DOCSLIB.ORG

The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Mehler, Andreas Working Paper Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation GIGA Working Papers, No. 116 Provided in Cooperation with: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Suggested Citation: Mehler, Andreas (2009) : Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation, GIGA Working Papers, No. 116, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47732 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Inclusion of a paper in the Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should limit in any other Inclusion of a paper in the Working Papers serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior publicaton encourage exchange Working GIGA GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security ___________________________ Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation Andreas Mehler No 116 December 2009 venue. Copyright remains with the authors. of ideas and academic debate. www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers GIGA WP 116/2009 GIGA Working Papers Edited by the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz‐Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien The GIGA Working Papers series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. Inclusion of a paper in the GIGA Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. When working papers are eventually accepted by or published in a journal or book, the correct citation reference and, if possible, the corresponding link will then be included on the GIGA Working Papers website at <www.giga‐hamburg.de/ workingpapers>. GIGA research unit responsible for this issue: Research Programme “Violence and Security” Editor of the GIGA Working Papers series: Juliane Brach <brach@giga‐hamburg.de> Copyright for this issue: © Andreas Mehler English copy editor: Melissa Nelson Editorial assistant and production: Christine Berg All GIGA Working Papers are available online and free of charge on the website <www. giga‐hamburg.de/workingpapers>. They can also be ordered in print. A fee of €5 will be charged for production and postage costs. For orders or any requests please contact: E‐mail: workingpapers@giga‐hamburg.de Phone: ++49 (0)40 ‐ 4 28 25 ‐ 548 The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this Working Paper; the views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz‐Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 20354 Hamburg Germany E‐mail: info@giga‐hamburg.de Website: www.giga‐hamburg.de GIGA WP 116/2009 Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation Abstract This paper analyzes the declining importance of political parties in the Central African Republic (CAR). It argues that the problematic attitude of elites who are fluctuating be‐ tween violent and peaceful behavior in order to further their own careers is jeopardizing both peace and democracy. The author hypothesizes that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suffering more in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behavior are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of representa‐ tion, with international actors’ preference for inclusionary power‐sharing deals seen as the main aggravating factor. Keywords: Central African Republic, peace process, political parties, rebel movements, representation Dr. Andreas Mehler is a political scientist and the director of the GIGA Institute of African Affairs. Contact: mehler@giga‐hamburg.de Website: http://staff.giga‐hamburg.de/mehler Zusammenfassung Umgestaltung des politischen Raums? Die Auswirkungen der bewaffneten Rebellion auf politische Parteien und Repräsentation in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik Dieses Diskussionspaper analysiert die schwindende Bedeutung politischer Parteien in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik. Argumentiert wird, dass das problematische Verhalten der Eliten, die zwischen gewaltsamen und friedlichen Handlungsweisen hin und her wechseln, um ihre eigene Karriere zu befördern, letztlich Frieden und Demokratie gefähr‐ det. Der Autor stellt die Hypothese auf, dass sowohl politische Parteien als auch Rebellen‐ bewegungen darin versagen, (ethnoregionale) Interessen adäquat zu repräsentieren. Al‐ lerdings leiden Parteien deutlich stärker im Verlauf des Kriegs‐ und Friedensprozesses. Verhaltensmuster der Elite werden als wesentliche Erklärung für die daraus resultierende Krise der Repräsentation dargestellt, während die Präferenz internationaler Akteure für inklusive Machtteilungsarrangements als hauptsächlicher verschärfender Faktor angese‐ hen wird. Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation Andreas Mehler Article Outline 1 Introduction 2 Parties and Cleavages, Conflict and Violence in the CAR 3 Peace Negotiations and Imperfect Dialogue Processes 4 Representation of Social Interests via Rebel Movements? 5 Conclusions 1 Introduction This contribution examines the relationship between violent conflict and the crisis of repre‐ sentation in an African country by focusing on political parties and rebel movements. It deals with the “chicken or the egg” question of whether inadequate representation leads to violent conflict or whether violent conflict damages representative democracy. Political parties are assumed to represent social interests; in the context of the plural society of the Central Afri‐ can Republic (CAR) these are mainly ethnoregional interests. As will be shown, political par‐ ties have not performed well in their representative role, for a number of reasons (from objec‐ 6 Mehler: Reshaping Political Space? tive obstacles such as organizational shortcomings and lack of means of communication to rent‐seeking behavior). Numerous rebel movements claim to put local and national griev‐ ances on the agenda; they are heard and therefore seem to address these issues better than parties. Parties and rebel movements therefore compete to a certain extent, but political par‐ ties lose out in the course of war and in peace processes, not least because they are no longer regarded as the main actors by international mediators. The relationship between political parties and violence can be complex, particularly when violence has become an established mode of competition, as is the case in many African states. More importantly, civilian political parties can fall prey to armed insurgencies in an indirect but significant way: They are simply no longer the most important actors in the po‐ litical game when peace negotiations involve the government on the one hand and rebel movements on the other. Political parties also have to position themselves between alignment and critique with respect to violent actors—a potentially risky business. They may ultimately lose out as a result of power‐sharing arrangements enacted in peace agreements. In such processes they usually receive substantially less attention from the media and the donor community present in the country than most armed movements do (Mehler 2009). Moreover, the difficulties of political parties in representing supposedly ethnoregional interests are ag‐ gravated by rebel movements which appeal to the same clientele. Formerly violent actors, the warlords and rebel movements, may turn their organizations into political parties and com‐ pete in future elections—it cannot be ignored that they are often more successful than their peaceful competitors
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Central African Republic Country Report BTI 2006
    Central African Republic Status Index Management Index (Democracy: 3.22 / Market economy: 3.14) 3.18 3.91 HDI 0.355 Population 3.9 mn GDP per capita ($, PPP) 1.089 Population growth1 2.3 % Unemployment rate - Women in Parliament - UN Education Index 0.43 Poverty2 66.6 % Gini Index 61.3 (1993) Source: UNDP: Human Development Report 2005. Figures for 2003 unless otherwise indicated. 1 Annual growth between 1975 and 2003. 2 People living below $ 1 a day (1990- 2003). A. Executive summary Following a constitutional referendum in late 2004, CAR conducted the first round of presidential elections in March 2005 and completed the second round on May 6, 2005 when voters cast their votes for legislative elections.1 These elections mark the end of a transitional period after a military takeover by General François Bozizé. Bozizé stood as a presidential candidate in the first round and succeeded to gain an absolute majority in the second round, despite declaring earlier that he would step down after the transition phase. Initially, most competitors were barred from running and only after mediation by Gabon’s President Bongo and the re-admittance of most candidate hopefuls were fair elections given a chance. The Central African Republic (CAR) is a poor country according to all traditional, albeit rather unreliable indicators, yet it is rich in natural resources such as diamonds, timber and unconfirmed recent oil discoveries. However, the sparsely populated and only marginally accessible interior suffers from extremely poor governance. After a series of unsuccessful mutinies, coup attempts and rebellions, Ange-Félix Patassé was overthrown in March 2003.
    [Show full text]
  • Central African Republic – Uncertain Prospects
    UNHCR Emergency and Security Service WRITENET Paper No. 14 / 2001 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS By Paul Melly Independent Researcher, UK Revised May 2002 WriteNet is a Network of Researchers and Writers on Human Rights, Forced Migration, Ethnic and Political Conflict WriteNet is a Subsidiary of Practical Management (UK) E-mail: [email protected] THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND COMMENT. ALL SOURCES ARE CITED. THE PAPER IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE, EITHER EXHAUSTIVE WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY SURVEYED, OR CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE MERITS OF ANY PARTICULAR CLAIM TO REFUGEE STATUS OR ASYLUM. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF WRITENET OR UNHCR. ISSN 1020-8429 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction.....................................................................................1 2 Historical and Cultural Background............................................1 3 The Patassé Government and Military Instability......................4 3.1 The Patassé Administration: Political and Economic Tensions ..............4 3.2 The 1996-1997 Mutiny Crisis and Its Consequences................................5 4 The Crisis of 2001 ...........................................................................8 4.1 Failed Coup of May and Aftermath...........................................................8 4.2 The Aftermath and Consequences ...........................................................14 5 Factors Shaping
    [Show full text]
  • Capital Flight, Hard Mineral Resources Exports and Political Governance Crisis in the Central African Republic: How Far We Have Learned?
    Capital Flight, Hard Mineral Resources Exports and Political Governance Crisis in the Central African Republic: How Far We have Learned? Thales Pacic Yapatake Kossele ( [email protected] ) Oxford University Press Research Keywords: Capital ight, hard mineral resources, Political Governance crisis, Multiple Correspondence Analysis, ARDL, CAR Posted Date: October 9th, 2020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-88690/v1 License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Read Full License Page 1/23 Abstract The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration is applied to examine the role of political governance crisis in the relationship between hard mineral resources exports particularly diamond, and gold and Capital ight in the Central African Republic over the period of 1978-2010. The results of short- run show that ocial development assistance, gross national expenditures have a negative and signicant impact on capital ight while the interaction of political governance crisis and hard mineral resources, GDP per capita have a positive and signicant effect with capital ight. Moreover, governance crisis, exports of hard mineral resources has a negative and insignicant impact on capital ight. The results of the long run show a negative and signicant effect on governance crisis, ocial development assistance and gross of national expenditures. The interaction term between hard mineral resources and GDP growth have a positive and signicant effect on capital ight. However, export of hard mineral resources exhibits a positive but insignicant effect on capital ight. Without strong action to stop and promote political governance stability and the implementation of appropriate reforms at institutional level in CAR’s hard minerals resources sector, success in the ght against capital ight is unlikely.
    [Show full text]
  • AC Vol 40 No 10
    6 August 1999 Vol 40 No 16 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL SIERRA LEONE 3 MOROCCO Problematic peace The ceasefire is just about holding Our friend, the new king a month after the 7 July peace deal. The next stage - the Young King Mohammed VI faces a tide of economic and social demobilisation and disarming of problems bequeathed by his father Hassan II the rebel RUF - looks much shakier. The mass outpouring of grief after the death of King Hassan II, one of Africa’s most ruthless and And it's being made worse by the canniest rulers, is fast being overtaken by worries about the future, particularly the shaky economy. lack of foreign funds for rehabilitation. A week after his father’s sudden death from a heart attack on 23 July, King Mohammed VI went to Fez to lead Friday prayers. This was a critical signal of political and religious continuity. Surrounded by the Makhzen (the Palace-run political establishment) Mohammed VI took over as Al KENYA 4 Amir al Mouminin (Commander of the Faithful), Morocco’s spiritual head. Mohammed had accepted the Ba’ya (oath of allegiance) from his subjects immediately after Hassan II’s death. Leakey's big game King Mohammed’s assumption of the spiritual leadership told Moroccans that it would be Once more President Moi has business as usual for the Chérifien monarchy (which, as the title indicates, claims descent from the confounded his critics. After Prophet, as well as legitimacy through the role in the Independence movement played by the late meeting World Bank President King Hassan’s father, King Mohammed V).
    [Show full text]
  • 2003 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act
    2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT A Report Submitted by the President of the United States to the United States Congress Prepared by the Office of the United States Trade Representative THE THIRD OF EIGHT ANNUAL REPORTS MAY 2003 2003 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act The Third of Eight Annual Reports May 2003 Foreword ................................................................... iii I. U.S.-African Trade and Investment Highlights ..............................1 II. Executive Summary .....................................................3 III. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) ..........................5 A. AGOA Summary, Eligibility, and Implementation .................5 B. AGOA II ..................................................11 C. Outreach ..................................................11 IV. Economic and Trade Overview ..........................................15 A. Economic Growth ..........................................15 B. Africa’s Global Trade .......................................16 C. Trade with the United States ..................................18 D. International Financing, Investment Results, and Debt ..............19 E. Economic Reforms .........................................22 F. Reforms Undertaken by AGOA Beneficiary Countries ..............23 G. Regional Economic Integration
    [Show full text]
  • Fiche Pays Republique Centrafricaine
    FICHE PAYS REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE Avertissement : ce document a été élaboré par la Représentation pour la France du HCR à partir d’informations publiques. Toutes les sources utilisées sont citées. Il ne prétend pas être exhaustif sur le pays dont il traite ni décisif pour apprécier l’aptitude d’un requérant à bénéficier du statut de réfugié ou de la protection subsidiaire. CONTEXTE ACTUEL Ancien territoire de l’Afrique-Equatoriale française (AEF), l’Oubangui-Chari a accédé à l’indépendance en 1960 sous le nom de République Centrafricaine. Le caractère enclavé du pays a freiné son développement mais sa situation géographique lui a longtemps conféré un intérêt stratégique de première importance pour la France qui y entretenait à Bangui et à Bouar deux de ses principales bases militaires. Depuis son indépendance jusqu’aux premières élections législatives pluralistes du 22 août 1993, si l’on excepte la brève parenthèse de la deuxième présidence Dacko (1979/1981), la république centrafricaine n’a connu qu’une suite de régimes autoritaires, de la première présidence Dacko (1960/1965) au régime militaire du président André Kolingba (1981/1993) en passant par l’ubuesque mais tragique épisode de Jean-Bedel Bokassa (1965/1979), sacré « empereur » en décembre 1977. Ses années de règne virent la dégradation des conditions de vie de la population. L’agitation culmina en août 1979 avec la révolte scolaire : des centaines d’enfants furent internés à la prison de Ngaragba de Bangui où, selon Amnesty international, 150 d’entre eux ont péri. Après qu’une Mission africaine d’information eut déclaré Bokassa personnellement responsable de ces massacres, l’opération Barracuda de l’armée française dépose Bokassa le 20 septembre et ramène au pouvoir l’ancien président David Dacko.
    [Show full text]
  • Bangui (1996-2001) Emmanuel Chauvin
    Rivalités ethniques et guerre urbaine au cœur de l’Afrique - Bangui (1996-2001) Emmanuel Chauvin To cite this version: Emmanuel Chauvin. Rivalités ethniques et guerre urbaine au cœur de l’Afrique - Bangui (1996-2001). Enjeux, 2009, 40, p. 30-38. hal-00948669 HAL Id: hal-00948669 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00948669 Submitted on 18 Feb 2014 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives| 4.0 International License RIVALITES ETHNIQUES ET GUERRE URBAINE AU CŒUR DE L’AFRIQUE - BANGUI (1996-2001) Emmanuel CHAUVIN, doctorant en géographie1, Université Paris 1, UMR PRODIG 8586. Alors qu’en février 1959 éclataient sur fond d’instrumentalisation ethnique de lourds affrontements entre les leaders politiques du Moyen-Congo2, les bouleversements aboutissant à l’indépendance de son voisin, l’Oubangui-Chari, ne prenaient pas une tournure ethnique3. Dans un même élan national, les Centrafricains réussissaient à se réunir autour d’un homme, Barthélemy Boganda, pour lutter contre les abus de l’administration coloniale4. Autre signe d’espoir dans ces années charnières, une langue unificatrice, le sango (aujourd’hui deuxième langue officielle de la République centrafricaine), s’était diffusée à l’ensemble du pays suite à la multiplication des échanges et à son utilisation par les missionnaires chrétiens à partir de 19205.
    [Show full text]
  • Central African Republic
    COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC NIAGALE BAGAYOKO 2018 Page 1 of 57 African Comparative Transitional Justice the Central African Republic Table of Content Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 1. Colonial factors ................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Pre-colonial society ...................................................................................................................................... 6 1.2. ........................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Colonial society: The Oubangui-Chari Province of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) ................................ 7 Economic exploitation .................................................................................................................................. 8 Defining characteristics of CAR’s colonial experiences ............................................................................. 8 Violence under colonial rule ......................................................................................................................... 8 Justice under colonial rule ..........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Dynamiques De Formation Et De Reproduction Des Elites Politiques Centrafricaines
    UNIVERSITE PARIS I PANTHEON – SORBONNE UFR DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE DYNAMIQUES DE FORMATION ET DE REPRODUCTION DES ELITES POLITIQUES CENTRAFRICAINES MEMOIRE EN VUE DE L’OBTENTION DU MASTER 2 RECHERCHE EN SCIENCE POLITIQUE Apolline Gagliardi-Baysse Sous la direction de Monsieur Roland Marchal Septembre 2009 2 TABLE DES MATIERES CHAPITRE INTRODUCTIF ................................................................................................. 7 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 7 DU TRAVAIL DE LA RECHERCHE ................................................................................. 22 CHAPITRE 1 - DES ORIGINES DE L’ÉLITE POLITIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE..... 35 I. OUBANGUI-CHARI, CENDRILLON DE L‟EMPIRE : A LA RECHERCHE DE L‟ÉLITE POLITIQUE OUBANGUIENNE ..................................................................................................................... 36 A. La plus délaissée des colonies ................................................................................... 37 1. De la violence de la colonisation ........................................................................... 37 a. Un territoire abandonné aux compagnies concessionnaires ............................... 37 b. Travail forcé, portage et exactions multiples ..................................................... 40 2. Des lacunes de l‟administration coloniale ............................................................. 43 a. La sous-administration ......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Extrait Du Livre Affaires Centrafricaines
    Extraction : Journal Média Plus - Mise en page V. Baikoua 1 AFFAIRES CENTRAFRICAINES Rapport d’Amnesty International sur les crimes politiques et humains du général d’armée Kolingba pendant les cinq premières années de sa présidence. Du haut de la tribune de l’Assemblée nationale, en 1979, François Mitterrand qualifie Abel Goumba d’ «homme très remarquable» . A la même époque, il lui écrit en soulignant: «Les Socialistes seront à côtés toutes les fois qu’il le faudra pour que soient respectés les droits de l’homme dans votre pays ». Le 1 er décembre 1981, au cours d’une conférence de presse, le ministre de la Coopération Jean-Pierre Cot déclare, le «Lorsque j’examine nos relations avec tel ou tel pays, je commence par consulter l’annuaire d’Amnesty International. La France demeure intransigeante quant aux questions qui touchent au respect des Droits de l’homme ». Le 9 décembre 1982, Christian Nucci -qui vient d’être nommé ministre de la Coopération- publie le communiqué suivant: «Au moment de prendre mes foncions, je voudrais confirmer que les objectifs fixés par le président de la République française, François Mitterrand, notamment lors de la conférence de Paris et à la réunion de Cancun, sont maintenus: aider le Tiers Monde à surmonter la crise; contribuer au recul de la faim par le développement, la recherche de l’autosuffisance alimentaire, la stabilisation des cours des matières premières, défendre la cause des Droits de l’Homme et de la Liberté; telles sont les ambitions de la France». Le 27 avril 1983, dans «Jeune Afrique », le journaliste François Soudan publie un article consacré à Jean-Christophe Mitterrand , adjoint de Guy Penne , le conseiller du Président pour les affaires africaines, avec la conclusion suivante: «Et si vous le classez parmi les ‘’réalistes’’, opposé à l’idéalisme généreux d’un Jean-Pierre Cot, il brandit un exemplaire du rapport d’Amnesty International posé sur un coin de son bureau: ‘’J’ai lu, vous savez’’ .
    [Show full text]
  • Central African Republic
    CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ANATOMY OF A PHANTOM STATE Africa Report N°136 – 13 December 2007 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. FROM THE FRENCH EMPIRE TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE....... 2 A. A COLONIAL CUL-DE-SAC ....................................................................................................2 1. Exploitation and weak administration .......................................................................2 2. Colonial crimes and depopulation .............................................................................3 B. FROM INDEPENDENCE TO BOKASSA 1ST................................................................................4 1. Construction of a predator state.................................................................................4 2. Bokassa in power (1965-1979), emergence of the criminal state..............................5 III. THE “BARRACUDA SYNDROME”........................................................................... 7 A. TRIBALISATION UNDER FRENCH TUTELAGE ..........................................................................7 B. DEMOCRACY AND CHAOS .....................................................................................................9 1. Mutiny after mutiny.................................................................................................10
    [Show full text]
  • République Centrafricaine : Anatomie D'un État Fantôme
    RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE : ANATOMIE D’UN ÉTAT FANTÔME Rapport Afrique N°136 – 13 décembre 2007 TABLE DES MATIÈRES SYNTHÈSE ............................................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. DE L’EMPIRE FRANÇAIS À L’EMPIRE CENTRAFRICAIN............................. 2 A. UN CUL-DE-SAC COLONIAL ...................................................................................................2 1. Exploitation et sous-administration ...........................................................................2 2. Crimes coloniaux et dépopulation .............................................................................3 B. DE L’INDÉPENDANCE À BOKASSA 1ER ..................................................................................4 1. Mise en place de l’État prédateur ..............................................................................4 2. Bokassa au pouvoir (1965-1979), apparition de l’État criminel................................5 III. LE « SYNDROME BARRACUDA »............................................................................ 7 A. TRIBALISATION SOUS TUTELLE FRANÇAISE ...............................................................................7 B. DÉMOCRATIE ET CHAOS ........................................................................................................9 1. Mutineries à répétition.............................................................................................10
    [Show full text]