Sahotra Sarkar · Ben A. Minteer Editors a Sustainable Philosophy— the Work of Bryan Norton the International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics
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The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics 26 Sahotra Sarkar · Ben A. Minteer Editors A Sustainable Philosophy— The Work of Bryan Norton The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics Volume 26 Series editors Michiel Korthals, Wageningen, The Netherlands Paul B. Thompson, Michigan, USA The ethics of food and agriculture is confronted with enormous challenges. Scientific developments in the food sciences promise to be dramatic; the concept of life sciences, that comprises the integral connection between the biological sciences, the medical sciences and the agricultural sciences, got a broad start with the genetic revolution. In the mean time, society, i.e., consumers, producers, farmers, policymakers, etc, raised lots of intriguing questions about the implications and presuppositions of this revolution, taking into account not only scientific developments, but societal as well. If so many things with respect to food and our food diet will change, will our food still be safe? Will it be produced under animal friendly conditions of husbandry and what will our definition of animal welfare be under these conditions? Will food production be sustainable and environmentally healthy? Will production consider the interest of the worst off and the small farmers? How will globalisation and liberalization of markets influence local and regional food production and consumption patterns? How will all these develop- ments influence the rural areas and what values and policies are ethically sound? All these questions raise fundamental and broad ethical issues and require enormous ethical theorizing to be approached fruitfully. Ethical reflection on criteria of animal welfare, sustainability, liveability of the rural areas, biotechnol- ogy, policies and all the interconnections is inevitable. Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics contributes to a sound, pluralistic and argumentative food and agricultural ethics. It brings together the most important and relevant voices in the field; by providing a platform for theoretical and practical contributors with respect to research and education on all levels. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6215 Sahotra Sarkar • Ben A. Minteer Editors A Sustainable Philosophy— The Work of Bryan Norton 123 Editors Sahotra Sarkar Ben A. Minteer Departments of Philosophy School of Life Sciences and Integrative Biology Arizona State University University of Texas Tempe, AZ Austin, TX USA USA ISSN 1570-3010 ISSN 2215-1737 (electronic) The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics ISBN 978-3-319-92596-7 ISBN 978-3-319-92597-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92597-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018942926 © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. 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Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Foreword Rudolf Carnap and External Questions: My Path to Sustainability I am sometimes asked: What philosopher has most affected your work? When I respond, “Rudolf Carnap,” those not associated with philosophy give me a blank look, while those inquirers who know the story of philosophy in the twentieth century are even more nonplussed: How could Carnap’s work, best known for its attack on the meaningfulness of metaphysics and most of traditional philosophy, support my efforts to use philosophy to address contemporary social problems, especially environmental problems? The key to this puzzle requires that we distinguish between two sometimes-clashing themes in Carnap’s work: his empiricist (verificationist) view, associated with the Vienna Circle, and his principle of tolerance (PT), associated with his conventional notion of language. In my dissertation and an early book, I showed that these two themes co-existed throughout Carnap’s career, with the former view being more dominant in the early decades, while the latter view emerged as more central in his more mature philosophy. In a University of Michigan seminar (1968) led by Prof. Jaegwon Kim, we read Carnap’s 1950 piece, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (ESO); as I was struggling to understand how to separate “meaningless metaphysics” from what seemed to me to be valuable philosophical insights, I came to see that Carnap’s attitude toward traditional philosophy in 1950 embraced a shift away from his early emphasis on empiricism and the denigration of philosophical utterances as unver- ifiable (see Appendix). By the time he wrote “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” empiricism appears not as an essential criterion of meaningfulness but rather as posing problems for his ongoing work in semantics, in which he con- structed languages that formed sentences referring to entities, some of which were not observable and would, hence, be unverifiable and meaningless according to the strict empiricism of the Vienna Circle. In particular, he was stung by criticisms from empiricists who charged him with falling into metaphysics when he introduced v vi Foreword conventions that allowed reference to unverifiable (abstract) entities such as num- bers, classes, properties, and relations because he included such entities in the ontologies he introduced to provide semantic content for his constructed languages, which he fashioned to allow creative improvements on the language of science. To respond to these uncomfortable criticisms, Carnap returned in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” to the second theme, which had been formulated in his early masterwork, The Logical Syntax of Language (1937). There, Carnap rejected attempts of philosophers to exclude some linguistic forms based on “negative requirements” and instead proposed his Principal of Tolerance: It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions (Carnap 1937: 51). Elaborating on this point, he said: “In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments” (Carnap 1937: 52). PT merely dramatizes the position more commonly referred to as “linguistic conventionalism,” which asserts that language forms are tools for communication and that choosing linguistic forms necessarily involves choices not fully dictated by the structure and content of reality; they are better understood as proposals to adopt specific languages in particular situations which, in turn, give shape to the reality humans experience. Whereas the strict empiricism of the Vienna Circle positivists aimed to destroy and put to rest philosophical problems, PT aims more at a reconstruction of tra- ditional philosophy. This reconstruction was accomplished by arguing that philo- sophical assertions such as “There are material objects” or “There are numbers” can be rehabilitated by restating them in the metalanguage as assertions about the usefulness, in particular situations, of languages that refer to material objects or to numbers, respectively. Without going into great detail here (see Norton 1977, 2005, 2015, Appendix for more detail), we can see that Carnap was advocating a new mode and purpose for philosophy. The mode was to use linguistic analysis in cooperation with active empirical scientists to improve communication of scientific findings and, in the process, to create “ontologies,” which represent useful interpretations of scientific observations. Chosen linguistic categories can thus reflect models of reality through semantic choices justified not by appeals to “essences” existing in the real world, but with a method of appealing to the practical usefulness of proposed language forms. This apparently innocuous viewpoint has deep and consequential implica- tions for philosophy because choices legitimized by PT can only be resolved or justified by appeal to human purposes and thus require appeals to human interests and values. The linguistic choices that Carnap defends in ESO—based on PT and a human interest in language reformation—are “pragmatic” decisions. In The Logical