Victim Scapegoating J Vossen Tilburg Univ

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The Search For Moral Agency: (Reactive) Victim Scapegoating

J Vossen

Tilburg University

129805

Fig. 1: Titian: The Flaying of Marsyas. Photograph by Zdenek Sodoma in Olomouc, Museum of Art, Kromeriz (from Rösing, 2013).

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1. Scapegoating and the Search for Moral Agency Agents and Patients Our Psychological Construing and Misconstruing of Action and Effect upon Eternal Fictions The Doer Behind the Doing Psychological Essentialism and Appealing to Intuitions The Art of Moral and Political Discourse

2. Moral Nativism and Scapegoating Moral Skepticism Moral Skepticism plus Moral Nativism The Adaptationist Approach to Moral Emotions and Scapegoating Dispositional Psychology Scapegoating, Stigma and (Social) Ostracism The Scapegoat’s low WTR Moral Motivation and Intuition: Relationship Regulation Theory Protomoral Intuitions: The Building Blocks of Human Morality and Scapegoating Human Morality and the Consciousness of Guilt (Schulden) Punishment and Revenge On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic

3. On the Hard-to-Decipher Hieroglyphic-Script of Man’s Moral Past Pharmacology Athens’ Rational Ethos The Delphic-label Jerusalem’s Obedient Ethos The Victima-label Reactive Scapegoating The Ultimate Agent The Ideal Pharmakos Ideal Scapegoats in Athens and Jerusalem

4. Construing Morality Ideal Types Dionysus versus the Crucified

References:

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Abstract. This paper reflects on the way people cope with apparent morally significant scenarios and especially the related process of scapegoating. I assume this occurs when people fundamentally (though arguably erroneously) attribute responsibility – moral agency – for perceived dissonance or other 'uneasy feelings' (including Fürcht) unto a subject. Moral skepticism – agnosticism regarding moral fact – is cultivated throughout the thesis allowing the scientific tackling of the associations of processes that correspond with or lead to the (erroneous) attribution of moral agency and placing scapegoating in the realm of moral psychology and seeing it as a morally motivated conduct. I argue that sense of agency is fundamental in our psychology and grammatical habits and is essential to any construal of morality. This paper seeks to account for diverse practices ranging from (types of) cursing, to (secondary) victimization (including scapegoating, stigmatization, social ostracism and moral disengagement more generally). An ethnographic and linguistic psychological approach shows how our attribution of agency to a subject (and belief that injuries can be compensated for) is consequence of how we encounter the world in language (Nietzsche, 1887; Pemberton, 2012) and Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is able to provide an understanding of how complex proximal psychological mechanisms (i.e., functional machinery), can come into being (e.g., Darwin, 1871; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) which are concerned with getting individuals and groups to do this (and to scapegoat). “Natural selection’s hierarchical ethic will have a group to scapegoat [because it] values order over chaos and peace over justice” (Grote, 2009: pg., 183). That is in brief: it values withingroup predictability and peace for the sake of enhancing relative reproductive advantage. As such it is not concerned with the accuracy of moral judgments (justice) per se in order to fulfill its function. Therefore I argue moral nativism (inevitably) leads to moral skepticism. 'The hieroglyphicscript of man's moral past' can, in contrast to positivist genealogies, help to understand (and learn from) man’s moral past (Nietzsche, 1887) at a borader, more fundamental or actual level. Apart from the fact Nietzsche already clearly saw entire human groups were involved in scapegoating rituals (as Girard, 1987 contends), Nietzsche, more importantly, shows what we can discern as psychologists from these rituals and from the very attempt of philosophy. Therefore, apart from simplifying reductionist theories, historical observations and nonhistoric fact derived from the myths and texts that survived time will be reported to further distill the associations of practices of the complex psychology of scapegoating. Notwithstanding (or rather by taking into account) the criticism at genealogical projects and theory, this thesis sets out a psychological model that genealogically debunks our moral intuitions and explains most reactions and judgments related to perceived immoral scenarios to derive from adaptive machinery. I purport moral agency – far from being objective or accurate – is perceived and attributed unto the person (or persons) that makes most sense from the point of view of our adaptive machinery. The proposed model accounts for a great variety of (historic) observations and furthermore is very effective (and intuitively applied) in moral and political discourse. The trick here, as I will argue, is to appeal to intuitions (of fear or even terror) that warrant cruelty. The easiest, most effective way, I propose, is to attribute a Dionysian essence to someone or some group.

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At the end of round ten of the lightmiddleweight world championship in 1963, boxer Davey Moore lost to his opponent Ultiminio Ramos providing the latter with the title of WBC/WBA World Featherweight Champion. The match was broadcasted live on national television and the footage (available on youtube.com) shows the blow against the base of Moore’s neck, injuring his brain stem and causing him, after having completed the tenth round and having given his final interview, to fall into a coma in the dressing room out of which he never returned. He died 75 hours after that as a result of his incurred injury. His death and that of Benny "the Kid" Paret, a year before in 1962 prompted debates about the morality and dangers inherent in the sport, leading some to advocate for its altogether abolition in the United States.

Not being a big sports fan particularly, I point out these facts because they help to construe the question that is raised in the song of Bob Dylan (1963): Who killed Davey Moore, why and what’s the reason for? The young poet sings nobody – not the referee, the angry crowd, Moore’s manager, the gambling man, the boxing writer or Ramos himself – admits culpability or will (voluntarily) bear responsibility. All but Ramos assume proximal causation behind Moore’s death, which implies there must have been an active agent – a subject – behind the deed; this is illustrated in their closing arguments (“it wasn’t me that made him fall, you can’t blame me at all”). Ramos instead assumes ultimate causation and uniquely attributes responsibility for the incident to “destiny” and “God’s will”.

1. Scapegoating and the Search for Moral Agency

Scapegoatologist René Girard (1986: The Scapegoat) believes that all people or communities will eventually resort to scapegoating rituals. Jan Van Dijk (2008: Slachtoffers als Zondebokken; Victims as Scapegoats) agrees that these rituals function to moderate social strain, which would otherwise – if not dealt with appropriately – terminate in ‘explosions of violence’. That is, it is a (last) resort to violence to prevent even greater violence. In line with this, the “violence against the scapegoat must in Girard’s words be seen as ‘good violence’ in the sense that for the ritual to be effective, the attackers must be honestly convinced of the rightfulness of their accusations and the legitimacy of the violence afflicted on their targets” (Van Dijk, 2009: pg., 7). Because morality in a sense is shared and moral discussions and (normative, prescriptive) judgments almost as a rule center on responsibility – which requires actions are performed by intentional, deliberate agents of sound mind – this is most easily achieved if the accused is come to be perceived as an (responsible) agent (e.g., Girard, 2008; Nietzsche: 1887, II§4).

Agents and Patients

Moral psychologists Gray, Young and Waytz (2012a), assert this particular sort of framing appeals to the ‘essence of morality’. Moral typecasting theory assumed that people are inclined to view (im)moral events in 5 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS dyadic terms – constituted by an agent (the cause, i.e., a doer) and a patient (the effect, i.e., a feeler) – and are compelled to complete unsatisfying and uncompleted dyads, even in immoral yet ostensibly victimless cases (Gray & Ward, 2011) or those that (objectively) consist of a triad or (for that matter) any other polyad (e.g., in cases of more unrelated offenders or victims). Immoral acts are defined as those that in some way harm – i.e., perceived suffering brought about by an intentional agent – an individual, her group or its related values and resources (2012b). Moral typecasting theory is basically extracted from Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics) whose primary interest was (the conditions under which we may rightfully speak of) moral responsibility and moral character. These roles are mutually exclusive, so that we see others as “moral Neckercubes” (Gray, Young & Waytz 2012a: pg. 114): when we focus on someone’s agency (e.g., when we perceive of an offender as the unequivocal instigator of an apparent injustice), we consequently deny him patiency which facilitates moral disengagement or demoralization and ‘justifies’ revenge (ibid.; see also Gray, Gray & Wegner, 2007). Comprehensive and illuminating as it may appear at first glance; Gray, Young and Waytz’s eliminative reductionist model might have neglected potentially equally essential elements of morality and we are warned that their overenthusiastic claim (of ‘mind perception’ as ‘the essence of morality’) must be taken with caution (e.g., Koleva & Haidt, 2012; Baumeister & Von Asch, 2012) because, although mind perception is necessary in this respect (Haslam, 2012), it is absolutely not sufficient by itself (Monroe et al., 2012). Equating immoral acts with harm places too much emphasis on harm (Koleva & Haidt, 2012; Hamlin, 2012; Monroe, Guglielmo & Malle, 2012) and excludes harmless behaviors (e.g., Alicke, 2012). Gray and colleagues (2012b) reply they consider mind perception the essence of morality, but it is not all of morality and that for example the important role of selfcontrol (Baumeister & Von Asch 2012) is associated the model. In addition, Strickland, Fisher and Knobe (also in the same issue Psychological Inquiry, 23: 2012) address the question why we perceive of moral events in these dyadic terms. Perhaps even more important still; the very assumption, that morality can have a single essence, is likely to be flawed (e.g., Haslam, 2012; Haidt & Koleva, 2012; Nietzsche, 1887). It is more apt that morality (and mind perception) is contextdependent – closely interacting with social norms and relational values (Rai & Fiske, 2012; Baumeister & Von Asch, 2012; Alicke, 2012; Haslam, 2012; Joyce, 2006). Where Haslam (2012) wraps it up by claiming he is antiessentialist and morality can have no single essence; Haidt (2004) asserts he is antiparsimonist and opts with Koleva (2012) for a solution that does not resort to the use of ‘Ockham’s chainsaw’. As purported by them, morality is not a basiclevel (e.g., chair) but rather a superordinate (e.g., furniture) category. Bas van Fraassen (2008: The Empirical Stance, pg. 7) however thinks this would be tantamount to give in to “one of the temptations that make for really bad philosophy” because whereas a chair may be considered part of furniture to a moving company; an estatemanager would count it as a part of the house and so forth. So it is for morality: (infinitely) many superordinate categories of morality can be 6 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS constructed that are all entirely contextdependent. Therefore, culture (and corresponding socialization processes) may be equally essential because it depends on and at the same time shapes our shared understandings of how morality is conceived of at any given time (Rai & Fiske, 2012; Baumeister & Von Asch 2012; see also: Baumeister, 2005; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Bjorkland, 2008; Joyce, 2012). According to this view and critique, a simple dyadic analysis is unable to distinguish fair competition from cheating (Baumeister & Von Asch 2012; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Gray, Young and Waytz (2012b) reply moral typecasting theory is in fact fully compatible with cultural variability and underscore once more that all morality is understood through this dyadic template. ‘The essential confusion’ arises because “both morality and mind are in the eye of the perceiver” (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012: pg., 208). That is, the perceptions of ‘harmful’ (and intended) agency combined with perceived suffering causes moral judgments. This means harm (and hence morality) must be understood relative to (inter alia) cultural (Haidt & Koleva, 2012) and socialrelational (Rai & Fiske, 2012) contexts (e.g., Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010; Nietzsche 1887) – but always involve a perceived agent and a patient. Specifically of current interest, moral agents and patients (victims) are judged differently and are for example likely to be blamed (more), when they display certain characteristics that emphasize their sound mind and intentionally planned and skilful acting (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Nietzsche 1887, II§4; Girard, 2008). This is consistent with Girard’s perspective on scapegoating in which “victims are too often chosen among physically challenged people or foreigners to be a purely random event” (Girard, 2008: Ch. 3, Scapegoating and Social Order) and that of Kurzban and Leary (2001: Evolutionary origins of Stigmatization: The functions of social exclusion: pg., 188) who assume "that many of the characteristics that lead to stigmabased social exclusion are nonarbitrary and derive from evolved adaptations designed to cause people to avoid interactions that are differentially likely to impose fitness costs". Socalled preferential signs of victimization (Girard, 1980, 2008) – which can be personal characteristics or other conditions – are used rationalize the scapegoating which per effect incites and justifies repetition. Though it is tempting to assume there are definite preferential signs, as it appears, “we must abandon the assumption that moral judgments are based on features of actions independent of the socialrelational contexts in which they occur (e.g., Did the action cause harm? Was the action unfair?)” (Rai& Fiske, 2011: pg. 57). Perhaps sounding counterintuitive at first; practices associated with scapegoating (or, for that matter, revenge, torture or genocide) are morally motivated conducts (like grooming or helping the needy) and not simply moral errors or limitations of knowledge or selfcontrol (Rai & Fiske, 2011). “To put the point provocatively: It is entirely possible that Hitler’s decisions were as much guided by the workings of an innate moral faculty as were Mother Teresa’s” (Joyce, 2013b), in other words; Adolf Hitler’s notorious actions and judgments might have a moral basis in his psychology – and, in this sense, they are ‘morally motivated’ like those of the saintly (Rai & Fiske, 2011). 7 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

Our Psychological Construing and Misconstruing of Action and Effect upon Eternal Fictions

That ‘mind perception’ – which presumes causation – need not be rational (or even objective), but may very well rest on fundamental delusion in order to fulfill its function, can be concluded on David Hume (1772)’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding concluding our fundamental psychological makeup causes us to see effects as being instigated by a cause yet “how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect” (Ch. On Cause and Effect) is not at all selfevident: we seem compelled to think in terms of cause and effect, agent and patient, good and bad etc. (Gray & Wegner, 2007; Haidt & Algoe, 2004); but causation can not be indefinitely settled on an empirical basis. Immanuel Kant (1783: Prolegomena to any future metaphysics) writes this epistemic genealogical debunking of ‘the connection of cause and effect’ was so powerful it interrupted him from his ‘dogmatic slumber’. He may indeed have been among the first since to place “a tremendous question mark after the concept ‘causality’” yet Nietzsche (The Gay Science: §357) observes neither he nor Hume doubted its legitimacy at all. Strickland, Fisher and Knobe (2012) inquired about the question why people perceive events in dyadic terms as purported by Gray and colleagues (same issue), and analyzed the available linguistic literature on this matter (e.g., Dowty, 1991). They conclude that an agent is that which we conceive of causes events to happen and intends their occurrence. From this they derive a generalized view of ‘event dyads’: all events are construed in terms of agents and patients regardless of whether the scenario is morally significant and syntax manipulates aspects of theoryofmind so that it ‘designates agents and patients’ (ibid.: 1 pp. 5 & 19; see also: Nietzsche, 1886: §17) . Nietzsche too believes that the fact that we presuppose and assert agency and responsibility is consequence of how we encounter and structure (interpret) the world in, and by means of, language. He concludes that: “Heraclitus will remain eternally (ewig) right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction. The ‘apparent world’ is the only one: the ‘true world’ is merely added by lie (hinzugelogen)” (Nietzsche, 1889: Twilight of Idols; italicized in the original). Principally, “every activity requires an [active] agency” – a substratum – which is foisted upon us by grammar and syntax (der grammatischen Gewohnheit) (1887:II§17): “But there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; ‘the doer’ is invented as an afterthought – the doing is everything”.

The Doer Behind the Doing

1 The word patient (derives from the Greek páthos, which means suffering) is slightly confusing because it frames the event in terms of suffering and focuses on harm and immoral scenarios. 8 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

As it appears: “we construe and misconstrue all actions as conditional upon an agency, a ‘subject’” (Nietzsche, 1887: I§13) and for example ‘separate lightning from its flash’ and take the latter to be ‘a deed – something performed by a subject – which is then called lightning’ (Cf., Darwin, 1860). Strickland, Fisher and Knobe (2012), provide us with novel evidence that backs up this perspective: Mostly the agent is included as the grammatical subject in sentences and people attribute more agency and intentionality to subjects then to nonsubjects or objects; especially to syntactic agents (compared to patients) (ibid.; Strickland, Fisher, Keil & Knobe, 2012). Moreover, using a manipulation from linguistics research on a sample of 83, they found that, in both morally relevant as well as in morally irrelevant events, there was a consistent tendency to assign higher qualities of agency such as intentionality, responsibility and punishment, to grammatical subjects than to objects, whereas the latter were viewed as patients and rated to be more upset in morally charged situations. Syntactic subjects, i.e., agents, are perceived to act more intentionally and thus deserving of more blame and punishment in both morally significant and neutral situations. Strickland, Fisher and Knobe (2012) propose that “people have an innate preparedness to understand events in terms of these roles and that this innate preparedness then structures their thinking about events in numerous domains” (ibid.: pg. 21; emphasis added) thereby shifting the attention and discussion (of dyadic perception and hence of morality), expectedly, to nativism – which is addressed extensively below.

Psychological Essentialism and Appealing to Intuitions

Less concerned, at first, with whether the perception of event dyads is foisted upon us by grammatical habits or our genes via natural selection is the socialpsychological thesis purported by Medin & Ortony (1989; see also, Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 2000). Psychological essentialism is the “psychologically plausible analog of the logically implausible doctrine of metaphysical essentialism” (ibid.: pg. 183). Instead of, like the latter, naively purporting things actually possess some internal essence (cf., Plato’s theory of forms); it modestly assumes that people (implicitly) believe in the existence of concepts with some internal essence that defines them (erroneous or naive as this may be). Importantly, the theory provides a proximal psychological framework for explaining variations in mindperception.

The Art of Moral and Political Discourse

Because moral values are in a sense shared, moral (d)evaluation can be employed to condemn, justify and warrant punishment and subhuman treatment. Arguments in moral discourse that appeal to the way we perceive of others in terms of their essence are especially likely to be effective and can affect the agency that is attributed to the essencebearer. Consider for example the passage in Aristophanes' (philosophical) comedy The Birds (414BC: 361348; Oates & O'Neill, 1938: pg., 750) where Epops' justificatory questions "Why tear these two men to 9 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS pieces, why kill them? What have they done to you?" are met by the leader of the Chorus with the counterquestions: "Are wolves to be spared? Are they not our most mortal foes? So let us punish them". – By focusing on the wolflike essence of these two men and arousing emotions of fear, his spearheading the Chorus to 'tear, pluck, strike and flay them' very effectively provokes killerintuitions, making corresponding actions rendered justified (acts of selfpreservation). The catching phrase, “homo homini lupus (man is a wolf to others)” (Plautus: 195 BC) was made more famous by socialcontract theorist Thomas Hobbes (1651: De Cive), who uses it similarly to justify the right to unlimited and preemptive selfpreservation (jus naturalis). To Hobbes, man appears selfish by nature and – after already having provided a mechanized analysis of humans and animals in the first few chapters of The Leviathan (1651) – with the purpose of essentially dehumanizing all humans; the (only remaining) solution is the total and fearful control by a total sovereignty, the almighty Leviathan: The wolves need be tempered and controlled by force. Not diverging much from Hobbes, John Locke in a chapter entitled On the State of War (1689: Second Treatise) uses Hobbes’ powerful approach (with some amendments) for the justification of killing, forced labor and more general use of violence in particular situations. The first thing that has to be done in this respect is to induce a sense of hatred and guiltlessness towards the target. – And how can this better be achieved (especially for Abrahamists) than by deeming a person subhuman (and 2 hence less godlike . JeanJacques Rousseau (1755: Origin of Inequality, Second Part) likewise uses the analogy but again alters the framework and locates the origin of the transformation into wolves in the development of amourpropre, vanity, and love for inequality. He thus believes man is not selfish by nature but, having excluded his own humanness, has become wolf ("which, having once tasted human flesh, despises every other food and thenceforth seeks only men to devour”). The selfpresenting solution is to reacquire freedom and become (moral) human. Paradoxically, seeing others as wolves (as humans possessing a wolflike essence) creates the 3 distance that is needed to enable victims to treat their (perceived) offenders as if they are wolves . Therefore ‘lonewolf terrorism’ induces so much fear and is a powerful concept in moral and political discourse. Contracts are all about bargaining – getting others to agree with your position. According to recent socialpsychological theorizing (e.g., Haidt's social intuitive link, 2001), this is (most easily) achieved by changing the others intuitions on a matter. It is therefore not surprising the social contract theorists (had to) "place a false and prejudiced interpretation on the object of his attention" (Nietzsche, 1887: II, §11). With the

2 “And one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power” (ibid.). 3 A final contemporary wolfexample, directly after the “terrorist attack” at Charlie Hebdo – and against France’s most sacred value, freedom – it was called "un acte d'une exceptionnelle barbarie" by president Hollande. (The word barbaric (barbaros) was originally used by Greeks to refer to foreigners; those who did not speak proper Greek and sounded like barbarbar to them.) My point is merely diagnostic (because I privately am inclined to agree with Mr. Hollande): labeling the other party as terrorists and instilling their actions with a sense of otherness not only induces fear but offers a framework solution because it also arouses feelings of anger, resentment and/or contempt – intuitively warranting cruelty against the wolves for selfpreservation. 10 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS use of analogy for dehumanizing a specific part (or all) of mankind, a frameworksolution that seems intuitively appealing presents itself heuristically: All (moral) considerations then merely serve to justify what is already meticulously settled by intuitions – they are posthoc confabulations. Some contemporary scientists still do no better when they creatively rationalize their intuitive (morally motivated) stance on a matter, as is for example the case for many normative (prescriptive) ethical theories that try to vindicate their preconceived notion of morality (in terms of good and evil) and duties.

2. Moral Nativism and Scapegoating

Darwin (1871: The Descent of Man) writes that his dog, like us, has the basic tendency to assume agency in the case of “movement without any apparent cause”. In this section, among other things, the question is raised how and why we have developed from Hyperactive (moral) Agent Detection Devices – which makes “the difference between eating and becoming dinner” because of the high costs associated with failing to detect agents compared to the low costs of false detection (Gray & Wegner, 2010; see also Barrett, e.g., 2004) – to sacrificing human beings to bloodloving gods.

Moral Skepticism

From the offset, for disbelief in the evident existence of moral fact, i.e., moral scepticism, the details of Darwinian discoveries and hypotheses are redundant. Because, as stated earlier, even if Darwin’s early hypothesis is wrong – and the moral faculty is not a biological (adaptation or) byproduct – moral judgment still appears to be caused by proximal psychological mechanisms that can (easily) be manipulated and be shown to systematically fail to track the truth. They function in order to achieve some relative reproductive advantage so need not be appropriate epistemic mechanisms (i.e., beliefformation processes) for producing beliefs sensitive to the facts they represent and may instead result from processes independent of their accurateness that structurally fail to track the truth (e.g., Joyce, 2014b; Goldman 2008; Haidt, 2001). That said, moral nativism does feed additional fuel for the cultivation of moral skepticism and puts the fundamental tensions between opposing parties, such as in victimoffender relations and among their friends, into perspective because it entails our moral judgment machinery is not concerned with – because it was not designed for – accuracy or truth, but instead can fulfill its evolutionary function by producing false judgments. Moreover, it provides a plausible explanation as to why (or rather, how it comes that) we are naïve realists regarding moral facts. Additionally, it allows empirical research (with falsifiable hypotheses) to have a say in the matter. We think we see the world as it is and have the feeling that morality and moral intuitions are objective and possess a sense of outthereness while in fact we are constantly projecting aspects of our emotional lives on to our experiences of the world. This leads us to conclude others in moral disputes are biased by ideology and selfinterest whereas we are not (Haidt, 2007; Joyce, 2006).

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Moral Skepticism plus Moral Nativism

“Every one will admit that man is a social being” (Darwin, 1871: pg. 85), but this is not what we understand with moral nativism, rather in evolutionary biology and psychology, innateness refers to a trait being an adaptation (which is also not the same as it being inborn per se). Moral nativism is the assumption that the (faculties that underlie) human moral sense, and the capacity to make moral judgments, is innate because it enhanced reproductive success in our evolutionary past – i.e., the moral sense is a Darwinian adaptation. Important is thus it is nowhere implied these judgments ought be objectively tracking the truth in order to fulfill their function: they can be false and still encourage cooperation or function as a signalling device – because foregoing a short term benefit provides honest signals to others (Alexander, 1987; Zahavi, 1977). Function, then, is defined in terms of ultimate contribution to reproductive success and does not pertain to the attainment of proximal goals as it does in the realm of folk psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Preston & De Waal, 2002). Most adaptationist accounts agree humans are designed by natural selection to think in moral terms and are morally motivated by different emotions. Justice, in this sense, is “an evolved solution to the problems faced by our distant ancestors” (Walsh 2000: pg. 842; see also Darwin, 1871; Alexander, 1987; De Waal, 1996; 2006; Trivers, 1971; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Joyce, 2006; 2014b). This is in line with Darwin (1871) who suggested morality acts as a motivation enhancer (by helping the individual succumbing to the temptations of immediate gratification) and it encouraged ancestral cooperation to think in terms of moral obligation. Important is that justice thusly conceived does not consist of indiscriminate sociality. It is more plausible natural selection has taken interest in the related content and direction of morality. In other words, if natural selection is concerned with (smooth and effective) cooperation, this requires mechanisms for effective discrimination have evolved (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988; Buss, 1990). Man in this (strict) sense is thus a discriminating social being – and justice involves cruelty. Some academics purport the human brain comes prewired with some broad universals and finds it easier to learn certain moral systems than others (e.g., Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983; Haidt & Bjorkland 2008). Support for this view comes from empirical (crosscultural and developmental) research indicating all societies have moral systems that focus on harm (e.g., Rozin et al., 1999; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). However, despite these observations, our natural tendency for making moral judgments is the result of contingent, conditional mechanisms and therefore innateness of morality does not guarantee specific manifestation of morality. In fact, in theory this means that, even if some specific trait is innate, it’s development and manifestation is not necessitated (e.g., in conditions of impoverished stimuli: Cf., Chomsky’s linguistic nativism, 1968). Moral intuitions regarding the goodness, nobility or virtuosity of certain behaviors are not simply based on abstract asocial principles such as harmfulness and disgust but can 12 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS only be understood in relation to the (socialrelational) context in which they occur which makes them to be perceived as either honorable or dishonorable.

The Adaptationist Approach to Moral Emotions and Scapegoating

Any adaptationist approach owes us an explanation as to why we observe a trait (i.e., what is its purported ultimate, or distal, function) or rather how it provided our ancestors with a net benefit in terms of reproductive success (and thus what were relevant selection pressures). Although, "the paradox of altruistic cooperation" remains unsettled (e.g., Boehm, 2007) and “those who profess the greatest surety that it has been settled, do not seem to agree on the resolution” (Putnam, Neiman & Schloss, 2014: pg., 113). What most if not all investigators do agree on is that natural selection caused sociality to be discriminating (Darwin, 1871) where some individuals are more likely to reap benefits (in terms of reproductive success) whereas others run the chance of being excluded, ostracized or even maimed and killed for the sake of the group. There is no automatic benefit to an individual from group living or even cooperation, but instead there are diverse and 'automatic detriments' (Alexander, 1974) such as cheating or parasite infested individuals. Homer, in The Odyssey, already indicates that autothymotic emotions, such as anger, can be considered to serve a function and for example motivate to impose costs or withhold benefits, i.e., to punish or seek vengeance. Although the emotions that are often responsible for our punishing others may be (at first) costly to the individual, it is an effective way of maximizing the joint outcome of the group: (feelings of) anger and revenge reaffirm group values, increase predictability and cohesion and subsequently restores the sense of fairness and justice (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Walsh, 2000; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009b; Maltese, Baumert, Knab & Schmitt, 2013). Yet a perceived imposition of costs is not always a conscious decision of the other party and may reflect unintended accident; forgiveness (an extra tit for a potential tat) then is an effective strategy because it permits the other party to keep cooperating after it has defected once and therewith prevents the ‘echo effect’ (Axelrod, 1984). Forgiveness can also be found in other (primate) species and has proven to be a beneficial 4 strategy in ultimatedilemma games (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) . However, if the observed imposition of costs or lack of contribution while reaping benefits of cooperation (i.e., cheating) is consistent, people will benefit from punishing or excluding them (Boyd & Richerson, 1992). In such circumstances, it is

4 The complex psychology of forgiveness will not be further discussed on this occasion though importantly, convincing apologizers – who often accompany apology with conciliatory behaviors or hardtofake signs of remorse such as blushing (De Jong, Peters & de Cremer, 2003; Boehm, 2007; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Castles, Aureli, De Waal, 1996; Cordoni & Palagi, 2008; Darwin, 1871) – appear more remorseful and less blameworthy (Zechmeister et al. 2004; McCullough et al., 2013a; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). This provides a restarting point or foundation for secure future investments and facilitate forgiveness; on the other hand, apologies are easily faked and not very reliable (honest or costly) signs: They do but seldom indicate but may contribute to an actual upwardly revised value of the victim’s welfare, i.e., a genuinely recalibrated WTR (McCullough et al, 2013a; 2012; Sell, 2011, 2013; Petersen et al., 2010). They may be counterproductive then and perceived as insults, stimulating anger instead (Duff, 2003; Pemberton, 2009; Allan, Kaminer & Stein, 2006; Zechmeister et al., 2004). 13 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS not hard to conceive that natural selection requires one to carefully select with whom one decides to affiliate (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) Drawing on Trivers (1971)’ theory of reciprocity, Alexander (1987) and Zahavi (1977) formulated theories of indirect reciprocity via reputation or costly signaling. Both agree with Trivers (1971: pg. 35) in that altruism is (only) apparently detrimental for the individual, meaning that it only seems to forego reproductive success but in actuality benefits from the enhanced reputation (consequential of its altruistic tendencies and corresponding behaviors) in the long run. Zahavi (1977)’s handicap principle asserts that a (visible) trait that costly (i.e., honestly), signals a good reputation or gene pool provides its bearer with a reproductive advantage and may be selected for. For example, costly helpfulness is rewarded by third parties (who witnessed it themselves or else have heard or read about it) that want to socially or economically interact (or mate) with those whom they know have good reputation. This is summarized by Boyd and Richerson (1992)’s article, Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups, which asserts that language makes irrelevant the size of a group because it enables gossip, which is a form of thirdparty norm enforcement (punishment) that does not require the punisher to invest much recourses. Therefore Haidt (2001: pg. 826) calls this the “moral Rubicon that only Homo sapiens appears to have crossed”. Because what makes a good reputation depends on specific socialrelational contexts; indirect reciprocity may (in theory) help develop any trait: “if a good reputation means wearing a pumpkin on your head, then a pumpkinwearing trait will develop” (Joyce, 2006b: pg. 10). Even observations of voluntary sacrificial behaviors (including martyrdom) are not inconsistent with indirect reciprocity theory.

Dispositional Psychology

On the micro level, some additional features that influence our autothymotic emotions and (corresponding) moral judgments, decisions (e.g., to forgive) and actions (e.g., to punish or exclude) towards victims and perpetrators, are our degree of ‘empathic concern’ (Leliveld, Van Dijk & Van Beest 2012; see also Batson et al., 2007; Batson 2011) and age, supposedly for the late ontogenetic development of more advanced forms of affective perspective taking (Will, Crone, Van den Bos & Güroğlu, 2013; see also Hoffman, 2000). Also, certain personality differences, such as justice sensitivity (e.g., Schmitt, 1996; Batson et al., 2007; Batson 2011), essentialist beliefs (Bastian & Haslam 2006), agreeableness and neuroticism (e.g., Mullet, Neto & Riviere, 2005), influence moral behaviors, including the willingness to employ prosocial behaviors towards victims or withhold them towards, and punish, offenders. Additionally (and likely to interact with the preceding); some clinical disorders are characterized by either a lack of valuable relationships, e.g., in the case of narcissism (Foster et al., 2006; Konrath, Bushman & Groove, 2009; Baumeister, 1997), and/or a lack 14 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS of executive control that inhibits the focus on longterm goals and (therewith) mediates the way relationships are perceived and valued (Balliet 2010; Baumeister, 2012). Correspondingly, studies of Balliet and Joireman (2010; 2011) show that egodepletion reduces the general concern for others’ wellbeing so that, if for example (by means of experimental manipulation) executive control – which plays an essential role in focusing on longterm goals – is (temporarily) depleted, people tend to become more punitive (Karremans & Van der Wal, 2013; see also: Karremans & Aarts, 2007; Baumeister, 2010).

Scapegoating, Stigma and (Social) Ostracism

Moral typecasting theory (Gray &Waytz, 2007) is compatible with the observed variation in personal psychology: Our predispositions influence the way we perceive of harm and hence of morality: they influence our manipulation of aspects of theoryofmind of others (Strickland et al., 2012) and even what counts as a morally significant event (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012b; Fiske, 2012). That said, they do not tell us much about what, if any, general or fixed preferential signs for victimization (Girard, 1980; 2008) we can expect natural selection to have taken interest in (despite extant variability in personal dispositions), as suggested by Darwin (1871):“That animals sometimes are far from feeling any sympathy is too certain; for they will expel a wounded animal from the herd, or gore or worry it to death. This is almost the blackest fact 5 in natural history” (Descent of Man: Ch. IV) . Without man’s reasoning powers as fully developed as ours are now (and lacking our Western science and accumulated knowledge), Darwin believes savage or animal morality inevitably leads to “various strange superstitions and customs. Many of these are terrible to think of, such as the sacrifice of human beings to a bloodloving god; the trial of innocent persons by the ordeal of poison or fire; witchcraft, &c.” (ibid.: pg. 75). Again, the current approach, far from purporting scapegoating is arbitrary, assumes it is functional and that possible benefits of scapegoating (including stigmatization and social ostracism) for the community may include for example enhanced selfesteem and social identity (Turner et al., 1987) and the justification of the social and political system (and its social norms and ethos: Jost & Banaji, 1994). Anthropologist James Frazer (1890: The Golden Bough) reports various observations of what he labels “mediate expulsion”, or “expulsion by scapegoat” (pg. 482a), which occurs when a “material medium” is “employed as a vehicle”in order to expel the accumulated ills of a whole community and settle their debts. He contrasts “the civilized nations of Europe” against the “selfish, barbarous and cunning races” standing “on a low level of social and intellectual culture”. “Because it is possible to shift a load of wood,

5 It is almost the blackest fact in history because the blackest fact, according to Darwin, would be observations among humans (such as those reported by Frazer) because only man is able to “declare – not that any barbarian or uncultivated man could thus think – I am the supreme judge of my own conduct, and in the words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity of humanity” (Darwin: 1871: pg.85). However, to run a little ahead, Darwin’s antagonist notices (even) “the categorical imperative smells of cruelty” (Nietzsche, 1887: II, §6). 15 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS stones, or what not, from our back to the back of another, the savage fancies that it is equally possible to shift the burden of his pains and sorrows to another, who will suffer them in his stead.” (ibid.: pg. 474b; italics added).The latter he describes using the same approach that is used in this section to report conduct of primates. He writes that communities (for example in Uganda) who resorted to practicing the “curious principle of vicarious suffering” invoked gods to rationalize the cruelty. Gods, for example, ordered them to cure incurred evils (as a result of war) by escorting a slave woman and some animals to the border of the country to die of broken limbs and hunger (pg. 478b). In another example: “The scapegoat consisted of either a man and a boy or a woman and her child, chosen because of some mark or bodily defect, which the gods had noted and by which the victims were to be recognised” (pg. 479b: italics added to illustrate 6 Nietzsche’s polemic against ‘the English’ discussed below) . Though (some) variability is permitted, scapegoats seem to not be picked arbitrarily but instead are picked according to some pattern. Recent evolutionary research shows that dispositional or preferential signs for victimization (including stigmatization and social ostracism) range from slightly deviant marks from the community's quintessence (standard or prototype) to deeply discrediting marks or attributes that do not meet the normative criteria of a society (Goffman, 1963; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Paradoxically, marks of quintessential deviance initiate fundamental attribution processes that cause the scapegoat to lose its perceived individuality. Subsequently, the scapegoat will come to be regarded as inconsistent and unpredictable – a threat to social interactions (e.g., Elliot et al., 1982; Grote, 2009) – which may eventually lead to its altogether exclusion (Leary & Schreindorfer, 1998). As a rule we could say that the more visible or conspicuous a mark of deviance and the less it is perceived to be under the control of the victim, the greater its impact on the chances of being scapegoated (e.g., Crandall & Moriarty, 1995). Though it is tempting to assume the same preferential signs should exist crossculturally and independent of context, as stressed earlier, it is not selfevident there exist any such asocial principles (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Instead, it is more plausible social devaluation and corresponding preferential signs must be understood relative to particular social contexts (Crocker, Major & Steele, 1998) because what is considered “normal” or “deviant” changes as societal expectations change (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Notwithstanding contextspecificity, theoretically it remains conceivable that recurrent adaptive problems have caused natural selection to take interest in the specific content of certain preferential signs for victimization, resulting in virtually fixed preferential signs that provoke a response (almost) crossculturally (as Girard, e.g., 2008,would contend). Indeed: "The fact that some stereotypes particularly ones about sexual roles, the handicapped, and the diseased are so consistent across cultures and history seems to suggest that something more than an arbitrary sociocultural process is at work" (Kurzban & Leary, 2001: pg., 190; see also: Boehm, 1986; Winzer, 1997: Disability and

6 This note of Frazer’s specific critic, too, runs a little ahead: “Frazer is much more savage than most of his savages, for they are not as far removed from the understanding of spiritual matter as a twentiethcentury Englishman. His explanations of primitive practices are much cruder than the meaning of these practices themselves” (Wittgenstein, 1967: pg. 127; italics in original). 16 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS society before the eighteenth century). As stated above, cooperation requires sophisticated coordination, and having unpredictable goals and behaviors (e.g., the mentally ill), a known history of cheating (e.g., criminals: Buss, 1990) or little social or economic capital to offer (e.g., the homeless: Phelan, Link, Moore & Stueve, 1997) increases the chances of being punished or excluded instead (Kurzban & Leary, 2001: pg., 193; Boyd & Richerson, 1992). If an individual is unwilling or unable to follow social conventions, or his intentions are difficult to infer, he increases the likelihood he is systematically excluded from cooperative relationships. If his intentions furthermore signal malevolence towards the group, he further raises the chances of being ostracized as scapegoat or even killed. This suggests that certain signs (those convention violations that imply malevolence) incite a community to more actively impose costs (sanctions, or death) than other signs (those that merely imply unpredictable or incomplete reciprocation) that are less dangerous to social exchanges and may be dealt with via more lenient impositions of costs or withholding of benefits (e.g., exclusion and stigmatization). In line with this and as Darwin already observed, simplified forms of scapegoating (e.g., hierarchic systems and territoriality) exist among other animals that were confronted with some of the same adaptive problems our hominid ancestors were. This link with observations among nonhumans does not imply or prove the same functions should apply to humans or that we resort to scapegoating for the same reasons. Notwithstanding this, it is plausible the practices associated with scapegoating originate in more basic discriminatory tendencies that fulfill a function for the group and its cohesiveness. Evidence supporting this perspective comes from the abundant literature base of primatology. To them, scapegoating in the broadest sense is the (partial) socially determined exclusion from casual interactions with the effect of constantly redistributing individuals in relation to their resources, thereby increasing social cohesion (Lancaster, 1986; Gruter & Masters, 1986, Alexander, 1986b; Mcguire & Raleigh, 1986b). As such, it ranges from the (planned) killing or expulsion of a scapegoat by the community – this is most often a lowranking individual but in some cases may be the alphamale (De Waal, 1986) – to more subtle forms where the scapegoat is unable to leave for lack of better alternatives and moreover may be able to serve future purpose to the group, 7 say, as laughingstock . In general then, there is a tradeoff between two parties where the community's reproductive success increases at the cost of that of the scapegoat. Jane Goodall (1986; see also, 1991) recognizes human warfare which principally involves dehumanization in the extreme and unrestrained aggression that chimpanzees use against other groups. She asserts 'dechimpized' victims (ibid.: pg. 532) are regarded as beasts of prey, and precise and skillful attacks are meant to kill or seriously injure and disable the victim (see also, De Waal 2006: pg. 133 & 2010: Ch. 3). She distinguishes three categories of ostracism: social rejection, exclusion, and shunning. The first is mainly

7Alexander (1986b) for example purports humor is a way to elevate the status of the self and the group at the expense of a scapegoat. O'Connell (1960; see also Freud’s humor theory: 1905)) empirically distinguishes (nonsensical) humor from (racist) wit where the first is associated with empathy, favored by women, and the latter with hostility, favored by men. Both function to raise one's esteem. 17 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS elicited by male competition, where dominance shifts and coalition forming (status hierarchies) are essential and function to increase (within) groupcohesion and reduce group tension (Vervafcke et al., 2000; De Waal, 8 1984) . The second is concerned with the exclusion of outsiders and functions to protect valuable resources and decrease the chances of contamination (because outsiders are more likely to carry systemstrange parasites: Trivers, 2011; Dugatkin, Fitzgerald & Lavoie, 1994; Boehm, 1992). Exclusion is an important mechanism to limit the amount of individuals with whom resources are to be shared and to foster 9 cooperation within the group that is needed to exploit excluded individuals (or entire groups) . The final category, shunning, is concerned with the scapegoating of ingroup individuals as a result of certain individual characteristics. Goodall (1986) reports that those chimpanzees, whose behavior or appearance seems “abnormal”, e.g. as a result of polio, are more likely to be scapegoated. Scapegoating overall is directed at lowranking individuals: one study, for example, reported that over 80% of the totally observed aggression was at the expense of the two lowestranking individuals (Vervafcke, de Vries and Van Elsacker, 2000: pg. 262; also: Watts, 2004). Furthermore, McGuire and Raleigh (1986a&b; see also: Raleigh et al., 1991) stress that serotonergic systems mediate processes of scapegoating (via impact on aggression and 10 dominance acquisitions) . Human scapegoating may serve proximal ends such as the refreshing of the community, but given our phylogenetic affiliation with lower animals and some of the same adaptive problems applied to us, it would not be strange if ultimate ends (enhancing reproductive success via ostracizing or excluding, say, parasite infested or cheating individuals) helped to shape our scapegoating tendencies and have got the ball rolling.

8 For example, De Waal (1986) reports of a killing among captive male chimpanzees. According to him (1996: pg., 102) communities tend to “create a common enemy for the sake of peace” and those who lose status thereby increase the likelihood of being scapegoated (De Waal, 1984, 1996; cf., Girard, e.g., 2004). Coalitions are more likely to redirect tension towards a scapegoat than individuals by themselves and the victim also reacts considerably less distressed in the second case (Vervafcke et al., 2000). Observations of redirected (highintensity) aggression towards a scapegoat (by two bonobo alphafemales: Vervafcke et al., 2000) as well as winnersupport in general (De Waal 1984) suggest the process directly seems to reduce some group tension. 9 Historical evidence (e.g., from WWII or Rwanda) shows subordinated and stigmatized groups are often reproductively exploited and some (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1988; van den Berghe, 1981) purport adaptations for betweengroup conflict have developed especially for this purpose (of raping and abducting females of subordinated groups). Important for the current thesis is that groupbased stigma and exclusion is expected to be facilitated by different preferential signs for victimization than is that which pertains to individuals (e.g., in dyadic cooperation) and furthermore, different variables are likely to mediate the process (e.g., perceived group identity or salience matters less in the latter cases). 10 McGuire and Raleigh (1986a&b) show how the “activation (or failure of activation) of certain genetic programs can have behavioral consequences which extend across a lifetime” by inducing orbitofrontal cortex lesions and manipulating serotonergic activity pharmacologically. They found that low serotonin levels (which are associated with depression and psychosis in humans) increase vulnerability to being scapegoated, whereas a high serotonin and adrenal activity is associated with the scapegoating community. Data of experiments where infant Rhesus monkeys were separated from their mothers and community to be reintroduced back in the group at a later time and similar studies of forced separation among macaques reveal that, as soon as ambiguous situations occurred or stressors were induced experimentally, those who were separated as infant were more frightened, aggressive and less socially active (Kraemer in McGuire and Raleigh 1986a; see also Kraemer: 1997) and showed more negative (physical) effects such as adjusted sleep patterns, decreased body temperature, immunological dysfunction and heart rate and rhythmic problems (Reite & Short, 1978). 18 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

The Scapegoat’s low WTR

Tooby and Cosmides (1996)'s model of psychological engagement– which originally attempted to genealogically account for friendships – assumes people discriminate between engagement partners on the basis of personal skills and (beneficial or harmful) attributes. Their reductionist concept of Welfare Tradeoff Ratios (WTRs; Tooby et al., 2008) subsumes the preferential signs for victimization that Darwin, Frazer and other, more contemporary, sociobiologists and primatologists are drawing at (some of which are consistent with Girard’s earlier mentioned preferential signs). It is hypothesized humans make use of computational processes for generating baseline WTRs for other individuals and vice versa that act as internal indicators of how much the target’s welfare is valued (McCullough et al., 2013). The concept incorporates all possible variables that may influence and establish the cognitive computational outcome to either take revenge or to forgive, and assumes that intentional harming results from a low WTR of the agent for the patient 11 (McCullough et al., 2013) . Despite some difficulties and complexities that come with computation (e.g., Aureli & Schaffner, 2013; same issue), WTRs are explanatory potent for predicting; a) the way we treat others, and; b) the way we think we ought be treated (Petersen, Sell, Tooby & Cosmides, 2010; Sell, 2011). These computational processes incorporate "all the information processing which the brain’s functions entail" (McCullough et al., 2013b:pg., 43) including complex interactions of emotions (Aureli & Schaffner, 2013). In functionalist jargon: A bad investment of resources induces anger, which serves to recalibrate the other’s WTR so that future cooperation (and investment) may result in a (more) positive return of investments (McCullough et al., 2013a; Tooby et al., 2008). (Perceived) safe cooperation is likely to be mutually beneficent (i.e., to lead to an increase in resources for both cooperating partners) and is accompanied by emotions of trust (Sell, 2011; Petersen et al., 2010). Especially when fitness interdependence and relationship value is high, such as in coherent, committed and attached groups, people have a high WTR for each other – with the exception of, and possibly facilitated by means of, the scapegoat. This is in line with the assumption of Kurzban and Leary (2001: pg., 190; see also Alexander, 1987; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989) that social exclusion functions ultimately to "affiliate with those who are differentially likely to generate fitness benefits and to avoid those who represent potential fitness costs". For example, diseased and mentally handicapped individuals are socially rejected because they tend to disrupt the course of normal social interactions (Jones et al., 1984). Also in dyadic cooperation and mutual

11 On the basis that third parties are inclined to incur costs on transgressors in thirdparty punishment games even when anonymous (Fehr & Fischbacker, 2004), McCullough et al. (2013a) assert the benefit of the group is only a side effect of revenge and forgiveness systems and that initially, they are not designed for altruism and neither for reputational advantages (e.g., Trivers, 1971; see also costly signaling theory, Zahavi, 1975; Smith et al., 2003 but for their directly satisfactory features 19 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS engagement we can expect these adaptations to cause one to avoid or punish poor social exchange partners and favor those with good reputation (Alexander, 1987; Trivers, 1971; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Boyd & Richerson, 1992). Concluding, a scapegoating individual or community is expected to have a low WTR for the scapegoat (McCullough et al., 2013; Sell, 2013). (Secondary) victimization downturns the scapegoat’s WTR for the victimizing community and 12 conveys a sense of otherness towards them (Sell et al., 2009; Sell 2013; see also: Pemberton, 2009: pg. 7) . This in turn increases his perceived threat to the community because he is prone to take revenge out of the hatred ensuing from the threat to his existence (Sell, 2013). Though the antivictimization machinery common hedgehogs have developed (e.g., its 6000 spines and ability to curl up) appear more obvious than those of humans, it is assumed that we too have developed specific adaptations designed to respond 13 functionally to being (secondarily) victimized (e.g., hatred or shame) . Because the focus of the current thesis is not the scapegoated individual but rather the processes leading to scapegoating and exclusion, the rich literature on the contents of this adaptive [anti and postvictimization] machinery will not be discussed on this occasion (see for example: Baumeister& Tice, 1990; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice &Stucke, 2001; Twenge, Catanese & Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister, DeWall & Twenge, 2005; Twenge, Ciarocco, DeWall & Bartels, 2007) and instead I shift focus back to the moral motivations that cause scapegoating and sacrificial behavior.

Moral Motivation and Intuition: Relationship Regulation Theory

Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (‘social intuitionist solution’, 2001: The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail), opts that most moral thought (and beliefs underlying judgments) is only post hoc confabulation and results from “a reasoning process which readily constructs justifications of intuitive judgments causing the illusion of objective reasoning” (ibid.: pg. 382). We do this by using a priori moral or causal theories (see Wilson, 1977). Haidt (2001: pg. 822) continues to expresses the need to move away from the rational theories pioneered by Plato and the ancient Greeks that assume “our ability to search for and evaluate evidence in an open and unbiased way” and towards the study of “perception, intuition, and other mental

12 To no surprise, this approach stresses the important role of group identification to account for the (in)direct function of anger and prosocial emotions: When we witness an apparent injustice we seem to experience emotions on behalf of those whom they identify with (e.g., Gordijn et al., 2006; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1982 & Turner et al., 1987: selfcategorization theory). Helping other individuals of our group induces a sense of contentment that motivates to employ more moral behaviors towards the ingroup and perceived intentional harming leads only to (more) anger in the observer if the victim is perceived as ingroup (Gordijn, Wigboldus & Yzerbyt, 2001) and offenders perceived as ingroup receive more empathy and lower sentences than those perceived as outgroup (Wenzel et al, 2008; Gromet& Darley, 2009; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Dumont, 2006). 13 Because the scapegoat (by then) lacks the bargaining power that is essential for direct confrontation and negotiation; anger (functioning to recalibrate the other’s WTR) is not effective (Sell et al., 2009). Forgiveness, likewise, is rendered ineffective and – because the community believes that the scapegoat is responsible – his forgiveness, which presumes they did something wrong, instead fuels the (cognitive) dissonance that incentivizes cruel reactive scapegoating. Hate towards the scapegoating community rather functions to (seriously) exploit, harm or destroy the other party if the opportunity to impose costs presents itself (Sell, 2013; 2012). 20 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

14 operations that are quick, effortless, and generally quite accurate” . His genealogy of intuitions (2001: Ch., The Origin of Intuitions) shows that conduct of chimpanzees is regulated by prescriptive rules and behavioral norms and concludes language is not required. He follows research of De Waal (1992, 1996, 2006), who similarly asserts chimpanzees and some monkeys have certain “building blocks” of morality that require emotional arousal (e.g., empathy, equity awareness, consolation behavior). However, as Darwin (1871; also Joyce, 2012a) already pointed out (and De Waal agrees), fear for negative consequences (punishment) is not the same as moral judgment or belief which requires an understanding of merited reactions (which necessitates the belief that one has free will and the ability to act otherwise: Nietzsche, 1887:II) and thus of certain concepts like desert, wrongness, and justification for which higher order cognitions are required (and the chimpanzee does not possess). Certain cognitive capacities are necessary for the “moralization” of affective states and the generating of moral beliefs and these capacities provided the additional building blocks in the emergence of human morality and help to explain the fact that humans have greater capacity to internalize norms than other primates (Joyce, 2014b; Flack & De Waal, 2001; Boehm, 2012).

Protomoral Intuitions: The Building Blocks of Human Morality and Scapegoating

De Waal (1996)’s three chapters on the “building blocks” of human morality correspond to the first three of Alan Fiske (1991, 2000; Fiske & Haslam, 2005)’s four models of human social relations (see also: Haslam, 1997; Haidt, 2001, 2004). De Waal’s first “building block”, sympathy, leads chimpanzees to care for their kin and is closely related to Fiske’s model of Communal Sharing in which the moral motive is unity. De Waal’s second is rank and order, which corresponds to Fiske’s Authority Ranking where the moral motive is hierarchy (see also: Boehm, 1999). The last (and arguably most important and first to develop phylogenetically) “building block”, quid pro quo, is concerned with reciprocal relations and corresponds to Fiske’s Equality Matching where equality is the moral motive (see also Trivers, 1971; and titfortat strategies: Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). N.B., for the above “building blocks” of morality, no actual moral thought – or even language – is required, i.e., they are affective mechanisms: building blocks.

Human Morality and the Consciousness of Guilt (Schulden)

Fiske’s fourth, and latest to both onto and phylogenetically emerge (Fiske, 1991; Haidt, 2004), model, “market pricing”, requires the highest order cognitions and most complex calculations for the trading of

14 N.B., Plato’s interest is Socrates, who personifies philosophy in the Platonic corpus, whereas Haidt’s (and the current thesis’) interest is “the many”. The many may perhaps be studied by focusing on their intuitions primarily, Socrates cannot be. In other words, where Haidt studies actual man (who is represented by Plato locked up in a cave), Plato is interested in ideal man, or man’s perfection – the rationalist theories therefore (only) ideally apply. 21 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS nonequivalent objects and it is motivated by proportionality, to ensure reward and punishment is proportional to for example merit, costs and benefits (see also: Haslam, 1997; Haidt, 2004). It has no equivalent in primate protomorality and indeed may be considered uniquely human because understanding of diverse concepts is required, among which, arguably most importantly, is that of debts – saying (or feeling): ‘Everything can be paid off, everything must be paid off’ (see Nietzsche 1887: II,‘Guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and related matters: §10). Victimologist Antony Pemberton (2012) for example concludes it “is in many ways the most important social construct of our time”. He draws on work of David Graeber (2011), who like Nietzsche notices our use of the concepts fault, sin and guilt and our ‘consciousness of guilt’ (Bewusstsein der Schuld) originates in the material concept of ‘Schulden’ (debts). (For neglecting this, and lacking the “will to know the past”, the ahistorical genealogists of morality “are no good (taugen nichts)”.) Responsibility is something we attribute to an agent that can make promises and remember them, someone 15 whom we can hold responsible for paying off his debts or compensating for them (1887: II§2) . The feeling of guilt or obligation and the idea we can compensate for (pay off) injuries – that everything has an equivalent – originates “in the relationship of buyer and seller, creditor and debtor: here person met person for the first time, and measured himself person against person” (§4,8). This means that there is an inevitable reduction of the injury, or wrongfulness to make the debt quantifiable so that it can be compensated for. (“Let’s be quite clear about the logic of this whole matter of compensation: it is strange enough”: Nietzsche, 1887: II). In relation, Pemberton withholds that “the interpretation of compensatory reactions as amounting to restorative justice should be more closely scrutinized and probably discarded” (2012 pg 6; italics in original). Pemberton warns that we may expect taboo tradeoffs (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) in cases of victimization. In practice we do encounter certain situations where injuries are the kinds of things that can be ‘paid of’ (so that no debt remains and the dispute is mutually considered settled or restored), though arguably, in these situations there was no perceived wrongfulness. This is because tabootradeoffs occur only if certain moral motivation applies: intuitions depend on socialrelational contexts (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Wrongfulness is perceived. This suggests that, depending on the relationship motivation; there is a (perceived) tabootrade off.

Punishment and Revenge

15 We do not usually morally judge or legally prosecute animals or babies for their actions (Gray & Wegner, 2012; Joyce, 2014b) because some kind of agency of the ‘debtor’ is intuitively required for moral assessment: “the criminal deserves to be punished because he could have acted otherwise” (1887: II §2). 22 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

Nietzsche (1887: Second Essay) writes on many occasions – and concludes both paragraph 6 and 7 – that punishment has always had very strong festive features and aspects that please the gods too. So “people were 16 then practically obliged to invent gods” because all is justified if they enjoy it . In the case of victimization, the creditor (victim) perceives the debtor (offender) owes a sort of pleasure to him as repayment, although admittedly in some cases no payment would suffice (i.e., tabootradeoff). If the victim and the offender employ different moral motives, it is unlikely they settle their dispute by nature and convention (rituals or legislation) is required to restore the relation. Seeing your offender gets punished or (better still) punishing him yourself arouses “the elevated feeling of being in a position to despise”. It reinstates or strengthens the belief of (moral) superiority. In this sense Nietzsche considers it different from revenge, “the concept ‘revenge’ has merely obscured and darkened his own insight, rather than clarified it ( revenge itself just leads us back to the same problem: ‘how can it be gratifying to make someone suffer?’ (§6). Revenge is better not ‘sanctified’ with the term justice (or even injustice), punishment by itself, itself is terrible (but not by itself ‘unjust’, see also: Beyond good and Evil). The idea of compensation is “made up of a warrant for and entitlement to cruelty” (1887: II, §10).

On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic

Nietzsche is the antagonist of Darwin in a variety of ways: where Nietzsche focuses on culture and (the force of) language – in short, on historical man – Darwin is a genealogist who traces the origins of good and evil 17 to prehistorical man . The following discussion between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein (who are here concerned with philosophy and epistemology) on the one hand and the positivist English genealogists (who were concerned with empirical and falsifiable phenomena) on the other, is confusing because the latter believe that moral facts are those which bring about the most happiness whereas the former would object to 18 the evident existence of (their) facts and end up with different definitions of morality . In reality, we observe

16 And: “Les dieux ont toujours soif, n'en ont jamais assez” (G. Brassens, 1972: Mourir Pour des Idées) 17 Nietzsche calls Darwin (Mill and Spencer) ‘mittelmässiger Engländer’ (1883: §253) because, “for scientific discoveries like those of Darwin, a certain narrowness, aridity and industrious carefulness (in short, something English) is required”. Darwin warned that his advice to “take as the standard of morality, the general good or welfare of the community” must not be used in political ethics. Regardless, Rée and Spencer’s normative publications derive their method from Darwin (1871, Ch. IV: pg 92). For example, Rée (1877) advocates the “profoundly erroneous moral doctrine” which presupposes that moral phenomena can be traced to natural causes like physical phenomena (i.e., moral naturalism) and holds that “what is called good preserves the species, while what is called evil harms the species” (Nietzsche, 1882: The Gay Science, I §4). Likewise Herbert Spencer (1879) reduced the good to “the relatively more evolved conduct” and the bad and evil to unhealthy and unintelligent things. (N.B., it was Spencer who came up with the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ which is not the same as Darwinian fitness – denoting phenotypes with greater reproductive success relative to others – but concerns fitness in the intuitive, vernacular sense. However, as stated, because Darwinian adaptations do not per se bring about more complex and harmonious or even smarter and healthier beings, they do not automatically lead to fitness in the vernacular sense. 18 In fact, most (ethical) discussion about morality is problematized by a lack of consensus or even a basis of shared understanding about the concept or its object under investigation. The semantic problems are already illustrated in Plato’s Republic (Book I), where the question is raised what is to be understood by the concept of justice. First, Polemarchus (whose name literally means warlord) opts that truthfulness, belongingness and entitlement are essential to justice, which only pertains to ‘friends’. (This is what Darwin and some contemporaries contemptuously refer to as savage morality). After dropping divine retribution, the utilitarian thesis – that 23 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS even within fragmented scientific disciplines, there is often no real consensus about what is meant by ‘morality’ or what accounts as a moral fact (if anything). Wittgenstein (1967: Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough) specifically commented on and criticized Frazer’s reductive approach and its general failure to distinct biological conduct and rituals (which are subject to falsifiable description) from the ritualistic (which are not). The latter simply cannot be assessed solely on the basis of their origins and it cannot be priory assumed (as the genealogist must) that it serves a 19 purpose . The fact that we can empirically verify that certain customs exist together with certain beliefs does not mean we can deduce causality (requisite for any GDA). In the end it remains eternal speculation whether customs preceded belief and intuition or vice versa and so Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (1922) ends with the famous phrase: “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.” For dogs or any other ahistorical biological species lacking language, the reductive and static project that traces some trait or machinery (say, morality or scapegoating)’s status quo along the lines of our evolutionary past, and presumes its continued use today, a genealogy, can be useful. (Today, however, may be contextually unrelated to the conditions and selection pressures our biological descent faced – given the already not selfevident presupposition that ancestry is certain.) But: “Positivist data seem of little help to explore at a more fundamental level how victims are construed by society and responded to by their environment” (Van Dijk, 2009: pg., 8). It is because humans are historical creatures that narrow genealogies do not obviously contribute to understanding social behavior and often are able to provide no more than “a crass example of ethologic reductionism” (Van Dijk, 2008: pg., 80) “that explains nothing” (Wittgenstein, 1967: pg., 245; italicized in original). (Some of) these genealogists lack philosophical integrity and intellectual conscience – they are either epistemologically dishonest or just negligent. The mere explanatory purpose at the heart of any genealogy requires no more then a plausible theory, of which there are (infinitely) many. Biologic genealogies furthermore presume functionality and genetic descent and neglects (the force of) language and beliefs or else equates them with biologic conduct and naturalistic properties. Nietzsche’s desire then was to stop the “English hypothesesventuring” and to steer bad scientists – who use Darwin as a basis for evolutionary etiology – like his friend Paul Rée (1877: Ch. 1, The Origin of the Concepts of Good and Evil) and James Frazer (1908: The Scope Of Social Anthropology) who take morality to be given (unproblematic or selfevident) away from “gazing around haphazardly in the 20 blue” . Instead morality should be put to question and the grey (das Graue) should be far more important justice consists of helping friends and harming enemies – is adopted by Trasymachus. Socrates’ speech, that characterizes dogs as genuine philosophers, problematizes this view by equating it with (pre or subrational, nonphilosophical) intuitions. 19 “Frazer's account of the magical and religious views of mankind is unsatisfactory; it makes these views look like errors.” (Wittgenstein, 1967: Ch. 7; Cf., Nietzsche, 1882: §58) 20 The title and especially subtitle of Nietzsche’s book On the Genealogy of Morals (1887): A Polemic and the title Beyond Good and Evil (1886), emphasize this necessity to move away from the nogood pseudorealist programs (notice the similarities with Rée’s title of Ch.1, 1877) and instead accentuate the need to go beyond the concepts of good and evil (i.e., to transcend morals). Both tasks he considers of vital importance for the conservation and development of morality: man must be retranslated back into nature to be born again. 24 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS than the blue for an actual “Historie der Moral” because it concerns “that which can be documented, which can actually be confirmed (WirklichFeststellbare) and has actually existed (WirklichDagewesene), in short, the whole, long, hardtodecipher hieroglyphicscript of man’s moral past (MoralVergangenheit)” (1887: pref. §7, italicized in original).

3. On the HardtoDecipher HieroglyphicScript of Man’s Moral Past

Myth (and scripture) – that survived time – should from the start cause one to be suspicious regarding its historical accuracy. Regardless, Girard euhemeristically asserts all myths are rooted in real historical events of victimization (Girard, 1978: pg. 39). Though unmitigated as this claim may seem (e.g., Kearney, 1995: pg., 5), it is plausible that those myths that were passed on are biased in favor of the surviving prosecutors because the scapegoats were unable to tell their (perhaps equally) biased account. Their interpretation of the victimization justifies the event and inspires future repetition of similar rituals. Myths and ideology rationalize violence and cruelty (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Begue, 2011; Baumeister, 1997; Haidt, 2006) in a similar way that “nationalism stirs, justifies and channels competitive energies and scapegoating tendencies like none other” (Grote, 2009: pg. 181).

Pharmacology

Theories of scapegoating all (have to) assume the phenomenon of interest is in some way functional and the corresponding associations of processes have a long (crosscultural) history (even when they do not invoke natural selection in their functional explanation). René Girard’s mimetic theory purports scapegoating is the result of our innate desire to want what belongs to someone else – we do not simply have desires; we are our desires and depend on them – when ‘mimetic contagion’ spreads and the society deteriorates; the community naturally identifies a cause. Van Dijk agrees that mimesis plays an important role (2008: pg. 80). The concept of mimesis derives from Artistotle (though Plato employed it before him in discussions of art), who uses it in the analysis of poetry and tragedy with the intent of setting them apart from history and on a par with philosophy (which is, in contradistinction to history, concerned with universals). It does not simply mean imitation but rather describes the process by which an artist creates his art. “Tragedy is a mimesis of a serious and complete action […] in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions” (Poetics, Ch. VI), i.e., it has the function of catharsis – the purgation of pity and fear. Aristotle’s notion of the ideal tragic hero (Ch. XIII) corresponds to this function and furthermore to our most fundamental psychology: tragedy must involve a change of fortune to “a man of eminence and virtue whose misfortune is brought upon him not by vice or depravity but by some error of judgment”. That is, only certain characters (pharmakoi) arouse our tragic emotions and are able to satisfy our moral sense and strengthen our belief in some moral order (or justworld), others instead may strengthen belief in the opposite, e.g., moral chaos. 25 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

Interestingly, the word pharmakos “can be – alternately or simultaneously – beneficent or maleficent and without mistranslation, the rendering of the same word by ‘remedy’, ‘recipe’, ‘drug’, ‘filter’, etc. is permitted” (Derrida: pg., 430). This word is used for a scapegoat who paradoxically can serve as a poison (the subject to whom responsibility is attributed to) while at the same time it is believed to be a remedy capable of curing the ills (it inflicted) – it is attributed a causal role for both the origin and the termination o f the perceived tensions. In other words it can be a cause (for worse) or a solution (for better) and this is to some extent dependent on knowledge of its nature. This is already illustrated in Homer’s The Odyssey (Book X), where the god Hermes shows Odysseus the physis (nature) of a pharmakos who therewith gains 21 knowledge that protects him from the sorceress Circe . Also in Plato, pharmakoi run throughout the dialogues where the word acquires different meanings (see far more extensively: Derrida, 1968: La Pharmacie de Platon). In his Phaedrus, Phaedrus asks where exactly Socrates thinks the Athenian princess Orithyia was said to be taken from the banks of the illisus and 22 whether Socrates believes the myth . Socrates starts his reply by asserting that “the wise are doubtful” and then tacitly changes the river illisus in the poisonous spring pharmakeia – which is a a little ‘lower down’ the river illisus (symbolic of being little lower down in biologic descent) and therefore in mythology, Illisus’ daughter – where Orithyia was playing with Pharmakeia which led to her death (because she, unlike Odysseus, was without knowledge of the gods regarding the physis of Pharmakeia and was thus playing with fire). The logoi en biblioi (doctrine in books, or words that are deferred, rolled up and hidden – N.B., Phaedrus literally tries to hide the roll from Socrates) that Phaedrus has brought along are likened by Socrates to a pharmakos (in this sentence mostly translated either as ‘a spell’ or ‘a drug’ but also ‘counter spell’ or ‘filter’) by means of which Phaedrus can lead (move or tempt, as if under the influence of a drug) Socrates all around the country not unlike a rabbit or a cow in front of whom you hold a carrot on a stick or a bunch of leaves. (Even) Socrates is moved by a pharmakos. Girard observes that, “as in the case of drugs [notice the pun: drugs = pharmakoi], consumers of sacrifice tend to increase the doses when the effect becomes more difficult to achieve”. In other words, scapegoating is an indispensable part of nature or human conduct that seeks or needs the effects caused by 23 the ritual. Furthermore, every attempt to rid of it is in vain or only temporary . He further believes all religious rituals are essentially sacrificial (Girard, 1977; Van Dijk, 2009). This is in line with Nietzsche, who asserts, all religions are, at their most fundamental, systems of cruelty (1887: II, §3).

21 Interestingly, this is the earliest known occurrence of the important word physis and appears just once in Homer 22 To avoid confusion I use capitals to refer to gods and noncapitalized words indicate the rivers. 23 “Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret” (Horace, 20BC: Epistles: Book 1: X24): “You may drive out nature with a hayfork but she will always come back”. 26 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

Athens’ Rational Ethos

The people of ancient Athens once a year voted on who was to be scapegoated. For example, in 442BC, the politician Thucydides was exiled for a minimum of ten years. In principle, any citizen was eligible to be scapegoated, however the vast majority of victims were chosen because they presented a threat to the nomos (regime) of the polis (city). Girard (1986) asserts that Friedrich Nietzsche (and also James Frazer) clearly saw entire human groups were involved in the sacrificial killing and/or expulsion of victims in pagan mythology and tragedies. It goes not unnoticed that many cultures periodically resorted to scapegoating and were especially likely to do so during (large) 24 festivals . Frazer for example recognized that certain seasons of the year might be better suited for such processes and both Van Dijk and Girard note it is common practice at Greek festivals and theme of many tragedies that had their origin in godliness. Indeed, both Girard (1984: pg. 204)’s and Van Dijk (2008)’s own analyses concur that scapegoating is the hidden theme in all Greek tragedies: “scapegoats act as spontaneous mediators”. For example, during Dionysia, a six (or, postPeloponnesian war, five) day festival, in honor of the ancient god Dionysus, human sacrifices (pharmakoi) were ritually made to clean the city of their ills. (Dramatic performances at the Greater Dionysia were performed even up until the fifth century although the dithyramb then did no longer contain anything of the satiric). As stated, Girard (Girard, 2008: Ch. 3, Scapegoating and Social Order) believes that here, “victims are too often chosen among physically challenged people or foreigners to be a purely random event”. The myth of Oedipus and – whose name, ‘swollen foot’, reflects a bodily defect resulting of being ostracized at birth – illustrates this. Such ‘preferential signs’ of victimization increase the likelihood of being scapegoated and help the community to rationalize and justify the cruelty (see more extensive: Girard, 1986). Sophocles’ tragedy of Oedipus Rex (and the Book of Job), he continues (pg. 32), includes all of the persecution stereotypes.

The Delphiclabel

The ancient god Dionysus accommodates all human passions and becomes what he touches upon; therefore both he and his manic maenads – derivative of the word ‘mainesthai’ which (loosely translated) means ‘to be in frenetic excess’ – are commonly recognizable in literature and art by their impulsive, instinctive and ecstatically intoxicated essence and their bringing about of chaos, disorder and destruction. Dionysus’ symbolization in sound may reflect a proneness to accepting (dogmatic) hearsay (e.g., myth and religion) and his ultimate desire to sink back in his ‘primordial oneness’ (Nietzsche, 1972: pg. 22). This is in contradistinction to the Delphicgod, Apollo, who represents logic and rationality through vision, enabling positivist deduction of mathematical relations (subsuming or enabling the creation of art and science, but also harmony, metaphors and metre) necessary for the creation and maintenance of the Apollonianregime.

24 But consider also more modern historical (say, sacrificial slaughter) and unhistorical (say, the brothers J&W Grimm’s German sage: ‘Das ertrunkene Kind’) examples 27 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

In line with this symbolism, Apollo plays the lyre, an instrument that may be accompanied by structural semantics, i.e., lyrics (which means ‘accompanied by the lyre’), which usually carries seven strings/notes that naturally vibrate in the vicinity of others (i.e., his instrument symbolizes natural harmony: one string for each day and sphere of the cosmic order under his control). Dionysus and his maenads, on the other hand, 25 play panharmonic flutes (or an aulos) that cannot be accompanied by singing . Dionysus’ parson Marsyas is said to have invented the aulos and had, in his audacity, challenged the god Apollo to a ‘fair (musical) competition’. According to Socrates, when he is constructing the ideal regime in The Republic (Plato), the panharmonic scale and a “multiplicity of notes” are unwanted because “the preferring of Apollo and his 26 instruments over Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange” . Marsyas’ perceived satiric (part or subhuman) essence and sketches the preferential signs of victimization that provoke and at the same time 27 (are used to) justify the cruelty and pleases the gods (“No cruelty, no feast”: Nietzsche, 1987:II) . Even though we are told in this case there was a mutual agreement apropos of; a) the judges that would arbiter and; b) the outcome, that whomever would win could do to the other as he pleased; this ‘fair competition’ alone does not take away our feeling that something is morally happening when Apollo decides to remorselessly flay Marsyas alive and made him into a ‘leathern bottle’ (Plato: Euthydemus) after having won the musical contest. Whereas we may find Apollo’s reaction (slightly) sordid, it is perceived laudable by 28 pious Athenians . Apollo contentedly strips off parts of Marsyas’ skin, who owes him this pleasure for having lost the competition. Moreover they could blame the victim for his hubristic challenging of their god

25 The aulos is an ancient Greek (usually doublereeded) wind instrument that. In Plato’s Minos, Socrates, when speaking to a nameless companion, argues therefore that Marsyas and his boyfriend Olympos, the Phrygian, “would be good lawgivers for the aulos among the ancients”. This absurd assertion implies that Marsyas actually knows what he’s doing when he’s playing whereas instead, he is (only) ‘inspired’ by Dionysus: Marsyas could never put to words how he accomplishes his frantic, ecstatic playing, let alone be a good lawgiver. Instead, lawgiving is the realm of Apollo. Marsyas can only inspire. According to this line of reasoning the companion then agrees the best laws for sheep are those of the shepherd, for cows those of the cowherd and for the ‘souls of human beings’ those of a king. 26 Ironically though, Marsyas’ aulos is reintroduced in Laws, a later dialogue (and the only one where Socrates is not speaking). The Apollonian regime constructed in The Republic, is one that – though ideal according to the standards of Glaucon and Adeimantus (Plato’s ambitious brothers) – a priori excludes philosophers such as Socrates and where ‘the shoemaker must stick to his last’. The construction of a regime according to nature (kata phusin) presupposes that acquiring absolute knowledge (episteme) is possible. Ironically, Socrates informs us elsewhere this is a Sisyphean labor, ‘akin to staring directly into the sun’. (Lets again look at Nietzsche who albeit unintended further unhides the irony: “And look! Apollo could not live without Dionysus! The ‘Titanic’ and the ‘barbaric’ were, in the end, every bit as necessary as the Apollonian”: 1972: pg. 20; consider also: "Ich sage euch: man muß noch Chaos in sich haben, um einen tanzenden Stern gebären zu können ": Zarahthustra) 27 The preferential signs of Marsyas’ (quint)essential difference from the Apolloniansphere is illustrated, or amplified, by his subhuman appearance, conspicuously illustrated in the aweinspiring painting of the flaying by Titian – who paints Marsyas tied upside down, making him appear like an animal before it is butchered. The animal part is at the top with a human navel in the exact middle. Apollo is stooping to flay off a large part of the skin of Marsyas’ chest, flaying off his human appearance. The ones who are perceived to have touched or have been touched upon by Dionysus, like Marsyas, conform to a great extent to what Roy Baumeister (1997) captures with the ‘myth of pure evil’: The maenad is a ‘selfindulgent pleasureseeker’ (pg. 52) who acts ‘on a capricious whim (pg. 42), is – tends to speak with a foreign accent (pg. 70) – has low emotional and general selfcontrol (pg. 139), destroys his own resources (pg. 71) and in sum, is chaotic and (therefore) unreliable. Although personally, he does not withstand these deficits and he has (manically) high selfesteem (pg. 135) and is driven by extreme feelings of pride, entitlement and deservingness (pg. 132) instead – i.e., he is hubristic 28 One author (Sontag, 2003: pg. 34) mentions she can barely stand to look at Titian’s portrayal of the flaying of Marsyas (or, for that matter, at any other painting of cruelty). The cruelty is (only) justified because the gods take pleasure in it, in absence of them (enjoying the feast), there is no feast and unfounded evil remains. 28 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

Apollo and defying the Delphiclabel In this way, “the gods justify the lives of men, because they themselves live it” (Nietzsche, 1972: pg., 17). And Apollo, the Delphicgod, makes an example out of the

Delphiclabeldefying Marsyas. The first Delphicmaxim: “know thyself (gnōthi seauton)!” must be interpreted to limited selfknowledge – for the shoemaker to stick to his last and to, above all, know you are not (to challenge) a god – underscored by the second: “nothing in excess (mēdén ágan!). Selfindulgence and the intoxicated effect of Marsyas threatens the structure of an Apollonian regime by emanating and bringing about the opposite, i.e., the Dionysian chaos and deterioration. In sum, to the ‘Apollonian Greek’ the “effect aroused by the Dionysian [i.e., arrogance and excess]” seem “Titanic and barbaric”, and were considered “the essentially hostile daemons belonging to the nonApollonian sphere” (Nietzsche, 1972: pg., 19). Plato (Symposium) compares the ‘ravishing effects’ that Socrates’ ‘great and enchanting speech’ has on the ‘souls of men’ to the effects of Marsyas’ fluteplaying (both induce, by means art, i.e., medicine, some sort of ecstasy) and explicitly points out – despite of Socrates’ unusual attempts to dress appropriately, put on sandals and even comb his hair – the apparent similarities between Socrates and Marsyas regarding their physical appearance, i.e., they are both perceived to be (hideously) ugly, and hence their quintessential dissimilarities from the rest. In Plato’s Apologia, Socrates himself indicates with his defense the validity of the claims against him and shows how he might be perceived in terms of a Dionysian essence. That is, (the actual) Socrates may or may not have been guilty of the charges he was executed for – which were disbelief of the local gods such as Apollo, the introduction of new ones and the corrupting of local youths – that made him a liable threat to the Apollonian regime, Plato’s (fictional) Socrates certainly is. In sum: Socrates accomplishes ‘with his words’ the same effects that Marsyas has on men, “and does not even require the flute” (Symposium). The above serve as examples of the scapegoating mechanism where in order for the ritual to work, it is important that the scapegoat is seen as guilty, dangerous and not one of us (Girard, 2008;Van Dijk, 2008:pg., 112). “Bragging victims (slachtoffers met praatjes) are dysfunctional viewed from a criminal law perspective” (Van Dijk, 2008: pg. 113). Therefore, scapegoats are subjected to distrust, disinterest and hostility (Van Dijk, 2008: pg., 117) and may be accused of concrete crimes or mischief to facilitate and provide rationalization for the expulsion (pg., 112). This is most easily achieved (as stated in a previous section) by placing a false and prejudiced interpretation on the object of attention (Nietzsche, 1887: II, 11), that is, by appealing to someone’s essence. For it to be effective, the scapegoat is not (longer) to be perceived as one of us (Van Dijk 2008: pg. 112). 29 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

Jerusalem’s Obedient Ethos

Though Girard agrees with Nietzsche that religious rituals are essentially sacrificial, he does not agree all religions (still) are systems of cruelty. Instead, only preChristian scripture and myths still reflect the punitive character of God. He asserts they justify aggression by telling the prosecutors’ narrative but that Christianity uniquely uses the evangelic victims’ narrative (in the New Testament) and therewith explicitly denounces aggression and renders ineffective future scapegoating rituals. It is not selfevident however that scapegoating has vanished altogether or is rendered ineffective; cruelty may have merely changed its form and became “more intellectualized in higher cultures” (Nietzsche, 1887: II, §7). For starters, all three Abrahamic religions can be said to have rejected human sacrifice in the Old Testament – where the honored Abraham, obediently, is willing to sacrifice his son Isaac – where the victima is eventually saved and switched with a nearby ram. It is perhaps more plausible a gradual process that started with the siege of Jerusalem (587 BC) and the subsequent destruction of Solomon’s Temple led to the rejection of human sacrifice and changed the ethos. That is, this event may have set in motion a new way (ethos) of preserving the relation with God: Sacrificing became increasingly more symbolic and focus shifted on a thorough studying of text and myths (anteceding further than 1000 years BC). Among these myths are those pertaining to sacrificial rules that were bundled together in the book of Leviticus (116). They are primarily concerned with priesthood and meant for priests. N.B., they are not concerned with sinofferings (see also Van Dijk, 2008). Here the Israelis for example send a goat, loaded with the community’s ills, off to die in the desert.

The Victimalabel

Jan Van Dijk (2008: Victims as Scapegoats; see also 2006; 2009)’s sociohistorical and ethnographic analyses on the (Western) conception of victimhood and the ‘etymological quest’ (2008: pg.: 89) after the colloquial word victim led him to the victimalabel. He purports that Christianity, instead of radically abandoning the scapegoat mechanism altogether (as Girard contends), set the example for more intellectualized scapegoating. This victima voluntaire – who voluntarily choses to relieve others from their sins (via his vicarious sufferings and subsequent death) – is Jesus. Jesus’ example thus shows the moral imperatives that are subsumed in Van Dijk’s victimalabel. To Van Dijk, “Girard’s theory suggests an interpretation of criminal justice as a ritual sacrificing the victim’s interest through symbolic exclusion on behalf of the community”. Labeling the victim contributes to, or causes, the elimination of the victim as process party (ibid.: ch. 8). “The victima label’s – the ideal model for crime victims’– first and foremost connotation is that of 30 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS compassion or comisery” (2009) and the associated moral imperatives perhaps are most famously illustrated by Christie (1986)’s ‘ideal victim’. So that the mere use of the word victim to refer to someone who has been (severely) affected by a disaster we express compassion with their innocent suffering – as long as they deserve it, which depends on the degree they conform to the label’s requirements. The moral imperatives attached to the victima label, among which are, most importantly, innocence and a willingness to forgive unconditionally despite its deep suffering. If they defy this label they “thereby forsake their entitlement to compassion and respect and may even provoke anger and moral indignation instead” (Van Dijk 2009: pg., 8), they are reactively scapegoated. In other words, victims who do not (sufficiently enough) follow Jesus’ example and name conform to this label are “just like scapegoats in a Giradian sense… excluded from criminal justice procedure as a matter of course” (Van Dijk, 2009: pg. 7)

Reactive Scapegoating

Blaming the victim and displacing anger aroused by the crime unto the scapegoat, reactive scapegoating, “is a well known defense mechanism that serves important psychological functions for those confronted with the victimization of others” (ibid: pg. 13). The psychological functions referred to consist (most importantly) of our meticulous need to cope with crime in a way that keeps actions and beliefs in consonance with other (prior) assumptions (Festinger, 1957), such as the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), which restores or strengthens our sense of predictability and moral order (Aristotle). Van Dijk (2009: pg. 24) believes trying to understand this complex issue “should be a new top priority within victimological research”. The moral bias of policymakers and researchers who take morality, which often refers to (offenders) and patients (victims), to be given and who project their preconceived notion of morality and victimhood on the object of their study, such as the early victimologists Mendelsohn and Von Hentig have reproduced the Girardian stereotypes (see: Van Dijk, 2009). Ideally, for (criminal) justice to fulfill its (Durkheimean) function of enhancing moral cohesiveness, they have to sacrifice their own personal wishes and desires in favor of the community, the bigger picture, 29 and restore peace by accepting their fate like the example of the ideal victim, Christ (Van Dijk, 2009; 2008) . Victims of crime then find themselves tussen de wal en het schip because they are “invited to restore the 30 peace” by sacrificing their “natural right to revenge”(Van Dijk, 2009: pg., 6; 2008) but if they go against

29 The parentheses in this sentence indicate, as I have tried to show and will continue to argue: all sensible explanations (from Aristotle to Darwin or Durkheim) of why (criminal) justice and scapegoating is functional (or adaptive) assume it in some way benefits (dyadic) cooperation or moral cohesiveness. 30 I believe Van Dijk here does not strictly refer to the ius/lex naturale (law or right of nature) as, say the earlier mentioned social contract theorists or scholastics used it and neither to a reduced form of naturalistic, biologic revenge. These observations nonetheless (though intended) aroused discussions about the role of the victim in criminal justice proceedings. What is natural about the right to revenge? Indeed, what is natural about revenge?: (‘how can it be gratifying to make someone suffer?’, Nietzsche: 1887:II). Though I showed in a previous section how revenge can be directly satisfactory (McCullough et al., 2013) this does not evidently transpose into a right. Bas van Stokkom (2012: A ‘natural right’ to revenge? pg., 138) purports “realising full victim participation is a good idea” for 31 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS the victimalabel’s imperative and actively resist being silenced “the aggression caused by the crime is redirected on to the victims in response to their assertiveness” (Van Dijk, 2009: pg. 18), i.e., the victim is 31 reactively scapegoated . Subsequently, “the scapegoat absorbs the social tensions within the community and cleanses the community through his subsequent expulsion” (Van Dijk, 2009: pg. 6). In short, the victim or scapegoat is the perceived cause of the illness (the poison) and provides a remedy (a cure), i.e., (s)he is the pharmakos. Both Girard and Van Dijk analyzed The Book of Job, which according to Girard includes all of the persecution stereotypes (Girard, 1986: pg. 32) and complete his mimetic theory (2008). In line with this, the 12th century Jewishphilosopher Maimonides writes that “Job, as well as his friends, was of opinion that God Himself was the direct agent of what happened, and that the adversary was not the intermediate cause.” (The Guide of the Perplexed: Ch., XXII; italics added). The point that provides serious (cognitive) dissonance is the fact that Job (as well as his first three friends) believes that no unjust actions can be ascribed to God. Yet Job (who was thought of to be an innocent gooddoer) is the recipient of seeming unjust actions against him. The actions however (or so his fourth and youngest friend, and also Maimonides, believe) only seem unjust which basically is the result of their tendency to antromorphise God and attribute to Him humanlike intentions and motives. Yet, because Job at first reacts so disturbing to his dreadful fate – and furthermore, taking his direct claims seriously is tantamount to admitting there is something wrong with either society’s or God’s providence – that he provides serious threat to his (and his friends’) belief. The (simplest) way out – to which his first three friends resort) is reactive victim scapegoating, i.e., to blame the victim. Responsibility is fundamentally attributed to a scapegoat, Job, who (because he refuses to voluntarily submit to his fate and suffering) is perceived guilty and dangerous. (Both avenues would have sufficed to restore consonance with the belief that no injustice can be ascribed to God.)

The Ultimate Agent

The earlier unpacked cognitive template of moral typecasting theory (agents and patients) should not be mere post hoc rationalization, or only occur when intuition finds no reason and we are morally dumbfounded (as in Haidt, 2001; Haidt Bjorklund & Murphy, 2000), because instead, to recap, it is presumably abstracted

its potential to “benefit the sentencing process” and for victims to get recognition. However he stresses the need to impose victims’ duties because of the risk ‘vindictive emotions’ escalate their participation. A natural right to revenge then may be more validly interpreted to be a fundamental (psychological or perceived) right to revenge (i.e., the victim feels intuitively, whether this intuition is foisted upon him by grammatical habits or evolved machinery, that it has the right – or rather, given the relation of rights with law and convention, the ‘natural desire’) to revenge – but this is not a right sensu strictu because it (being only perceived) does not impose a duty on the debtor. For now leaving it at that and hasting back to scapegoating. 31 If the victim is scapegoated (s)he loses (perceived) entitlement to compassion, respect and sympathetic reactions (which, all, are privileged to patients). This reactive victim scapegoating has potentially devastating consequences for the victims and has the tendency of culminating in a vicious cycle of declining (mental) health, selfperception and wellbeing in general, partly issued from and simultaneously facilitating further increasing antitherapeutic conditions and environmental (e.g., housing) circumstances. One of the questions this thesis raises is whether these antitherapeutic effects should weigh in discussions regarding criminal justice system reforms most specifically (offenderfocused) restorative justice procedures and (victimfocused) therapeutic jurisprudence. 32 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS from the very structure of morality itself, i.e., from the fundamentally dyadic understanding of moral acts and from that of language and causality (Gray et al., 2012a&b; Strickland et al., 2012; Nietzsche, 1887). Yet, when it is hard or impossible to atone for a moral act, i.e., when we lack a moral mind to blame, – especially in the case when we have trouble finding a human agent to bear responsibility for perceived harm – or people who simply lack an apparent natural agent (like Dylan’s character, Ramos) invoke the ultimate agent, 32 i.e., God, in an attempt to give meaning to the event (Gray & Wegner, 2010: Blaming God for our pain) . Especially negative life events – suffering – correlate with religiosity (both in scripture as in documentable reality): “In the most canonical of examples, the Bible’s Job is harmed in every conceivable way: His possessions are destroyed, his family is killed, his body riddled with disease, but the worse it gets, the more he believes (Gray & Wegner, pg., 7)”. (Gray and Wegner’s notion of the ultimate agent may also remind of Aristotle’s notion of the prime or unmoved – but ultimately responsible – mover). Darwin (1860, July 3) writes in a letter to his friend A. Gray that most people believe that “if an innocent man is killed by a flash of lightning”, that God designedly killed him (in a similar way Darwin would designedly kill a bird he wants for food). Like Gray, Gray and Wegner (2007), Darwin seems to suggest we are compelled to think of events in dyadic terms (of agent and patient). Recall from earlier, Darwin (1871) believes his dog, like us, has the basic tendency to assume agency in cases of “movement without any apparent cause”. Human beings, he purports, perhaps uniquely are endowed with higher mental faculties that have led them to believe in ‘unseen spiritual agencies’ (and later in monotheism), to account for cases without any apparent cause. Like Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, Darwin presents a genealogical debunking argument against religion or piety. The belief in supernatural entities (like God and Satan) can be genealogically explained to derive from a nonreligious (naturalistic) psychological basis that developed for the completing dyads in cases of movement without any apparent cause. Gray and Wegner (2010: pg., 8) determine similarly the moral dyad “forms the template for both morality and religion” and all deities are (only) human inventions that stem from the structure of morality and dyadic moral typecasting. However, as I showed the psychological mechanisms that are concerned with restoring the necessitated (cognitive) consonance by completing a dyad need not do this in a truthtracking way for it to work. Instead we quite actively search for a complementing moral role – and typecast – construing and misconstruing subjects and objects in our ways to deal with perceived harm (Gray & Wegner, 2010). Interestingly, Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) found in an experiment of 78 pairwise comparisons among 2399 participants that people rate God (and only God) to have a capacity for Agency but not for 33 Experience (patiency) .

32 Cf., Nietzsche (1886) says the agent – the subject (and God) – is invention of slaves, to give, via the ascetic ideal and morality, meaning to their otherwise ‘senseless suffering’. 33 Critically; Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007)’s method of pairwise comparisons presumes that people are able to rate and compare the entities they are provided on the same attributes and indeed that they preconceive of them as entities; this means that no matter how ridiculous the question (e.g., how much agency or experience has a red stone compared to a blue stone? – or, which do you think 33 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

The Ideal Pharmakos

The scapegoatologists all realized Jesus Christ “stood in a long tradition of scapegoats killed to bring peace 34 to the community” (Van Dijk, 2009 pg. 7; Nietzsche, 1887; 1881) . His example of voluntarily sacrificing himself, causes him to appear morally agentic – assertive and autonomic – making us care less about his suffering (which is, after all, deliberately selfchosen or even selfinflicted). This is in line with Gray and Wegner (2009), who found people do not mind the suffering of saintly (i.e., of perceived moral agents) as much as that of average persons and allocated more pain to them when they had to judge how much pain 35 was to be distributed . God (and Jesus) is vernacularly used as scapegoat (for example by our curses) and can be said to be the ultimate pharmakoi, functioning as “both the cause and the cure” (Gray & Wegner, 2012: pg., 11). The word victim (which originally refers to a sacrificial animal) appears to have been introduced originally to appertain to a human being in 1642 namely Jesus Christ, who was then called a ‘victime volontaire’ – and (only) in 1736 in English (Van Dijk, 2009). Increased emphasis on the humanness and human aspects of the imagery of Christ in Renaissance art (e.g., El Greco) may either show by itself, or has facilitated, a “growing awareness by modern man of the Crucifixion as a case of scapegoating” and eventually led to the adoption of a broader meaning of the concept by ordinary people where it came to refer to a recognizing of the passion of Christ in the suffering of others (Van Dijk, 2009: pg. 5). It is also plausible that by referring to ordinary human beings as victims, and recognizing the passion of Christ in their suffering, we come to see them as agents, and less as patients. We care less about their victimization – because it is selfchosen or they are to blame for it – so that the events do not provide dissonance with our

is nicer or feels more pain when harmed?); answers will be provided. Gray and Wegner (2010)’s claim is that people tend to anthropomorphise God while in fact the structure of their experiment asks people to do so (regardless of their natural tendency). Notwithstanding this point; their results remain that most people – assuming they have this tendency to anthropomorphise God or gods (which they probably have always had, see for example Xenophon or Aristophanes) – attribute to God more agency compared to any other (conceivable) subject or entity and will ignore contrasting stories from scripture in their perceptions of God (e.g., Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008). However, although Gray and Wegner at some occasions generalize their findings to polytheistic societies, this extrapolation is less selfevident because these mythical gods are often driven by human(like) passions and desires (including those for hunger or sex) – giving rise to tensions and quarrels amongst them – and furthermore need humans to provide for them, e.g., Aristophanes’ (414BC: The Birds, 176201; Oates & O'Neill, 1938: pg., 742) proposes 'gods die of rabid hunger' because of lack of sacrifices. Hence the title of ultimate moral agent perhaps need be reserved for monotheistic religions originating in Zoroastrian beliefs. On the other hand, consider Plato’s Republic where the pious merchant Cephalos, after his thesis on justice has been discarded, hurries off to go and try to settle the debts he think he owes to the people he has done wrong by sacrificing to the gods – easing his guilty conscience by means of repaying his debts to ultimate agents. 34 “In the act of cruelty the community refreshes itself [and] it is imagined that the gods too are refreshed and in festive mood when they are offered the spectacle of cruelty – and thus there creeps into the world the idea that voluntary suffering, selfchosen torture, is meaningful and valuable” (Nietzsche, 1881: Daybreak: 1,18: The morality of voluntary suffering). 35 This may help explain the collective awarding of a 'hero'status to certain victims that present a great threat to our belief in a just world. Consider for a recent example, the policeman that was executed from very close range in Paris during the attacks at Charlie Hebdo. By focusing on the gunned down victim's heroic actions on his moral agency we per effect distantiate ourselves from feeling at loss and provide a more meaningful narrative. Consider also attempts to relabel victims of genocide, torture or 'miscarriages of justice' as heroes. – Sometimes the victim agency is not enough. 34 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS belief in a just world or God’s providence. Important to note though, the origin of the development of something (e.g., of our concept of ‘victim’ or, for that matter, of ‘good’ and ‘evil’) does not evidently imply 36 anything for its contemporary or ultimate application(s) and/or usefulness .

Ideal Scapegoats in Athens and Jerusalem

Drawing on the distinction of Habermas (2001: Israel or Athens; see also, Strauss, 1967; Janssens, 2008) we can say Athens is characterized by rational thought and purports philosophy as the right way to life (reflected in their voting who to scapegoat and belief that they can settle and repay their debts by means of making sacrifices to the gods) whereas Jerusalem accepts revelation and considers piety, devotion and consequent obedience the right way to life (reflected in the willingness to sacrifice the firstborn son, though not for the repayment of any debt in particular). I suspect the interaction of their different ethos (the rational versus the obedient) with the abovediscussed protomoral “building blocks” of morality is reflected in corresponding local observations of scapegoating rituals and stories and hypothesize that the related (function of) practices in Greece differ from those of Jerusalem. In the first, we are perhaps more likely to encounter deliberate exclusion (via voting) and punishment of specific (malevolent) individuals than in the latter. Jerusalem is characterized by devotion, this means that preferential signs for victimization do not (have to) correspond to those we encounter in nature or in Athens. The function here is not so much the exclusion of deviant individuals (to enhance social exchange and predictability) but in sharp contrast, may function to increase obedience. So that we may expect the scapegoating of threatening or lowstatus individuals in Athens (or among animals), in Jerusalem, God may order the sacrifice of those with a (extremely) high WTR for us because obedience is proven best by showing complete devotion and willingness to sacrifice, say, one’s firstbornson. Because Christianity (in Nietzsche’s words the religion of pity) emphasizes (unconditional) forgiveness to a greater extent than do Islam and Judaism – which may have led to a greater emphasis on the offender in Christianity (Van Dijk, 2008) –, “the idealized conception of victimhood, rooted in Christian morality and derived from their (unique) forgiving ethos” (2009: pg. 21; italics added), is only one of many possible idealized conceptions of victimhood. Indeed, different findings, for example in Islamic theology, culture and morality, where the myths of the passion of Christ bear far less significance than in Western cultures, indicate that forgiveness, the victimalabel’s main moral imperative, either plays quite a different role or is altogether absent. Therefore, “upon closer examination, the use of the victimalabel seems to be a

36 “How foolish it would be to suppose that one only needs to point out this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts for real, socalled “reality” (Nietzsche, 1882: The Gay Science §58). 35 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

37 uniquely Christian phenomenon” (Van Dijk & Sarkeshikian, 2013) . Context matters and what is perceived ideal is always in relation to its function.

4. Construing Morality

“Dreadful (Fürchterliche) experiences raise the question whether he who experiences them is not something 38 dreadful also” (Nietzsche, 1886, Beyond Good and Evil: 89) .

Effects of Nietzsche’s Heraclitean aphorism are reflected in ample empirical studies showing social support gradually decreases after being victimized, experiencing a serious disaster, becoming chronically ill or (even) having a chronically ill child (e.g., WijnbergWilliams et al., 2006): motivated by selfpreservation, many people fear to become and/or remain involved with victims (Van Dijk, 2008: pg. 111). Consequently, victims often report they experience more distress from secondary victimization and gradual loss of social support than from the primary victimization. The aphorism can be considered Heraclitean in the sense that it inspires us to inquire about the nature of this seeming truism because, according to Nietzsche, an aphorism has not been deciphered only because it has been read out; this is only the start and requires the art of interpretation for any genuine Auslegung. Heraclitus, instead of making a coherent argument or thesis, tries to show to us that we naturally infer there is something that “breathes the fire into the equations” (Stephen Hawking, cited in Benardete, 2000: On Heraclitus). Formulated in terms of the current thesis’ general research question: what facilitates or contributes to people making (moral) judgments (say, on the basis of someone’s Fürchterliche experiences)? – And (both historical and genealogical); ‘why’ and ‘how’ do we do it? This section proposes a general model that incorporates the theoretical framework thus far and seeks to understand the central research questions just stated, may broadly be captured under the concept of judgementalism: ‘a disease of the mind’ that is also the ‘mind’s normal condition’ and can lead to ‘anger, torment and conflict’ (Haidt, 2006: pg. 78).

Ideal Types

Max Weber perceptively recognized the use of abstract hypothetical concepts – ‘ideal types’ – in physics and implemented them in the social sciences (that he believed should, like physics, henceforth be a valueneutral and descriptive enterprise). In a similar (albeit strictly speaking, because of his identification with a specific

37 It is even conceivable that, even within Christianity, moral imperatives are emphasized to diverging degrees – depending on the interaction of Christianity with local socialrelational contexts – so that we may not even rightfully be able to speak of a single victimalabel but instead expect cultural variability. 38 Fürcht – which Nietzsche on several occasions calls the mother of morality (e.g., 1886: §262) provides halfagenealogy of morality because (if we may assume he refers to human mothers and thus a diploid species) morality originates from (a combination of) Fürcht (its mother) and a (noch nicht festgestelltes) father who must also (provide for a second haploid set of chromosomes and) be partially responsible for the Ursprung (and perhaps the further development) of morality. In fact, we have seen Nietzsche criticises genealogy exactly because of this narrow limiting focus on a mother: neglecting the father amounts to neglecting actual (historical) man and the force of language.

36 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS culture, not in a valueneutral) way, Nils Christie (1986) speaks of an inclination in the criminal justice culture to idealize victims so as to increase the apparent contrast with the offender. Jan van Dijk (2009; 2008) explains analogously that, in order for a victim to benefit from help and compensation (in criminal justice proceedings), it has to confirm to the previous explained victimalabel. In sum, the victim has to be meek, blameless and willing to forgive unconditionally. Hypothetical victims have been constructed differently depending on what they were used for. As stated, ideal types are by definition always ideal in the service of something, therefore, different authors created varying prototypes of victims that would be ideal for achieving a certain outcome (in a domain where they can be put to use). This has led to ideal victims in the service of punishment (Ashworth, 2002), restorative justice, (Van Dijk, 2006: pg. 22; Pemberton, Winkel and Groenhuijsen, 2007: pg. 11) and victim support (Van Dijk, 2008: pg. 131; Goodey, 2005). The various ideal types that have been discussed so far can be said to depict different (ideal) Apollonian victims. Usually they are suffering to a restorable degree, want (psychological) help and are forgiving. Conversely, the (ideal) victim these authors (albeit tacitly) agree to have least chances of being treated with sympathy, respect and dignity, I will call a Dionysian victim. The Dionysian victim is to be understood in contradistinction to the Apollonian victim; as such, the Dionysian victim is usually perceived to be overly emotional (therefore irrational, unreasonable and incalculable) and selfish to a dysfunctional and threatening extent; its needs are unclearly distinguishable and, when provided, there is no way to guarantee this will terminate its suffering. The same typecasting can be applied to offenders and the resulting interaction heuristically provides a remedy that immediately restores the sense of justice.

Dionysus versus the Crucified

Nietzsche (1872) in The birth of tragedy uses and made famous the distinction of the Apollonian and the 39 Dionysian and many have, albeit discrepancies in usage, based models on the dyad . Jenks (1996: Childhood), a developmental psychologist, for example uses these two mythological images in summarizing the way researchers conceptualize a child’s behavior. S he associates the Apollonian social construct with Rousseau (e.g., Emile 1762). The Apollonian child is “angelic and innocent” – characterized by “natural goodness” and “clarity of vision”– whereas the Dionysian child is the exact opposite (Jenks, 1996: pg. 71).

39 N.B., sixteen years after writing The Birth Of Tragedy (which happened during the FrancoPrussian war of 197071), Nietzsche, in the opening section (An Attempt at Self Criticism; added in 1886), admitted the book by then seemed ‘unpleasant’ and ‘impossible’ to him and had come to regard of it as being “without any logical clarity, extremely selfconfident and thus dispensing with evidence, even distrustful of the relevance of evidence – an arrogant and rhapsodic book”. Nevertheless, none of these attempts at selfcriticism actually address the validity of the perhaps illogical arguments or the importance of the attempt of answering the question – what is Dionysian? And, “What is revealed in that synthesis of god and goat in the satyr?” (ibid.: pg. 6). 37 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

The abstract hypothetical ideal spheres – the Apollonian and the Dionysian – are mutually exclusive and asymmetrically oppose each other. The assumption is that when an apparent injustice is witnessed we are naturally compelled to ascribe an Apollonian or Dionysian essence to both the victim(s) and the offender(s) to be able to heuristically come to a solution that is functional to the individual by directly restoring the apparent threat to their belief in a social cohesiveness (Durkheim), the justworld (Lerner) or moral order (Aristotle). Ultimately it serves the group (and individual) by creating coherent, committed and attached communities where relationships are valued sincerely enabling high fitness interdependence. In other words, because everybody contributes to an increase of the welfare tradeoff ratio of each individual towards the group in general, consequently predictability and opportunities for safe cooperation are enhanced and increased; thus maximizing both the joint and individual outcomes (and reproductive success), possibly at the cost, or by means of either or both the offender and/or the victim. The specific predictions that follow from the expected third parties’ dyadic perceptions are summarized in table 1.

Victim Dionysian: Apollonian: Dionysian offender poses a threat; victim is Both parties are perceived as instrumentalized in the service of severity, e.g., threatening immoral agents, e.g., when an evil offender attacks a lady in her Dionysian: gang fights home Offende r Both victim and offender are instrumentalized Dionysian victim poses a threat: in the service of restorative justice / (reactive) victim scapegoating in conciliatory processeses, e.g., in cases of ‘petty Apollonian favor of the offender, e.g., Apollo theft’, unreturned books or conflicts between : vs. Marsyas sincere (honest) companies

Table 1: Third parties' dyadic perceptions of (polyadic) victimoffender interactions

The Apollonian victim in general is wholly intelligible which allows for its perfect instrumentalization that plainly serves a specific end. He induces feelings of anger and revenge in third parties and can be used in the service of severity. When, on the other hand, the offence was not too severe in the perception of third parties, the offender has an important role for the group (e.g., when the group has a high WTR for the offender) and furthermore appears quite reasonable, reconciliation is a more efficient outcome. The Dionysian victim on the other hand cannot be properly instrumentalized and is thus 40 scapegoated to accomplish the same effect .

40 As stated earlier, victimoffender interactions need not objectively consist of a dyad but is perceived as such. Many cases consist of either several offenders and/or may involve more than one victim. For example, in the case of Athens versus Socrates, a polyadic interaction is dyadically perceived since an entire group (i.e., the citizens or rulers of Athens) is casted or perceived as Apollonian. Also the 9/11 attacks were executed by more than one offender, if not a group, and was directed at a group of victims and further 38 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

The instrumentalized Apollonian offender likewise is intelligible and able to serve a specific end. E.g., (plea)bargaining, conciliatory behaviors and negotiation are expected and effective. The Apollonian offender may even be used to heroify certain transgressions against Dionysian victims, and serves as an example for future victimizations, e.g., Apollo’s flaying of (the ideal Dionysian victim) Marsyas. In the cases where both the victim and offender are no valued members of the community and are likely to lead to chaos and disrupt moral and social order (i.e., in cases with negligible WTRs from and for the group), both are scapegoated or ostracized. They are both immoral agents and are not perceived to attack each other (for agents lack patiency) but considered to attack the perceiver, the community and its social and moral order or ultimately, to attack our sacred values and God. I hypothesize such scapegoating varies depending on their relation with and the (kind of) threat they pose to the community; sometimes it is suited to let them result their issues violently amongst themselves, e.g., gangfights via “streetjustice”. Consider the following example of the ‘ideal battered woman’, which shows a transformation in perception from Dionysiac victim to Apollonian offender. According to family therapists BoszormenyiNagy and Ulrich (1981: pg. 168), scapegoating is a “final move of any family member to bind the chaos”. So that, when any real or imagined chaos instills existential fear; scapegoating is a way to maintain the equilibrium at the “cost of the dog or battered wife” (Grote, 2009: pg. 178). As discussed, scapegoating gets accompanied with a dehumanizing ethic (i.e., “I’m more human or important than you are”) and as also stated, this is negatively reflected in the scapegoat’s self esteem and bargaining power. However, it is precisely these features that are among the essential signals third parties use to interpret the situation and accordingly, construct essences for the parties that are involved in the conflict. As Dunn and PowellWilliams (2007) note, the woman (scapegoat) is in these cases often framed as responsible for her manic returning to the battering husband (and thus responsible for her fate and morally agentic). This kind of storytelling shifts away the attention (from the responsible batterer and socialstructural and political constraints that these women face) to the (Dionysian) agency of the victim. On the other hand, framing the battered woman as an (Apollonian) “ideal victim” fails to account for the fact that she could have made other choices (e.g., Dunn, 2005). Berns (2004) asserts that this tension between victimization and responsibility / agency are largely the result of what she has called the “victim empowerment frame” (see also Dunn & PowellWilliams, 2007: pg. 996), where victims are told “explicitly that it is up to them to take responsibility for their own lives” (Berns, 2004: pg. 156). Poletta (2009) asserts that by telling the “storyline of rebirth”, battered women emphasize their agency in a way that it becomes clear that their “responsibility for their own lives” has resulted in them realizing their willingness or determination to live. Their prior victimization has culminated in their realization of their innate desire to survive. “The women’s stories emphasize their choice to live far more

affected many others vicariously – it nevertheless was, albeit at that time, framed as an attack from the Dionysian terrorists directed at an Apollonian society (the USA). 39 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS than their decision to kill – indeed, recast their decision to kill as a determination to live” (ibid.: pg. 1505). In sum, if the women are perceived of as Dionysian in essence – madly returning to the one that threatens her and beats her up and after a couple of yearsorso decides she has had enough and to kill her husband – this heuristically provides a different remedy than when aspects of victimhood (including prior dependency and dehumanization) and growth of rationality (including agency and reasonableness) are combined so as to constitute the perception of an Apollonian essence. Perceived agency may be “the default resolution to the dilemma” (Dunn and PowellWilliams, 2007: pg. 997). But perceived essence, I expect, makes that there is no real dilemma: the resolution comes with the dyadic perception.

40 MORAL AGENCY AND VICTIMS

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