessel were obtained. There remains however, a number of serious questions which must be answered more fully if we are to be certain that our mechanisms for preventing and managing future crises will maximize opportunities for peaceful resolution and minimize risks to the lives of US civilian and military personnel.

In the post-Watergate and post- there is a pervasive air of skepticism about virtually every action of our Government. It is incumbent on the institutions of government tot attempt to reestablish the mutual trust and confidence necessary to maintain both an effective government generally and an effective foreign policy particularly. For this reason, it is my hope that the administration will cooperate fully with the subcommittee in this inquiry. We start out with no knowledge that anything improper has happened. We are seeking no villains. We know that no human and no bureaucracy is perfect and that hindsight makes it easy to find fault. Our inquiry, however is serious in purpose: We simply want to make certain that our imperfect system works as well as it can when the lives of American citizens are at stake

Mr Fascell’s statement was followed up by a question to Mr. Miller that in essence asked if there was any truth to the rumor that Sea-Land’s (the Mayaguez ’s company) representative in Hong Kong had received a message that the

Cambodians would assure the return of the vessel and crew prior to US military action. It later was confirmed that rumor had no basis in fact. The members of the committee then began debating amongst themselves whether the

649 IR Committee Part II, 140.

239 Congressional notification process was sufficient and whether the intent and letter

of the War Powers resolution had been complied with. 650

Rep Riegle returned also and noted that Miller hadn’t been present at any

of the NSC decision meetings and was the wrong person to testify. He also was

not satisfied that the initial reports of casualties did not include the 23 Air Force

security police and aircrew that died in a helicopter crash in Thailand on May 14.

That brought the number of US dead in the operation to 41, which, he noted was

more than the 39 the US rescued. He stated that “on the face of it that this is the

kind of concealment and the kind of deceit that I don’t understand.” and “I want

the specific answer to the question of why we did not have those facts sooner and

if it turns out that they were deliberately concealed, then I think we need to know

that.” 651 Representative Riegle would return to that theme of misleading and

cover-up by the administration several times. Likening it to the Watergate issue,

he stated, “Let us hope this record of investigational obstacles is not repeated in

this committee’s search for the Mayaguez facts. Indeed let us hope that this

record is never repeated again.” 652

Chairman Fascell asked Miller about allegations by Sihanouk, the deposed leader of Cambodia that Marines “or somebody” was on the island prior to any

650 IR Committee pt II, 140-141. Also see Rep Burton’s statement (page 181) in which he cited a “fairly reliable source’ that told him the ship’s company was notified 14 hour before the invasion they would release the crew. 651 Ibid, 153. Note the author visited Cambodia in Feb 08 and the Mayaguez memorial at the US embassy does not include the names of the Airmen killed on 14 May 1975. The US government maintains the 23 airmen’s deaths were not battle related. 652 Ibid, 155.

240 action. Miller said that was not true, and there has been no evidence since to support that claim. 653

In their testimony, Representatives Schroeder, Holtzman and Burton were very critical. Ms Schroeder (D-CO) questioned particularly the operation’s timing and the executive branch’s reporting to Congress (consulting versus advising per the War Powers Resolution). This episode could be interpreted as a continuation of the ongoing constitutional struggle between the congress and executive branch. It is a built-in feature of the Constitution with the separation and balance of powers. Representative Schroeder mentioned the possibility of new legislation that would require the president to supply detailed data for “all events surrounding the commitment of US troops overseas.” She portrayed recent

American presidents as “evasive” in supplying accurate information to Congress, citing the incident and the alleged attack on the USS Maddox , which was later proven a fabrication as an example. 654

Rep Holtzman (D-NY) stated the “ Mayaguez incident raises a number of questions on a variety of levels.” Those levels included the technical questions such as the adequacy of US intelligence and military inter-service communications, and a multitude of policy questions including “was there too great a willingness to resort to military means when it wasn’t absolutely necessary?” And were the lives of the Mayaguez crew and Marines being used for political purposes? She stated there were also constitutional questions

653 IR Committee pt II, 156, 160. 654 Ibid, 161-166.

241 regarding presidential power and statutory questions regarding the president’s

responsibilities under the War Powers Act. 655

She found the administration lacking on all counts. She believed President

Ford did not pursue a diplomatic solution vigorously enough and the military

action was not aimed at recovering the ship and crew, but focused on sinking

gunboats and bombing the mainland. She opined the administration was also

overly concerned with sending a signal of American strength as noted in

statements by Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger. She added the delay in

casualty reporting was attributable to the “President’s desire to get political

mileage out of the incident.” Declaring the president’s actions were “illegal,” she

stated none of the conditions of the War Powers Resolution were met for use of

military force: “Only pursuant to: 1. A declaration of war; 2. Specific statutory

authorization; or 3. A national emergency created by attack upon the US, its

territories or possessions or its armed forces.” She also noted the incorrect

intelligence estimates of Cambodian strength on Koh Tang Island and reiterated

the committee’s objection to a lack of warnings to civilian vessels. 656

Representative Burton also criticized the Ford administration’s response,

charging deliberate oversights or “gross negligence” in the alleged failure to

notify the Mayaguez of the dangerous waters it was in. He cited “reliable sources

that the Cambodian government was willing to release the crew and had contacted

655 IR Committee pt II, 171. 656 Ibid, 173-6. It is worth pointing out that in the Clausewitzian sense it is entirely appropriate for the civilian leadership to use the Marines or any other military force for “political purposes.” Clausewitz maintained that war or violence is an extension of politics and should only be used as such. In other words, force is the ultimate diplomatic act.

242 the ship’s line before the attack on Koh Tang began. Most importantly perhaps he

expressed his opinion that the administration didn’t “give serious efforts in

diplomatic relations in the Mayaguez case,” pointing out that “Dr Kissinger has

made it clear that this was an object lesson, that reports were out that he was the

super hawk in the National Security Council discussions and lastly….I heard a

report—again I will stipulate this as hearsay—from someone who was fairly on

target that one of the plans was to secure this island as a beachhead and as a

point for interdicting shipping between the island and mainland.” 657 Mr. Burton

relied heavily on hearsay that was almost exclusively unfounded.

Captain Charles Miller, the Captain of the Mayaguez provided the central testimony during the th session. Recounting the details of the seizure of the ship and crew and the events of their captivity made up the large majority of his testimony. That account is outlined throughout this work, so it will not be restated here. It is worth adding however, that Captain Miller took many opportunities to express his gratitude to the US military and his conviction that the show of force in the form of aerial bombings and the sinking of Cambodian gunboats were the deciding factor in the crew’s release. He called the aircraft,

“his angels from heaven.” 658 Capt Miller also stated that “at no time” did the

Cambodians accuse him of violating territorial waters, explaining that international law sets the limit as three miles as long as the ship is just transiting the area.659 He also said the crew was well treated, fed and given respect. 660

657 IR Committee pt II, 181-2. 658 Ibid, 194, 189, 199, 218. Note that his testimony is two month after the fact and Capt Miller had many conversations with military and administration members. 659 Ibid, 191.

243 After Capt Miller completed his narrative, some interesting points came

out in questions from the committee members. Capt Miller was asked if he

thought the Mayaguez was targeted because it was an American ship. He replied in the negative and offered two compelling reasons as evidence. First, the

Mayaguez was not flying an American flag at the time it was seized, so the

Cambodians would not have known the ship had a US crew onboard. It was common practice not to fly a national flag because the strong sea winds would rip it to shreds in a short amount of time. Second, Capt Miller later talked to several

Cambodian sailors from a larger ship that was reportedly supposed to stop the next ship that passed near the islands in dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam.

According to Miller, he was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. 661

Congressman Riegle pressed an earlier point he had made, noting Captain Miller had previously repeated a comment the captain of the Holt made after Miller and his men were released. Commander Rodgers had said something to the effect that Capt Miller and crew were 3 hours too late, in other words, had the crew been picked up by the

Wilson 3 hours sooner the whole military operation would not have happened. Riegle said, “There are two ways to look at that. The other way of course is maybe the military operation started 3 hours too soon.” 662

When asked about the lack of maritime warnings by the US government even after the seizure of the Korean and Panamanian ships, Captain Miller stated that the

660 IR Committee pt II, 192, 197. 661 Ibid, 208; Rogers comment on 198. 662 Ibid, 212. Not to take this too literally, but the operation was planned as a daybreak invasion to take advantage of the morning surprise. It was impossible to know that 3 hours later the prisoners would be released. It is possible that is Mr Riegle’s point; that the US government didn’t know because it didn’t attempt enough diplomatic action.

244 warning sent out by the Coast Guard mapping section Geodetic Survey on 24 May was

only the sixth warning that organization had put out in their entire existence. Capt Miller

blamed the Governments of Panama and Korea for failing to notify the

Convention office in Geneva, not the US government. 663

Mr. Riegle then said he “wished we hadn’t been as ‘trigger-happy’ as we were on

these gunboats because that was what made you afraid to go back out to the Mayaguez

that night. That is the period when the decision was made to launch these military

strikes.” Captain Miller disagreed with the “trigger happy” characterization. He repeated

that as “the man there” he wouldn’t have been sitting in front of the committee had

military action not been taken to release the crew. Mr. Riegle countered, “We don’t

know that for a fact; do we?” Capt Miller shot back:

Yes sir. Nobody would talk to me about any negotiations until the angels in the sky were up there, as I call them. Our military jet fighters. Then they were determined to get me to somebody that could interrogate me and sit down and negotiate and when I got to a man that could speak English the fear of our aircraft in the skies over Cambodia was the only hope they were going to sit down and negotiate with me that I get the aircraft away from Cambodian soil .664

Miller’s statement ended that round of Congressional inquiry. Two more rounds of hearings were held by the International Relations Committee on July 31 st and

September 12 th , 1975. 665 Their discussions followed along the same lines, the details of which would not add significantly to this narrative.

663 IR Committee pt II, 215: Special Warning No 45- (12 May, 1975) “Shipping is advised until further notice to remain more than 35 nautical miles off the coast of Cambodia and more than 20 miles off the coast of Vietnam, including off-lying islands. Recent incidents have been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. This warning in no way should be construed as United States recognition of Cambodian or Vietnamese territorial sea claims or a derogation of the right of innocent passage for United States flag vessels, or derogation of the freedom of the high seas.” 664 IR Committee part II, 218. 665 IR Committee part III, 3.

245 Chapter 27: Defense Restructuring

Gen David Jones, Chief of Staff of the Air Force and acting Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs during the Mayaguez incident would follow General George Brown as the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in June 1978. 666 Jones saw the military response to the Mayaguez operation as symptomatic of a large systemic problem in the

US military that was clearly evident at the time, but was also traditional in nature. The

different arms of the US military did not operate well when tasked to operate “jointly” or

where more than one service was tasked to combine forces for an operation. It would

become Jones’ crusade to try to correct this. The landmark 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act

would in part arise from the difficulties apparent in the Mayaguez operation along with

others, including the April 1980 failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt. In Jones own

words:

It (the Mayaguez operation) convinced me also of some of the difficulty of the problems of the joint system. If you look at our record of joint activity, we have had great problems of execution. There have been exceptions: the landings at Normandy and Korea at Inchon. But we've had our Gulf of Leyte, and we had terrible problems in Vietnam in joint operations. We have had them since then--the Iranian Crisis and Grenada. We found out in the aftermath that the command arrangements were down through CINCPAC, but below that it tended to get divided. We somewhat lucked out. Although we lost some troops on the island, we were quite fortunate to get the crew members back .667

On February 3, 1982, nearly seven years after the Mayaguez operation, and

nearing the end of his second term as Chairman, Gen Jones appeared in a closed hearing

before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) alongside Secretary of Defense

Casper Weinberger. Jones believed the time was right to describe the poor functioning of

666 Willard J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole, The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Division Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC 1989, 97. 667 Jones interview, 202.

246 the JCS and urge the enactment of legislation to reform the nation’s military. Jones was set to retire in less than five months and believed the HASC members would be receptive to his recommendations. He also knew Secretary Weinberger wouldn’t be as receptive.

Jones’ request was a landmark step. Not since 1945 had a serving officer initiated an effort to reform the JCS. 668

Jones stated, “It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars and weapon systems; we must also have an organization which will allow s to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning and the full war fighting capability. We do not have an adequate organizational structure today, at least in my judgment.” 669 After serving longer on the Joint Chiefs than any other member in the history of the organization, Jones’ credibility was difficult to impeach. Jones called for a complete restructuring of interaction.

During his initial nine-minute statement, Jones offered five recommendations.

First, he proposed strengthening the “role of the chairman.” Next, with regard to joint papers, Jones said, “service staff involvement…should be limited to inputs rather than debates.” Thirdly, he recommended the “Joint Chiefs should receive their advice on joint issues from the joint system rather than from their own service staff.” Fourth, he recommended giving “the commanders in chief in the field, those whom we hold responsible for fighting the forces, an increasing role.” Finally, he proposed to “enhance the preparations and rewards for joint duty.” 670

668 David C. Jones, interview by James Locher, Sep 25, 1995, cited in Victory on the Potomac , Texas A&M Press, College Station, 2002, 34. 669 Locher, Victory on the Potomac, 35. 670 Ibid, 36.

247 Jones’ testimony was just the initial salvo in a battle that waged in Washington

DC for over four years. On October 1, 1986, President Reagan signed the “Goldwater-

Nichols Act of 1986” which did legislatively restructure the Department of Defense and

the Joint Chiefs. 671 That legislation continues to influence the organization and operation of the military establishment to this day.

671 Webb and Cole, The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 115.

248 Chapter 28: The Mayaguez, Its Crew and Koh Tang Island Aftermath

On 17 May 1975, the Mayaguez sailed into Singapore’s harbor. At the pier-side news conference, Capt Miller praised President Ford and the Marines for rescuing his ship and crew. Miller declared emphatically that had it not been for the military’s efforts, the crew “would be in prison or dead now.” Miller also said American military action was a major part of the Khmer Rouge’s decision to let the crew and ship go and that he had agreed to intercede to stop military action if let go. 672 He repeated those statements in his Congressional testimony.

Koh Tang Island-July 1975

Less than two months after the US attack on Koh Tang and the recovery of the

Mayaguez, the island and several others were taken from the Cambodians by the

Vietnamese. 673 The islands indeed were disputed as CIA Director Colby had asserted in the NSC meeting and was cut short by President Ford. The exchange was understandable because as President Ford said, that information didn’t really contribute to the short term goal of freeing the crew and the ship from the Cambodians. Nevertheless, while the US aim was never to annex Koh Tang Island, apparently the Vietnamese had a more effective plan for attacking it than did the Americans.

SS Mayaguez

The Mayaguez was over thirty years old and rusting in 1975 when she was made famous. In 1979, the ship was sold by Sea-Land Industries and unceremoniously cut into pieces for scrap metal. 674 An analysis of the Mayaguez operation follows.

672 “The Mayaguez Story: Her Seizure and Return.” Sea Land Service publication 1975, www.KohTang.com/Multimedia/The %20Mayaguez%20Story.pdf 673 IC Post-Mortem Report , 15. 674 Wetterhahn, The Last Battle, 314.

249 PART VI: ANALYSIS

Chapter 29: Strategic Leadership Analysis 675

In the wake of our humiliating retreat from Cambodia and South Vietnam in the spring of 1975, our allies around the world began to question our resolve. “America—A Helpless Giant,” ran the headline over a page-one editorial in the respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . The British were concerned. So, too, were the French. Our friends in Asia were equally upset; in the Middle East the Israelis began to wonder whether the US would stand by them in the event of a war.

As long as I was President, I decided, the US would not abandon its commitments overseas. We would not permit our setbacks to become a license for others to fish in troubled waters. Rhetoric alone, I knew, would not persuade anyone that America would stand firm. They would have to see proof of our resolve. The opportunity to show that proof came without warning. 676 Gerald Ford

It is all too simplistic to classify complex strategic decisions as “good” or “bad.”

Distinctions such as those serve well as bumper stickers, but do not further a deep understanding of the situation. However, it is possible to attempt to deconstruct and analyze the decision-making process, the reasoning involved and the outcomes of a crisis situation. There are questions that surface with regard to the Mayaguez crisis . How did

Ford and the strategic leadership perform under the pressure of a crisis? Was the joint military planning adequate? Should the Mayaguez operation be labeled an intelligence failure? Was command and control for the operation suitably arranged? What were the executive-legislative ramifications of this situation? Should the crisis have been prevented by a maritime warning system? Was the US military responsive to the civilian political ends? The previous 28 chapters described the events involved with the

675 Leadership in the Mayaguez crisis extended from the President and the NSC all the way down to the individual Airman and Marine involved in the battle. Although outside the military chain of command, Captain Charles Miller was included in that line of responsibility. Miller managed to successfully juggle considerations of the safety of his ship and crew with the demands of his Cambodian captors and the outspoken nature of a crew that was literally assembled just before sailing. Additionally, Miller had to deal with the entirely understandable fear of the unknown US reaction. His performance under duress was laudable. This section will focus however on the strategic level. 676 Ford, A Time to Heal, 275.

250 Mayaguez crisis and its aftermath. Part VI is an attempt to analyze and evaluate the

decisions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, the planning and intelligence

that played a major role in those decisions, and some of the other contributing factors that

led to the ultimate outcome of the crisis.

Above all, the handling of the Mayaguez incident must be considered in the context of international environment and perceptions of the summer of 1975. Cambodia and South Vietnam had just fallen, their loss advancing an expectation of a diminishing

US influence in that part of the world. The Pueblo incident had occurred less than seven years earlier (the same time differential as Sep 11 2001 and the present) and was fresh in the minds of decision-makers. After the to the Khmer Rouge, communications between Cambodia and the rest of world had all but ceased.

Administration officials did not know why the Cambodians seized the Mayaguez .

They were uncertain whether the Mayaguez seizure was a carefully planned operation or an isolated act of a local commander. In general many felt that Cambodian intentions were not relevant. 677 It was widely believed that once the Mayaguez was seized, the

potential for international and domestic political embarrassment was too great for no

military action to be taken.

Strategic leaders can draw upon the national instruments of power: diplomatic,

informational, military and economic (DIME) to maneuver their way through complex

and difficult international situations. 678 It has been said the US neglected to use the

diplomatic instrument of power in the case of the Mayaguez . This has been shown

incorrect in the narrative and will be further discussed. The decision makers of the NSC

677 Comptroller General , 101. 678 This is a derivative of Hans Morganthau’s instruments and elements of national power described in his book Politics Among Nations, McGraw , Boston, 1993.

251 correctly decided early in the crisis the economic instrument of power was of little use,

since the US had already cut off all economic ties to Cambodia. The informational

element of power had to be handled delicately for reasons that will be further explained.

That left military power, which the leaders understood and could apply quickly and

intensely for effect.

The President, Kissinger and the other members of the NSC could be criticized

for many of the decisions made in the four days of the Mayaguez crisis. However, there

are not checklists or war plans drawn up for every eventuality. In crisis situations, such

as this one that arise unexpectedly, leaders must be able to use their best judgment based

upon their experience and combined intellect. As can be expected, the final analysis is

mixed.

The four NSC meetings called by President Ford and held during the Mayaguez crisis of 12 to 15 May 1975 and the fifth following the resolution of the crisis provide a superb opportunity for one to obtain insights into how decisions are made under pressure at the most senior levels of government. The minutes from those meetings were originally classified Top Secret and were declassified in 1996. 679 Prior to that time, the accounts of the actions of the decision makers reported in articles and publications of the

Mayaguez crisis were largely derived from personal accounts of some of those present, and in some cases from those not present. Several points stand out in the analysis of these meetings.

First, process affects the outcomes. The decision-making process demonstrated was different from those employed by other administrations. The President in this case was Gerald Ford, a renowned consensus builder, who unlike his predecessor Nixon,

679 See NSC meeting minutes.

252 preferred to hear dissenting opinions before he would enter the discussion and make a

decision. 680 This could allow the reader of the meeting minutes to draw the conclusion

that Ford was not “steering the ship,” so to speak, and others were making the decisions.

This was not the case in the Mayaguez incident. President Ford did fulfill a strong

leadership role in the discussions, acting at times as a facilitator to keep the discussion on

track. Ford also felt confident enough in his leadership to send Kissinger, who was

acting as both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, away on a speaking

engagement to Kansas City during the first day of the crisis. He also often drew on his

military experience to question details the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs presented during the meetings.

Second, the NSC discussion leads one to question the often-discussed truism that

the US is suffering from a lack of military experience in US political leadership. There is

great merit to that argument. However, experience is only valuable if it is applied in the

correct manner. In this case, Ford was guilty in numerous cases of distracting the

strategic discussion with tactical trivia and often micromanaging the situation. For

example, President Ford, who served both on ship and shore duty in the Navy in World

War II, was aided by his knowledge and understanding of the relative speed with which

forces could be brought to bear on the Sea of Thailand from their starting positions

scattered across SE Asia. 681 However, he was not benefiting the situation when he chose

for instance to debate the flank speed of the USS Coral Sea with the Acting Chairman,

General Jones, who happened to be an Air Force General. 682 The time used in that and other tangential debates would have been better spent discussing overall goals or

680 Ford, A Time to Heal, 281. 681 Ford Library, “Gerald R. Ford biography,” http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/grf/fordbiop.asp . 682 See the discussion in the 13 May NSC meeting.

253 guidance, the joint planning (or lack thereof) occurring and capabilities of the units being sent to execute the mission. As an example, it was never brought to the attention of the

NSC that none of the disparate military units assembled for the mission had trained together or that the Air Force helicopter units were not trained in assault tactics. 683

Kissinger admitted the Mayaguez crisis events:

…demonstrate the risk of planning military operations in the National Security council without any preparatory work by a subordinate group and without some official short of the President being made responsible for the hour by hour coordination. The NSC is better designed for overall decisions than for micromanagement. 684

Third, Ford’s questioning of Schlesinger, Jones and the military went beyond micromanagement during the crisis. On several occasions he openly questioned the rapidity of movement of forces into the area. Conversely, the GAO report questioned the urgency of the timing of the assault, presenting the opinion that forces would have been in a better position to quarantine Koh Tang Island and that there was no evidence

Cambodian forces were preparing to assault or reinforce the island. 685

Were there advantages to postponing the assault? A postponement (according to

GAO) would have reduced the operational risk to the US forces. The size of the attack force violated Marine Corps doctrine, which called for a three to one superiority of attacking forces over enemy forces, which was not planned because a lack of helicopters available in Thailand did not permit the rapid delivery of a large Marine force. It was not possible to move additional helicopters into the area given the NSC determined timeline.

However, the Coral Sea could have been used as a floating helicopter base to preposition the Marines and made the round trip cycle time of the available helicopters much shorter.

683 Guilmartin e-mail 13 May 2007; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 111. 684 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 572. 685 Comptroller General , 94-95.

254 Also, the ten additional helicopters aboard the USS Hancock were about 35 hours away at the time of attack and a postponement would have effectively doubled the helicopters available. A postponement would also have allowed more planning time and possibly made the Amphibious Ready Group accompanying the Hancock available. 686 Those were all valid points. There was also a rationale involved in not following that path.

Jones later said, “There was great pressure to act very quickly and to act before all the forces were in place, to take that risk.” 687 In the President’s mind, the US reaction to the Pueblo seizure in 1968 was not quick enough to prevent the transfer of the crew to the

Korean mainland where they had languished in a prison camp for nearly a year, and Ford was determined not to allow a repetition of that incident. 688 He felt compelled to bring forces to bear as soon as possible. Jones asked for more time and the President, exercising his authority as the Commander-in-Chief said no.

Fourth, with the Pueblo incident (only seven years earlier) such an important factor in the decision makers’ mind-sets, it is understandable why many of the NSC actions were taken. The NSC’s direction was not simply a reckless, emotional reaction to an apparent challenge to US power. Risks had to be weighed carefully yet quickly. The

US was facing an adversary they had already unsuccessfully fought for over five years.

The president and his advisors felt a time pressure to rescue the crew before they reached the mainland and the brutal regime that later killed 2 million of 7.5 million of its own people. That pressure was passed on to the military. Given the intelligence the NSC received and the perceived time frame available to accomplish their mission, their actions were on the whole logical. The NSC’s overall decision-making process to a large degree

686 Comptroller General , 95. 687 Jones interview, 203. 688 Ford, A Time to Heal, 277.

255 acknowledged the emotional aspect of the situation, but set it aside and corresponded

closely with the “rational actor” model. 689

It is tempting to conclude the Ford administration was eager for an opportunity to

display American power and that any response outside the military realm was given little

or no thought. But the State Department did in fact make several attempts to reach the

Cambodians through diplomatic channels. US diplomatic initiatives and

communications seeking the release of the Mayaguez and her crew began immediately

following the first NSC meeting which ended at about 1245, 12 May 1975, about 10

hours after the Mayaguez capture. Between the time of the Mayaguez seizure and the

crew’s rescue, the Ford Administration:

• Issued a public statement that demanded the immediate release of the ship and crew (1350 12 May) • Sent a message to the Cambodians through the People’s Republic of China Liaison Office in Washington DC. (1630 12 May) It must be remembered that tentative overt diplomatic relations with the PRC were only begun in 1972 and were not as yet strong after almost 25 years of Cold War non-communication. Embassies had not yet been formed. • Had George Bush deliver messages to the Cambodian Embassy and the Foreign Ministry of the PRC in Peking (0010 am 13 May) • Sought UN Secretary General Waldheim’s assistance in the matter (1300, 14 May) • Attempted to respond via a “” broadcast to the Cambodian broadcast that stated the Mayaguez would be released. (2145, 14 May)

While State Department officials were “confident” the Cambodians received US

demands for the release of the Mayaguez and its crew, Secretary Kissinger noted the

absence of any return communication from the Cambodians had “precluded a diplomatic

689 “In the rational actor model of decision making, decision makers seek to accomplish four tasks: accurately identify the problem that confronts them; take into account the key factors that bear on the problem; critically examine alternative courses of action; and make a choice that will wisely maximize benefits and minimize costs.” Neil Reimer, Douglas Simon and Joseph Romance, The Challenge of Politics, Ch 14, “Decision Making in Politics” (Washington: CQ Press, 2006), http://www.cqpress.com/cs/challenge/chap14/study.asp .

256 solution.”690 As a point of emphasis, the Khmer Rouge had displaced the Sihanouk

government only four weeks previous to the incident. There was simply no functioning

Cambodian governmental apparatus to negotiate with.

Fifth, the United States and particularly the Ford administration was in a

vulnerable political position. The constitutional power of the presidency was in question.

Ford, who had only held the office of the President for nine months (he assumed the

office on 9 Aug, 1974) was tackling his first military and international crisis against the

backdrop of Watergate and a lack of public trust in the institution of the presidency.

Domestically, his political capital was low as the first (and thus far only) unelected

president whose September 1974 pardon of Nixon had set off a political uproar. There

were allegations surfacing that the Nixon pardon was a pre-condition of Ford’s

assumption of the office. 691 Ford also had to contend with a Congress emboldened and strengthened by the power vacuum left by the Nixon presidential disgrace. Included in this struggle was the War Powers Resolution. The Mayaguez incident was the first test of

the limits placed on the president as Commander-in-Chief by that law and it was apparent

by the conversations that the NSC members were acutely aware of the precedent-setting

consequences of the law. The central discussion with respect to the War Powers

Resolution was the required level of compliance with the law. President Ford, along with

many presidents since, did not think the War Powers Act was constitutional. But he did

comply sufficiently to circumvent any serious challenge by Congress, as evidenced by

the 14 May meeting with Congressional leaders.692

690 Comptroller General , 66. 691 For a detailed discussion of this event, see Bob Woodward’s Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate, Touchstone Press New York, 1999. 692 See Chapter 4.

257 The international situation was also at best challenging. The American public and

the world had watched on television as Saigon had fallen two weeks earlier, on 30 April

1975, to the communist Vietnamese. Phnom Penh also was lost to communist forces two

weeks before Saigon and the US was forced to evacuate all its citizens and the US

embassy personnel. Communism, Korea, the Soviet Union, and China were in the

forefront of the President and his advisors’ minds. The “Domino Theory” appeared to be

coming to fruition before their eyes.

The risks appeared very high. It must be remembered that often huge events are

triggered by small ones. It was possible a seemingly small event such as the Mayaguez seizure could be the “tipping point” that would further lean the balance of power toward one or more of the communist countries and away from the US-led west. A historical example of such a small event was the 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of

Austria by a Serbian separatist, Gavrilo Princip. The resulting I had an immensely dramatic impact far out of proportion to the initial act. The threat of radical change is more than a possibility, it is a reality and strategic leaders constantly face that reality. 693

Sixth, Ford and his advisors properly placed the strategic priority of American power and prestige above the individual lives of the crew of the Mayaguez or the military forces they sent to conduct the operations. While the end-state priorities in the resolution of an international crisis are often too complex to articulate clearly in order, one can draw conclusions from the NSC discussion of the events and the memoirs of the main actors.

In this case it is clear that the return of the Mayaguez and crew were lower in the strategic

693 For a discussion on tipping points, see Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, New York: Back Bay Books, 2002.

258 prioritization of President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger and the other members of the National Security Council than was advancing or perhaps retrieving American political power and international prestige.

It must be stressed the NSC’s first priority was to send a strong message to the

Cambodian government, as well as the world writ large that the US, although stung by setback in Vietnam, was not a hollow power. In his memoir, A Time to Heal, Ford began his account of the Mayaguez incident not as he could have, by discussing America’s devotion to each of its citizens, but by expressing the need for the US to show its power and resolve in the face of challenge. His quote shown at the introduction to this chapter and repeated here for emphasis clearly demonstrates his prioritization:

In the wake of our humiliating retreat from Cambodia and South Vietnam in the spring of 1975, our allies around the world began to question our resolve. “America—A Helpless Giant,” ran the headline over a page-one editorial in the respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . The British were concerned. So, too, were the French. Our friends in Asia were equally upset; in the Middle East the Israelis began to wonder whether the US would stand by them in the event of a war.

As long as I was President, I decided, the US would not abandon its commitments overseas. We would not permit our setbacks to become a license for others to fish in troubled waters. Rhetoric alone, I knew, would not persuade anyone that America would stand firm. They would have to see proof of our resolve. The opportunity to show that proof came without warning. 694

Kissinger in Years of Renewal began that he, President Ford and Scowcroft were primarily worried about the safety of the crew, based on the intelligence reports that the

Khmer Rouge had ordered the massacre of many Cambodians, which Kissinger also said were ignored by the media. But he quickly added, “foreign policy considerations were weighed heavily as well.” He believed the US needed to demonstrate the limits to its

694 Ford, A Time to Heal, 275.

259 tolerance; US Allies in the region (Japan and S. Korea) were watching to see US

commitment; and China would be measuring the US response. 695

Kissinger initiated advocacy early for violent action during the first NSC meeting; he was seconded by Rockefeller and the idea was never seriously challenged again.

Kissinger also noted during the first of the NSC meetings on 12 May 75 that the two priorities must be to send a strong message and to secure the release of the ship and crew and those two priorities would conflict at times:

As I see it, Mr. President, we have two problems: The first problem is how to get the ship back; the second problem is how the US appears at this time. Actions that we would take to deal with one of these problems may not help to deal with the other. For example, I think that if they can get us into a negotiation, even if we get the ship back, it is not to our advantage. I think we should make a strong statement and give a note to the Cambodians, via the Chinese, so that we can get some credit if the boat is released. I also suggest some show of force. 696

The two main priorities, advancing (or restoring) American prestige and the rescue of the Mayaguez and her crew were so interrelated that it was possible one could not have been accomplished without the other. As shown above, this was not lost on the

NSC leaders. Yet, at two critical moments during a very dynamic situation, when the crew was apparently (and correctly) observed being transported to the mainland on 14

May ( 13 May EDT ) and when the crew was again observed on a fishing boat after its release on the morning of 15 May ( 14 May EDT ), if the military had followed the orders from the NSC without questioning, the Mayaguez crew would have been killed by

American forces, not the Cambodians. 697

In the first instance, utilizing the new satellite technology that allowed real-time communications with pilots halfway around the world, President Ford made the decision

695 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 551. 696 NSC 12 May, 5. 697 See NSC May 13 2240 and Chapters 3 and 6.

260 to allow the boat carrying “Caucasians” to proceed to Kompong Som harbor and

presumed captivity. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger pointed out to a frustrated

Kissinger and Ford that “avoiding bargaining chips is less of an objective than being in a

position where the Cambodians could say that the US aircraft killed our own men.” 698

Kissinger did not agree with this line of reasoning and later wrote,

The NSC deliberations were shaped by the impression that the boat approaching Kompong Som carried only part of the crew (if any) and that the remainder (probably the majority) were still on Koh Tang. We were sliding into a position in which much of the President’s time and the NSC’s was taken up with decisions about the movement of individual small boats eight thousand miles away. To avoid this, Ford ordered the destruction of all the boats near Koh Tang, squelching attempts to return to a case-by-case consideration. With this, the NSC could at last turn to how to generate pressures to compel the Khmer Rouge to free the crew and the ship. 699

If the primary effort was to save the crew, as Kissinger stated earlier, this statement is somewhat astounding. Destroying all Cambodian boats approaching or leaving the island heightened the risk of killing the crew. The NSC could then turn toward generating pressures to compel the Khmer Rouge to do what? Release a dead crew from a sunken boat? The members of the NSC were prepared to accept an end-state in which the crew was not brought home alive.

Certainly no one including Kissinger wanted the crew killed. However, sinking all Cambodian boats in the area is completely logical from a strategic priority standpoint. It would have been a more advantageous final outcome for US strategic interests for the crew to be declared dead than for them to have become hostages for a lengthy period like the Pueblo crew. The worst case scenario for the Ford administration would have been if the crew had been publicly held on mainland Cambodia in an

698 NSC 13 May 2240, 2. See Chapter 3. 699 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 560 .

261 embarrassing hostage negotiation situation and then killed. 700 While this end-state is a

counter-factual and obviously did not occur, the NSC discourse supports that conclusion.

The NSC pointed to this on several occasions, including lengthy tangential discussions

regarding the similarities between the Pueblo incident and the Mayaguez. A hostage situation would have further demonstrated the actual lack of US power in SE Asia.

Congress would not have approved a ground invasion of mainland Cambodia to support a rescue attempt, which would have had a dubious outcome at best. 701

The attack on Koh Tang Island itself presented a definite risk to the crew of the

Mayaguez. While it could be argued that recovery of crew members might have been facilitated if the Cambodians could be quickly overwhelmed, the goal of safely landing the assault force on the island was in direct conflict with the goal of ensuring the safety of any possible American prisoners presumed on the island. For example, bombardment of the island before the arrival of the Marines would have reduced the risk to the assault force but also would have increased the risk to any Mayaguez crew members held there.

Also, the only suitable landing zones in Koh Tang were in the area where Cambodian forces were believed to be concentrated and where it was likely to assume Mayaguez crew members might be held. Further danger to the crew was posed by close air support fire from US jets which began shortly after the first Marines were landed.

The expendability of the Mayaguez crew was also demonstrated by the NSC decision to bomb the Kompong Som area after a portion of the crew was believed to have been transported to Kompong Som. In reality the entire crew had arrived at Kompong

700 Note the political from the Iranian hostage situation just four years later under the Carter administration. 701 The Case-Church Amendment, passed by Congress on , 1973, prohibited US military involvement in Southeast Asia without Congressional authorization

262 Som on the Thai fishing boat, but had left the harbor before the Coral Sea aircraft attacks.

The NSC did not know the Mayaguez crew had been transferred to Koh Rong Lam Sem

on the morning of May 14 th . The President therefore ordered the rather indiscriminant

bombing of the area where crewmembers were last reported.

The prioritization of punitive action over the release of the crew clarifies several

other actions taken by the Ford administration. It explains why Ford was adamant to

continue the bombing of mainland Cambodia even after the Mayaguez crew had been

rescued. And it further explains why he was so irate that his orders to bomb the

Cambodian mainland were not fully implemented. The reasoning that there was ground

forces on the Cambodian mainland that could be used as reinforcements on Koh Tang

Island was an afterthought in the plan to bomb Kompong Som and was exploited later as

an explanation to the public. Responding to a question about the use of air power, the

President is quoted by news sources as saying, “I am not going to risk the life of one

Marine. I’d never forgive myself if we didn’t do this and 2400 Cambodians attacked the

Marines.” Secretary Schlesinger termed the bombings as a “very prudent, limited use of

force, clearly motivated by a desire to protect the Marines on the island.” 702 However, no

Cambodian forces were targeted by the US naval aerial bombardment on the Kompong

Som area. And the central impetus for bombing Kompong Som discussed in the NSC

meetings was clearly not to deter reinforcement, but to send a message to the

Cambodians and other governments that the US would not tolerate actions like the

Mayaguez seizure. 703 By scaling back the Kompong Som bombing attacks the Ford

administration lost the opportunity to display the US’s massive military capability.

702 Comptroller General, 96. 703 See the NSC meeting discussions of 13 and 14 May.

263 Instead, a seemingly proportionate response was delivered by Schlesinger and the military. Ford never forgave Schlesinger for denying him the opportunity to display disproportionate massive American military might.

There was additional logic to sinking all the Cambodian boats that ventured into the Koh Tang area. First, the Cambodian patrol boats posed a real threat to the ongoing operation on and around Koh Tang Island. Second, if the Cambodian navy of swift boats was effectively neutralized, there would be a lessened chance of a repeat of the sea-lane harassment that had been occurring to more than just to US vessels. President Ford and others (Rumsfeld) characterized the Mayaguez incident as an “act of piracy.” One of the tenets of US international power is “freedom of the seas.” Any threat to free sea navigation was a threat to US power that could not be ignored. Third and most importantly, the seven sunken boats apparently had achieved the desired effect on the

Cambodian forces. Their sinking appears to have contributed to if not resulted in the release of the Mayaguez crew, which was affected before any of the attacks on the ship, the island or the Cambodian mainland. If the English-speaking Ensign on Koh Rom Lam

Sem could be believed, the air attacks on Cambodian boats had persuaded the

Cambodians to release the crew. Further evidence is an intercepted Cambodian radio message of 14 May that contained the phrase, "Release the Americans before we ourselves become the prisoners." The intercept occurred the night before any of the US military attacks other than the gunboat sinkings. It wasn’t the mainland bombing, the seizure of the Mayaguez or the attack on Koh Tang that forced the release of the crew, as has been asserted by others. It was the large military buildup in the area and the sinking of the gunboats that did it. In a 1986 interview General Burns agreed:

264 I have never seen that written up very much, the fact that the military activity on and around Koh Tang Island had so intimidated those people that they said, ‘Release the crew.’ Apparently that is why or it was one of the factors in the central government's sending the crew back the next morning. 704

Finally, the actual result of the operation was far better than could have been hoped for. The Ford administration had the good fortune to retrieve the crew despite the decision to sink all the boats in the area, which would have included the one that had carried them. The Cambodian release of the Mayaguez crew allowed the Ford brain trust to avoid confronting the most difficult question, namely how to react to a hostage situation. They also avoided having to explain the deaths of the crew, whether caused by the US or Cambodian action. With the recapture of the Mayaguez and the crew safe aboard the Wilson, the victory appeared to be total. Ford and his advisors celebrated and went to bed while Kissinger called the release of the crew, “the end of the Mayaguez crisis.” 705 But it was not.

The perception of total victory and the political boost Ford received from the public after the Mayaguez crisis would have been shattered by a military defeat and the annihilation of the 100 plus US Marines that had landed on Koh Tang Island and were doggedly fighting for survival as the Wilson retrieved the Mayaguez crew. The invasion of Koh Tang had been based on the faulty assumption that part if not all of the Mayaguez crew was on the island. 706 That decision was understandable given the information presented to the NSC. However, after micromanaging many of the details of the rescue operation, Ford and Kissinger treated the extraction of the Marines as an afterthought.

Ford’s order for the Marines to “disengage as soon as possible” resulted in the second assault wave on Koh Tang being turned off apparently by overzealous subordinates. The

704 Burns interview, 449. 705 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 571. 706 See CH 5.

265 heroic extraction of the Marines on Koh Tang was another fortunate outcome almost derailed by the administration’s action.

The following section will analyze the planning and actions at the operational and tactical levels and the ramifications of the strategic leaders’ decisions.

266 Chapter 30: Operational and Tactical Level Analysis

President Ford, as the Commander in Chief of US military forces was the ultimate decision authority on the military action taken during the Mayaguez crisis. Therefore the responsibility for successes and failures of the operations rested with him. While the

Mayaguez was recovered and its crew rescued, those successes did not come without costs. Forty-one Marines and Airmen were killed (counting the 23 Airmen that died in transit to Utapao) and 50 more were wounded in the operation. And as shown earlier, the attack on Koh Tang came perilously close to ending in an annihilation of the US forces.

Admiral Gayler as CINCPAC and LtGen Burns, the USSAG commander and their staffs had the authority to impact the operational planning and execution and lessen the operational and tactical risks.

The chain of command ran from the President and Secretary of Defense, also referred to as the National (NCA), through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Admiral Gayler, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) who as the regional combatant commander was given the overall planning and operational responsibility for the Mayaguez rescue. From there the chain of command became complicated. It was not optimal, but it was on the whole functional. (See Figure 4)

CINCPAC, Adm Gayler sent orders directly to the “on-scene” US commander, Lt

Gen Burns, the Commander US Support Activities Group/7th Air Force

(COMMUSAG/7AF) located at Nakhom Phanom AB Thailand (approximately 365 miles

NE of Bangkok) for execution. That segment of the chain of command was seemingly clear, but the chain was actually slightly different for each of the three military services

267 (Navy, Marines and Air Force) involved in the Mayaguez operation. Adm Gayler as

CINCPAC exercised control over naval operations through the CINCPAC Fleet and the

commander of the 7 th fleet. CINCPAC Fleet then delegated the command authority of the ships involved in the Mayaguez crisis (the USS Holt, the USS Wilson, and the USS

Coral Sea Carrier battle group) to the Commander of 7 th Fleet and performed staff functions in support of 7 th fleet.707 In other words, CINCPAC’s orders to the 7 th fleet passed through the CINCPAC fleet staff and the Commander of the 7 th fleet acted on them.

Once the Marine forces arrived in Utapao, they were under the operational control of the USSAG/7AF, rather than a Navy or Marine command structure. Lt Gen Burns sent orders directly to the commander of the Marine Task Group, Col Johnson and to the

Marine Assault Commander, LtCol Austin and the commander of the Mayaguez boarding party, Maj Porter. For the Air Force units involved, the chain of command went from

CINCPAC to Lt Gen Burns, who was the commander of 7 th Air Force then to the four operating wings in Thailand. 708 To further complicate matters, it was agreed that the

Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) would retain control over the B-52 strike force from Guam if it was used. COMUSSAG/7AF was directed to “act as the coordinating authority” for the all the units, quite a large task.709

It is apparent to any student of the military that these different lines of authority violated the “unity of command” precepts of the military. Admiral Gayler, CINCPAC, noted that one commander should be designated to run the operation, but all participating forces “need not be under the operational control of the on-scene commander if

707 Comptroller General , 85. 708 Ibid. 709 COMUSSAG/7AF 141730Z May 75, AFHRA.

268 supporting forces are clearly tasked to support his requirements.” 710 To mitigate

confusion, both he and the Commander of 7 th fleet gave instructions for all units to respond to directions and tasking from Lt Gen Burns, the COMUSSAG/7AF. 711 Gen

Burns would later also defend the setup, stating that he was not denied any request by supporting units. 712 The Mayaguez mission was not disrupted by inter-service .

But General Burns would also assert he was overly restricted in his authority to use military force. In fact, just three days before the Mayaguez event, the JCS had removed the authority the command had carried as a unified commander for SE Asian military support and the withdrawals from Vietnam and Cambodia. USSAG/7AF was drawing down and by the summer of 1976 all forces would be removed from Thailand, the US’s last foothold in the Indochina area. General Burns required permission from the

JCS to conduct reconnaissance missions, air operations, and to order his air forces to penetrate other countries’ sovereign airspace. These restrictions impaired his ability to act and delayed important missions such as photo reconnaissance of the islands and intelligence gathering on the whereabouts of the Mayaguez and crew. 713

The command structure installed by Lt Gen Burns at Utapao was overly confused and confusing. Throughout the Mayaguez operation, the lines of command and control at the tactical level were not clear and shifted and evolved continuously. This was in part due to the changing nature of the situation, political direction and the forces available.

Below is a quick reference of the on-scene commanders at Utapao:

710 CINCPAC Command History , 6 711 CINCPACFLT 131857Z May 75 and 140505Z Jun 75; COMSEVENFLT 142326Z May 75, AFHRA. 712 Burns interview, 428. 713 Burns Interview, 427. Gen Burns characterized the removal of that authority as “a great impingement on the Mayaguez.”

269 • 13 May 1200, Colonel R.B. Janca, USAF assumed command of 635 th Combat Support Group at Utapao in anticipation of USAF Security Police assault on the ship and island. • 13 May 1900, Col Lloyd Anders, DO 56SOW USAF helicopter mission commander departed NKP with helicopter units for Utapao; Col RR Reed, USSAG/7AF Coordinator/LNO at Utapao accompanied. • 131830G BGen Baxter, USAF Commander 13AF ADVON arrived Utapao; • Midmorning, 14 May- Col John M. Johnson, USMC, Commander Ground Support Force, arrived Utapao. • 14 May, CTF SEVEN NINE 140426Z May designated Col Johnson as CTG 79.9 and directed him to take OPCON of CO D(-), BLT ¼ and BLT 2/9 for operations as directed by CINCPAC and USSAG/7AF.714

The last message cited was important. General Burns intended for the message to make Johnson the overall mission commander and the direct commander of the Marines.

Burns had sent Brig Gen Baxter to help coordinate the mission with the Air Force elements on Utapao, since they were not part of 7 th Air Force. However, Col George

Dugard, the 307SW (a sub-element of Strategic Air Command) commander at Utapao felt the preparations at Utapao led by Brig Gen Baxter lacked coordination and leadership. He stated that no one seemed to be in charge and “everybody appeared only interested in their thing.” This climate resulted in several errors, for example, air refueling tankers received an execute message when the fighter aircraft they were scheduled to refuel did not. 715 Acting Chairman Gen David Jones was convinced problems arose from the command and control of the execution of the operation as opposed to the selection of forces. 716 Whether that was an accurate assessment or not, the command and control setup undoubtedly negatively affected operational and tactical planning and the intelligence flow.

714 Table in CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75, 2-3. 715 George Dugard, (Col USAF), CINCPAC IG interview 5 Nov 1975, AFHRA. Hereafter referred to as Dugard CINCPAC IG Interview. 716 Jones interview, 203.

270

Operational and Tactical Planning Analysis Overview

While planning was furiously conducted concurrently at many levels of military

command from the very beginning of the incident, in reality the decision-making was

being driven from the President and the NSC. Admiral Gayler’s CINCPAC planners

attempted to get ahead of the NSC decision cycle. Upon notification of the Mayaguez

seizure, the different levels of military command immediately set up conferences to

facilitate planning and information sharing. At the initial conference that included the

National Military Command Center, the CINCPAC staff and USSAG, Air Force

Lieutenant General Burns assumed the responsibility for planning and directing

operations to recover the Mayaguez and her crew. 717 But despite their best attempts, the

CINCPAC staff, along with General Burns and his small USSAG/7AF group at Nakhom

Phanom and Utapao were in a reactive mode after CINCPAC’s initial orders to move

ships into the Koh Tang area. The NSC was driving the timeline.

It was not an exclusively downward-directed process however. There were

instances where the lower level planning advice was taken. For example the NSC

accepted the recommendation to “delay” the attack on Koh Tang Island until the morning

of the 15 th of May rather than sending Marines in on the evening of the 14 th and thereby

avoided conducting an attack in the dark on an island where the US forces had no maps,

few pictures and very little idea what awaited them. 718

As discussed earlier, the tension in civil-military relations was well illustrated in

the Mayaguez affair. The President and Kissinger felt a sense of urgency which was

717 CINCPAC Command History , 5. 718 See Chapters 4 & 5 of this work.

271 echoed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but was also tempered

in the latter by the recognition that there is a temporal aspect to military operations and

also a desire to minimize the physical risk to the forces involved. The military leadership

believed that a little more time would ensure an efficient and effective operation, while

Ford and Kissinger believed the military wasn’t moving at its highest speed. The

President and his advisors set the priority to minimize the political risks and accept

increased military risks. 719 A lack of trust combined with the sense of urgency led to

people at the strategic level not trained in military planning making operational and

tactical decisions. It was a recipe for disaster. But not all the ingredients were present at

the strategic level. Many were added at the CINCPAC and USSAG levels.

Admiral Gayler questioned the time pressure being applied a number of times,

providing additional evidence the urgency was pushed down from the NSC.720 While the official CINCPAC history only once mentions this in its review of the situation, the NSC meeting minutes; the Burns interview; and Acting Chairman Jones’ interview combine to confirm the operation was being driven from the very top.721 The intermediate levels of command were therefore charged with attempting to plan and were reacting to mitigate the negative effects of the decision to accelerate the operations. The military was charged with “making it happen.” 722 The results were mixed.

Crisis planning is very difficult and time was definitely a factor in the Mayaguez

operational planning shortfalls. The Mayaguez operation was planned and executed at a furious pace. Less than 65 hours elapsed between the time the Cambodians seized the

719 See NSC meeting minutes, Chapters 2-4 and 9 of this work and Jones interview, 202. 720 Burns interview, 448. 721 CINCPAC Command History , 6. 722 Burns interview, 447.

272 Mayaguez and the recovery of the Mayaguez and her crew. Countless tasks were

completed in order to assemble the forces and plan and execute the assault on Koh Tang,

the ship and Kompong Som. It was a monumental effort. However, crisis planning is one

of the core competencies of the military and there are many planning and execution errors

that should not be explained away by the situation’s time pressures.

For instance, the 14 May Joint Chiefs of Staff plan directed a simultaneous

boarding of the Mayaguez and assault of Koh Tang. Gen Burns and his ComUSSAG/7AF

staff's plan derived from that guidance included a simultaneous helicopter island assault

and a direct ship helicopter ship boarding at dawn on 15 May. Adm Gayler, CINCPAC,

changed this plan about midnight on 14 May to helicopter the Marines to the Holt where they would board the Mayaguez from the Holt . The departure time of the helicopters

from Utapao was not changed, yet the transfer of the Marines to the Holt and the

subsequent docking of the Holt against the Mayaguez took an additional hour and a half

over the original USSAG plan. Meanwhile, the flight time of the helicopters destined for

Koh Tang did not change. Therefore, the Marine forces began their assault on Koh Tang

about one-and-one-half hours before the boarding of the Mayaguez (0600 vs. 0725G).723

If the timing of the assault on Koh Tang had been altered to affect the boarding

from the Holt and the assault on Koh Tang simultaneously, the 3 helicopters that

offloaded Marines on the Holt could have been available to support the initial insertions

at Koh Tang. Also, it was known the Wilson would not arrive at Koh Tang until after

0700L, and the Holt was tasked to support the boarding of the Mayaguez . Delaying the

assault on Koh Tang would have allowed the Wilson to arrive on scene at the time of the

assault. The approved plans ensured Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) would not be

723 See Chapter 12; also Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 101; Burns interview, 448.

273 available for landing zone preparation or during the initial Koh Tang attack waves and

made helicopter or ship search and rescue (SAR) virtually impossible. Both NGFS and

SAR would prove to be sorely missed. This will be discussed further.

Command and Control

Operational command and control was maintained at the CINCPAC level by

direction of the JCS. CINPAC decisions and orders were passed to USSAG via secure

telephone conferences and often followed later by messages. 724 This placed many restrictions on the USSAG commander and his staff. Partially as a result of these restrictions, the command and control system established by the USSAG staff was inadequate for the attack on Koh Tang, the seizure of the Mayaguez and the mainland naval air bombing attacks. Lt Gen Burns sent forward to Utapao commanders such as

Col Johnson and Brig Gen Baxter, to execute the operation. Yet, Burns retained a centralized command and control network run via an Airborne Command and Control

Center (ABCCC) that was supposedly “on-scene,” but was actually orbiting more than 90 miles from the attacks.725 The result was a structurally inflexible process that instead of facilitating the attacks had to be overcome.

The immediate and complete disruption of the landing plan within the first few minutes of the assault on Koh Tang confirmed that the US forces were surprised by the

Cambodian resistance. This surprise was then exacerbated by a breakdown in the rigid centralized command and control setup, which occurred at the outset of the Koh Tang

724 CINCPAC Command History , 5. 725 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 108.

274 assault and reoccurred often throughout the day. 726 Related to this breakdown was a

breakdown in communications during the battle.

Communications (See Figure 13)

Communications are, of course, essential to the command and control function,

both for the commander to exercise authority and direction over his assigned forces and

for his forces to provide the commander with reports and information on which the

commander can base his directions. The Mayaguez crisis communications network performed admirably at the higher levels, but did not fair as well at the operational and tactical levels. Decision makers in Washington were able to control actions halfway around the world, but the “on-scene” US commanders in Thailand were not able to communicate directly with their own forces during the operation around Koh Tang. The communication systems that were available were often not as clear as those with

Washington.727

High level command and control of the Mayaguez operation was carried out

through a secure voice conference net which included the NMCC in Washington DC,

CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF in Hawaii and COMUSSAG/7AF in

Thailand. The satellite technology that allowed this real-time control was new and

procedures had not been established on how to best use it. This new-found rapidity of

communications tended to encourage central direction during the incident, and the

communications network was used to exercise close control over the use of force. This

connectivity permitted direct control by Washington decision-makers, but entangled

some lines of responsibility and at times overloaded the net with “extraneous high level

726 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 103. 727 Comptroller General , 86.

275 queries not appropriate for a command and control voice net.” 728 There were too many

people trying to use the same path from strategic decision makers to tactical users on the

battlefield. For example, satellite communication permitted the President to decide

whether to attack the vessel suspected of carrying Mayaguez crew members and later to

cancel and then reinstate the initial air strikes against Kompong Som. 729

The communications difficulties at the tactical level demonstrated the “friction”

of war. One of the first casualties, literally and figuratively of the operation was the

communications plan. Two Forward Air Controllers (FAC’s) and an Air Liaison Officer

(ALO) were sent in the first wave of helicopters with UHF and VHF radios that would

have ensured air to ground communications up to fifty miles. The first FAC, Lt Terry

Tonkin crashed short of the eastern LZ on Knife 31, and the second was on Knife 52,

which aborted its second wave landing. 730 The ALO did land with the command group,

1200 meters away from the western LZ. However, he was unable to communicate with

anyone on the UHF radio he carried.731 Note that Lt Tonkin did use his survival radio to

communicate with tactical attack aircraft overhead while he was treading water and was

able to call in air strikes on the island .732

The communications arrangements made before the departure of the assault force

from Utapao specified that the assault force (CTU 79.9.1) would orders from Col

Johnson, CTG 79.9 (at Utapao) via the ABCCC as directed by the NMCC and USSAG.

The assault force did establish communications with the ABCCC but the link between the

728 CINCPAC Command History , 8. 729 Comptroller General, 85. 730 See Ch 5. 731 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 70. 732 IG report, 76

276 ABCCC and Utapao was not ever established. 733 Col Johnson, the supposed commander could not communicate with Lt Col Austin or his forces on the island. 734 The Marines grouped in the eastern and western landing zones could not communicate directly with the other landing zone. However, each group could communicate with the ABCCC using various UHF and VHF radios. 735

Col Johnson (CTG 79 .9) at Utapao was especially frustrated and confused between 0615G and 0821G due to communications problems with the ABCCC and he was unable to determine exactly which helicopters had been shot down or how many

Marines were on the island. He was completely unaware of the situation on the eastern side. He assumed some friendly force might be on that side as he knew 2 helicopters had crashed there; but he did not know who or how many. 736 The ground forces were also confused. Lt Col Austin and his Marine commanders on Koh Tang stated that they did not know that that assault force communications with ABCCC were not relayed directly to CTG 79.9 (Col Johnson) as planned. 737

The airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) that orbited near

Koh Tang received orders from USSAG/7AF but had no command authority. Instead, it was intended to facilitate battlefield coordination and was used mainly as a communications link between the USSAG and the military units involved in the

Mayaguez operation. 738 ComUSSAG/7AF assigned the ABCCC an orbit anchor point about 90 nautical miles from Koh Tang Island, a distance which precluded visual contact

733 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 47; Johnson, Austin, Quinlan, 18. 734 Johnson, Austin, Quinlan, 18. 735 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 70. 736 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 70; Johnson, Austin and Quinlan, 12. 737 CTG 79.9 151138Z May 75. 738 Comptroller General, 85.

277 with the area.739 The airborne command post therefore had to depend on voice reports

from the air and ground forces in and around Koh Tang for its situational awareness.740

The forces in place adapted. After the assault began, three fighter/attack aircraft flying overhead were directed by the ABCCC to report what was happening on Koh Tang. By

0825G, an accurate count of the number of helicopters lost was obtained, but communications difficulties continued. 741

Due to communications problems, the Marines on Koh Tang did not know what tactical air support was available or how to obtain that support. While three tactical VHF radio nets were assigned for the battalion landing team (BLT) use, including a separate frequency for air communications, all the aircraft were communicating on the BLT net assigned to communicate with Marine ground units, saturating that frequency and making it difficult for the ground units to communicate.742

Communication was difficult in other areas. In the air, there was confusion over ground force location. Exacerbating the confusion was the location of the ground forces.

They were spread out in three separate locations, instead of being in one of the two planned two landing zones. Tactical air support was further complicated because of the frequent change in pilots entering the area. New pilots had to be briefed on troop locations before each attack and on several occasions pilots reported not being able to determine the friendly ground troop positions and therefore were not able to strafe or bomb the Cambodians.743 The CNA report condemned the confusion on Koh Tang as

739 ComUSSAG/7AF 141651Z May 75, AFHRA. 740 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 53. 741 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 105. 742 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 71. 743 388-TFW 150230Z May 75, AFHRA.

278 “exaggerated .” 744 That may be overstating the case. Combat, by nature is confusing and

initial reports are rarely accurate. However, the single most important detriment to

coordination between the ground and tactical air forces at Koh Tang could have been

avoided. There was no airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC) assigned to the mission

who could provide a single point of airborne control to mark friendly positions and direct

US close air support attacks.

Forward Air Controller (FAC) and On Scene Commander

The "Forward Air Controller (FAC) is an officer (aviator/pilot) member of the

tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls

aircraft engaged in close air support of ground troops.” 745 Col Johnson, commander of

CTG 79.9, on 14 May requested to USSAG that Air Force OV-10 aircraft be assigned the

FAC role for the assault on Koh Tang. However, USSAG/7AF did not task OV-10

aircraft in either the aircraft schedule or the plan. Therefore, OV-10 aircraft did not

participate in the operation until late on 15 May. 746 There were fighter aircraft on station during the morning attacks, however, no pilot acted as a FAC for air to ground attacks until over eight hours after the first wave assault.747

After the initial losses during the first helicopter assault wave, the 56 th Special

Operations Wing Commander requested OV-10s be deployed to facilitate close air support of the Marines on Koh Tang Island and the USSAG complied.748 The first two

OV-10s, call sign Nail 68 and Nail 47 departed Nakhom Phanom at 1040G on 15 May

744 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 105. 745 JCS Publication #1, 1975, GRC; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 89. 746 ComUSSAG/7AF 141651Z May 75; ComUSSAG/7AF 141730Z May 75; Assault on Koh Tang, 2-4, 18, 29; CINCPAC Command History , 26. 747 388-TFW 151200Z May 75; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , Table VI-5, 83-84. 748 56-SOW 210700Z May 75, AFHRA.

279 and after stopping to refuel at Utapao, arrived over Koh Tang shortly after 1600. Nail 68

then began directing air strikes as the "on-scene" commander. Another flight of OV-10s

would follow. 749

Until the OV-10s arrived, the ABCCC attempted to facilitate the close air support

by designating certain TacAir aircraft at Koh Tang “on-scene” commander and act as the

ABCCC’s “eyes and ears.” During the 10 and 1/2 hours that elapsed between 0530 (30

minutes prior to the first assault wave), and 1600 (the arrival of the OV-10s) there were 8

different "on-scene commanders" with 12 handoffs of responsibility. From 0530 to 0630

alone, there were four handoffs of "on-scene commander." It is not hard to imagine the

confusion that accompanied that volatility. After the OV-10s arrived at 1600, there was

only one change of “on-scene” command. This stabilized the helicopter and TacAir

control situation at Koh Tang. 750

Search and Rescue (SAR)

The lack of coordination was also reflected in the lack of Search and Rescue

(SAR) missions. Although US fighter aircraft reported radio contact as early as 0615G with the eastern landing zone and also with survivors from Knife-31 in the water, no SAR helicopter missions were directed the Knife-31 survivors. All helicopter rescue efforts were focused entirely on the survivors from Knife-23 that were fighting at the edge of the eastern landing zone. 751 Lt Tonkin, the Marine FAC and one of the survivors from Knife

31, reported that he could see helicopters maneuvering nearby and that none made any

movements indicating they were searching for the men floating in the sea.752

749 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 89. 750 CINCPAC Command History , 26. Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 90-91. 751 388-TFW 150230Z May 75, AFHRA. 752 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 107.

280 The Wilson was not informed that survivors were in the water but serendipitously

happened upon the Knife 31 survivors floating in the water or the operation’s death toll

would have been increased. 753 The Wilson also was not informed that one Air Force

crewman from Knife-21 was in the water on the western side of the island and was

missing. 754

Supporting Fire

Supporting fire (Air Force Tactical Air and Naval gunfire) was inadequate for the

assault on Koh Tang. There were sufficient numbers of Naval surface ships and tactical

aircraft available and sorties flown in support of the Mayaguez operation, however, they

were poorly scheduled and the missions were not coordinated correctly. Higher

headquarters had given direction to use air and sea support for the operation. On 14 May,

the day before the recovery of the Mayaguez and the assault on Koh Tang, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had specifically authorized naval gunfire (NGFS) and tactical air (TacAir)

support for those operations . 755 CINCPAC also directed ComUSSAG/7AF to develop

plans for TacAir support.756 The planning and execution of supporting fire did not fit the need.

The ComUSSAG/7AF plan for the Mayaguez /Koh Tang Operation stated:

"USAF/USN TacAir will be available on a 24-hour basis to prohibit small craft movement and provide CAS for the assault force. This TacAir will provide CAS for

Marine assault forces (including pre-assault strikes as required) and supporting naval vessels." Under the sub-paragraph dealing with coordinating instructions, it read, "Direct

753 See Chapters 17 and 19. 754 Rodgers, “Mayday for the Mayaguez”, 256; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 105-107. 755 JCS 140645Z May 75, AFHRA. 756 CINCPAC 140750Z May 75, AFHRA.

281 communication between the ground force commander and the strike flight and/or forward

air controller is mandatory" 757 Yet, as previously described, the forward air controller

role was not assigned to the OV-10s available. There were other issues with support of

the operation. Since the naval air attacks on Kompong Som were already discussed and

analyzed, this portion of the analysis will concentrate on the US Air Force tactical air and

naval gunfire support for the 15 May assault on Koh Tang.

Air Force Tactical Air Support

Tactical air (TacAir) support, while available, was also inadequate. The

ComUSSAG/7AF summary report of the Mayaguez operation reported a total of 260 Air

Force TacAir sorties flown during 13-15 May, with 131 (50 percent) flown on 15 May.

Of the 131 sorties flown on 15 May, about half (66) fired or dropped ordnance on Koh

Tang or the Mayaguez . Of those, 62 Close Air Support (CAS) sorties were flown to support the Marine assault forces on Koh Tang and 4 CAS sorties were flown in support of the Mayaguez boarding force.758 In addition to those sorties, a C-130 dropped a 15,000

lb BLU-82 bomb (see chapter 22) and 2 OV-10 sorties expended 20-mm rounds and

rockets in their capacity as forward air controllers. Also 2 F-111s and 4 F-4s attacked a

Cambodian patrol boat about 10 nm west of Koh Tang. 759

The vast preponderance of the attacks occurred after noon, reaching a peak in

mid-afternoon and then tapering off. Seventy five percent of the attacks occurred between

1315L and 1815L, which helps account for a lull in Cambodian activity during that

timeframe.760 Only twelve attacks took place before 1215L and during initial insertion,

757 ComUSSAG/7AF 141730Z May 75, AFHRA. 758 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , Tables VI-1, VI-3, VI-5, 78-87; ComUSSAG/7AF 161500Z May 75. 759 347-TFW 150930Z May 75, AFHRA. 760 See chapters 17 and 22.

282 the most critical stage of the ground operations there were no air attacks . Only 7 air

attacks occurred after 1815G during the extraction. 761 Air support during that time was

hampered largely by darkness.

Probably the most effective fire support aircraft for this operation, the AC-130

was available, but underutilized. The USSAG summary reported 13 AC-130 Spectre

sorties were flown during the period 13-15 May with 5 sorties on 15 May. 762 But,

astonishingly, the AC-130 that had been orbiting over Koh Tang during the early

morning hours before the 15 May assault departed Koh Tang, as scheduled, just minutes

before the assault began.763 The aircraft returned after 0700 from Utapao to Koh Tang

and reported striking targets at Koh Tang after 0830. Three other AC-130 aircraft

supported the Koh Tang operation later in the day and during extraction. 764 The aircraft

could have been used for pre-assault strikes.

Pre-Assault Strikes in the Landing Zones

There were no pre-assault air or naval gunfire strikes made to prepare the east and

west landing zones on Koh Tang on or before 15 May.

Most parties involved said they expected some preparation of the beach. Gen

Burns stated he directed the use of riot control agents as some prep of the beach, but did

not want to drop bombs and other ordnance for fear they would harm the Mayaguez crew that was reported to be on the island.765 Col. Johnson stated that he received photo

761 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 85. 762 ComUSSAG/7AF 161500Z May 75, AFHRA. 763 David Mets, “The Mayaguez Incident: A Later” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 , 111-115. Author e-mail with Dr David Mets, Col USAF (ret) 4 Jun 07. Mets was the pilot of Spectre 61, the AC-130 that departed just before the attack. Also, Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 88: “The OpRep-4s of two A-7s (Dennis 1 and 3) report taking over ‘. . . as on-scene commander prior to first light 0530 from Spectra.’” 764 ComUSSAG/7AF 161500Z May 75, AFHRA; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 88. 765 Burns interview, 452.

283 reconnaissance updates of Koh Tang following the 1900 planning conference on 14 May

that revealed an anti-aircraft site in the planned landing zone area. The assault force

commander, LtCol Austin said he had asked for preparatory suppression fire and Col

Johnson, the CTG 79.9 commander reported that he had approved the request and passed

it to USSAG/7AF.766 Col Johnson also stated that the helicopter crews were briefed at

the 15 May 0200 meeting that there would be pre-assault preparation of the western

landing zone. A CTG 79 .9 message to USSAG dated 141400Z May included a request

that “maximum TacAir be provided at insertion and for the first 4 hours.” LtCol Austin,

the Marine assault force commander confirmed that he began the attack with the

understanding that the possible AAA site would be verified by aerial reconnaissance and

pre-assault strikes conducted, if required.767 None of this happened.

It is possible to conclude it was a case of miscommunication caused by a lack of

proper operational planning and proper written direction not being given. Burns

countered this criticism by reporting that there was no time for formal written orders and

a preponderance of the tasking was done via telephone.768 The ComUSSAG/7AF Plan

stated that Air Force ". . . TacAir will provide CAS for Marine assault force (including

pre-assault strikes as required) and supporting naval vessels." 769 The term “as required”

provides too much ambiguity in a situation where clarity was needed. It is not clear how

the requirement was to be determined or who was to determine it.

766 Johnson, Austin, Quinlan, 18; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 92. 767 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 92. A 56 Special Ops Wing after action message stated, "TacAir was fragged to arrive at Koh Tang prior to first light. Col. Johnson, CTG 79 .9 and Col. Anders, commanding officer of 56-SOW made a request to USSAG/7AF to use TacAir as required to secure the area prior to arrival of the helo forces." 768 Burns interview, 453. 769 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 92.

284 Message traffic issued around the time of the assault does not reveal why no pre-

assault preparation of the landing zones occurred. While, as discussed previously, much

of the tasking was done by voice, it is likely Lt Gen Burns never intended to provide pre-

assault preparation. In his plan, USSAG noted that ComUSSAG/7AF plan stated that

“ground fire directed at air and/or ground forces from the vicinity of designated targets

could be returned without further approval. Ground fire received from other areas could

not be returned without ComUSSAG approval.”770 That rule of engagement prevented any US forces from firing until fired upon and prevented preparatory fire. There were many reports of Cambodian forces firing at the aircraft circling overhead prior to the assault, yet US aircraft were not allowed to return fire. 771

The results of the initial insertion attacks on Koh Tang proved the need for pre- assault landing zone preparation: three helicopters were lost and 14 men were killed in the first 10 minutes of the assault.

It has been stated that pre-assault preparation of the landing zones was prohibited in order to minimize the risk to the crew of the Mayaguez that was reportedly on the island. 772 However, the pre-assault messages issued reviewed for this study did mention crew safety and the CNA study also did not find any indication crew safety was a concern prior to the assault. 773 Burns in his interview defended his decision to not allow ordnance

to be dropped on the landing zone beaches, but reported that he permitted use of 20-mm

cannon and gas. 774 That order was not evidenced in any messages found.

770 ComUSSAG/7AF 141730Z May 75, AFHRA. 771 E-mail from Dr David Mets, Air University, 4 Jun 2007; “The Mayaguez Incident: A Generation Later,” 112. 772 “Seizure of the Mayaguez , Part IV, 4 Oct 76; Burns interview, 439. CINCPAC Command History , 26. 773 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 93. 774 Burns interview, 439.

285 Even if ensuring Mayaguez crew’s safety precluded pre-assault strikes, then logic would dictate that USSAG and CINCPAC would have concluded from the intelligence estimates available to them (and not to the forces involved in the attack) that it was more important to provide armed air escorts for the troop helicopters and to begin the assault after the Wilson was on station and available to provide naval gunfire support after the attack had begun.775

Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS)

Naval Gunfire Support was underutilized throughout the operation. There were

two Navy ships in the vicinity of Koh Tang Island on 15 May capable of delivering

gunfire support to the attack, the Destroyer Escort Harold E . Holt and the Destroyer

Henry B . Wilson . Each ship was equipped with 5'' guns (one on the Holt and two on the

Wilson ) that could be used for NGFS. Both ships were under the Command of

ComDesRon (Commander, Destroyer Squadron) 23 who was embarked on the Holt .

ComDesRon 23 in turn received tasking orders from USSAG via the ABCCC. Not only

did the ABCCC not task ComDesRon 23 with NGFS, USSAG did not provide him with

Koh Tang assault plans.776 This was possibly due to the fact the Holt was tasked with

boarding the Mayaguez.

The Wilson reported at Koh Tang at 0718 on 15 May, almost an hour and a half

after the assault began. Therefore, she was not available for naval gunfire support for the

first wave assault. Had the assault on Koh Tang been timed to begin simultaneously with

the Mayaguez boarding from the Holt , as proposed by CINCPACFlt, then the Wilson

775 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 93. 776 Ibid , 98.

286 would have arrived and been able to provide NGFS and search and rescue operations.777

The Wilson did provide effective NGFS after retrieving the Mayaguez crew. She was

also the most effective Search and Rescue vessel of the operation.

Compliance with Doctrine

The joint Air Force and Marine helicopter assault on Koh Tang ignored many

aspects of the Marine Corps assault doctrine of 1975:

• Adequate reconnaissance before insertion. • Pre-assault strikes in the landing zones. • Escort of troop helicopters by aircraft capable of supplying suppressive fire. • The use of suppressive fire, continuous and close in, while the assault helicopters are near and in the zone. • Rapid insertion, offload, and departure. • Rapid troop buildup ashore. • Maintenance of unit tactical integrity . • Superiority of Force and Use of Supporting Arms 778

Perhaps most importantly, Marine Corps doctrine at the time of the assault

emphasized the necessity of assault force numerical superiority over the enemy forces it

faced.779 It is highly likely Cambodian forces substantially outnumbered the assault force

until the second wave reinforcements arrived. The Table below shows the relative Marine

Corps troop strength ratio to the Cambodian forces on Koh Tang Island, assuming a

Cambodian troop strength of 150, which is conservative.

Time period Estimated Ratio Marines to Cambodians 0600-0620 0.35 to 1 0620-0900 0.73 to 1 0900-1230 0.87 to 1 1230- 1.50 to 1 780

777 CINCPACFlt 141254Z May 75 778 Table from Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 111. 779 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 111. 780 Table from Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 113.

287 Marine Corps doctrine called for overwhelming attack force, with a ratio of at

least 3:1 friendly to enemy. 781 As shown, the estimated ratio never reached the 3:1

planning factor called for in Marine doctrine. If the ComIPac and DIA estimates were

correct, the first assault wave would have at best had a ratio of approximately 1:1. If the

proper intelligence had been used for planning at the tactical level, the entire assault plan

would have necessarily been revised. Nevertheless, command echelons from the

ComUSSAG and above should have questioned the assault plan given their knowledge of

enemy force estimates.

Helicopter Planning and Tactics

Helicopter type and availability had a major impact on the operation, dictating the

size of the attack force, the timing of the attack waves on Koh Tang and the survival of

the crews and Marines carried. The limited numbers and helicopter round trip flight time

to Utapao put the entire operation at risk. Fortunately for the Marine forces, the Coral

Sea ’s movement to within 10 miles of the island reduced shuttle distance and made the

completion of the extraction possible. Also, there were two different types of helicopters

used, CH-53s and HH-53s, which were basically the same airframe with modifications.

CH-53s were troop carrying helicopters, which did not have the air refueling capability

nor the armor or fire prevention capabilities of the HH-53s which were designed for

search and rescue operations. The losses were greater on the CH-53s. 782

There was a lack of AF pilot training in Marine helicopter assault tactics. 783 To

the Marines onboard, that became apparent during the approach profiles and landing zone

781 Field Manual 3-1 Command and Staff Action, US Marine Corps, 20 Sep 1966 GRC. 782 CINCPAC Command History , 27; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 54. 783 Dr John Guilmartin, (retired AF Colonel and former member of Knife helicopter squadron), e-mail interview by author, 13 May 2007.

288 insertion attempts.784 The Koh Tang helicopter crews made straight-in approaches from the sea, entering perpendicular to the beach. Upon reaching the beach, the pilot then slowed to hover 20-30 feet above the narrow beach, rotated the aircraft 180 degrees, pointing its tail toward the island and landed to the beach. The rotation was designed to help make the offloading of Marines easier, according to the AF pilots. 785 According to

the Marines, these helicopter approach and landing tactics hindered rather than aided the

assault. Lt McDaniel, inserted on the Western zone, referred to the approach as an

"administrative" type of landing as opposed to a vertical assault landing. 786 The tactics of a relatively slow approach and hovering and turning 180 degrees before landing increased the exposure time of the helicopter and consequently increased the damage suffered during the insertions. The experienced Cambodian forces, trained after years of fighting, held their fire until a helicopter was in its hover. Once they opened fire, it was very effective. Thus, heavier suppressive was needed to cover the period between the helicopter's hover and departure. 787 It was not planned for.

To summarize, the responsibility for the major difficulties of the Mayaguez operation has to be shared between the strategic decision makers, the President and the

NSC, and the two commanders at the operational level charged with the planning and execution of the operation, Adm Gayler (CINCPAC) and Lt Gen Burns (USSAG). The strategic leaders set a timeline that led to an ad hoc operation and the associated missteps.

Adm Gayler and his CINCPAC staff and Lt Gen Burns and the USSAG staff were handed a very difficult task. However, several planning and execution errors should not

784 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 66. Verified by Guilmartin interview 13 May 2007. 785 56 SOW Nakhom Phanom 191200Z; Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 66. 786 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 66. 787 Ibid , 110.

289 be attributed to the short time span of the crisis. While operating in a challenging environment, they did not rise to the occasion. They failed to provide the proper support to the tactical forces for the success of the operation. The Sailors, Airmen and Marines that executed the operation did so heroically and somewhat tragically. The success of the operation was largely due their dedication and to good fortune. Operational level planning and execution while functional, was not entirely effective.

The assault planning at all levels was hampered by the intelligence provided and its distribution. That issue will be further discussed in Chapter 31.

290 Chapter 31: Intelligence Analysis

The term “intelligence failure” is commonly used today and the term could be

applied in the case of the Mayaguez. The reports that reached the NSC and the Navy, Air

Force units and Marines in the field regarding the location of the Mayaguez , the location of its crew at any given time and the size and composition of the Cambodian force on

Koh Tang were often inaccurate and were at the least misleading. But, there were mitigating circumstances that inhibited the intelligence communities’ ability to accurately analyze the situation. Also, while the intelligence provided was a contributing factor, the difficulties faced during the Mayaguez rescue and Koh Tang operations were not wholly the fault of the intelligence community. Military reports were often misleading and the operational and tactical command and control structure previously discussed also played a major role in the faulty distribution of the intelligence available. This section will analyze the overall performance of the intelligence community, the reporting on the whereabouts of the Mayaguez ship and crew, the Koh Tang troop strength estimates, the use of available intelligence sources and the effect the operational command and control system had on intelligence sharing and therefore operational risk.

Overall Intelligence Performance

The Mayaguez incident’s intelligence evaluation might better be characterized as a failure of expectation management. If one expects perfect intelligence and doesn't get it, then that's a failure. There were errors in passing the proper intelligence information to the proper decision-maker and those errors need to be investigated. It's also debatable

291 whether it was an issue of correct information being provided or if an increased amount of information was practical to obtain under the circumstances.

Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Kissinger characterized the intelligence as poor throughout the crisis and stated that the political and military leadership in Washington had difficulty determining a course of action due to the

“absence of accurate intelligence.” 788 He added, “At too many stages, starting with the first NSC meeting, decisions were made on the basis of information that had turned out to be almost totally wrong.” He also noted however, that in all “fairness, it was difficult to acquire intelligence in an area which was normally of only marginal interest to

Washington and where, as a result, intelligence collection had to start from scratch. But this limitation was never made clear to the officials deliberating in the Cabinet Room.” 789

Elaborating further, Kissinger went on to say, “It wasn’t so much that the intelligence was wrong, it was the fact that it was reported with such an unfounded sense of confidence that it was correct.” 790 The Intelligence Community (IC) didn’t see it that way. 791

In its 8 August “Post-Mortem Report” to the director of the CIA, the Product

Review Division of the IC reported : “The Intelligence Community reacted quickly and effectively to the Mayaguez crisis. It demonstrated a fundamental strength in the way its collection systems responded with speed and flexibility and its analytical capabilities provided immediate and effective service to operational users and high level

788 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 556. 789 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 571. 790 Kissinger interview in Mayaguez documentary. 791 The Intelligence Community (IC) is the term used for the sum of the different intelligence agencies inherent in the US government including the military intelligence arms of the different services and the joint staff. This includes the CIA, the (NSA) the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) now National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), among others.

292 consumers…The Mayaguez crisis occurred in the same area which had just seen the

collapse of the US allies in Vietnam and Cambodia, and—while it seriously tested the

machinery’s capacity in the in the initial stages to respond—found that machinery

generally capable of meeting the challenge.” After stating that, the report went on to

acknowledge, “Still, there were aspects of the Community’s performance before and after

the Mayaguez incident which prompt a close look, and their identification should help the

Community serve national needs better during future crises.” 792

The report divided the actions into three categories: The role of collection before

the seizure of the ship; the functioning of the IC on 12 May, the day of the seizure; and

the level of support during the decision process from 12-14 May. 793 The reports’ major

findings were:

o “Before the Mayaguez was seized on 12 May, Cambodian Communist naval activities in the Gulf of Thailand did not seem to portend a threat to US interests.” o “There was little awareness in the Community or elsewhere that a pattern might be forming, partly because most of the Cambodian Communist activity in the Gulf was directed against Vietnamese refugees and Thai fishing, not international shipping and partly because the two incidents that did involve foreign merchant ships did not have serious consequences. Thus no alerting device was triggered and there was no warning notice issued to US merchant shipping.” o “When the Mayaguez was seized during the early morning hours (about 0300 EDT) on 12 May, word first reached Washington through the CRITIC (Critical Intelligence) system roughly two hours later. Word did not reach principals immediately upon receipt of the first CRITIC message. Nevertheless, all principals had been informed by around 0800 EDT and both the intelligence and operational communities had by that time initiated a great deal of necessary activity.” o “Intelligence reporting during the crisis, from 12 through 14 May, was rapid and effective, though at times unavoidably unclear. Information

792 IC Post-Mortem Report, 1. 793 IC Post-Mortem Report , 3.

293 concerning the disposition of the Mayaguez crew was extremely difficult to obtain and interpret.” o “The tendency of the independent parts of the Community to report upward within their own organizations, rather than to exchange information laterally, may have hampered somewhat the effort to provide quick and clear intelligence support to the NSC.”794

The IC’s analysis stated that it seemed “clear with hindsight” that the Cambodian regime was “especially anxious to demonstrate its recently won sovereignty as forcibly as possible and that it wanted to do so both at home and abroad.” 795 However, the report justifiably explains that the analysts devoted to Southeast Asia and particularly Cambodia and Vietnam had been very busy at the time. The SE Asia analysts had been “faced with the almost contemporaneous collapse of the governments and armed forces of South

Vietnam and Cambodia and the formation of new communist governments in Saigon and

Phnom Penh” and were “thus preoccupied with complex questions which lacked visible answers.” 796 Also, the two previous incidents involving international shipping did not produce major repercussions because while the Korean ship had been fired upon, it had not been detained and the Panamanian ship was detained, but quickly released. Also, neither S. Korea nor Panama had the international prestige issue the US had. The IC was interested in the Cambodian claims to offshore islands and its conflict with Vietnam and had written a report on that subject, but it was not published until 13 May. 797 The failure

to predict the event is understandable, but the admission of shortcomings in the report

appears to be an attempt to divert any further scrutiny from the Intelligence Community.

794 IC Post-Mortem Report , 1-2. 795 IC Post-Mortem Report , 4. 796 IC Post-Mortem Report , 6. 797 IC Post-Mortem Report , 6.

294 It was clear the US had gone too far in moving away from human intelligence,

especially in the intelligence activity. In a typical American response to the

failures in Southeast Asia, intelligence had invested heavily in technical intelligence,

depending on satellite and electronic interception. 798 The lack of “eyes and ears on the ground” cost the American effort. This conclusion has been repeated many times in the investigation of other situations in the over thirty years since the Mayaguez incident.

Crew Location

Throughout and after the Mayaguez crisis, officials stressed the uncertainty that existed over the crew’s location as a major factor in the decisions made.799 It not known

whether all or some crew members might be on the Mayaguez , on Koh Tang, on the

Cambodian mainland or some combination of all locations. Acting Chairman General

Jones correctly found it difficult to criticize the intelligence community for not knowing

where the crew was located, stating that it was possible to hide that small number of

people anywhere. 800 However, decisions were made based on assumptions about the

location of the crew and the resulting confusion contributed to flawed decision-making at

the NSC and therefore at every level below. Amidst the confusion, there were several

major errors with respect to reporting the location of the crew:

o 12 May: Both the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the NSC briefings reflected field reports that the Mayaguez was under way from Poulo Wai toward Kompong Som when its actual destination was Koh Tang Island, which was on approximately the same course. 801

o 13 May: Both military and civilian intelligence agencies concluded the crew had been moved onto Koh Tang Island. DCI Colby briefed the NSC at the

798 Jones interview, 202. 799 Comptroller General , 73. 800 Jones interview, 205. 801 12 May NSC meeting minutes, 2.

295 1030 meeting that the crew had been moved onto Koh Tang and could be moved to mainland anytime. The 13 May DIA assessment also reported the crew had been transferred to Koh Tang. The crew was never on the island. 802

o 13 May: About 12 hours later, there were military aircrew visual reports that 30-40 possible “Caucasians” had been taken to the Cambodian mainland aboard a fishing vessel. This report was ignored in later planning. 803

o 14 May: The National Intelligence Brief reported “it is possible that some of the crew may have been moved (from Koh Tang) to the mainland.” The National Intelligence Daily sported the headline: “Cambodians May hold US crew on mainland” and added “it seems likely that at least some were moved to Kompong Som.” DIA sent the CJCS the same information. Colby then briefed at least some of the crew had been moved to mainland at the 1550 NSC meeting. While the crew had been briefly detained in Kompong Som Harbor, they never set foot on the mainland and were quickly moved to Koh Rong Sam Lem. That movement was never reported. 804

There were no reports indicating any crew members were still aboard the

Mayaguez after it was reported anchored off Koh Tang, nor were there reports of anyone entering or leaving the ship after the crew had been reported off the ship.805 Intelligence

units used imagery of the ship’s smokestack, which showed a steadily decreasing

temperature, to determine the engines were stopped. Conversely, an increasing

smokestack temperature could have indicated the intention to move the ship, which

would probably have required Mayaguez crewmembers since the Cambodians were unlikely to have expertise in operating such a large vessel.806 Note however, that Captain

Miller and 9 crewmembers did attempt to board the Mayaguez on 13 May, but were

frightened off by US aircraft.807 That movement was not reported.

802 NSC 13 May 1022, 2; Comptroller General , 73; Miller testimony. 803 NSC 13 May 2240, CH 3. A show of force had already been decided upon. 804 NSC 14 May, 2-3; IC Post-Mortem Report , 12; Miller testimony; Comptroller General 73. 805 Comptroller General , 73. 806 Comptroller General , 76. 807 See Ch 3; Miller testimony, 250; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez , 84-88.

296 In retrospect, the information collected by aircrews under difficult circumstances appears to have been accurate at times and inaccurate at others, but the credence lent to the reports was not always logical. The NSC and its advisors placed significant emphasis on the evidence that American prisoners were moved to Koh Tang Island. 808 It is questionable why more credence was given to a visual report of possible Caucasians being transferred to Koh Tang by one aircrew member than to the reports by several pilots of 30 to 40 possible Caucasians being taken to the mainland on a fishing boat. The assumption that crewmembers were on Koh Tang was presumably the basis for the attack on the island. It could have just as easily been deduced that all of the crew was on the

Cambodian mainland at the beginning of the Marine assault on Koh Tang.

The Defense Department position was once the fishing boat docked at Kompong

Som harbor, any further action with regard to that boat would be less productive than addressing what were seen as more urgent issues at Koh Tang where the majority of crewmen were believed to be. The fishing boat was not designated as “a target of significant interest,” although continued reconnaissance flights near Kompong Som were directed. The ABCCC ordered US jets to continue observing the fishing boat until it neared the mainland, but had no authority to allow the aircraft to overfly the Cambodian mainland. Therefore, the fighter aircraft lost visual contact with the boat as it reached

Kompong Som harbor. The ABCCC requested permission from USSAG/7AF to allow the reconnaissance aircraft to follow the boat into the harbor. Permission was denied.

General Burns did not yet have the authority to grant that permission and the NSC had only directed the boat be turned back if possible, but did not stress identifying the

808 See Ch 6; Comptroller General , 76.

297 passengers. 809 The NSC believed the crew was lost once they entered the harbor, but did not address the value of isolating Koh Tang if the crew had been transferred to the mainland. It was assumed some of the crew was on Koh Tang.

In summary, the Mayaguez crewmembers were not positively identified from the time they were taken from the ship on 12 May 1975 until they came alongside the USS

Wilson in a Thai fishing boat about 1008 local on 15 May. 810 However, the Koh Tang

Island invasion phase was based on the conclusion that there were Mayaguez

crewmembers on the island. Not only was the Koh Tang invasion plan based on a faulty

assumption of the Mayaguez crew location, the operation was planned based on inaccurate initial enemy troop strength reports.

Koh Tang Island Cambodian Troop Strength Estimates

There were many intelligence estimates of troop strengths on Koh Tang Island available for use in operational planning. The intelligence estimates were updated and proved to be accurate enough for proper mission planning and execution. However, the messaging process and command and control structure set up for the Mayaguez operation

was faulty. Often in ad hoc situations, mistakes occur that jeopardize the success of the

operation. Clausewitz referred to that as the “friction of war,” where “everything in war

is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by

producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” 811

Nowhere was that more evident than in the Mayaguez operation. No intelligence estimate of enemy strength other than the initial COMIPAC message of 18-20

809 Comptroller General , 75. 810 See Ch 19; Miller Testimony, 251; Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez 211-12. Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 55; Rodgers, “Mayday for the Mayaguez,” 256. 811 Clausewitz, On War, 119.

298 Cambodians was provided to the deployed Air Force helicopter elements or the Marine

Koh Tang Island assault force.812

At least five intelligence force estimate messages were issued from CINPAC headquarters and USSAG concerning Koh Tang Island from 13-15 May 1975:

o COMIPAC 131823Z May 75 (140123L). This message estimated 18-20 Cambodian military with families on Koh Tang island. It was based on a report by a former Khmer Naval officer who last visited Koh Tang Island on 17 April 1975. o COMIPAC SSO 132142Z May 75 (140442L). Estimate of one reinforced company of 90-100 troops plus a weapons squad. o COMIPAC 132144Z May 75. (140444L) A retransmission of the above intelligence report with same 90-100 troops. o USSAG/7AF 132210Z May 75 (140510L) This estimate indicated it was likely that the KC had transferred elements of main force units to Koh Tang Island; probably no more than a battalion (approximately 300 troops) equipped with multiple mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and light machine guns. o USSAG/7AF 141535Z May 75 (142235L). Intelligence summary revised the estimated KC strength on Koh Tang Island as probably not exceeding 100; small arms and automatic weapons and some mortars. Also reported anti- aircraft sites and small arms fire on Koh Tang Island. 813

As stated in Chapter 12, a DIA estimate was also prepared for the NMCC crisis action team on 13 May that estimated 150-200 heavily armed Cambodian troops on Koh

Tang Island, but that estimate remained in the Washington DC area. 814

There were sufficient intelligence estimates available for the Koh Tang assault forces and the estimates were available in time for planners to use. After investigation, it is clear why the estimates did not reach the assault force planners. The primary reason was the failure of CINCPAC or USSAG/7AF to include CTG 79.9, the helicopter mission commander, USSAG/7AF LNO at Utapao and CO 635 th Combat support group Utapao as addressees on intelligence estimate messages. This is another

812 CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75, 4. See Chapter 12. 813 CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75, 2. 814 CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75, 2.

299 result of the ad hoc nature and fast-moving nature of this crisis. Other parts of CTG 79 including CTG 79.1 to 79.8 were included as was the 307SW at Utapao.815

Task Group 79.9 was activated at Okinawa at approximately 2200 local 13 May

75. The task group commander, Col Johnson received the initial IPAC estimate of 18-20

Cambodian military carrying small arms on Koh Tang Island when he arrived at Utapao

AB, Thailand. Johnson was not apprised of the updated estimates and therefore, the estimate of 18-20 Cambodians present on Koh Tang was the planning factor the Marines used. 816

But there were other opportunities for the troop estimates to be passed to the tactical planners. The host unit at Utapao, the 307SW, was on the distribution for the various intelligence estimates, but they were not officially tasked to provide intelligence support to Brig Gen Baxter, the USSAG/7AF LNO, the Marine assault forces under Col

Johnson or the helicopter units under Col Anders. The persons involved confirmed that the quickly pieced together operational command structure impacted intelligence dissemination.

Up and down the convoluted chain of command, there were many assumptions about the intelligence estimates. USSAG/7AF commanders, including Lt Gen Burns agreed the 307SW at Utapao should provide intelligence support to the forces deployed to Utapao for the Mayaguez operation; however they did not direct the 307SW to provide that support. 817 Burns and his deputy, MajGen Hunt “assumed the intelligence reports were getting to the forces.” 818 Col Logan, the Assistant J-2 (Chief of intelligence) at

815 USSAG 132210Z May 75; USSAG 141535Z May 75, AFHRA. 816 Johnson CINCPAC IG interview. 817 Logan CINCPAC interview. Burns CINCPAC IG Interview. Archer CINCPAC IG Interview. 818 Burns CINCPAC IG Interview. Hunt CINCPAC IG Interview.

300 USSAG/7AF Headquarters assumed Col Reed, deployed forward with the helicopter

units would have the updated estimates, since he was in constant contact with

USSAG/7AF HQ. 819 Reed and Maj Gen Archer, the USSAG/7AF Chief of Staff spoke several times, but Archer never mentioned the increased intelligence estimates to Reed. 820

As an intelligence specialist at USSAG/7AF Headquarters at Nakhom Phanom AB,

Thailand, Capt Jeffery Anderson received all the IPAC intelligence estimates and discussed with the acting commander of 13AF ADVON at Nakhom Phanom, Col

Warren, the necessity of passing the messages to Brig Gen Baxter, Commander, 13AF

ADVON at Utapao. They agreed passing intelligence to Utapao would be redundant since the 307SW was addressed on the messages. There was an error in those assumptions; the 307SW was not specifically tasked to provide intelligence support to the deployed AF or Marine personnel. 821

The USSAG/7AF General officer leadership inexplicably didn’t discuss the increased Cambodian troop strength estimate amongst themselves. Maj Gen Archer, the

Chief of Staff, did not talk to Maj Gen Hunt, USSAG/7AF deputy commander about the subject and neither discussed it with Lt Gen Burns. 822 Burns recalled hearing Hunt

discuss the topic with Johnson, which Johnson denied. 823

The commanders directly involved in the Koh Tang attack were extremely busy

and were in meetings until at least 2030 the night before the attack. There was neither

much time for nor any inclination to sleep. There was also little time to develop personal

819 Logan CINCPAC IG interview. 820 Reed CINCPAC IG interview; Archer CINCPAC IG interview. 821 Merrel CINCPAC IG interview; Archer CINCPAC IG interview; Alan Geer, (Capt USAF), CINPAC IG interview 11 Nov 1975, AFHRA. Hereafter referred to as Geer CINCPAC IG interview. 822 Archer CINCPAC IG interview. 823 Burns CINCPAC IG interview.

301 relationships between the participants. Lt Col Austin was never sure who anyone was at

Utapao; they didn’t identify which unit they were from with the exception of Col Johnson and Col Reed. 824

While Brig Gen Baxter was deployed to Utapao as the 13 AF liaison by Gen

Burns, he was reportedly unhappy about intelligence support provided, but he also reported that he did not speak to any of the 307SW intelligence officers about the troop strength on Koh Tang. 825 That is only partially correct. As detailed in Chapter 12, on 14

May, a personality conflict severely impacted the mission. At approximately on 14 May,

Col Merrell the Intelligence Director for the 307SW attempted to brief Brig Gen Baxter and Col Reed regarding troop strength estimates and was turned away by both. Col

Merrell admittedly did not brief Brig Gen Baxter or Col Reed on Koh Tang estimates after the first rebuff. 826

An additional opportunity was missed when Capt Alan Geer, a 307SW intelligence officer and LtCol John Hopkins, Col Johnson’s Executive Officer did not adequately communicate. In an impromptu meeting at approximately 1430 on 14 May,

Lt Col Hopkins came to Capt Geer’s office area to discuss riot control agents that could be used on Koh Tang and filters for protective gas masks for US Marines. According to

Capt Geer, during this discussion, he informed LtCol Hopkins that intelligence messages indicated the possibility existed of increased enemy strength on Koh Tang Island, including machine guns, mortars and automatic weapons. He did not show LtCol

Hopkins a hard copy of the message. The conditions were hectic, with many people talking in the area and LtCol Hopkins was engrossed in the issue. Apparently,

824 Austin CINCPAC IG interview. 825 Baxter CINCPAC IG interview. 826 Merrell CINCPAC interview; Baxter CINCPAC interview.

302 Hopkins did not comprehend what Capt Geer was attempting to communicate. 827 Lt Col

Hopkins denied that conversation ever took place. 828 Given the fact the interviews took place six months after the actual event, it is understandable that details of specific conversations could have been difficult to recall.

A similar incident occurred between Capt Charles Heubusch, the AF Security

Police force commander who was assigned the task of landing on the Mayaguez until relieved of that duty by the Marines and Maj Raymond Porter, USMC that was assigned the mission. Heubusch did see the IPAC message with the updated estimate of 90-100 men reinforced with a heavy weapons squad. He verbally briefed Porter at approximately

1100 on 14 May, but did not have a hard copy of the message to provide Porter. 829 Porter was focused on his assigned task of seizing the Mayaguez and did not pass this information to Johnson or Austin. 830

The amount of swift boat activity around Koh Tang and the gunfire emanating from the island also provided valuable clues to the actual number of combatants present.

Hunt, Baxter and Anders, among others all later stated they personally thought there were

100 troops on the island. 831 If this is so, why did the attacking force not have that information? It is highly likely their deductions were a product of 20/20 hindsight.

A hard copy of an increased intelligence estimate was finally delivered by personnel from the 307SW command Center to Col Anders the helicopter mission commander 15 minutes after the departure of the helicopters (0415L 15 May).832 Col

827 Geer CINCPAC IG interview. 828 John Hopkins, (LtCol USMC), CINPAC IG interview, 11 Nov 1975, AFHRA. 829 Charles Heubusch, (Maj USAF), CINPAC IG 1 Nov 1975, AFHRA. 830 Porter CINCPAC IG interview. 831 Hunt CINPAC IG interview; Anders CINCPAC IG interview; Baxter CINCPAC IG interview. 832 CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75, 4.

303 Johnson and Lt Col Austin both believed at the time of the assault the attacking force would meet limited resistance and possibly sporadic small arms fire. 833 Austin first saw the IPAC/USSAG Intelligence summary about the 21 st of May, after returning to

Okinawa. He was surprised at what he believed to be an accurate count and never understood why he wasn’t made aware of the actual enemy strength estimates. 834 Col

Johnson returned to Okinawa on 16 May 75 where he first saw the COMIPAC and

USSAG/7AF intelligence estimates at III MAF Headquarters. 835

Brig Gen Baxter provided an insight into what it was like at the time:

I think it would be fair to mention that we started off on a shoestring. The Mayaguez was captured and we observed it from a distance. The next thing we saw it from airplanes. We did a quick reaction search launch and decided to hurry up there to board the Mayaguez the next morning. We did a lot of things in a short period of time. We had a 12-hour lead time. Get Helicopters, get landing nets and board the Mayaguez . We got the word “HOLD” when we were ready to launch…Released the security police forces and substituted the Marines. The concept of operations expanded. Time sort of raced together. We were up for 48 hours…we were not only going to board the Mayaguez , but going to invade the island…We did not know that the carrier made strikes against the mainland until the operation…we never got conflicting information from 7AF…We were sort of proud of the way we responded. I don’t want to convey that our actions were without fault. It was a busy time. A lot of people worked awfully hard. The Marines were fantastic to work with. 836

Lack of Photographic Intelligence

Once the Mayaguez was anchored off Koh Tang, the ship and the surrounding area were photographed frequently; mainly by USAF RF-4 photo reconnaissance aircraft.

RF-4s took an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 pictures during the 16 missions they flew from

13-16 May. A high altitude U-2 aircraft also flew a photo mission on 13 May and P-3 aircraft took a small number of hand-held photographs during the crisis. Due to the short

833 CINCPAC IG memo Nov 75, 5. 834 Austin CINCPAC IG interview. 835 Johnson CINCPAC IG interview. 836 Baxter CINCPAC IG interview

304 duration of the crisis, very few photographs reached Washington before the Mayaguez

and crew were retrieved. The photographic evidence obtained was reported to have been

analyzed in the field. 837 Yet the pertinent visual information was not given to the forces

that were to conduct the assault. 838

Why wasn’t a maximum effort made to confirm via photographic or eyewitness

evidence of the fighter pilot’s report of Caucasians onboard the fishing boat? There were

numerous methods available, including drones, helicopters, RF-4’s, or P-3’s. While a

GAO report criticized DOD for not using drones, the drones were not used for several

reasons: at least 24 hours were required to prepare a drone for a mission; airspace

saturation; and the drone required its flight route to be pre-programmed so it had little

chance for success tracking a moving target. The GAO also believed search and rescue

helicopters could have been used to obtain a positive ID on the “Caucasians” spotted on

the fishing boat heading toward Kompong Som, but due to the flight time of a helicopter

from Utapao to Kompong Som it would have been nearly impossible to intercept the

fishing boat. Also, helicopters were in short supply and Defense officials stated the risks

involved with using a helicopter were unacceptable. 839

The RF-4 was perhaps the best aircraft for the mission; however, RF-4 coverage was not continuous during the incident. No RF-4s were airborne at the time the

Mayaguez crew was reportedly transferred to Koh Tang. However, RF-4s were in the area when the fishing boat with possible Caucasians on board left Koh Tang for

Kompong Som. Despite the fact that none of the RF-4 reconnaissance aircrews were directed to take photos of fishing boats in the Kompong Som area, photos were available

837 Comptroller General, 76. 838 James Davis, (Lt Col USMC (ret)), interview by author, 12 May 07. 839 Comptroller General 82-84.

305 of the area. But the photos were not used for locating the crew because none of the photo interpreters were asked to look for a fishing boat suspected of carrying Caucasians, nor were they kept abreast of the evolving situation. 840 Nevertheless, pictures existed that provided strong evidence the Mayaguez crew was at Kompong Som. A GAO investigation team subsequently reviewed approximately 1000 photos taken in a single

RF-4 mission on 14 May and in less than an hour discovered a picture of a fishing boat anchored near Kompong Som with “approximately 29 possible persons on deck.” That was in fact the Mayaguez crew and the fishing boat was the one the crewmen were eventually released on. Despite the reports of possible Caucasians on the fishing boat that had steamed to Kompong Som, the RF-4s already airborne were not directed to take photos of fishing vessels at the time or location. 841 That provided additional evidence the

NSC and DoD were more focused on the attacks on the ship, Kompong Som and Koh

Tang Island than on finding the crew.

While there had been over a dozen photo reconnaissance missions flown on May

13-14, Col Johnson, CTG 79.9 stated that there was very good aerial photo coverage of the Mayaguez available at Utapao on his arrival (about 0900G 14 May) but no photos of the island. Hence the need for the reconnaissance mission flown by LtCol Austin and his staff on 14 May. In response to Col Johnson’s request for more detailed photos than those secured by LtCol Austin’s group, aerial photographs were delivered later that night, around 2200G.842 Those photographs were also inadequate for assault planning and offered little new detail of the island. 843 Photos with more granular detail of Koh Tang

840 Comptroller General 77. 841 Miller testimony. 842 Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 101. 843 Austin CNA interview; McGowin CNA interview, MCHD.

306 were delivered by an Air Force enlisted person to Capt Davis, Golf Company commander of the assaulting force as they boarded the helicopters at approximately 0400. With the rotors on the helicopters literally starting to turn, Capt Davis made the decision it was too late to attempt to change the assault plan .844

The fate of the mission was sealed.

844 James Davis, Author interview 10 Jan 2007.

307 CONCLUSION

We had entered Indochina to save a country, and we had ended by rescuing a ship.

Henry Kissinger 845

This study has shown the Mayaguez crisis was a significant historical event in a number of ways. The Mayaguez incident was the first direct foreign challenge to

American power since the end of the Vietnam War and more specifically the first test of the Ford presidency. As such, the US and the world watched to see how America would and could respond. Ford and his advisors treated the Mayaguez incident as a crisis of strategic importance. On the international scene, the US was involved in the Cold War and had to maintain or improve its power relationships with China and the Soviet Union.

American leaders were also concerned with and the Middle East and a continued poor showing in Southeast Asia would further weaken the perception of

American power in those areas. Therefore, the Ford administration’s perception of a crisis and their response was logical in the strategic sense. Domestically, Ford needed to address his weak power position as an unelected president and head of a party in shame.

The Mayaguez crisis’ constitutional implications were real and enduring. As the initial test of the 1973 War Powers Act, the Mayaguez crisis set precedence for both the executive and legislative branches on limits of power which are still being debated. As president, Ford used his extensive legislative experience and political capital to rally the congress behind a president involved in battle. Despite the weakened presidency, the congressional challenge was met.

845 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 575.

308 The technological advances in warfare that were first exploited during the

Mayaguez incident foreshadowed future communications breakthroughs. Satellite

communications advances allowed for the first time a US President and the high ranking

members of his civilian and military staffs to speak directly to a combatant on the

battlefield halfway around the world. That capability has dubious advantages at the time

and continues to be a double-edged sword.

The Mayaguez crisis exposed critical weaknesses in the US military’s ability to operate in a joint manner. While this was not the first time that subject was discussed, this crisis, along with American difficulties in the failed 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt and the 1983 Grenada operation helped spawn the Goldwater Nichols Act, the most radical organizational and operational transformation in the Department of Defense and the military services since its inception in the National Defense Act of 1947.

This study has been a small step toward expanding the understanding of the

Mayaguez crisis and correcting its treatment as a historical footnote. The study ties

together the different levels of political and military strategy, operations and tactics and

attempts for the first time to provide a holistic account of the crisis and answer previously

unanswered questions. It is intended to also pay tribute to those who fought and died for

their country in the Mayaguez rescue operation.

This investigation focused largely on the decisions made during the four days of

the Mayaguez crisis and the results of those decisions at all levels: strategic, operational

and tactical; from the National Security Council (NSC) down to the on-scene

commanders of the airmen, sailors, soldiers and marines, and including the captain of the

Mayaguez . It recounted the situational context, the diplomatic and military action and

309 analyzed the objectives, events and outcomes of the brief but intense crisis. It also analyzed and evaluated the operational structure of the forces that implemented the decisions of the US leadership and the intelligence community’s performance during the crisis. Finally it reinforced the position that this seemingly small event had significant consequences.

This four-day crisis proved to be a valuable case study in national security decision making. The limited time frame and scope of the operation allowed an in-depth hour by hour analysis of decisions at many levels. Key US officials were forced to make strategic, operational and tactical life or death decisions with a far from perfect understanding of the situation under a very short timeline. With less than complete intelligence information and in keeping with American practice and tradition, the military forces involved then attempted to execute those decisions. Their performance, while heroic in many cases, was far from perfect and provided many lessons to be learned.

Unfortunately, many of those lessons would have to be relearned several times over before action was taken to correct fundamental flaws in the military system.

There were four main themes that flowed through this analysis. The NSC’s strategic priority of showing American resolve in the face of an international challenge and thereby restoring American international prestige was often in conflict with the

NSC’s other stated goal of rescuing the ship and crew. Second, the decisions made at the strategic level often caused difficulties at the operational and tactical levels in achieving the stated ends or goals and the operational level planning and execution was substandard. Third, the operation came perilously close to ending in disaster. It was largely due to good fortune that the crew of the Mayaguez was rescued at all and was not

310 unwittingly killed by US forces. In addition, the Marine force that landed on Koh Tang came dangerously close to being overrun and annihilated. That would have further damaged US prestige and run counter to the goal of enhancing the US image. Lastly, to label the Mayaguez crisis an “intelligence failure” is far too simplistic. The Mayaguez operation is however a valuable case study in intelligence expectation management and the importance of proper dissemination of information.

Once again, perhaps most importantly, this study may provide some insights for future decision makers facing crisis situations.

311

Figure 1: Mayaguez Capture Area (From Wetterhahn, The Last Battle, 176.)

312

Figure 2: SS Mayaguez 13 May 1975 (AFHRA)

313

Figure 3: Location of US Forces 12 May 1975 (Comptroller General, 87)

314

Figure 4: Command Relationships (CINCPAC Command History, 7.)

315

Figure 5: Koh Tang Island (Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 11.)

316

Figure 6: Local Area Map (Rowan, Four Days of the Mayaguez, 115.)

317

Figure 7: Destroyed Helicopters on East Beach (Knife-23 and -31) (AFHRA)

318

Figure 8: Koh Tang Island at 0830 (Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation , 12)

319

Figure 9: SS Mayaguez and USS Holt (AFHRA)

320

Figure 10: USS Holt Tied Alongside SS Mayaguez (AFHRA)

321

Figure 11: USS Holt Towing SS Mayaguez (AFHRA)

322

Figure 12: Ford and Advisors Celebrate Release of Mayaguez Crew (Guilmartin, A Very Short War)

323

Figure 13: Post-Strike Photos of Damage in Kompong Som Area (AFHRA)

324

Figure 14: Post-Strike Photo of Ream Airfield near Kompong Som (AFHRA)

325

Figure 15: Mayaguez Operation Communications (CINCPAC Command History, 11)

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Unpublished Sources

Reports and Studies

Central Intelligence Agency, Post-Mortem Report: An Examination of the Intelligence Community’s Performance Before and During the Mayaguez Incident of May 1975. Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff for the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA) 8 Aug 1975. Declassified with portions redacted. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

CINCPAC COMMAND HISTORY 1975 Appendix VI—The SS MAYAGUEZ Incident. Command History Branch, HQ CINCPAC San Francisco 1976. Top Secret, Declassified 8 May 80. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

CINCPAC Inspector General Memo 00106-75, “SS Mayaguez Seizure” from Brigadier General Johnson to Admiral Gayler, 17 Nov 1975. Secret. Declassified 16 Dec 1991. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

HQ Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Assault on Koh Tang. HQ PACAF DCS/Plans and Operations report dated 23 June 1975. Secret, declassified on 31 Dec 1983. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

JCS after action report, no date. Obtained from Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

Johnson, James Col USMC; Austin, Randall, LtCol USMC, and Quinlan, Maj USMC, The Koh Tang Mayaguez Operation. Report undated. Obtained from Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

Mueller, Theodore H., “Chaos Theory and the Mayaguez Crisis” USAWC paper, 15 Mar 1990. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

National Security Council Meeting Minutes, May 12 1975 declassified 20 Mar 1996. Gerald Ford Library.

330

National Security Council Meeting Minutes, May 13, 1975 (1022-1117), declassified 20 Mar 1996. Gerald Ford Library.

National Security Council Meeting Minutes, May 13, 1975 (2240-0025), declassified 20 Mar 1996. Gerald Ford Library.

National Security Council Meeting Minutes, May 14, 1975, declassified 20 Mar 1996. Gerald Ford Library.

National Security Council Meeting Minutes, May 15, 1975, declassified 2 June 1995. Gerald Ford Library.

Patrick, Urey W. The Mayaguez Operation. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, April 1977. Obtained from the Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

“Seized at Sea: Situation Critical.” VHS. History Channel, aired 2 Dec 2005. Copy obtained from James Davis, USMC (ret), US Marine Corps University, Quantico VA.

USMC Field Manual 3-1 “Command and Staff Action,” US Marine Corps, 20 Sep 66. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

White House Press Release, 15 May 1975, Obtained from the Gerald Ford Library

Interviews, Oral Histories and Testimony

Archer, Maj Gen Earl J. Jr, USAF Chief of Staff/J-3 USSAG Nakhom Phanom AB Thailand. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General via telephone 10 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Austin, Lt Col Randall USMC, CNA interview 2 Mar 76. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

Austin, Lt Col Randall, USMC, Commander BLT 2/9. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General on 4 Nov 1975. . Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Baxter, Brig Gen Walter H., Commander 13 AF Advon, Utapao AB Thailand. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General 7 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

331 Burns, Lt Gen John L. USAF, Commander, USSAG/7AF NKP Thailand. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General 5 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Burns, Lt Gen John L. Interview conducted by Hugh N Ahmann, Historian USAF Historical research center. Published 8 Jun 1984. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Cicere, 2 nd Lt Michael. USMC, 3d Platoon commander, “G” Co., 2 nd Bn/9 th Mar. CNA taped interview 14 June 75. Obtained from the Gerald Ford Library.

Davis, Lt Col James H. USMC (ret) Author interview, Jan 2007, Feb 2008 and Apr 2008.

Davis, Capt James H. USMC G Company Commander, 2/9 Mar. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General on 4 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Dugard, Col George A. H. USAF, Commander, 307SW, Utapao AB Thailand. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General 5 Nov 1975 at Utapao AB Thailand. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Geer, Capt Alan B. USAF, Intelligence Officer, 307SW. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General 11 Nov 1975 via telephone. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Guilmartin, Dr John, Col USAF (ret), former member of Knife helicopter squadron, e- mail interview and phone interviews by author. 13 May 2007, and 10 Dec 2007.

Hendricks, Maj John B. USMC, Operations officer, 2d Bn/9 th Mar. CNA taped interview 5 June 75. Obtained from the Gerald Ford Library.

Heubusch, Maj Charles J. USAF, Commanding Officer, 656 th Security Police Sq, Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. Assigned to Utapao 13-14 May 75. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General 1 Nov 1975 via message. Classified Secret, declassified 31 Dec 1983. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Hopkins, LtCol John I. USMC, GSF Executive Officer, Utapao Thailand. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General 7 and 11 Nov 1975 via telephone. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Hunt, Maj Gen Ira A. USA, Deputy Commander, USSAG/7AF NKP Thailand. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General via telephone 13 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

332 Johnson, Col John M. USMC, Ground Support Force Commander, Combat Task Group 79.9, Utapao Thailand. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General via telephone 31 Oct and 3 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Jones, Gen. David C. Oral History Interview Conducted by Lt Col Maurice Maryanow and Dr Richard H. Kohn, 5 Aug and 15 to 17 Oct 1985 and 13-14 Mar 1986, Washington DC. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Keith, 1 st Lt James D. USMC, Executive Officer, “G” Co., 2d Bn/9th Mar., CNA taped interview 9 June 75. Obtained from the Gerald Ford Library.

Logan, Col Douglas K. USA, Assistant J-2, USSAG/7AF Nakhom Phanom AB Thailand. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General via telephone 31 Oct 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

McDaniel, 2 nd Lt James, USMC, 1 st platoon Commander 2d Bn/9 Mar., Taped interview, 9 June 75. Obtained from the Gerald Ford Library.

McGowin, Gunnery Sergeant Francis, Intelligence Officer, 2 nd Bn/9 th Mar Taped CNA interview 5 June 75. Obtained from the Gerald Ford Library.

McGowin, Gunnery Sergeant Francis A, USMC, BLT 2/9 intelligence officer. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General on 4 Nov 75. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Merrel, Col Alfred L. USAF, Director of Intelligence, 307 SW Utapao AB Thailand. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General by message 31 October and telephone 6 November 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Miller, Capt Charles. Congressional testimony captured in US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs Hearings, 94 th Congress 2nd session, “Seizure of the Mayaguez ,” Part IV “Reports of the Comptroller General of the United States,” US Gov’t Printing Office Washington, Oct 4, 1976. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

Porter, Maj Raymond E., USMC. Interview by CINCPAC Inspector General via telephone on 6 and 12 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Reed, Col Robert R., USAF, USSAG/7AF Coordinator/Liaison Officer, Utapao AB Thailand. Interview by CINPAC Inspector General via telephone 31 October and 3

333 Nov 1975. Unclassified. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Rodgers, Cdr Mark USN, Commanding Officer, USS Wilson. CNA interview, 1 Mar 76. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

Undorf, Major Robert. Interview by Des Brisay, Capt Thomas, 5 Jun 75. Obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

Memos

Austin, Lt Col Randall, Memo to Commanding officer, 9 th Marine Regiment, “Koh Tang/ Mayaguez Historical Report” 9 Dec 1975. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA. Obtained from Marine Corps University Historical Division, Quantico VA.

Buchen, Phillip. “The Mayaguez Situation in Connection with the War Powers Resolution” Top Secret Memorandum, dated May 14, 1975 for Jack Marsh. Declassified 28 March 1990 by NARA. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

HQ Marine Corps Point paper, Mayaguez. 31 Jul 1975 . Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

Option Paper “Possible Scenarios for Recovery of Ship and Crew” Top Secret. Probably from DoD to President on 13 May 1975 based on the events described. Declassified by NARA on 23 March 1990. Obtained from the Gray Research Center, Quantico VA.

White House Memo for Record dated May 16, 1975. Subject: The Mayaguez Incident. (14 May 1975 meeting). Confidential. Declassified 29 Nov 2001 by NARA. Photocopy obtained from Gerald Ford Library through Gray Research Center, Marine Base Quantico VA.

White House Memo to Secretary of Defense. “Use of Riot Control Agents in Efforts to Recover the SS Mayaguez and its Crew and Passengers.” Marine Corps History Division.

Messages

(Note: All messages were obtained from the AF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL unless otherwise annotated. Also, all messages were classified at issuance and have been declassified)

56-SOW message 191200Z May 75.

334 56 SOW message 241100ZMay 1975.

56-SOW message 210700Z May 75.

347TFW message 140404Z May 75.

347-TFW message 150930Z May 75.

388 TFW message 140355Z May 75.

388-TFW message 150230Z May 75.

388TFW message 151200Z May 75.

CINCPAC message 131338Z Feb 76.

CINCPAC message 140750Z May 75.

CINCPACAF message 1723402 May 75.

CINCPACFLT message 121812Z May 75. Obtained from Marine Corps HistoryDivision, Quantico VA.

CINCPACFLT message 122028Z May 75. Obtained from Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

CINCPACFLT message131857Z May 75. Obtained from Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

CINCPACFLT message 140505Z Jun 75. Obtained from Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

CINCPACFLT message 141254Z May 75. Obtained from Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

CINCPACFLT message 171727Z May 75. Obtained from Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

COMIPAC message dated 131823Z May 75.

COMIPAC Message 132144Z May 75.

COMSEVENFLT message142326Z May 75.

COMUSSAG/7AF message 141651Z May 75.

335 COMUSSAG/7AF message 141730Z May 75.

COMUSSAG/7AF message 150400Z May 75.

COMUSSAG/7AF message 161500Z May 75.

CTF- 79 message 132124Z May 75.

CTF-79 message 130148Z May 75.

CTF-79 message 140426Z May 75.

CTF 79 message 150945Z May 75

CTG 79.9 message 141400Z May 75.

CTG 79.9 message 151138Z May 75.

CTU 79.9.2 message, 160837Z May 75.

JCS message 121437Z May 75.

JCS message 131610Z May 75.

JCS message 131905Z May 75.

JCS message 131912Z May 75.

JCS message 140645Z May 75.

JCS message 142203Z May 75.

JCS message 150044Z May 75.

JCS message150455Z May 75.

USS Wilson message 150220Z May 75.

USS Wilson message 150240Z May 75.

USS Wilson message 151803Z May 75.

USS Wilson message 210900Z May 75.

USSAG/7AF message 132210Z May 75.

336 USSAG/7AF message 141535Z May 75.

Online sources

Ford, Gerald R. Biography online at: http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/grf/fordbiop.asp .

“Secretaries of Defense.” Department of Defense website at http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories .

Department of Defense Dictionary. Online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/o/03914.html .

“The Mayaguez Story: Her Seizure and Return.” Sea Land Service publication 1975. Online at: www.KohTang.com/Multimedia/The %20Mayaguez%20Story.pdf.

United Nations Website: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm .

US Navy official website Pueblo information at http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh- usn/usnsh-p/ager2.htm .

337

APPENDIX: Maritime Warning System

Was the crew of the Mayaguez warned of the potential danger in their route

through the Sea of Thailand near the turbulent Cambodian coast and the islands that were

being contested by Cambodia and Vietnam? If so, what kind of warning did they

receive? If not, why was there not a warning? What kind of warning went out after the

Mayaguez was captured? And finally, when did that warning go out? Those were

questions asked by many during the time of the Mayaguez crisis. Much of the information presented in this appendix is taken directly from or summarized from a 1975

GAO report to Congress: “Report of The Comptroller General of the United States:

System to Warn US Mariners of Potential Political/Military Hazards: SS Mayaguez , A

Case Study.” 846

The crew of the Mayaguez could have been alerted to the earlier attacks on shipping by the Cambodians and warned to steer away from the area. But the Captain of the Mayaguez might not have received the warnings had they been sent nor heeded the warnings if received. Arrangements for issuing such warnings did exist. But those arrangements were not clearly delineated or codified, and they must be described in some detail if the failure to warn the Mayaguez is to be understood.

In 1975, the US maintained a system for broadcasting long-range-radio hydrographic warnings to US mariners on the high seas to give them navigational safety

846 House Committee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs Hearings, 94 th Cong. 2nd session, Report Of The Comptroller General of the United States: System to Warn US Mariners of Potential Political/Military Hazards: SS Mayaguez, A Case Study,” 1975. Hereafter referred to as System to Warn US Mariners.

338 information as quickly as possible. There were two general types of warnings: 1.

navigational warnings, which contained such information as changes in buoys, lights and

other navigational aids; floating dangers, and naval operations; and 2. Special warnings which were more political and/or military in nature and included such things as declarations of hostilities and territorial sea claims. The Defense Mapping Agency

Hydrographic Center (DMAHC) was responsible for originating and issuing navigational warnings. 847

When declared a blockade around England in 1939, the US Government found it needed to disseminate certain official public announcements. Officials at the US

State Department, the Navy and the Maritime Administration met and instituted an informal system. After the end of WWII, the issuance of special warnings stopped.

However, the State Department determined that a system was still required and a reintroduction was made on May 17, 1948.848 In 1975, the State Department still had the

primary responsibility for issuing special warnings, although other Federal agencies

could draft a warning and request issuance. 849

Radio navigational warnings for the Atlantic Ocean, , and

contiguous areas were called HYDROLANTS. Radio warnings for the Pacific Ocean

and East Asia and contiguous areas were called HYDROPACS. Special warnings were

originated as a necessary supplement to regular navigational warnings and were

numbered consecutively irrespective of the year issued. Following initial broadcast, they

847 System to Warn US Mariners , 8. The Defense Mapping Agency, formed in 1972 is now part of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 848 Ibid, 9, 10. 849 Ibid, 5, 8.

339 were published in Defense Mapping Agency’s Hydrographic Center’s (DMAHC) weekly

Notice to Mariners. 850

Prior to May 12, 1975, forty-four special warnings had been issued along with one update, equating to roughly one and a half per year since the inception of the program. 851 Seven remained in effect on May 1975. Special warnings generally tended to cluster around significant political/military events. For instance:

• On , six special warnings were issued regarding actions of various Middle East countries following Israel’s proclamation of independence. • Between 24 June 1949 and Feb 10, 1950, five special warnings were issued pertaining to the Chinese Government. • In 1962, five special warnings were issued dealing with US quarantine of Cuba.

Radio telegraph broadcasts were made to merchant vessels twice daily at about

1230 and 0030 Eastern Daylight Time. However, the system did not ensure timely dissemination of information, because unlike the requirement for US civil aircraft to monitor warnings issued by the FAA or International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO), US merchant vessels were not required to monitor, copy or acknowledge receipt of US hydrographic broadcasts. This matter was generally left the ship operators/owners and vessel captains. 852

The State Department’s Office of Maritime Affairs had the overall responsibility for issuing Special maritime warnings, but the procedure was not formalized in any interagency agreement or memorandum of understanding. In fact, with each periodic personnel change in the Maritime Affairs office, it had been necessary for DMAHC to

850 System to Warn US Mariners , 10. 851 Ibid, 6. 852 Ibid, 8, 12.

340 brief the new State personnel on the functions of DMAHC and operation of the

navigational and special warning system. 853

The State Department maintained two 24-hour watch centers to bring substantive

matters to the attention of appropriate State officials as quickly as possible and to serve as

liaison with operations centers of other government agencies. 854

When the SS Mayaguez was fired upon and boarded by Cambodian armed forces on May 12, 1975, several incidents had recently occurred off the Cambodian coast in which Cambodian forces had fired on or detained merchant vessels of other nations.

CINCPAC noted in their estimate, “adequate and timely warning was provided by the information and warning system, and that both the NSA and (IPAC) Intelligence Center

Pacific reported on earlier Khmer Communist acts against foreign shipping. The main problem according to CINCPAC was “converting intelligence in the system to an appropriate operational response, both civilian and military.855 However, State’s

Maritime Affairs office was not informed of those incidents until after the Mayaguez seizure. The Maritime Affairs office had not adequately informed other State

Department activities and other government departments of the types of situations which should be brought to its attention. 856

On Sunday, th , 1975 at 0600, the State Department’s Operations Center received a phone call from the American Embassy in Korea about a call from a Korean

Government official regarding a possible capture of a South Korean vessel by a

Communist ship. At 1217, the Ops Center learned through military channels the Korean

853 System to Warn US Mariners , 10. 854 Ibid, 13. 855 CINCPAC Command History , 4. 856 System to Warn US Mariners , 5, 8.

341 ship had escaped and the case was closed. The Ops center and the Korea country director

did not know to alert the Maritime affairs office. The Foreign Broadcast Information

Service (FBIS) carried a report on 5 May of a ship being shelled, but State’s Bureau of

Intelligence and Research (INR) did not notify Maritime affairs. On the 7 th of May, a

Panamanian vessel enroute to Thailand from Singapore was seized by Cambodian vessels and released about 36 hours later. This information was also available to US intelligence agencies, but was not passed to Maritime Affairs and DMAHC until after the Mayaguez seizure. 857

The GAO reported, “If the offices responsible for issuing navigational and special warnings to US mariners had known of the prior incidents and the seriousness of those incidents, some type of warning would have been issued before the Mayaguez seizure.” 858

That may be true, however, no warnings about any of these incidents likely would have made any difference in the Mayaguez situation nor would it have affected any other ship’s fate in the area.

The Captain of the Mayaguez said he was sailing under company orders in those waters, which he considered international, under “innocent passage” rules” and a warning might not have made it to him anyway since the Mayaguez was not monitoring the US government warning system frequency. 859 When asked about the lack of maritime warnings by the US government even after the seizure of the Korean and Panamanian ships, Captain Miller blamed the Governments of Panama and Korea for not notifying the

Geneva Convention office in Geneva, not the US government. 860

857 System to Warn US Mariners , 18. 858 Ibid, 19. 859 Miller testimony, 215. 860 IR Committee pt II, 215.

342 There was also a question of why other US Mariners were not advised to avoid

the area of the Mayaguez seizure sooner than they were. Approximately 19 hours after the Mayaguez SOS and agencies in Washington DC learned of the seizure, Special warning 45 advising mariners to avoid the area of seizure was broadcast. The warning stated:

SHIPPING IS ADVISED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE TO REMAIN MORE THAN 35 NAUTICAL MILES OFF THE COAST OF CAMBODIA AND MORE THAN 20 NAUTICAL MILES OFF THE COAST OF VIETNAM INCLUDING OFFLYING ISLANDS. RECENT INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED OF FIRING ON, STOPPING AND DETENTION OF SHIPS WITHIN WATERS CLAIMED BY CAMBODIA, PARTICULARY IN VICINITY OF POULO WAI ISLAND. THIS WARNING IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS US RECOGNITION OF CAMBODIAN OR VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS OR AS DEROGATION OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE FOR US FLAG VESSELS, OR DEROGATION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS. 861

As mentioned earlier, the warning broadcasts were issued every twelve hours, at

1230 and 0030. The State Department did not issue a warning regarding the Mayaguez situation until 1230 a.m. 13 May 1975 because the department officials simply did not get the message approved quickly enough to make the 1230 broadcast. 862 The GAO reported, “the State Department should have responded in a more timely manner by issuing a navigational or special warning on the May 12 1230 pm hydrographic broadcast rather than 12 hours later.” 863 While this conclusion was debatable, this part of the investigation about warnings was a minor background piece when the whole context of the Mayaguez incident is considered. It was also a convenient vehicle for second guessers to add evidence of administrative malfeasance.

The GAO recommended several internal measures to the Department of State formalizing the Maritime Affairs office responsibility for issuing Special warnings and

861 System to Warn US Mariners , 13. 862 Ibid, 45. 863 Ibid, 19.

343 other State offices, including INR, the regional bureaus and the ops centers to keep the

Maritime Affairs office apprised of developments that might require maritime warnings be issued. They also recommended more formal interagency agreements to smooth the process and a more timely issuance of warnings once they were drafted. Finally, the

GAO recommended the Secretaries of State and Commerce to “jointly encouraged US steamship owners/operators to:

• Require their vessels to monitor at least one US hydrographic broadcast each day.

• Supplement the broadcast of a US Special Warning by transmitting the warning to

their vessels which may be near the critical area. 864

The State Department responded to the committee this comment: “While the

Department of State believes recommendations were well taken, it also believes that such actions fall within the purview of the two government agencies most closely associated with their implementation—DMAHC and the Department of Commerce

(Maritime Administration). The State Department does not have the facilities to invoke, monitor or enforce these recommendations.”

864 System to Warn US Mariners , 6, 46.

344