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2005 Judge Pierre Crabitès: A Bourbon Democrat in , 1877-1943. Brian R. Parkinson

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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

JUDGE PIERRE CRABITÈS: A BOURBON DEMOCRAT IN EGYPT, 1877-1943.

By

BRIAN R. PARKINSON

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2005

The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of Brian R. Parkinson defended on August 4, 2005.

Peter Garretson Professor Directing Dissertation

Alec Hargreaves Outside Committee Member

Paul Strait Committee Member

Jonathan Grant Committee Member

Michael Creswell Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

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I would like to dedicate this manuscript to my wife, Alwen. Throughout my career as a graduate student, you have always been there for me. You have encouraged and supported my work. And, perhaps most importantly, you have been patient with me and tolerant of my shortcomings.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Peter Garretson, for all of his help with this dissertation. His encouragement and expertise have enabled me to complete this manuscript. His suggestions for improvement have been invaluable. I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, including, Dr. Michael Creswell, Dr. Jonathan Grant, Dr. Alec Hargreaves, and Dr. Paul Strait, for their sage advice and comments for revision. I would also like to thank my Arabic professor, Dr. Zeina Tamer Schlenoff, for opening my eyes to the Arab world. Her patience and pedagogy have helped me immensely.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... vi

Introduction ...... 1

1. Early Life ...... 10

2. Launching a Career...... 41

3. A Judge in Egypt ...... 71

4. An American in Cairo ...... 97

5. Court of Appeals...... 134

6. The Tutankhamen Case...... 171

7. Accidents ...... 210

8. Taking off the Robe...... 238

Conclusion ...... 275

Bibliography ...... 279

Biographical Sketch ...... 294

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ABSTRACT

Judge Pierre Crabitès was born in the French Quarter of , , 17 February 1877. Like so many in New Orleans, Pierre Crabitès was a Creole. His father was a wealthy French immigrant, and his mother was a Virginian. Crabitès grew up without want, attending the best private schools and universities that New Orleans had to offer. His family connections helped him when President Taft nominated Crabitès to a seat on the Mixed Courts of Egypt in 1911, and he sat on the bench in Cairo for the next twenty-five years, rendering decisions on many important cases, including the case for the sequestration rights to the tomb of the Pharaoh Tutankhamen. His career as a judge on the Mixed Courts coincided with a period of British dominance over Egypt, and his anti-British sentiments thus evolved during his stay in Egypt. Several accidents led Crabitès to take up writing as a hobby. He published many book sand articles, and these works exhibit the environment in which he grew up and his anti-British opinions. These anti-British feelings ultimately barred his appointment to the Mixed Courts’ Court of Appeals and later hindered his work for the OSS. After serving on the Mixed Courts for twenty-five years, Crabitès took up a post lecturing on law at Louisiana State University. When not busy teaching, Crabitès spent much of his time giving speeches on popular subjects in the 1930s, such as politics and the war. President Roosevelt appointed Crabitès as the American delegate to the Montreaux Convention, which resolved to slowly phase out the Mixed Courts. Crabitès finally realized his goal of obtaining a foreign service post when he accepted a job working for the OSS and Colonel Bill Donovan; however, his anti-British sentiments continued to haunt him when he returned to the Middle East, and he was subsequently transferred from Egypt to Iraq. Unfortunately, Crabitès died soon after his arrival in Iraq on 10 October 1943, in Baghdad.

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INTRODUCTION

The son of a French immigrant shop clerk, Judge Pierre Crabitès (1877- 1943) became an American scholar on Middle Eastern history and politics. He grew up in the French Quarter of New Orleans, where he was reared in a Catholic household and attended parochial schools until he graduated from the Jesuit College of the Immaculate Conception in 1895. He subsequently matriculated at , where he studied law. However, he failed to meet the minimum age requirement necessary to take the bar exam upon graduation, so he traveled to to study first at the Sorbonne and later at the University of . While in Europe, he witnessed first-hand the spectacle of the Dreyfus Affair. After returning from Europe in 1900, Crabitès passed the Louisiana Bar and joined Hugh Cage and Henry Baldwin to form Cage, Baldwin and Crabitès, a law firm in New Orleans. He spent the next eleven years building a reputation in Louisiana law, even presenting a case before the Supreme Court in 1909. During this period, Crabitès rapidly ascended the social ladder in New Orleans. He only associated in the most elite of circles. Crabitès greatly benefited from his intellect and family connections, which helped him secure a seat on the Mixed Courts of Egypt in Cairo, when President appointed him in 1911. He lived in Egypt from 1911 to 1936, a period when American foreign policy largely ignored the Middle East. Crabitès spent most of his career on the Mixed Courts, yet at heart he remained a Creole from Canal Street. When he departed his home in New Orleans for Cairo, Crabitès brought his Creole heritage and Bourbon Democrat politics with him. His writing reflected the environment where he came of age. Crabitès’s court opinions and publications mirror his background and convictions. He observed British foreign policy shape Egyptian domestic policy. This account highlights his reaction to

1 the British dominance of Egypt. It demonstrates how Crabitès’s professional relationships facilitated his selection to the Mixed Courts, while his personal beliefs ultimately hindered his ability to rise to the Court of Appeals and later to secure a much-desired diplomatic post. Crabitès attempted to obtain promotion to the Mixed Courts’ Court of Appeals in 1921, but his anti-British sentiments obstructed the nomination. He would eventually retire from the bench in Cairo early, aware of British intentions to block his appointment to the Court of Appeals. Over time, Crabitès became increasingly anti-British. This stance directly related to his positions on nationalism and imperialism. He strongly believed that imperialism was immoral and thought that America should promote nationalism and democracy in occupied countries. These attitudes harmonized with President ’s “Fourteen Points,” that the United States should “make the world safe for democracy.” His anti-British feelings germinated in New Orleans, where Crabitès beheld Anglo-Saxon culture slowly gain predominance over the French Creole culture. Crabitès’s animosity towards the British flowered during his extended stay in Egypt. During his lifetime, Crabitès resided in many cultures, including Arab, Muslim, French, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and Creole. And even though he changed climates during his move from Progressive-Era Louisiana to British- occupied Egypt, he remained true to his Catholic-Creole heritage and convictions. Crabitès stayed in Egypt and Louisiana during periods of declining French culture and a simultaneous rise in Anglo-Saxonism; yet his knowledge of the and French culture assisted him on the courts of Louisiana and also helped him attain a seat on the Mixed Courts’ bench. He flourished in both worlds, but his pro-French attitude ended up harming him in Egypt. This dissertation examines the interaction in British-American relations, and how Crabitès’s anti-British sentiments damaged his opportunities for advancement in Egypt and even strained affairs between the two countries. Wrapped up in the debate over Crabitès’s perspective on nationalism was his decision in the Tutankhamen case. In 1924, Howard Carter sued the

2 Egyptian government for the sequestration rights to the Pharaoh Tutankhamen’s artifacts. Crabitès presided over the case and ruled in favor of British archaeologist Howard Carter. This famous court case captured the attention of the world, and Crabitès inadvertently reinvigorated the nationalist effort in Egypt by supporting Carter’s argument. It is interesting to note that Crabitès authored a judgment against Egypt when he condemned the British occupation of Egypt. This dissertation analyzes his opinions on the case by considering the accounts of Egyptian, European, and American journalists. Just a few months later, Crabitès lost his leg when he tripped and fell under a Cairo streetcar. While recovering from his subsequent amputation, Crabitès took up writing as a hobby. By the time he died in 1943, he had published thirteen books and twenty-eight articles, mostly biographies and histories. Crabitès left behind numerous unpublished manuscripts and articles. He published in academic journals, including the American Bar Association Journal, Catholic World, Current History, and Foreign Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations, Macmillan, and Routledge all published his books. History has most widely recognized Crabitès as a prodigious and opinionated author; however, this work focuses on his role as a judge on the Mixed Courts of Egypt and an agent for the Office of Strategic Services in the Middle East. He also served as a translator, translating several important books from French into English. Crabitès popularized Middle Eastern history and politics. He was no popular author but a legitimate scholar. He was one of the most prominent American authorities on the Middle East in this period, as well as one of the very few pro-Arab intellectuals in the United States. American and British specialists on the Middle East reviewed his works, which influenced American foreign policy towards the Middle East. Crabitès began publishing primarily out of a desire to influence American foreign policy, but he composed out of a need to be famous. He also wrote from frustration at a lack of progress in his career because he recognized that the British obstructed his advancement on the Mixed Courts. Moreover, his schedule

3 at the Mixed Courts occupied little time, and he needed a diversion to focus his energy and keep his mind off of his health problems. This biography integrates Crabitès’s compositions into his intellectual life. His works reveal his anti-British sentiments, pro-Catholic proclivities, Social Darwinist attitudes, and other controversial opinions. While Crabitès was well- published, he was unable to find homes for all of his works because there was little interest in the United States for Middle Eastern affairs during this period. This dissertation sorts out and analyzes his major works, including the major themes of Catholicism, nationalism, Palestine, imperialism, and gender. New Orleans experienced many changes as Crabitès grew up. He watched Anglo-Saxon culture supersede his French Creole heritage in Louisiana. This transformation had a significant effect on his writing. Crabitès reacted conservatively to these changes in his life. The dynamic between his French and Creole heritage influenced his intellectual life. There is a noticeable tension exhibited in his works between his American (Anglo-Saxon)-Protestant, French, and Creole-Catholic backgrounds. Nationalism was a major theme in Crabitès’s life, and he directly confronted this issue. He had strong sentiments regarding nationalism. Even though his anti-imperialist outlook cost him promotion, he still expressed his anti- colonial opinions. Crabitès had close connections to King Fuad and his son Farouq, and he preferred the over the British and the nationalists (Wafd). He disapproved of the British occupation of Egypt and Palestine. Crabitès favored both Egyptian and Arab nationalism. He was partial to one brand of nationalism in Egypt and then another in Palestine. His belief in Egyptian nationalism stemmed from his conviction that Egypt’s nationalism predated Arab nationalism and Islam. For him, nationalism in Egypt was a uniquely Egyptian, Pharonic nationalism. This dissertation ascertains Crabitès’s position on Palestine. On the one hand, he opposed the British Mandate for Palestine, yet he was not an avowed Zionist. He advocated a Palestinian state. He considered Palestine the home of Arabs, not the Jews. He contended that the Arabs had governed Palestine

4 peacefully for millennia until the British mandate, which afforded a Jewish minority the power to govern the Holy Land and an Arab majority. His hostility towards the British mandate related to their incompetence there. This biography also connects Crabitès’s stance on Palestine to the Catholic Church’s position on Palestine. Crabitès was an anti-imperialist Democrat. Democrats refused to approve of for numerous reasons. Some were Social Darwinists who alleged that imperialism brought America into contact with inferior peoples, and they opposed granting them American citizenship. These men were reluctant to become involved with a “lesser race” because they thought that America had already taken part in that before. Other American anti-imperialists, such as , considered imperialism immoral and believed domestic problems to be of greater import. Imperialism meant involving America in affairs that were none of its business. Still other anti-imperialists were labor unionists, who assumed that immigrants would bring down American standards and depress wages. Crabitès applied these perceptions of imperialism to the British occupation of Egypt and Palestine. Women played a significant role in Crabitès’s life. His father died when he was young, and his mother, grandmother, aunt, and female cousins helped raise him. Gender was a major theme in Crabitès’s intellectual life. He wrote one book and twenty-one articles on women. The role of gender dominates his writing on Islam. This dissertation examines the impact that these women had on his writing. Crabitès left Egypt as soon as he realized that he could not advance on the Mixed Courts. In 1935, he arranged for a position as a special lecturer in law at the Louisiana State University. Crabitès began simultaneously publishing editorials in newspapers and traveling the country to lecture at Rotary Clubs. Most of his speeches took place in the Southeast. He also traveled to the Midwest and Northeast to give an address on occasion. He covered numerous topics in his lectures and newspaper editorials, including such subjects as communism, African-Americans, and the Nazi-Fascist threat.

5 This biography analyzes his opinions on World War II, which were surprisingly tolerant of Nazi . Crabitès, like many Americans who experienced the horrors of World War I, believed that America should retreat into isolationism after the war. Many Americans, such as Charles Lindbergh, protested American involvement in World War II. Crabitès’s early pacifism related to Catholic , but it also reflected the values of mainstream America, so he was not exceptional in his opinions. Later, Crabitès changed his attitude towards Germany, adopting a more internationalist perspective on the Nazi threat. In 1936, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Crabitès as the American representative to the Montreaux Convention, which resolved to phase out the Mixed Courts of Egypt. After a few years of teaching at the Louisiana State University, Crabitès decided that he wanted to become a diplomat. Not only did he seek to return to the Middle East in this capacity in another attempt to gain fame, but he sincerely attempted to assist America in the war effort. Unfortunately for him, his outspoken anti-British proclivities hindered his ability to secure a stable diplomatic position, for many in the diplomatic community were suspicious of his motives or disagreed with his opinions. Even though he was one of the few American specialists on the Middle East, many in the State Department and British Foreign Office believed that he was not up to the task. Most likely, these feelings can be attributed to his poor health, although, the State Department was distrustful of Crabitès’s motives in diplomacy. His views, and the relationships that he forged both in New Orleans and in Egypt, caused problems for him, and the State Department was reluctant to support his mission with the Office of Strategic Services. Even though he was immensely qualified for the job of coordinating relations with the royal palace, they believed that he was more concerned with seeking glory than aiding in the Allied war effort. Crabitès had a close association with the Abdine Palace. Both British and American authorities in Egypt questioned his politics and connections. Crabitès was intensely patriotic and truly interested in helping the American cause during

6 the war. He was assigned to Egypt for a short while, only to be relocated to Iraq in 1943, where he died of a brain hemorrhage months after his arrival. Although most of the studies on the Mixed Courts have been in French, these were published prior to the closure of the courts. There has been very little research conducted on the Mixed Courts since they shut down, even in French. However, there have been two histories published in English on the Mixed Courts and one master’s thesis.1 Almost no research exists on the judges of the Mixed Courts and little has been written on Judge Crabitès. Aside from my master’s thesis, the longest work is a master’s thesis written by Jamal T. Perkins.2 This work is brief, insufficiently researched, and contains errors. Its thesis argues that Crabitès was an under-utilized expert on Middle Eastern affairs during a period of increasing American interest in the Middle East. It considers some of the information housed in the Crabitès Collection at the University of New Orleans and focuses on Crabitès’s manuscripts on the conflict in Palestine, especially his unpublished manuscripts “Palestine and her Problem” and “The Partition of Palestine.” It fails to analyze any of his major works and neglects many primary source documents on Crabitès’s life, including State Department documents referencing Crabitès’s time as a judge on the Mixed Courts and his stint working for the State Department, as well as foreign archival material. Perkins does not examine any of the State Department or British National Archives documents. He ignored the importance of Crabitès’s anti-British sentiments and the effect that they had on his life. This dissertation intends to correct the errors from earlier work on Crabitès and provide a more extensive and in depth study of his life. Besides focusing on Crabitès as an expert on the Middle East, this account concentrates on Crabitès as a man whose intellect and connections helped him ascend the social ladder, yet his personal opinions ultimately limited his ability to accomplish his goals,

1 Jasper Yeats Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt, revied ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). Mark S.W. Hoyle, The Mixed Courts of Egypt. (: Graham and Trotman, 1991). Wadih A. Saleh, “The Mixed Courts of Egypt and International Law . . . “ (Master’s thesis, Duke University, 1968). 2 Brian R. Parkinson, “Judge Pierre Crabitès: An American in Egypt (1877-1943).” (Master’s thesis, The Florida State University, 2002). Jamal T. Perkins, “Pierre Crabitès: An Early American Expert on the Middle East” (Master’s thesis, University of New Orleans, 1992).

7 such as an appointment to the Court of Appeals and a diplomatic post. While Crabitès’s relationships back home in the United States helped his promotion to the Mixed Courts, he fell out of favor with members of the British government in Egypt, such as Sir William Brunyate, and these personal conflicts hindered his grander aspirations. The foundation for the story of Crabitès’s life relies on primary resources. The secondary sources used supply background information and situate Crabitès in the period. The work essentially uses the research gathered at seven archives, including the Crabitès Collection, housed at the University of New Orleans, census information from the National Archives I in Washington D.C., State Department documents from the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, British Foreign Office sources from the Public Record Office in Kew, , and newspapers from the British Library in London, England. It also uses newspapers from the Bibliotheque Nationale. Historians can profit from studying Judge Pierre Crabitès and the Mixed Courts of Egypt. Crabitès is an excellent example of the early American diplomatic experience in the Middle East. He lived and worked in the Middle East during a period when the United States was unable to influence colonial powers or even other Middle Eastern countries with its foreign policy. Crabitès illustrates the conflict between imperial powers and the United States in colonized Middle Eastern countries. An avid writer, Crabitès was also one of the most eminent scholars on Middle Eastern affairs during his lifetime. He was a specialist on the Middle East and international law as it related to the region during a time when there were very few Americans in the region. Historians can gain much from examining his role on the Mixed Courts of Egypt. In addition to his published articles on Mixed Courts, he made landmark decisions while on the bench. This biography pulls his life together by revealing what was important to him, such as his family, fame, and prosperity. It also traces the major themes in his life, including the dynamic between the French and British cultures in Egypt and his Creole heritage, as well as his Catholicism, nationalism, and his intellectual life.

8 This dissertation covers such historical areas as the Gilded Age and Progressive-Era America, early twentieth century Egypt and the Middle East, Palestine during the Mandate, and World War II. Crabitès is significant in the history of American relations in the Middle East in the early twentieth century. His life provides a fascinating and unique window onto U.S. relations with Egypt during the beginning of the twentieth century. This dissertation is a largely political biography; however, it should interest a range of audiences, such as intellectual, social, political and legal historians, as well as Americanists, Europeanists, and historians of the Middle East.

9 CHAPTER 1- EARLY LIFE

Background to Pierre Crabitès Sr.’s Immigration to New Orleans In 1830, Charles X was the King of . He was a Bourbon, struggling to construct a stable government, beset by opposition from both the far left and the extreme right. But during the election of 1830, enemies of the monarchy captured a majority in parliament. Rumors of another revolution floated through the highly-charged political currents in France. Pierre Crabitès Sr. was born that very same year in Sus, France, a small village in Pyrénées-Atlantiques.1 Pyrénées-Atlantiques was a strong Catholic province located in the very southwestern corner of France, tucked in between the Pyrenees Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. The had originally sought to preserve the regional characteristics of provinces like Pyrénées-Atlantiques. The revolutionaries had favored a devolution of the central government’s power so that the provinces could elect their own local officials, but the subsequent federalization of provincial governments eventually placed local authorities under the control of the minister of the interior, gradually draining the personality from regional France.2 Provinces like Pyrénées-Atlantiques suffered a loss of identity. Pierre Crabitès Jr. acknowledged this process, stating, “The Old Regime knew of Normandy and Brittany, of Gascony and Bèarn. There were scores of provinces divided along historical lines. The Revolution abolished all of them.”3 Pierre Crabitès Jr. astutely recognized this historical pattern of centralization in France: “Richelieu, in order to facilitate the overthrow of feudalism, became a strong advocate of centralization. . . Louis XIV emphasized that policy. Napoleon stressed it.” He continued, “France is a highly centralized state. It is the paradise of bureaucracy. It is run by its civil service. Officialdom, not politics, governs France.” According to Crabitès, the French Revolution transformed the country little in terms of the governmental administration of the

1 Letter from a cousin in Sus, France, to Pierre Crabitès speaking about the Crabitès family ancestry,(1925): Mss. 73-2, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 2 Alan Forrest, “Paris versus the Provinces: Regionalism and Decentralization since 1789,” in French History since Napoleon, ed. Martin S. Alexander (London: Arnold, 1999), 111-12. 3 Pierre Crabitès, “Who Rules France?” South Atlantic Quarterly 31 (1932): 368.

10 provinces, “fundamental French institutions remain practically what they were during the days of the First Empire.” For him, France preserved the status quo, confirming “the basic and immutability of France.”4 During the French Revolution, provincial France grew weary of the radical brand of republicanism so fashionable in Paris. The violence in Paris highlighted the distinctions between the two Frances- Paris and the rest of France.5 Growing up in rural France, Pierre Crabitès Sr. came from a traditional Catholic family in Pyrénées-Atlantiques. He was the eldest son of Jean Crabitès (1792-1875), a public official for over twenty-five years in the city of Sus. Jean Crabitès came of age during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, eventually serving the city of Sus as the deputy-mayor and then as the mayor during a period of great bureaucratic expansion in France.6 The French Revolution had endeavored to prohibit the sale of civil service positions, instead making them based solely upon merit. The revolutionaries had faith in the virtues of equal opportunity. They sought greater accessibility to these positions after the revolution, yet one still required schooling to ascend within the civil bureaucracy. Educational opportunities during this period largely remained open to the wealthy.7 Pierre Crabitès Jr. believed that this philosophy, while applicable to the revolution, was not relevant to the Napoleonic Era, for Napoleon radically altered the French civil service when he codified French law. Crabitès maintained, This unification of the laws of France did more than create a series of digests; it symbolized the oneness of France. It burned incense to the principle of centralization. . . It is that in France everything is referred to one common center. It is there that all the civil functions are absorbed. It is true that there are governmental agencies all over the country. They, however, owe allegiance to the central power. They report to it. They

4 Ibid., 366-68. 5 Forrest, “Paris versus the Provinces: Regionalism and Decentralization since 1789,” 117. 6 Letter from a cousin in Sus, France, to Pierre Crabitès speaking about the Crabitès family ancestry,(1925): Mss. 73-2, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 7 Theodore Zeldin, France, 1848-1945, Ambition, Love and Politics. vol 1. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 113.

11 receive instructions from it. They are amenable to no other authority. They can look for advancement from no other source.8 Over time, civil service positions became hereditary or purchasable offices. In other words, Crabitès contended that France was not a meritocracy, as the French Revolution had intended it to be, because Napoleon’s centralization had made the country beholden to nepotism and clientage. Jean Crabitès came from an upper-class French family and had the education and means requisite for a position such as mayor. It is likely that Jean Crabitès bought his position as the mayor of Sus. Poor economic conditions would eventually persuade his son, Pierre Crabitès Sr., to seek his fortunes elsewhere. In the years following the French Revolution, there existed a significant degree of social and economic dislocation in France. The French Revolution drastically changed the French economic model. Enlightenment ideals eliminated the feudal aspects of the French economy and replaced them with more uniformity and greater property rights. The basic philosophical premises of the Enlightenment were rationality and reason. The Revolution took land away from the nobility and the church. The new pattern of land ownership concentrated the majority of French property in the hands of small landowners. Moving towards fiscal independence and private , the disruption caused by the French Revolution ultimately produced lower productivity than in the surrounding countries. The French economic model sought to avoid a massive rural to urban migration, concentrating the majority of its production in the hands of small-scale and rural manufacturers.9 France remained a largely rural and agricultural country until it recovered from the aftereffects of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. It took decades for France to regain its footing from such an unstable period. The French economy eventually began to expand again during the 1840s. The mid- century economic resurgence witnessed historic industrial expansion. French manufacturing increased greatly. The French economic model incorporated

8 Pierre Crabitès, “Who Rules France?” 368. 9 Robert Tombs, France, 1814-1914. (London: Longman, 1996), 147-50.

12 technological modernization and advancements in business administration. Most of the improvements were in the realms of engineering and metallurgy, as well as banking, education, and transportation. Many Frenchmen continued to suffer in poverty during this period, affecting every facet of French society, from religion to the family and subsequently produced a collapse in traditional social values.10 A campaign for greater decentralization and regionalism in France took place in the 1850s, when provincial groups promoted cultural awareness.11 Efforts in provincial France promoted a return to traditional identities. Business had slowly transformed the social bonds that had previously held French society together, including the family, church and village.12 Increased mobility during this period contributed to a breakdown in the role of the church and family. There was also anti-clerical reaction during the Revolution and a simultaneous erosion of traditional French , yet a rigid social hierarchy remained ingrained in the French psyche. The French government’s own policies towards religion had a deleterious effect on the church. Pierre Crabitès Jr. condemned French behavior towards his church, stating, “The French prosecute their church at home and fondle it abroad.”13 The French became more transient. Children were more likely to leave home at an earlier age than their parents. They usually migrated from rural to urban, industrial areas. Many went abroad. Migration and Ethnic Conflict It was in this environment that Pierre Crabitès Sr. immigrated to New Orleans as a young man in his twenties. During this period, numerous Frenchmen emigrated from France to North America. Most of those who left France for New Orleans came from the southwest of France, such as Pyrénées- Atlantiques. There existed a notable connection between New Orleans and southwest of France. New Orleans profited from a transformation in the pattern of French migration. Whereas most Frenchmen had previously relocated to Saint Domingo, this pattern changed after the in 1791. The

10 Ibid., 152. 11 Forrest, “Paris versus the Provinces: Regionalism and Decentralization since 1789,” 117. 12 Colin Heywood, “Society and People in the Nineteenth Century,” in French History since Napoleon, ed. Martin S. Alexander (London: Arnold, 1999), 81. 13 Pierre Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” Catholic World 126 (1928): 603.

13 successful slave rebellion discouraged French immigration to the Caribbean; instead, many migrants went to New Orleans.14 Prior to the arrival of Pierre Crabitès Sr. in New Orleans, many of his fellow countrymen had already journeyed across the Atlantic to establish a new life and find a home for their families in Louisiana. They brought their French culture with them. This mass migration began with the expulsion of the French- speaking Acadians from Nova Scotia at the hands of the British in 1755. Acadians had first sought refuge in France, but the King of France had never truly assisted them with their relocation. They returned to North America, via Saint Domingue, reaching Louisiana in 1764. They thrived in New Orleans and the Bayou. Over time, Acadians became known as Cajuns. The Acadians, or Cajuns, paved the way for future French immigrants to Louisiana, men like Pierre Crabitès Sr., who were literate and also had the means and wherewithal to move to the United States.15 Pierre Crabitès Jr. would later carefully analyze the export of French culture abroad to places such as Louisiana. Growing up in a francophone society, he recognized that France had reached her pinnacle under Napoleon and was thereafter in a state of decline: “I know that the population of France was declining. I associated such symptoms with stagnation, yet while France was stagnating, their culture, not politics, was pushing forward.”16 French Acadians and Jesuit missionaries spread their language and religion across Louisiana. When Pierre Crabitès Sr. reached New Orleans, he settled down in the French Quarter (Vieux Carré) along with many other French immigrants. By 1860, a full forty percent of New Orleans’ population was foreign born. Like many other French immigrants to Louisiana, the French Quarter had become a home away from home for Pierre Crabitès Sr. In the French Quarter, he could

14 Paul F. Lachance, “Foreign French,” in Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization. eds. Arnold R. Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 112-13. 15 Charles L. Dufour, “The People of New Orleans, “ in The Past as Prelude: New Orleans, 1718- 1968, eds. Hodding Carter and Wm. Ransom Hogan (New Orleans: Tulane University/ Pelican Publishing, 1968), 33-4. 16 Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” 600.

14 speak French, practice Catholicism, and mingle with those who shared his background and many of his views.17 Pierre Crabitès Sr. arrived to New Orleans in the midst of an Anglo-French conflict, a time when so many Americans, or “Kaintucks,” began drifting down the River to New Orleans. These “Kaintucks” migrated southward in hopes of profiting from Reconstruction. They came from the Northeast and eventually challenged French dominance of Louisiana. The Creoles slowly yielded to the Americans. The Americans were more aggressive in their pursuit of property and wealth than the Creoles. The Creoles were weighed down by several disadvantages. Louisiana Creoles lacked the level of education of the Americans. Their wealth was slowly dwindling away, and they led a more rusticated lifestyle. The only factor that kept the Creoles afloat was a constant influx of the français étrangers, the foreign French. The français étrangers defied Americanization and continued the French dominance of New Orleans for a few more decades.18 Pierre Crabitès Sr. and his son Pierre Jr. were part of this community of français étrangers. The father came from a family of means, yet he ended up like so many other immigrants to the United States when he first found employment as a grocery store clerk in New Orleans. The economic conditions in New Orleans were disappointing at this time. Pierre Crabitès Sr. accepted a more humble job than expected, but he eventually advanced in the grocery store. French immigrants both owned and operated this store. It specialized in the importation of goods from France, such as food, wine, liquor, and other commodities that the people of the French Quarter desired. It was a profitable business venture. As a group, the foreign French were not as wealthy as the Americans and Creoles; however, a few immigrants, such as Pierre Crabitès Sr., clawed their way into the elite of New Orleans’ society. The foreign-born French were more business savvy than their American counterparts. They also played a greater

17 Martin Siegel, ed., New Orleans, a Chronological and Documentary History, 1539-1970. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1975), 22. 18 Lachance, “Foreign French,” 102.

15 role in commercial and professional trades. Approximately thirty percent of the French born abroad were accountants, bankers, clerks, doctors, lawyers, merchants and schoolteachers, whereas Creoles held only fifteen percent of those positions. About half of the foreign-born French, but only twenty percent of Creoles, participated in the service sector, including such jobs as bakers, carpenters, traders, and shopkeepers. The foreign French enjoyed a couple of advantages over the Creoles. They generally had a higher level of education and came to New Orleans with some wealth, providing them with more business opportunities. Crabitès Sr.’s good fortune afforded him greater marriage opportunities. The most gifted of the French-speaking immigrants attained greater upward mobility, partly due to their education and money. The majority of the foreign-born French failed to achieve such social advancement.19 A declining French-speaking population of New Orleans and a corresponding increase in the Americans strained the relations between these two communities vying for political power in the Crescent City. Even without the Anglo-French conflict, life was replete with hardship in the days before the Civil War. Small pox, cholera, and plagued the city during the 1850s, making living conditions arduous. Vaccinations for small pox existed but only for the wealthy few like the Crabitès family. At the time, there was no remedy for cholera and it rapidly dispersed throughout the city, killing between 450 and 1,448 a year from 1850-1855, but it was yellow fever that most Americans identified with disease in New Orleans. Yellow Fever instilled fear in the citizenry of New Orleans, for over twenty thousand succumbed to the sickness during the 1850s. It hit poor communities hardest. Large populations fled the city during yellow fever outbreaks, forcing local governments to erect shotgun quarantines. Poor sanitation and drainage in nineteenth-century New Orleans amplified the effects of these illnesses. The tradition among city residents of discarding their

19 Ibid., 123-30.

16 refuse, garbage and personal waste from bedchambers into the Mississippi River contributed to the problem.20 The epidemic divided the medical community, as French and Creole physicians followed a policy of moderation, allowing nature to cure the disease. Meanwhile, American doctors adopted much more aggressive measures, including prescribing mercury and bloodletting. The American solution exacerbated the condition of those already suffering from yellow fever. It was only the improved sanitation measures undertaken by Northerners during Reconstruction that assuaged the cholera and yellow fever epidemics in New Orleans.21 On 30 April 1862, New Orleans surrendered to Union Admiral David Glasgow Farragut. Union forces under the command of General Benjamin F. Butler took control of New Orleans soon thereafter. For Louisiana and the citizens of New Orleans, the Union occupation was harsh. Twenty percent of Louisiana’s white men who took up arms in the Civil War either died in battle or of disease. The loss of a way of life predicated on slavery severely damaged the state’s economy, and once under Union domination, Louisiana entered an economic depression. Pierre Crabitès Sr. withstood this egregious period in Louisiana’s history and eventually became a full partner in the grocery store by the 1870s. Crabitès Sr. and the corporation both survived America’s first major depression, which began in 1873. He devoted most of his energy to the store, but he also operated privately as a creditor, both lending and holding money for safe keeping. Lending money and the subsequent prosperity of the store afforded the family a comfortable lifestyle. He saved enough money to leave a sizeable inheritance to his wife and son when he died during the Gilded Age.22 The Gilded Age was a sarcastic term for the materialism of the period. During this era, New Orleans was inhospitable to its citizens. Racial tension was

20 John Duffy, “Pestilence in New Orleans,” in The Past as Prelude: New Orleans, 1718-1968. eds. Hodding Carter and Wm. Ransom Hogan (New Orleans: Tulane University/ Pelican Publishing, 1968), 92-102. 21 Ibid., 102-3. 22 General index of all successions opened in the civil district court of the Parrish of New Orleans, Louisiana, from its organization August 1st, 1880 to August 31, 1894. New Orleans: W.L. Mc Bee & L. Graham and sons Ltd., 1895, Case no. 12, 347, Jan 29, 1886, New Orleans Central Library.

17 commonplace. Another yellow fever epidemic spread through the city in 1878, killing thousands. Other diseases such as typhoid, small pox, malaria, and diphtheria also plagued New Orleans. Poor sanitation and problems collecting the city’s refuse contributed to the problem of disease in the city. Emerging from the darkness of Reconstruction, debts left by former Carpetbag administrations and the sluggish pace of business hindered any attempts at recovery.23 Carpetbaggers was the pejorative term aimed at Northerners who descended on the South after the Civil War to take advantage of the power vacuum left after the war and business prospects arising from Reconstruction. During Reconstruction, the federal government filled the new Southern governments with Northern Republicans. These Northerners alienated conservative Southerners by introducing black suffrage and civil rights into state constitutions. Pierre Crabitès Jr. felt strongly about black franchise. Later in life he would argue that the United States should have withheld the right to vote from blacks because they would likely vote Republican or even communist. Northerners moved southward in search of better economic circumstances. While other major American cities could display new streets, sewage systems, and waterworks for the debts they incurred, New Orleans’ insolvency, held over from the days of the Carpetbag regimes, had produced no tangible results. Corruption had robbed the city of any improvement opportunities. Influence peddling was routine, for private corporations garnered the attention of government officials. The citizens of New Orleans responded to the malfeasance of these Northern radical Republicans by electing a new reformist administration following Reconstruction.24 Pierre Crabitès Jr.’s Early Life in New Orleans Reformists were victorious in the mayoral election of 1880 when New Orleans elected Joseph Shakspeare as mayor of the city. Progressives soon filled the political offices of the Crescent City. Shakspeare declared that his ambition was to reduce government debt, and soon the city’s economy started

23 Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics and Urban Progress, 1880-1896. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 2. 24 Ibid., 3.

18 showing signs of improvement. Unfortunately, spending too much money to settle old city liabilities run up in the 1870’s hampered the city’s ability to compete with other major American cities. In many ways, Pierre Crabitès Jr. was a progressive. He once claimed, Because I desire more sparkle, more brilliancy, more light, I do not think it necessary to go back to oil lamps simply because the world has outgrown illuminating gas. Progress has decreed that the horse is too slow but this did not recall the pack mule from its slumber. Navigation has ordained the death knell of the coal burning engine, but this didn’t revive the old sailing ship. On the contrary, science doesn’t go to the discard when a new deal is demanded. The rubbish pile is destined for incineration not for inspiration. Old age has its charms but it lacks spring, elasticity and resiliency, and this is the day of the pneumatic tire.25 Reconstruction and the subsequent transformation of Louisiana politics had an enormous impact upon Pierre Crabitès Jr. He reacted conservatively to a period of radical Republican control of Louisiana and the transformation of society around him, aligning with the Bourbon Democrats and the Catholic Church. He wanted to return to the status quo of the days before all the “Kaintucks” and Republicans came down south and disrupted entrenched Creole culture. He would never overcome the horrors of Reconstruction, which he blamed on the Anglo-Saxon Protestants. He would carry this grudge for the rest of his life. He would later transfer his dislike of “Kaintucks” to the British in Egypt. He matured to be a loyal follower of the Democratic Party in Louisiana, much like other Creoles, for he associated Republicans with Carpetbaggers. Unlike most of his French-speaking community in New Orleans, Pierre Crabitès Sr. took an American wife. He married a Virginian, Martha Patton. Both American and Creole families gained from wedding their daughters to wealthy foreigners like Crabitès Sr. Pierre Crabitès Jr. was born to an Anglo-American Protestant in Martha Patton, but he grew up in the French Quarter and identified

25 Pierre Crabitès, “Women and Her Purse,” Catholic World 131 (1930): 322.

19 with his father’s French-speaking Catholic community rather than his mother’s Anglo-Saxon society.26 Pierre Crabitès Jr. was born to Pierre Crabitès Sr. and Martha Patton in the French Quarter of New Orleans on 17 February 1877. He was their only child. His mother was an English-speaking Protestant, and his father spoke French as a first language and practiced Catholicism. The early years of Pierre Jr.’s life were a tumultuous time for New Orleans. The next year, 1878, yellow fever engulfed New Orleans, claiming 4,046 lives in a city of only 154,132 people. Just a couple of months after he was born, federal troops withdrew from the city, thereby ending the in New Orleans. Two years later, the Republicans defeated the Democrats and occupied the mayoral office. Republicans in Congress had shocked the Creole community with the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.27 The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted 28 July 1868, stated that all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of that country and the state where they reside. The amendment stipulated that no state could make laws withholding from its citizens their privileges or immunities; nor could any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law, and all persons would have equal protection under the law. The Fifteenth Amendment, enacted 3 February 1870, guaranteed the right of American citizens to vote regardless of race, color, or a previous condition of servitude.28 Blacks had a proclivity to vote Republican, so is easy to understand why the Creoles objected to such legislation.29 Creoles responded by forming the White League, which aimed to reestablish white supremacy in Louisiana through terror, as espoused in the Le Carillon, “We must be either White or Black . . . The Carillon flies the flag of the whites, with the profound conviction that only within its folds can Louisiana be

26 Lachance, “Foreign French,” 116, 127. 27 Siegel ed,, New Orleans, A Chronological and Documentary History, 1539-1970, 27. 28 Ibid. 29 Constitution of the United States of America

20 saved.”30 The Civil War had humiliated the Creoles, who sided with the Confederacy during the internecine conflict, ending their hopes of a Gallic resurgence. They concentrated their efforts on maintaining the purity of their race, willing to subordinate Gallicism to Caucasian unity.31 This was also a time when Carnival clubs began popping up on Canal Street; meanwhile, families struggled to pull themselves out of the four-year depression that began in 1873. While many families suffered during the economic decline, Pierre Crabitès Jr. lived a life without want. Growing up in one of the wealthiest families in New Orleans, Crabitès Jr. remarked, “I was born with a silver spoon in my mouth.”32 Unfortunately for young Crabitès Jr., by the time he was sixteen in 1893, both of his parents had died, and he was left to be raised by his grandmother in the French Quarter. The French Quarter, where Crabitès Jr. was born and reared, was home to many of the French immigrants to New Orleans during the nineteenth century. It had been a French city. Progress here lagged behind many major American cities. New Orleans retained much of the culture that made the city unique throughout the eighteenth century. Two distinct cultures existed in New Orleans, and Canal Street bisected the two. Canal Street, a street that had run along a canal at one time, was so broad that it divided these two warring factions. The Americans resided north of Canal Street, while the French Creoles lived south of Canal Street.33 Since it separated the two societies, Canal Street was the center of all business and social activity.34 Pierre Crabitès Jr. witnessed the sunset of the French Creole as a young man in New Orleans. As an ethnic group, they were declining in population, at least in proportion to the total population of New Orleans. Heavy Northern

30 Joseph Tregle, “Creoles and Americans,” in Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization. eds. Arnold R. Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 172. 31 Ibid., 175. 32 Pierre Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” unpublished ms., (c. 1938), p. 33: Mss. 77-23, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 33 The term “American” can be associated with the “Kaintucks,” those white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants who migrated south to New Orleans after the Civil War. Whereas, the Creoles can be associated with the “French.” 34 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 8.

21 immigration preceded a gradual Americanization of the Crescent City. The new immigrants to New Orleans were no longer predominantly French-speaking, but Irish, German, and American. The Creole birthrate could not keep pace with the influx of these immigrants. These groups pursued the American dream and had little interest in preserving the city’s French heritage.35 Over time, the Creoles lost command of the political importance they had held prior to the Civil War. Crabitès observed the French-Creole culture slowly become overwhelmed by the American-English culture. Remarking on the metamorphosis, Crabitès said, If I was a man before I knew that ‘damnyankee’ was not one word, I was a big boy before I found out that Irlandaise was not the French for female servant. It was a surprise to me when I discovered that the socially prominent McCarty’s were really the McCarthy’s and that they were Irish. And little by little the attitude of my generation whipped out that of my grandmothers’.36 It was these new immigrants to New Orleans who adopted their new country and assimilated into American culture, rather than French. When the Americans moved to Louisiana, they sought to recreate their own Anglo-Saxon culture in New Orleans. They were unwilling to assimilate into Creole culture and expected the Creoles to adapt to their society. The Creoles responded by promoting Gallic nationalism, which encouraged further clarification of the meaning of Creole. During this period, there was a controversy among the Creoles of Louisiana concerning the definition of Creole. The debate focused on the question of whether a Creole was a white of native French descent or a white of mixed ancestry.37 Crabitès was a Creole according to the concept that one was Creole if they were white of native French descent, for his father was French and his mother was Anglo-Saxon. He took an inherently conservative stance on this topic, believing that the dogmas and disciplines of the Roman Catholic Church

35 Tregle, “Creoles and Americans,” 166. 36 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 45. 37 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 9.

22 disapproved of miscegenation.38 He failed to recognize a French, Anglo-Saxon union as a form of miscegenation. Homer A. Plessy, of Plessy versus Ferguson fame, was a Creole of heterogeneous descent and considered Afro-American. Varied parentage implied that a Creole like Plessy was “colored.” Responding to a preponderance of Americanization during the period, the Creoles of New Orleans created a myth of the Creole, which romanticized the earliest Creoles in Louisiana, imagining them to be aristocrats, liberated from the character flaws that plagued humanity. While these Creoles considered themselves a culture distinct from the Anglo- American civilization, they shared with Southerners the idea of the lost cause of the Civil War as well as the tradition of the Old South.39 The white Creoles believed that they had an inherent primacy over these new “Kaintucks” coming down river to establish themselves on the . This putative predominance rested on their claim of earliest settlement of Louisiana, or nativity, and the aristocratic myth that they were all descendents of French royalty, Bourbons who had journeyed to Louisiana to claim their fortunes. These Creoles referred to themselves as the ancienne population. While the Creoles were reluctant to abandon their cultural identity, they still considered themselves patriotic Americans. Crabitès took his Americanism seriously, describing himself as an intensely loyal American. He was able to disassociate his heritage from his nationality.40 The Americans regarded the fairly illiterate French as indolent and simple, living a rusticated life completely void of culture. The Americans implied that the challenge for the Creoles was their Latin heritage more than any other factor. This Anglo-Saxon superiority complex annoyed Crabitès. He witnessed it not only while growing up in New Orleans, but later during the Dreyfus Affair, and finally while serving on the Mixed Courts of Egypt. The fusion of these two cultural would be difficult. Eventually, the sheer preponderance of Americans shifted political power from the Creoles to

38 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 12. 39 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 10. 40 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 84.

23 the Americans. The Americans were better suited to govern Louisiana. They were better prepared than the Creoles for a fight for dominance of the Crescent City. The Americans were better educated, had more practice with commercial and political competition, and naturally benefited from the wherewithal common amongst immigrants leaving home to start a new life. This hostility between the Americans and the French was rooted not just in economics, but politics and culture as well. Perhaps most troubling to the Creoles was the economy of the French Quarter. Commerce here lagged behind the American part of town, and the quarter was in a state of disrepair and decay. At the same time, the Americans gentrified the areas of the city where they settled.41 Reflecting the religious beliefs of the original inhabitants of the Crescent City, Catholicism remained the dominant religion of New Orleans; for many of the immigrants to New Orleans were not only Catholics from France but from Ireland and southern Germany as well. The Catholics, as well as the Protestants, of New Orleans had a traditional religious sensibility.42 French Catholicism dominated the brand of Catholicism practiced in New Orleans. No Catholic seminary existed to train American clergy until 1858, and an American did not become archbishop of New Orleans until the 20th century.43 Crabitès’s parents reared him in a strict Catholic household, where he attended Catholic parochial schools in New Orleans. The young Crabitès took strongly to the Catholicism of New Orleans. A devout and uncompromising Catholic, his church’s beliefs affected his beliefs about the world around him. Speaking of his church, Crabitès Jr. said he was “blindly partisan in respect of the prestige of my Church.”44 He obediently followed the Catholic Church’s dogma, never questioning it. His Catholicism greatly influenced his writing. He often conformed to the Vatican’s line on many domestic and international matters, including miscegenation, imperialism, and the conflict over Palestine. Crabitès also defended the Catholic Church against its detractors.

41 Tregle, “Creoles and Americans,” 146. 42 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 15. 43 Lachance, “The Foreign French,” 115. 44 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 55.

24 In 1884, when young Pierre was just six, his father died at the age of fifty- four, leaving him in the care of his mother, Martha, who was forty-one years old.45 After his father’s death, women surrounded Crabitès as he grew up. They exerted a great influence upon him. His future works reflected the clout they had in his life since many of his unpublished articles concerned women. Following Pierre Crabitès Sr.’s death, the Civil District Court of the Parish of New Orleans appointed his mother, Martha Patton Crabitès, as Pierre Jr.’s tutor and charged her with his inheritance, which was over 57,000 dollars, a considerable sum in 1884.46 Most of Pierre Jr.’s inheritance was tied up in real estate, including properties on such illustrious New Orleans streets as Camp, Rampart, and Canal. Only a small proportion of his legacy was in movables, such as cash. Martha Patton Crabitès inculcated her conservative value system to the young Crabitès, shaping his views of women, race, and religion. When his mother went to court in order to safeguard his bequest, Judge Henry L. Lazarus protected Pierre Jr.’s inheritance. Judge Lazarus appointed his mother as his tutor. Although the judge probably had little other choice in the matter, this deed left an impression on Pierre. He regarded Judge Henry L. Lazarus as chivalrous. Early in life, his mother helped to cultivate his feelings towards Jews. He fondly remembered the Jewish judge, Henry L. Lazarus, since he helped young Pierre and was very caring to his mother throughout a difficult time in their life, just after the death of his father. Later in life, Pierre reflected on the years he spent with his mother, “Never in my home did I hear one word of disparagement of the Jewish race.”47 His feelings towards the Jews, cemented early in his youth, assisted Pierre later in life when he composed the manuscripts “Palestine and Her Problem” and “Israel out of Egypt,” for he approached the issues covered in these works with a non-traditional thesis.

45 The 1880 U.S. Census stated that Pierre Crabitès Sr. was 42, which made him 46 when he died. However, the letter to Pierre Crabitès Jr. from his cousin in Sus, France, which used the Sus municipal records, shows Pierre Crabitès Sr.’s birth date as 1830, so he would have been 54 at his death in 1884. 46 General index of all successions opened in the civil district court of the Parrish of New Orleans, Louisanna, from its organization August 1st, 1880 to August 31, 1894, New Orleans, LA: W.L. Mc Bee & printed by L. Graham and sons Ltd., NO, LA, 1895, case no. 12, 347, Jan 29, 1886. 47 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 35.

25 He later developed an analysis of anti-Semitism in the United States. He insisted that America was drifting in the direction that Germany had taken and this progression was fueled by stereotypes. Crabitès believed that these conventions hampered the ability of Jews to assimilate into American society. The American perception of newly-arriving Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, based upon generalizations, had been applied to Western European Jews who had been in the United States for years, thus inhibiting their ability to assimilate. For example, Crabitès said, I reasoned that as a linguistic bond linked together all branches of Ashkenazic Jewry, creating thereby an affinity between the Russian and Romanian Ashkenazic Jewish immigrant from the East, and the French and German from the West, every time one of the descendents of the latter began to climb the social scale, the Russian or Romanian newcomer hampered his assent.48 Crabitès believed that it was not anti-Semitism that plagued America, but anti- Ashkenazim. He discounted the lack of solidarity between German Jews and Eastern European Jewry. Although some of the earliest Jews to settle in America were Sephardic, German Jews had moved to America generations before their Eastern European brethren. Having already assimilated into American society, the German Jews felt that the Eastern European Jews were bringing them down with the stereotypes and generalizations applied to them, just after the German Jews had escaped the immigrant ghettos themselves. His attitude towards Jews solidified at such an early age, as did his impression of Afro-Americans. He viewed Afro-Americans with the same paternalistic attitude ingrained in most Southern whites during the Progressive Era. Many Southern whites were unwilling to afford Afro-Americans with their basic civil rights. Instead, Southern whites preferred to take care of Afro- Americans, rather than provide them with a political voice and allow them to make their own decisions. The Progressive Era was anything but progressive for American blacks. Segregation was commonplace in New Orleans during this

48 Ibid., 43.

26 period. Crabitès lived and breathed in this world. He never attended church with blacks, nor did he study with them. Crabitès was only fifteen years old when the Plessy versus Ferguson court case went to trial in Louisiana. That year, 1892, a group of Afro-Americans in New Orleans planned to challenge the legality of segregation. They formed a group called the Citizens’ Committee to overturn an ordinance requiring train cars to remain segregated. They wanted the Supreme Court to rule that segregation was unconstitutional. The Citizens’ Committee invited Homer A. Plessy to test the law to ascertain the arbitrariness of segregation. Albion Tourgee, a white advocate for Afro- Americans, volunteered to defend Plessy pro-bono. Plessy was a Creole of mixed-ancestry. He was born free, spoke French, and was not recognizably black. He was only one-eighth Afro-American, but that was immaterial because all one required was just one ounce of black blood to be considered Afro- American. In June of 1892, the Citizens’ Committee alerted the East Louisiana Railroad that Plessy would purchase a first-class ticket and take a seat in the railcar designated for white passengers. The police promptly arrested Plessy after boarding the white-only car. Judge John H. Ferguson presided over the U.S. District Court in Louisiana and handed down the ruling on the case. In an earlier decision, he concluded that the law was unconstitutional, reasoning that the federal government had the authority to regulate interstate commerce. However, in this particular case, Ferguson upheld the law and ruled against Plessy because he was on an intrastate train, thus he came under the purview of state law, not federal law. This judgment was a conservative one. Eventually, the case advanced to the Supreme Court, where Tourgee contended that segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment which called for all American citizens to have equal rights and protection under the law. In the majority decision, Justice Henry H. Brown ruled against Plessy, in favor of the concept of separate but equal.49

49 Brook Thomas ed., Plessy v. Ferguson: A Brief History with Documents. (: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1997), 5.

27 Crabitès was a self-proclaimed Bourbon Democrat, yet he did not want to appear bigoted, so he moderated his beliefs towards Afro-Americans by stating that he was fond of blacks but despised their allies, referring to the Republican Party. Democrats like Crabitès feared that Afro-Americans would lend their support to the Republicans, thereby handing them electoral victories in future elections.50 Growing up, he saw the Republican Party as an amalgamation of the “fire- eating damnyankees of the north” with blacks, Scalawags, and Carpetbaggers of the South. The and the Fourteenth Amendment had been calculated to make Afro-Americans full American citizens and prohibit their repression, but they had another unintended result: angering . Republicans branded the Democratic Party as treasonous, pro- secession, and opposed to Reconstruction. Democrats believed Reconstruction to be a Northern conspiracy to relegate Southerners, whites in particular, to the same status as Carpetbaggers and Afro-Americans. In reality, the Fourteenth Amendment did very little for Afro-Americans. Instead, big business and the Supreme Court manipulated the idea of Substantive Due Process to build a case for the right to pursue property, not for the equal treatment of blacks. Under Substantive Due Process, states could not enact laws that deprived one of property or the right to earn a profit. 51 Crabitès could not disassociate himself from his upbringing, nor could he forget the horrors of Reconstruction. He was a product of his time, and his politics and intellectual works reflected his values. At a young age, he asked his mother if slavery was immoral. He needed to know the truth, and he wanted to know if she would confide in him the truth. When he asked his mother if slavery was reprehensible, she replied, I believe that many negroes were better off as slaves than they are now. Their masters took all worries off their shoulders, and, as a rule, were good to them. But slavery debased the owners, the white race. It is a

50 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 34. 51 Thomas ed., Plessy v. Ferguson, 9-10.

28 debasing thing for one man to own another. Lincoln emancipated the whites of the south when he freed the Negroes.52 As a Southern mother, it was her duty to “civilize” her son. Martha Patton Crabitès, a woman who grew up in the South before the Civil War probably thought that blacks had their own specific place and role in society; yet she also believed that they were not worthy of associating or commingling with whites, and she inculcated her value system to the young Crabitès. While Crabitès’s mother was consistent in her conservatism towards blacks, she was liberal in her attitudes about Jews. This inconsistency towards minorities rubbed off on Crabitès, as he, too, took a traditional stance on blacks but a progressive attitude towards Jews and Muslims. In the same year as his grandmother’s death, there was a very important gubernatorial election in Louisiana in 1896 in which the Populist Party enlisted Afro-Americans and white Republicans to defeat the ultraconservative Democrats. The Populist Party, otherwise known as the People’s Party, was mostly popular with Western farmers because of its resistance to the . The Populist Party also managed to acquire a following in Louisiana for a short period. The unified Populist-Republican ticket actually received the majority of votes cast, but Democrat parishes tampered with the votes to win the election. This election aroused the most racially-based animosity and violence in Louisiana since the years of Reconstruction. Next door in Mississippi, Democrats had already disenfranchised black voters and many believed that Louisiana was going to be next to pass laws restricting their franchise. Afro- Americans had to own property and pass literacy tests in order to gain suffrage. This stipulation drastically decreased the number of Afro-Americans eligible to vote in future elections, an action which won wide support among Democrats, for it gave them a decided edge in future elections. Crabitès supported denying blacks the franchise.53

52 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 48. 53 William Ivy Hair, Carnival of Fury: Robert Charles and the New Orleans Race Riot of 1900. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Press, 1976), 104.

29 Crabitès supported the Social Darwinist attitude, first espoused by Andrew Carnegie in the form of his Gospel of Wealth and later by the Democratic Party, that whites had a moral responsibility to help improve the lot of the less fortunate, as well as Afro-Americans. This concept proposed that wealthy men spend their money to benefit society, in essence, through benevolence. This brand of comforted the rich and powerful during a period of change, such as the Progressive Era. Social Darwinism is a form of social theory that associates Darwin’s theory of evolution and inter-societal relationships. Broadly-speaking, Social Darwinism explained that societies evolve according to natural laws; however, critics of the philosophy argued that its underlying goal was to legitimize the disparate and inequitable divisions between societies. This conservative political philosophy was used to maintain the status quo for wealthy and powerful whites. Crabitès wanted political leaders to ensure for Afro- Americans that “every possible doubt should be construed in [their] favor so that they may have implicit confidence not only in his fairness but in his determination to protect them in the enjoyment of their rights, if it need be with his life.”54 Crabitès thought that it was his responsibility to help Afro-Americans, but he sought to control the manner in which they were assisted, guaranteeing that all power and control stayed out of their hands. In 1892, the citizens of New Orleans elected John Fitzpatrick mayor of the city. There were allegations of corruption within the city government during his tenure in office but the many attempts to impeach Fitzpatrick failed.55 During this time of political turmoil, tragedy stuck Crabitès again. Only nine years after the death of his father, his mother died from congestion of the lungs on 22 June 1893.56 She was fifty-years old. His mother molded his worldview. She taught him much, including how to be introspective. Supporting the two of them had

54 Pierre Crabitès, “The American Negro and Communism,” unpublished ms. (c. 1930’s), p. 1-2: Mss. 73-6, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 55 Siegel ed., New Orleans: A Chronological and Documentary History, 1539-1970, 32. 56 General index of all successions opened in the civil district court of the Parrish of New Orleans, Louisanna, from its organization August 1st, 1880 to August 31, 1894, New Orleans, LA: W.L. Mc Bee & printed by L. Graham and sons Ltd., NO, LA, 1895, case no. 39,491.

30 reduced his inheritance to almost fifty thousand dollars when his mother died, but still leaving him wealthy. At the time of his mother’s death, the young Crabitès only had one male relative in New Orleans, his fourth cousin, Pierre A. Capdau, a native of New Orleans and a druggist by profession. Since his ties to Capdeau were tenuous, Crabitès decided to live with his maternal grandmother. Court records demonstrate that Crabitès’ maternal grandmother wanted to take over as his tutor since his father had no immediate family in New Orleans to care for him.57 Crabitès’s maternal grandmother, Fredericka Patton, and aunt, Ida Patton, continued rearing him and profoundly influenced him while he lived with them. Like his mother, they helped shape his view of women. For a man of his day, Crabitès had a progressive attitude towards women. He was sympathetic to improving women’s property rights: “I recall with what sympathetic interest I then watched the movement which tended to extend and to buttress the property rights of the Louisiana married woman.”58 He endeavored to push women’s rights forward and was supportive of strong women with a cause: “I am in favor of more Jane Addamses, more Lady Astors, and more Mrs. Catts.”59 Politics His grandmother and aunt persuaded him to support the Democrats, telling him “of the days when the Know-Nothing Party terrorized New Orleans.”60 By understanding the history of the Party, Crabitès’s sympathy for the Democrat Party is more readily comprehensible. The Know Nothing Party grew out of the conflict between the Creoles and the Americans in New Orleans. By and large, the Americans of New Orleans backed Whig Party candidates, and the Creoles endorsed the Democrats. The Whig Party began as a collection of Republicans to resist ’s politics, but these Northerners also garnered the backing of Southern states’ supporters. The newly-arriving French to New Orleans, much like Pierre Crabitès Sr., identified with the Creoles based

57 Ibid. 58 Crabitès, “Woman and her Purse,” 319. 59 Ibid., 322. 60 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 244.

31 upon their language and cultural affinity. Irish immigrants fleeing the Irish Potato Famine of 1846 and Germans escaping the revolutions of 1848 tended to settle downtown in a municipality adjacent to the Creoles, while the Americans lived uptown, north of Canal Street. Creoles allied with the immigrants to maintain their hold on power. While many newcomers to the United States felt compelled to assimilate into American culture, those Europeans moving to New Orleans had no such compunction, for they were not a minority in a Northern city. The Creoles composed a sizable portion of the overall population of New Orleans, and like the Crabitès family, they owned much real estate in the city. Americans were a minority in New Orleans, living in a culture alien to their own. Remarking on the two distinct cultures in the 1850s, a Northern governess once said, There are two distinct cities that make up New Orleans- the American and the French. The former is so much like a Northern city that I did not remain in it much, although the most superb portion; but I took kindly to the latter for its very novelty. In the French part, a few of the population speak English. Their language, manners, customs, are preserved; and a Parisian would think himself in a city of France, if he did not cross Canal Street, which is the Rubicon that separates the American quarter from it. In walking through the French municipality, or district, I could hardly realize that I was in my native land.61 These stark differences remained between the Creoles and Americans through the 1890s.62 The Creoles and Americans harbored deep-rooted resentments towards each other. Each group expressed their aversion of the other in terms of damaging cultural stereotypes. The Americans accused the Creoles of being clannish, indolent, and opposed to progress. Although Crabitès was neither clannish nor lazy, he did seek to return to a “better” time in American history, preferably before Reconstruction. The Creoles believed that the Americans were

61 Leon Cyprian Soule, The Know Nothing Party in New Orleans: A Reappraisal. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Historical Association, 1961), 10. 62 Ibid., 6-10.

32 overly concerned with commercial prosperity to the detriment of French and Creole culture. Although the two cultural backgrounds residing side by side produced much animosity, the root of their hostility stemmed from competition for political power. Even though the Creoles staunchly opposed the Americans, the sheer number of Americans continued to rise in New Orleans, and their wealth increased as American power slowly superseded that of the Creoles. This period witnessed the decline of the Whig Party and the ascendancy of the Know Nothing Party in New Orleans. The Know Nothing Party filled the political void following the collapse of the Whig Party in 1852. In 1852, the Whigs split up along pro- and anti-slavery factions. The Know Nothing Party was a predominantly American political party that terrorized foreigners. When Crabitès Sr. had just immigrated to New Orleans, the Vigilantes, supporters of the Know Nothing Party, rioted and even forced Mayor Waterman to resign on charges of corruption in 1858.63 The chief tenets of the Know Nothing Party were anti-foreignism and anti-Catholicism.64 Both of these Know Nothing manifestos angered Crabitès and the Creole community. Creoles and immigrants alike responded to the Americans and their acts of aggression by voting Democrat. By combining under the Democratic umbrella, they believed that they could best oppose the Americans. Party alignment soon broke down according to district, with the Creoles of the second and the immigrants of the third voting Democrat and the Americans of the first and fourth casting Know Nothing ballots.65 During this period, many Southern Whigs crossed over to the Democratic Party; however, this did not happen in New Orleans. Americans joined together against the Creoles under the Know Nothing Party. Concerned with rising numbers of German and Irish immigrants, Know Nothing Party sympathizers intimidated voters at the polls, leading to much disenfranchisement. The actions taken by the Know Nothing Party towards Creoles and immigrants and Crabitès’s

63 Siegel ed., New Orleans, 22 64 Soule, The Know Nothing Party in New Orleans, 3. 65 Ibid., 35-8.

33 own family greatly influenced his Democrat proclivities, as he became a loyal supporter of the Democrat Party. 66 While Crabitès concentrated on foreign affairs in his future profession and intellectual life, the environment in which he grew up greatly influenced his outlook on life and helped form his political views. From a young age, Crabitès was a staunch advocate of the Democratic Party. He matured in the period following Radical Republican Reconstruction, hearing of Republican Carpetbaggers stealing elections for the governor’s office, dividing Louisiana with two governors, capitals, and state legislatures. After Union troops left Louisiana on 24 April 1877, Louisianan politics became decidedly one sided. Democrats controlled all branches of government under Governor Francis Tillou Nicholls. In the election of 1896, the Republican candidate for governor, John Newton Pharr, received almost half of the votes cast in the election. This result alarmed Democrats that they instituted a grandfather clause into the state constitution, which stipulated that only those whose grandfather had been a property owner could vote. This action withheld suffrage from most blacks in Louisiana. By discarding black applications for registration, the Democrats had guaranteed a lily-white election. This policy effectively destroyed the Republican Party in Louisiana.67 Crabitès was a traditional conservative Bourbon Democrat. Of the Democrat Governor of Louisiana, Francis T. Nicholls, he said, I hope to go to my grave without seeing a Republican listed among his successors. I would rather hold my nose, if necessary, and vote for a Democratic Governor of Louisiana than see the best of Republicans installed in Baton Rouge. In the domain of statesmanship, institutions can be more dangerous than individuals.68 Crabitès was clearly sectarian, partisan, and prejudiced. Later in life, Crabitès reflected upon his youth in the French Quarter,

66 Ibid., 35-8. 67 Hermann B. Deutsch, “New Orleans Politics: The Greatest Free Show on Earth,” in The Past as Prelude: New Orleans, 1718-1968. Hodding Carter and Wm. Ransom Hogan eds. (New Orleans: Tulane University/ Pelican Publishing, 1968), 310-13. 68 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 33.

34 I am the victim of the generalizations which dominated my youth and which have become lodged in my sub-conscious mind. They are stronger than I am. I could eradicate them were I to try hard enough, but I fear to do so lest in tearing them up by the roots, I should change my entire personality.69 Most likely, his anti-Anglo Saxon sentiments developed during his early years living in the French Quarter, only to be compounded later by the Dreyfus Affair and the British occupation of Egypt. These early responses to Anglo-Saxon encroachment shaped Crabitès as a man, and, later on, it affected his judicial, diplomatic, and intellectual life while living in Egypt. It is interesting, though, that Crabitès distinguished between Anglo-Saxonism and Americanism. He remained a very patriotic American, even though he was a member of a minority. Education His grandmother and aunt, along with two of his cousins, Martha Smythe Norris and Undine Crabitès Norris, relocated to 316 Camp Street to live with him. This house was just outside of the French Quarter and in view of the Mississippi River. His father had left him three stores on Camp Street, but it was not sufficient to cover all of their expenses. The family had to spend some of Pierre’s inheritance money to care for the household. The money his parents bequeathed to him no longer provided for just him and his mother, it also supported his grandmother, aunt, and two cousins. This increased outlay rapidly diminished his remaining funds. Family finances concerned his grandmother, and she approved the sale of two tracts of land in the Parrish of East Baton Rouge on 12 October 1894. 70 His maternal grandmother Fredericka died in January of 1896. The court appointed a long-time family friend R.A. Tichenor to be his tutor for the interval until he came of age. At the age of nineteen, Crabitès argued that he was fully

69 Ibid., 34. 70 General index of all successions opened in the civil district court of the Parrish of New Orleans, Louisanna, from its organization August 1st, 1880 to August 31, 1894, New Orleans, LA: W.L. Mc Bee & printed by L. Graham and sons Ltd., NO, LA, 1895, case no. 39,491.

35 capable of attaining his majority and taking charge of his estate, now estimated to be worth approximately thirty-five thousand dollars.71 After his mother died, Frederika had made sure that the young Crabitès received a proper education in a city whose school system was so diverse that it included public, private, and parochial institutions. For Pierre, attending a public school was out of the question, and his family’s strong Catholic background ensured that he would go to a Catholic school. The most important consideration for Frederika involved the widespread belief in New Orleans that instruction from a public school education was substandard, that only parochial or private school academics were consistently excellent. Education in New Orleans had remarkable disparities. When radical Republicans attempted to desegregate schools in the 1870s, parents demonstrated their contempt for the decision by enrolling their children in private and Catholic schools, which turned out to be a decisive blow to public schools. The Louisiana state school system experienced another setback when Governor Nicholls, the first Democrat Governor of Louisiana following Reconstruction, enshrined the concept of separate but equal into the state school system, stating, The education of all classes of the people being essential to the preservation of free institutions, we do declare our solemn purpose to maintain public schools by an equal and uniform taxation upon property, as provided in the Constitution of the State; which shall secure the education of white and colored citizens with equal advantages.72 In 1896, Plessy vs Ferguson further protected the idea of separate but equal. Black children’s education suffered greatly during this period. The number of black children attending school halved during this period. The Democrats reduced the previous Republican budget for education.73 Only the children of means enrolled in the best private and parochial schools, those like Pierre Crabitès Jr. His parochial education had a significant bearing on his life. He said

71 Ibid., Case no. 48, 632. 72 John P. Dyer, “Education in New Orleans,” in The Past as Prelude: New Orleans, 1718-1968. eds. Hodding Carter and Wm. Ransom Hogan (New Orleans: Tulane University/ Pelican Publishing, 1968), 131-32. 73 Ibid., 133.

36 that he was brought up in a strict Catholic environment where he became a believer in the dogmas and discipline of the Catholic Church.74 Crabitès considered the French Catholic education outside of France, asserting, “The French try to propagandize their own culture.”75 In school, every subject was taught in French. He believed that the purpose of French education was to ensure that all students graduate observing the world through French lens. He attributed the success of the French Catholic parochial education abroad to his Jesuit teachers, doubting that the French could have achieved so much on foreign soil had their teachers been lay. Crabitès believed that priests and nuns were more devoted to the cause of education. 76 Prior to her death, Frederika was able to observe Pierre graduate with a master’s degree from the Jesuit College of the Immaculate Conception in New Orleans in 1895. He was only a teenager. The Jesuit College of the Immaculate Conception began not as a university but as a Catholic high school. Jesuits established the College of the Immaculate Conception in 1849 as a parochial school for boys, rivaling the Ursuline School, which was a girls-only institution. It was so popular that it rapidly expanded its grounds, and before long it was offering college courses. By 1912, the school took the name of Loyola University of the South, renaming the institution of Immaculate Conception College as Jesuit High School.77 After graduation, Crabitès enrolled in the Law School of Tulane University.78 At the time, Tulane University was the most prestigious institution in New Orleans. Paul Tulane, an American of French descent, donated his real estate holdings in the city to benefit higher education. Tulane had explained that this philanthropic effort was meant “for the promotion and encouragement of intellectual, moral and industrial education among the white young persons in the city of New Orleans,” a quote that would later haunt the school during integration.

74 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 112. 75 Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” 604. 76 Ibid., 604. 77 John P. Dyer, “Education in New Orleans,” in The Past as Prelude: New Orleans, 1718-1968, 137. 78 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 1.

37 Tulane University promptly incorporated the University of Louisiana, which had been suffering from financial difficulties for some time.79 French Law Crabitès’s family’s finances enabled him to attend private universities, like the College of the Immaculate Conception and Tulane University. At Tulane University, he studied law based on the French Code. The French Code was important to Crabitès’s career as a judge on the Mixed Courts of Egypt, which was modeled after French law. Owing to its French background, Louisiana is the only state in the Union to establish its law on French Code. The remainder of American states formed their law around English . Unlike any other state in the Union, Louisiana preserved its French heritage in her laws. The original charter for the Company of the Indies in 1717, which founded Louisiana, specified that the colony’s law code would imitate that of the Parliament of Paris. By 1733, Louisiana had become a crown colony, subjecting the citizens to the law of France, but France had grown weary of Louisiana by 1762. The state consistently drained French resources, consistently failing to produce a profit. The French ceded Louisiana to Spain in the clandestine Treaty of Fontainebleau. Louisiana continued practicing French law until 1769, when Spain introduced Spanish law. Louisiana remained under Spanish control until 1800, when they returned it to France. Pierre Clement Laussat, the colonial prefect for Louisiana, reinstated the French law and French customs, rejecting English ones.80 In April of 1803, Napoleon Bonaparte sold Louisiana to the United States. Occupied with continental problems, he did not have the time to concentrate on North America. Napoleon desperately needed the revenue from the sale of Louisiana. That left to decide just what kind of law would govern Louisiana. The Louisiana Territorial Legislature adopted the recommendations of James Brown and Louis Moreau Lislet, which came to be

79 Ibid., 135. 80 Ferdinand Stone, “The Law with a Difference and How it came about,” in The Past as Prelude: New Orleans, 1718-1968. eds. Hodding Carter and Wm. Ransom Hogan (New Orleans: Tulane University/ Pelican Publishing, 1968), 45-53.

38 known as the Code of 1808. The Code of 1808 resembled the Projet of the Code Napoleon. Later, in 1822, the State Legislature appointed Edward Livingston, , and Moreau Lislet to revise the Code of 1808. They concluded that the Louisiana should incorporate the existing English laws, the Digest of the Louisiana laws, and the codes of both France and . The Code of 1822 was based in Roman law and resembled the Code Napoleon.81 The law in Louisiana resembles English Common Law practiced by the other states in many ways, including constitutional, administrative, and corporate.82 Nevertheless, the two systems differed in several respects, mostly concerning the judicial process and the backgrounds of the two forms of law. First of all, there are very few instances of trial by jury in Louisiana law or the French Code. There is also a strong concept of property rights to be held by one person in Louisiana law and the French Code. The French Code concentrates the responsibility of ownership in the hands of one body. Furthermore, the Louisiana Code emphasizes protecting the family. Parents are unable to leave their children propertyless. Their children must receive a portion of their parents’ estate as their inheritance. Spouses have equal rights to their partners’ property. The Louisiana Code makes parents responsible for the unruly behavior of their children. Louisiana law even prohibits the alteration of one’s last will and testament for cases of aggravation or suggestion. The code also unencummbers the freedom of , barring any violations of ethics or proper morals.83 Crabitès’s legal training at Tulane University prepared him well for his future in law. He would eventually be appointed to the Mixed Courts of Egypt. His knowledge of French law and his fluency in French contributed to his nomination. The Mixed Courts of Egypt drew from the French Code and were inherently Roman in manner. Crabitès received his law degree in 1898, when he was just twenty-one years old; even though Louisiana law then prohibited taking the bar exam at such a young age. Faced with some spare time on his hands, Crabites traveled to Europe to further his studies. He studied at the Sorbonne

81 Ibid., 60-5. 82 Ibid., 68. 83 Ibid., 69.

39 and the University of Berlin. His experiences in Europe greatly influenced his character, for he loved to immerse himself in foreign climes. International affairs became one of his passions. He studied foreign languages and international diplomacy. His love of foreign cultures helped him to become one of the first American specialists on the Middle East and a future diplomat.

40 CHAPTER 2- LAUNCHING A CAREER

The Dreyfus Affair Rather than waiting until he was of age to take the Louisiana Bar Exam, Crabitès packed up his belongings, left New Orleans, and traveled to Europe. As might be expected, Crabitès first went not to London but to Paris, where he studied law at the Sorbonne.1 Instead of proceeding to the United Kingdom to further his studies, he attended the University of Berlin, either because of his antipathy towards Anglo-Saxon culture or because of his interest in acquiring a new language. During his stay at the Sorbonne, he studied the Napoleonic Civil Code, which he later employed while serving on the bench of the Mixed Courts of Egypt. This experience heightened his love of foreign languages and international affairs. He said of his European sojourn, “I had traveled quite extensively and had devoted my leisure to the study of foreign languages and international politics.”2 Also while at the Sorbonne, Crabitès realized “what the systematic and scientific teaching of law connotes,” something he never learned at Tulane University in New Orleans.3 Crabitès thought that he received a more thorough education in law in France than he had in Louisiana. During his stay at the Sorbonne, Crabitès observed the spectacle of the Dreyfus Affair, a major court case that captured all of the French-speaking world’s attention and displayed to the world the strength of anti-Semitism in France. It exhibited the best and worst of French society. The Dreyfus Affair had an immense impact on Crabitès. It struck at the very heart of his character, specifically his Catholic heritage and love of French Law. The Dreyfus Affair helped shape Crabitès’s views on Jews and Protestants alike. Like some French-speaking intellectuals, known as Dreyfusards, Crabitès sympathized with Alfred Dreyfus; however, he differed from most Catholics, who did not support the cause of Dreyfus. He had a more progressive reaction towards French anti-

1 State Department Document 883.05/44: Chief Justice E.D. White to Secretary of State, Washington D.C. 24 February 1911. 2 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 1. 3 Pierre Crabitès, LSU lecture, (c. 1939) p. 3-4: Mss. 73-61, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

41 Semitism. This incident further developed Crabitès’s Jewish sentiments, instilling in him a more pronounced sensitivity towards Jews. The American response to the Dreyfus Affair troubled him, for many Americans reacted in an anti-Catholic manner. Crabitès spent a portion of his intellectual career attempting to correct Protestant injustices directed towards Catholics. Americans denounced the Catholic French and condemned their system of law, one that Crabitès had studied and would later practice in both Louisiana and Egypt. Most American Catholics tended to downgrade any criticism of France or its legal system because they did not want to appear openly pro-French and incur the wrath of Protestant Americans. Crabitès expressed his outrage at the French treatment of Dreyfus; he continued to champion French law, yet he reserved his support from the French judiciary. The Dreyfus Affair began in September 1894, when a French intelligence officer, Major Hubert-Joseph Henry, paid a cleaning woman to collect documents from the German Embassy in Paris. Among the papers gathered from one of the wastebaskets was a torn bordereau, or slip of paper, with secret information regarding a French 120 millimeter cannon, troop deployments, and a new artillery manual. The bordereau had been signed “D.” The ensuing scramble to discover the identity of this mysterious “D” triggered an outburst of false allegations and anti-Semitism in France. From the beginning, leaders of the French military’s Statistical Section, such as Colonel Jean-Conrad Sandherr, suspected that only an officer of the General Staff could have penned the note, as only he would have been privy to that sort of information. Sandherr perused a list of stagiaires, officers in training, because they had access to this classified information. He quickly came across the name of Artillery Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a man who had fallen out of favor with his superior officers. Unlike many of his comrades, Dreyfus lacked a mentor or close ally in the general staff. He also fit the profile of a traitor. He was a Jew, and his superiors alleged that his handwriting matched that of the bordereau. Not only was Dreyfus an easy target, but he was a scapegoat for the general staff’s inability to control the suspect behavior of its officers. His Jewish

42 heritage played a salient role in the General Staff isolating his name from that of his colleagues. They targeted him for who he was. Late nineteenth-century anti- Semitism had transformed from prejudice and discrimination predicated upon religious and cultural mores to intolerance based upon the doctrines of biological determinism of Social Darwinism. Traditional anti-Semitism regarded Jews as an evil force that could only be conquered through Jewish conversion to Christianity and adoption of European culture. Meanwhile, racial anti-Semitism considered Jews as a biologically inferior race and demanded their eradication.4 Convinced of Dreyfus’s guilt, the officers of the General Staff had no more than circumstantial evidence to prove his culpability. They concluded it was him largely because he was a Jew. Over time, the actions taken against Dreyfus became more conspiratorial, taking on a momentum of their own. The Minister of War Auguste Mercier, set the plan into action. He hoped to quickly dispose of this unsavory matter. He sought to arrest and prosecute Dreyfus, hoping to avoid a press campaign that might cost him his post. Members of the statistical section and Minister of War Mercier manufactured evidence to guarantee a conviction. Dreyfus’s ill fortune went far beyond implication motivated by prejudice, for he was at the mercy of men who were determined to retain their appearance of honor and remain above the law. These men forged documents to assure a guilty verdict.5 Once the Police arrested Dreyfus, his supporters, the Dreyfusards, campaigned to vindicate Dreyfus and exonerate their good name. The Dreyfusards were a diverse group, including French intellectuals, Jews, and Protestants. Their pressure on the French military was to no avail, for a military court wrongly convicted Dreyfus on charges of treason during a court-martial on 22 December 1894, and subsequently imprisoned him on Devil’s Island, off the coast of French Guiana. About a year later, in March 1896, a search of the rubbish bins inside the German

4 Martin P. Johnson, The Dreyfus Affair: Honor and Politics in the Belle Époque. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 5-6. 5 Ibid., 17.

43 Embassy in Paris revealed a piece of blue paper exonerating Albert Dreyfus and incriminating Commandant Charles Esterhazy. The message on this petit bleu, a paper used for correspondence, launched through pneumatic tubes between post offices, read, Sir. I await above all a more detailed explanation than the one you gave me the other day on the question at issue. Consequently, I ask you to give it to me in writing so I may judge whether I should continue my relations with the firm of R. or not. C.6 This time, there was a signature at the top of the message, “Commandant Esterhazy, 27, rue de la Bienfaisance.” The General Staff immediately suppressed this information because it was very damaging to their reputation to have tried and convicted an innocent man on fabricated evidence. Unlike Dreyfus, who had no motivation for treason, these men recognized that Esterhazy had sufficient incentive for such treachery. Furthermore, he also had the support of his commanding officer, Major Curé. During this period, the Dreyfusards continued their crusade for justice. Anti-Semitic journalists and French nationalists maintained their hostility towards the Jews and those who protected or sympathized with them, portraying them as murderers. This intolerance angered some of the most prominent French intellectuals, including Emile Zola and Bernard Lazare. In an article appearing in a May 1896 issue of Le Figaro titled “Pour les Juifs,” Zola attacked what he called a “war of species against species.”7 Lazare blamed Catholics for exploiting anti-Semitism to suppress reason. Evidence in the case against Esterhazy continued to grow when a double agent described Esterhazy as the spy who revealed secrets to the Germans. Writing samples further incriminated the commandant. Esterhazy had reason to commit espionage. He had wasted his inheritance and incurred exorbitant gambling debts. Esterhazy found himself in a desperate situation. He had been selling information to newspapers and was known to have prostituted himself to

6 Ibid., 39. 7 Ibid., 44.

44 women willing to compensate him for favors. Esterhazy was indigent, and, at the same time, embittered against the army for various minor injustices. He believed that he deserved better than what life had allotted him. Esterhazy came with an eminent pedigree, but he suffered from a defective character.8 Fortunately for Esterhazy, his superiors adamantly believed in Dreyfus’s guilt. Not only did they attempt to conceal Esterhazy’s culpability, but they endeavored to undermine the case against him by keeping the Dreyfus Affair separate from the argument against Esterhazy, anything to safeguard themselves from a guilty ruling. Under the weight of a growing mountain of damning evidence, the French military tried Esterhazy in January 1898 in a court- martial. The trial acquitted him; however, they relieved him of his duties. The Supreme Court of Appeal put Dreyfus on trial in 1899. Again, they found him guilty, but this time they reduced his sentence to ten years imprisonment. Ten days later, the French elected a more liberal government, in part due to the political fallout from the Dreyfus Affair. The new government pardoned Dreyfus, and he eventually served during World War I as lieutenant colonel. This highly-charged case exposed the anti-Semitism rampant in the French Army and facilitated a further separation of church and state in France. During this period, France suffered from widespread violence. There were riots, attempted assassinations, and a failed coup d’état. Crabitès recalled anti- Semitic denunciations from the students at the Sorbonne during the Dreyfus Affair in his classes where he heard shouts of “á bas les Juifs!” –“down with the Jews!” The trial of the famous French writer Emile Zola also took place during this raucous period. Crabitès attended his trial in 1898 because he had an interest in law and current affairs. Zola authored the famous missive “J’accuse,” a letter directed against civil authorities and the military establishment. He condemned military corruption and contended that the army and civil authorities had falsely charged Dreyfus in the case. Zola reproached the government and court-marital for their complicity in Esterhazy’s acquittal. For his denunciation and allegations,

8 Ibid., 48.

45 the French government sued the author and publisher of Aurore, Georges Clemenceau, the future leader of France, for libel. Sitting in the courtroom during this trial, Crabitès yet again heard the shouts ring out, “á bas les Juifs!” and “Down with Zola!” American newspapers publicized the difficulty of securing seats for such a celebrated trial: “The public - and only a very few were admitted without tickets - were squeezed together like herrings in a barrel. The heat was suffocating, and every half hour or so fainting women were carried outside.”9 Newspapers, such as the Boston Evening Transcript and the New Orleans Daily Picayune described the courtroom sentiment to American readers, “In were several notabilities and many ladies, especially actresses, most of whom [sic] were provided with sandwiches and bottles of wine.”10 After fifteen days, the jury convicted both Zola and Georges Clemenceau of libel. They sentenced Zola to one year in prison and Clemenceau to four months. Rather than reporting for jail, Zola fled France for England. The trial burnished Zola’s image in the United States and worsened the American estimation of France. Jaundiced American journalists criticized France’s judicial system and its rampant anti-Semitism. American muckrakers attributed what was rotten in France to their Catholicism. They associated France’s legal and moral decline with their religious heritage. American yellow journalists insisted that the French were anti-Semitic because they were Catholic. It was not just an Anglo-Saxon critique of French law, but also a Protestant indictment against Catholicism.11 During the course of his academic career, Crabitès condemned English Common Law and its American counterpart. American reaction to Catholicism profoundly distressed Crabitès, who was not only a devout Catholic, but a lawyer of the French Code. Regarding the relationship between Catholicism and anti-Semitism, Crabitès examined the dispute over Palestine well before it had concerned most American academics. He was one of the foremost American authorities on the Palestinian Question.

9 Boston Evening Transcript, 5 March 1898; New Orleans Daily Picayune, 12 February 1898, in Egal Feldman, The Dreyfus Affair: And the American Conscience, 1895-1906. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), 9. 10 Ibid., 9. 11 Feldman, The Dreyfus Affair, 17.

46 Throughout the course of his intellectual career, Crabitès would compose many articles on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although he adopted what would appear to be a pro-Arab stance on the subject, it was clearly not an anti-Jewish position. Crabitès believed that the circumstances in Palestine dictated that the Arabs control the region as they had for a millennia, for the Jews living there had benefited from Arab hospitality and Islamic tolerance.12 Crabitès had written much on French law and its derivations, including the law of the Mixed Courts of Egypt. He paid tribute to the French Code and the Napoleonic Civil Code, the two forms of law adopted by the Mixed Courts of Egypt.13 Although he believed strongly in the merits of French law, Crabitès had qualms with the members of the judiciary in France. He questioned their motives, stemming from the method by which they secured their positions, for he believed they were beholden to the government for their jobs.14 Crabitès maintained that the historical problem with the French judiciary was its relationship with broad-based governmental centralization. Of this process, Crabitès said, This bureaucratic institution exists not only in the administrative and executive branches of the government, but it extends to the judiciary. There, the same elaborate hierarchy obtains as in the other departments.

12 “Israel out of Egypt.” Unpublished ms., (c. 1938), Mss. 73-23, Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans. New Orleans, LA. “Partition of Palestine.” Unpublished ms. Mss. 73-43-44, Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans. New Orleans, LA. “The Impending Jewish Pogrom in Palestine.” Unpublished ms. Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. “A Jewish Political State in Palestine.” Current History 31 (1931): 749-757. “Let Islam Save Israel.” Unpublished ms. Mss. 73-71,Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans. New Orleans, LA. “Palestine and Her Problem.” Unpublished ms. Mss. 73-42, Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 13 “The Capitulations are in Harmony with the Present State of Egypt.” Tulane Law Review V: 245 ff. “The Courts of Egypt.” American Bar Association Journal 11 (1925): 485-491. “The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt.” The Nineteenth Century March, 1926, 364-372. “Napoleon Bonaparte and the Code Napoleon.” American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927): 439-443. “The Omnipotent Bar of Islam and the Egyptian Captiulations.” American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927): 694-696. 14 “The American Bar is not Self-Governing.” Unpublished ms. Mss. 73-5, Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans. New Orleans, LA. “The Omnipotence of British Justice.” Unpublished ms. Mss. 73-39, Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans. New Orleans, LA. “Our Maleficent Legal Ethics.” Unpublished ms., (c. 1930’s), Mss. 73-40: Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. “Why American Criminal Justice is a Failure.” Unpublished ms. Mss. 73-66, Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans. New Orleans, LA.

47 Judges do not win their spurs at the bar. They go from law school to the ‘parquet.’ This means that as soon as fledglings get their diploma they obtain a billet as a ‘standing judge.’ This puts their foot on the judicial ladder. They are civil servants.15 In other words, French judges were not at liberty to hand down impartial decisions because of their connection to the centralized bureaucracy; rather, they were compelled to render judgments favoring the government line. Referring to members of the French court, Crabitès argued, “These state functionaries fill an hereditary, or rather a purchasable [sic] office.”16 He continued, “The very bar which practices before them [judges] is, in part, a closed corporation. It is not a bureaucracy. It is something more entrenched than that. It is a private demesne, an hereditary appendage, a fenced-off preserve.”17 Court positions were sold to the highest bidder, often going for millions of Francs. Crabitès said, “They are in the nature of Stock Exchange seats. . . One can readily grasp how succulent these monopolies really are. And no one talks of suppressing them.”18 For Crabitès, hereditary succession, nepotism, and clientage were all corrupting the partiality of the French judiciary. The Dreyfus Affair coincided with a period of mounting anti-Catholicism in the United States. American Protestants were quick to criticize Catholics for the Dreyfus Affair. In reality, these Protestants were reacting to the latest influx of mostly Catholic immigrants from Europe. Suspicious of these new peoples arriving each day, most of them from Eastern Europe, Protestants questioned Catholic morality and patriotism. Newspapers propagated the conviction that the Dreyfus Affair could only have happened in a Catholic country. Perhaps Crabitès reacted the way he did because he too had dealt with a similar situation, where “Kaintucks” floated down the Mississippi River to resettle in New Orleans, eventually displacing the deep-rooted Creoles and their culture. Not only did Crabitès defend Catholicism and his French heritage, but he attacked the

15 Pierre Crabitès, “Who Rules France?” The South Atlantic Quarterly 31 (1932): 369-370. 16 Ibid., 370. 17 Ibid., 370. 18 Ibid., 371.

48 unchecked Anglo-Saxonism so pervasive in Progressive Era America, mostly in the form of radical Protestantism and intolerance towards foreign cultures.19 Crabitès and his Attitude towards Jews During this episode, American Catholics muted their criticism of France, for the most part; some even went so far as to justify the actions of the French. Many Catholics in America had such hatred for all things British that they naturally took the competing side in the Dreyfus Affair; they considered the whole matter a Protestant conspiracy. The Dreyfus Affair exacerbated Crabitès’s estimation of the British. He already had a poor opinion of American Anglo- Saxons for their invasion of New Orleans. Later, his stay in Egypt would intensify his abhorrence of the British. Generally, American Catholics united in their opinions of the Dreyfus Affair. Many Catholics in America spoke out against Emile Zola. They concluded that he tarnished the Catholic Church’s reputation. American Catholics not only downgraded the Catholic issue of anti-Semitism in the Dreyfus Affair, but they also took offense at the sympathy displayed for Dreyfus.20 Catholics in the United States avoided persecution by diverting Protestant wrath and directing it towards the Jews. Not all American Catholics were supportive of the French government. Some American Catholics believed that the French policies over the past century had targeted their religion. Crabitès once said of French, The walls of their churches are now defaced with the battle cry of Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternité. And yet, they care nought for liberty or fraternity. They, however, demand equality. And they have insisted upon having it during these last hundred and odd years, whether a Bourbon, a Bonaparte, or a Bourgeois king or president has filled their highest office.21 Catholics in France, especially the ultraconservative ones, thought that American Catholics had turned away from their true Catholic roots and had assimilated into

19 Feldman, The Dreyfus Affair, 126. 20 Ibid., 128-134. 21 Crabitès, “Who Rules France?” 372.

49 American culture. They visualized American Catholics as pro-Semitic, adopting Jewish and Protestant values.22 Papal reaction to the Dreyfus Affair gave cause for consternation in many American social circles. Pope Leo XIII’s silence during an upsurge of French anti-Semitism prompted many to say that since he did not condemn such behavior, he endorsed it. The Vatican’s influence no longer held such sway over the French population had it decided to denounce this wave of anti-Semitism.23 Crabitès, like many American Catholics, strived to clear the name of his beloved church. He hoped to portray the Papacy as guardian of the Jews and a leader in the fight against anti-Semitism. In his later writing, Crabitès made the case that the Catholic Church protected Jews during periods of protracted European anti-Semitism. Catholics in America safeguarded the Jesuits against attacks that the Church was anti-Semitic and had prosecuted the case against Dreyfus. While Crabitès did not subscribe to the theory of a Jewish conspiracy behind the Dreyfus Affair, he diffused criticism of his church and placed the blame for anti-Semitism on the Protestants. He was critical of their brand of anti- Catholicism and tried to defend the honor of his church from such attacks. He struck back against Protestant anti-Semitism in America, those same hypocrites whom he maintained were vilifying the Catholic Church. Crabitès was not anti- Semitic in the least. He spent much of his writing career trying to understand the Jews and the phenomena of anti-Semitism. Crabitès regarded himself as pro- Jewish and wanted to better protect the Jews. In his unpublished manuscript titled “Israel out of Egypt,” written during the Holocaust, Crabitès defended his reputation against charges of anti-Semitism: “I have examined my conscience and I know that there is not the slightest tinge of Judenhass in me.”24 Crabitès crafted many works on the dispute over Palestine and was hypersensitive to the subject of anti-Semitism. He wanted to avoid accusations of harboring prejudice towards the Jews.

22 Feldman, The Dreyfus Affair, 140-41. 23 Ibid., 127. 24 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 92.

50 Crabitès guarded the Catholic Church against accusations of anti- Semitism and contended that it had championed the Jews throughout history. He separated Catholic dogma from the narrow-minded practices of some Catholics and differentiated between the teachings of the Catholic Church and the anti-Semitic practices of some Catholics. In this manner he mitigated any disparagement of his beloved church. Crabitès professed his faith in the Catholic Church, When I speak of my Church I mean the Roman Catholic Church. I have already recorded in these pages how narrow-minded I am in regard to the local politics of my home state. I am just as blindly partisan in respect of the prestige of my Church. It would not have disturbed my equanimity had it been shown that it is the Protestantism of America which is just as anti- Ashkenazic as the Paganism of Nazi Germany. In envisaging the contrast between an anti-Semitic Christendom and a tolerant Islam, it was the honor of Catholicism which stirred me. My faith and my country, my country and my faith stood before the bar of my judgment. I owed it to the training which Jesuit teachers had given me to face the facts without fear or favor.25 With such unequivocal devotion to his church, Crabitès constructed walls of historical evidence and logic around the Vatican to defend it from charges of anti-Semitism. He had an uncanny ability to pick and choose issues, emphasizing some examples of Papal protection of the Jews while minimizing other examples of Catholic intolerance and anti-Semitism. Regarding the acts of anti-Semitism committed during the late Roman Empire, Crabitès remarked, I reasoned that the Papacy had nothing to do with these measures, for they were effective in the Eastern Empire, where it had no temporal power. I was getting closer to the Popes however, when my attention was directed to the great banishment from England in 1290, to the expulsion from France (exempting papal Avignon) in 1306, 1384 and 1396, to the exiles from Spain and Sicily in 1429, Portugal in 1497 and Naples and

25 Ibid., 55.

51 Sicily in 1509 and 1540. . . The Popes, even as temporal sovereigns, had no direct connection with any of these outrages.26 So instead of reproaching his popes, Crabitès held European secular leaders responsible for outbreaks of anti-Semitism throughout history. Crabitès denied that the anti-Semitism was even religious in character, otherwise, he reasoned, “The Moslem [sic] world would be anti-Semitic.”27 There were two distinct possibilities which Crabitès could have been referring to by that statement. First, that it was impossible for Muslims to be anti-Semitic because Arabs were technically Semites. Second, Crabitès argued that the Jews benefited from living peacefully under Islam. Following a more Social Darwinist approach, Crabitès held that anti-Semitism was more racial in character. He argued that there was no such thing as anti-Semitism. Instead, Crabitès believed that what most misinterpreted as anti-Semitism was in actually anti- Ashkenazism: “I had also come to the conclusion that there was no such thing as anti-Semitism. I had become convinced that what the world so designated was nothing but anti-Ashkenazism.”28 He posited that Sephardic, or Oriental Jews did not suffer the same sort of discrimination as Ashkenazic or Occidental Jews. He glossed over Catholic anti-Semitic rhetoric and calling the Catholic Church the champion of the Jewish cause. He relieved popes of the Catholic Church of any culpability regarding the rampant anti-Semitism of Medieval Europe, declaring, “The Popes, even as temporal sovereigns, had no direct connection with any of these outrages.”29 Crabitès assigned the blame of Christian anti-Semitism on other strains of Christianity, such as Protestantism and Orthodoxy. He used the example of the Jewish enclave in Leghorn (Livorno), the city that many Sephardic Jews in the Middle East claimed as their home. Crabitès insisted that these Jews chose the Italian city for their official residence because, “Leghorn is associated in the Jewish Mind with the

26 Ibid., 58. 27 Ibid., 54. 28 Ibid., 65. 29 Ibid., 58.

52 Papacy.”30 According to Crabitès, Leghorn was the centuries-old spiritual home of the Jews, a place where popes sheltered Jews from Christian persecution. Based upon this one example lifted from history, Crabitès concluded, “Not a shadow of doubt thus remained in my mind about the honorable role which the Popes of my Church had played, as temporal sovereigns, in resisting the general tendency of Christendom to persecute Jews.”31 Indicting lay leaders, Crabitès stated, “It was that the Church of Rome refused to sanction the extinction of the Jews.”32 Crabitès appropriately cited Aquinas. While many thirteenth century friars campaigned to convert Jews to Christianity, Aquinas preached toleration of the Jews. However, Crabitès failed to represent Aquinas’s view of Jews as heretics because they knowingly rejected the truth of Jesus. Crabitès on Protestant Thought After shielding the Catholic Church, Crabitès attacked militant Protestantism. He accused evangelical Protestants of anti-Semitism. Crabitès claimed that Protestants harbored deep-rooted anti-Catholic convictions and sought any opportunity to denigrate the Catholic community, often resorting to negative stereotypes of indolent and anti-Semitic Catholics. He once said, “Some of my English friends were forever saying, ‘You can’t do anything with the Irish Catholics; they’re a priest-ridden lot.’”33 Growing up in a New Orleans undergoing a rapidly expanding American population, Crabitès experienced their intolerance towards Catholic Creoles first- hand. In Egypt, Crabitès fell victim to British prejudice rooted in outdated generalizations. Regarding British bigotry, he said, “I am inclined to believe, that many Englishmen read their Times with their morning tea, in the fervent hope of finding some specific instance in support of their conviction that all Irishmen are unreliable.”34 Crabitès considered anti-Semitism in America just one facet of Protestant narrow-mindedness towards other religious beliefs, including Catholicism. He referred to the exhibition of American anti-Catholic proclivities

30 Ibid., 62. 31 Ibid., 63. 32 Ibid., 64. 33 Pierre Crabitès, “Islam, Divorce and Decadence,” Catholic World 127 (1928): 662. 34 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 37-38.

53 during the Democratic nomination for president 1923-1924, which pitted New York Governor Alfred E. Smith, a Roman Catholic, against former Secretary of the Treasury William G. MacAdoo, a Protestant: I had seen how the militant Methodists and Baptists of the United States had put a knife into the ribs of Alfred E. Smith because he is a Catholic. I began to wonder whether the benign anti-Semitism or anti-Ashkenazism rampant in the United States was not a phase of the same religious intolerance which had spread through America in 1923.35 Crabitès contemplated anti-Semitism in the United States and delved into the reasons for the unpopularity of Jews in America. He submitted that Americans loathed the Jews, not because of their religious beliefs, but because they were distinctive and individualistic. This notion contained elements of Social Darwinist thought. Not surprisingly, German Jews who had immigrated to the United States prior to their Eastern European cousins were the first to promote Reform Synagogues, which espoused a greater acculturation or assimilation into American culture.36 Crabitès turned his attention to the rights granted to American citizens by the founding fathers. He challenged the idea that the framers truly believed all men were created inherently equal, declaring, I finally came to the conclusion that when the Declaration of Independence said that ‘all men are created equal,’ it really meant to give to the term ‘all men’ a restricted meaning and to confine its import to white men. Thomas Jefferson took this connotation for granted. He assumed that everybody understood the words ‘all men’ in the same sense. He considered that it would be tautology to speak of ‘all white men being created equal.’37 Crabitès declared that Americans were free to practice their religion so long as they were of a Protestant faith.38 The founders regarded religion and nationality as inseparable and this belief promoted xenophobia. Crabitès consulted Judge

35 Ibid., 52. 36 Ibid., 176. 37 Ibid., 231. 38 Ibid., 233.

54 Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution to help frame his argument on the First Amendment: The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance Mohammedanism or Judaism, or infidelity, but prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.39 Instead, Crabitès believed the United States was a government created largely by and for Protestants. For Crabitès, this concept became explicit during the 1928 election when Protestant Democrats voted for the Protestant Republican , rather than for the Catholic Democrat Alfred Smith. He associated those opposed to immigration with Protestant anti-Semitism. Crabitès posited that the Jews immigrating to the United States would be the victims of xenophobia because they would not assimilate, “It was not until the militant Protestants of the United States associated Jews in their minds with the foreign hordes streaming into this country, that anti-Semitism took firm root in American soil.”40 Crabitès on French Law American reaction to the Dreyfus Affair hinged on their Anglo-Saxon tradition of missionary work and belief in the superiority of the American moral and legal system. This belief in the pre-eminence of the American ethical and legal system undoubtedly disturbed Crabitès, both an American and a Catholic. Referring to his patriotism, Crabitès said, “I was known to be intensely American. I cite this fact with pride, not apologetically.”41 Crabitès distinguished between Americanism and Anglo-Saxonism. He referred to himself as an American, not a Creole. However, American and British attacks on French justice also annoyed him. This was a form of law in which he placed great confidence. The Dreyfus Affair presented Americans with just the opening they needed to disparage the French system of justice. Americans did not comprehend how Dreyfus’s guilt

39 Ibid., 240. 40 Ibid., 245. 41 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 84.

55 could be overlooked, and thus condemned French law. The trial confused many Americans.42 Even those Americans uneducated in law found it bewildering that French law permitted witnesses to digress at length, or even that they had the privilege of remaining silent while under questioning. Americans failed understand how counsel could not cross-examine witnesses. Finally, they believed that French judges formed judgments to accommodate public opinion. It came to a shock to many Americans that French law regarded the accused as guilty.43 Experiencing an Anglo-Saxon superiority complex, Americans compared their system of law based on English Common Law to that of French law, which drew from the French Code and the . Americans invariably came to the conclusion that their form of law was inherently superior. They began to believe that France suffered from lawlessness, partly as a result of the verdicts in the Dreyfus Affair, which clashed with what they believed to be a rational and impartial judgment. At the 1898 and 1899 American Bar Association conventions, generally conservative lawyers and jurists condemned the French judiciary. Members of the American Law Review protested holding the annual meeting of the International Law Association in Rouen in 1900. They concluded that what had taken place in France could never have happened in America.44 Crabitès defended the system of French justice, specifically the French Code and the Napoleonic Civil Code. Louisiana used French law and, too, did the Mixed Courts of Egypt, an institution for which Crabitès had great admiration and pride. Nubar Pasha, the Armenian-born foreign minister credited with conceiving the Mixed Courts, incorporated the French Code and the Napoleonic Civil Code since these codes were easily adapted to the Mixed Courts. Crabitès published several journal articles on the Mixed Courts and French law. He wrote these articles to influence a broad American audience. As an expert in the field, Crabitès sought to educate Americans on the Mixed Courts of Egypt and the finer

42 Feldman, The Dreyfus Affair, 18-22. 43 Ibid., 30. 44 Ibid., 38-39.

56 points of French law. He was conscious of American public sentiment towards French law and tried to steer public opinion in a more positive direction. In an article written for the American Bar Association Journal titled “Napoleon Bonaparte and the Code Napoleon,” Crabitès argued that Napoleon’s greatest accomplishment was his Civil Code.45 Referring to the French law employed on the Mixed Courts of Egypt, Crabitès said, “The laws administered in these courts were taken from French sources. Maitre Maunoury, uncle of General Maunoury, one of the heroes of the Great War, compiled them. He copied the codes of France, making a change here and there.”46 M. Manoury adopted French law to the exigencies of Egypt. Crabitès revealed, “Sir Maurice Amos, the former Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, once told me that the Mixed Courts were, with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church, the greatest international organization in the world. I think that he is absolutely right. No human agency is in the same category.”47 It is significant that Sir Maurice Amos, Judicial Advisor to Egypt, would make such a sweeping statement on the merits of French law. Crabitès had confidence that the justice administered under French law on the Mixed Courts was of the highest caliber: “French Law has answered admirably to the strain put on it.”48 He believed that no other law could have stood up under such conditions, pronouncing, “I doubt where better results could have been obtained under any imaginable circumstances.”49 Crabitès certainly did not adhere to the notion that French law was somehow inferior to the English Common Law practiced in the United States and Great Britain. Cage, Baldwin, and Crabitès Crabitès next traveled to Germany, where he studied German at the University of Berlin. During the early twentieth century, Germany was a key player on the world stage and an industrial superpower; for that reason alone any

45 Pierre Crabitès, “Napoleon Bonaparte and the Code Napoleon,” American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927): 439. 46 Pierre Crabitès, “The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt,” The Nineteenth Century (March 1926): 370. 47 Pierre Crabitès, “The Courts of Egypt,” American Bar Association Journal 11 (1925): 491. 48 Ibid., 487. 49 Ibid., 487.

57 study of German would be desirable. German was also one of the languages of academic scholarship, especially in the fields of science, history, and foreign policy. Unlike France, where he had little trouble adjusting because of his Creole background and fluency in French, Crabitès struggled in Germany trying to learn the language. Later he would hire a German-speaking nanny for his son, Henry. Although German might have been difficult for Crabitès to learn, his fluency in it served him well later in life: “I was twenty before I began the study of German. There was a time when I did practically all my collateral reading in that language. I made frequent trips to Germany, but I have never been able to take an American note out of my German.”50 Actually, his fluency in German helped him secure a position on the Mixed Courts of Egypt.51 After a couple years study at the Sorbonne and the University of Berlin, Crabitès was old enough to satisfy the age requirement to take the Louisiana Bar Exam, he returned home to New Orleans. He never received any degrees from his study in Europe since he was a “gentleman scholar” simply attending lectures. Crabitès took the bar exam in 1900 and was admitted to the Louisiana Bar. He was twenty-three years old. Subsequently, he joined the law firm of Cage and Baldwin, renamed Cage, Baldwin and Crabitès. Soon thereafter, they relocated into the Perrin Building in New Orleans. Crabitès bonded with Cage and Baldwin, becoming life-long friends with them. Henry F. Baldwin, along with Crabitès, joined the Pickwick Club in New Orleans, and Baldwin even became president of the prestigious social club. Hugh C. Cage was a Protestant born in 1859 on Woodlawn Plantation in Terrebonne Parish, a predominantly Cajun community (a hotbed of Cajun activity). Cage relocated to the 1400 Block of Webster Street after receiving his law degree from Tulane. After becoming a judge of the New Orleans Civil District Bench, Cage would serve as a well-placed reference for Crabitès, for he served in the Louisiana State Senate as a representative from New Orleans from 1896-1904.

50 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 87. 51 The British Ambassador, Mitchell Innes, referred to Crabitès’s knowledge of German as an added advantage.

58 Soon after he began practicing law, Crabitès married Charlotte Berlin, a young lady from Chattanooga, . Charlotte, the daughter of Dr. Berlin, came from a family with political connections that extended to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Edward Douglas White. Her family relationships eventually helped Crabitès secure an appointment to the Mixed Courts of Egypt. Crabitès did not harbor intense disdain for the British since his mother and wife were both Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. As Chief Justice, Edward D. White had access to the most elite of Washington’s social circles. Because of him, Crabitès was able to attend parties and gatherings where he could associate with high-ranking diplomats and United States government officials. Chief Justice White was both a United States senator representing Louisiana, and the ninth chief justice of the United States. In 1891, the Louisiana State legislature promoted him to the , where he served until President nominated him to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1894. After serving six years as an associate justice on the Supreme Court, President William Howard Taft raised him to the position of chief justice in 1910. This promotion was an unusual maneuver to say the least, for not only was White the first associate justice elevated to chief justice, but he also was a Democrat, and Taft was a Republican. Race and Politics in New Orleans Crabitès was well-established and living a comfortable life in New Orleans when he read about the New Orleans race riot of 1900 in the Daily Picayune. With the most acerbic of language, newspapers denounced the instigator of the riot, Robert Charles, as a wicked deviant for his murderous rampage. They accused him of propagating the “back-to-Africa” movement, first espoused by Marcus Mosiah Garvey, a Jamaican immigrant to and advocate for black nationalism.52 The hostility between Afro-Americans and whites had been escalating for some time prior to the day of 27 July 1900. That day Robert Charles shot

52 William Ivy Hair, Carnival of Fury: Robert Charles and the New Orleans Race Riot of 1900. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Press, 1976), 2.

59 twenty-four people, including four police officers, on Saratoga Street before they killed him. Earlier that same week, on 23 July, Charles had shot three more police officers. At this time, no blacks in New Orleans were immune to racial repression and segregation. Regardless of Robert Charles’s actions, a race riot in New Orleans was almost inevitable.53 While waiting on the doorstep for the white Schwartz family to return home on the evening of Monday, 23 July, two police officers approached Robert Charles and his roommate, Lenard Pierce, whom they suspected of mischief. After a heated argument between the police and Charles, the police attempted to beat him, but he took flight and a gunfight ensued. Charles fled to his home that night so that he could dress his wounds and grab his rifle. The police tracked Charles back to the dilapidated tenement where he lived. They cornered him there, and he came out firing, killing two police officers and then retreating. Thus began the largest manhunt in the . Posses patrolled the streets of the Crescent City looking for Charles.54 Robert Charles knew the fate of a black man who shot a police officer in the South. He proceeded to 1028 Saratoga Street and took refuge, just a mile and a half from Crabitès’s home on Canal Street. Days later, an informant in the neighborhood provided the police with his location. After discovering Charles holed up at a friend’s place on Saratoga Street, the police besieged the building, willing to take Charles at all costs. Charles fired fifty shots at his attackers that day and twenty-four of them hit their mark. Eventually, the police smoked Charles out. He attempted to flee his assailants, but they cut him down. Incidents like the one involving Robert Charles shaped Crabitès’s perception of Afro-Americans. Like many of his white-Creole contemporaries in New Orleans, Crabitès was conservative in character. He was both a Social Darwinist and paternalistic in his attitude towards blacks.55 That same year there was another gubernatorial election in Louisiana. This time, however, Louisiana Democrats had disenfranchised most Afro-

58 Ibid., 119-20. 54 Ibid., 135-37. 55 Ibid., 175.

60 Americans, awarding them with a tremendous advantage at the polls. The Democrat majority largely comprised merchants and planters. They had controlled Louisiana state politics since Reconstruction and realized that they had no formidable opposition in the election of 1900. Democrats had denied Afro-Americans suffrage, and the white resistance, mostly comprised of poor rural farmers, expressed indifference towards the election.56 The Democrats ceded only one parish in the election, St. James Parish, which was predominantly Afro-American. As a Bourbon Democrat, Crabitès expressed willingness to deny blacks their right to vote, so long as the government discriminated on behalf of them as the institutionally weak. He was leery of deceitful attempts to garner black support. He believed that Afro-Americans were easily persuaded, “Talk social equality to an American Black and he is a sympathetic listener.”57 Crabitès’s own attitudes towards blacks can be drawn from his many journal articles and remarks made from lectures that he gave. His opinions reflect the general Southern perception of Afro-Americans. By applying general stereotypes to the black man, Crabitès had a tendency to denigrate them, but he did so without malice aforethought, once describing an Afro-American that he met in Cairo, “Six months ago an American Negro came to Cairo without a saxophone with no intention of playing in a jazz band. He was as black as the Ace of Spades, his teeth a wall of ivory, and his speech the drawl of the Southern plantation.”58 He would later contend that Afro-Americans were susceptible to foreign “isms,” such as Communism. Crabitès alleged that the black vote posed a grave threat to American institutions, “If the Negroes take over the control of the Northern States, they will take over the control of the Federal Government and gradually the judicial system of our country.”59 He believed that Bolshevist elements within the United States understood the value of the black vote as the balance of power between Republicans and Democrats, thus they could appeal

56 Ibid., 111. 57 Pierre Crabitès, “American Negro Muhammedians,” Catholic World 136 (1933): 565. 58 Ibid., 559. 59 Newspaper clipping: Mss. 73-1, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

61 to Afro-American proclivities: “Before the Hoover Administration 45 percent of the voters were Republicans and 35 percent Democrats. The remainder was a flying wedge that acted as a balance of power. It is to this flying wedge that the Communists are making their appeal.”60 For various reasons, Crabitès subscribed to the Democrat Party platform. In New Orleans, Creoles generally voted as a unified block for the Democrats. Like many Creoles, Crabitès thought that the only way they could maintain political superiority over the Americans was to vote Democrat. The Americans generally supported the Know Nothing Party. Crabitès could not distinguish between the Republican Party and Reconstruction. He envisioned radical Republicans destroying his Southern Creole heritage: If I recognize these facts, and still remain as uncompromisingly hostile to Republicanism in Louisiana as I am, it is because I cannot cast off the effect of the horrors of Reconstruction in the South. The generalizations which gripped my childhood still hold sway over my manhood.61 This quote provides great insight into Crabitès’s sentiments towards those “Kaintucks” who had come to Louisiana after the Civil War, profiting from influence peddling and seeking to recreate Louisiana in a similar fashion as the North. He viewed these men as Carpetbaggers seeking to displace Creole predominance over Louisiana. Crabitès opposed Afro-Americans entering the ranks of the Republican Party, for that was another obstacle Democrats would have to overcome in order to win elections: “When I was a child I looked upon the Republican Party as a combination of the negroes, carpetbaggers and scallawags of the South and of the fire-eating “damnyankees” of the North. I was genuinely fond of the negroes but hated their allies.”62 The loss of political power to the Republican Party terrified Creoles like Crabitès. It was the Republican Party who had absorbed the Know Nothing Party, the party of “Kaintucks” and the Vigilantes. They promoted the spread of Protestantism and endeavored to anglicize Louisiana.

60 Ibid. 61 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 34. 62 Ibid., 34.

62 The Republican Party had also pushed through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which many Creoles found insulting because they afforded Afro- Americans more rights and greater freedom. Crabitès reasoned that Afro- Americans should be deprived of their franchise.63 Like many of his generation, it was difficult for Crabitès to separate his background from the politics of race: “It may seem sacrilegious for me, a Bourbon Democrat, to link my mother’s name and that of a negro in the same sentence.”64 Although Crabitès took after his father in terms of his cultural traditions and religion, his mother shaped his ideas on race and politics. New Orleans’ social organizations transformed Louisiana state politics. At the turn of the century, elite social clubs began appearing on Canal Street, just around the corner from Crabitès’s home at 316 Camp Street. He joined some well-known Carnival clubs as well as some of New Orleans’ most illustrious social clubs, including the prestigious Pickwick Club. Becoming a member in these organizations revealed his place in New Orleans’ society, as well as his intention to remain in New Orleans, not to pack up his bags and venture to a far away continent such as Africa. When he was a young, politically-minded Bourbon Democrat, Crabitès joined the Regular Democratic Organization of New Orleans as well as the Choctaw Club in 1900. The Democrats of the Crescent City had a colorful history. Following Reconstruction, a harsh period ripe with racial tension, New Orleans Democrats maintained their white supremacy at all costs, often resorting to violence in order to accomplish their political goals. Ward bosses in New Orleans made use of threats to sway elections. The Democrats enlisted political machines to mobilize their voters. Although Crabitès affirmed that he eventually overcame his prejudice towards Northerners, for most belonged to the Republican Party, he acknowledged, “I have never shaken off my ingrained antipathy to the Republican party- although I did not refuse to accept the

63 Pierre Crabitès, “The American Negro and Communism,” Unpublished ms. Mss. 73-6, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 64 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 48.

63 American judgeship in Cairo when President Taft offered it to me.”65 His partisanship knew no boundaries. Referring to his Democrat proclivities, Crabitès explained, “I am narrow-minded, insanely partisan and blindly sectarian.”66 The last thing he wanted was another Republican governor: I was born but a few months after the first inauguration of Governor Francis T. Nicholls, the Democrat who drove the Republicans out of Louisiana’s Statehouse. I hope to go to my grave without seeing a Republican listed among his successors. I would rather hold my nose, if necessary, and vote for a Democratic Governor of Louisiana than to see the best of Republicans installed in Baton Rouge. In the domain of statesmanship, institutions can be more dangerous than individuals.67 The Choctaw Club was only four years old when Crabitès joined it in 1900. It originated out of the recently dissolved Crescent Democratic Club, established in 1891. The Choctaw Club’s membership mirrored that of its political counterpart, the Regular Democratic Organization. Most of those in the club were residents of the Crescent City, men mostly from the business and professional classes, including many attorneys. The majority of the club members actually resided near the center of the city, and more often than not they were neighbors. These men were the descendants of immigrants, although, very few recent newcomers belonged to the club. Like Crabitès, members of the club had political aspirations. Club members parlayed their connections gained through the association into political offices. Many of the relationships Crabitès cultivated as a member of the club were put to good use when he sought promotion to the Mixed Courts Court of Appeals, and later when he sought a diplomatic position. By the time the Choctaw Club was only five years old, it had 422 members and was the most powerful political machine in the South.68 While these men represented some of the wealthiest men in New Orleans, only six men in the club possessed more wealth than Crabitès in 1902. Crabitès increased his

65 Ibid., 33. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., 34. 68 Edward F. Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City: New Orleans in the Progressive Era, 1896-1902. (Ruston, LA: McGinty Publications), 68

64 worth from approximately $35,000 when his grandmother died to $48,825 by 1902.69

As a partner in his law firm, most of his recent income had come from his law practice. He was a successful attorney and even brought a case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909. In the case of Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., Crabitès represented the appellant Mrs. Frances E. Waterman in a question of jurisdiction regarding the power of circuit courts to allow a particular bill in equity. The majority decision in the case decided in favor of Crabitès and declared,

Upon the whole case, we are of opinion that that Federal court has jurisdiction for the purpose of ascertaining the rights of the complainant to recover as against the executor, and the interest of the persons before the court in the fund. While the court could make no decree which would interfere with the possession of the probate court, it had jurisdiction to entertain the bill and to render a judgment binding upon the parties to the extent and in the manner which we have already stated. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the court below erred in holding that there was no jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and the decree is reversed and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.70 Interestingly, Justice White, a relation of Crabitès, dissented. A life of spending the day at the office and coming home to settle down at night was not enough for Crabitès. He yearned for more from life. Crabitès was a man of grand ambition. He pursued both fame and fortune. While he accumulated a great deal of wealth from his law practice in New Orleans, it did

69Ibid., 139. 70 U.S. Supreme Court: Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S.33 (1909) Mrs. Frances E. Waterman, Wife of Charles A. Crane, Appt., v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Company, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Caroline Stannard Tilton, Deceased, et al. No. 306. Submitted 23 February 1909. Decided 8 November 1909.

65 not translate into fame. He was on the lookout for more desirable opportunities. His fortune and connections provided just the opening that he needed. Whetting his appetite for travel during his sojourn in Europe, Crabitès could not stave off the itch to travel for long. Foreign peoples and cultures fascinated him. When not laboring for his law firm, Crabitès was “devoting his leisure time to the study of foreign languages and international politics.”71 In 1901, Crabitès traveled to Mexico. Four years later in 1905, he boarded a steamer in New Orleans and sailed to Istanbul. He just escaped death on his first trip to the Middle East in 1906. He had taken a Russian ship to the Palestinian port of Jaffa (Haifa). While disembarking, inclement weather caused Crabitès to plummet from the ship, plunging into the water. He narrowly avoided drowning.72 Mardi Gras When he returned home, Crabitès began socializing with the New Orleans elite by joining clubs promoting Carnival Balls. This period in the history of New Orleans coincided with the development of the Carnival Ball. These balls served a three-fold purpose for the New Orleans elite. They segregated New Orleans by unifying its social circles and inviting American high society to come down and observe their rituals. While they acknowledged their own, they also excluded many. The upper classes attended these invitation-only to present themselves to the New Orleans establishment, while other participants merely turned up as observers. Crabitès belonged more to the former group of socialites than the latter. Invitations were not merely meted out by the members of these clubs, but by special committees, who could reject candidates freely if they did not meet their standards.73 Leadership of the club often refused to admit those who were not of the same appearance and politics as their membership rosters. The privileged presented these balls for the privileged, ritualizing the submission of

71 Crabitès, “Israel Out of Egypt,” 1. 72 Newspaper Clipping: Mss. 73-85, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 73 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 6.

66 one group to the next in order to confirm their own hierarchy. They also enhanced social demarcations.74 These gentlemen’s clubs were highly segregated. Crabitès had the background, politics, and wealth to gain admission into the most genteel social organizations. These men’s clubs became a means for members to network. Crabitès formed important connections through these Carnival organizations, as well as the Pickwick Club. He built friendships with high-powered businessmen, lawyers, and Louisiana congressmen. These associations helped Crabitès later in life when he appealed to Louisiana congressmen to help him obtain his appointment to the Egyptian Mixed Courts’ Court of Appeals. Crabitès called upon these men to insist that Washington nominate him to the Court of Appeals. Around the same time that Crabitès joined the Carnival clubs, they began restricting their membership by practicing discrimination. They refused to admit Afro-Americans. Policy dictated the exclusion of Jews. Crabitès had a life-long fascination with the study of Hebraic culture, most likely inspired by his mother’s early praise of Jews. His early encounters with Jews in New Orleans and during the Dreyfus Affair also shaped his views of them. He would grow to become one of America’s foremost authorities on Jews residing both in the United States and in the Middle East. His academic works on Jews are significant because Crabitès was one of the very few Americans examining Jews in the Middle East; most Americans studied American and European Jews. Most importantly, he approached the topic from an unconventional Creole-American Catholic perspective.75 Crabitès could only recall one Jew ever being a member of a Carnival club: “Try as hard as I could, I did not recall a single Pickwickian of Jewish blood, born and reared in New Orleans or its vicinage, who was not of what I now know to be of Sephardic descent.”76 Unlike Ashkenazic Jewry, Sephardic Jews did not conform to the traditional American stereotype of Jews. How this particular man,

74 Reid Mitchell, All on a Mardi Gras Day: Episodes in the History of New Orleans Carnival. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 97-107. 75 Ibid., 100. 76 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 15.

67 Ernest Florance, a Sephardic Jewish bachelor with no relatives residing in New Orleans could gain entrance into a Carnival club confused Crabitès: I had often asked why it was that Ernest Florance had had this unique position in the New Orleans of the gay nineties. I knew that he was a man of refinement, of probity and of culture. But I was acquainted with scores of other Jews to whom these terms applied. They were not admitted into the inner circles of the Carnival world and, with few, very few, exceptions were entirely tabooed in that domain. Why, then this exception in favor of Ernest Florance, who had no striking personal charm to make him stand out among the many high-class Jews of New Orleans? . . . The answer was given to me by a prominent jurist of New Orleans. . . He replied, ‘Il est celibataire et sans famille.’ (He is a bachelor and without family ties.)77 Crabitès deduced that there was a marked difference between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewry. Although he argued that the New Orleans of his day was not anti-Semitic, he conceded, “The New Orleans world in which I moved when I went to Egypt in 1911, admired the individual Jew, but was afraid of his environment.”78 New Orleanians were not afraid of Jews but Jewishness. Crabitès questioned, for example, why Jews in the Middle East rose to such social prominence while American Jewry suffered from prejudice in Catholic Louisiana. He concluded that the United States was not anti-Semitic. For him, America was not so much anti-Semitic as anti-Ashkenazic. Recalling that only Sephardic Jews participated in the high society of New Orleans, such as the carnival organizations and men’s clubs, Crabitès asked, “Is the world really anti- Semitic? Is it not merely anti-Ashkenazic? And if it is, why this distinction?”79 He described the discrimination that existed between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews in the Middle East. Crabitès explained that the two groups did not encourage intermarriage. As a matter of fact, the intermarriage of an Ashkenazic Jew with a Sephardic Jew, in his opinion, challenged the Jewish social structure in the Middle East.

77 Ibid., 5. 78 Ibid., 6. 79 Ibid., 15.

68 When Crabitès joined the Pickwick Club on 2 February 1899, following his return from Europe, he belonged the elite ranks of New Orleans society. Crabitès had specific motivation for joining the club, including networking and confirming his elite status. The Pickwick Club was a gentlemen-only club established on Canal Street in 1857. Named after a literary character and a creation of Charles Dickens, Mr. Pickwick, it represented all that was high society in New Orleans. The Pickwick Club was a year-round association of men from New Orleans with roots in the celebration of Mardi Gras. The men who established the Pickwick Club were the same founders of the Mistick Krewe of Comus, a group dedicated to producing a parade in New Orleans each year for Mardi Gras.80 The membership list of the Pickwick Club included local, state, and national politicians, business leaders, and high-ranking military officers. During the years that Crabitès belonged to the Pickwick Club, from 1899 until he left for Egypt in 1911, it was located at 1028 Canal Street. Crabitès’s entrance into New Orleans’ society occurred on the eve of Mardi Gras. The daily business of the Pickwick Club went unchanged that year. The next year, however, poor business conditions in the city forced fifty-three members to resign, leaving only 182 members. Crabitès had the good fortune to avoid suspending his membership because of financial problems. The club could not operate as it did in the past with fewer than two hundred members, so it levied an extra fee on those who remained to compensate for the deficit. This was the first time in many years that the club’s revenue finished below its expenses.81 Next year, the Pickwick Club elected Henry F. Baldwin as an officer, a partner and friend of Crabitès. He remained an officer through 1910. Much remained the same for the Pickwick Club over the next few years until 1909, when President-elect Taft visited New Orleans to witness the spectacle of Mardi Gras. The club hosted Mrs. Taft during the parade. Pickwick Club members entertained her and the president during their stay. Some members of the club, such as Cardinal Gibbons, were friends with the future president. Theodore

80 Augusto P. Miceli, The Pickwick Club of New Orleans. (New Orleans, LA: Pickwick Press), 1,199. 81 Ibid., 139.

69 Roosevelt’s chosen successor, President Taft, a Republican, returned to New Orleans on 30 October that same year to attend the Lake-to-the-Gulf Waterway Convention. He was the guest of honor at the Pickwick Club during his stay in New Orleans. Even though Crabitès was an ardent supporter of the Democrat Party and Taft was a Republican, Taft would appoint Crabitès to fill a vacant seat on the bench of the Mixed Courts the next year. Their first meeting may have taken place in 1910 in New Orleans.82

82 Ibid., 145-46.

70 CHAPTER 3- A JUDGE IN EGYPT

A Meeting with the British Ambassador in Washington Civic organizations like the Choctaw Club and the Pickwick Club produced many noteworthy and politically valuable relationships for Crabitès, yet it was his family that provided him the occasion to display his talents in Washington D.C. He sought a high-ranking diplomatic position. Fortunately for Crabitès, his wife Charlotte was a relative of Edward D. White, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Charlotte helped him gain admission to a social function held at the home of the Chief Justice. His family connections granted him this extraordinary opportunity, but the burden was his to make a lasting impression. The event gave Crabitès a stage to showcase his talents. On the evening of the affair, Crabitès presented himself to each guest in attendance in their native tongue. He had a command of French, Italian, German, and Greek. While conversing with those present, Crabitès aroused the interest of the British Ambassador to the United States Mitchell Innes. When Ambassador Innes learned of Crabitès’s background in the French Code and the Napoleonic Civil Code, he promptly solicited an audience with President Taft. Crabitès had impressed the ambassador with his refinement and erudition. Ambassador Innes remembered that an American seat on the Mixed Courts of Egypt had recently become available due to the retirement of American Judge Walter Berry. The Egyptian government had solicited Innes’s assistance in locating a successor to Judge Berry. The ambassador actively searched on behalf of the Egyptian government for an acceptable candidate. Once British authorities in Cairo received word from Innes, they then advised the Egyptian government how to proceed and who to recommend for promotion to the Mixed Courts. Innes explained his role in the selection process, “My part consisted in trying to find out the names of likely candidates and sending them to our representative in Cairo, explaining their qualifications.”1 Ambassador Innes was

1 State Department Document 883.05/44: From Chief Justice Edward D. White to Secretary of State Knox in Washington D.C. 24 February 1911.

71 unaware of Crabitès’s background growing up in a New Orleans, one fraught with tension between Anglo and Creole communities. In the summer of 1910, Judge Walter Berry, an American, announced his intention to step down from the Mixed Courts in 1911. Before representing the United States on the Mixed Courts of Egypt, Judge Berry had belonged to a reputable law practice in Washington D.C.2 Finding a qualified replacement, satisfactory to the Egyptians as well as the British, was a formidable task. According to the founding charter of the Mixed Courts, the Egyptian government controlled ultimate approval of appointees to the courts. In reality, the British worked behind the scenes to influence judicial designations. The British judicial advisor to the khedive manipulated the arrangements. Although he approved of Crabitès, the khedive was not bound by law to take the place of Judge Berry with an American. Crabitès required British sanction for promotion to the courts, which embittered American authorities; however, it was ultimately overlooked. The United States was confident that this manner of designating candidates for the Mixed Courts would not continue. This was a significant appointment because it provided the United States with a voice in Egyptian politics. The British ambassador persuaded President Taft, a Republican, to promote a Bourbon Democrat to the bench of the Mixed Courts of Egypt. President Taft fully understood the ramifications of this decision. He was judicially minded and an accomplished attorney before Theodore Roosevelt designated him as his successor. As a close friend of Roosevelt, Taft was his solicitor general in the 1890s. He also sat on the Federal Circuit of Appeals, and after his presidency he served on the Supreme Court. Taft despised politics; he was a judge and an administrator. The president was willing to assign Crabitès to the Mixed Courts because he believed Crabitès was the best man for the job, regardless of Crabitès’s political allegiances.

2 State Department Document 883.05/197: From the Office of the Solicitor in Washington D.C. to the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. 7 March 1921.

72 Taft did not have serious reservations appointing a Bourbon Democrat to the Mixed Courts of Egypt. He sent Edward D. White to the Supreme Court of the United States, even though he was a Bourbon Democrat. He was willing to cross party lines. During his presidency, the president effected change by working with insurgent senators and reformers inclined to break from the ranks of the Democratic Party. Crabitès had superb recommendations, including one from Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Edward D. White. The United States government failed to realize that Justice White was a relative of Crabitès; although it probably would not have mattered. Naturally, White supported Crabitès’s candidacy. In a 24 February 1911 letter from White to the secretary of state, the Supreme Court justice made a case for the nomination of Crabitès to the Mixed Courts. White vouched for Crabitès. He explained to the secretary of state that Crabitès had lived an upright life and was a respectable gentleman of excellent character. He informed the secretary that Crabitès was well-qualified for the position because he had theoretical training in French law.3 The United States protested the British conspiracy with Egypt to subrogate Judge Walter Berry, a scheme in which Ambassador Innes selected the replacement and Egypt consented to his choice. The American government recognized that it had been disenfranchised from the process.4 Solicitor Clark condemned the subversion of American wishes to British and Egyptian desires. In a 16 March 1911 letter to Mr. Wilson, Solicitor Clark complained that the Egyptian government had ignored American sentiment by designating Crabitès. Clark reasoned that this method undermined American freedom of deciding upon nominees for the Mixed Courts. The solicitor believed that should this manner of appointment continue in the future, the United States would be reduced to merely acquiescing to those candidates endorsed by the British administration in Egypt.5 The practice persisted, causing the United States much dissatisfaction. The

3 State Department Document 883.05/44: From Justice E.D. White to Secretary of State, Washington D.C. 24 February 1911. 4 State Department Document 883.05/32: From Peter Jay, Consul-General in Cairo, to the Secretary of State Knox in Washington D.C. 21 February 1911. 5 State Department Document 883.05/45: From Solicitor Clark to Mr. Wilson. 16 March 1911.

73 Americans were powerless to alter the situation, as the United States had long ago placed Egypt within a British sphere of influence. This impaired Crabitès’s prospects for advancement, as the British dominated the courts. Before Crabitès could be officially appointed to the Mixed Courts, he had to personally satisfy President Taft and American Consul-General Peter Augustus Jay, of his suitability for the position. Designees to the Mixed Courts traditionally informed the American Agency and Consulate-General of their qualifications. Crabitès assured the president and consul-general of his experience with the French Code and the Napoleonic Civil Code, as well as his knowledge of French. Fluency in French had been a sticking point for earlier nominees to the post. It had been problematic for the Americans to locate men experienced in French law and also conversant in French. Louisiana was the only state where one could locate many lawyers knowledgeable of the French Code and fluent in French; these men were generally both Catholic and Creole. Ambassador Innes corresponded with Secretary of State Philander Knox, expressing his approbation for Crabitès. Chief Justice Edward D. White also suggested Crabitès’s name to the secretary of state, having already taken exception to several names submitted as possible candidates to replace Judge Berry.6 Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs Hussein Rushdi ultimately confirmed Crabitès, assigning him to a Court of First Instance at Cairo. Rushdi had difficulty rejecting any aspirant that the British had already hand-picked, especially when the British judicial advisor essentially dictated Egyptian policy towards the courts. While the United States tolerated British and Egyptians scheming to designate Crabitès, they regarded it as an infringement of their rights and labored to discontinue this method of nominating a successor. The American government demanded a more pronounced voice over their own affairs, for the United States considered Crabitès an international diplomat. He lived and

6 State Department Document 883.05/44: From Chief Justice Edward D. White to Secretary of State Knox in Washington D.C. 24 February 1911.

74 worked under the rules and regulations governing diplomats.7 The United States thought that the process, as it existed, meant nothing more than having them endorse those men favorable to the British.8 The United States government eventually surrendered to British demands for the promotion of Crabitès and let the matter go. A couple of salient factors led to this decision. First, the counselor to the Department of State reminded the secretary of state that the United States had failed bring this subject up in the past when the Egyptian government followed a more irregular manner of choosing new American judges, as in the case of Judge Berry and Judge Tuck. Second, the counselor acknowledged that Crabitès was a deserving candidate with the patronage of principal American political figures like Senator Foster of Louisiana and Chief Justice White.9 Egypt clarified the misunderstanding between it, the United States, and Great Britain over the assignment of judges to the Mixed Courts. The Egyptian government issued a statement declaring that it alone had the right to appoint a successor because the United States concluded Great Britain was responsible for this fiasco concerning the nomination of a replacement for Judge Berry.10 Although Egypt could legitimately contend that only it promoted judges, British influence in the decision-making process was omnipresent. For example, it was the custom for the British judicial advisor to visit those countries with vacancies on the Mixed Courts to find an acceptable substitute. With the help of the British embassy, the judicial advisor informed the Egyptian government of his preference. It was then that the Egyptian government officially designated a judge to the open seat.11

7 State Department Document 883.05/65: From H. Garland Dupré, Representative, 2nd Louisiana District to William J. Bryan, Secretary of State, Washington D.C. 15 April 1913. State Department Document 883.05/65: From Chandler Hale, Third Assistant Secretary of State, to Secretary of the Treasury, Washington D.C. 18 April 1913. State Department Document 883.05/66: From Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to Secretary of State Bryan, Washington D.C. 23 April 1913. 8 State Department Document 883.05/45: From Solicitor Clark to Mr. Wilson. 16 March 1911. 9 State Department Document 883.05/47: From the Counselor of the Department of State to the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. 10 May 1911. 10 State Department Document 883.05/49: From Peter A. Jay, Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, to the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. 20 June 1911. 11 Ibid.

75 Egypt before Crabitès Egypt’s geographical location almost invites conquest. As early as 1798, Europeans had sought to control the land of the pharaohs. No native Egyptian ruled their own homeland from the time of the Alexandrine Greeks down through Gemal Abdul Nasser’s 1952 Revolution. This alien presence in Egypt permeated all aspects of society, from the fellaheen, or the Egyptian peasantry, to the governing elite. Prior to the appearance of Western powers on Egyptian soil, the Ottoman Empire held dominion over the land of the pharaohs. The Ottomans remained in Egypt for centuries, beginning with Sultan Selim I’s conquest of the Mamlouk Empire in 1517. Envisioning himself as a second Alexander, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798. Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt was short-lived, but Egypt’s relationship with the West facilitated the most advanced economy in the Middle East. In just a few short years, Napoleon encouraged the modernization of Egypt. He introduced printing presses to help establish Egypt as the intellectual center in the Middle East. Napoleon also brought to Egypt the first archaeologists to decipher hieroglyphics and advocated the modernization of many Egyptian institutions. The British allied with the Ottomans to force the French out of Egypt. The Ottoman sultan dispatched an Albanian mercenary named Muhammad Ali to help dislodge Napoleon from Egypt. Muhammad Ali remained in Egypt and defeated his Mamlouk rivals, taking the title of pasha, or governor, of Egypt.12 Muhammad Ali founded a Turko-Albanian dynasty in Egypt, which survived until 1952. Muhammad Ali recruited European engineers and advisors to work in Egypt. While this practice facilitated the modernization Egypt, it also provoked indignation amongst ordinary Egyptians. Foreigners had accepted great benefits to relocate to Egypt.13

12 By this point in Egyptian history, the term Mamlouk referred to the ruling elite. Previously, Mamlouks had been slave soldiers. 13 J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1953), 52-61.

76 The grandson of Muhammad Ali, Ismail Pasha, transformed Egypt into a forward-looking state. With the aid of Ferdinand de Lesseps, Ismail initiated the construction of the Suez Canal. Along with Prime Minister Nubar Bughus Pasha, an Armenian Christian, he also conceived the Mixed Courts. The much-maligned Ismail was a gentleman farmer before becoming the khedive. An intelligent and charismatic man, Ismail patterned himself after his grandfather Muhammad Ali. Convinced Egypt could only realize its potential by bringing itself up to date, Ismail incurred enormous debts from European banks. With these loans, he enhanced irrigation, thus placing more agricultural land under the plow, and yet Egyptian agriculture remained remarkably labor-intensive. Ismail wanted to cultivate sugar and cotton to attract foreign capital to improve Egypt’s infrastructure by building roads, railroads, bridges and harbors. The khedive also enhanced brokerages, banking and marketing services in Egypt for the express purpose of bringing in foreign capital.14 Ismail laid the foundation for modern Egypt, but he also greatly exacerbated Egypt’s debt. Most of the khedive’s loans belonged to British banks. For all intents and purposes, foreigners dominated Egypt’s financial and commercial superstructure. The khedive owed only a minor fraction of this debt to American creditors. Drawn by dreams of high profits and the Capitulations, many foreigners relocated to Egypt. These European money lenders held excessive clout over Ismail and his government. Their special status also included capitulatory rights. The Capitulations were a leading impetus for Egyptian nationalism. The nascent period of Egyptian nationalism stemmed from the resentment of foreign interference in domestic affairs. Ismail was a ruthless autocrat, willing to banish or murder those who defied him. He surrounded himself with fellow Turco-Circassians, who considered themselves as part of an Ottoman governing class rather than native Egyptians, even though they were generations removed. These Turco- Circassians, also known as mamlouks, greatly outnumbered native Egyptians in

14 Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, 61. 182 Roland Oliver and G.N. Sanderson eds., The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. 6 From 1870 to 1905. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 592.

77 Ismail’s mostly hereditary bureaucracy. They regarded native Egyptians with ill will and contempt. Interestingly, native Egyptians were able to exert some power from the ulama’a, mostly over the masses and in terms of religion; however, it had only minimal influence over Ismail’s Turco-Circassian administration.15 The khedive accomplished much in little time, but Egypt sacrificed exceedingly on its path towards modernity. By 1876, the European powers placed Egypt under the authority of a debt commission, La Caisse de la Dette Publique, thus delivering control over their economy to foreigners. The foreign financial advisors essentially governed alongside Ismail. They taxed the land of the elite, terminated the private exploitation of corvée labor, and nationalized Ismail’s property. The fellaheen suffered under Ismail and his “European Ministry.” The agriculturally-based economy fell victim to poor fiscal planning and a series of catastrophic natural disasters, relegating the fellaheen to virtual starvation.16 Chafing under his “European Ministry,” Ismail unified Egyptians and Turco-Circassians, as he secretly encouraged nationalist sentiment by focusing on foreign control over Egypt. The majlis called for greater participation in the administration of Egypt’s finances; meanwhile, disgruntled military officers assailed Rivers Wilson, Ismail’s English financial advisor, and Nubar Pasha in February of 1879. Ismail personally delivered the two men from the demonstrators. He had clandestinely instigated this action, and used it as justification to replace Nubar as prime minister with his son Tawfiq.17 Ismail thereby instituted his own economic reform, known as the National Program, which returned all nationalized property to private individuals, called for a reduction of the interest on Egypt’s debt, and did away with the surtax on notables’ land. European creditors protested against Ismail for lowering interest rates and called upon the Ottoman sultan to remove Ismail and install his son Muhammad Tawfiq. The Turco-Circassian elite disintegrated into factionalism following the deposal of Ismail, and Mustafa Riyad, Tawfiq’s prime minister, who

183 Roland Oliver and G.N. Sanderson eds., The Cambridge History of Africa, 593-94. 184 Ibid., 595-96. 185 Ibid.

78 was a Turco-Circassian member of the Debt Commission, became the defacto ruler of Egypt for the next two years (September 1879- September 1881) for all intents and purposes. Americans in the Egyptian Army The earliest American experience in Egypt had been neither commercial nor martial but religious. Presbyterian missionaries had first traveled to Egypt in 1854, where they instituted some thirty-six schools.18 The United States established formal relations with Egypt during the American Civil War. Egypt benefited handsomely from the American Civil War when American cotton output plummeted. Demand for cotton remained constant but supply decreased; Egypt gained from the ensuing rise in the price of cotton. During this period, Ismail damaged relations with President Lincoln when he willingly dispatched 500 Sudanese troops to wage war on behalf of the French in Mexico.19 Ismail restored ties with the United States under President Grant when the khedive engaged veteran civil war officers in his Egyptian army. Crabitès’s most celebrated book, Americans in the Egyptian Army, examined this subject. Americans in the Egyptian Army was perhaps Crabitès’s most important scholarly composition, or, at least, his most widely-read work. Unlike many of his other efforts which addressed contemporary themes in international affairs, Americans in the Egyptian Army was an academic history. In fact, Crabitès had been the only scholar to analyze the topic. It chronicled the lives of a number of American officers recruited by the Khedive Ismail to Egypt to facilitate the organization of an Egyptian army along Western lines. Crabitès described the duties of each of these men in the service of the khedive. Ismail needed these Americans during a period when he endeavored to liberate Egypt from French control. Ismail astutely recognized the American effort to push the French out of Mexico and appealed to President Johnson for assistance expelling the French from Egypt. Crabitès postulated that America was the best country to appeal to

186 J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, 59. 187 Ibid.

79 because it was sufficiently powerful to force France out of Mexico, and Ismail assumed that the United States had no hidden agenda for Egypt.20 At a time when Ismail wished to throw off the reins of the Ottoman Empire, he could not approach the United States officially, for America was on good terms with the Ottomans. According to Crabitès, Ismail instead took up the matter unofficially with General Sherman, who located the men appropriate for the task, men who could be attached to the Egyptian army. Many of the soldiers were Southerners serving under the authority of their Northern brethren. Crabitès reasoned that these men were not soldiers of fortune, rather men interested in the betterment of Egypt; and with the aid of the American officers, Egypt would recover the Sudan. 21 For Crabitès, Ismail hoped to liberate the Sudan from slavery and make it accessible to trade. This was a controversial statement, for most historians would argue that Ismail had been compelled by Cromer to emancipate the Sudan. According to Crabitès, the native Egyptian officers concerned Ismail. The khedive suspected that they would find fault with the American officers. French and British pressure thwarted any attempts to place the American officers in positions, such as military attachés, where they could transform the Egyptian army. The British and French endeavored to impose their military advisors upon Egypt, but that left no room for American officers in the Egyptian army. Instead, the Americans conducted mostly scientific fieldwork.22 Other than William “Wing” Loring, who served in Abyssinia in the 1870s, the American officers, for the most part, lacked the necessary authority to command troops; therefore, the Egyptian army never profited from their expertise.23 The “Veiled Protectorate” When Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox, American cotton production expanded once more, reducing the price of Egyptian cotton and propelling the already strained Egyptian economy into a depression. Ismail

188 Pierre Crabitès, Americans in the Egyptian Army. (London: Routledge, 1938), 5. 189 Ibid., 17, 20. 190 Ibid., 45-46. 191 Ethiopia used to be referred to as Abyssinia.

80 found it impossible to repay his debts under these conditions. He was burdened by the usurious interest rates that Europeans had forced him to accept their assistance. In 1876, the Europeans created a commission to supervise Egypt’s obligations. The Caisse de la Dette Publique enabled European domination of Egyptian affairs. Under the Caisse, foreigners expropriated much of the income of the Egyptian economy to pay back the debt and did not invest enough money in Egypt. Still, Ismail fought bankruptcy and offered his own plan for financial solvency instead. Europeans attributed Ismail’s new fiscal policy to his unwillingness to cooperate. Sir Evelyn Baring, who managed a substantial share of Egypt’s liability, persuaded the British to depose the khedive in 1879.24 Ismail’s son Tawfiq succeeded him. Tawfiq lacked his father’s ambition and enjoyed few of his father’s abilities. By 1880, the Law of Liquidation awarded the Caisse de la Dette Publique one half of Egypt’s income, thereby restricting Tawfiq. Suffering from a lack of revenue, there was little Tawfiq could do to improve Egypt. He was under British control and incapable of operating without the sanction of a European advisor. Tawfiq thought it better to side with his creditors than the Egyptian nationalists. This period also witnessed the rise of the Constitutional Movement. Resistance groups, hoping to protect their own interests, formed in response to the egregious economic conditions and arbitrary government action. The 1881 a nationalist revolt by Colonel Ahmed Urabi made Tawfiq replace his Circassian war minister with an Egyptian nationalist, Mahmoud Sami al-Barundi. Less than a year later, nationalist members of the Egyptian army encircled the Abdine Palace and compelled Tawfiq to appoint a liberal cabinet. Under Urabi, the military held considerable sway over Tawfiq’s government. Urabi threatened that Egypt would not reimburse the colonial powers for their loans. Confident that he had the endorsement of Britain and France, Khedive Tawfiq complied with their requests. During the nationalist revolt, resistance groups demanded a constitution guaranteeing certain rights, including the protection of their property

192 Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 69.

81 and franchise. They sought constraints on Tawfiq’s autocracy, chanting “Egypt for the Egyptians.”25 Tawfiq refrained from cooperating with the new administration and when riots erupted in Alexandria, he requested British assistance. He urged the British to help restore his power, assuming they would retreat after they accomplished the mission. The British reacted to Urabi’s intransigence by deploying their army and navy to crush his nationalist uprising. The bombarded Alexandria on 11 June 1882, and the army defeated Urabi at Tall-al-Kabeer on 13 September that same year, establishing the Veiled Protectorate (1882-1914). Although the British intended the intervention to be a temporary measure, British troops remained in Egypt, incorporating it into the British Empire. Britain desired to compensate European bondholders for Egypt’s defaulted loans. Sir Evelyn Baring went to Egypt where he assumed the role of consul general and was accountable only to England.26 Baring dominated Egyptian politics from 1883 to 1907. He exiled Urabi. Baring was unpopular with Egyptians because he was ethnocentric and an arrogant man, often referred to as ‘Over Baring’; however, he balanced Egypt’s budget by showing fiscal discipline. He amended the tax code, repaired irrigation canals, and promoted education, albeit very little at the secondary and university level. Ironically, Baring rehabilitated Egypt’s finances by instituting the reforms previously suggested by the Khedive Ismail, which Baring had rejected while he worked to have Ismail deposed.27 During the “Veiled Protectorate,” the British recognized the Ottoman sultan as the suzerain of Egypt as long as there were no conflicting interests. The British held executive authority in Egypt. Abbas Hilmi II succeeded his father Tawfiq in 1882. He was only sixteen years old when his father died. The young khedive calculated that he could govern Egypt on his own, and he distanced himself from Lord Cromer, the former Sir Evelyn Baring. Lord Cromer cautioned Abbas, threatening to depose him

193 Ibid., 72. 194 Arthur Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt: Formation of a Nation-State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 39. 195 Al-Sayid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, 69.

82 should he step out of line. Abbas’s subordination to Cromer, as well as the fear of harsh reprisals should he not follow orders, prompted him to clandestinely finance the nationalist movement.

Lord Cromer improved Egypt’s finances to the detriment of industrial and agricultural production. No longer did the Egyptian fellaheen cultivate a variety of crops. The new economy under Cromer revolved around one cash crop, cotton. Instead of stimulating the development of new industries, Cromer encouraged commerce based on the production of raw materials begun under Muhammad Ali.28 Under this monocrop economy, Egypt’s wealth flowed to the West. So while Cromer balanced Egypt’s financial ledger, he also destroyed Muhammad Ali and Ismail’s dreams of modernizing Egypt to compete in an industrial society, setting Egypt back decades.

The French were at odds with the British concerning their administration of Egypt under the “Veiled Protectorate.” The French had an inherently divergent perspective of imperialism in Africa. They shared many of the same motives for imperialism as the British, including the spread of Christianity, economic imperialism, strategic concerns, military technology and intellectual justifications like Kipling’s White man’s burden or a mission civilsatrice. There was, however, a disconnect between the British and French concerning their method of managing colonized lands. For instance, the French generally approached imperialism through direct rule, in which French officials presided over lands from the governor all the way down to the local level. They also followed a policy of assimilation to acculturate indigenous peoples. The British generally administered to Africans through indirect rule, which allowed for there to be some native control at the local level. While the British incorporated Africans in governance, they set up strict policies of segregation. In general, Crabitès abhorred all forms of imperialism, for “European Imperialism changed Islamic tolerance and made an appeal to Islamic religious fanaticism.”29

196 Ibid., 78. 197 Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” 663.

83 Crabitès believed that the French had made a greater impact on the culture of the Middle East than the British. The French had been able to spread their culture throughout Middle Eastern lands, even in those countries conquered by the British. Crabitès recognized that Middle Easterners preferred to speak French rather than English: “I observed the same phenomena in a 1907 trip to Egypt and Palestine.”30 He attributed the dissemination of French culture with the Jesuit mission, which was humanitarian rather than sectarian: “The Jesuits represent the overt French culture, occidental civilization and European advancement.”31 Their missionary efforts were not solely restricted to the conversion of Muslims to the Gospel but the propagation of Western erudition. This process began with the first capitulatory agreements between the French and the Ottomans in the Middle Ages, which provided France with the opportunity to defend Catholics in the Middle East.32 Francis I made France the spokesperson for Levantine (Oriental) Catholics. No other Catholic states were directly involved in the Middle East at the time, so Catholic representation in the Middle East became synonymous with Gallicanism.33 According to Crabitès, the French eventually gave up trying to convert Muslims to Catholicism. They arrested their antagonism of Islam and concentrated on spreading science and wisdom in its place. Crabitès described French prestige in the Middle East, It taught men and women to lead better lives. By precept and example it won new friends every year. But it gained them for Occidental civilization, for Western ideals and for French letters. In a word it burned incense to France, chose Paris as its intellectual Rome and made first the Fleur de Lys and then the Tricolor the banner to which it owned obedience.34

198 Ibid., 600. 199 Ibid., 601. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid., 602. 202Ibid., 603.

84 Bringing the debate closer to home, Crabitès examined the resiliency of French culture in the Middle East: “It has not been thwarted by the political leadership of England in Egypt.”35 He concluded, As a consequence of the prevalence of French culture in the Levant, when Turkey and Egypt decided to modernize their laws, they copied those of France. Therefore, there grew up strong bodies of men throughout the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt who acquired, as they thought, a vested right to earn their living by the practice of French law.36 France resisted British policy decisions until the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale in 1904. Previously, the French had made an effort to assert some influence in Egypt and the Sudan. France strove to annex the White Nile, thus threatening the Egyptian water supply and lifeblood. Before the accord, the French had resisted any maneuver on behalf of the Anglo-Egyptian government. The Entente Cordiale established a more conciliatory relationship between France and Britain regarding their governance of Egypt. At the time, both imperial powers were pursuing an understanding about their colonial interests. Signing the Entente Cordiale unencumbered the British to concentrate on their overseas possessions. France no longer concerned the British in Africa. The Entente Cordiale conferred more freedom of action for the British in Egypt. It also permitted unrestricted use of the Suez for the major powers. This was of paramount strategic importance to the British, who required a shortened route to their colonial crown jewel, India. The British still continued to stress their dominance on certain issues, often indirectly forcing Egypt to concede to their wishes over imperial communications, defense, the Sudan, and the Capitulations. British governance of Egypt infuriated Crabitès. He considered their dominance of Egypt a disservice to the nationalist desires of the Egyptians. Crabitès did not judge Egyptian nationalism to be part of the broader movement of Arab nationalism. Rather, he postulated that Egyptian nationalism was

203 Ibid. 204 Ibid., 605.

85 uniquely Egyptian, something that even predated Islam. For Crabitès, this Egyptian nationalism was more akin to Pharaonic nationalism. Crabitès associated Coptic Egyptians with the pharaohs. Not only were the Copts Christian, but they were the descendants of the pharaohs. Christian Arabs had played a critical role in Arab nationalism, Qawmiyya; however, as in the case of Egypt, Wataniyya, the nationalism of an individual state, Crabitès argued that the non-Muslims residing in Egypt like Armenians, Copts, and Jews, were not interested in Egyptian nationalism, “The result of this mental boycott was that the Nationalist aspirations of Egypt for a time lacked proper driving power. There was plenty of steam but compression was not at its best.”37 Historical conditions present in Egypt distinguished it from the other Arab states, and the brand of nationalism espoused in Egypt was distinctively Egyptian rather than Arab. Problems with the Selection of Judges When Crabitès arrived in Egypt in 1911, it was a backwater in terms of American diplomacy and foreign policy. The United States government placed Egypt within a British sphere of influence to avoid conflict with Europeans over the Middle East. It was the British who protected American companies in Egypt. They had much more power and authority in the country and the United States preferred to defer to them, but the British were not always the dominant foreign power in Egypt. British policy concerns, connections, and Crabitès’s natural ability coalesced in 1911 to facilitate his appointment to the Mixed Courts. Neither the British nor the Egyptians conducted a thorough background investigation of Crabitès. They would have immediately recognized that the Creole heritage of this Bourbon Democrat did not harmonize with the British occupation of Egypt. The British would later object to the United States nominating candidates from Louisiana to the Mixed Courts, largely because of their experience with Crabitès. They then complained that it was difficult to locate qualified candidates in the

205 Crabitès, “Spiritual Empire of France,” 605

86 United States who both had an understanding of French law and could speak French. Prior to his fortuitous meeting with British Ambassador Innes, Crabitès’s name was not in consideration for the assignment. Instead, Mr. Van Dyne was the frontrunner for the American nomination; however, certain factors worked in Crabitès’s favor. Ambassador Innes approved of Crabitès’s appointment. For example, Chief Justice White objected to Mr. Van Dyne and supported Crabitès. Senator Foster of Louisiana, one of Crabites’s political contacts, endorsed the young attorney. Crabitès had strong backing from Democrat politicians in the South. Although he eventually consented to the appointment of Crabitès, Peter Augustus Jay, Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, disapproved of the manner in which the British essentially nominated Crabitès. Jay denounced the British for their involvement in the selection process. The Egyptian government never consulted him regarding a replacement for Judge Berry. The situation greatly frustrated him because he was powerless to affect change in Egypt. He truly desired the power to affect the appointment. The British and Egyptians had already set a precedent for this sort of conduct. In 1886, the Egyptians had attempted to persuade President Grover Cleveland to acquiesce to their choice for the American seat on the Mixed Courts.38 The United States already had difficulty elevating their barristers to the Court of Appeals. At the time of Berry’s promotion to the Mixed Courts, Lord Cromer had threatened to overturn the appointment of Judge Tuck should the United States nominate him to the Court of Appeals.39 Much like Crabitès, Berry secured his seat on the Mixed Courts through personal contacts, rather than any formal process conducted by the American government.40 Berry was well acquainted with one of the secretaries to the British embassy in Washington D.C.

206 State Department Document 883.05/45: From Solicitor Clark in Washington D.C. to Mr. Wilson. 16 March 1911. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid.

87 In a fall of 1910 meeting with the Solicitor of the Department of State, Peter A. Jay endorsed another candidate for the position, most likely Mr. Van Dyne. No other names had been mentioned as leading contenders to replace Judge Berry. It shocked Jay to discover that his support for Van Dyne had been reversed by the British Ambassador to the United States Mitchell Innes. Disillusioned by the method of appointment, Jay held the British accountable. Jay condemned the procedure and described the British practice of nominating a successor to an open seat on the Mixed Courts. He explained that the custom was for the British judicial advisor to call on those countries with vacancies on the Mixed Courts. According to the consul general, the British judicial advisor worked directly with British embassies to find the appropriate candidate, preferably someone Anglo-Saxon and pro-British. Once the judicial advisor settled on a suitable applicant, he was then officially promoted to the courts by the Egyptian government. While this might have been a typical scenario, Jay explained that in the cases of Berry and Crabitès, the judicial advisor deferred to the British ambassador in Washington.41 After tedious negotiations between the United States, Egypt, and Great Britain, the American government officially designated Crabitès as the legatee to Walter Berry on 24 April 1911. Later recalling this event, Crabitès remarked, “It was April, 1911, that President Taft sent me to Egypt to represent the United States on the bench of the Cairo International Tribunal. I was an unreconstructed rebel, a Bourbon Democrat and in my early thirties.”42 Crabitès remained steadfast to the values and customs of Louisiana that existed prior to the American Civil War. While Secretary of State Philander C. Knox accepted the promotion of Crabitès to the Mixed Courts, he criticized Hussein Rushdi Pasha, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, for not consulting with him before assigning a successor. Philander C. Knox recommended that Egypt review its procedure,

209 State Department Document 883.05/49: From Peter Jay, Consul-General in Cairo, to Secretary of State Knox in Washington D.C. 30 May 1911. 210 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 1.

88 lest the United States refuse to yield to Egypt’s suggested nominee.43 This argument resurfaced when Crabitès applied for a seat on the Court of Appeals in Alexandria some seven years later. A Bourbon Democrat in Egypt For Crabitès, life as an attorney in New Orleans lacked meaning. He clearly had greater aspirations. He ultimately pursued a high-ranking diplomatic position, evidenced by his numerous applications for employment with the State Department and Office of Strategic Services. Crabitès desired a measure of notoriety in international diplomacy. Leaving a quiet and comfortable life in New Orleans for the Cairo bench was a momentous decision. Crabitès was an industrious, life-long student. Although he never possessed a healthy constitution, he desired to improve his intellect. Traveling to Egypt offered Crabitès the perfect occasion to begin his “post-graduate course in general culture and foreign affairs,” taking up from where he left off after his years studying in Europe.44 Up to this point, Crabitès had only evaluated themes in American and European affairs. Egypt provided Crabitès with the opportunity to become one of America’s foremost authorities on the Middle East. Soon after accepting the post, Crabitès put his affairs in order and quitted New Orleans for the land of the pharaohs. He, his wife Charlotte, and their young son Henry, boarded a steamer in New Orleans bound for Cairo. Young Henry Crabitès would mature while in Egypt, as his father’s appointment lasted from 1911 until 1936. In 1936, Crabitès resolved to return to his roots in Louisiana after 25 years in Egypt. He no longer believed he had the possibility to advance his career through the Mixed Courts. The Capitulations and the Mixed Courts of Egypt The Mixed Courts of Egypt came under the purview of the Capitulations, legal agreements between the Ottoman Empire and foreign countries dating back to the sixteenth century when Suleiman the Lawgiver first awarded them to Francis I of France. At the pinnacle of their empire, the Ottomans could easily

211 State Department Document 883.05/54: From Secretary of State Knox in Washington D.C. to Hussein Rushdi Pasha, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Egypt. 8 August 1911. 212 Crabitès, “Israel Out of Egypt,” 1.

89 afford to furnish foreigners with these commercial advantages. Foreign trade was imperative to the well-being of the Ottoman economy, but Europeans were reluctant to do business in the Ottoman Empire unless they received a guarantee of protection from arbitrary government action. The Capitulations exempted foreigners from Ottoman taxation and granted them freedom of religion without fear of persecution. In exchange for the Capitulations, foreigners took up residence in the Ottoman Empire and traded with the Ottomans. Long before the Protestant Reformation, Christians began ignoring the Bible’s pronouncements against usury.45 They started extending credit and charged interest. As Muslims in the Ottoman Empire still adhered to the Qur’an’s prohibitions against usury, Christians living in the Ottoman Empire loaned money and charged exorbitant interest rates.46 This placed Muslims at a commercial disadvantage because they were indisposed to loan money save when they could foresee a profit. The Ottomans forfeited their riches to Christians under the Capitulations, engendering much animosity towards foreigners. Often, many Ottoman Jews and Christians purchased foreign citizenship, or berats, from these European countries so that they too could benefit from the Capitulations. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Egypt, an Ottoman territory, forfeited even more power to the Capitulations, and resident aliens in Egypt habitually abused them. Foreigners in Egypt controlled much of the wealth in the country, yet they assumed such a modest tax burden under the Capitulations that the fellaheen picked up the slack. A Brief Background on the Mixed Courts of Egypt There was a total of four judicial systems in Egypt, Shari’a courts, Mixed Courts, personal status courts, and the mejlis, which were the khedive’s administrative courts. The Mixed Courts of Egypt were the brainchild of the Armenian-born Foreign Minister of Egypt, Nubar Pasha, in 1876. Nubar Pasha conceived of the Mixed Courts because of a demand for a separate court system

213 Exodus 22:25-27. Leviticus 25:35-37. Deuteronomy 23:19,20. Matthew 25:14-29. Luke 19:11- 26 214 Qur’an 2:275, 2:276, 3:130.

90 to accommodate foreigners conducting business in Egypt. They were also a reform instituted to curb the power of the European consuls living in Egypt. Egyptian Muslims were not averse to creating an independent judiciary for foreigners, as most of the foreigners residing in Egypt were not Muslims, but Christians and Jews. The Shari’a, or Islamic law, had been designed for Muslims only; therefore, non-Muslims were beyond the Shari’a’s purview.47 Non-Muslims traditionally had their own courts under the Ottomans. Under the millet system, the Ottomans considered non-Muslims second-class citizens, or dhimmi. The dhimmi were legally protected religious minorities within the Ottoman Empire. And the millet system provided separate legal courts for all non-Muslim minorities. The Ottoman sultan appointed a religious patriarch to supervise each millet. So long as a millet remained loyal to the sultan, religious patriarchs maintained power over their own communities. In a similar manner that the millet system protected the dhimmi, Egypt developed the Mixed Courts to safeguard the rights of foreigners. The jurisdiction of native Egyptian courts did not apply to commerce when foreigners were involved. The founders of the Mixed Courts substituted foreign laws in lieu of the Shari’a. Egyptians endeavored to segregate commercial affairs from the native Egyptian courts, for they felt these cases did not merit the Shari’a’s involvement.48 The Mixed Courts had authority over three basic types of suits, including those involving litigants from different countries, lawsuits between foreigners and Egyptians, and claims by non-natives against the Egyptian government which also fell under their jurisdiction. The courts were an institution erected for foreigners in Egypt to guard against unreasonable government action. The development of the Mixed Courts of Egypt had a precedent. They were based upon the Mixed Courts of Commerce of Constantinople and incorporated two types of law, the French Code and the Napoleonic Code. The Mixed Courts employed the French Code in commercial cases and adapted the

215 Jasper Y. Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 4. 216 Mark Hoyle, Mixed Courts of Egypt. (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), 7.

91 Napoleonic Civil Code to conditions in Egypt. They also integrated Aristotelian , an aspect not found in the French Code.49 Aristotelian Natural Law states that just laws occur naturally in nature. These just laws can be discovered but never created, or they can surface through a process of conflict resolution. While these two notions differ, they share one binding commonality, that they are innate to nature rather than being formed by man. Precedent was not as important to the law of the Mixed Courts as in English Common Law. Judge of the Court of Appeals in Alexandria, Jasper Y. Brinton, said of precedent, “It is true that, in general, the judge was free to decide each case presented to him without being bound by the decisions rendered by others.”50 The testimony of witnesses was not as crucial as concrete evidence in these courts. Founders of the Mixed Courts preferred French law for multiple reasons. French was the lingua franca of Egypt, and the French Code could be incorporated into the Mixed Courts without difficulty.51 During the nascent years of the Mixed Courts, judges were not always distinguished. Much like nomination of men to diplomatic positions, countries often assigned men to the Mixed Courts as political favors. The Mixed Courts also became a repository for politicians removed from their previous jobs. The courts were a place to send less-desirable men. Eventually, the commercial progress of Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century placed enormous strain on the courts, for they attended to most of the economic activity in Egypt. The Egyptian government realized the implications of having an unqualified judiciary charged with accommodating the increasing commercial activity. Egypt pressured member nations of the Mixed Courts to nominate better-qualified judges capable of managing the increased burdens of the court, and they responded by sending men of the highest caliber like Crabitès.52 Those fortunate enough to be designated to the Mixed Courts were some of the most eminent justices that the United States and Europe had to offer.

217 Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt, 95. 218 Ibid., 93. 219 Hoyle, Mixed Courts of Egypt, 16. 220 State Department Document 883.05/49: From Peter Jay, Consul-General in Cairo, to Secretary of State Knox in Washington D.C. 30 May 1911.

92 They had to meet strict requirements just to be considered for the bench. Prerequisites for a seat on the Mixed Courts included a command of French, as well as knowledge of the French Code and the Napoleonic Civil Code; the right political connections helped as well. Mixed Courts Court of Appeals Justice Jasper Y. Brinton affirmed, “From the outset the Mixed Courts were a success. The judicial posts were considered attractive, and the foreign powers nominated for them sufficient jurists of the first rank to give standing and character to the institution.”53 Like members of the Supreme Court of the United States, those on the Mixed Courts enjoyed permanent positions, eliminating political pressure from their native countries. They were paid handsomely for their expertise, as Mixed Courts justices fared better than their European and American counterparts. In fact, Crabitès commanded a salary of 30,000 francs per annum when he first joined the courts.54 He also had a pension equal to one-fifth of his annual salary. Most notably, Crabitès lived under the Capitulations, as well as the rules and regulations governing diplomats, providing him with certain immunities from Egyptian interference.55 Technically, the Egyptian government had the most prominent voice in the appointment process. In reality, however, the British stealthily worked behind the scenes to control nominations. Expecting a vacancy on the courts, the British would oftentimes search for a replacement on their own accord, rather than permitting the retiring judge’s respective country to do so. In order for one to survive these proceedings, they had to submit to a litmus test ensuring that they were pro-British. British sanction was significant, as they indirectly determined appointees to the Mixed Courts. The State Department recognized the British control over the Mixed Courts and the selection process. Countries did not designate men on their qualifications alone, as political connections played a vital role in the procedure. Solicitor Clark described American dissatisfaction with the manner in

221 Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt, 27. 222 State Department Document 883.05/32: Hussein Ruschdi in Cairo to American Secretary of State in Washington D.C. 21 February 1911. 223 Ibid.

93 which judges had been promoted to the Mixed Courts. Clark recounted the method that Judge Berry had been designated to the Mixed Courts. He recalled that Judge Berry received his post because of the relationship he had with a secretary to the British Embassy in Washington D.C. Clark believed that Crabitès had secured his seat on the Mixed Courts in the same manner as Judge Berry.56 To a degree, he was correct, for Crabitès’s connections facilitated his encounter with Innes; however, the onus was on him to impress the British ambassador. At the inauguration of the Mixed Courts in 1876, only the major Capitulatory Powers could send judges to the Court of Appeals in Alexandria. The Great Powers included France, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Austria, Russia, and the United States. The Lesser Powers, such as Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland assigned referees to lower district courts. Each of the fourteen Capitulatory Powers had two district court justices. As one might think, the distribution of seats on in the Mixed Courts was politically sensitive, so the charter attempted to prevent a prevalence of judges from any one nation.57 Later, the British would circumvent the original contract of the Mixed Courts to stack the courts with their appointees, providing them with undue influence over the judiciary. Justices spent the first few years adjusting to their new positions and resolving minor complications. This was a time when Egypt was bankrupt and lacked the revenue to satisfy the Caisse de la Dette Publique. The Caisse de la Dette Publique filed suit against the Egyptian government before the Mixed Courts. They sought a diplomatic solution to the loans the khedive incurred, but the Mixed Courts exacerbated Egypt’s finances by siding with the European creditors over the Egyptian government. Most importantly, the Mixed Courts provided the Caisse with the legitimacy that it needed to prolong these inequitable credit arrangements.58

224 Ibid. 225 Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt, 49. 226 Hoyle, Mixed Courts of Egypt, 35.

94 During their second decade, the Mixed Courts settled several important cases. In a trial involving the Daira Sanieh, Ismail’s estates in Upper Egypt, the Mixed Courts insisted that its jurisdiction depended upon the nature of the claim, not necessarily the litigants concerned. This suit successfully established the Mixed Courts’ purview over the native Egyptian courts in certain instances. In a court case involving the Ottoman Bank, the Mixed Courts extended their prerogative over commercial affairs to international businesses. The Ottoman Bank maintained that it was outside of the Mixed Courts’ authority because it was headquartered in Istanbul. The courts conceded that the Ottoman Bank was an Ottoman corporation, but it was also located in Egypt, where it regularly conducted business; it fell under the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts. Foreigners utilized Egyptian government services gratis while living in the country. The Egyptian fellaheen taxpayers paid for these benefits. The Mixed Courts delivered a decision in 1894 regarding the government levies against foreigners. The Capitulations exempted foreigners residing in Egypt from taxation. At the same time, British Parliament had charged Cromer with returning Egypt to solvency. Assessing foreigners would have certainly amended Cromer’s finance ledger, and the British endorsed Egypt’s request to do so. The British persuaded the other Capitulatory Powers to permit an indirect tax of their citizens in Egypt. In 1894, the Mixed Courts ruled that Egypt could not directly tax these foreigners since that would be in violation of the Capitulations, but it was permissible for the Egyptian government to indirectly tax foreigners.59 As the power of the courts grew over time, petitions deluged the courts. By the mid-1890s, the Mixed Courts had to limit the number of cases they would hear. Although flooded by a massive amount of litigation, the Mixed Courts expanded the breadth of its jurisdiction. They began accepting lawsuits involving trademark disputes. The courts sought to protect both the producers of goods and consumers by developing the field of trademark law. They also attempted to shield the illiterate and prevent fraud.60

227 Ibid., 59. 228 Ibid., 73.

95 By 1905, the Mixed Courts incorporated English as an official language of the court, along with Italian, French, and Arabic. To the dismay of the British who lobbied for the inclusion of English, so very few of the litigants in Egypt actually spoke the language that it was never fully integrated into the system. The British had presumed that if English was an official language of the courts it would enhance their influence, but it did little to elevate their legal authority.61 The Mixed Courts survived this chaotic period of their inauguration, and weathering this difficult period in Egyptian history instilled confidence in the courts. At the turn of the century, the Mixed Courts were a well-established institution. They had an unquestioned reputation, and the courts continued hearing suits unhindered during the British protectorate over Egypt. The Mixed Courts were fortunate throughout this period because they avoided the anti- British propaganda of the Egyptian nationalists. Instead of being a victim of nationalist wrath, Egyptians viewed the courts as an instrument to correct the injustice they suffered from the British. In 1911, the Mixed Courts approved Law No. 17, which established the right for Egypt to institute new laws affecting foreigners without the approbation of the Capitulatory Powers. Now, Egypt could pass laws concerning foreigners with only the approval of the Mixed Courts’ General Assembly. This greatly accelerated the process by which laws affecting foreigners were implemented.

The British remained in Egypt for strategic and economic reasons. They wanted to safeguard the Suez Canal, as it was the quickest route to India. The British also stayed in Egypt for commerce. In order to repay Egypt’s massive debt to their European creditors, they endeavored to rehabilitate Egyptian finances. Unfortunately, certain historical conditions present in Egypt inhibited economic growth. The Egyptian economy was unable to thrive under the Capitulations.

229 Ibid., 79.

96 CHAPTER 4- AN AMERICAN IN CAIRO

British Administration of Egypt Long-term European ascendancy left Egypt damaged and scarred; it would take Egypt generations to overcome European intervention. Europeans promoted the program of modernization adopted by Muhammad Ali and his grandson Ismail that propelled Egypt to the forefront of the Middle East, and by the late nineteenth century, Egypt was among the avant-garde of Middle Eastern states and a cultural center of the Arab world. 1 Mustafa Riyad instituted fiscal reforms to satisfy his European creditors, including the appropriation of approximately half of Egypt’s revenue for Egypt’s foreign creditors. By doing so, Riyad garnered the consent of the European financial controllers to reduce the interest on Egypt’s debt to five percent. Unfortunately, while Riyad harvested European good will, he inadvertently instigated domestic opposition from such groups as Egyptian nationalists and Islamic reformers, who attacked Riyad in the interest of patriotism, constitutionalism and Islam. Some of these nationalists assailed Riyad as a representative of European interests, insisting on the re-establishment of Egyptian financial independence. Riyad suppressed such resistance as ruthlessly as Ismail.2 In January of 1881, Colonel Ahmad Urabi, leader of a group of wronged officers, called for the replacement of War Minister Uthman Rifqi. Within a month, Urabi had been arrested and court-martialed. His soldiers reacted to the news by storming the War Office and securing his release. The army subsequently rejected the khedive’s commands to intercede, so Tawfiq had no option but to restore Urabi; meanwhile, dismissing Uthman Rifqi. This officers’ movement recognized Riyad’s disbanding of the army, which abandoned Egypt to foreign invasion, as retaliation for their actions. The officers’ movement became more patriotic and jihadist. They demanded greater pay and an

1 William R. Polk, The Arab World. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 134. 2 Roland Oliver and G.N. Sanderson eds., The Cambridge History of Africa, 599-601.

97 enhanced military, which was at variance with foreign control over the Egyptian economy. In September of 1881, Urabi marched on Abdine Palace and insisted that Tawfiq remove Riyad’s ministry and called for the reinstatement of the majlis. With little authority over the army, Tawfiq readily consented. Egyptians widely credited Urabi for these positive developments.3 In January of 1882, the British and French issued a “joint note,” threatening to withdraw their support from the khedive. Egyptian nationalists believed the note was designed to intimidate them under the menace of armed intervention. The majlis responded to the “joint note” by attempting to manage the part of the Egyptian budget not allocated for debt repayment. The majlis also insisted that Tawfiq appoint Urabi as war minister and Mahmoud Sami as prime minister. Sami’s ministry became the first with a preponderance of native Egyptians rather than Turco-Circassians. This new ministry was characterized by an unwillingness to agree to foreign economic control beyond the dept service. Concerned about protecting their interests in Egypt, the British began to view a military solution as their only recourse to Egyptian intransigence. Urabi had sought to destroy the Turco-Circassian hold over Egypt. The khedive was disinclined to consent with Urabi’s radical reorganization of the army, which promoted the replacement of many Turco-Circassians with native Egyptians while dispatching other Turco-Circassians to the Sudan. The majlis sided with Urabi, who had seized the khedive’s authority for all intents and purposes.4 The British deployed their army to Egypt in the name of quelling Colonel Ahmed Urabi’s military coup in 1882. Their occupation of Egypt was intended to be only temporary. The geo-political rationale for British intrusion centered around control of the Suez Canal and the Nile River, but there were other considerations including religious and economic motives for their imperialism. The Suez played an important role in world trade, and the Nile is the lifeblood of Egypt and the Sudan. Britain and France had clashed over Africa well before the Great War, and the British succeeded in preventing France from dominating

3 Ibid., 601-03. 4 Ibid., 603-05.

98 Northeast Africa when she prevailed at the Fashoda Incident of 1898. However, it was not until the Anglo-French entente of 1904 that the British came to a clear understanding with the French about their respective roles in Egypt. After years of criticizing the British, the French finally suspended their calls for an end to the occupation and permitted the British a greater role in the administration of Egypt. The British proclaimed their occupation of Egypt the “Veiled Protectorate.” Although the Egyptians technically maintained authority over their country, the reality was that the British attached “advisors” to Egyptian officials, who were incapable of declining their advice. Lord Cromer, the former Sir Evelyn Barring, justified such action under the cloak of efficiency. To check the growth of Egyptian nationalism, Cromer deliberately founded institutions incapable of surviving without British assistance.5 The British invasion of Egypt dealt a severe blow to the nationalist movement. British intelligence had been aware of negotiations between the khedive and the Ottoman sultan to grant Egypt full sovereignty, but British interference nullified this plan.6 Tawfiq was a pawn during the British occupation of Egypt, maintaining his position so long as he proved to be a pliant tool of the British. Previously, Muhammad Ali and Ismail had the opportunity to secure their autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, but European involvement frustrated their efforts. Lord Cromer, British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, became the defacto ruler of Egypt in 1883. While did much to rehabilitate the Egyptian economy during the “Veiled Protectorate,” he did little to foster education and reduced the native Egyptian role in politics. Cromer was able to achieve solvency, not by instituting higher taxation, but through the strict management of expenditure.7 British Prime Minister Gladstone adopted a decidedly laissez-faire attitude towards Egypt. As a member of the Liberal Party, he had endorsed the

5 A.D. Roberts ed., The Cambridge History of Africa: 1905-1940, vol. 7, 742-43. David Steele, “Britain and Egypt 1882-1914,” in Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East: The Anglo- Egyptian Experience, 1882-1982, Keith M. Wilson ed. (London: Mansell Publishing, 1983), 16-18. 6 Steele, “Britain and Egypt 1882-1914,” 6. 7 Polk, The Arab World, 137. Roland Oliver and G.N. Sanderson eds., The Cambridge History of Africa, 620.

99 expansion of and made an effort to limit government spending. He even worked to eliminate the income tax. Gladstone’s policies sought to enhance individual freedoms by minimizing governmental intrusion in private life. To accomplish this, Gladstone, intended to reduce state expenditures. He believed that citizens were capable of spending their own wealth. Gladstone also had a foreign policy designed to promote peace by increasing trade through laissez-faire . Regardless of the British need for Egyptian cotton, Gladstone was prepared to withdraw from Egypt and the Sudan as soon as possible; however, there were four obstacles to accomplishing this goal. First, Gladstone recognized the need to buttress the khedive’s government with an army of occupation. The British manipulated early espousals of Egyptian nationalism to their advantage, as political turmoil compelled the khedive to remain dependent on British might. Second, the British quickly realized that they would have to administer to Egypt as well, as they assumed the khedive’s men were incapable of doing so. Third, the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan postponed any thoughts of evacuation. The Sudanese Mahdi, or Muhammad Ahmad, believed he was the precursor to final judgment, a modern messiah. He proclaimed jihad against the Turco-Egyptian dominance of the Sudan, and defeated an Egyptian force of some seven thousand men in 1882. The Mahdi’s rebellion culminated in the defeat of English General Gordon’s forces in Khartoum in 1885. This had a deleterious impact on Gladstone’s popularity back in Britain. His detractors referred to him as the “Murderer of Gordon.” Fourth, and finally, the British had to contend with the beginnings of Pan-Islam, or Islamic nationalism.8 The conflict between Pan-Islam and British hegemony remained a central theme in Anglo-Egyptian relations until 1952. Egyptian nationalism, which advocated Enlightenment ideals, took a backseat to Pan-Islam during this period, as thinkers like Jemal al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu championed Pan-Islam

8 Steele, “Britain and Egypt 1882-1914,” 7-8.

100 and republicanism. Lord Cromer had a greater respect for Pan-Islam than Egyptian nationalism, for he saw it as the larger threat.9 Lord Salisbury succeeded Gladstone as Britain’s thirty-second prime minister. He had served as ’s secretary of state for India before becoming in 1878. As a member of the Conservative Party, Lord Salisbury pursued a foreign policy known as "Glorious Isolation.” In terms of Africa, Salisbury presided over the “Scramble for Africa.” Lord Salisbury had an uncanny ability to foresee problems in Egypt which other British leaders were incapable of recognizing. For example, he understood that too much British control over Egyptian affairs was detrimental to their broader effort in Africa. Salisbury opposed the dismantling of the Egyptian army, for this rendered the khedive too dependent upon the British. Most Egyptians considered the khedive a British lackey. Salisbury also had concerns regarding the rivalries that Britain’s position in Egypt might instigate with the other Great Powers, like France for instance. Early on, the prime minister realized that the Egyptians were on a path of rapid growth towards economic solvency and capable of self governance, declaring, “If Egypt goes on improving as rapidly as she is . . . now, the time will come when she will insist on being free from Turkey, or England, or anybody else.”10 Although Lord Cromer, British proconsul to Egypt, accomplished much in Egypt, including balancing its books, improving the lot of the fellaheen and expanding agriculture, he had a great antipathy for Islam, and endeavored to undermine the religion, supplanting it with a Christian social morality. Cromer’s lack of sympathy for Islam translated into a policy of Westernization to undermine all aspects of Egyptian and Islamic nationalism.11 Faced with maintaining the Turco-Egyptian monarchy or replacing it with upstart Egyptian nationalists, Lord Cromer deferred to what he understood best, the Turco-Circassians, including Abbas Hilmi II, who had succeeded his father Tawfiq in 1892, when he was only seventeen. The young and independence-

9 Ibid., 2, 9. 10 Ibid., 11-12. 11 Ibid., 14.

101 minded Abbas attempted to distance himself from Cramer. Abbas nurtured Egyptian nationalism and had a predilection for discriminating against Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. Abbas truly overstepped his bounds when he accused British Sirdar, Sir H. H. Kitchener of insubordination.12 Cromer reacted by forcing Abbas to acquiesce to his demands, which included the khedive issuing an ‘order of the day’ lauding the British officers. Cromer preferred sympathetic ministers and was unwilling to countenance the khedive’s Arabist choices for minister. Cromer compelled Abbas to submit, and British numbers swelled in the bureaucracy. Following the Anglo-French entente of 1904, the khedive lost the backing of one of his strongest supporters, France. He had no choice but to comply with Cromer.13 The Early American Experience in Egypt For the most part, Americans remained largely uninterested in the Middle East in the period prior to Crabitès’s arrival in Egypt. During the late nineteenth century, there was a limited but significant contingent of American internationalists who had unsuccessfully attempted to move American diplomacy away from its isolationism. These men were mostly Presbyterian and Congregational missionaries to the Middle East. They strove to convert Muslims and secure more autonomy for minority Christians in the Ottoman Empire.14 The early American experience in Egypt during the nineteenth century had been mainly philanthropic; however, there were some commercial ventures as well. For the most part, it was a revivalist endeavor promoting interaction with Middle Easterners. American Protestants desired to expand Christianity during the nineteenth century. Crabitès wrote that ordinary Egyptians regarded Americans in terms of Protestant missionaries, Egyptologists, and tourists. Even though the majority of Americans in Egypt were tourists, Crabitès considered them as birds of passage. There were only a handful of American archaeologists in Egypt, and their activities were limited. Meanwhile, American evangelists were

12 Sirdar was the British Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army. 13 Ibid., 16-18. 14 Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 3.

102 omnipresent in Egypt: “The uplift workers were numerous, ubiquitous and tireless. They led the vanguard. Everybody knew them. They were universally loved and respected.”15 American missionaries established the Student Volunteer Movement to proselytize Middle Easterners. Most of these evangelists were young Northeastern college graduates from schools like Andover, Williams, Yale, Dartmouth, and Middlebury. While only a small percentage of Americans matriculated in college in the nineteenth century, the majority of missionaries to the Middle East were college graduates, men like Levi Parsons, a young Andover graduate, who was the first American missionary to Egypt. Levi Parsons first traveled to the Holy Land to spread the faith but had to relocate to Egypt for health reasons. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had sponsored their traditional Calvinist missionaries to the Middle East. The American Board encouraged Parsons, and men like him, to adapt to local cultures by learning the language, obeying the law and customs of the land, and providing only private instruction. To better connect with Egyptians, Protestant ministers of the Gospel founded missions, hospitals and schools.16 Missionaries recognized the value of understanding the local culture. They learned Arabic and had some comprehension of Islam, both prerequisites for spreading the gospel in an Islamic environment. American evangelists spent years painstakingly translating the Bible into the vernacular.17 These men inculcated their Middle Eastern students with Americanism. They westernized these students by instructing in English.18 Crabitès believed that American missionaries played a greater role teaching English to Egyptians than did the British. Stateside churches and Christian organizations funded these religious missions in the Middle East, many of them in Egypt. Most of these men were Presbyterians; however, there were other denominations represented, such as Congregationalists. The first Presbyterians arrived in Egypt in 1854. By 1901,

15 Pierre Crabitès, “American Negro Mohammedians,” Catholic World 136 (1933): 559. 16 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 4-6. 17 John A. Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), 13. 18 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 19.

103 the United Presbyterian Church had established a synod, 4 presbyteries, and 220 stations and churches. They had 6,500 communicants, 50 native pastors and 14,000 students. These Christians had a rather orientalist perception of Arabs, regarding them as “the other.” Orientalism here refers to the long- standing Western perception of the Orient as the antithesis of Western culture. During the colonial period, Westerners perpetuated the idea of the West by contrasting it with Eastern, or Oriental culture. They stereotyped the East as a static region, replete with exotic women and treacherous men to help justify their own colonial activities.19 American missionaries matured during this period which coincided with the rise of Social Darwinist thought and an Anglo-Saxon superiority complex.20 Proselytizers applied these new ideas to the people they were aiming to convert. Americans and Europeans alike treated Egyptians with condescension. Westerners referred to Egyptians as “Gypo” and “Wog” – Wily Oriental Gentleman.21 They excluded Egyptians from their clubs, like the prestigious Gazira Sporting Club, located on an island in the middle of the Nile.22 Inherent in the attitude of these men towards Muslims was a belief in their religious superiority, and, perhaps, even more significant was their Puritan sense of duty to convert Muslims and Middle Eastern Christians to their particular version of Christianity. Evangelization required financial support from churches back home, but they also expected protection while abroad. On occasion, they even called on the American military to oblige the Egyptian government to cater to their needs. American foreign policy under men like Theodore Roosevelt reflected this crusader attitude. Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of State subscribed to Rudyard Kipling’s “white man’s burden.” They endeavored to bring civilization to the world. Theodore Roosevelt believed that in order for the United States to be a great power it had to emulate one like Great Britain.

19 Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 9-10. 20 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 4. 21 Polk, The United States and the Arab World, 154. 22 Ibid.

104 The United States pursued humanitarian causes by sending missionaries around the world.23 The primary objective of American missionaries in Egypt was the conversion of Muslims to Christianity; however, this was a more difficult and arduous task than they had initially expected. Both Muslims and non-Muslims alike misinterpreted the Qur’an, inferring that it affirms that those who forsake Islam should face death.24 Americans construed this severity in terms of Christian morality and the sinfulness of Islam. On the other hand, Middle Easterners considered American missionaries as a liberal force there to disrupt their society.25 Instead of spending most of their time attempting to convert Muslims, these Americans concentrated their efforts revitalizing Middle Eastern Christian populations, like the Armenians, Greek Orthodox, and the Coptic communities of Egypt.26 The relative lack of success that these men had proselytizing to Muslims correlated to the number of Americans actually attempting to convert them. Only two out of four hundred American missionaries in the Middle East were actively involved in conversion efforts.27 Instead, these Americans tried to win over Middle Eastern Christians to their own brand of traditional Calvinist Protestantism.28 In Egypt, they focused on the Copts. Coptic Egyptians claim that they are the descendants of ancient pharaonic Egyptians. Christianity in Egypt can be traced back to the apostle Mark. The Coptic Orthodox Church broke away from the Roman Catholic Church and Eastern Orthodox Church by rejecting the Council of Chalcedon (451 C.E.), an ecumenical council which stated that Christ had two natures, human and divine, rather, Copts assert that Christ had a single, divine nature, otherwise known as monophysitism. Crabitès recognized the difficulties inherent in the conversion of Muslims to Christianity in an Islamic country. He was mindful of the obstacles that missionaries faced attempting to convert Muslims: “Conquests of a Moslem

23 Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 11. 24 Qur’an. 2:217. 25 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 7. 26 Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 11. 27 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 32. 28 Ibid., 10.

105 soul were as rare as they were of doubtful sincerity. But the very fact that attempts were made to spread the Gospel among those who accepted the Koran made matters, at times, extremely difficult.”29 American missionaries’ own notions instigated many problems in the Middle East, especially the messianic belief of these Calvinists in the destiny of the United States. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions addressed the Americanization of what they assumed to be these indolent, naïve, sensual, idolatrous, and self-centered peoples. American evangelists constructed churches throughout Egypt. They had printing presses to disseminate Bibles and other Christian works, first in native Christian communities and later in Muslim areas. These Americans developed a culture of literacy by translating the Bible into the Arabic vernacular.30 While these Christians achieved only minimal success converting Muslims, they made a permanent impression by introducing Western medicine and education to Egypt. They instituted several colleges throughout the Middle East, from Syria and Turkey to Lebanon and Egypt. In Lebanon, missionaries established the Syrian Presbyterian College, now American University of Beirut; in Egypt, the United Presbyterian Church founded what would eventually become the American University of Cairo. These Americans admitted native Egyptians into their schools and educated them along Western lines. From the beginning, most of their students were Christian minorities. Muslims did not take advantage of this new opportunity for edification because they distrusted the motives of the American missionaries. These schools originally inculcated religion, but they became more secular over time. Unlike traditional learning in Egypt, which focused on religion and memorization, the Western instruction was more worldly and stressed analysis. Partly through these institutions, Western science and technology slowly filtered into the Middle East. Crabitès lauded the work accomplished by American missionaries in Egypt, especially in the realm of education. He realized that the United States

29 Crabitès, “Spiritual Empire of France.” 601. 30 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 13-14.

106 did not export goods but ideas to Egypt. Crabitès explained the results of American missionary activity in Egypt, “American schools have sprung up all over the Land of the Lotus. These institutions now have an average daily enrollment of over 20,000 pupils. Many of these boys and girls, taken from all walks of life, are children and even grandchildren of former students.”31 For Crabitès, Egyptians associated the United States with Christian propaganda, Protestant doctrine, and Western civilization.32 He praised the American education of the Levantine, I am aware of the splendid work done by the American Mission throughout the Levant. Their Robert College at Constantinople and their Universities at Beirut and at Cairo are models of which any nation may well be proud. Their work makes my heart swell with pride. Their curriculum is splendid. They build up both the mind and the body. Their student corps is well disciplined and their course of study admirable. These higher institutions are moreover but the crowning achievements of innumerable schools scattered throughout the length and breath of the Eastern Mediterranean.33 American missionary efforts made up the majority of the contacts between the United States and Egypt, but the influence of proselytizing began to wane in the 1890s. Moreover, the social gospel, espoused by such men as Washington Gladden, encouraged missionaries to redouble their efforts in the Middle East by promoting Western democracy, medicine and business.34 American missionaries in Egypt required almost constant assistance from the small band of diplomatic castaways banished there by the State Department. Since they made up the greater part of Americans in Egypt, they needed the most diplomatic assistance. Most of these ministers of the Gospel wanted diplomatic support for their own personal security. They also desired assistance protecting their property; yet other missionaries obtained diplomatic assistance to ease restrictions on their

31 Crabitès, “American Negro Muhammedians,” 559. 32 Ibid. 33 Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” 603. 34 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 31.

107 activities and projects.35 American business enterprises and diplomatic ventures gradually superseded the Protestant evangelical effort in Egypt at the turn of the century. American commerce drew the two cultures closer together. As early as 1815, the United States based a naval squadron at Minorca in the Mediterranean, expecting to give support to American companies. During this same period, there was a conflict between American corporations looking to foster more trade with the Middle East and missionaries who sought to Christianize the region.36 Egypt exported gum Arabic, senna, onions, hides, and long-staple cotton, while it imported petroleum and petroleum products, such as kerosene, and some industrial products.37 Americans also took an interest in Egyptology and Biblical archaeology in the late nineteenth century. Universities in the United States began sending archeological expeditions to Egypt. As a benefactor and regent of the University of California, Phoebe Hearst sponsored the first American expedition in Egypt in 1899, undertaken by the University of California. She was also the wife of U.S. Senator George Hearst and mother of William Randolph Hearst. Men like James H. Breasted, George Reisner, and A.M. Lythgoe were some of the first Americans to take part in Egyptian archaeological digs. Later, these archaeologists, and Crabitès would play an important role in the dispute over the sequestration rights to the Pharaoh Tutankhamen’s artifacts. Archeology also stimulated tourism in Egypt. Wealthy Americans alighted in Egypt to visit some of the more historic archaeological expeditions.38 Technically, the State Department had the responsibility of protecting American citizens abroad; however, in the case of Egypt, they deferred to the British authorities more often than not to ensure the wellbeing of Americans. The United States made such diplomatic agreements with the Ottoman sultan, Egyptian khedives, and British governors of Egypt to guarantee the safety of

35 Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 24. 36 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 36. 37 Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 16. 38 Ibid., 17.

108 Americans. The United States established a consul-general in Cairo to promote American affairs. For the most part, the United States strived to remain free from Middle Eastern entanglements, and Democrats in Congress were staunch isolationists. In fact, the United States had a general policy of non-intervention for the Middle East, placing it within a British sphere of influence. Because of this, Egypt continued to be a backwater in terms of American diplomacy. During this period, the United States dispatched second-tier envoys to the Middle East. Not only were these American representatives held in low regard by their own nation, but the United States did not have enough prestige in most Middle Eastern countries to warrant high-level ambassadorial positions. They were treated like second-class diplomats, shunned by their fellow diplomats back home in the United States and in Egypt alike.39 Cognizant of their country’s lack of influence, many Americans in Egypt turned to the British for assistance. There existed an unspoken covenant between British and American diplomats in Egypt, where British officials helped American citizens in times of need, and American representatives repaid the favors later. This level of cooperation between the two countries corresponded to the late nineteenth-century Anglo-American détente.40 Back home in the United States, American policy makers rarely considered the Eastern Question. The Eastern Question covered the political and diplomatic dilemmas associated with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The Americans were too engrossed with their own backyard, namely the Caribbean and Latin America. However, under the Capitulations, Americans claimed political, economic and legal immunities in the Ottoman Empire. The United States asserted its privilege as a most-favored nation based on the Turkish-American treaty of 1830, in which American businessmen and missionaries benefited from the Capitulations.41 More often than not, extraterritorial arrangements with Egypt protected their transgressions.42 In

39 Ibid., 19. 40 Ibid., 20. 41 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 37. 42 Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 22.

109 1850, Congress passed high import tariffs, designed to protect American manufacturing to the detriment of foreign goods. This damaged American commerce in the Middle East because many Middle Eastern countries responded in kind to these changes. It was not until 1900 that American business recovered from this setback. 43 America emerged as a world power in the Progressive Era. It was not until the 1890s that the United States developed its first comprehensive foreign policy. Prior to the 1890s, America had a limited foreign line of conduct, simply reacting to events rather than controlling them. During the Progressive Era, American policy makers recognized that what transpired in one part of the world had an impact in other regions. America rapidly industrialized during this period. Secretaries of state like Henry Cabot Lodge and William Jennings Bryan searched for new markets to sell all of America’s newly-produced goods. After Manifest Destiny, America looked abroad to new markets for export. Manifest Destiny was a widely held conviction that the United States had a providence- inspired mission to expand across the continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Once Americans reached the West Coast, many American thinkers postulated that the United States would need to economically expand beyond its borders to find overseas buyers. Alfred T. Mahan wrote on the necessity of sea power to secure these markets. His ideas shaped the notion of the Middle East as a strategic concept. He was the first man to refer to the region as “the Middle East.” Previously, the area under Ottoman and Persian hegemony had been known as the East or the Near East.44 Most famous for his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published in 1890, Mahan argued for an effective Navy to protect American commercial interests abroad. Mahan also composed academic articles on the Middle East. Theodore Roosevelt read and reviewed his works in academic journals. Mahan contended that Britain should enhance its strategic

43 Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, 37. 44 Marwan R. Buheiry, “Alfred T. Mahan: Reflections on Sea Power and on the Middle East as a Strategic Concept.” In The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry. Lawrence I. Conrad, ed. (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1989), 158-60.

110 positioning the Middle East by acquiring more land.45 For Mahan, Britain’s imperial future depended on obtaining the sea route from the Suez Canal to its crown jewel, India. Many Americans regarded with displeasure the United States’ involvement in foreign entanglements. Members of the Anti-Imperialist League, many of them Democrats, endeavored to extricate America from foreign strife. The Anti- Imperialist League considered domestic problems to be more important than “immoral” foreign affairs. The league brought together a sundry group of individuals, including Jane Addams, Andrew Carnegie, Grover Cleveland, John Dewey, Samuel Gompers, William Graham Sumner, and Mark Twain. They successfully lobbied Congress to prevent the annexation of Cuba during the Spanish-American War of 1898, but they failed to restrain American imperialism in the Philippines. American interests expanded in Egypt during the decade before Crabitès arrived. Altruistic missions continued to dominate the American experience in Egypt until more American commerce began to filter into Egypt. President William H. Taft pursued a foreign policy known as Dollar Diplomacy. Taft distanced himself from his predecessor’s Big Stick Diplomacy. Theodore Roosevelt had engaged in a much more aggressive and interventionist foreign policy modeled after an African proverb, speak softly and carry a big stick. Under Big Stick Diplomacy, Roosevelt sought to protect American economic interests in Latin America from the rapacious Europeans. Roosevelt advocated American naval expansion. Taft deviated from Roosevelt’s saber-rattling mentality; instead, Taft employed the power of the United States Dollar to promote American business concerns abroad, extending U.S. capital to impoverished countries. Taft shunned the idea of using force to solve foreign problems. He put confidence in Dollar Diplomacy and hoped to draw on the value of the dollar to defuse dangerous situations. In many cases, Taft concluded that instability had been exacerbated by a poor economic environment. To combat this crisis, Taft

45 Ibid., 161.

111 asserted that the United States had to strengthen the economies of countries in need. For Taft, Dollar Diplomacy appealed to humanitarian motives, which was in harmony with the American missionary effort in Egypt. Dollar Diplomacy also helped to advance peace. It was better to send in American Dollars than the Marines to ensure there were no threats to its overseas interests. Under Taft, American diplomats in Egypt were reluctant to use violence to protect American interests. They usually deferred to the British instead, for they considered Egypt to be a British sphere of influence. Crabitès’s Early Years in Cairo Crabitès departed Louisiana and traveled to Egypt in the summer of 1911. He viewed his move to Egypt as another adventure to expand his perspectives. Crabitès would spend the next twenty-five years of his life in Egypt, yet he never lost his love for his native Louisiana, declaring, “That long sojourn in foreign parts has intensified my love of home.”46 Of his relocation to the Middle East, he said, “I left for Egypt to begin a life of absorbing interest, and of unequalled opportunities for study and observation.”47 Crabitès would use this opportunity to expand his future prospects. His long time spent abroad influenced his perspective but did not fundamentally change him: “My residence in the East, if it has altered my vision, has not affected my sight. It is because I am now able to contemplate the scene from a different angle than formerly accessible to me that I feel that my mental reaction is apt to be less biased than it formerly was.”48 When the Crabitès family arrived in Cairo, they took up residence at the Continental Savoy Hotel. They remained there for the next for ten years. Only the wealthiest in Egypt could afford such a lifestyle. The Continental Savoy was perhaps the most prestigious hotel in all of Cairo. It was a first-class hotel and catered to elite British and American expatriates as well as wealthy tourists. Both of these groups preferred hotels like the Continental Savoy and its competitor across the street, Shepheard’s Hotel, because they accommodated their needs by offering guests all of the latest amenities and an atmosphere evocative of

46 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 47-48. 47 Ibid., 36. 48 Pierre Crabitès, “Woman and Her Purse,” Catholic World 131 (1930): 322.

112 home. The French and Italians favored the de l’Europe or the Hotel du Nil. These hotels provided a sense of community and security. Guests had to pay an exorbitant price for this kind of lodging, as it ran approximately forty piasters per day while an excellent house in the Frank Quarter cost only 250 per month. Hotel guests traveled to Egypt to experience the local color, but they had no interest in observing it in the hotel. Most of their comments to the hotel staff concerned proper dress, etiquette, or efficiency and would have been more appropriate for a hotel in London rather than Cairo. These hotels became a meeting point for the foreign community, more so than even the clubs and consulates. They hosted at least one ball per week, allowing the privileged classes of all nations to commingle, and of those the Continental Savoy and Semiramis were the best.49 It was at these parties that Crabitès most likely discussed the issues of his time with his fellow jurists, diplomats, and businessmen, and also where he probably expressed his ambitions and anti- British proclivities to these same men. It was a life much like the one he had in New Orleans. The only difference was that the men in New Orleans most likely shared more of his convictions. By remaining at the Continental Savoy, Crabitès had access to many of his fellow judges, as well as foreign diplomats, journalists and military officers.50 These hotels were not the only setting where men of Crabitès stature gathered to discuss the local news and international politics, there was also the Cairo Opera House, the Gezira Sporting Club, and the Turf Club. Foreign notables attended the Cairo Opera to watch French and Italian companies perform famous pieces. The Cairo Opera was a favorite meeting place for foreigners living in Egypt, where Europeans and Americans could isolate themselves from Egypt outside. These foreigners also congregated at the Gezira Sporting Club, which had the appearance of a typical English sporting club. Although gambling was forbidden, one could play polo, golf, or go riding on their race track. One achieved high standing in society with membership of Gezira

49 Anthony Sattin, Lifting the Veil: British Society in Egypt, 1768-1956. (London: J.M. Dent, 1988), 204. 50 Ibid., 179-81.

113 Sporting Club, but that status came with responsibility, for members could be expelled from the club for unscrupulous behavior. For Crabitès, these clubs were similar to the social organizations back home in New Orleans, and they actually served similar functions in both communities.51 The Gezira Sporting Club was mostly an international institution, the Turf Club, on the other hand, was largely a British enclave. The Turf Club was a residential club of poor accommodation, albeit filled with the right sort of people.52 It was located in the heart of the European part of town, not far from the British Agency and the British Army Headquarters. Englishmen could take refuge there, read The Times of London and have a drink with their countrymen. Egyptians were denied admission. While these clubs catered to the foreign high society, they were much more inexpensive than the establishments of the Ezbekieh quarter. Crabitès customarily met at these clubs for drinks and dinner, so he could gossip with his friends and colleagues.53 There was a strict hierarchy within this society; cliques segregated along professional lines, ranging from the military and diplomatic elite, to official and professional circles. Crabitès and his fellow judges would have belonged to the diplomatic elite, high up on the social ladder, only surpassed by the most high- ranking diplomats and British personnel. There was a running joke in Egypt that aptly described the foreign society there, where two young men from the same university back home in Britain relocated to Egypt and were busy finding their niche within this new stratified society: One of the schoolmates had been accepted by the most prestigious department, Finance, while the other joined the Ministry of Education, otherwise known as Public Instruction (P.I.), a rather lowly position within the social strata: Finance, having grasped the situation in all its clarity, failed to see Education for several months, but one day they came face to face outside the Club and recognition was unavoidable.

51 Ibid., 184, 188. 52 Ibid., 189. 53 Ibid., 197

114 ‘Hullo, ‘said Finance heartily; ‘I’d no idea you were out here. What Department are you in?’ ‘Well,’ said Education meekly, ‘as a matter of fact I’m in the P.I., But I don’t want you to mention it to anyone at home as I have told my people that I’m playing piano in a brothel.’54 The British insulated themselves from the “natives,” avoiding contact with the Egyptians, but they did not remove themselves from the company of other Europeans to such a degree. Men like Crabitès and the other non-British foreigners in Egypt were more likely to come into contact with Egyptians. As soon as he reached Egypt, Crabitès took a vacation in July, receiving full pay before he had even ruled on one case. He returned from holiday in October to sit in the Commercial Division of the Cairo Branch of the Mixed Courts. Crabitès received a salary of some thirty thousand francs per annum, a considerable sum for 1911. He replaced Justice Walter Berry, an American representative on the Cairo Branch who retired in 1911 and retired to America. Crabitès did not completely abandon the comfortable life that he enjoyed in New Orleans when he traveled to Cairo. He pursued a lifestyle in Cairo similar to that of New Orleans. Crabitès cultivated intimate friendships with many of the most eminent jurists presiding over the Mixed Courts. While there, he became friends with both diplomats and journalists who encouraged him to obtain a job in the American diplomatic corps. He socialized mainly with expatriates, but he also mingled with Egyptian judges. His colleagues on the Mixed Court of First Instance in Cairo were: the Egyptians Hanna Nasrallah Pasha, Shaker Ahmad Bey, Mahmoud El-Toayer Bey, Mustafa Beyram Bey, Ibrahim Waguili Bey, and Ali Kalab Bey; the Danes D. G. Nyholm and K.W. Kraft; the Dutch C.B.J.A. Wierdels and J.C.T. Heyligers; a Greek A. Stoupis; a Swede A.J.P. Adlercreutz, a Swiss R. Houriet, an Italian G. Baviera, a Frenchman Frederic Giraud, and, finally, the British H.W. Halton.55

54 Ibid., 191-92. 55 State Department Document 883.05/78: from Arnold, Consul General in Cairo, to the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. 6 May 1915.

115 Crabitès intimated that he studied Cairo’s social register. Bragging of his excellent appetite, he attended many parties and other social functions, “I have read a great deal, traveled extensively and have a splendid digestion. I bring out the latter feature because it is almost impossible for a man to be broadminded if his digestive apparatus is out of gear.”56 Later on, as he aged, Crabitès became more epicurean, for he had to pay more attention to what he ate. Even though he was a teetotaler, he still attended parties. Crabitès abstained from alcohol because of the effects it posed to his health. He witnessed the consequences of drinking on some of his closest friends, declaring, “His vice tended to make a tee- totaler [sic] of me.”57 Remembering his time hobnobbing with Cairo’s gentility, Crabitès recalled, “I was ‘a tea lizard’ in my Cairo days. The phrase lacks literary elegance but it is expressive. I mean by it that while I do not drink tea I went to tea parties, as my post-graduate course in foreign affairs made it necessary that I do so.”58 Unlike his younger years, he could no longer drink tea and coffee. His fragile constitution could not handle the caffeinated diuretics: “I could not drink coffee all day long and keep my liver in order.”59 He always aspired to take good care of his health, watching what he ate and taking regular exercise, like strolls with his wife or close friends through the medieval quarters of old Cairo. Crabitès was an elite Cairo socialite. He went to social events to fraternize with Cairo’s establishment. Crabitès enjoyed discussing international politics with fellow judges, diplomats, and businessmen. At parties, he could take the pulse of the Egypt, but also Europe and back home in the United States. As a polyglot, Crabitès eavesdropped on discussions taking place in multiple languages: I understood enough of all of them to know where it would pay me to loiter, although my Arabic was adolescent and my Ladino inexistent except where it blended into modern Spanish. But as almost all of the

56 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 33. 57 Ibid., 184. 58 Ibid., 10. 59 Ibid., 187.

116 conversations were carried on in French, I feel that I missed nothing which came within earshot.60 Of French, the lingua franca of Egypt, he once said, “It was a rare treat to meet anyone who spoke what I might call ‘refined’ English or German. On the other hand, I ran into scores of men who conversed in French with easy mastery.”61 From these encounters, Crabitès formulated many of his opinions on international affairs. A lover of politics, he never felt compelled to hold political office: “I am proud to be able to say that prolonged residence abroad in no sense lessened my love for American politics. I have never made a political address in my life. I never expect to hold political office.”62 He did, however, aspire to a diplomatic position. It was also during these occasions that Crabitès, always an opinionated character, found himself incapable of restraining his forceful criticism of the British governance of Egypt. Undoubtedly, Crabitès aroused the ire of British officials and contributed to his failure to be promoted to the Court of Appeals later on in his career. Cairo’s high society party scene introduced Crabitès to the world of international diplomacy. He had profound respect for diplomats, stating, “The diplomatic service stands out so prominently in the life of the Near East.”63 Crabitès became enthralled with the prospect of assisting his country as a high- ranking diplomat. He viewed his time on the Mixed Courts as a means to that end. Crabitès tried to guide American foreign policy towards the Middle East. Much of his intellectual work involved international affairs, as many of his compositions considered current events in the Middle East and were read by British and American officials alike. Both the United States and Great Britain maintained files on Crabitès’s articles, which included their attitude towards his line of argument. After serving over ten years as an attorney in New Orleans, assuming the role of a judge was a considerable change for Crabitès. He had never studied

60 Ibid., 11. 61 Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” 600. 62 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 173. 63 Ibid., 17.

117 the Middle East before. His first step in this transition was to understand the Middle Eastern mindset. Crabitès researched the background and history of the Middle East in an effort to better appreciate the men he was working with, saying, “It struck me that if I hoped to broaden my culture and to improve my grasp of foreign affairs, the first thing that I should do was to study what I may describe as the psychology of the Near East.”64 Over time, Crabitès, a devout Catholic, developed what he termed “a Mohammedan complex:” “I had lived in Egypt so long and devoted so much attention to studying Islam.”65 While he remained a staunch Catholic, Crabitès tried to view the Middle East through the eyes of a Muslim. He was unequivocal in his devotion to his church: “I do not want to create the impression that my Catholicism has been shattered by long residence here.”66 Unlike the relationship between judges and attorneys in New Orleans, Crabitès realized that the prestige of his position in Cairo came between him and the lawyers before him. He disliked the lack of understanding among members of the court. He reminisced about his early days in Cairo, stating, “I am afraid, however, that my post did not bring me at once into intimate touch with the Cairo bar. It tended to put me upon a pedestal which at first isolated me from the practitioners who appeared before me.”67 Crabitès abhorred this mindset; however, he still maintained tradition. Referencing the stature of his colleagues, Crabitès disclosed, “Judges are privileged characters whether they are in Cairo or Poughkeepsie.”68 He was gregarious and congenial. Crabitès desired a more personal relationship with his colleagues: “I resolved to get my insight into the background of my judicial functions by trying to understand the workings of the minds of those members of the bar with whom I came into official contact.”69 Crabitès set about transforming this partition between judiciary and barrister so pervasive throughout the Mixed Courts, taking many lawyers under

64 Ibid., 2. 65 Ibid., 52. 66 Crabitès, “American Negro Mohemmedans,” 656. 67 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 1. 68 Ibid., 8. 69 Ibid., 2.

118 his wing. He thought it was essential to mentor attorneys. Speaking of these lawyers, Crabitès said, “A judge is usually very much attached to the young lawyers who grow up under his eyes. He considers them his intellectual nephews and nieces. Their success gives him the keenest pleasure.”70 When he first presided over cases in 1911, many of these attorneys were younger than Crabitès. Crabitès classified members of the court according to their knowledge of French: “There were, however, scores of those who argued before my Court whose French seemed to me to be somewhat exotic, but which I could not classify. It was excellent wine, but not vintage wine. And I was most anxious to know whence it came.”71 Remembering his days as a fresh attorney in New Orleans, Crabitès sympathized with many new lawyers. He criticized Levantine lawyers as men who assume that the more exceptions they can bring forth during a case, the better they have proven their argument. Of this practice, Crabitès pontificated, “My experience in the American bar had taught me that it was bad strategy, to say the least, to raise technical objections during the trial of a case unless they reposed upon a solid foundation.”72 Crabitès sensed that his colleagues did not make sufficient effort to relate to the Egyptians. Although he too suffered from this problem, it was to a lesser extent than his colleagues on the Mixed bench. Unlike so many members of the diplomatic corps, or foreigners for that matter, Crabitès attempted to better understand Egyptian and Islamic culture. He studied Islam and Middle Eastern history. He also learnt Arabic. Even though most Westerners in Egypt tended to denigrate Islam, Crabitès sought a better comprehension of the religion. In his academic works, he tried to correct many of the Western misrepresentations of Islam. Crabitès specifically wrote many of his articles especially for Western

70 Ibid, 20. 71 Ibid., 2. 72 Ibid., 204.

119 audiences who possessed little or no knowledge of Islam, making him one of very few Americans of that time to do so.73 Crabitès on Islam and Egypt Americans comprehended little of the Arab and Muslim world. They held a distorted view of the Middle East in general. American misperceptions had been shaped by Christianity and what little information had filtered through Europe to America. Americans generally stereotyped Arabs as camel-riding desert nomads who restricted their women to harems.74 For the most part, Crabitès made an effort to dispel these misplaced images in the articles and books he published on the Middle East, especially in regards to Islam and the conflict over Palestine. Unlike most Americans critical of Islam, Crabitès approached the religion with impressive respect. He had a progressive outlook towards Muslims and Jews. On the other hand, most Middle Easterners knew little if anything about the United States. There was a general lack of shared experience between Arabs and Americans, as almost no Middle Easterners had visited the United States, and they had only limited contact with Americans in Egypt. Although most Americans in Egypt were evangelists, there were also some diplomats, educators and businessmen. Most Egyptians took their impressions of the United States from these Americans living in Egypt.75 Crabitès criticized the lack of Western understanding of the Middle East. He tried to enlighten his readers across the Atlantic, declaring, “I studied the East thru American glasses, never forgetting that the Nile was the Mississippi.”76 Crabitès had a great many Arab associates and acquaintances and abhorred the Western double standard imposed on them. It was difficult for Crabitès to

73 “Islam, Divorce, and Decadence,” The Catholic World 127 (1928): 660-668. “Moslem Education in Egypt.”Catholic World 132 (1931):709-716. “The Omnipotent Bar of Islam and the Egyptian Captiulations,” American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927): 694-696. Unpublished Manuscripts include “Egypt’s Primacy in Islam,” “Israel out of Egypt,” “Let Islam Save Israel” and “Palestine and Her Problem,” which can all be found in the Crabitès Collection at the University of New Orleans. 74 Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 6. 75 Ibid., 7-8. 76 Pierre Crabitès, “Women and Her Purse.” Catholic World 131 (1930): 319.

120 disparage the people whom he knew. Contemplating his close relationship with Sheikh Mansur Nazar, his servant and tutor, Crabitès pronounced, It remained for my guide, philosopher and friend, who initiated me into the mysteries of Islam, dear old Sheikh Mansur Nazar, to give me the real reason underlying this dual standard. He was some thirty years my senior, but working together, as we did for two hours a day for seven consecutive years of eight months, reciprocal esteem engendered close ties.77 Crabitès devoted much of his intellectual life to Middle Eastern topics. Far from being the ugly American, Crabitès did not view Arabs as the inferior “other.” Many foreigners had moved to the Middle East, and instead of assimilating and adapting to native Egyptian culture, they attempted to impose their own cultural hegemony on the Arabs. These Europeans held contempt for their Arab counterparts. Disinclined to learning Arabic, many Europeans expected the Arabs to speak English and French. Crabitès described this practice, As a rule one speaks Arabic only to one’s servants, except when addressing an Alim, who knows no foreign language. The etiquette followed in Cairo is to use French, unless all parties to the conversation have a common mother tongue. The Egyptian Moslem aristocracy has held very tenaciously to this rule, since the British occupation. The opinion seems to be that as it gives a man a tactical advantage to discuss a subject in his own speech, fair play dictates the choice of a neutral medium. French is thus the lingua Franca of Egyptian society. A few words of Arabic, however, if thrown in merely incidentally and appositely, are invariably most effective, provided they take the form of a proverb or of a colloquialism; and, in the latter case, provided that the Egyptian and the foreigner are close friends.78 Crabitès did not subscribe to an imperialistic philosophy and clearly made an effort to acculturate into Egyptian society. He recognized that his Arabic was

77 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 17. 78 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 89.

121 in need of improvement. So in order to better communicate with Egyptians, he made it his goal to improve his Arabic: “I was hammering away at Arabic for an hour and a half a day, six days in the week and eight months in the year.”79 His teacher was Sheikh Mansur Nazar, an elderly gentleman and retired teacher. He had been a graduate of Al-Azhar University. For Crabitès, his sheikh was a religiously-minded Muslim who continued to live in the past. By working on his Arabic every day with his tutor, the two men became close friends. The sheikh managed to radically alter Crabitès’s perception of Muslims: “The liberality, the tolerance and the truly Christian charity of the man revolutionized my ideas of the Moslem attitude towards the infidel.”80 Reflecting on his colleagues’ impression of the Arabic-speaking Egyptians, Crabitès pronounced, “I was one of the very few judges of the International Bench who had ever taken the trouble to work hard on their language. I was the only foreign member of our judiciary, as then constituted, who was making a conscious effort to absorb the opinion of Arabic letters.”81 In many of his articles on the Middle East, Crabitès made an effort to correct Western distortions of the Middle East: It is a popular fallacy in the circles in which I moved in the Occident that Mohammedans persecute Christians and Jews, and welcome an opportunity to kill them. Such is not the case. The Koran enjoins upon all True Believers to war against heathens to the death, unless they embrace Islam. But it does not class Christians and Jews as heathens. On the contrary, it puts them, and them alone, into a special category of non- believers known as “the People of the Book.” In other words, Mohammed, the Prophet had a vague idea of the Bible, which he called the ‘Vengile.’ He considered that, because Christians and Jews based their creeds upon it, they should be differentiated from heathens who had no such guide.82

79 Pierre Crabitès, “Islam, Divorce, and Decadence.” Catholic World 127 (1928): 663. 80 Ibid. 81 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 71a. 82 Ibid., 27.

122 Crabitès also sought to reconcile Arab perceptions of Jews with reality. He disproved of the notion of the Jew as the profligate usurer. Over the years, many moneylenders came before him in the Commercial Division of Cairo’s Mixed Courts. He articulated his bitter contempt for these extortionists, “I do not like money-sharks, even when they confine their operations to important communities. I loath them even when they steer clear of the small property owner.”83 Referencing Egyptian creditors, Crabitès exclaimed, The arch offenders, whose depredations drove Lord Kitchener to the warpath, were made up practically entirely of Greeks, Cypriotes, Syrians, Copts, Maltese and Armenians. I am almost certain that there was no Jew among them. I do not now recall that anybody, in these days, even suggested that there were any.84 The usurers were not Jews but Christians who benefited from berats and the Capitulations. On more than one occasion he overheard his colleagues implicate the Jews as moneylenders. He actually caught one of his Muslim colleagues reference Jewish extortion, saying “Parce-qu’ils veulent tout accaparer; le juif est né usurier.” (Because they want to grab everything; the Jew is born a usurer).85 This mindset confounded Crabitès, who believed that the Jews were no more guilty of usury than anyone else. He familiarized himself with all the Egyptian lenders while sitting on the bench, bragging that he cataloged them in his mind. He saw these creditors as unjust usurers.86 Crabitès praised Islamic tolerance, “My long sojourn in the Near East has made of me a firm believer in the fundamental liberalism and sense of fairness of the Arab race.”87 He had a progressive attitude towards the peoples of the Middle East. In fact, he believed that Islam delivered the Jews from undue persecution taking place in the West. Unfortunately, Crabitès had a conflicted perspective of the Middle East. On the one hand, he castigated Westerners for their unwillingness to adapt to Egyptian society. On the other hand, Crabitès too

83 Ibid., 75. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 72. 86 Ibid., 75. 87 Ibid., 92.

123 suffered from some of the traditional stereotypes and generalizations of Arabs that plagued many Western minds. He explained that it was his study of Arabic and relationship with Sheikh Mansur Nazar which made him more sympathetic to Islamic thought and enhanced his desire to understand Islam’s decline and fall.88 He attributed the wane of the Islamic world to two specific factors, Islamic divorce and Islamic education. Islamic Divorce After careful study, Crabitès concluded that one of the salient explanations for the decline of the Islamic world was Islamic divorce. Crabitès argued that Muslim women must contend with insecure marriages and unpredictable husbands. For this reason, Muhammad provided women with special property rights because they could be divorced on a whim: “The Mohammedan married woman has to have these transcendent property rights because with her every day is moving day. She has no lease upon her bed or board.”89 Crabitès lauded Muhammad as one of the earliest champions of women’s rights, but the Prophet compartmentalized two aspects of woman: “In making marriage a temporary and a precarious relationship Mohammed did what the logic of the situation made imperative. He segregated a woman’s purse from her soul.”90 Crabitès concluded, “It emphasized the utter dependence of the wife for the security of her marital status and withal her absolute independence as regards her property rights.”91 He took issue with this kind of marriage alliance, for he believed that it denigrated the value of long-lasting marriage. He contrasted Islamic marriage with Jewish marriage, The Jews admit of no such doctrine as that sanctioned by Ancient Egypt and hallowed by Islam. On the contrary, the legislation of Israel provides in some cases for an intimate financial partnership and in others for a limited community of interests. Why? Because the sons and daughters of

88 Crabitès, “Islam, Divorce, and Decadence,” 660. 89 Crabitès, “Woman and Her Purse,” 320. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid.

124 the Chosen People marry to live together and not to make of marriage a mockery.92 Crabitès defined the function of the couple in Islamic marriage as a fundamentally passive one, where love has been cast aside to be replaced by profit, social aspirations, and business partnerships, “Such a commercialization of love, such a desecration of a sacred relationship, such a prostitution of all that I held most inviolate and dear that I felt that here was the heel of Achilles of Mohammed.”93 Most importantly, Crabitès believed that this would lead to what he termed marital militarism, where husband and wife would constantly be at each other’s throats over fiscal matters: This is marital or social militarism in its most insidious, surreptitious and subcutaneous form. It starts out from the premise that men and women sometimes disagree, and reaches a conclusion predicated upon the hypothesis that spouses are always at loggerheads. It turns the fire of the hearth into that of the cannon, the powder of the boudoir into that of the shot and the shell and the salt of goodwill into the chemical agent of explosion. This marital militarism warps the beam which supports marriage.94 Crabitès believed that parents had to place their trust in their children, for they alone must achieve their own salvation. According to Crabitès, the American marriage is centered around love, rather than money, social advancement, or family tradition. He expressed a basically orientalist view of Islamic marriage, There is a radical difference between the Occidental family and its Mohammedan counterpart. This fundamental divergence resides in the fact that in Christendom marriage, in its essence, creates a permanent relationship between the man and woman . . . Islam, on the other hand, pays homage to a different school of philosophy. It makes of marriage a civil contract purely and simply and, automatically, unless otherwise stipulated, writes the divorce clause into these agreements. It safeguards

92 Ibid., 321. 93 Crabitès, “Islam, Divorce, and Decadence,” 665. 94 Crabitès, “Woman and Her Purse,” 323.

125 the purse of the wife but, unless differently ordained by contract, holds over her the nemesis of repudiation.95 Islamic Education Crabitès concluded that a secondary source for the decline of the Islamic world was their educational system. He argued that the deterioration of Islamic education started long ago when the Arabs deferred to the Jews as an intellectual resource. Crabitès regarded Arabs as belligerent warmongers, unwilling to do menial tasks which they considered beneath them. Referring to the Arabs, Crabitès said, They come from a race of warriors. They would more willingly fight than lounge about in a café smoking nargilehe, although they love their pipes. Generations of fighting ancestors have developed these warlike characteristics and have made them unsuccessful as businessmen, inefficient as farmers and worthless as administrators.96 Crabitès stratified Middle Eastern society, with its own social hierarchy: The Mohammedans did the fighting, but had no budgetary worries, and allowed themselves to drift into intellectual stagnation . . . The ruling Mohammedian caste found it most congenial to rattle swords without worrying about money. The Jews, upon whom the financial responsibility fell, considered it far more satisfactory to remain quietly at home while others lived underproductive lives in the army.97 This sort of Western perception of the Orient was common amongst his contemporaries. According to Crabitès, the Arab world, which at one time was a center of intellectual activity, allowed the Jews to surpass them. He complained that the majority of Middle Easterners were improperly educated, “The Majority of the literate minority still takes its learning from the archaic schools of Islam.98 He subscribed to the widespread view of the Jews residing in the Levant. Crabitès succumbed easily to some of these traditional stereotypes, but they had

95 Crabitès, “Islam, Divorce, and Decadence,” 665-66. 96 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 28. 97 Ibid., 29. 98 Crabitès, “Spiritual Empire of France,” 606.

126 little basis in reality. He recognized his own deficiencies and questioned his perceptions of Muslims, Why did the Arabs of Spain and the Turks of the Ottoman Empire admit Jews to the higher ranks of their bureaucracy? The answer came at once. It ran: They needed the industry, the honesty and the adaptability of these Jews, to assure the orderly administration of their public affairs so that they could strut about and have a good time.99 For Crabitès, Muslim education, rooted in religion, did not measure up to Western standards. Rather than providing their students with a proper education embedded in the Western liberal arts tradition, they instead inculcated religion. These madrassa emphasized memorization over analytical skills: “With their risha, or wooden quill, and their homebrew ink they write on this Pfizer product say ten of the first ninety-nine names of God. They commit these to memory, clean their slate and start over again until all of the ninety-nine names are known by heart.”100 It bothered him to watch young children committing the Qur’an to memory: It was interesting and distressing, from my point of view, to see them at their work. They made regular machines out of their bodies. They rocked to and fro like the pendulum of a clock. Then they seemed to slip a cog and to swing from side to side. While they were doing these gyrations and contortions they recited their text in a monotonous and funeral if not sepulchral chant.101 Crabitès utilized the words of an aleem at Al-Ahzar to make his point. In a conversation with Crabitès, Sheikh Mahmoud Ibrahim said of Western didactic techniques, “You Occidentals with your modernism imagine that new matters of inquiry are arising every day. You are wrong. We stay put. Our ulema have long since molded into authoritative form all that an educated man is required to know, should know or should be allowed to know.”102 This sort of mindset

99 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 96. 100 Pierre Crabitès, “Moslem Education in Egypt,” Catholic World 132 (1931): 713. 101 Ibid., 714. 102 Ibid., 715.

127 explained the stagnation of Islamic learning. Crabitès proclaimed, “Islamic centers of learning in the past put Christian ones to shame but now the Islamic has slipped backwards.”103 He concluded, “There are ten Moslems where there was one in the old days of Islamic ascendancy but quantity has replaced quality. The Mohammedan world failed to emulate the Jews.” 104 In other words, the Muslims, unlike the Hebrews, failed to improve over time. Life in Cairo Several different types of courts constituted the Mixed Courts of Egypt. The Mixed Courts had three lower courts, at Mansourah, Cairo, and Alexandria respectively, and a Court of Appeals at Alexandria. Those who founded the courts demanded that the Court of Appeals reside away from Cairo, Egypt’s principal population center and a hotbed of political intrigue. Usually, new and untested judges appointed to the Mixed Courts began at either Mansourah or Alexandria, but Crabitès embarked upon his career auspiciously because he assumed Judge Berry’s vacant post. Instead of beginning at one of the lower courts, such as Mansourah or Alexandria, Crabitès began as an associate justice in the Commercial Division of the Mixed Court at Cairo. He remained in that position for ten years until in 1921, when he was promoted to the Commercial Division’s Civil Section as its president. Sitting on the bench in Cairo for twenty-five years, Crabitès adjudicated thousands of cases. Unlike his contemporaries, who adapted to modern technologies such as the typewriter, Crabitès continued to compose his decisions longhand. He claimed that he had no assurance in the reliability of typewriters, “They [his decisions] were not dictated to a stenographer or typed. I bought a portable typewriter and sought to use it, but I could not place the same confidence in it that I reposed to my fountain pen.”105 Crabitès was something a technophobe; he was only comfortable with the past and what he understood. Crabitès recognized the value of silent deliberation. He thought that oral decisions rendered directly from the bench did not posses the sagacity of a

103 Crabitès, “Islam, Divorce, and Decadence,” 663. 104 Ibid., 667. 105 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 148.

128 carefully contemplated judgment. Crabitès emphasized that he adjudicated all of his decisions fairly. He complained of writer’s block and suffered frequent bouts of this oft incurable disease. For him, the only way to break through was to write free form, that is, with a stream of consciousness. Crabitès felt that his colleagues lauded his decisions more often than not when he employed this method of writing.106 He defended his judgments from his British critics, “I did not perform my judicial duties as a Democrat or as a Republican. I did so simply and solely as a judge.”107 Crabitès’s court docket required his attention for only two hours a day. After taking off his stembouline, tarbouche and echarpe, he had the freedom to follow other intellectual pursuits. Crabitès was a voracious reader, and he reviewed many books for the Egyptian Gazette, a very pro-British newspaper, I have found that one of the best ways to digest a book is to review it for publication. I do not mean that I favor the practice of imitating those experts who cut the pages of a volume, smell the knife, and then begin to write ex cathedra. I always took my reviews most seriously, even if nobody else may have done so.108 He spent much of his time loitering in bookstores with his friends and colleagues. More often than not, he went to Delbourgo’s Book Shop in Cairo. There he could satiate his need for histories and detective stories. He had a penchant for mysteries. Eventually, he took up writing as a hobby to help pass time. Crabitès’s published books were mainly biographies, while his journal articles were both biographical and thematic. He wrote histories of great men and women. His works exhibit many of the qualities reminiscent of his contemporaries. They were full of conjecture and generally lacked footnotes. Crabitès was a very opinionated writer, often challenging accepted wisdom. He published eleven books, two translations and twenty-eight articles, as well as forty-three

106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., 129. 108 Ibid., 100.

129 unpublished articles and six unpublished book-length manuscripts.109 Most of Crabitès’s compositions on the Middle East were not as controversial as his unpublished manuscripts “Palestine and Her Problem” and “Israel out of Egypt,” they did confront earlier interpretations. Crabitès took a pro-Arab stance on most Middle Eastern topics, defending figures such as Ibrahim, the son of Muhammad Ali, and the Khedive Ismail, as they both suffered harsh treatment from historians. His contemporaries criticized him as a revisionist. Crabitès spent a good deal of time at Abdine Palace in Cairo researching for his book Ibrahim of Egypt. There he developed a relationship with the Egyptian royal family, headed by King Fuad and later his son Farouk: It was in King Fuad’s private library in Abdine Palace that I gathered this information. His late Majesty was so interested in my historical studies that he had paid me the unusual compliment of giving me unrestrained access to the royal archives, and to his family records. Thus I acquired the habit of browsing frequently among the books of the king’s personal library.110 Such access was really quite remarkable. Crabitès gained entrée to the royal palace because of his sympathetic perspective of the Egyptian royal family over the years. His books had a tendency to treat the ancestors of King Farouk in a more favorable light, plus Crabitès was well known to be anti-British, something which did not escape the monarchy. His connection to Abdine Palace alarmed the British. The British would later seek to bar Crabitès from returning to Egypt in the capacity of a United States State Department official because of his relationship with the palace. In terms of the triangle that existed between the British, Wafd, and royal family, Crabitès clearly sided with the monarchy. Crabitès’s unpublished manuscripts were his most controversial works, and their controversial character contributed to his difficulty in publishing them. Publishers were unwilling to take a chance on such potentially divisive matters, especially when there was a lack of interest in the United States for Middle

109 See bibliography for full list. 110 Ibid., 201.

130 Eastern subjects. These compositions challenge Western notions on the conflict in Palestine and the nature of anti-Semitism. Unlike the majority of his books, which were biographical, these manuscripts were thematic. Crabitès made some startling predictions for the future of the Holy Land in this manuscript. While he accurately predicted Adolph Hitler’s ascendancy and increasing militarism in Germany, he did not foresee Hitler’s scheme to eliminate Jewry from Europe which resulted in a tidal wave of Ashekenazic-Jewish immigration to Palestine. Crabitès showed he was a man of his time when writing in “Palestine and Her Problem,” for he was inaccurate in his prediction that “as long as the Balfour Declaration, as now interpreted and enforced, remains part of the British Mandate for Palestine, the Holy Land is destined to be either an armed English camp or a vast Jewish graveyard.”111 Crabitès did not spend all of his spare time reading and writing. He also volunteered his time at the Royal School of Law. There were two schools of law in Cairo, the Ecole Française and the Royal School of Law. The French legation administered the Ecole Française, and the British subsidized the Royal School of Law. Both of them specialized in Roman law. During his spare time, Crabitès volunteered at the Royal School of Law. There he sat on the board of examiners for some fifteen years. During this period, foreigners lost their jobs to native Egyptians, and although he harbored no ill feelings, Crabitès believed that Egyptian nationalism forced him out of the position. Government positions, like those at the Royal School of Law, were the first to go. Like so many other public offices in Egypt, court was in session for only eight months out of a year. As it was too hot to hold court during summer, the courts adjourned, affording Crabitès the opportunity to travel for a four month stretch each year. He sometimes returned to his native New Orleans during this period, but he retired to Germany more often. Crabitès had developed an affinity for the medicinal qualities of the German baths while studying at the University of Berlin.

111 Pierre Crabitès, “Palestine and Her Problem,” unpublished ms., Forward, p. I: Mss. 73-41: Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. [The pagination of this manuscript is by chapter and then by page, not consecutive]

131 Crabitès had a frail constitution, so he returned to Germany almost every summer to relax and regenerate his strength.112 Frequently visiting the baths of Karlsbad, Crabitès recuperated while he gathered information on international politics, mingling with both the European and Middle Eastern elite, including the Ottoman and Egyptian nobility. Crabitès referred to Karlsbad as Egypt’s summer capital. It was there that one could socialize with pashas, beys, and effendis who were there for some rest and relaxation to improve their livers. The cure at Karlsbad revolved around walking and drinking its water. Crabitès described the experience, I had found out, when I first became a votary of its waters, that I could get closer to an Egyptian in a week at Carlsbad than in a lifetime at Cairo. The Spruedel salts dissolve the barrier between East and West. The suspicious Levantine lowers his guard when his bowels are active.113 Just before one trip to Karlsbad, Crabitès even met and interviewed Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Eduard Beneš in Prague. From these interviews, Crabitès composed a biography of ’s future first president. The judge surmised that he had only secured this prized interview based on his connections and impressive vita. He believed that Beneš had the greatest trust in him when Beneš told him, “I have no hesitancy in telling you what you want to know.”114 The Crabitès family also traveled throughout the Middle East, vacationing in Turkey, the Levant, the Holy Land, and Egypt. He journeyed to many historically significant places throughout the Middle East, including the Monastery of Saint Catherine on Mount Sinai. He loved to make the trek to the place where Moses received the Ten Commandments. When he first arrived in Egypt, it took about two weeks to go to Mount Sinai and back by camel. The introduction of automobiles made this a two-day trip. The trouble for Crabitès was not the distance but the climb:

112 Ibid., 17, 73. 113 Ibid., 212. 114 Ibid., 211.

132 Some three thousand steps lead from its outer walls. They have to be climbed before the spot is reached where Moses received the Ten Commandments. When I had finished ascending them I was exhausted. So was every member of our party. Luckily, however, nobody dropped dead at the summit. Such occurrences are, unfortunately, fairly frequent.115 Crabitès even said that he visited the spot where Moses was said to have been discovered among the bulrushes. His family spent time visiting the beaches of Suez on the Red Sea, as well as those at Port Said on the Mediterranean Sea.116 Crabitès had connections with many of the men operating digs at Luxor and Giza, thus he was able to make an appearance at many of these archeological sites. He had his picture taken with the mummy of Ramses, the pharaoh supposed to be responsible for the Hebrew exodus from Egypt. Crabitès visited the Boston-Harvard Egyptological expedition during the war, headed by his good friend, Dr. George A. Reisner. There he saw, Hetapheres, history’s first red-head, as well as mother, wife, and daughter of a pharaoh.117 Years later, Crabitès would travel to the tomb of Pharaoh Tutankhamen, first discovered by English archeologist Howard Carter and Lord Carnarvon. As a judge, he would rule on the sequestration rights to Tutankhamen’s artifacts.

115 Ibid., 195-96. 116 Ibid., 159. 117 Ibid., 166.

133 CHAPTER 5- COURT OF APPEALS

Wartime Egypt The British continued to claim that the occupation had always been intended to be temporary. However, with each passing year of occupation, Britain’s empire increasingly relied on Egypt in the maintenance of their vast empire. Lord Cromer, the epitome of empire, retired in 1907. The British would remember his tenure in office as the halcyon days of their power and prestige in Egypt, but the Egyptians continued to associate Cromer with the Dinshawi Incident in 1906, in spite of his efforts to improve the lot of the fellaheen. In 1906, there was a minor incident that took place in the small Nile delta village of Dinshawi, where British soldiers had shot and killed many pigeons for sport. These pigeons were not feral but the domesticated pets of the Dinshawi villagers. Already rankled by British treatment, the villagers attacked the British soldiers. Determined to uphold their prestige, Lord Cromer had the assailants arrested, handing down harsh punishments, including four executions and four life sentences. This incident exacerbated the relationship between the two parties, mobilizing common Egyptians against the colonizer. Lord Cromer resigned not long thereafter, cognizant that he could no longer continue to rule Egypt after election of a Liberal government in London.1 Lord Eldon Gorst replaced Lord Cromer in 1907. Early on, a reform- minded Gorst endeavored to synchronize relations between the residency and palace. He sought to mend the frayed relationship between Khedive Abbas and the British, which was largely a result of Lord Cromer’s personal distaste for the khedive. Gorst also attempted to nurture the development of nascent representative institutions; however, this goal was irreconcilable with British support for the khedive. Beset by Egyptian nationalists on the one hand, and British officialdom on the other, Gorst retired in 1911. Lord Kitchener succeeded Gorst that same year. Those who had hoped Kitchener would return to Cromer’s

1 Al-Sayid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, 79. Roberts ed., The Cambridge History of Africa, 742-44.

134 autocratic style were somewhat disappointed, for Kitchener incorporated some liberal reforms, even though he refused to tolerate resistance to his policies. During this period, Egyptian opposition to the British occupation remained fractured and disunited. Most importantly, it was led by elites, or intellectuals, and failed to include the masses.2 Just prior to the Great War, the Young Turks put aside traditional Ottoman tolerance in favor of narrow-minded Pan-Turkism. Arabs increasingly broke from Ottoman or even Islamic influence, and Arab thinkers, both Christian and Muslim, sought to revive the Arabic language. This had a major impact on the development of nationalism. Some Arab intellectuals concentrated on the pre- Islamic tradition of the Arabic language as the foundation of their modern identities.3 Crabitès associated nationalism with Egypt’s pre-Islamic heritage. World War I was a significant turning point in Egyptian history. Under the exigencies of war, the British declared Egypt a protectorate in December of 1914. The British deposed Khedive Abbas and appointed his uncle Hussain Kamel as the new sultan. Sir Henry MacMahon became the high commissioner. Kamel’s reign lasted only three short years. He died in 1917, and his younger brother Fuad took the title of sultan. Egypt was strategically important to the British, and they tried to protect the Suez Canal because it linked the Mediterranean to India. Egypt was also an excellent location to garrison troops should Britain open up another front in the eastern Mediterranean to alleviate pressure on the Western Front, but the war also fostered much nationalist sentiment in Egypt. The transition from the “Veiled Protectorate” to a full protectorate intensified Egyptian resentment of Britain. Britain had promised that it alone would assume the defense of Egypt during the conflict, only to go back upon its word when it established the Egyptian Labor Corps in 1916, which conscripted, often involuntarily, more than one and a half million Egyptians for the war effort. After millennia of foreign domination, most Englishmen viewed Egypt as a nation wholly incapable of independence. They assumed that Egyptians invited

2 A.D. Roberts ed., The Cambridge History of Africa, 742-45. 3 Polk, The Arab World, 95.

135 invasion and dominance since they could not rule themselves. The British promoted westernization to compensate for the Egyptians’ lack of experience managing their own country. They believed that only by pushing Egypt westward could they drag it into modernity. Crabitès, like many Westerners in Egypt, did not regard Egyptians as Arabs. For such Westerners, Egyptians had their own separate identity that predated Islam. Tracing their heritage back to the ancient Egyptians, the Copts actually preceded Islam and Arabization. Although many Westerners conceded that most Egyptians had been Islamicized, they were not fully Arabized, clinging to pre-Islamic customs and traditions. David George Hogarth, head of the Arab Bureau, as well as English archaeologist and director of the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, articulated a common Western perception of Egyptians, that they were not Arabs, rather the sons of pharaohs, Of course Egyptians are not Arabs at all but sons of Ham with a sprinkling of prophet progeny: and all this talk of Arab nationality is fudge. Really they have no interest in anything but the cotton crop . . . and . . . family feuds. What can you do with such but rule them, whether they like it or not.4 By feeding armies in Europe and the Middle East, the fellaheen actually prospered economically. The British also enlisted the services of over twenty thousand Egyptians in the Camel Corps, while other Egyptians served the British army in more menial, yet nonetheless important positions as hard laborers. This influx of British pounds helped the Egyptian economy, although it did produce some social dislocation. British soldiers received all of their back pay while on leave in Cairo. They spent their money while on leave, so merchants in Cairo benefited from the war as well. The British restrained Egyptian politics during this period, keeping the nascent nationalism in check.5 After being repressed for years during the war, the end of war brought a surge of Egyptian nationalism.

4 Sattin, Lifting the Veil, 142. 5 Polk, The Arab World, 108.

136 The British forbade any opposition to their rule and discouraged Egyptian nationalist expression.6 When nationalist leaders across the Middle East listened to President Wilson deliver his “Fourteen Points” to Congress in 1918, in which he called for self-determination for nationalities, they believed that he was speaking directly to them. Like President Wilson, a Democrat, Crabitès did not agree with British policies in Egypt. Following World War I, Egyptian nationalists demanded independence and representation at the peace negotiations taking place at Versailles, just outside of Paris. The British further exacerbated their relationship with the Egyptians by excluding Sa’ad Zaghloul, Egyptian nationalist and leader of the Wafd Party, from the settlement at Versailles. From Versailles, Britain and France delimited Arab states according to their own whims, rather than adopting any policy of nation-building which included input from the Arab. Zaghloul returned from Paris determined to put further pressure on Britain. His Wafd Party represented Egyptian grievances towards the British and commanded widespread support. Fearful of nationalist unrest, the British exiled Zaghloul to Malta in 1919. This action aggravated the relationship between the British and the Egyptians. After riots in the streets, the British backed off from their intransigent posture and invited Zaghloul to return to Egypt. Even at Zaghloul’s homecoming, the violence against British interests did not abate, for Zaghloul was adamant that he would accept nothing less than real Egyptian autonomy and perhaps independence. Britain sought to safeguard its interests in Egypt in 1922, but escalating hostility in Egypt forced Lord Allenby, Sirdar to Egypt and the Sudan, to grant Egyptians their independence; however, Allenby ensured that Britain retained power over four key areas of interest crucial to their broader imperial ambitions, including: the status of the Sudan, protection of minorities and foreign businesses, security over communications, and defense from foreign aggression. Field Marshal Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby, gained fame for his leadership during World War I, in which he commanded the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in the conquest of the Levant. As commander-in-chief of the

6 Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 53.

137 Egyptian Expeditionary Force during the war, he supported T.E. Lawrence’s efforts to promote an Arab revolt against the Ottomans. Allenby won decisive victories in 1917 and 1918, first at Beersheba during the Third Battle of Gaza, Junction Station, and finally at Megiddo. After the war, Allenby was promoted to field marshal and later created the Viscount of Megiddo and Felixstowe, in Suffolk County, England. He continued to be high commissioner of Egypt and the Sudan until his retirement in 1925. The terms of the British settlement appealed to Egyptian independence, which included greater Egyptian control over their own finances, a shared defense of Egypt, the placement of the Capitulations under British administration, and Egyptian authority to dismiss foreigners in the service of the Egyptian government.7 Unfortunately for Egyptian nationalists, the British retained jurisdiction over the four principal areas. In a sense, this British dominion over these specific areas of concern left Egypt only partially autonomous. Egypt’s government and economy still relied heavily on foreigners.8 Cairo and the Mixed Courts During World War I, Cairo experienced much upheaval. The British deposed Khedive Abbas II and replaced him with Hussein Kamel. Sir Henry McMahon, famous for his correspondence with Hussein bin Ali, the Sherif of Mecca, during World War I, succeeded Lord Kitchener as the new high commissioner. The British army of occupation swelled in number. They interned any Germans or Turks who did not escape Egypt early on. McMahon imposed martial law during the war, censored the press and suppressed all forms of nationalist expression, and yet much still remained the same for Cairo during the war. 9 The citizens of Cairo went about their usual routines without any real interruptions. Foreigners continued to attend their races at the Gezira Sporting Club, the tennis courts managed to remain fully booked, and it was still difficult to reserve at table at the Turf Club.10

7 Polk, The Arab World, 139. 8 Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 59. 9 Sattin, Lifting the Veil, 210-12. 10 Ibid., 212.

138 The Mixed Courts operated throughout World War I, although the composition of the courts altered due to the conflict. German and Austrian judges customarily traveled home while the Mixed Courts recessed during the hot summer months. The judges arranged to return to their posts in the fall of 1914; however, the Mixed Courts informed them not to come back to Egypt because of the outbreak of hostilities. After consulting with the Allied Capitulatory Powers, the Egyptian government decided to replace the six German and Austrian judges on the Mixed Courts. They compensated for the loss of the German and Austrian judges by creating a new seat for the Court of Appeal and two new seats for the Courts of First Instance.11 Crabitès attempted to obtain this new position on the Court of Appeals. Towards the end of World War I, Crabitès approached the State Department, offering his services to them. He was highly patriotic and believed it his duty as an American to aid his country during the war, but this was really a job search for Crabitès. During this period, Egypt, in consultation with Great Britain, considered abolishing the Mixed Courts once their contract expired. Crabitès was concerned about losing his seat should the Capitulatory Powers not extend the contract for Mixed Courts. At the same time, he sought promotion to a judgeship on the Mixed Courts. Crabitès thought that he could improve his prospects while at the same time serving his country. He sought a post in the Foreign Service, so he turned to his contacts back home for assistance. He enlisted the influence of men he had associated with in New Orleans’ social organizations to help procure a diplomatic position, men like Louisiana Senator Ransdell. Crabitès went so far as to complete a job application for the State Department. In 1917, he wrote Paul Knabenshue, then chargé d’affaires for the American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General in Cairo, offering his services, I venture to suggest that it is my belief that the Government may be able to make use of my services, either at the Department or in a capital of

11 State Department Document 883.05/78: Olney Arnold, Consul-General in Cairo, to Secretary of State, 6 May 1915.

139 Europe, for the purpose of acting in an advisory capacity in connection with legal matters requiring a special knowledge of the laws of continental Europe.12 The United States seemed to have little need of his aid as a legal advisor during World War I. The State Department responded that they only had limited fields of services and he should divert his attention elsewhere. They offered to send his application to the Council of National Defense instead. Later on, his specialization in Middle Eastern affairs would prove to an attractive asset to the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.13 In reality, the State Department did require his help at the time, but they were not interested in his services even though he spoke fluently both French and German. Life remained much the same for Crabitès during this period. After living in the Continental Savoy Hotel for years, Crabitès grew weary of hotel life and decided to relocate. This was post-war Egypt. For months, he and Charlotte hunted without any luck until they found a villa situated on the banks of the Nile.14 He wanted a study and Charlotte wanted a garden. Recalling the time spent searching for the perfect place to live, Crabitès said, Our patience was rewarded, for our garden was a riot of color made even more attractive because surrounded by others of wide expanse. We had, on our own grounds, two majestic royal palms, a gorgeous flame tree, and about a dozen exquisite poinsettias. Our lawn, while not large, was ample for our purposes. Beds of roses and others of cacti were a delight to us and our friends. A pergola of bignonia led up to our front door. The entrance to our garden was through an arch of brick-red and royal-purple bougainvillea. Our roof-garden was almost equally attractive. I was in my seventh heaven when I lunched up there in the spring, looking at the

12 State Department Document 883.05/106: Enclosure from Paul Knabenshue, Chargé d’Affaires in Cairo, to Secretary of State, 8 February 1917. 13 State Department Document 883.05/107: From in Washington D.C. to Pierre Crabitès in Cairo, 27 March 1917. 14 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 166.

140 pyramids of Guiza [sic] in the distance, and watching falukas glide along the Nile, winding their way, so it seemed, through my garden.15 Crabitès maintained a luxurious life in Cairo. He had a villa on the Nile and his own personal servant. Court of Appeals (1917-1921) There were already discussions underway in Egypt concerning the abolition of the Capitulations, when Crabitès attempted to secure a post with the State Department. These talks centered around the modification of the Mixed Courts and the establishment of a new Court of Cassation to supersede the Mixed Courts’ Court of Appeals. Foreign citizens residing in Egypt were wary of terminating the Capitulations and all of the privileges they afforded. This new court sought to preserve some power for the British, albeit at the expense of other foreign nationals. If the British had their way, they would be able to appoint more Englishmen to the new courts, thereby increasing their influence over the judicial system and compensating for the loss of rights contingent upon the abolition of the Capitulations. The man behind the Egyptian judicial reform was Sir William Brunyate. He was the British judicial advisor to the Egyptian government. The Foreign Office aptly described Brunyate as “a certain English lawyer in Egypt (Brunyate) who has conducted a regular campaign against the Capitulations Commission and in favour of the thorough Anglicization of the new system.”16 Crabitès did not fit into Brunyate’s well conceived plans for judicial reform in Egypt. At the time of these negotiations over the fate of the Capitulations, Judge Tuck was the American representative on the Court of Appeals. An elderly man, Judge Tuck had been pondering retirement for some time. Judge van Horne of the Court of First Instance was next in line to succeed Judge Tuck to the Court of Appeals, but he too was of advanced age and within sight of retirement. This left Judge Crabitès as the sole American member of the Mixed Courts to be considered for promotion to the Court of Appeals. The subsequent scramble to

15 Ibid. 16 Public Record Office Document 63213/W/50: From the Foreign Office, 28 May 1919.

141 obtain a position on the Supreme Court would become an obsession for Crabitès. By taking a seat on the Supreme Court, not only would Crabitès achieve a more elite status but a higher salary as well, but this would have also compensated for being refused diplomatic position. Crabitès was an ambitious man, but before he could even contemplate nomination to the post, he had to campaign to assure that an American would be appointed following Judge Tuck’s retirement. Brunyate actually proposed to limit the non-British foreign judges on the new court to a single Frenchman and Italian.17 He cared little for Americans. This would have restricted the American representation on the Mixed Courts to just one judge on an inferior court. Crabitès believed that Brunyate, a man with a forceful personality, would simply bully the (London) Foreign Office to acquiesce to his demands. Once guaranteed that an American would replace Judge Tuck, Crabitès tried to gain the nomination to this court of last resort. He made a case that the United States deserved special attention as one of the Great Powers. As a Capitulatory Power, it had been assured a position on the Mixed Courts’ Court of Appeal, and Crabitès believed that seat belonged to him as the most able successor to Judge Tuck. Crabitès claimed that he had all of the necessary professional qualifications for appointment. He realized that any attempt to sidestep his promotion would hinder his chances for advancement and essentially kill his judicial career.18 Crabitès was vigilant for any opportunities of upward mobility. When first nominated to the Mixed Courts in 1911 to replace Judge Walter Berry, British Ambassador to the United States Mitchell Innes had advanced Crabitès’s candidacy. Ambassador Innes insisted that the United States approve Crabitès, bypassing their right to appoint and promote their own representatives to the Mixed Courts. At the time, the United States acceded to British desires with the assurance that they would be able to nominate their own representatives in the future, in the absence of foreign involvement. The British had established a

17 Public Record Office Document 212648/W/50: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Senator Joseph Ransdell in Washington D.C., 30 November 1917. 18 Ibid.

142 protectorate over Egypt and endeavored to modify the legal system, including the appointment process. The United States wanted to have independent control over their own nominees, with approval in the hands of the Egyptians, just as the charter for the Mixed Courts intended. The United States was almost powerless to affect change in Egypt since it was a British protectorate and Great Britain was a nation unwilling to bow to American demands. This difference in opinion would lead to conflict later on when Crabitès tried to secure a seat on the high court. To counteract British influence, Crabitès again enlisted the help of contacts in the United States to make a case to the American government on his behalf. These men were fellow club members and close associates from his days in New Orleans, including United States senators and congressmen, judges, clergymen, and well-placed military officers. Crabites even provided some of these men with expense accounts for any costs they might incur lobbying on his behalf.19 In letters to these men, Crabitès reasoned that it was in the best interest of the British to have the United States staunchly on their side during the war, “We are in the world war and we must win it. To facilitate our victory we must march side by side with our present Allies and in order to bring about this result it is our duty as Americans to abstain from doing anything likely to produce distrust of any ally.”20 Crabitès suggested that if the British contested his appointment it could damage British-American relations. At the time, he believed that it was not London guiding British policy towards the courts but Cairo, and to that extent Crabitès assumed that the State Department had the capacity to rectify the impasse. Crabitès composed several articles in an effort to persuade the government of the United States to nominate him for the position on the Supreme Court on Judge Tuck’s retirement. He submitted these articles to prominent government officials, including Senator Ransdell and Congressman Dupré of Louisiana, as well as Frank Lynn Polk Counselor for the Department of State.

19 Public Record Office Document 19940/W/50: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Judge James O’Conner in New Orleans, 10 December 1917. 20 Public Record Office Document 213277/W/50: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Reverend D.P. Lawton, Shreveport, LA. December 1917.

143 Crabitès asserted his worthiness for the promotion, outlining his rationale why the United States ought to be granted a seat on the new court, should it eventually replace the Mixed Courts. Crabitès made a specific case to Senator Ransdell, for the United States Senate had the power to ratify treaties, and the Capitulations, or any alteration thereof. He explained to Senator Ransdell that he would personally have no problem with the modifications so long as the British awarded the United States a post on the new Court of Cassation, for anything less would be tantamount to depriving the United States of its privileges under the Capitulations without any just compensation.21 As early as December of 1917, Crabitès expressed his concern over the judicial situation in Egypt. In briefs to American officials, he argued, It is not denied that one of the main reasons underlying the abolition of the Mixed Courts lies in the very natural desire of Great Britain to do away with the principle of national representation in the Mixed Courts, but it is urged that as it is admitted that a Frenchman and an Italian, besides Englishmen and Egyptians, will be appointed to the bench of the new Supreme Court, unjust discrimination is done the United States when American judges are denied the same treatment accorded France and Italy.22 Crabitès maintained that the British were reducing the American representation on the courts in order to boost their own presence. Troubled he would lose the opportunity to serve on this new Court of Cassation, Crabitès considered it unjust to eliminate other Capitulatory Powers from representation yet allow France and Italy to retain positions on the new court. Crabitès intimated to Senator Ransdell that the United States should cooperate in the modification of the Capitulations as long as the British and Egyptians gave assurances that an American would be guaranteed a seat on the high court. There was no profit for the United States to bring about the end of the

21 State Department Document 883.05/116: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Senator Ransdell in Washington D.C., 20 November 1917. 22 State Department Document 883.05/114: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Frank Lyon Polk, Counselor for the Department of State, Washington D.C., 1 December 1917.

144 Capitulations, which greatly benefited its citizens residing in Egypt, should their post on the Court of Appeals be expropriated.23 From the foundation of the Mixed Courts, the United States always had a representative on the court of last resort. Crabitès reasoned that should the new Supreme Court not have an American, the British and Egyptians would be denying precedents. Furthermore, that American should be Crabitès, for he insisted that when Ambassador Inness first offered him the appointment in 1911, he had implied that Crabitès would eventually be promoted to the Court of Appeal.24 In articles submitted to American officials in Egypt, the United States, and Great Britain, Crabitès articulated that the United States should have judges sitting on the proposed Supreme Court, as there were already representatives from countries other than Great Britain and Egypt previously promoted to this court. According to Crabitès, the United States should make a strong effort to accomplish this; otherwise it would be faced with the prospect of public opinion in the Middle East viewing the United States as a country whose power and influence in the region were on the wane. Crabitès learned as early as December of 1917 that certain British diplomats adamantly opposed his elevation to the Court of Appeals. Crabitès was vehemently anti-British and did not conceal his feelings in court judgments, journal articles, and social life. Members of the diplomatic community were aware of his stance towards Britain. He even expressed his anti-British sentiments to members of the American Diplomatic Agency in Cairo, including Paul Knabenshue, the Vice Consul in charge. Crabitès held Knabenshue in high regard and would later compose a biography of Knabenshue. Vice Consul Knabenshue never questioned Crabitès’s patriotism; however, Knabenshue suggested that Crabitès’s opinions regarding Britain were well known in Cairo,

23 State Department Document 883.05/117: To the Office of the Solicitor, Department of State, 20 February 1918. 24 State Department Document 883.05/120: Memorandum from the American Embassy in London, 3 April 1918.

145 While the Judge is perfectly loyal to the United States and to the cause of the Allies, he is, nevertheless, very anti-British. This I know from his emphatic statements to me in this regard . . . He has been unable to hide his sentiments in this regard-from the time of his arrival in Egypt until the present day – and as his anti-British sentiments have become fairly generally known, I feel obliged to inform the Department.25 Paul Knabenshue was an interesting character. He was often critical of Crabitès. At the same time that Crabitès struggled for promotion to the Court of Appeals, Knabenshue was lobbying for advancement to become the American diplomatic agent and consul-general in Cairo. Already, he was the acting diplomatic agent in place of Olney Arnold, a man reputed to have pro-German sympathies.26 In Cairo, he solicited the help of Judges Tuck, Van Horne and Crabitès to help his chances for advancement. They all vouched for Knabenshue, as did George Reisner, famed American archaeologist.27 Although Crabitès offered to assist Knabenshue obtain a higher post, Knabenshue did not reciprocate. As we have seen, Crabitès’s anti-British bias developed as a young man in Louisiana, where he witnessed the Anglo-Saxon culture slowly overwhelm Catholic and Creole New Orleans. During his stay in Egypt, his opinion of the British worsened. Crabitès was against imperialism and followed the Democratic Party line on this issue. He strongly opposed the British occupation of Egypt. He supported the Catholic Church and the Papacy’s decidedly pro-Arab foreign policy. The British occupation and protectorate of Egypt would have conflicted with their goals in the Middle East. This is especially important because the Vatican wanted to protect the endangered Catholic minorities in the Holy Land and elsewhere in the Middle East. The Church promoted social change and human rights, and the possibility of a Jewish state predicated upon a religious mission ran against the main tenets of Catholic foreign policy by blurring the

25 State Department Document 883.05/111: From Paul Knabenshue, Vice Consul in Charge, American Diplomatic Agency in Cairo to Wilbur Carr, 13 December 1917. 26 Public Record Office Document 201072/W/50: Sir R. Wingate in Cairo to Lord Hardinge in London, 17 October 1917. 27 Public Record Office Document 201072/W/50: Sir R. Wingate in Cairo to Lord Hardinge in London, 18 October 1917. Public Record Office Document 209065/W/50: George Reisner, Harvard Camp, Pyramids, Cairo, to Sir R. Wingate, 22 October 1917.

146 distinction between temporal and spiritual matters. With their concern for Middle Eastern Catholics, the Vatican adopted a policy more favorable to the Arab governments in the region. Of primary concern for the Papacy were the Christian holy sites in Palestine and protection of the Catholic minorities. The Vatican shared more common interests with the Arab-Islamic states than with Israel. Thus, it is not surprising that Crabitès would adopt a pro-Arab stance on the conflict over Palestine.28 Crabitès witnessed first hand the British treatment of the native Egyptians during the “Veiled Protectorate” and later during World War I. He concluded that British had designed their Egypt policy to exploit the Egyptians for profit. This knowledge, along with his research on the British Mandate for Palestine deeply affected his negative opinion of the British. In the future, Crabitès would compose a thesis defending the Arabs of Palestine, attacking the British Mandate for their manipulation of both the Jews and Arabs to further their own agenda. His traditional Democrat proclivities conflicted with the British occupation of Egypt and Palestine. He strongly rejected imperialism. Crabitès’s appointment to the Court of Appeals produced some discord between the United States, Great Britain, and Egypt. It made no difference that Crabitès was pro-Egyptian since British officials essentially dictated Egyptian policy. The official Egyptian position on Crabitès often mirrored the British stance. Concerned that the Egyptians and British did not favor his nomination to the highest court, Crabitès again recruited the assistance of Louisiana congressmen in order to secure the post. Throughout his long ordeal to become a justice on the Court of Appeals, Crabitès would continually make use of his contacts in America to exert influence on Washington. Early on, Knabenshue recognized Crabitès’s determination to sit on the high bench: The judge is so obsessed with the ambition to become a member of the new Supreme Court, that I am convinced from his remarks that he is prepared to enlist political influence at home to force the United States

28 George Emile Irani, “The Holy See and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” in The Vatican, Islam, and the Middle East. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 125-127.

147 Government to demand his appointment. I have frequently heard him mention Senator Ransdell of Louisiana as one of his supporters. I also believe that he may go so far as to ask his friends at home to use the press to influence public opinion in his favor.29 To a certain extent, Knabenshue accurately described Crabitès, for the judge was consumed by ambition. The American mission in Egypt did not favor Crabitès’s promotion to the Supreme Court at this point. In an effort to discredit Crabitès as a candidate, the British and Egyptians alleged he had not attained the professional qualifications nor was he eminent enough to be a judge on the Supreme Court. They reasoned that he did not posses enough seniority to warrant promotion. At the time, he had only six years of experience on the bench of the Mixed Courts, but by the time that Judge Tuck retired and the British and Americans agreed on an appointee, Crabitès had ten years of experience. Crabitès was a man steeped in French law and possessed a working knowledge of Arabic. In the past, the British had been known to promote men with fewer qualifications and experience to the Court of Appeals. Most likely, it was not the position of the Egyptian government on Crabitès which led to this denunciation, but the view of Sir William Brunyate. Sir William Brunyate largely controlled Egyptian policy regarding the Mixed Courts. While Brunyate was seeking to call into question Crabitès’s fitness as a judge, Lord Curzon had been pressuring Brunyate to promote two military officers to the Court of First Instance.30 Neither of these officers had a knowledge of Arabic or French law.31 In fact, these men were directed to the School of Oriental Languages in London to learn the Arabic Language.32 Knabenshue had a political relationship with Brunyate; although not a necessarily friendly one. Knabenshue disclosed of Brunyate that he “stated to me that the Judge (Crabitès) is eccentric in his ideas and utterances and that he

29 State Department Document 883.05/137: From Paul Knabenshue, Vice-Consul in Cairo, to Wilbur J. Carr, Director of the Consular Service, Department of State, 8 July 1919. 30 Public Record Office Document 22639/W/50: From the Foreign Office, Cairo, to the Secretary of the Army Council, 15 February 1919. 31 Public Record Office Document 28010/W/50: From Sir M. Cheetham in Cairo, 19 February 1919. 32 Public Record Office Document 33828/W/50: From Sheldon Amos to Hurst, 3 March 1919.

148 has the reputation among his colleagues of not possessing sound judgment, in which opinion he (Sir William) concurred.”33 After many discussions with Brunyate, Knabenshue concluded, “I have reason to believe that the British authorities in Egypt consider Judge Crabites to be anti-British in his sentiments.”34 It was important to maintain a good relationship with the judicial advisor. It turns out that it was not really the judgment of the Egyptian government obstructing Crabitès’s appointment but the conviction of Sir Brunyate, who personally disliked him. Naturally, Crabitès did not favorably regard Sir Brunyate’s meddling in the appointment process. Referring to the judicial advisor’s overbearing personality, Crabitès pronounced, “Brunyate dominates the field and is a brutal London prize ring kind of a fighter, whereas Wingate sticks to the Marquis of Queensbery rules.”35 Brunyate tended to bully his opponents, whereas Wingate followed proper administrative procedure. Crabitès’s problems in obtaining promotion to the Court of Appeals were partly attributable his anti-British proclivities, but also because Sir William Brunyate had a specific pro-Anglo-Saxon agenda. He was a domineering man who detested non-British foreigners in Egypt. This was especially pertinent to Crabitès because unlike so many Americans in Egypt of Anglo-Saxon heritage, Crabitès had a Creole background. Crabitès said that while he disagreed with Brunyate on the modification of the Capitulations, he still remained on friendly social terms with the judicial advisor, It must not be inferred from this letter that my personal relations with Sir William Brunyate are unfriendly because such is far from the case. It has been deemed necessary to concentrate fire upon him because it is his assertive personality which is shaping the present Egyptian situation in respect to the abolition of the Capitulations. I am loath to believe that

33 State Department Document 883.05/112: From Paul Knabenshue, Vice-Consul in Cairo, to Secretary of State in Washington D.C., 8 December 1917. 34 Ibid. 35 State Department Document 883.05/119: From Hampson Gary, Consul-General in Cairo, to Secretary of State, 22 February 1919.

149 anyone less self-centered could fail to see the egregious blunder which he is making.36 Crabitès clearly recognized the work of Brunyate in the matter, but he also realized that Brunyate could not simultaneously oppose all of the Great Powers while trying to alter the Capitulations and had to enlist the support of some non- British states to modify the Capitulations. Crabitès concluded that Brunyate needed the Americans. , Brunyate ultimately decided to placate France and Italy by promising them special entitlements after the reforms. Crabitès believed that the United States suffered unjust discrimination in being deprived of the same privileges afforded to France and Italy.37 Brunyate had managed to incur the wrath of other nations as well. He made an effort to eliminate French as a language on the new courts and replace it with English. Brunyate thought that over time this would bring about the disappearance of the French language in Egypt as had been the case with Italian.38 He recognized the pitfalls of such a plan and conceded that certain groups in Egypt would take issue with his reforms: One section of the Mixed Bar is likely to make common cause with a certain section of the French colony here which has a distinct feeling that it is being sacrificed, and feels very sore in consequence . . . Egyptian opinion is, of course, much disturbed at present as to political matters, and as regards the Native Bar it is clear that the measure of foreign privilege we propose to retain is distasteful to them.39 The advisory committee in London ventured not only to make English the primary language of the new courts but to replace French law with British commercial law.40 Crabitès understood the ramifications of Brunyate’s policies: “It became generally understood that Sir William Brunyate, the Judicial Advisor to the

36 Public Record Office Document 19940/W/50: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Edward Bell, Secretary of the American Embassy, London, 24 December 1917. 37 Ibid. 38 Public Record Office Document 13870/W/50: From Sir William Brunyate in Cairo, 25 January 1919. 39 Public Record Office Document 28010/W/50: From Sir William Brunyate, Cairo to Sir Milne Cheetham, 22 February 1919. 40 Ibid.

150 Ministry of Justice, had determined that the Common Law of England should supplant the Napoleonic Codes.”41 The next step would be to increase the Anglo-Saxon presence on the courts. Confidential documents from the Residency in Cairo disclose the effort underway to anglicize Egypt by removing all non-British foreign elements: The tenor of the resolutions, as understood by Lord Curzon, is to the effect that, in the view of the Committee the form and substance of the proposed new codes of law should be to the greatest possible extent anglicized and freed from the international, and particularly French, influences which have characterized the legal system of Egypt since the establishment of European control in that country.42 For British officials in Egypt, Crabitès’s Creole heritage and specialization in French law undermined his chances of promotion. The same British officials who wanted to substitute English for French as the lingua franca of Egypt also had concerns that French speakers, including those native Egyptians who spoke French rather than English, would unite in opposition to the protectorate.43 Crabitès argued that it was not until Britain tried to anglicize Egypt that the nationalist movement was able to mobilize all sectors of Egyptian society against the colonizer, Such a decision affected the intellectual elite. It meant an attack upon their preserves. It told them that their scholarship was menaced . . . And suddenly the situation changed. Native sons with foreign passports and French intellects sprang into the fray. They organized public opinion. They brought into the lists the educated minority whose pride held them aloof until their bailiwick was invaded. Sir William Brunyate found foemen worthy of his steel. England grasped the meaning of the struggle. The

41 Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” 605. 42 Public Record Office Document 63213/W/50: From the Residency in Cairo to the Honorary Secretary of the Parliamentary Commercial Committee, House of Commons, in London, 28 May 1919. 43 Ibid.

151 bugle of retreat sounded, the Common Law threat was withdrawn and French culture planted its standard in the Temple of Victory.44 The British regarded Crabitès as a part of this contingent. Even though Crabitès composed almost all of his academic works in English, rather than French, the British still considered him to be a member of the French colony of Egypt, rather than the Anglo-Saxon community. Already aware of Crabitès’s anti-British attitude, they must have thought that he would fall within the purview of this resistance. In a sense, the British would have been correct concerning Crabitès’s hostility, but not because of the French language issue, rather his opposition on principle to the protectorate. By the spring of 1918, it appeared that Crabitès would, at least, retain his position as a judge on the new courts, for the British and Egyptians were inclined to keep the members of the Mixed Courts as judges in the new courts. During this same period, Crabitès modified his argument about the French and Italian judges set to take up positions on new Court of Cassation. Instead of asserting that these judges would be representatives of France and Italy, Crabitès maintained that they were integral to the proper functioning of the Supreme Court.45 In a letter to Secretary of the American Embassy in London Edward Bell, Crabitès wrote, “I know that he (Sir Brunyate) stoutly denies that any posts have been guaranteed to representatives of these two powers; I know that he does not deny that he has agreed to appoint the Frenchman and the Italian.”46 Crabitès was conscious that if Brunyate had the authority to guarantee judgeships, then he had the power to reject them as well. Instead of focusing on the situation involving the appointment French and Italian judges to the Supreme Court, Crabitès attempted to garner more American support for his position by concentrating on the repercussions of the proposed changes to American foreign policy. He surmised that the abolition of

44 Crabitès, “The Spiritual Empire of France,” 605. 45 State Department Document 883.05/122: From Laughlin (for the Ambassador) in London to the Secretary of State, 7 May 1918. 46 State Department Document 883.05/122: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Edward Bell, Secretary of the American Embassy in London, 23 April 1918.

152 the Capitulations and the creation of the new courts would be detrimental to American treaty rights in Egypt.47 Crabitès spent much of his leisure time attending dinner parties where he mingled with the elite of Egypt. These society functions were an opportunity for Crabitès to elicit salient information concerning the political situation in Egypt. In January of 1919, evidence surfaced in Cairo that the convention for the Mixed Courts would be renewed by the Egyptian government; however, the new contract only extended the life of the courts for another nine months. For Crabitès, this suggested that the days of the Mixed Courts were numbered. Clearly anxious about his fate, he wrote Counselor of the Department of State Frank Lynn Polk, I am absolutely certain that if our diplomatic agent be espoused to say that Washington would view with favor the granting of the same honor to an American as will be accorded to any other non-British foreigner, the English would raise no objection. I am the only available appointee; personally I stand well with the British and all that they desire is to have it said that Washington desires to see me appointed.48 Not only did Crabitès have such confidence in his own worthiness, but he also imagined that the United States had more pull than it did in Egypt. In the summer of 1919, Judge Tuck, the American representative on the Mixed Courts Court of Appeal, was on the verge of retirement. The British realized that they would have great difficulty passing over Crabitès. They urgently searched for an alternative candidate to avoid publicly rejecting Crabitès. The British understood that they were ignoring proper procedure relating to the future appointment or promotion of Mixed Courts judges: The solution of this question in the sense above indicated is of an urgent nature, as the Egyptian Government, in agreement with the State Department, should be in a position to recommend a candidate as soon as Judge Tuck’s resignation is officially notified. The acquiescence of the

47 State Department Document 883.05/127: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to Counselor of the Department of State, 8 January 1919. 48 Ibid.

153 United States Government to the above proposal should be obtained in order to obviate the appearance of Messrs. Crabites and van Horne being passed over by the Egyptian Government without previous agreement with the State Department.49 In the past, as we have seen, the United States government had permitted Britain take the lead. This time, however, the American government was unwilling to have the British bully them into acquiescing so easily. By the fall of 1919, members of the American diplomatic corps were openly advocating Crabitès. Clearly, his networking and lobbying efforts back home achieved positive results. Director of the Consular Service for the Department of State Wilbur J. Carr was confident that Crabitès was the best man for the job. He also felt that it was in America’s best interest to force Crabitès’ nomination. Paul Knabenshue, now consul for the American consulate general in Beirut, Syria, expressed little confidence in Crabitès in 1917, yet by 1919 he was perhaps one of Crabitès’ most ardent supporters, even attempting to persuade others in the Foreign Service to endorse his cause, including Edward Bell of the American embassy in London. Knabenshue considered the conditions ripe for the United States to inform Great Britain of its desire to see Crabitès appointed to the Supreme Court. The situation had changed in Egypt. Now that the war was no longer in Egypt, he probably did not have to worry too much about the opinion of the British. In a letter to Wilbur J. Carr, Knabenshue declared, The opposition to Crabitès was confined to one official- Sir William Brunyate, the Legal Advisor- and he was animated in this respect, I am convinced, purely by a personal feeling against Crabitès. However, owing to the political blunders made in Egypt recently, a clean sweep of British officials is taking place there at present and I believe that Brunyate who is now on leave will not return. I am persuaded from my close study of the question that Crabitès is the logical American for the new Supreme Court,

49 Public Record Office Document 108205/W/50: From the Residency in Cairo to Lord Curzon, 13 July 1919.

154 and being a young man, would ensure us a long term of representation than if an older man was to be appointed.50 The Americans wanted to nominate Crabitès because of his young age, but Brunyate had implied that his age was a handicap, making him less eminent from a lack of experience. This was not a justifiable argument for Brunyate since he had taken steps in the past to appoint less distinguished men lacking Crabitès’s judicial experience. Knabenshue suspected that the Egyptians would insist that van Horne, who was next in seniority, be promoted to the highest court over Crabitès. This troubled Knabenshue who speculated that when van Horne stepped down in two years time, the Egyptians would be reluctant to appoint Crabitès to the new Court of Cassation, thus leaving the United States in the position of having its only remaining judge in an inferior position. By sending Crabitès to the Court of Appeals upon the retirement of Judge Tuck, the United States could avoid the possibility of having no representation on the Court of Cassation in two years. United States Agent and Consul-General to Egypt Hampson Gary, lobbied for Crabitès as well in the fall of 1919. While Crabitès was away in Italy vacationing during the court recess, Gary traveled to Alexandria to confront Judge Sheldon Amos, Acting British Advisor to the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, on behalf of Crabitès. He too recognized that Sir Brunyate’s domination over other officials in Egypt was detrimental to Crabitès, so Gary advocated an affirmative course of action to persuade local authorities to nominate Crabitès to the Supreme Court.51 The Vacuum Oil Company also thought Crabitès’s promotion to be advantageous to American interests in Egypt.52 This company was a subsidiary of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. Vacuum Oil was preoccupied with Crabitès’s appointment, for they sought a monopoly on kerosene in Egypt, and perhaps

50 State Department Document 883.05/137: From Paul Knabenshue, Consul in Beirut, to Wilbur J. Carr, Director of Consular Service, Department of State, 8 July 1919. 51 State Department Document 883.05/144: To Edward Bell, Secretary of American Embassy in London, 5 September 1919. 52 State Department Document 883.05/141: From the Vacuum Oil Company in New York City to the Secretary of State in Washington, 30 October 1919.

155 expected to discover oil in Egypt. They believed that Crabitès would be sympathetic to American businesses in Egypt. Senior officials in the American diplomatic corps resoundingly favored Crabitès’s promotion. While Knabenshue still felt optimistic about the circumstances in Egypt, he endeavored to avoid the local authorities and deal directly with London, convinced that the United States could force Great Britain to yield to Crabitès. Knabenshue pursued negotiations between the American Embassy in London and the British Foreign Office. He hoped for the talks to commence quickly, otherwise British authorities in Egypt might come to another conclusion.53 Unfortunately, Ronald C. Lindsey, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Great Britain, had already settled on an acceptable candidate for nomination to the high court, Philip Marshal Brown, professor of international law at who had diplomatic experience in Istanbul. 54 It is interesting to note that while the British insisted that Crabitès did not have sufficient seniority as a judge on the Court of First Instance, Philip Marshal Brown, although a professor of international law, had no experience as a judge on the Mixed Courts, or in French law for that matter. In the summer of 1920, there was heightened tension over the appointment of a successor to Judge Tuck on the Court of Appeals. Communications between the State Department and the American embassy in London clearly demonstrate that the Americans demanded the promotion of Crabitès to the Court of Appeals, regardless of British sentiment.55 British officials responded to American petitions by attempting to discredit Crabitès, declaring that he lacked the qualifications necessary for the court of last resort. In the meantime, they tried to hinder Crabitès’s nomination by postponing the decision until the judicial reforms had taken place.

53 State Department Document 883.05/144: To Edward Bell, Secretary of American Embassy in London, 5 September 1919. 54 Public Record Office Document 108205/W/50: To Lindsay in the Foreign Office, 5 August 1919. State Department Document 883.05/140: From R.C. Lindsay, British Embassy, Washington D.C., to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 22 August 1919. 55 State Department Document 883.05/160: From the Department of State, Washington D.C, to the American Embassy in London, 12 May 1920.

156 The British ventured to adjust the composition of the Mixed Courts by compelling judges to step down once they attained a certain age. The judicial advisor counseled Lord Allenby, High Commissioner of Egypt and the Sudan, on selecting these judges without any restrictions based on nationality, thereby assigning more British judges and expanding their influence over the courts.56 The British planned on supplanting all retiring judges with British appointees. This would have obstructed the promotion of non-British foreign judges from lower courts to the Court of Appeals. Most likely, the British endeavored to delay Crabitès’s appointment so as to circumvent his nomination in favor of one of their own judges, for the British actually wanted to increase their representation on the Court of Appeal from one to four judges: “It will be observed that the estimate of British judges is based to some extent upon a general consideration of the proportion of British to foreign judges desirable in order to bring a moderate but sensible British influence into the Mixed Courts.”57 There were other obstacles frustrating Crabitès’s chances for nomination to the Court of Appeals, including British preference towards those nationalities with large colonies in Egypt, such as the French and Italians. Beyond that, the British were not averse to promoting Americans to the highest court, as they believed that Americans would follow the British lead in the administration of justice.58 This would have eliminated Crabitès as a possible candidate for appointment. His anti-British sentiments hindered his opportunities in Egypt. There were two open seats in May of 1920. M.S. Amos, Judicial Advisor to Egypt, suggested replacing one of the vacancies with an American, but it could not be Crabitès or van Horne, “We shall certainly want another American, and we should be prepared to put a very suitable man into the Court of Appeal.”59 Although few Americans resided in Egypt during this period, they represented powerful American institutions. They were inclined to work with the

56 Public Record Office Document E4860/509/16: From Judicial Advisor M.S. Amos in Cairo to Lord Curzon, 14 May 1920. 57 Public Record Office Document E5132/509/16: From M.S. Amos, Judicial Advisor in Cairo to the Residency in Cairo, 8 May 1920. 58 Public Record Office Document E4860/509/16: From M.S. Amos, Judicial Advisor in Cairo to Lord Curzon, 14 May 1920. 59 Ibid.

157 British to abolish the Capitulations, contingent upon the British assuming responsibility for protecting Americans and their interests in Egypt. Under the new British plan, that responsibility would be transferred to the Mixed Courts.60 The British were conscious of the American resistance to the proposed judicial amendments. In a letter to Lord Curzon, Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby remarked, “Further evidence of the strength of American opposition to these reforms has now been furnished by Dr. G.A. Reisner, a distinguished archaeologist, very pro-British in his views who is head of the Harvard Egyptological Mission here.”61 George Reisner, American archaeologist to the Harvard mission, implied that the current course had already produced a slight rift in relations between the two loyal friends, “I myself, and I am sure that other Americans as well, would regret deeply any combination of circumstances which forced us to appear publicly as critics of British policy in Egypt and add a weapon, however insignificant, to the arsenal of the anti-British party.”62 Washington continued to assert pressure on the Egyptian government for Crabitès’s appointment to the Court of Appeals. Under the existing scheme, the United States had the prerogative to nominate their own candidates as judges, and the Egyptian government only had to grant their seal of approval, but according to the proposed reforms, the Americans would forfeit that right. Field- Marshal Allenby reasoned that the British should negotiate with the Americans because he was reluctant to recommend promotion for either Crabitès or van Horne. Allenby opined that the British could convince the Americans to submit a new candidate. He believed that this matter should be taken care of post haste, “If the Egyptian Government had complete liberty of appointment there would be little question of either of these gentlemen being promoted at present in view of superior claims of other judges, foreign and British.”63 Clearly, the other judges

60 Public Record Office Document E4755/509/16: From George Reisner, Harvard Camp, Pyramids, Cairo to M.S. Amos, Judicial Advisor, Cairo, 29 April 1920. 61 Public Record Office Document E5132/509/16: From Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby in Cairo to Lord Curzon, 11 May 1920. 62 Public Record Office Document E4755/509/16: From George Reisner, Harvard Camp, Pyramids, Cairo to M.S. Amos, Judicial Advisor, Cairo, 29 April 1920. 63 Public Record Office Document E4860/509/16: From Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby in Cairo to Lord Curzon, 15 May 1920.

158 on the Mixed Courts held Crabitès in high esteem. In fact, a British judge on the Court of Appeal, J.E. Marshall, testified to Crabitès’s competency, I asked the members of the English Bar practicing in Egypt, English colleagues, and Judge Crabitès, one of the American Judges in the Mixed Courts, to meet Sir Cecil Hurst, so that he might have an opportunity of hearing their views and also those of Judge Crabitès, a man of great ability and very friendly to Great Britain.64 The estimation of British judges on the Mixed Courts did not harmonize with that of the Residency. These British judges poorly assessed Crabitès. Judge Tuck retired from the Court of Appeals in late May 1920. The American government directed the Foreign Office to promote Crabitès to the high bench, insisting that only it had the privilege to designate its own judges.65 Rather than addressing American concerns over Crabitès’s appointment, British officials like Lord Curzon and Lord Hardinge avoided the issue, telling the American ambassador to Great Britain that it was involved in reorganizing the Mixed Courts.66 In June of 1920, Crabitès composed a legal article in opposition to the modification of the Capitulations and current constitution of the Mixed Courts. He submitted this article to the Residency in Cairo, conscious that the British intended to replace Judge Tuck with a British judge. Aware that the British had concerns about Egyptian nationalism, he played to their fears: If the article under analysis is pregnant with danger to the life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of Anglo Saxons, it spells untold trouble for the success of the British Protectorate. It places the High Commissioner on the firing line in Every Egyptian legislative discussion of general as opposed to local interest and inevitably subjected him to the tender

64J.E. Marshall, The Egyptian Enigma, 1890-1928. (London: John Murray, 1928), 218. 65 Public Record Office Document E5408/509/16: Memorandum from London, 27 May 1920. 66 Lord Hardinge was a former governor-general of India and later ambassador to Russia before serving under Arthur Balfour as the undersecretary in the Foreign Office.

159 mercies of the upper mill-stone of Nationalistic pressure and the nether mill-stone of foreign intrigue.67 Crabitès astutely recognized British intentions for the reforms they were proposing. He was cognizant that they sought greater British influence over the courts: The present Art. 12 provides that no change can be made in Mixed Legislation except by a vote of two thirds of all judges present. This majority should be reduced to a bare majority and steps taken to assure that at all times the presence upon the Mixed Court of Appeals of a clear majority of British judges.68 Once the British had their majority, they could propose any modifications they wished to mixed legislation. Crabitès argued that British dominance over the courts would have a deleterious impact on the politics of the court. For instance, he asserted that a preponderance of British judges would permit the high commissioner to essentially pass his legislation through the Mixed Courts without resistance. Crabitès deduced that the high commissioner, knowing full well that he had a British majority, would be incapable of removing himself from any controversy that might arise in the courts. The only recourse was to ensure that there was a non-British majority to bring about objective discussion and unbiased decisions. The British had difficulties with Crabitès’s convictions regarding judicial reorganization. They refused to appoint future judges according to their nationality. The British could only promise that the American judges on the present court system would serve on the newly constituted courts, with no assurances of future promotion.69 Towards the end of the year, American insistence and British obstinacy during the negotiations over the nomination of Crabitès forced a stalemate. The British were loath to promote Crabitès to the Court of Appeal, and the United States protested any judicial amendments which would consign it to a

67 Public Record Office Document E6615/509/16: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to the Residency, Cairo, 16 June 1920. 68 Ibid. 69 Public Record Office Document E8016/509/16: From Lord Curzon in the Foreign Office in London to Mr. Davis, the United States Ambassador, 15 July 1920.

160 disadvantageous position. The United States was disinclined to relinquish the right to appoint its own candidates for the bench, sans British involvement. Crabitès and the Americans returned to the original construction and formulation of the Mixed Courts to prove that they had the privilege to nominate Crabitès without British obstruction. The British, on the other hand, anticipated their proposed reorganization of the Mixed Courts, which naturally conferred to them greater authority. Under the new arrangement, the Americans would no longer hold the same entitlements as they did under the previous courts, and the British were at liberty to supplant Judge Tuck with a British judge, rather than an American like Crabitès. Cecil Hurst, the new judicial advisor to the Egyptian government, said that he was prepared to appoint another American judge to succeed Judge Tuck to supplement the English-speaking judges on the Court.70 The British did not view Crabitès as part of that contingent. As he was a Catholic Creole and spoke fluent French, the British must not have perceived Crabitès as Anglo-Saxon but French. Carroll Sprigg, American Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, attempted to bridge the gap between the United States and Great Britain. He approached the British High Commissioner to Egypt, Lord Allenby, in order to ascertain current British attitudes towards Crabitès’s promotion. The British held to their position that Crabitès was unacceptable due to his insufficient experience. Later the British would accuse Crabitès of not possessing the abilities necessary to properly perform his duties on the high court. In the meantime, the high commissioner solicited names of other candidates from the State Department, realizing how challenging it would be for the United States to produce another nominee with sufficient qualifications to be acceptable for appointment to the Court of Appeals. Sprigg received only evasive answers while questioning Lord Allenby about Crabitès. He decided that the real reason for British intransigence was neither Crabitès’s inexperience nor the outlook of the judicial advisor, but the

70 Public Record Office Document E11985/509/16: From Sir Cecil Hurst in Cairo to the Foreign Office in London, 28 September 1920.

161 possibility of Crabitès becoming a dominant justice by sitting on the Court of Cassation for many years to come.71 The Capitulatory Powers resisted British plans to reorganize the Egyptian judicial system. In late 1920, the British reluctantly approached the Egyptian government and the other powers to temporarily prolong the contract for the Mixed Courts.72 They conceded that they needed more time to implement their scheme. Much of the American resistance to British proposals hinged on Crabitès’s promotion to the high court. In October, Lord Curzon requested the United States government to submit three names for the Court of Appeals. The United States government had no interest in substituting another name in place of Crabitès. They desired to elevate him to the Court of Appeals, so the State Department pressed for his nomination. In recently declassified documents, Sir Cecil Hurst, Judicial Advisor to the Egyptian government, clarified Britain’s staunch contravention to Crabitès’s appointment, During Sir R. Wingate’s tenure of office as High Commissioner, he sent home various private letters to Sir R. Graham, giving details of the active campaign which Judge Crabitès was then carrying on with the authorities in the United States for the purpose of endeavouring to secure his own appointment to the Court of Appeal. If for no other reason, I think that an effort of this sort should be resisted; no man ought to be allowed to profit by active political intrigue, carried on to secure his own promotion in the service of the Government which he is working, by the extraneous use of foreign influence.73 The British objected to his method of wielding his powerful associations back home to strengthen his cause. M.S. Amos recommended that Sir Cecil Hurst advance the appointment of an American law professor; however, Hurst found this idea unappealing. Hurst

71 State Department Document 883.05/182: From Carroll Sprigg, Consul-General in Cairo to Secretary of State, 17 November 1920. 72 Public Record Document E12275/509/16: From Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office in London to the United States ambassador to Britain in London, 12 October 1920. 73 Public Record Office Document: From Sir Cecil Hurst in Cairo to the London Foreign Office, 11 November 1920.

162 contended that the notion of promoting a law professor was along the lines of continental law and was opposed by the British community in Egypt. Instead, he maintained that the British should nominate a practicing American judge, which was the tradition in Anglo-Saxon law.74 The United States government fervently protested British attempts to bypass Crabitès’s promotion to the Court of Appeal, if for no other reason than British obstinacy and their unwillingness to concede to American demands. Acting Secretary of State Norman H. Davis, claimed, I have the honor to state that this Government’s position was set forth in an instruction of November 23, 1920, to the American Ambassador at London, in which the Department referred to its previously expressed desire that Judge Crabitès, now serving on the Court of First Instance, should be elevated to the position made vacant by the retirement of Judge Tuck.75 Before he would more forward on the issue, Davis desired to understand just exactly why the British opposed Crabitès and what were their objections to his nomination.76 At this juncture, Crabitès had the full encouragement of the American government. Lord Allenby acknowledged that the Americans were disinclined to follow the usual procedure in this situation by submitting three names for consideration to the Egyptian government.77 The United States government championed Crabitès for a few salient reasons. First, the Americans still believed that Crabitès was eminent enough to warrant promotion to the Court of Appeals. This attitude seems to be validated by the sentiment of Crabitès’s fellow judges, who all held him in high regard. Second, as a judge, Crabitès was relatively youthful, so the United States could count on his influence in the high court for years to come. Finally, Crabitès had much political patronage back

74 Public Record Office Document E13794/509/16: From Sir Cecil Hurst in Cairo to M.S. Amos at the Foreign Office in London, 11 November 1920. 75 State Department Document 883.05/184: From Acting Secretary of State Norman H. Davis in Washington D.C. to the British ambassador to Washington, 8 December 1920. 76 Ibid. 77 Public Record Office Document E1104/189/16: From Lord Allenby in Cairo to Lord Curzon in London, 10 January 1921.

163 home, especially from his friends in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives. The Americans continued to insist on Crabitès, but the British were equally adamant in their poor estimation of Crabitès, which they attributed to his lack of judicial achievement and tenure on the bench. Lord Curzon made a case that Crabitès did not posses the professional qualifications necessary for an appointment to the high court.78 This argument was a deceitful ruse to force the United States to nominate another less qualified candidate. In January of 1921, Crabitès aware of the precariousness of his situation, enlisted the support of a relative in Washington, Chief Justice White. Crabitès hoped that White would approach the British government on his behalf. This time, however, Justice White was reluctant to become involved, although he did mention his interest in Crabitès’s original promotion in 1911. Justice White did not consider it befitting for him to intervene at this particular time.79 The Vacuum Oil Company was not so scrupulous and assailed British motives in regard to the Mixed Courts, charging them with attempting to increase their power over the courts at the expense of other nations. According to the Vacuum Oil Company, Great Britain manipulated the Egyptian government to promote judges of their liking to the Court of Appeals. The founding charter of the Mixed Courts affirmed that only the Egyptian government could appoint those judges to the highest court after their respective governments had furnished their names.80 British encroachment upon the rights of foreigners in Egypt’s private sector disquieted American business interests. American businesses were averse to the abolishment of the Capitulations, for no longer would foreigners be immune to taxation. It was for this reason that the Vacuum Oil Company took such a great notice in the proposed alterations to the Mixed Courts. Unlike Carol Sprigg, who speculated that the British wanted to keep Crabitès off the high court for fear of his future dominance on the Court of Cassation, the Vacuum Oil

78 Public Record Office Document E15967/509/16: From Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office in London to Sir Auckland Geddes in Washington D.C., 11 January 1921. 79 Letter from Chief Justice White to Crabitès. Box 73, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 80 State Department Document 883.05/189: To Senator James W. Wadsworth Jr., Washington D.C., 5 February 1921.

164 Company stated, “It is in the opinion of all Americans familiar with this matter that the British are opposed to the appointment of the nominee of the United States Government because he is the strongest and best equipped man for the position.”81 This argument directly contradicted earlier British and Egyptian accusations that Crabitès was incapable of serving on the court of last resort due to his inability to render competent decisions. The Mixed Courts’ contract to operate was scheduled to expire on 30 April 1921.82 At this time, Carroll Sprigg, Agent and Consul General in Cairo, reiterated his advocacy of Crabitès. Like American businessmen in Egypt, he too was apprehensive about the effect of the British proposals on American rights in Egypt. In a letter to the secretary of state, Sprigg declared, Under the circumstances, I respectfully and earnestly recommend that the Department refuse to entertain favorably any proposal emanating from the British Government, which may contemplate the renewal of these tribunals, until in the receipt of assurances that existing American rights will be respected and that the unreasonable opposition to the American Government’s nomination of Judge Crabitès which it has maintained for the past four months, will be withdrawn.83 Unlike American officials in Washington D.C., members of the legation in Cairo, like Paul Knabenshue, who eventually returned from Lebanon, and Carol Sprigg, seem to have been Crabitès’s most earnest defenders. They were well acquainted with the judge. Sprigg wanted the United States to eschew cooperating with Great Britain until it acquiesced on the issue of Crabitès’s nomination. It was too late to redeem Crabitès, even in the eyes of his own government back in the United States. Great Britain continued to interfere with the appointment process. In March the British dispatched letters to Supreme Court Justices Brandeis and Holmes, as well as Professors Lawrence Lowell and Professor Felix Frankfurter

81 State Department Document 883.05/190: Copy of a Memorandum from the Vacuum Oil Company in Egypt, February 1921. 82 State Department Document 883.05/193: From Carroll Sprigg, Consul-General in Cairo, to Secretary of State, 16 February 1921. 83 Ibid.

165 of Harvard University, soliciting their assistance locating suitable candidates for promotion.84 They sought alternatives to Crabitès. The Defeat of Crabitès’s Appointment to the Court of Appeals (1921) Up until the spring of 1921, it seemed as if American insistence would be able to force the British to acquiesce to their demands that Crabitès be appointed. Now, however, it appeared that the United States was surrendering to British imposition and began searching for recourse. Finding an acceptable applicant was a formidable task, as the qualifications restricted the pool of names from which America could draw. They had to be intimate with the French Code as well as English Common Law, and fluency in French was absolutely necessary. In early February 1921, R.L. Craigie of the British embassy in Washington met with Mr. Norman Davis and Solicitor of the State Department Nielsen, to discuss Crabitès’s nomination to the Court of Appeals. Following this encounter, the State Department contacted the British embassy in Washington to announce that they no longer advocated Crabitès’s appointment to the high court. The Americans finally complied with British demands that they present further names for approval. R.L. Craigie intimated that he had “impressed on them that nothing was to be gained by insisting on a candidature which was acceptable neither to His Majesty’s Government nor to the Egyptian Government, and which was unlikely to enhance American prestige in Egypt.”85 While the State Department abandoned Crabitès, members of the American diplomatic community in Egypt still pressed for his candidature. The necessity to appoint an American to fill the vacancy left by Judge Tuck was becoming urgent. The British had difficulty finding suitable aspirants for the nomination, as most of the names they had canvassed lacked experience in one way or another. The United States yielded to British pressure, and Crabitès name appears to have faded, as the American government offered

84 State Department Document 883.05/196: From A.E. Geddes, British Ambassador, Washington D.C., to Secretary of State, 24 March 1921. 85 Public Record Office Document E2950/189/16: From R. L. Craigie in Washington to Lord Curzon in London, 15 February 1921.

166 other names, including Walter Berry, the man whom Crabitès replaced.86 At this point, it seems that the United States had reservations promoting anyone other than Crabitès, for all of the names that the British had tendered in lieu of Crabitès had neither his qualifications nor his experience. Realizing the futility of his efforts to secure appointment to the high court, Crabitès abandoned his efforts to persuade the United States government himself, and left the task to his backers in Louisiana. They continued to lobby on behalf of Crabitès, not recognizing that Egypt was unwilling to accept him, even at the State Department’s insistence. Regardless, Third Assistant Secretary Robert Bliss, conveyed his offices’ approbation of Crabitès, In view of the attitude of the Egyptian Government toward the promotion of Judge Crabitès, the Department feels that it could not with propriety insist upon his appointment. The Department has not, however, withdrawn its support of Judge Crabitès, and it expects to take up again in the near future the matter of filling the existing vacancy on the Court of Appeal at which time it will probably again recommend the elevation of Judge Crabitès to the Court of Appeal.87 Crabitès, who directly benefited from the unorthodox appointment process in 1911, argued that Egypt was acting outside of its authority by attempting to designate an American representative to the Court of Appeals.88 He was correct. Only Egypt could approve or disapprove of candidates submitted by the United States for promotion. The new contract for the continued operation of the Mixed Courts was only short-term and was scheduled to expire on the 31 October 1921. Crabitès maintained, It is accordingly urged even were there no precedent established in 1875 and categorically reaffirmed in 1900 that the best interests of the United States would be subserved by a refusal to renew the existing treaty unless

86 State Department Document 883.05/197: From the Office of the Solicitor, Department of State, to the Secretary of State, 7 March 1921. 87 State Department Document 883.05/208: From Robert Bliss, Third Asst. Secretary, Washington D.C., to C.A. Moser, Director, Vacuum Oil Company, New York City, 20 April 1921. 88 State Department Document 883.05/220: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to the Department of State, 1 September 1921.

167 the Egyptian Government accede to the clearcut wish of the Department of State.89 The Egyptians followed proper procedure in the nomination process from the court’s inception until British Ambassador Mitchell Innes suggested Crabitès’s name to President Taft. In 1911, the United States notified Egypt that it was reluctant to renew the contract for the Mixed Courts in the future unless they adhered to the proper method of promotion. Crabitès asserted that by absorbing the Russian seat and the Small Power seat on the Court of Appeals, the British had endeavored to deny the Mixed Courts their international character.90 By obtaining two more Court of Appeals seats and controlling the appointment process, the Anglo-Egyptian judges on the Mixed Courts were now in a position of dominance. On 31 October 1921, the United States promoted Jasper Yeates Brinton to the Court of Appeals. The Egyptian government accepted Brinton and subsequently appointed him to the Court of Appeals, four years after beginning their search for a successor to Judge Tuck.91 British Ambassador Geddes exhorted the United States to sanction the contract extension of the Mixed Courts since it was due to expire at the end of the month. At the urging of Great Britain, the United States approved the prolongation of the Mixed Courts. Born on 17 October 1878, in Pennsylvania, Jasper Yeates Brinton had been a legal advisor for the United States Shipping Board and later assistant procurator-general in Pennsylvania. He was a colonel in the army at the time of his nomination to the Court of Appeals. During World War I he served in the American Expeditionary Forces as a judge advocate in Bordeaux, France.92 Later he accompanied Major General J. G. Harbord to Turkey and Armenia in

89 Ibid. 90 State Department Document 883.05/223: From Pierre Crabitès in Washington to the Secretary of State, 23 August 1921. 91 State Department Document 883.05/229: From the American Agency in Cairo to the Department of State, 27 October 1921. 92 State Department Document 883.05/244: From Major General J.G. Harbord, Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington D.C., to Nielson, Solicitor for the Department of State, 19 September 1921.

168 1919, where he did intelligence work on the Ottoman Empire.93 Sir William Brunyate had a penchant for nominating military officers to the court, so it is not all that surprising that Brinton received British favor.94 In a Foreign Office Circular entitled “Personalities in Egypt,” the British said he “is an erratic but most likeable individual with literary tastes. A fair jurist. But, in spite of seniority, has not been admitted to preside [sic] a chamber of the Court of Appeal. Is [sic] pro- British and essentially broad-minded, although sometimes unexpectedly stubborn.”95 It was clear that Brunyate preferred to be cautious by appointing Brinton over Crabitès. While Crabitès had more experience and was eminently more qualified in French law, Brunyate preferred to promote someone who could supplement British influence over the courts. When Crabitès learned of Brinton’s selection he was not all together despondent. Crabitès understood the exigencies of the situation. Aware that Crabitès would not be appointed to the Court of Appeals, the Egyptian government instead elevated him to the presidency of the Court of First Instance in Cairo. Crabitès did not feel betrayed by his country. He understood the circumstances; the United States did not have much bargaining power in Egypt. On the contrary, he felt that the United States had done an admirable job supporting him for four years. In a brief to the Secretary of State, Crabitès declared, Permit me to take advantage of this opportunity to renew my expressions of appreciation of the strong endorsement which my name received from you. It means a great deal to me as a man, as a judge and as an American to know that the Department of State has gone on record, over your signature, in support of me in terms of no uncertain tenor. The fact that my candidacy has failed when so endorsed can only be construed as a tribute to me more eloquent than could have been a promotion. In so

93 Ibid. 94 Public Record Office Document 13870/W/50: From Sir William Brunyate in Cairo, to Sir M. Cheetham, Cairo, Foreign Office, 4 February 1919. Public Record Office Document 22638/W/50: From Sir William Brunyate in Cairo, to Sir M. Cheetham, Cairo, 8 February 1919. 95 Public Record Office Document J436/235/16: “Personalities in Egypt.” From Mr.Yencken in Cairo, 5 February 1934.

169 expressing myself, however, I am fully conscious of the irreparable consequences of the Anglo-Egyptian veto.96 This missive was political in nature, for Crabitès sought to maintain good relations with the State Department. He ultimately aspired to a diplomatic post. Following Brinton’s appointment to the Court of Appeals, details surrounding the episode began to emerge. Crabitès’s anti-British attitude definitely hindered his desirability to be promoted, and his Creole background further contributed to his inability to reach the Court of Appeals. According to Chargé d’Affairs in Cairo W. Whitney Andrews, “The real reason of opposition to Judge Crabitès for the American Judgeship in the Mixed Courts has been that the British desired to increase the Anglo-Saxon element in the composition of that court, or rather not to increase the Latin element from the point of view of mentality and psychology . . . The British Authorities would have preferred to have filled the American vacancy with an English or British Judge.”97 Crabitès was correct that Great Britain wanted to increase the Anglo-Egyptian dominance of the Mixed Courts. The British saw him as an impediment to their interests.

96 State Department Document 883.05/234: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to the Secretary of State, 28 November 1921. 97 State Department Document 883.05/235: From W.W. Andrews, Chargé d’Affaires in Cairo, to the Secretary of State, 2 November 1921.

170 CHAPTER 6- THE TUTANKHAMEN CASE

Discovering Tutankhamen Following World War I, in 1921, Crabitès was promoted to the presidency of a division of the Cairo tribunal.1 It was as the president of one of the tribunal’s civil sections that Crabitès became intimately acquainted with the litigation for the sequestration rights to the Pharaoh Tutankhamen’s artifacts. He presided over the suit brought before him by Howard Carter and the Egyptian government; his association with the Tutankhamen case gained him a measure of fame.2 The case came before the Mixed Courts because it involved litigants from a foreign state, and Crabitès presided over the case as the president of Cairo’s Court of First Instance British archaeologist Howard Carter, along with Egyptologist George Herbert, better known as Lord Carnarvon, discovered the tomb of the Pharaoh Tutankhamen on 4 November 1922, in the Valley of the Kings, located at Luxor, Egypt. Tutankhamen was only a minor pharaoh, occupying the throne just nine years until his death at eighteen. The son-in-law of Akenaton, Tutankhamen was only nine years old when he became pharaoh. He ruled Egypt from 1333 to 1323 B.C., during the 18th Dynasty and New Kingdom, founded by Ahmose. This was a peaceful period in ancient Egyptian history, after the death of Akenaton. The Egyptians had expelled the Hyksos, restored government, and the economy recovered. The young pharaoh reestablished order following the reign of his father-in-law, Akenaton, when he reinstituted worship of the Egyptian God Amon. The find was most significant because his tomb was intact, almost untouched by grave robbers. Crabitès was one of the first to hear of the discovery of Tutankhamen. He learned of the news while breakfasting with British General McEwing. General McEwing intercepted the communiqué from Carter to Lord Carnarvon, describing

1 Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” 38. 2 This chapter will rely primarily on the Times of London, for it had monopoly rights to report from the excavation at Luxor. The remaining newspaper sources were collected from the British Library in London, such as the Egyptian Gazette, and from La Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, like Le Journal du Caire and Le Temps.

171 his lucky strike. Interested in assisting one of his journalist friends, Crabitès relayed the information, but a British newspaper had already publicized the expedition’s discovery.3 Conflict over the Times of London Monopoly at Luxor Lord Carnarvon appointed the Times of London to serve as the official correspondent for the archaeological expedition. The Times of London aided Lord Carnarvon and Howard Carter by assuming the burden of recording the daily events. The Times of London had a press monopoly to cover the excavation of the tomb of Tutankhamen. The local press took exception to this favoritism. They protested limited admission to the dig and expressed their displeasure in print. Journalists could only visit the tomb one fixed day per week. The Egyptian Press Bureau declared that it had no right to interfere in such an agreement between the archaeologists and the Times of London. The Egyptian government supported Lord Carnarvon’s right to distribute information of his own accord. Lord Carnarvon had the Egyptian government’s concession to the Valley of the Kings and with it the prerogative to restrict access to his work. This issue erupted when the Antiquities Department sought to publish the official guidebook to the Egyptian Museum with the information supplied by Howard Carter in his regular technical reports to the Antiquities Department, in accordance with their license. Carter objected to this action, stating that this treatment by the Egyptian government relegated him to the status of a paid servant collaborating to write their guide books. The press was especially critical of the relationship between the Times of London and Lord Carnarvon. The Egyptian Gazette asserted that while Lord Carnarvon and Howard Carter were private individuals and allowed to express their opinions as such, they were, however, not entitled to the possession of the Tutankhamen antiquities, for they belonged to humanity.4 The Egyptian Gazette

3 Newspaper Clipping: Mss. 73-85, Scrapbooks 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 4 Egyptian Gazette, 22 January 1923. Le Temps, 23 January 1923.

172 believed that the Egyptian government would never knowingly tolerate such a journalistic monopoly.5 The Arabic press had a significant advantage over the local British and French press, as it had primary access to Lord Carnarvon’s special news service.6 Arabic papers had the ear of the Egyptian government; thus they were able to influence the government’s perspective of the excavation and subsequent trial for the sequestration rights to the dead pharaohs’ artifacts. Those close to the expedition endorsed Lord Carnarvon and the Times of London. Dr. Jean Capart, Secretary of the Musée Royal du Cinquantenaire de Bruxelles, published an op-ed piece in the Times of London defending the decision by Lord Carnarvon to restrict press entry to the site to only the Times of London. He claimed that Lord Carnarvon had the privilege of removing all impediments to the successful examination and recovery of Tutankhamen’s artifacts. According to the agreement between the famed Egyptologist and the Antiquities Service, his only requirement was their regular inspections, which had no bearing upon whom he chose to publish a record of the dig. In fact, Dr. Capart believed that not only was Lord Carnarvon not guilty of hindering the press, rather he actually promoted the scientific record of the discovery. For Dr. Capart, the same could not be said of many previous discoveries, including the excavation of the tomb of Sen Nedjem, the tomb of the architect Kha, and the house of the artist Thotmes, all of which left posterity with few details. He concluded that science would suffer should Lord Carnarvon carry out his expedition based upon the will of public opinion, Let us leave Lord Carnarvon to continue in peace his wonderful discovery. Let us leave Mr. Howard Carter and his assistants in peace to execute the task of preserving for us all these wonders, and let us respect their choice of the manner in which they wish to communicate to the public the result of their discoveries.7

5 Egyptian Gazette, 22 January 1923. 6 Ibid. 7 Times of London, 14 March 1923.

173 Sir John Grenfell Maxwell championed Lord Carnarvon as well, shielding him from relentless attacks in both the English and foreign press. Sir John Grenfell Maxwell served as a lieutenant-general in Egypt during World War I, where he repelled a Senussi attack in 1916 and was transferred to Ireland thereafter. Shortly after his appointment to commander-in-chief, military governor of Ireland, he brutally crushed the nationalist Easter rebellion that same year, for which he gained the name “Bloody Maxwell.” In an editorial for the Times of London, Sir John remonstrated the journalists involved in this smear campaign, According to reports sent home, Lord Carnarvon (in conjunction with The Times) is not only acting in a manner derogatory to his position and to archaeology, but is prostituting science to commercialism. Further, he is defying and disobeying the orders of the Egyptian Government and attempting to seduce the British Inspector here from the path of honour.8 Sir John clarified Lord Carnarvon’s reasoning for entering such an agreement with the Times of London. He maintained that Lord Carnarvon’s privacy had endured the weight of correspondents infiltrating his private residence and social clubs to secure an interview. To relieve this tedious responsibility, Lord Carter decided it was best to circulate an account of the happenings at the tomb through one media agency. Sir John concluded, “What we outsiders cannot understand is that any British journalists worthy of the name could use the anti-British vernacular Press to instigate attacks on Lord Carnarvon, who, after all, has done more for Egyptology than any other private individual.”9 Rumors abounded throughout Egypt regarding the remuneration which Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Carter received for their arrangement with the Times of London. Competitors of the Times of London in Egypt intimated that the Times of London had bribed the famed archaeologists for the exclusive rights to the tomb. To this accusation, the Times of London professed that the only money the executors of Lord Carnarvon derived from the paper were totally devoted to

8 Times of London, 20 March 1923. 9 Ibid.

174 maintaining their work at the tomb and solely intended to promote their scientific research.10 Excavating the Tomb of Tutankhamen Early progress at the tomb was remarkably slow. Lord Carnarvon and Howard Carter took painstaking care to preserve the recovered artifacts. The archaeologists planned to work on one room at a time, beginning with the ante- chamber, followed by the second chamber and finally the throne room where Tutankhamen’s sarcophagus lay. Arthur Merton, the official Times of London correspondent to the excavation described the process as such, The work of removal is being carried out with the tenderest [sic] care. Each article is strapped on a special tray constructed in the form of a stretcher, and carried by two or more labourers, who carefully climb the ascent from the tomb to the road, and then proceed up the hill for some two hundred yards to the empty tomb of Seti II, where the articles are deposited for treatment before packing. The whole of the way Mr. Howard Carter walks by the side of the tray, watching every moment, and from time to time himself steadying the load.11 Once in Seti II’s workshop, the archaeologists set about preserving the objects. By February of 1923, Howard Carter and Lord Carnarvon had fully opened the tomb, revealing Tutankhamen and his treasures. The announcement created a sensation that reverberated across the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Tourists flocked to the Valley of the Kings with hopes of glimpsing the tomb of the boy pharaoh. They congregated in the valley to observe this historic discovery and to visit the dig site. The Egyptian Gazette reported, The publicity so far given to Lord Carnarvon’s discoveries is, from all accounts, drawing a large number of additional tourists to Egypt this season, while it is reported that several thousands have already booked

10 Times of London, 27 November 1923. 11 Times of London, 5 January 1923.

175 their berths for next season, Tutankhamen’s tomb being the special attraction.12 The Times of London put to rest any gossip that the site had been closed to visitors. In fact, the Times of London correspondent proclaimed that Howard Carter himself was guiding tourists when he was not too busy, “Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Carter have always shown such consideration for tourists’ interests.”13 This only served to encourage greater numbers of tourists to visit the location. The Times of London defended Mr. Carter’s work at the tomb of Tutankhamen to their detractors, “Unquestionably Mr. Howard Carter and his assistants have done remarkably good work in effecting the removals, especially when one considers all the difficulties with which they have had to contend.”14 Those lucky enough to witness the early stages of the expedition found the tomb somewhat disappointing. It was not nearly as grand as the more illustrious pharaohs like Seti I. What was so magnificent about Tutankhamen’s tomb was not the grandeur of the site but the artifacts archaeologists found in it. Unlike so many other pharaohs’ tombs that were plundered by grave robbers, Tutankhamen’s tomb almost entirely intact. The relics recovered from the tomb were undisturbed from the time when the grave was sealed. By the end of January 1923, the dig had progressed into the king’s burial chamber. Carnarvon and Carter removed all artifacts from the tomb of Tutankhamen to that of Seti II, where they consolidated, organized and repaired the objects: In the tomb of Seti II, now the workshop of Mr. Mace of the Metropolitan Museum; and Mr. Lucas, late Director of the Government Analytical Laboratory, the restoration and preservation work is proceeding at the highest speed consistent with the proper care of the objects.15 On 23 January, M. Pierre Lacau, Director General of the Antiquities Department, took the first step towards what would become an acrimonious relationship between the archaeologists and the Antiquities Department by

12 Egyptian Gazette, 22 January 1923. 13 Times of London, 13 January 1923. 14 Times of London, 20 January 1923. 15 Egyptian Gazette, 6 February 1923.

176 closing the tomb of Tutankhamen to visitors. M. Pierre Lacau explained his decision, It is essential that the removal of objects in the new tomb be carried out as methodically and quickly as possible. The public will readily understand that it is impossible to work seriously under the eyes of visitors. From to- day entrance to the tomb is strictly forbidden. Only archaeologists who are able to usefully to assist the excavators will be admitted.16 M. Pierre Lacau was a Frenchman who had previously worked under M. Maspero, the former director general of antiquities. He had a close association with the Egyptian Museum and the Tutankhamen case. He helped write the 1900 catalogue of the Egyptian Museum. In the past, M. Pierre Lacau had been accused of not possessing the necessary qualifications to be the director general. As an archaeologist, he specialized in the Ptolemaic Greek period, not the pharaonic one. His detractors criticized him of poorly administering the Egyptian Museum. They believed that he was more concerned with garnering the good graces of Egyptians than caring for the museum. During the Tutankhamen case, the British complained that Lacau had an anti-British bias by displaying favoritism towards the Egyptians.17 The Curse of Tutankhamen After years of digging in the Egyptian desert, Carter and Lord Carnarvon finally achieved a measure of notoriety. They sought to reap the windfall of a discovery of such momentous proportions. Shortly after uncovering the tomb, a heated debate ensued in Egypt regarding the rights of the archeologists and those of the Egyptian government relative to the objects. The European press naturally promoted the claims of the excavators over those of the Egyptian government. The Egyptian Gazette presented Carnarvon and Carter as archaeologists who had sacrificed their time and money, often to no avail; and to deny them any just reward for their efforts would stifle their productive energies. Rumors circulated throughout Egypt regarding the fate of Tutankhamen’s

16 Times of London, 24 January 1923. 17 Public Record Office Document J436/235/16. “Personalities in Egypt.” From Mr. Yencken in Cairo. 5 February 1934.

177 artifacts. The Egyptian Gazette lent a measure of credence to such hearsay: “The Department of Antiquities proposed to bring in a Bill by which no antiquities discovered were to be allowed to leave Egypt.”18 The Egyptian Gazette argued, “Such a step would almost certainly, put a stop at once to any further work done by any of those now excavating, and I can hardly believe that it is likely to be taken.”19 British newspapers like the Egyptian Gazette did not aspire to great levels of journalistic objectivity. They believed that the Egyptian government would come to their senses and settle with Lord Carnarvon prior to passing any future laws barring the removal of ancient relics from Egypt. In December of 1922, the Egyptian government issued their definitive statement concerning the sequestration rights to Tutankhamen’s artifacts. The government stated that while it had been common practice to divide treasures equally between the excavators and the government, the tomb of Tutankhamen deserved special consideration since they were of such unprecedented value.20 The local press made much out of the apparent “Curse of Tutankhamen.” Many of the newspapers in Egypt encouraged stories involving suspected ill fortune to expand their readership. One of the earliest such incidents occurred when the Egyptian Gazette reported an episode of misfortune for the archaeologists in which Howard Carter seems to have lost his pet canary to a cobra at the tomb, There is a story current here that on the night before Mr. Howard Carter opened up the actual entrance into the Tomb, a cobra attacked and killed a pet canary he had had with him during the excavations. From the fact that the cobra was sacred to the ancient Egyptians, superstitious people may suppose that the spirit of Tutankhamen took the form of a cobra and attacked the property of the invader of his privacy.21 Within two months of opening the tomb of Tutankhamen, Lord Carnarvon fell ill. He retired to Aswan to recuperate his health after a heady period of excavation in

18 Egyptian Gazette, 6 February 1923. 19 Ibid. 20 Egyptian Gazette, 16 February 1923. 21 Egyptian Gazette, 6 February 1923.

178 which he and Howard Carter not only uncovered the outer chamber but exposed the inner chamber as well. A mosquito gorged with streptococcus bit Lord Carnarvon while he was resting at Aswan on 16 February 1923. By the middle of March his condition had deteriorated to such an extent that doctors called for his wife and son. While under the best medical supervision in Egypt, Lord Carnarvon developed lobar pneumonia. George Edward Stanhope Herbert, fifth Earl of Carnarvon, died a week later in the morning hours of 5 April 1923, of erysipelas, blood poisoning, and pneumonia.22 Uncovering Tutankhamen One month later, most of the artifacts from the tomb, some six hundred in number, made their way North on the Nile River via tug and barge to Cairo, where they were stored in the Egyptian Museum. Most of the objects, however, were too fragile and had not been preserved or sufficiently secured to place them on display. Fortunately, some of the relics responded so well to Carter’s preservation techniques that they were able to exhibit them in display cases, including the King’s throne and the “mannequin.”23 Carter quitted the excavation site, as the weather posed too difficult a hardship to continue in the hot, dry Egyptian summer. He retired to England for a brief respite. Work would not restart again until the fall. Back home, Carter delivered lectures on his recent work in the Valley of the Kings, including an address to the Egypt Exploration Society in London. In his talks, Carter said that archaeology can not be measured in the material worth or value bequeathed to posterity, but the intellectual knowledge gained from studying past cultures. He concluded that modernity had actually stifled the creativity which can be found by uncovering such archaeological discoveries as the tomb of Tutankhamen.24 An accomplished artist, Carter described Tutankhamen-era art, “Egyptian art embodies refinement in every way- it embodies love of simplicity, patience in

22 Le Temps, 7 April 1923. Egyptian Gazette, 7 April 1923. 23 Times of London, 23 May 1923. 24 Times of London, 22 September 1923.

179 execution, and it never descends to an unideal copy of Nature. This fact is manifested by the material in the tomb of Tutankhamen.”25 The excavation of the tomb of Tutankhamen restarted on 22 October 1923. Before any work could begin on the actual tomb, gangs of Egyptian workers had to uncover the tomb from beneath a mountain of dirt. Before leaving on his summer vacation, Carter had dumped seventeen hundred tons of earth on to tomb to protect it from grave robbers.26 Carter sought to remove the tomb’s sepulchral shrines so as to access the sarcophagus by summer. This time, Carter had the added benefit of electricity. The archaeologists bathed the ancient tomb with electric light, which better enabled them to accomplish their tasks. As they broke through the wall separating the outer chambers from the inner chambers, they were rewarded with the greatest of Egyptological artifacts, including several shrines and two gold-gilded chariots. Carter called in reinforcements for help dismantling the sepulchral chamber.27 On 3 January 1924, Carter opened the doors to the last shrine in the hall, revealing the large stone sarcophagus of the Pharaoh Tutankhamen. Carter had a strong suspicion that this would be the case, so he invited Chief Inspector of Antiquities Engelbach, as well as E.S. Harkness, Chairman of the Committee of Trustees, and A.M. Lythgoe, Curator of the Egyptian Department of the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art, and Mr. Winlock, Director of the Egyptian Expedition of the same museum, to witness the event. The Times of London reported the remarkable moment when Carter unsealed the shrine, All watched with tense excitement. The bolts of the last doors were drawn aside, the doors swung slowly open, and there, filling the entire area within the fourth shrine, and effectually barring all further progress, stood an enormous sarcophagus of crystalline sandstone, intact, with the lid still firmly in place. At the corners, modeled in the highest relief, were figures of the four protective goddesses, Isis, Nephthys, Neith, and Selk, not standing free like the exquisite figures round the shrine in the store

25 Ibid. 26 Times of London, 23 October 1923. 27 Times of London, 28 December 1923.

180 chamber, but cut in the stone of the sarcophagus itself, with their arms and wings outstretched along its sides; while the entablature comprised a frieze of inscriptions giving the cartouches of King Tutankhamen, thus confirming that this was his tomb, and that within the sarcophagus reposed his mortal remains.28 They now had a much better understanding of the funerary customs of the Egyptian Kings. Based on paintings in the sepulchral chamber, Carter surmised, King ‘Aye’ is represented before the Osiride King Tutankhamen, one is constrained to conclude that its true interpretation is that Aye was no less than co-Regent with Tutankhamen, and that in this 18th Dynasty branch of the Amenhotep and El Amarna families we are really dealing with a series of co-regencies and not with successive separate reigns.29 Carter and his associates discerned that the fine craftsmanship of the artisans who built the shrines, artifacts, and the sarcophagus, was in vain, as those charged with actually delivering the artifacts were hasty and negligent. Carter recognized that these men placed some pieces out of proper position, leaving the shrine untrue. They either put the pieces out of order, or did not bother to correct their mistakes, instead they decided to often force them into place rather than take the time to properly fit all the objects.30 Carter carefully removed the lid to the stone sarcophagus on 12 February 1924, revealing the burial coffin of the Pharaoh Tutankhamen. Carter employed differential pulleys to help lift the heavy granite lid of the sarcophagus. What the archaeologists found underneath perplexed them, for instead of viewing the coffin, they found it had been wrapped in a protective shroud.31 The Times of London reported the unveiling, “Beneath the shrouds lay the gigantic gilded coffin, in the form of a KING’s body: his face of gold, with crystal eyes, a life-like

28 Times of London, 5 January 1924. 29 Times of London, 7 January 1924. 30 Times of London, 15 January 1924. 31 Le Temps, 13 February 1924. Times of London, 13 February 1924.

181 portrait; the signs of kingship on his brow; the flail and the sceptre of kingship in his crossed hands.”32 Disagreements between the Egyptian Government and Howard Carter The discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamen and subsequent excavation prompted many disputes between Howard Carter and the Egyptian government. For instance, the Egyptian government insisted that the pharaoh’s treasures should remain in the care of Egyptian curators; ordinary Egyptians thought Tutankhamen’s treasures should be used to pay off the staggering national debt. Howard Carter endeavored to perform scientific research on the artifacts. Goals for all parties involved differed and much bickering ensued. Archaeology was a time-consuming endeavor, often requiring months or years to reach the objects after initially detecting the tomb. It took seventeen months after first uncovering of the tomb before Howard Carter arrived at Tutankhamen’s sarcophagus. He carefully raised the lid of the sarcophagus in February 1924. Carter was the first person to see the pharaoh in 3,247 years. The Egyptian Gazette described the first glimpse of the boy pharaoh, The beauty of the sarcophagus far exceeds our expectations. It is in every respect a casket fit to contain the mortal remains of a king. Of yellow crystalline sandstone, curiously rose-tinted, it is in a state of perfect preservation, and of even more superb workmanship than the view through the shrine doors had led us to anticipate. It is far superior to that of King Aye, Tutankhamen’s immediate successor, and is probably the finest specimen of its kind the world possesses.33 Carter soon realized that the lid to the sarcophagus was not yellow crystalline sandstone, as they had originally believed it to be, but granite. It had cracked during the initial sealing process, some 3,000 years ago, making it very difficult to remove the lid without harming the structure of the sepulcher.34 Tomb workers were already having trouble maneuvering in such close, cramped quarters. Another week passed before Carter could extricate the lid. Journalists described

32 Times of London, 13 February 1924. 33 Egyptian Gazette, 6 February 1924. 34 Egyptian Gazette, 7 February 1924.

182 the scene in the Valley of the Kings where such notables as Professor Breasted, M. Foucart, M. Pierre Lacau, Theodore Davis and Muhammed Pasha Zaghloul had gathered, The coffin shows the king wearing the golden cobra sign of Lower Egypt on the left side of his forehead and on the right side the golden vulture sign of Upper Egypt and, as it happens, each is on the right side in relation to the geographical position of the two parts of the country, for the king lies with his head to the West. The arms are folded, engaging in the coffin, but the hands are free, the left one holding a wonderful solid gold scourge, or flail, the right a crook staff of gold, inlaid with semi-precious stones, these two articles constituting the insignia of Osiris, sovereign of the Other World. The face and eyes were inlaid with black and white crystal and the upper part of the body – down to the point of the folded arms – is of heavy sheet gold, laid on wood, the rest of the coffin being covered with heavy gold leaf.35 Carter had invited many visitors to the excavation site, even though prior agreements with the Egyptian government stipulated that only those persons associated with the dig could be present. Carter had asked Sa’ad Zaghloul, Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Public Works, if he would grant entrance to the English and American wives of his assistants. Zaghloul rejected the archaeologists’s demands. Carter insisted that these ladies gain admittance into the tomb. He requested they join their husbands, whereupon they were barred entry by Egyptian authorities. Insulted, Carter secured the excavation site and threatened to halt his work on the tomb. Zaghloul responded by stationing an armed guard at the tomb to forbid entrance to all, including Carter and his team. Carter proceeded to Luxor, where he publicized a notice in the local hotels, stating, “The Ministry of Public Works has put so much obstruction in the way of my work at the Tomb of Tutankhamen that it is impossible to continue it. In these conditions, my collaborators and I refuse to go on with the task of

35 Egyptian Gazette, 14 February 1924. Le Journal du Caire, 5 February 1924.

183 dealing with the objects requiring treatment there.”36 Many of the archaeologists who had been known to associate with Carter sympathized with him and suspended their work in protest.37 It appears that this incident was only the culmination of series of disagreements between Carter and the Antiquities Department. Earlier, there had been a misunderstanding over the rights to publish information relevant to the discovery. Le Temps believed that Carter’s decision to shut down the tomb primarily stemmed from the conflict between the Egyptian government and the Times of London monopoly in the Valley of the Kings; however, it also recognized that the barring of Carter’s female guests was a secondary point of contention.38 On 13 February 1924, Carter posted the following notice in local hotels: Owing to impossible restrictions and discourtesies on the part of the Public Works Department and its Antiquity Service, all my collaborators, in protest, have refused to work any further upon the scientific investigations of the discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamen. I, therefore, am obliged to make known to the public that immediately after the Press view of the tomb this morning between 10 a.m. and noon, the tomb will be closed and no further work carried out.39 Most important for Carter was unimpeded access to the tomb and its artifacts, so he could examine and take notes on all of the objects free from government interference. Negotiations with the Egyptian government collapsed during discussions over the government’s concession to the expedition. Carter expressed his displeasure with the authorities, “This was only the culminating point of a series of acts of unwarrantable interference on the part of the government since work was resumed in October, which, in their cumulative effect, have tended to render

36 Le Journal du Caire, 14 February 1924. Le Journal du Caire, 15 February 1924. Egyptian Gazette, 15 February 1924. 37 Ibid. 38 Le Temps, 16 February 1924. 39 Times of London, 14 February 1924.

184 scientific work at the tomb increasingly difficult.”40 The Times of London recorded Carter’s criticism of the Antiquities Department, The exclusive right of your Department to the tomb does not commence until I have had sufficient time to examine the tomb and take such notes as I judge necessary. As you are doubtless aware, I so far have had time to examine but a small part of the contents of the tomb, and the opportunity to examine and make notes on the rest is a fundamental right, which I will not give up.41 The pro-British press in Egypt naturally supported Carter’s claims against the Egyptian government. The Egyptian Gazette concluded that the real issue for Carter was not the question over sequestration rights but the Egyptian government’s constant interference to the detriment of science and history.42 The Egyptian Gazette argued that the Egyptian government had previously transferred the license at the death of Lord Carnarvon to his wife Almina, which required the government to be responsible for protecting the archaeologists from any unnecessary interruptions; however, the Ministry of Public Works had only managed to hinder Carter and his team.43 Le Journal du Caire, was not so sympathetic to Carter. The pro-French newspaper described the famed archaeologist as “obstinate” and “incomprehensible.”44 Le Journal du Caire criticized Carter for pretending that he was a victim being persecuted by so-called tyrants.45 It was difficult for pro-British journalists to determine the motivation behind such a policy, for it only jeopardized the condition of the pharaoh’s artifacts. In the estimation of these journalists, the Egyptian government had wronged Howard Carter. For example, the Times of London actively promoted the claims of Carter, publishing his contentions against the Egyptian government while ignoring their rebuttals.

40 New York Times, 3 March 1924. 41 Times of London, 14 February 1924. 42 Egyptian Gazette, 16 February 1924. 43 Ibid. 44 Le Journal du Caire, 16 February 1924. 45 Ibid.

185 Nationalism played a prominent role in the affair. The Egyptian government asserted its sovereignty by barring female visitors to the tomb. Egyptian nationalists perceived Carter and his associates as traditional European imperialists attempting to abscond these priceless artifacts of Egypt’s distant past. Howard Carter and his defenders, on the other hand, resented any interference in their work. They resisted accountability to the Egyptian government. During the archaeological strike, Howard Carter had retired to Gurna with the keys to the tomb, so not even the Egyptian government could safely enter the tomb. He wanted to continue working in the tomb, fearing his absence would result in damage to the artifacts. He demanded that the Egyptian government suspend their obstruction of the expedition. In a letter to M. Pierre Laccau, Carter insisted that this discovery did not belong to Egypt alone but to all of humanity. Considering the delicate nature of the objects, archaeologists Breasted, Gardiner, Lythgoe and Newberry wrote a letter to Laccau, explaining need for uninterrupted work to protect the relics, Besides endangering the completeness of the security of the records; the unnecessary delays now being incurred are seriously obstructing and delaying the related enterprises of the co-operating staffs. Those are irretrievable, and totally unnecessary scientific losses of time and ability and of available funds by the organizations at present in this country to serve science, but in this particular case accomplishing a vast amount of costly work, accruing chiefly to the benefit of the Egyptian Government, without costing that Government a penny.46 They concluded that the onus was Lacau’s to better manage this delicate situation by removing the difficulties placed on the excavators by the Antiquities Department, which was symbolic of the Anglo-French competition in Egypt. Egyptian nationalists hijacked the local press for their own personal motives. The anti-British press in Egypt took advantage of this unique opportunity with the conflict between Carter and the Egyptian government to

46 Egyptian Gazette, 16 February 1924.

186 condemn the British. The Egyptian press sought to incite anti-British sentiment in Egypt, hoping to transform the issue over the rights to the tomb into one of Egyptian nationalism. The Times of London referenced this situation, “The extremist Press continues its attitude of opposition to Mr. Carter, and appears to prefer to regard the matter from the point of view of national dignity rather than its legal aspect or on its merits. It seems that it is blindly following the lead given by the Prime Minister, Zaghlul Pasha.”47 As fervent as the British, or English- speaking press, was in their advocacy of Carter, the Egyptian and pro-French press were equally as opposed to the archaeologist. Al-Balagh (The Informer) used the opinion of British MP MacDonald against Carter. It reported that MP MacDonald had reminded the British archaeologist that he was subject to the laws of Egypt. This was the very same paper that believed the Egyptian government must revoke its concession and undertake the remainder of the work on its own: “Egypt has suffered enough from this foreigner, who, under the nose of the Egyptian public and of a high official of the Government, closes the tomb of the Pharaoh as though it were the tomb of his own father.”48 Al-Mahroussa (The Guardian) adopted a somewhat softer stance towards the famed archaeologist, thanking him for all that he had done, but it too maintained that the Egyptian government should embrace a stronger position regarding controlling rights to the tomb “so that Mr. Carter may know we have a real government.”49 Al-Akhbar (The News) criticized the Egyptian government for reissuing the concession to Lady Almina upon the death of her husband Lord Carnarvon. It asserted that the Egyptian government could have avoided this terrible headache by simply doing the work itself, “so as to put an end to the tyranny of Mr. Carter and those like him.”50

47 Times of London, 20 February 1924. 48 Egyptian Gazette, 18 February 1924. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.

187 Al-Siyasa (The Politics), another local Egyptian paper, embraced the archaeologists and reproached the Ministry of Public Works. It was the sole Egyptian Arabic paper to patronize Carter. Al-Siyasa declared that the government should have avoided a confrontation over the visitation of workers’ wives to the tomb, The incident makes us laugh indeed, because the arrangements made in regard to it have been unworthy of these who made them. Why did the Minister of Public Works refuse Mr. Carter’s demand to permit the wives of his collaborators to visit the Tomb several days before other people? It is not natural for the wives of the Ministers to hear the important news of the Ministry before they become known to the public? And even if it is natural would it not be an act of courtesy to agree to the ladies’ visit. What patriotic interests and national dignity required the refusal of the request? To tell the truth, the Minister of Public Works was too strict where strictness was not required.51 Egyptian Prime Minister Sa’ad Zaghloul Pasha issued a statement to clarify the government’s position in regards to Carter’s nationality. He intended to assuage nationalist sentiment as well as placate foreign public opinion: Not at any moment has our action been influenced by Mr. Carter’s nationality. On the contrary, because of that nationality and our sincere desire that nothing should happen to trouble the friendly relations between the two countries, the Egyptian Government has never ceased to display much consideration and quite special sympathy for Mr. Carter, and I can assure you that if the concession-holder had been an Egyptian we would not have treated him with as much consideration.52 Negotiations between the two parties moved to Cairo, and should those break down the only recourse would be to take the matter before the Mixed Courts. The minor dispute over the wives’ attendance at the tomb was only a

51 Egyptian Gazette, 16 February 1924. This royal family was not comprised of native Egyptians but the descendants of Muhammad Ali, an Albanian mercenary working for the Ottomans to help suppress this once-rebellious province of the Ottoman Empire. 52 Times of London, 22 February 1924.

188 diversion from a broader conflict involving nationalism. In reality, the Egyptian government and Howard Carter were battling over control of the tomb and the artifacts therein. The Egyptian government believed it possessed sole authority over the tomb since it was located in Egypt. Carter and his team, however, considered it an infringement upon their rights, granted under licensure by the Egyptian government, to be under constant government surveillance and subject to harassment while conducting an excavation in the name of science. In the midst of the controversy, the Egyptian Gazette reminded its readers that the granite lid to Tutankhamen’s sarcophagus was still hanging precariously above the tomb and mummified remains of the late pharaoh. Should the ropes holding the lid in place give way under the strain, it would come crashing down and destroy the most valuable treasure of all.53 The Egyptian Gazette alleged that the deadlock between the Egyptian government and Howard Carter had prompted the Egyptian government’s decision to procure the services of other, more amicable, archaeologists. They asserted that the Egyptian government had already contacted other men within the archaeological community to enlist their services. These same reporters surmised that the Egyptian government only needed to remove the danger of the dangling lid, and then they could start training their own Egyptian archaeologists in Europe to manage the remainder of the excavation without the worry of Carter leaving for England with any of the artifacts.54 On 14 February 1924, Carter traveled to the tomb to inspect the condition of the locks. There he encountered Habeeb Affandi, the local inspector for the Antiquities Department, who denied Carter access to the tomb. Habeeb Affandi explained that he was under orders from Cairo to forbid anyone from visiting the tomb. Le Temps explained that after careful deliberation, it had been M. Pierre Lacau’s decision to place a guard at the tomb and effectively bar Carter’s entry.55 The Egyptian Gazette recalled that it was Carter, who after thirty years of hard

53 Egyptian Gazette, 18 February 1924. 54 Ibid. 55 Le Temps, 17 February 1924.

189 work, finally realized his ambition of uncovering the lost tomb, and now he was prohibited from entering the tomb. Howard Carter Takes the Egyptian Government to Court: Prelude to the Mixed Courts At this point, it seems that the negotiations had broken down between the Egyptian government and Carter. Rumors in Egypt predicted that a settlement could only be accomplished within the Mixed Courts, and in the meantime the government would reopen the tomb to finish the job originally begun by Carter. The Egyptian Gazette predicted that the Egyptian government would be incapable of properly supervising the excavation, “It seems obvious that were such a course attempted Mr. Carter would immediately apply to the Courts for an injunction to restrain the Government, but, apart from that, the task would be an impossible one for the Government, which has not in its employ a single official competent to undertake the work.”56 After observing Carter’s treatment at the hands of the Egyptians, the same paper concluded that all foreign archaeologists in Egypt would be loath to associate themselves with such a government action. Furthermore, Carter had the full support of the archaeological community in Egypt. As tensions escalated, accusations ensued from both parties. The Egyptian government announced that Carter was at liberty to resume work so long as he severed his relationship with the Times of London.57 Egypt considered his relationship with the Times of London not only was a detriment to local Egyptian papers, but that the two profited from the partnership because the paper had a monopoly on the expedition’s information. The Times of London, issued a clarification, stressing that Howard Carter and Lord Carnarvon had approached the paper to assume all reporting from the site in order take time off their hands. It declared that it gained no profit from the venture. The British paper maintained that had their paper not undertaken this responsibility, the archaeologists would have been burdened under the demands

56 Times of London, 19 February 1924. Egyptian Gazette, 18 February 1924. 57 Le Temps, 20 February 1924.

190 of publication and would have lacked adequate time to conduct their own research. The Times of London insisted that it was no monopoly since all other newspapers had access to their first-hand accounts of the day’s transactions, so they too could simultaneously publish their articles. It considered the Egyptian government’s argument that local papers suffered a non sequitur because per arrangement with the paper and the Egyptian government, the native Egyptian press had access to the Times of London’s service free of charge.58 On 18 February 1924, the Times of London reported that the Ministry of Public Works was interested in resolving the dispute with Carter; however, should the negotiations falter it had no compunction in appropriating the tomb and continuing the work of its own volition.59 The next day, Howard Carter filed suit in the Mixed Courts against the Egyptian government. Defending his legal action, Carter affirmed, I have initiated proceedings in the Mixed Courts for the protection of the objects contained in the tomb. If the director of the Antiquities Department will express regret for having insulted the ladies who had been invited by the Countess of Carnarvon to visit the tomb on Wednesday, after the visit of journalists, and if he undertakes to make no opposition of such kind as might provoke an incident, I will open the tomb a second time for a period of ten days in conformity with the agreement of February 8, Article 8 of which has been contravened by you.60 Weary from all the posturing, Carter filed suit against the Egyptian government in the Cairo branch of the Mixed Courts in order to be named as the sequestrator of the artifacts. Both sides sought to save face by compelling the other side to express regret for their behavior and the embarrassment and humiliation they caused. The Ministry of Public Works defended their actions, Considering that on February 13 Mr. Carter interrupted the execution of the programme of work agreed to by closing down the Tomb and publicly

58 New York Times, 19 February 1924. 59 Times of London, 19 February 1924. 60 Egyptian Gazette, 21 February 1924.

191 declaring that further work was impossible, and, when on February 18 he was formally invited to resume work he declined, and proposed unjustifiable and inacceptable [sic] conditions . . . Therefore Mr. Carter’s authority for excavation is declared to be cancelled, and the Director- General of Antiquities is ordered to reopen the Tomb and resume work.61 Back home in Britain, MP Ormsby Gore, stood before the House of Commons and suggested that the British government contact the American government to jointly protest the poor treatment of British and American archaeologists by the Egyptian Minister of Public Works. MP MacDonald obstructed this proposal because he believed that the British government should avoid such involvement at that time.62 On 20 February, Egypt promptly dispatched guards to Luxor, effectively barring Carter admittance to the tomb. M. Pierre Lacau, Director General of Antiquities, also revoked Carter’s excavation permit. He argued that Carter voluntarily abandoned work at the site and was averse to reopen it, in violation of Article 13 from their contract dating to 1915. Carter initiated a second lawsuit in the civil chamber of Cairo’s Mixed Courts without delay, requesting admittance to the tomb. He wanted to work, but the executors to Lord Carnarvon’s estate also sought ownership of half the artifacts discovered, in accordance with Article 11 of the same contract. In the same court proceeding, Carter demanded a writ prohibiting the Egyptian government from entering the tomb. He expressed apprehension that the Egyptians would do irreversible damage to the tomb and its contents.

That same day, the Egyptian government published a ministerial arrêté, canceling the concession to Lady Carnarvon. This action incensed Carter. He requested permission to return to the tomb for the sole purpose of securing the relics and protecting them from any damage, stating, “I should be given the opportunity of taking measures to protect the contents of the tomb and the

61 Times of London, 21 February 1924. 62 Egyptian Gazette, 20 February 1924.

192 laboratory during the suspension of work.”63 The ministry issued a rejoinder, expressing their shock to learn that Carter had not secured the tomb and laboratory before quitting the site. It concerned the government that he refused to take the necessary precautions to safeguard the sarcophagus, although in the interest of safeguarding the artifacts for posterity, the government would grant Carter one last chance to protect the excavation site and adjacent laboratory.64

Howard Carter found Egyptian governmental control a sticking point in the affair, regardless of how mild the Egyptian annoyance was in reality. He considered the government an obstacle impeding the completion his scientific research. Negotiations between the two parties related to the rights of ownership and the publication of scientific results. According to their contract, rights associated with the expedition were first determined according to usage and then to permit. M. Pierre Lacau jumped at the opportunity to steal some of Carter’s press coverage. On 21 February 1924, he departed Cairo for Luxor. The director general of the Antiquities Department invited Carter join him at the tomb on the next day. Lacau declared that his intention for the trip was to guarantee the safety of the sarcophagus since Carter was unable to properly secure it before locking up the tomb. Indeed, the granite lid of the sarcophagus was hanging precariously by ropes. For this purpose, he invited Carter to aid him in the name of science. Carter refused to assist Lacau, declaring that it would be improper for him to participate in such a venture with court action beginning the following day. On 22 February 1924, without Carter present, Lacau had Egyptian workmen saw off the padlocks which Carter had placed on the tomb’s entrance and replaced them with his own locks. Lacau successfully entered the tomb and lowered the granite lid without damaging it.65 Sa’ad Zaghloul Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, maintained that Egypt acted within its rights and conducted the affair in a friendly manner. To accusations of Egypt proceeding against Carter because he was British, Zaghloul

63 Egyptian Gazette, 21 February 1924. 64 Le Temps, 22 February 1924. Egyptian Gazette, 21 February 1924. 65 Le Temps, 24 February 1924. Times of London, 23 February 1924.

193 responded that his government’s treatment of Carter was no different than it would have been were he of any nationality. Zaghloul desired to maintain good relations with Britain, but he made it clear that it was imperative to defend Egypt’s prerogative in this case, and that he was not acting in order to satisfy the will of the Egyptians. While Carter was initiating legal action in the Mixed Courts against the Egyptian government, Egypt was preparing to issue a new concession to Almina, the Countess of Carnarvon. Egypt believed that the concession had operated well under Lord Carnarvon but had deteriorated under Carter, and it granted the license to Lady Carnarvon rather than Carter. Almina, the Countess of Carnarvon, defended Carter’s misfortune, The discovery of the tomb has been dogged by bad luck and bad temper . . . Howard Carter stands before the archaeological world as a partly wronged, partly foolish figure. He has done all the hard work and done it well, but the government of Egypt handed him a rope and persuaded him to hang himself.66 Tutankhamen on Trial: The Case for the Sequestration Rights to the Pharaoh Tutankhamen’s Artifacts The period between when Carter first filed suit and the initial hearing in the Mixed Courts was fraught with rumor. Silence from both Carter and government sources allowed many to speculate as to the outcome of the court case. The Egyptian government tried to put many of these rumors to rest. The Ministry of Public Works issued an official communiqué to help clarify many of the misunderstandings and misrepresentations swirling around Egypt. The Ministry of Public Works explained that it had reissued the concession to Lady Carnarvon following the death of her husband to maintain a level of consistency and continuity to the expedition and scientific research taking place in the Valley of the Kings. Carter took exception to the oversight and limits imposed by the Egyptian government, calling them unreasonable. Carter ignored the stipulations of his agreement with the government which implicitly forbade the entertainment of visitors at the site. Incensed by Egyptian demands, Carter had sealed the

66 New York Times, 22 February 1924.

194 tomb without securing the sarcophagus and departed for Cairo. The Ministry of Public Works professed that it was uninterested in such petty disputes, for it was only concerned with the preservation of the artifacts. Carter demanded an apology from the Egyptian government for its treatment of his lady visitors, and the Egyptian government merely asked that Carter continue working on the invaluable relics. Unable to put aside their differences, Carter then filed suit against the Egyptian government in the Mixed Courts.67 Summer was approaching, and Carter was distressed over the future condition of the objects in the tomb. The Mixed Courts adjourned during the hot summer months, and Carter hoped to properly preserve the treasures and close the tomb before summer arrived. Now that Carter had the proper mandate to bring the case before court, he and the trustees of Lord Carnarvon desired a quick resolution to the matter. Legal proceedings began in Cairo on 23 February 1924. The writ served on Morcos Bey Hanna, Minister for Public Works, was submitted on behalf of Howard Carter and three executors of Lord Carnarvon’s estate, including Sir John Grenfell Maxwell, Major General Sir Robert Hutcheson, and Arthur Fitz- Hardinge Berkeley Portman.68 The writ maintained that both Lord Carnarvon and Howard Carter held the concession to excavate the Valley of the Kings. This license from the Egyptian government provided for the excavation of the valley and preservation of artifacts. Carter requested that the Mixed Courts designate him as the sequestrator of the tomb of Tutankhamen and the relics held within.69 Howard Carter’s case against the Egyptian government was first heard in the Civil Section of the Mixed Courts at Cairo on 23 February 1924. Judge Pierre Crabitès presided in the case as president of Cairo’s Civil Section. F. M. Maxwell represented the plaintiffs. He was a British lawyer famous for his prior appearances in many prominent lawsuits in front of both the Mixed Courts and British military courts. Maxwell believed that it was in their best interest to establish the urgency of the situation and demanded that Carter be appointed

67 Egyptian Gazette, 23 February 1924. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid.

195 sequestrator so he could resume the excavation.70 Mr. Rosetti was the advocate on behalf of the Egyptian government as part of the legal team for the Department of Public Works. Mr. Rosetti, on the other hand, attempted to prove that there was no need for such action.71 Egyptians packed the courtroom on the first day of the trial, and most of them were university students. Throughout the proceedings, Judge Crabitès had to exercise his gavel in order to gain a measure of silence in the courtroom. Most of the Egyptians attended the trial to demonstrate against Howard Carter and F.M. Maxwell. Judge Crabitès had to frequently admonish the crowd gathered in the Mixed Courts’ largest courtroom for their inappropriate behavior. The Egyptian Gazette described the scene at the courtroom as something reminiscent of a performance at the Royal Opera House. Students protested outside of the court, showing their support for the Egyptian government. Judge Crabitès had to request a police detachment to ensure an uninterrupted trial. Certainly, Crabitès aggravated the already tense situation by creating a disturbance himself by visiting the tomb.72 Egyptian nationalists called for him to recuse himself. Crabitès should have recused himself, for he was a friend of Carter and was intimately acquainted with this excavation. The Egyptian Gazette naturally promoted Carter’s cause. When describing events in the courtroom, the Egyptian Gazette portrayed Mr. Rosetti as stentorian and garish, both pleading and thunderous: “Maitre Rosetti, appearing for the Government, raised his voice to something approaching a scream.”73 On the other hand, the Egyptian Gazette contrasted Mr. Rosetti’s demeanor with that of Mr. Maxwell, counsel for Carter and the three executors to Lord Carnarvon’s estate: “Mr. Maxwell, cool and collected, addressed the Court in a subdued and confidential tone, as though what he had to say were for the presiding judge’s special ear alone.”74

70 Thomas Hoving, Tutankhamun: The Untold Story. (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1978), 302. 71 Ibid. 72 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-85, Scrapbooks 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. Le Journal du Caire, 25 February 1924. 73 Egyptian Gazette, 25 February 1924. 74 Ibid.

196 Mr. Rosetti, counsel representing the Egyptian government, commenced by arguing that Carter had no right to bring the case to court because he was not included in the contract. The license existed between the Lady Carnarvon and the Egyptian government. The Egyptian government had no formal relationship with Carter. Mr. Rosetti maintained that Carter had no evidence of authorization to speak for the Countess of Carnarvon in court. The executors to the Carnarvon estate were scattered throughout the world, so Carter brought the case forward on their behalf. Mr. Maxwell contended that Carter was the fully empowered agent of Lady Carnarvon and capable of making decisions regarding her estate.75 Lady Carnarvon had cabled Howard Carter, saying, “Take proceedings in my name.”76 Mr. Rosetti argued that the Mixed Courts did not have jurisdiction over administrative measures such as concessions. Mr. Rosetti said that Carter had lost his right to dig when he abandoned the site and compromised the objects.77 Judge Crabitès adjourned court, providing the attorneys representing Carter time to prepare a rejoinder to Egypt’s accusations.78 Carter withdrew his case against the Egyptian government on 29 February 1924. In early March, both parties consented to external arbitration in lieu of a lengthy civil trial. Carter lacked confidence that the legal proceedings could be brought before the court without the executors present, so he instituted a new action, including Sir John Maxwell and Almina, the Countess of Carnarvon as litigants. Sir John Maxwell and Lady Carnarvon were the executors of the estate of Lord Carnarvon. Carter then persuaded an American archaeologist, Dr. James Breasted, to act as a third party referee in the ongoing negotiations between the Egyptian government and the Carter trustees. Although praised by both parties, Professor Breasted was doubtful that the case could be settled early.

During the midst of the trial for the sequestration rights to the Pharaoh Tutankhamen’s artifacts, M. Pierre Lacau staged the official opening of

75 Ibid. 76 Egyptian Gazette, 10 March 1924. 77 Le Journal du Caire, 12 March 1924. 78 Le Journal du Caire, 27 February 1924. New York Times, 24 February 1924.

197 Tutankhamen’s tomb. The Egyptian government invited hundreds to attend the ceremony on 5 March 1924, including eminent Egyptologists, senior officials, diplomats, and other notables. The Egyptians intended the opening ceremony to be a largely ceremonial function, but it quickly metamorphosed into a nationalist demonstration. Supporters of Zaghoul Pasha, numbering in the thousands, lined the route to cheer their hero, awaiting his arrival at Luxor. Students spread out along the road from Cairo to Luxor just for a glimpse of their own champion, student MP Hassan Yassin. British newspapers denounced the spectacle as a political maneuver undertaken by the Egyptian government with no relevance to the preservation of the artifacts.79 Judge Crabitès thought that the fiasco surrounding the reopening endangered the tomb and its contents.80 On 7 March 1924, the Egyptian Gazette published an opinion piece railing against the Egyptian government’s conduct during the Tutankhamen affair. All along, the Egyptians had intimated that they merely sought to safeguard the tomb for the sake of posterity. The Egyptian Gazette challenged this notion, for were it sincere, then why had the Egyptian government compromised the objects in the tomb by admitting visitors: “In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in this miserable affair they are behaving in a willfully hostile and provocative manner.”81 This article declared that what the government was really interested in was the promotion of hostility and animosity between Egyptians and the British. A root cause of the enmity between the two groups was the failure of Egyptians to cope with foreigners scavenging for their native treasures. The Egyptian Gazette denounced Egyptians for disregarding the hard work of foreigners who discovered their national monuments.82 Back in court, Mr. Maxwell disputed that Carter was a paid servant, as Mr. Rosetti had portrayed him, for he never received a salary from Lord Carnarvon, rather he paid for his work in the desert out of pocket. Mr. Maxwell declared that Howard Carter had no partiality towards the final destination of said artifacts. For

79 Le Journal du Caire, 7 March 1924. Egyptian Gazette, 8 March 1924. 80 Hoving, Tutankhamen, 302. 81 Egyptian Gazette, 7 March 1924. 82 Ibid.

198 Carter, his only concern was to secure, protect and scientifically record the objects located within the tomb. In reality, Carter was interested in the question of ownership of the objects; however, Maxwell convinced him to repudiate all entitlements to ownership so as to enhance his case for sequestration rights. Furthermore, Morcos Bey Hanna had intimated that he would be inclined to renew the concession provided that Carter signed over all claims to the relics.83 Mr. Maxwell held that the Egyptian government’s argument regarding the possession of the tomb’s contents should be applied to the executors of Lord Carnarvon’s estate and was not relevant to Carter. Prior arrangements stipulated that the executors could claim up to half the contents of the tomb, but they were only interested in duplicates.84 On 10 March 1924, Mr. Rosetti, insisted that Mr. Maxwell lacked the requisite authority to appear before the court on behalf of the litigants, as he had not proved his authority to the other party, namely the Ministry of Public Works. Mr. Maxwell replied that he was a member of the Mixed Bar in good standing, so he should be able to present himself to the court. Mr. Rosetti countered by asserting that Mr. Carter had no grounds to bring this action before the court since no concession had ever been granted by the Egyptian government to Mr. Carter. Lord Carnarvon had renounced his entitlement to a share of the artifacts; therefore, no rights could descend to his wife and executors. This concession had been based upon a similar license awarded to Mr. Theodore Davis, who had also abandoned his claim to the contents of the tomb.85 Mr. Davis had uncovered a number of tombs and subsequently made satisfactory arrangements with the Egyptian government concerning the distribution of the objects.86 Mr. Maxwell issued a rejoinder to rebut Mr. Rosetti’s contentions. Mr. Maxwell stated that there should be, in fact, two separate claims, one for Mr. Carter and one for the executors of Lord Carnarvon’s estate. Mr. Carter’s assertion rested on the notion that he had no interest in securing the possession

83 Hoving, Tutankhamun, 303. 84 Egyptian Gazette, 10 March 1924. 85 Ibid. 86 Egyptian Gazette, 11 March 1924.

199 of the artifacts found within the tomb. Instead, his mission concerned the scientific work in the tomb. Mr. Maxwell professed that the concession granted to Lord Carnarvon provided for the unhindered work at the tomb, and Mr. Carter was Lord Carnarvon’s associate and chief archaeologist. The Egyptian government’s license specifically named Mr. Carter as Lord Carnarvon’s representative. The executors maintained that their right to the objects in the tomb of Tutankhamen should remain distinct and separate from that of Carter’s. According to Mr. Maxwell, a provision from the Antiquities Ordinance supported the claim of the executors, stipulating that should a tomb be found, the discoverers were entitled to half of the artifacts, or half of their value.87 Mr. Maxwell contended that this proviso in the ordinance provided a measure of security for the excavators against an unruly Antiquities Service averse to working with the archaeologist, especially considering that M. Pierre Lacau made such proclamations as, “The Government decides, it does not discuss.”88 Mr. Carter’s counsel disagreed that the license was no longer relevant, as it was converted into a contract once they discovered the tomb. Counsel rebutted that if that were the case, Mr. Carter could complete the project according to his own whim and say, “When I please I will begin the work again and when I please I will finish it.”89 After adjourning for the weekend, the trial began on Monday 12 March 1924, with fireworks. Mr. Maxwell opened by requesting that Mr. Rosetti withdraw his objection to Mr. Maxwell’s counsel to Mr. Carter, which Mr. Rosetti refused to do. Mr. Maxwell replied, “May I then call upon General Sir John Maxwell to tell the court that he is my client?”90 This statement shocked everybody in the courtroom and especially surprised Counsel. Until then, General Sir John Grenfell Maxwell had been silently sitting next to Mr. Maxwell. He had only just arrived in Cairo one hour before from California. He rose from

87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Egyptian Gazette, 12 March 1924. 90 Egyptian Gazette, 11 March 1924.

200 his seat and approached the bench and announced that Mr. Maxwell was acting in his service and that he, General Maxwell, had been vested with the power of attorney from the other executors of Lord Carnarvon’s estate. This bombshell caught Mr. Rosetti unawares, for just the previous day in court he had alleged that in his opinion neither Almina Countess of Carnarvon nor any of the executors would come before the Court to endorse the court case.91 Judge Crabitès remarked to General Maxwell, “If I may put aside my official role for one moment, I should like to say that I am glad to see you in such excellent health, Sir John.”92 In light of General Maxwell’s sudden appearance in court, Judge Crabitès attempted to refresh Mr. Rosetti’s memory, in which he had said in the previous day’s testimony that the presence of an executor constituted “le meilleur mandate.”93 During the day’s trial, there was a contentious dispute between Mr. Rosetti and Mr. Maxwell in which Counsel reminded Mr. Maxwell of an earlier statement in which he had said that the contract could not override the law providing the concessionaire with half of all discovered objects. An adamant Maxwell denied such a remark. Mr. Rosetti assured the court, “I cannot claim to speak English perfectly, but at least I can say that I understand it thoroughly and I am certain that Mr. Maxwell said this.”94 Counsel referred to an article in the Daily Mail to prove his point that Lord Carnarvon never expected remuneration. Mr. Maxwell responded, “What is that newspaper?” Mr. Rosetti declared, “The Daily Mail.” (Laughter by Mr. Maxwell). Judge Crabitès questioned Mr. Rosetti, “Who wrote the article?” Mr. Rosetti answered, “Mr. Weigall.” Mr. Maxwell interrupted, “A gentleman who was excluded from the Tomb and went back and wrote an article against Mr. Carter.” Mr. Rosetti replied, “He was excluded from the Tomb by Mr. Carter.”95 Judge Crabitès concluded that the newspaper was irrelevant to the case at hand and the Counsel should concentrate on judicial matters instead. Mr. Rosetti reasoned that Lady Carnarvon and the executors of Lord Carnarvon’s

91 Times of London, 11 March 1924. 92 Egyptian Gazette, 12 March 1924. 93 Egyptian Gazette, 11 March 1924. 94 Egyptian Gazette, 12 March 1924. 95 Ibid.

201 estate had no justification for half of the artifacts or their present value, for Lord Carnarvon had never asserted this prerogative. Mr. Rosetti insisted that Lord Carnarvon had renounced all claims to the artifacts; therefore, they could not logically descend to his executors. In the previous concessionaire, Mr. Davis, had also abandoned his rights to the objects.96 Mr. Maxwell initiated surrebuttal by explaining that this conflict was one between the necessity of science and the dignity of the Egyptian government. For Carter, he only desired to perform scientific work at the tomb. Carter clarified his position as Lord Carnarvon’s associate in the excavation, not his agent, so he was at liberty to perform work on the tomb. He was unconcerned with questions of ownership of the artifacts. Mr. Maxwell told Judge Crabitès that the concession stipulated that in case there was a find, then the concessionaire, or his associate, was entitled to possession of the objects until the completion of his scientific research. The second claim related to the executors to Lord Carnarvon’s estate and their title to a portion of the objects. Mr. Maxwell argued that the Egyptian Antiquities Law specified that those who discover an antiquity are entitled to either half of the objects or half of their value. In the case of Mr. Davis, the previous licensee, the government had always reached an amicable resolution on the division of the artifacts.97 As the representative of Sir John Maxwell and Lady Carnarvon, Mr. Maxwell acknowledged that they were uninterested in ownership of the artifacts, but only half their value.

While Mr. Maxwell was attempting to read aloud an extract from a book on the archaeological requirements of such an endeavor, Judge Crabitès interrupted, Unfortunately (I say unfortunately on account of this case) I have for many years been a friend of Mr. Carter, and of many other archaeologists, and I know for myself much of the conditions under which archaeological work

96 Times of London, 11 March 1924. 97 Ibid.

202 is carried on: so that you may be able to spare yourself the trouble of reading those extracts.98 When Mr. Maxwell tried to read a specific section of a book which he said had particular relevance to the case, Judge Crabitès questioned, “Whose book is that?” Mr. Maxwell replied, “Mr. Carter’s.” Judge Crabitès remonstrated Mr. Maxwell, “Would it not have been better policy to get a book written by somebody else?” Mr. Maxwell answered, “It might have been better policy, but this book was written long before the dispute, and puts certain points connected with excavation better than I can put them myself, so I propose to read certain passages.” Judge Crabitès admonished the attorney, “It is most unusual to quote a man as his own expert witness, but if you feel that is the way in which you should conduct your case, go ahead.” Mr. Maxwell read excerpts from Carter’s book emphasizing the necessity of taking complete notes of a find once it had been discovered. Judge Crabitès concluded, “I have been taken around excavations by Dr. Reisner, and have seen his records and I understand all about that.”99 Mr. Maxwell declared that Carter’s work demonstrated the urgency of immediately recording the objects. This was a difficult task to accomplish as it was, even in the absence of constant interruption and harassment from the Antiquities Department. Mr. Maxwell complained, for example, that the antiquities had compelled Mr. Carter to respond to no less than 105 letters in the past winter alone. In addition to this, the government required that Mr. Carter admit representatives from the press to the tomb on numerous occasions. Mr. Maxwell pointed out that those members of the press who had been refused admittance by Mr. Carter had the misfortune of arriving at a time when he was busy with his work.100 The Egyptian government had a long-standing dispute with Carter regarding the contract he signed with the Times of London to cover his archaeological expedition. Mr. Maxwell addressed this agreement, maintaining

98 Egyptian Gazette, 12 March 1924. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid.

203 that there was nothing extraordinary about Carter’s conduct because he could not report the daily events at the tomb. Under these exigencies, he hired the Times of London to give an account of the excavation. Mr. Maxwell referenced other instances of this practice, including Professor MacAllister, an archaeologist working in Palestine, who had a compact with the Daily Telegraph to cover his progress, as well as General Bruce, who also had an understanding with the Times of London to publish his ascent of Mt. Everest. Mr. Maxwell emphasized that these arrangements had not been made for monetary reward, but to relieve these men of an added burden. A stubborn man, Carter refused to permit the Egyptian government to dominate him and force him to rescind his contract with the Times of London. Instead of acquiescing, Carter had appointed Arthur Merton to handle this on his behalf, but allowing Merton such access inevitably caused much acrimony within the journalistic community.101 Merton happened to be a close friend of Crabitès. Once he had concluded his argument, Judge Crabitès probed Mr. Maxwell, “There are one or two questions which I should like to ask. You say that Mr. Carter and your clients in general are entitled to remain in possession until the work is finished, in order that the necessary scientific work may be carried to completion. So the necessity of serving the interests of science is the primary object of your claim?” Mr. Maxwell replied, “Yes. A temporary interruption of the work is not of the greatest importance, but continual interruptions by Government visitors are very prejudicial.” Judge Crabitès reminded Mr. Maxwell that Mr. Carter had departed the tomb first and that the Egyptian government had only subsequently closed the tomb later that same day but only after Mr. Carter had stopped work and quitted Luxor for Cairo. To Judge Crabitès, it appeared that Carter had left the tomb of his own accord. M. Pierre Lacau believed this to be his final statement on the matter. As a friend of Carter, Judge Crabitès declared that this was the greatest contention against the archaeologist and implored Mr. Maxwell to rebut this argument. Mr. Maxwell said

101 Ibid.

204 that Carter had halted work because the Egyptian government had harassed him to the point where he no longer wished to continue.102 Judge Crabitès asked Mr. Maxwell, “Why did you not remain in possession of the tomb and come to me then? Now you are asking me to transfer possession.” Mr. Maxwell answered, “We were in possession of the Tomb, but the Egyptian Government went down like a bandit and broke into the Tomb.”103 Referring to the Egyptian government as bandits, Mr. Maxwell inadvertently caused an uproar in the courtroom. Excitedly, Mr. Rossetti exclaimed, “I protest most vehemently against counsel calling the Egyptian Government a bandit.” Judge Crabitès agreed, “The terms do not strengthen your case, I think, Mr. Maxwell.” Mr. Maxwell considered his previous statement and said, “No. I withdraw it.”104 Mr. Maxwell told the judge that Mr. Carter was unwilling to relinquish possession of the tomb to the government when he closed the tomb and locked it. Mr. Carter was neither abandoning the tomb nor his rights, but planned on resuming work once the Egyptian government assured him that he could work freely and without interference. All negotiations between both parties collapsed after that fateful day in the courtroom. Once Mr. Maxwell referred to the Egyptian government as rapacious bandits, they withdrew from arbitration. Mediation had been progressing steadily, with Egypt willing to offer Lady Carnarvon a new concession. It seemed as if that the efforts of Dr. Breasted would be worthwhile, at least, until Mr. Maxwell’s remarks. Outraged, the Egyptian delegation abandoned the discussions.105 Crabitès had been disposed to ruling in favor of Carter and the trustees. He had hoped that Professor Breasted could reach an arrangement with Morcos Bey Hanna which would permit Carter and his associates to resume their operations. Now, he had to continue gradually and carefully to avoid inflaming nationalist sentiment.106

102 Ibid. 103 Egyptian Gazette, 12 March 1924. 104 Egyptian Gazette, 12 March 1924. 105 New York Times, 12 March 1924. 106 Hoving, Tutankhamun, 307.

205 It was a truly unfortunate situation since both sides in the dispute were willing to come to terms. Dr. Breasted’s skill maneuvered the parties to accept an amicable solution. The Egyptian government had been inclined to consent to the demands of the trustees concerning the first claim. In the interest of science, the Egyptian government had agreed to permit Carter to continue his scientific research at the tomb. The executors of Lord Carnarvon relinquished their entitlement to half the value of the property contained within the tomb; instead they surrendered possession of the artifacts to Egypt. Mr. Maxwell negotiated this compromise until his inappropriate remarks about the Egyptian ministers. For his acerbic denunciation, the Egyptians demanded an apology from Mr. Maxwell. To make amends, Mr. Maxwell announced that Carter and the trustees of Lord Carnarvon’s estate were disposed to relinquishing all of their rights. The trustees were willing to waive their rights afforded under the Antiquities Ordinance for the duplicates. Sir John Maxwell’s motivation for this maneuver was to carry out the wishes of Lord Carnarvon, bequeathing the tomb’s remains to science and humanity rather than fighting over ownership. Dr. Breasted even convinced Carter to craft his own statement renouncing his entitlement to the objects: “I, for myself, never have made, do not now make, and never intend to make any claim against the Egyptian Government nor against anyone else, to any of the objects found in the tomb of Tutankhamen.”107 The Egyptian government was loath to negotiate further after Mr. Maxwell’s comment. While the British press declined to defend Mr. Maxwell’s behavior, it did highlight similar occurrences from Mr. Rosetti: It is not as though the epithet had not at once been withdrawn by Mr. Maxwell, and not only by him, but by all his clients, who have expressed their regret for its having been used. Nor is it as though the language used by opposing counsel was always a model of courtesy- on the contrary, the counsel for the Ministry of Public Works is accused of having

107 Egyptian Gazette, 13 March 1924.

206 on more than one occasion used expressions which could hardly be described as polite.108 The Egyptian Gazette insisted that the real problem was the conflict between the necessity of science and maintaining the Egyptian government’s dignity.109 In the interest of quickly settling this case, Judge Crabitès privately met with Morcos Bey Hanna, whereupon he informed the minister of his intention to decide in favor of Carter. To avoid such a ruling, the judge urged Morcos Bey Hanna to return to the table. Morcos Bey Hanna told Judge Crabitès that he would mull it over. Judge Crabitès left their meeting with a feeling that the Egyptians had no desire to resolve the dispute.110 Judge Crabitès was distressed by the continued tourist visits to the tomb, especially considering the lack of security at the site. To defuse the situation, he sought the advice of Herbert Winlock, Associate Curator of Egyptology at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Winlock counseled Judge Crabitès to compel Breasted to approach Morcos Bey Hanna with the goal of restarting negotiations. He wanted Breasted to find out just how intransigent the minister was towards mediation with Carter. Winlock also told Judge Crabitès to seek the help of American minister J. Merton Howell in order to promote Breasted’s arbitration with Morcos Bey Hanna. Both Judge Crabitès and Winlock recognized Carter’s obstinacy. He was out of control and a detriment to his own cause. The men tried to remove him from the discussions, and, at the same time, compel him to avoid making such incendiary comments as had been his proclivity.111 Morcos Bey Hanna had his own problems. He was not in favor of accepting a negotiated settlement, yet he was incapable of locating any archaeologists willing to excavate in place of Carter. When the minister contacted the Metropolitan Museum of Art archaeologists, they refused his offer. His own employees in the Antiquities Department also rejected his proposal. M. Pierre Lacau and Rex Engelbach, his number two, were reluctant to accept the

108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Hoving, Tutankhamun, 307. 111 Ibid., 307-8.

207 responsibility. Native Egyptian archaeologists readily confessed their inability to handle such a difficult task. Most importantly, Egyptian public opinion began to turn against Morcos Bey Hanna in favor of Carter, whom they now believed the only one capable of such an undertaking, especially in light of his rejection of ownership of all artifacts.112 During a discreet encounter, Morcos Bey Hanna promised Breasted and Howell that he would consent to allowing Carter to resume his work in the Valley of the Kings. He told the men to return in a couple days to sign the settlement. But rather than compromising, Morcos Bey Hanna filed an appeal against Judge Crabitès. Breasted and Howell gave the appearance of defeated men. Thinking that he had helped promote a just conclusion to the dispute, Judge Crabitès was infuriated. Winlock described him “in a state over the loss of prestige to the U.S.A.”113 Judge Crabitès tracked Howell down at his residence and berated the American minister for his ineptitude. The judge assailed Howell for submitting to such impertinent behavior. That night, Judge Crabitès composed a caustic letter to Howell, reproving him for bowing under Egyptian pressure to the detriment of American prestige in the region. He compelled Howell to send a stern message to the Egyptians so that “the new Egyptian Parliament would not labor under the false impression that having become independent, Egypt’s new Ministry could flout America with impunity.”114 Prior to agreeing to a settlement, the Egyptian government demanded that all parties renounce all claims to the artifacts before it would reissue the concession. The Carnarvon family had spent some £ 50,000 on the excavation and endeavored to recoup a measure of that considerable sum. Sir John Maxwell, speaking on behalf of the remainder of the executors, stated that they would be prepared to forsake all of their rights. 115 All of Egypt was abuzz over the Luxor dispute when Judge Crabitès handed down his verdict in the case. In the case for the appointment of Carter

112 Ibid., 308-9. 113 Ibid., 313-4. 114 Ibid., 314. 115 Times of London, 13 March 1924.

208 as the sequestrator for Tutankhamen’s tomb, Judge Crabitès ruled on 12 March 1924, in favor of Howard Carter and the trustees of Lord Carnarvon on all points. It had apparently helped Carter’s cause that he never made a claim for the possession of the artifacts.116 In rendering his decision, Judge Crabitès said that the judgment was one for all of mankind, not in opposition to Egypt or in favor of Howard Carter.117 Just a few days later the Egyptian government launched an appeal to the Mixed Courts’ Court of Appeals at Alexandria. Judge Eeman presided over the case. The Egyptian government attacked Carter, Sir John Maxwell, and the Countess Carnarvon, labeling them as exploiters who commercialized their discovery. The government argued that the tomb was within the state’s domain. Revocation of their license and taking control of the tomb were administrative actions, beyond of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts.118 The Court of Appeals adjourned in order to allow time for Procurator General M. van der Bosch, to compose a decision. When parties returned to court on 30 March, the procureur general explained that Egypt’s protests concerning the legitimacy of Howard Carter’s attorney did not apply to the case. Since Howard Carter and the trustees of Lord Carnarvon relinquished their claim to property within the tomb, there was no argument over the second claim in the case, possession of the objects; therefore, there was no cause to appoint a sequestrator for the tomb.119 Judge Eeman overturned Judge Crabitès’s earlier conclusion in support of Howard Carter and the trustees of Lord Carnarvon and ruled in favor of the Egyptian government. He decided that the Mixed Courts lacked jurisdiction in the affair and said it was one for the Egyptian government to resolve.120

116 New York Times, 13 March 1924. 117 Clive Hardy, “From Praline to Pyramid,” The Courier, (15-17 September 1977): 12. 118 New York Times, 20 March 1924. 119 New York Times, 31 March 1924. 120 Clive Hardy, “From Praline to Pyramid,” 12.

209 CHAPTER 7- ACCIDENTS

Sir Lee Stack In 1924, after Egyptian assassins killed the British Commander of the Egyptian Army and Governor General of the Sudan, Sir Oliver (Lee) Stack, an outraged Viscount Edmund Allenby, British High Commissioner to Egypt, insisted on an apology from Sa’ad Zaghloul, along with a fine of five hundred thousand Egyptian pounds.1 Allenby also compelled Egypt to recall their troops from and reduce their control of the Sudan. Zaghloul resigned rather than agree to British demands. Zaghloul’s withdrawal from the Egyptian political scene ushered in a new era of tripartite power sharing in Egypt, comprised of the British, King Fuad, and the Wafd Party. The Wafd Party maintained the popular support of ordinary Egyptians, while King Fuad used his control over appointments to widen his influence; and the British still held onto their “four Reserved Points” and attempted to prevent any decisions harmful British interests in Egypt.2 Egyptians sought a more favorable agreement regarding the British position in Egypt, but Great Britain elected a Liberal government, and Lord Lloyd George replaced Allenby. The Egyptians realized that they would have to be patient for political reform since George was a die-hard imperialist. Early on, George endeavored to displace the Wafd Party to his advantage; however, Great Britain and Egypt resumed a dialogue in 1929 with a newly-elected Labor government and victorious Wafd Party. Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi, replaced the Wafd-dominated parliament with one more amenable to a constitution that provided the king with more power, and the negotiations between the British and the Egyptians remained dormant.3 The Amputation and a New Career Just months after rendering a decision in his most famous court case in June 1924, Crabitès concluded his docket one morning and tried to catch a Cairo streetcar rolling down the street. He lost his footing while attempting to board,

1 Arthur Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 61. 2 Ibid., 62. 3 Ibid., 63.

210 slipped, and the trolley ran over him.4 The car was in motion when he tried to board it. Crabitès’s right leg received the brunt of the impact and was crushed under the weight of the streetcar. The accident broke the big toe on his left foot as well. Onlookers raced him to nearby Catholic Deaconess Hospital, where doctors promptly amputated his right leg below the knee. Although he was confident that the surgery would proceed smoothly, he had concerns over blood loss. Crabitès referred to the operation as “a petty amputation.” He scoffed at the curse of Tutankhamen, disregarding the notion that his misfortune was attributable to his court decision in favor of Mr. Carter and the trustees of Lord Carnarvon. Recalling the incident later, Crabitès said, “I was determined that the accident should not make of me a moral cripple.”5 Instead, he declared, “I make my living with my head, not with my legs, why should I worry?”6 Crabitès refused to allow the incident to dishearten him. This life-altering event left Crabitès with much time on his hands. He had usually taken long strolls, often for two hours a day, to obtain some exercise and stay in shape. Now, he had to abandon those walks that he relished. He devised a formula to help him survive the loss of his leg and console him during hard times. He needed a hobby. An old friend of his, Arthur Merton, correspondent for the Times of London in Cairo, encouraged him to begin writing in his spare time. His court duties lasted only a couple hours a day for eight months out of the year, so he had plenty of time to devote to writing. When he became well enough to travel, Crabitès sailed for New York City to be fitted with a prosthesis. He remained in New York until the spring of 1925, adapting to his new leg. While there, he wrote two essays. Writing became cathartic for Crabitès: “It taught me how to laugh old age in the face by giving a new vista to my life and by making me serene and contented.”7 During his stay, he submitted one of the articles he had written to Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs. Armstrong telephoned him within a week to announce the

4 Pierre Crabitès, “Struggle of a Monopede,” unpublished ms. (c. 1928), p. 1: Mss. 73-50, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 2. 7 Ibid., 3.

211 paper’s acceptance. It was published in the December 1924 issue of Foreign Affairs under the title, “Egypt, the Sudan and the Nile.” Foreign Affairs was a most influential journal. According to Crabitès, Sir Lee Stack’s assassination on 18 November, endowed the article with a “measure of timelessness.”8 The work’s acceptance boosted his morale. It encouraged him to continue composing new studies. Crabitès published two more articles for Asia Magazine while still in New York, thus furthering his new career and inspiring him to continue writing.9 When he returned to Egypt in the spring of 1925, he was confident that he could find a topic for book publication. Crabitès recalled his trip home to Egypt, “There was very little spring in my walk but there was a resiliency in my soul that took its place.”10 Submitting articles to editors edified Crabitès. It taught him that while many articles are submitted, few are accepted. This toughened him to the realities of the printing industry. He learned how to handle disappointment. Having his hard work turned down curbed any arrogance he might have had, and yet his early successes helped him maintain hope of publishing more articles, or even perhaps books, in the future. The British React to Crabitès’s Works Crabitès published two important articles in 1926, “Our African Cotton Rivals” and “The Suez Canal as an International Waterway,” both in prestigious journals. His early studies on Egypt and the Sudan caught the attention of the British Residency in Cairo because they dealt directly with two of the four reserved areas that Britain kept under its control after granting Egypt its independence in 1922, specifically the Sudan and the Suez Canal. Much like his subsequent works, these were a blend of conjecture intermixed with history. Crabitès often wrote in the first person, as much of these two works concern his contemporaries, with whom he had some personal contact. He published his articles in American journals to be read by American policy makers. They consider British infringements on American rights and, naturally, roused the ire of

8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 5. 10 Ibid.

212 the British in Egypt, reinforcing their already negative impression of him. These studies are excellent examples of Crabitès’s low estimation of the British, as well as his own inability to restrain his opinion in favor of political expediency. He never sought to impress British officials. Rather, he composed these articles to influence officials in Washington, perhaps with the hope of obtaining a future diplomatic appointment. “Our African Cotton Rivals” In a 1926 article for the North American Review entitled “Our African Cotton Rivals,” Crabitès examined the cotton industry in the Nile Valley, a great competitor to the American cotton trade. In this study, he also tackled the controversy over Nile water rights between Egypt and the Sudan and how these water rights related to the price of cotton back in the United States. Crabitès argued that after the rise of the Mahdi, Lord Cromer promoted a pro-Egyptian water policy, allowing more of the Nile’s precious water to be put to use in Egypt than the Sudan. Once Cromer placed Egypt’s finances in order, he dispatched an army southward to reconquer the Sudan. A British and Egyptian partnership governed the newly-designated Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. According to Crabitès, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium worked well for all parties until 28 February 1922, when Britain gave Egypt her “independence.” Up until that date, the British saw the Nile as Egypt’s river. Crabitès maintained that Cromer occupied the Sudan to protect and preserve Egypt, “The jealousy with which Lord Cromer safeguarded the principle of the Nile water monopoly of Egypt is readily understood when it is borne in mind that the country was the apple of the eye of her Regenerator.”11 The condition of the Nile would remain unaltered until basic changes occurred Sir Lee Stack was assassinated on 18 November 1924. The British attributed the crime to a follower of Sa’ad Zaghloul. Crabitès reasoned that Lord Allenby sought to alter Egypt’s water rights to chastise the Egyptians for the murder of the governor general of the Sudan. Lord Allenby reversed an Egyptian monopoly over the Nile’s waters into a Sudanese one. The judge believed that

11 Pierre Crabitès, “Our African Cotton Rivals,” The North American Review (1926), 19.

213 such a punishment was an indictment against the whole of Egypt: “Withdraw the water of the Nile from the Delta of Egypt, and its verdant fields will turn over night into a barren waste. The country is practically rainless.”12 While Crabitès considered this “water cure” a drastic but effective remedy to the spate of anti- British murders over the past year and half, he condemned the decision, for “it made future generations responsible for the crimes committed in 1924.”13 According to Crabitès, there was insufficient water in the Nile to accommodate the demands of both Egypt and the Sudan. There was not even adequate water to satiate Egypt’s own thirst. Crabitès thought that a transformation of water privileges towards a pro- Sudanese policy would also punish those residing in the South of the United States for the assassination of Stack. Egypt had approximately 7, 300,000 acres of arable land, whereas the Sudan had an estimated 35,000,000 acres of cultivatable land, roughly equivalent to that of the .14 By shifting the distribution of the Nile’s waters, the Sudan could place more land under the plow and harvest much more cotton; thereby depressing the value of American cotton. Crabitès explained that aside from American Sea Island Cotton, the Egyptian varieties were of a higher quality than American cotton and fetched a better price at market. He insisted that his arguments should not be misconstrued as pro-Egyptian, rather they were aimed at changing the water policy, for he did not want to see his fellow Southerners penalized for a crime committed in a far-away land. His first loyalty was to the South. Crabitès concluded, If, as I firmly believe, there is not enough water in the Nile in low years to deviate a drop from Egypt without jeopardizing her existence, and if the policy foreshadowed in the London Times be adopted, it will mean (1) famine in Egypt and (2) reduced prices for American cotton.15

12 Ibid., 21. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 23, 29. 15 Ibid., 30.

214 Crabitès also criticized the British appointment of Mr. Cremers, a Dutchman, instead of Mr. Cory, an American, to head the commission investigating a possible water settlement between Egypt and the Sudan. He contended that when Allenby originally tried to investigate the water issue in 1919, he procured the services of H.T. Cory, a Californian, “In those days, just after the Armistice, all thoughts turned to America as the one and only place to seek the ‘foreign’ member of this commission.”16 He questioned British motivation for failing to recall Cory when the subject resurfaced in 1924. Crabitès reminded the reader that Cory had dutifully fulfilled his job and received much praise. Naturally, the British responded to Crabitès’s article. C. Duff in the Foreign Office replied, It would not be difficult to pull Judge Crabitès’ elaborate article to pieces as he has failed to grasp the fundamental agricultural and engineering problems underlying the extension of cotton culture both in Egypt and the Sudan with the result that many of his conclusions are misleading.17 Duff also answered Crabitès’s inquiry regarding the nomination of Mr. Cremers over H.T. Cory. He stated that while the British would have loved to appoint Cory to investigate the Nile water privileges, the Egyptians were averse to accepting him, for they considered Americans indistinguishable from the British.18 “The Suez as an International Waterway” Crabitès also published an article entitled “The Suez Canal as an International Waterway” in the May 1926 issue of Current History.19 This composition was a general summation of the history of the Suez Canal and its relevance to international politics. It examined the significance of the Suez Canal to American interests and the British infringement of American rights related to

16 Ibid., 25. 17 Public Record Office Document J815/469/16: From C. Duff in the Foreign Office in London to A. Fletcher in New York. 12 April 1926. 18 Ibid. 19 Pierre Crabitès, “The Suez Canal as an International Waterway.” Current History 24 (1926): 216- 222.

215 the use of the canal. In this study, Crabitès asserted that the Suez Canal was of vital importance to the United States, just as it was to Great Britain. Where the British needed the Suez for their communications link with India, the canal was essential to the American links with the Philippines. Crabitès explained that when the profligate Khedive Ismail sold his shares of stock to the British on 25 November 1875, for four million pounds, the British took control of the canal company and renamed it Victoria, de Lesseps and Co. Once on board, the British endeavored to alter company policy. While French stock holders desired high tolls to yield dividends, the British attempted to lower rates and improve the condition of the canal.20 To advance their own agenda, the British placed Englishmen on the board of directors to promote their shipping interests.21 This only highlighted the strategic value of the canal and accomplished little to enhance its security. Unfortunately for the British, the original directive for the canal stipulated unrestricted passage for all commercial vessels, regardless of their nationality. For Crabitès, this meant that the Suez could not be navigated by belligerent vessels. Crabitès argued that the British had major problems with this technicality, as the Suez was of such strategic importance. They wanted to place warships in its waters. Britain decreed Egypt to be a “Veiled Protectorate” in 1882, and soon thereafter reexamined the agreement under which the Suez Canal was promulgated. In 1888, the British redressed this problem with a new contract which specified that all vessels were at liberty to travel the Suez, even during times of war, so long as they did not disembark and immediately quit its waters. The defense of Egypt was almost as imperative as that of the canal. Crabitès stressed that the British insertion of special exemptions from this arrangement permitted them to safeguard Egypt and the Suez in wartime.22 This allowed the British to both protect Egypt and manage the Suez Canal during times of war. Referring to the British governance of the canal during World War I, Crabitès affirmed,

20 Ibid., 219. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., 220.

216 I am criticizing no one. I am simply recording that when the strife was in its early stages the inviolability of the canal was respected. When, however, the agony was prolonged and the passions ran high, no one thought any more about the covenant which said that ‘during war belligerent powers shall neither embark nor disembark in the canal or its ports, troops, munitions or war material.’23 Perhaps the most salient part of this essay concerns Crabitès’s comments on the effect of British Suez policy on American rights. He made a case for the United States to compel Great Britain to reexamine its conduct towards the Suez Canal, “We cannot have access to it depend upon the caprice of Egypt, or upon any agreement which may exist between England and any of her present or future allies.”24 When Britain handed Egyptians their sovereignty in 1922, they retained control of the four reserved areas, including the Suez Canal and the Sudan. Crabitès disputed British domination over the four reserved areas, stating, This means in plain English that the Suez Canal may not be an English lake but that it is a British waterway. It tells us that we cannot use this English stream in time of war without Britain’s expressed or implied consent. It points out that our right to traverse the narrow seas is impaired.25 For Crabitès, the Suez belonged to all of humanity and should not be monopolized by one single country. He believed that this situation could not be postponed because the United States needed to assert their unrestricted right to free and equal access to the Suez Canal. Crabitès thought that the United States already had missed its best opportunity to redress this issue when the British asked the United States to recognize Egyptian independence. Crabitès said that the United States should have refused such acknowledgement until the British accepted a proposal calling for unhindered right of entry to the Suez during times of war. He concluded that

23 Ibid., 221. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid.

217 Great Britain would be loath to surrender this prerogative since the United States had already failed to take advantage of the circumstances when Britain called for American recognition of Egyptian independence; however, the United States still needed to rectify this impasse.26 Crabitès claimed that the British would only abandon Egypt so long as they could retain control of the Suez Canal and the Sudan. They wanted hegemony over the Sudan for its cotton production. Although Egypt was an economic drain on the British, the Sudan was a much more alluring and profitable venture: I do not blame the English. They entered Egypt largely because they wanted to control the canal. They are absolutely right from their point of view. But we are entitled to ours. We own the Philippines. We have maritime interests. We are a free people. We cannot retain our self- respect and permit our access to the high seas to be contingent upon the pleasure of any Power, however liberal and friendly it may be.27 This article caught the attention of British authorities in Egypt. They responded indignantly to his arguments against British control over the Suez Canal, He is an altogether disagreeable fellow as regards as [sic]- His correspondence which was perused to me by the censorship during the war showed a partisanship. . . 28 Crabitès Spends his Second Life Crabitès’s second brush with death came just a few years later in the summer of 1927, while leaving his house for court one morning. Losing his equilibrium because of his prosthesis, he stumbled and fell down the stairs. This time he broke his left knee. He returned to the same Catholic hospital where his right leg had been amputated in the summer of 1924, so Dr. Cassab could mend his knee with silver stitches. His previous accident had left him with no right leg to balance on, instead relying on a prosthesis. Therefore, he could not leave the

26 Ibid., 222. 27 Ibid. 28 Public Record Office Document J1096/469/16: To Lord Lloyd in London. 7 May 1926.

218 hospital on crutches. Immobile, Crabitès remained in the hospital for months. Remembering his stay at the hospital, Crabitès said, “Everything seemed to be sound about me except my legs, which specialized in going wrong.”29 This time, however, his hospital visit would not be so easy. On the night of 6 July Crabitès collapsed, as his legs swelled from phlebitis. His constitution had to fight an up-hill battle. He developed a fever; his temperature surpassing 103 for days on end during the sweltering Cairo summer. Wrapped in blankets, his swelling failed to subside, and he remained in critical condition. Most of the doctors and nurses attending to him were convinced that he would not survive. His well-being slowly improved, although not greatly. The swelling in his legs receded to some extent, as his temperature dropped ever so slightly. His nurse, Sister Neomie, whose vigilance never faltered throughout the entire ordeal, provided him with strength and hope. Crabitès remembered his gradual recovery, It, therefore, came to pass that one morning I said to Dr. Cassab, my attending physician, who was both devotion and skill personified: ‘Doctor, I have something on my chest which is worrying me. I want to get it off.’ He seemed surprised and reached for the tool which doctors wear around their necks. He was about to apply it to my chest when I said in a whisper: ‘Ne faîtes pas ça’. – ‘don’t do that. I have something to say.’ He leaned forward. I then added: ‘Doctor, the sisters think that I am going to die. I am not. I have found my formula. I am like the Allied armies. Germany lost the war when she failed to win the first battle of the Marne. From that hour onwards there were moments when the tide ran strongly against the Allies but they won. I shall have a hard time getting well. My Battle of the Marne was won when my constitution stood that first onslaught. I shall recover.30 While Crabitès was coming to terms with his first accident, he developed a formula that was to sustain him through hard times and give him hope, writing as

29 Crabitès, “The Struggle of a Monopede,” 7. 30 Ibid., 9.

219 a hobby. Crabitès became convinced that his only hope of recovering from this episode was to create a backup plan: All men should evolve a formula whenever a difficulty besets them. A formula is as necessary to sustained effort as it is to practical chemistry. Most business houses have a slogan. So have political parties. When I say that I worked out a formula shortly after the streetcar got the better of my foot and another, later on, all that I mean is that I chose a slogan for myself.31 Eventually, he settled on a motto. No longer would he merely put pen to paper as a hobby, rather to publish. The thought of finding homes for his articles instilled him with optimism and resiliency. His initial depression abated as Crabitès turned to writing again in an effort to uplift his spirits. Within two weeks of his hospital stay, he composed a piece titled “It is time for a Catholic President?” and published it in the Outlook on 17 August 1927. Locating a home for one of his papers, Crabitès was again filled with hope. Crabitès took the long road to recovery. He remained in the Catholic hospital for five months and finally was allowed to leave on 6 November. During that the time, he rehabilitated his shriveled leg. As he was immobilized for much of the time that he spent in the hospital, writing satiated Crabitès’s appetite for intellectual endeavors. Crabitès began composing articles for publication at a rapid pace, eventually achieving success in such journals as the North American Review, Virginia Quarterly, Journal of the American Bar Association, Commonwealth, Catholic World, and Muslim World. Crabitès continued his correspondence with many of his contacts back home in the United States. He intended to employ these contacts to assist him in obtaining a diplomatic position. Crabitès exchanged letters with Oscar W. Underwood before the congressman’s death in 1929. Underwood served in both the House of Representatives and the Senate while representing Alabama and was also the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. Underwood thought that Crabitès showed promise as a writer and recommended that he

31 Ibid., 8.

220 abandon his judgeship on the Mixed Courts, stating, “I think John Davis is right about your ability as a writer. I know that you are a good judge and an eminent one, but I believe that you have a great field open to you with your pen as you have ever found on the bench.”32 Often disagreeing, the two men contested the production and consumption of Sudanese cotton.33 Crabitès went so far in this discussion as to compose an article on the subject. Crabitès also communicated with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., grandson of Henry Cabot Lodge, the political adversary of Theodore Roosevelt. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was first a representative in the legislature of Massachusetts and later a senator representing Massachusetts in Washington D.C. The two debated the situation in Palestine, including the League of Nations as well as the proposal to partition Palestine. Lodge wanted Palestine removed from then Turkish and Muslim domination: “My own view about Palestine has been stated repeatedly, and that is that it should be taken from Turkey and the Moslems and for the Jews and Christians.”34 Taking stock of his situation allowed Crabitès to reflect upon his life. His injuries reminded him that he was maturing, although he was unwilling to accept it. He still felt young and was unenthusiastic about aging, exclaiming, I look around at my contemporaries out here in Egypt. I note that their hair is growing thinner and either whiter or suspiciously blacker. I see lines in their faces. Their teeth often strike me as being of distressing symmetry. I say nothing when I observe all of this. I simply lean on my stick a little harder and whisper to myself: ‘You do not get along as fast as you did when you first came to Cairo, and you have changed a great deal in appearance since then. Your accidents did that. Your age has nothing to do with it. You are still young.35 Greater Sovereignty

32 Letter, Mss. 73-85, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 33 Ibid. 34 Letter, Mss. 73-85, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 35 Crabitès, “Struggle of a Monopede,” 10-11.

221 Ever since King Fuad gained precedence over the Wafdists by dismissing them and issuing a new constitution, negotiations between Egypt and Great Britain remained on the shelf. Sir Miles Lampson became the high commissioner in 1934. He persuaded King Fuad to reinstate the old, 1923 Constitution and promote free elections, thus including the Wafd Party in the government and providing for the British to resume dialogue.36 The Italian occupation of Ethiopia and Libya encouraged Anglo-Egyptian discussions in 1936. Egyptians feared that World War II would be a replay of World War I, threatening their independence the way it did when it became home to foreign troops and the logistical base for the Gallipoli campaign. The British, on the other hand, wanted a guarantee on their strategic interests in the region, so when the pro-Axis Fuad died, his son Faruq succeeded him and resumed talks. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty called for British troops to remain in the Suez Canal zone for twenty years, and the British agreed to recognize Egyptian sovereignty and facilitate the end of the Capitulations.37 An American Proposal for Greater Representation on the Mixed Courts Concerned with Anglo-Egyptian dominance over the Mixed Courts, the United States pressed for more parity in the courts. Eight years after Jasper Y. Brinton replaced Judge Tuck on the Court of Appeals, the Department of State in March of 1929, sought the appointment of more American judges to the Mixed Courts in order to counteract the predominance of pro-British judges. In May if 1926, Dr. Morton Howell attempted to block the promotion of a British successor to Judge Booth. Howell insisted that the British must adhere to the principle that no one country could have a dominant influence over the courts.38 The charter for the Mixed Courts called for equal representation from the Capitulatory Powers on the courts. Great Britain had a total of seven judges on the Mixed Courts, whereas the United States only had three judges. The British argued that they actually followed the policy of equal representation until 1914 with the proclamation of the British protectorate over Egypt. At that time, two

36 Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 63. 37 Ibid., 64. 38 Public Record Office Document J391/56/16: To Lord Lloyd in London, 2 February 1929.

222 British, one French, and one Italian judge filled the vacancies in the Mixed Courts following the departure of German and Austrian judges. The British also stated that in 1920, two more British judges had received seats on the Mixed Courts in an effort to compensate for the loss of Russian representation as well. 39 The British reminded the Americans, “These comparatively recent departures from the principle of equal representation were noted by the American Government but no formal objections were made to the Egyptian or Allied Governments.”40 Confidential correspondence between the Residency in Cairo and the Foreign Office in London indicate that the British actually reasoned that they should have a disproportionate representation on the Mixed Courts for two reasons: First, the British had a much larger community in Egypt, and second, they contended that as they were the ones who had the protectorate over Egypt, thus they should stand to gain from this and exercise a greater influence over the courts.41 Franklin Mott Gunther, American Minister in Cairo, declared, It is obvious that the representation of the United States on the Mixed Courts is not commensurate with its position as a principal capitulatory power or in accordance with the principle of equality . . . The other three principal capitulatory powers are each represented by a greater number of judges than is the United States, and half of the lesser capitulatory powers have an equal representation.42 The British resisted this maneuver: “To support the Belgian and Greeks claims to first instance appointments and the Appeal posts will probably go to France, Italy and Switzerland, there does not appear to be any immediate possibility of satisfying American desires.”43 In order to assure greater American presence on the Mixed Courts, the State Department called for Crabitès’s promotion to the Court of Appeals and for

39 Public Record Office Document J95/756/16: Letter to the Royal Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1929. 40 Ibid. 41 Public Record Office Document J3291/85/16: From Peterson in Cairo to the Foreign Office in London. 18 November 1931. 42 Public Record Office Document J95/756/16: Letter to the Royal Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1929. 43 Public Record Office Document J391/56/16: To Lord Lloyd in London, 2 February 1929.

223 another American to replace him on the Court of First Instance in Cairo.44 During a Cairo tea party, Franklin Mott Gunther, American Minister to Egypt, and First Secretary Mr. Wadsworth, approached Arthur J. Booth, British Judicial Advisor to Egypt. Mr. Wadsworth told Booth that in the event that the Mixed Courts adopted a five-judge chamber, the United States should be assured one of those positions.45 The British judicial advisor to Egypt replied that while he recognized that the United States was one of the Great Powers, that did not guarantee her more positions on the Mixed Courts, for there was also Egyptian opinion to consider. Franklin Mott Gunther made a case for Judge Crabitès’s claim to the next available seat based on his merit and seniority. The judicial advisor believed that past American nominees had not been of the highest quality. Rather than dealing directly with his anti-British opinions, the British once again assailed Crabitès’s credibility and competence as a judge to frustrate any attempt at his appointment. This was obviously a disingenuous argument since other British judges on the Mixed Courts had stated on record that Crabitès was a judge of the highest caliber. Booth explained that although he was personally fond of Crabitès and had heard the high commissioner had a similar inclination, he would have to examine Crabitès’s history, as well as the high court’s opinion of the judge. Mr. Wadsworth regarded Sir M. Amos’s opposition to Crabitès’s promotion in 1921 as a matter of his politics rather than merit. Mr. Wadsworth insisted that these objections to Crabitès were no longer relevant; however, Booth countered, “I believe we had more than once suspected the hand of Crabitès in incidents which had caused us irritation.”46 The judicial advisor concluded that the United States was more likely to realize a new post on a Court of First Instance. To try and placate American opinion, the British proposed elevating more Americans to

44 State Department Doc. 883.05/293: From Kellogg, Department of State, to American Legation, Cairo, 8 March 1929. 45 Public Record Office Document J1393/398/16: From Judicial Advisor Sir Austen Chamberlain to the High Commissioner in Cairo, 20 May 1926. 46 Ibid.

224 the Courts of First Instance. This, of course, did not satisfy the American minister. It troubled the Americans that the British were willing to nominate M. Houriet to the Court of Appeals, who was from Switzerland, a non-capitulatory nationality and yet be so intransigent in their stance against Crabitès. The State Department declared that the British should heed their original proposal of elevating one American to the highest court and filling the vacancy with another American, “A failure to recognize this principle so far as the United States is concerned in the forthcoming appointments to the Mixed Courts of Appeal and First Instance will inevitably produce an unfortunate impression upon this government.”47 That same year, Franklin Delano Roosevelt nominated Crabitès as the American commissioner to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1929. Crabitès’s job was to “create a standing board to which may be referred, either by Egypt or the United States, any questions of importance to either or both nations.”48 Finally, on 6 August 1929, the British and Egyptians resolved the British occupation and replaced it with a military alliance. Egypt joined the League of Nations and the Sudan returned to the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. Judge Molostvoff died in December of 1930, and the British judicial advisor again passed over Crabitès for promotion to the Court of Appeals and instead appointed Italian Judge Vincenzo Falqui Cao, Vice President of the Court of First Instance at Cairo, to the Court of Appeals. At the time, Crabitès was President of the Cairo Court of First Instance.49 The nomination of Judge Vincenzo Falqui Cao was not the traditional manner in which judges were elevated to the Court of Appeals. Normally, judges received promotion based on seniority. Crabitès had already been overlooked in 1921, when Jasper Y. Brinton succeeded Judge Tuck to the Court of Appeals. Later Judge Peter, the Swiss

47 State Department Doc. 883.05/293: From Kellogg, Department of State, to American Legation, Cairo. March. 8, 1929. This is a letter from Franklin Mott Gunther, American Minister to Cairo, to Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 18 April 1929. 48 Newspaper Clipping, Mss. 73-85, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 49 State Department Doc. 883.05/378: From American Legation in Cairo to Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. 29 December 1930.

225 president of the secondary Mansourah Court of First Instance, accepted the appointment to the Court of Appeals.50 This was the third time that Crabitès had been ignored while other, less senior men received promotion over him to the court of last resort. This injustice compelled Crabitès to rethink his position on the Mixed Courts. He considered retiring from the courts and taking up a job as an arbitrator instead.51 A letter from the American Legation in Cairo to the secretary of state explained British inequity towards Crabitès, “In the recent election of December 10, last, there does, however, appear to have been clear discrimination against Judge Crabitès who, following Judge Molostvoff’s death, was the senior member of the bench.”52 The letter goes on to state, This explanation is, however, so obviously unnecessary and so void of pertinency when it is considered that in 1921 Judge Crabitès was also proposed for appointment to the Upper Court that it may be that there is some truth in a second suggested explanation. This letter harps back to the old rumor of alleged intrigues in which Judge Crabitès is said to have indulged in an endeavor to have himself appointed to the Court of Appeals, to his supposed anti-British attitude during and since the time of the British Protectorate when the British government proposed the reorganization of the Mixed Courts.53 No evidence has surfaced concerning Crabitès’s alleged plots to secure a seat on the Court of Appeals. In the appointment process from 1917 to 1921, Crabitès argued in favor of his nomination by composing articles to the State Department. He enlisted the support of congressmen from his home state of Louisiana, including Senator Ransdell and Congressman Dupré. Crabitès also turned to Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York for assistance. The American government brought forth the issue of equal representation on the Mixed Courts once more in 1931. Perhaps this was a reaction to Crabites’s snub for the Court of Appeals in 1930. Regardless, the Americans

50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.

226 again pressed the British for greater representation on the courts. American Minister W.M. Jardine approached Percy Lorraine, High Commissioner, to rectify this discrimination. Jardine’s greatest argument in favor of a balanced court dealt with the recognition that France, Italy, and Belgium had in the past agreed to stand fast against any British encroachment on their rights relating to the Mixed Courts. Jardine believed that during the time that these countries stood tall against any diminution of their power, American influence suffered. Jardine told the High Commissioner that if the Latin Countries organized to preserve their rights, so too should the Anglo-Saxon countries since they shared many of the same principles.54 This subject stressed relations between the United States and Great Britain. In fact, Percy Loraine went on record as having said, “Further remarks by Mr. Jardine led me to suspect that generally speaking the bearings of Americo-Egyptian relations were rather overheated.”55 In his conversations with the American minister, Loraine regurgitated an earlier contention of Arthur J. Booth, former British judicial advisor to Egypt, that American judges were of inferior ability, “As to the quality of American judges, I said that this had not generally been very high.”56 Loraine qualified this statement, “I was not thinking of Judge Crabitès or Judge Wright (the last American citizen appointed) but of the general run of Americans who had held posts.”57 Ultimately, the British considered it an inopportune time to put forth an American candidate for the next vacancy. First, the next post had been already promised to an Austrian. Second, Loraine believed that by pledging the next post to an American, Judicial Advisor Booth, would be placed in a dishonest and untenable position. Finally, Booth alleged that it would be difficult for the Americans to produce a high quality candidate.58 In a letter to Abdel Fattah

54 Public Record Office Document J3531/85/16: From Percy Loraine, British High Commissioner to Egypt, to Sir John A. Simon, M.P., in London, 30 November 1931. 55 Public Record Office Document J3531/85/16: From Percy Loraine, British High Commissioner to Egypt, to Sir John A. Simon, M.P., in London, 15 December 1931. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

227 Yehia Pasha, Royal Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jardine expressed the penultimate American decision, Under the circumstances the Government of the United States of America can not accept the statement of the Royal Egyptian Government of June, 1931, as a convincing or satisfactory reply to its repeated representations on this subject. Animated as it is, however, by the friendliest sentiments toward the Royal Egyptian Government, the United States will refrain at this time from continuing to press its point of view.59 The British were disinclined to permit Crabitès to reach the Court of Appeals. In a Foreign Office circular titled “Personalities in Egypt,” the British described Crabitès as a thorn in their side, especially during the war. The circular stated that Crabitès “was the author of a remarkable judgment at the outbreak of the war misinterpreting certain emergency legislation. The execution of this judgment had to be arbitrarily refused, apparently under martial law, and Judge Crabitès has not forgotten the Incident.” 60 However, the British did acknowledge his capabilities: He has done his work conscientiously as a judge and has a quick mind and considerable intellectual ability. He is not, however, always sound in decision. He is inclined to minor mischief-making, and has at times been suspected of being behind inconvenient representations made by various American Ministers.61 The British did affirm the importance of his intellectual contributions, recognizing his works in prominent journals on subjects regarding Egypt and the Sudan. The British thought that his arguments in these periodicals demonstrated his anti- British proclivities: “On one occasion at least he has had to be remonstrated with on account of his adverse reflections on British policy in Egypt.”62 Although the

59 Public Record Office Document J3359/32/16: From W.M. Jardine in Cairo to Abdel Fattah Yehia Pasha, Royal Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cairo. 2 December 1932. 60 Public Record Office Document J436/235/16: “Personalities in Egypt.” From Mr. Yencken in Cairo. 5 February 1934. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.

228 circular conceded that he was a likeable man, the British regarded him as a troublemaker more concerned with appeasing the Egyptians.63 To cope with this latest disappointment, Crabitès composed an article dealing with the effect of British control over the Mixed Courts. In an exposé submitted to William M. Jardine, American Minister to Egypt, Crabitès addressed the issue of parity on the Mixed Courts. He maintained that British dominance had altered the Mixed Courts to such an extent that they were neither mixed nor international but Anglo-Egyptian in character.64 There was not equal representation on the courts that the charter of the Mixed Courts had intended, and the effects could be experienced throughout Egypt. Crabitès conceded that Great Britain had an entitlement to a greater number of judges on the Mixed Courts because they had a greater stake in Egypt. It was difficult for him to accept that France and Italy both had more judges on the courts than the United States. He felt that an American should be appointed to the Court of Appeals, thus ensuring the United States of a representation on par with the other Great Powers.65 Judges of the Mixed Courts Sue the Egyptian Government for Compensation in Gold By 1931 the Great Depression was in full swing. Not only were markets in a deep recession in America, but much of the rest of the world as well. Judges on the Mixed Courts were anxious about their salaries and pensions during this period of apprehension and instability. Great Britain began paying the salaries of foreign judges in depreciated Egyptian currency, rather than gold. The foreign judges voiced concern over this new practice and wished to have their salaries and pensions paid in gold.66 Crabitès worried about the tension over the judges and their salaries. He realized the implications in the matter, for if the judges brought suit, the case

63 Ibid. 64 State Department Doc. 883.05/379: From Pierre Crabitès in Cairo to William Jardine, American Minister to Egypt, Cairo, Egypt. 31 January 1931. 65 State Department Doc. 883.05/382: From Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington D.C. 9 April 1931. 66 State Department Doc. 883.05/425: From William Jardine, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 19 December 1931.

229 would fall under the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts; and how could the judges hand down an impartial ruling on their own case? Crabitès was apprehensive that the Egyptian government would react unfavorably, should the judges rule in favor of payment in gold. He sought to avoid the government enforcing its will upon the Mixed Courts and said, “The policy of the United States has always been to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. This principle is menaced by the doubt which persists in regard to the basic value of my salary and pension.”67 The British shared many of the same concerns as Crabitès. For example, they took issue with submitting such a case before the Mixed Courts. Ronald Campbell, an assistant to the high commissioner, wrote in a letter to British M.P. Sir John A. Simon, “The question at issue is essentially one for decision by a court of law and it would be sufficiently embarrassing at any time that recourse to the only competent court should be barred by the circumstances that the judges of that court are interested parties.”68 The Residency in Cairo feared instigating Egyptian nationalists. Campbell explained his reservations regarding nationalist sentiment, “The whole question has caused me some anxiety in view of the obvious risk that it might prejudice Egyptian sentiment against the Mixed Courts.”69 Campbell’s intuition was correct, for Sa’ad Zaghloul and the Wafd Party protested the proposed changes to the judges’ salaries and pensions. Al- Ahram called for the abolition of the Mixed Courts, arguing that its judges were incapable of rendering unbiased decisions.70 As negotiations between the Egyptian government and the judges of the Mixed Courts persisted another two years, Crabitès understood the difficult situation in which the Egyptian government found itself. In February of 1933, the Mixed Court of First Instance at Cairo ruled that Egypt must pay the public debt’s interest in gold, a decision which aroused a hostile reaction from Egyptians in

67 Ibid. 68 Public Record Office Document J3691/3691/16: From Ronald Campbell at the Residency in Cairo to Sir John A. Simon M.P. in London. 19 December 1931. 69 Ibid. 70 Public Record Office Document J1639/92/16: Memorandum respecting the Egyptian press from May 26 to June 1, 1932. Cairo. 13 June 1932.

230 opposition to the Mixed Courts.71 The Capitulatory Powers expected the Egyptian government to provide monetary relief to the judges of the Mixed Courts whose salaries were directly affected by the drop in value of the Egyptian currency.72 This decision did not sit well with Egyptians, and nationalist sentiment prevailed. Egyptians already considered these expatriate judges overpaid. Now they perceived the judges on the Mixed Courts as foreigners unconcerned with their present plight. Crabitès changed his earlier views to payment in gold for the judges. He recognized the ramifications of calling for payments in gold while the remainder of Egypt suffered. He agreed with American Minister to Egypt William M. Jardine on the difficulty of asking for gold instead of the Egyptian pound, while Jardine thought the best course of action was to wait until the world’s financial situation improved.73 Crabitès reasoned that the insistence of the Mixed Courts for compensation could only result in the embarrassment of the Mixed Courts as an institution, and the humiliation of the Egyptian government.74 On 15 February 1933, the general assembly of the Mixed Courts accepted an earlier proposal from the Minister of Justice, calling for compensation of those judges where the value of the Egyptian currency dropped over ten percent in relation to their native countries’ currency.75 Remuneration for these judges came in the form of payment for the difference between the two currencies, but only for one-third of their total salary. It must be noted, however, that the Egyptian government was averse to any compensation of the judges of the Mixed Courts; their salaries, even in a depreciated state, were greater than those of their counterparts in, for example, the United States and France.76 The Egyptian government backed out of this agreement, refusing to compensate the judges of the Mixed Courts.

71 State Department Doc. 883.05/481: From William Jardine, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 5 June 1933. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid.

231 A year later in 1934, Crabitès attempted to bridge the gap between the Egyptian government and the judges on the Mixed Courts. His primary concern was the reputation of the Mixed Courts, and to this end he felt that those judges presently representing these courts should not have their cases adjudicated in the Mixed Courts because it would compromise the integrity of the court system. Crabitès insisted that a decision rendered by the judges on the Mixed Courts regarding their own welfare, “would shock Egyptian public opinion and bring the administration of justice in Egypt into disrepute,” so these judges should “recuse themselves.”77 Instead, the judges on the Mixed Courts should file suit against the Egyptian government in the World Court in the Hague, the Netherlands. He added that judges on the Mixed Courts who had already retired, could bring suit against the Egyptian government in the Mixed Courts. Abdul Futtouh Just a couple of months later in April of 1934, Crabitès ruled against a parquet agent of the Mixed Courts, Ismail Abdul Fettouh.78 Crabitès was a colleague and good friend of Fettouh. After handing down his decision, Crabitès turned to his good friend and told him that he should file suit in the “Native Courts,” where he could receive a more favorable result. A reporter for Al-Ahram overheard the conversation and published it on 21 April 1934.79 The report caused an uproar within the Egyptian judicial community. Those related to Egyptian justice considered their dignity slighted by Crabitès’s comments. President of the Court of Cassation Abdel Aziz Fahmi Pasha immediately took up the cause on behalf of the Egyptians, calling for an investigation into the matter. According to the 24 April 1934, issue of Al-Ahram: Judge Crabitès apologized to the Parquet Agent and to the President of the Mixed Court, saying that he was talking to the Parquet Agent as a colleague and friend, and that he was only joking with him out of court,

77 State Department Doc. 883.05/496: Copy of a letter by Pierre Crabitès, transmitted by Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 14 January 1934. 78 A parquet agent is a public prosecutor. 79 Al-Ahram 24 April 1934. Al-Ahram 9 May 1934.

232 and that he never intended to touch the dignity of the Egyptian justice which he honors and respects.80 This was obviously an embarrassing and humiliating experience for Crabitès. His credibility as a jurist had been called into question. The episode tarnished his reputation amongst his colleagues. In a letter to Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, Crabitès pleaded his case. He argued that he did not criticize the “Native Courts” nor did he make an aspersion concerning the Egyptian judges’ integrity. Attempting to help the American minister better understand his position, Crabitès said, I am very fond of Aboul Fettouh. He is a nephew of Moustafa Neguib Bey, a close friend of mine. He is also the nephew (by marriage) of the Prime Minister, with whom my relations have been friendly but not intimate for over twenty years. It hurt me to decide the case against Aboul Fettouh. I wanted him to feel that his defeat was more apparent than real.81 Crabitès did acknowledge that his comments; however, he was reluctant to accept total blame for the unfortunate situation, stating, It is an outrage that the nephew of the Prime Minister should seek to bring before the Mixed Courts a controversy with an Egyptian which has nothing to do with the Italian’s claim. Why are our Courts attacked when the Prime Minister’s nephew tries to force us to pass upon his case? Tell Ismail to go before his own Judges. He’s not an ordinary litigant who may be excused for attempting to force his case upon us. He’s the nephew of the Prime Minister. I like the boy. His uncle is my close friend. I mean Moustafa Neguib Bey. I’ve gone into his case far enough to see that he may perhaps win it. Don’t let him be downhearted because he has not win his suit before us.82 It appears to have been the Egyptian judges on the “Native Courts” who saw Crabitès’s remarks as insulting, not necessarily the Egyptian government. King

80 Ibid. 81 State Department Doc. 883.05/507: From Pierre Crabitès in Zamalik, Cairo, to Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, Cairo. 27 April 1934. 82 Ibid.

233 Fuad accepted Crabitès’s version of the events and said, “I have implicit confidence in him and that I know perfectly well, before I read this memorandum, that he had not said anything such as was imputed to him.”83 Crabitès next visited with the prime minister, hoping to reconcile his views with him. He met with Abdul Fettouh Pasha on 23 April, where he explained to the prime minister that the root of the problem lay not with him or the Mixed Courts but with those attempting to take advantage of the system in place in Egypt for their own benefit. He hated the position that these unscrupulous people had placed the Mixed Courts. Crabitès informed Abdul Fettouh Pasha, That it was outrageous that the “Bank Misr,” Egypt’s biggest financial institution, daily resorted to all kinds of pretexts, to bring its suits before the Mixed Courts, and that it was deplorable that families established in this country for 4 or 5 generations adopted all kinds of subterfuges to get their cases before us. I referred to the fact that it was scandalous that rich Copts and Syrians descended to all kinds of tricks to get foreign protection.84 He was referring to the sale of berats, where the status of a protected citizen was sold to non-Muslim Egyptians so that they could take advantage of the Capitulations, although it was unlikely that this practice continued in the twentieth century as it had earlier. Abdul Fettouh Pahsa, too, animadverted the Mixed Courts. He had offered his resignation to King Fuad many times in the past, citing dissatisfaction with the Mixed Courts and the controversy surrounding them as reasons for his willingness to leave.85 King Fuad persuaded Abdul Fettouh Pasha to remain as the prime minister. Crabitès continued explaining his problems to the prime minister, I find these conditions revolting, you should fight this state of mind, not the Capitulations. If you do away with this scandal your Capitulations will not disappear over night. Your problem is an internal one; not an external

83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 State Department Doc. 883.05/508: From Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 18 May 1934.

234 one. It was because I feel so strongly on this point that I spoke so frankly to your nephew’s friend. What I told him I have repeatedly proclaimed. I do not fear an investigation. I welcome it. It is only because I do not want to embarrass you, we have been friends for twenty years, that I am willing to see the matter dropped.86 His comments in court that day were not intended to attack the integrity of the judges on the Native Courts. Subsequently, Crabitès met with Egyptian Minister of Justice Muhammad Ali Pasha. His relationship with Muhammad Ali Pasha was a friendly one, going back to 1912 when Crabitès was a colleague of the minister’s father.87 Crabitès maintained that he never offered an apology for his actions and said, “Mohd [Muhammad] Aly was almost apologetic in his tone,” for the injustice Crabitès had suffered.88 All parties involved promptly dropped the matter. By the summer of 1934, there was an active debate in Egypt concerning the fate of the Mixed Courts. The Egyptian press essentially stoked the fire lit by the president of the Court of Cassation when he said that the “Native Courts” should assume the jurisdiction of all courts in Egypt and adjudicate for all in Egypt under one court. The Egyptian press struck a chord in all Egyptians, including the Egyptian judges on the Mixed Courts, who were expressing Egyptian nationalism in their own way. There were two issues which the Egyptian press seized upon, Egyptian precedence in the Mixed Courts, and Arabic as the primary language of the courts. While these might have been popular causes, considering local Egyptian sentiment, the foreign community was understandably concerned.89 Before deciding what to do with the courts, King Fuad wanted to wait until he learned of the high commissioner’s thoughts regarding the two Egyptian proposals to alter the courts. High Commissioner Miles Lampson had only been

86 State Department Doc. 883.05/507: From Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 9 May 1934. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 State Department Doc. 883.05/509: From Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 24 May 1934.

235 in Egypt for a short while and had not adequately familiarized himself with the controversy surrounding the Mixed Courts. He was more concerned with other English affairs in Egypt at the time. Therefore, the king endeavored to postpone his decision concerning the future of the Mixed Courts.90 Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, felt that the Egyptian judges had a good argument regarding their precedence over chambers, for they definitely possessed the qualifications for the job, unlike half a century before when the Mixed Courts relied on the competence of foreign judges to supervise chambers. According to Fish, “This opportunity was lost by the crude and ill-bred methods the Egyptian judges adopted, and especially their threat to strike if their demands were not accepted.”91 Fish reasoned that the case made by the Egyptian judges in favor of Arabic as the primary language of the Mixed Courts was less practical than the case to have Egyptian judges head chambers. The Mixed Courts required a language that all the judges and attorneys could speak, and since French was the lingua franca of Egypt, it was clear that it should be the main language used in the courts. Foreign judges on the Mixed Courts perceived the Egyptian judges’ attempt to establish Arabic as the language of the courts as a nationalist effort; however, that was not the real reason that the foreign judges disapproved of Arabic. Many judges did not actually possess a fluency in Arabic, so their opinion resulted more out of practicality rather than partisanship.92 The judges were also concerned that should Arabic be instituted they would lose their jobs. Fish declared of the Egyptian judges’ behavior, The threat of a strike and the insistence on the Arabic language prove conclusively that however great the learning of the native judges may be, they obviously still lack some important moral qualities. Foremost among them would seem to be a judicial and calm restraint in the face of a

90 State Department Doc. 883.05/508: From Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 18 May 1934. 91 State Department Doc. 883.05/509: From Bert Fish, American Minister to Egypt, to the Secretary of State. 24 May 1934. 92 Ibid.

236 political controversy, calling for the subordination of personal views and ambitions in the interest of justice and of the public.93 Fish felt strongly about the situation, and these heated words show his opinion on the controversy. The British felt similarly on the subject. Judicial Advisor Booth argued that while the Egyptians had the right to use Arabic, as it was one of the official languages of the Mixed Courts, the British and Italians had a similar right to use their native tongues, but they abstained from doing so in the interest of maintaining continuity.94 The British believed that the use of Arabic in judgments was purely political in character and meant to stir up Egyptian nationalism. What could be more classically nationalistic than language? The very fact that they knew denying Arabic the position would stir up nationalistic feelings shows that nationalism played a major part- and they knew it, even if they denied it.

93 Ibid. 94 Public Record Office Document E2279/955/91: From Judicial Advisor Arthur J. Booth to the Residency, Cairo. 19 April 1934.

237 CHAPTER 8- TAKING OFF THE ROBE

Return to the USA: 1935-1942 Leaving Egypt for Home Crabitès realized that the British would never permit him to reach the Court of Cassation. They restricted his advancement; meanwhile, the Depression had greatly reduced his salary. He had suffered humiliation just a few years earlier at the hands of the Egyptian press and his fellow Egyptian judges. After the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936, Crabitès must have sensed that the Mixed Courts would be phased out. It was time for him to pursue an alternate future course. This treaty provided for greater Egyptian control over domestic issues and a timetable for Britain to pull out of Egypt. Crabitès desperately desired a position within the State Department, but he had damaged his prospects by authoring an article railing against American treatment of the Foreign Service. In an article titled “The Wage of the American Diplomatist,” Crabitès condemned the lack of support that American diplomats received from their own country. This article, published in Catholic World¸ certainly did not endear him to the American Foreign Service community in Washington D.C. The impact of this article is not known, although it was published during a period of debate over Foreign Service reform. Crabitès insisted that the United States required an efficient diplomatic corps, which could only be achieved with proper funding. According to Crabitès, European states handsomely paid their Foreign Service officers, whereas the United States believed that a diplomatic career was attractive not for its monetary reward but for its cultural advantages and opportunity to take part in public service.1 Crabitès maintained that American diplomats could not be expected to entertain without a proper pecuniary compensation, “It takes money and experience to maintain both bibulous tendencies and an equilibrium. To meet

1 Pierre Crabitès, “The Wage of the American Diplomatist,” Catholic World 130 (1930): 405.

238 these conditions European nations grant post allowances and establish entertainment funds.”2 Crabitès debated whether the United States could recruit the best Foreign Service officers in the absence of an adequate salary commensurate with the private sector. In comparison, not only did Europe remunerate their Foreign Service officers better than the United States, but they also accorded them more prestige than their American counterparts.3 Crabitès resolved to leave Egypt and resigned from his post in June of 1936. He provided no other reason for his resignation from the Mixed Courts than a “desire to be among my own people.”4 The members of the Mixed Courts promptly extended their regrets at losing such a valued member of the judiciary.5 At the time, he had really wanted a Foreign Service position. After enlisting the support of American policy makers to assist him with obtaining a diplomatic job, their efforts could not secure him that much sought after post. Instead, he accepted a position with the school of law at Louisiana State University as a special lecturer in and legal history.6 Before returning home to his native state, Crabitès first traveled to Europe. His son Henry was already home in New Orleans with his daughter-in-law and his two granddaughters, Frederica and Margaret Crabitès.7 In July of 1936, Crabitès and his wife Charlotte boarded the SS Marco Polo and sailed for Europe. They went to Italy, Czechoslovakia, and England before heading home in August. When the Crabitès’s arrived in Baton Rouge, they lived in the King Hotel before he began teaching at Louisiana State University in September. The Montreux Convention That same year, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Crabitès to be the American representative to the Montreux Convention. He was part of a

2 Ibid., 406. 3 Ibid., 407. 4 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-88, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 5 Al-Ahram, 2 June 1936. Mss.73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 6 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-88, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 7 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

239 delegation which resolved to phase out the Mixed Courts and transfer their authority to the Egyptian government over a period of twelve years.8 The Mixed Courts’ last day of operation was 15 October 1949. After that day, all persons appearing before the law, regardless of their nationality, would have to go through the Egyptian National Courts. The Montreux Convention also brought the Capitulations to an end, a decision which received widespread support in Egypt. The Capitulations had been a polemic issue instigating nationalist sentiment. Speaking Tour After returning home, Crabitès traveled the South, Midwest, and Northeast on the Rotary Club lecture circuit. Before the Rotary Club recruited Crabitès, he had spoken to audiences in Louisiana, where he commanded packed halls and auditoriums. In his addresses, Crabitès concentrated on his specialty, foreign affairs, but he also spoke on hot topics of local interest, such as the Nazi and Fascist threat, Jews, and African-Americans. Local newspapers reported many of his talks.9 The Depression In late 1936, Crabitès thought that the American economy was recovering, so he believed that was no need to jumpstart the economy through government spending, thus providing the millions of unemployed Americans with jobs. Instead, Crabitès felt that the United States should create a solid foundation for peaceful employment. This view was not so unusual at the time. By 1937, however, Crabitès altered his original analysis regarding the Depression. He advocated Roosevelt’s policies towards the Depression, which called for heavy government expenditures to infuse the economy with much needed assistance, otherwise known as Keynesian Economics. Crabitès argued that America did not have to adopt foreign ideologies to solve its fiscal troubles,

8 Letter from Pierre Crabitès to Secretary of State , 24 February 1937, Mss. 73-2, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 9 This chapter will rely on newspaper reports to better understand the subjects of Crabitès lectures, specifically the Nazi and Fascist threat, Jews, and African-Americans. The texts to his speeches do not survive.

240 We can and we will find an American solution, but it is first essential that we recognize the fact that there is sickness in the body politic, that there is a moral cancer which requires some kind of surgery. The old laissez faire attitude toward economics is gone. We must be up and doing.10 He was a proponent of government intervention. To demonstrate his point that the United States required an American answer to an American problem, Crabitès emphasized that Britain and France were drifting towards socialism to cope with the Depression, meanwhile Germany and Italy had turned to dictatorship to resolve their economic tribulations.11 Red Scare Since 1917, Crabitès had been more concerned with Bolshevism than the Fascist or Nazi menace. Some of the legacies from World War I influenced Crabitès. The period between wars was a time of ethnic and cultural tensions, a time of distrust as well as Americanization. He witnessed the ascension of so- called super-patriots. Americans associated certain groups with the enemy, who were most often Germans, socialists, and communists. Super-patriots controlled the Committee on Public Information, and after World War I, American super- patriotism turned from the German to the Bolshevik threat. Americans perceived the Bolsheviks as German agents ever since the Revolution came to terms with the Germans at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and pulled out of the war. The ensuing Red Scare affected Crabitès: “America should fear both the disintegration of democracy and the inroads of Communism more than the other ‘isms’, and avoid war because current ills could lead to the chaos in Russia, Germany, and Italy.”12 Crabitès thought that the period after a war was often succeeded by inept decision-making. According to Crabitès, the United States had changed a great deal since World War I; therefore, it needed to be vigilant lest these two new influences, infiltrate the American people and government. Crabitès attributed Europe’s problems neither to Nazism nor Fascism but to the

10 Shreveport Times, 27 February 1937. Mss.73-89, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 11 Ibid. 12 Newspaper article, Crowley Signal. 15 March, Mss. 73-89, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

241 spread of the Soviet brand of communism, which espoused the international communist revolution and overthrow of Western capitalist democracies.13 He was in many ways sympathetic to King Farouq’s views. African-Americans Crabitès realized the importance of the African-American franchise in elections. Like so many other Americans, Crabitès linked labor and African- Americans with communism. He argued that African-American suffrage was the most threatening issue in America because communism had influenced it.14 Crabitès concluded, “If the Negroes take over the control of the Northern states, they will take over the control of the federal government, and gradually the judicial system of our country.”15 His white, Southern proclivities affected his perception of the world around him during a period when African-Americans were just beginning to demand greater rights. Crabitès feared the African-American vote would become the deciding factor in the power struggle between Democrats and Republicans, as both parties were courting African-Americans: “Before the Hoover administration 45 percent of the voters were Republican and 35 percent Democrats. The remainder was a flying wedge that acted as a balance of power. It is to this flying wedge that the Communists are making their appeal,” clearly referring African-American franchise.16 Crabitès could not overcome the environment in which he was raised, never forgetting Reconstruction which he labeled as “a period of Negro and Carpetbag rule,” and he argued in favor of white supremacy organized through white political unity.17 The Nazi and Fascist Threat The peril of Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy in Europe concerned many Americans. Crabitès’s popularity stemmed partly from the timeliness of his

13 Bogalusa News, 16 October 1936. Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 14 Baton Rouge State Times, 12 January 1939. Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 15 Ibid. 16 Newspaper article, Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 17 Pierre Crabitès, “A White South or Black?” North American Review, Mss. 73-Series III, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

242 main topic, the looming war, but he also provided a unique international perspective on the increasingly dangerous situation in Europe. His yearly tours to Europe prepared him well for his speaking engagements. He traveled often to Italy, France, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. During his visits to Europe, Crabitès collected information for his books and articles. For Crabitès, these trips facilitated a better understanding of the condition of pre-war Europe in the mid-1930s. An acclaimed speaker on the Rotary Club lecture circuit, Crabitès addressed the present conditions in Europe, offering his tips and predictions. His views towards the war developed as the war progressed. Crabitès recalled the foreign entanglements that drew America into World War I and said that the United States must eschew such arrangements. Weary of alliances, he was a stout isolationist during the buildup to war. He thought that the war hysteria was suicidal, and he went to Washington D.C. in order to convince the government to maintain its isolationism and avoid these entanglements.18 To forestall, or even avoid such intervention, Crabitès appealed to the government in Washington D.C. to forgive European debts.19 While he was unwavering in his disapproval of international pacts, he was willing to accept trade treaties. Crabitès remained optimistic that war could be averted early on, provided that the United States remained neutral: “We must make up our minds not to let anything draw us into the maelstrom of European difficulties.”20 He warned that it would require more than just refusing to sell to belligerents in order to avoid war.21 For him, only Roosevelt could manage to keep the United States disentangled from Europe’s coalitions: I am a warm supporter of the policies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and I believe that he is entitled to the undivided support of all Americans in

18 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 19 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 20 Birmingham Post, 9 January 1937. Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 21 Birmingham Post, 15 January 1937. Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

243 regard to the question of foreign policy. I believe in strengthening his hand by letting the world know that the whole American people regardless of politics are backing him as our spokesman on foreign affairs. But I believe that Congress is overstressing the importance of what is generally referred to as neutrality legislation.22 Crabitès predicted that Europe would remain at peace until someone accepted Hitler’s or Mussolini’s challenge, who, in return, must react in order to save face and maintain his job. He sensed that an immediate solution would be disastrous. Rather, the parties involved should pursue a gradual resolution: We should not crowd them too much. We should give Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin a chance to sell their bellicose, militant jargon to the people because their chief desire is the understandable one of wanting to hold office. They’ve got to talk ‘’ to hold their jobs.23 Although he was not entirely convinced that the war was inevitable, after his return home from his European sojourn in the late 30s, Crabitès finally accepted the necessity of preparing for conflict. He was a proponent of increased military spending, but this expenditure should not be the sole means for economic recovery. Crabitès concluded that the United States should distance itself from Great Britain and France because he foresaw Nazi Germany defeating them before America could enter war, forsaking the United States until Hitler brought the war to the shores of America.24 Conversely, should the war come to pass, Crabitès envisioned Hitler and Mussolini neutralizing each other over South Tyrol in Hitler’s drive to unite the Germans. Crabitès held world diplomats accountable for the present predicament in Europe, for they neglected to examine Hitler’s Mein Kampf, where he explained his goal of affecting a lebensraum for all Teutonic peoples: The diplomats of the world have themselves to blame for the present situation. I say this because Hitler in his book put all his cards on the

22 Shreveport Times, 27 February 1937. Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 23 Ibid. 24 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

244 table. That book was written about 1929 and had the diplomats taken the trouble to read it, as was their duty to do, they would have foreseen what has happened.25 Most likely, these views would have infuriated both British and American diplomats. Now that Hitler had achieved power in Germany and sought an anschluss with Austria and the Sudetenland, Crabitès obliged the foreign service to either make provisions in order to endure the looming crisis or acquiesce gracefully: “My dominant feeling is one of complete disgust for the diplomats of the world and particularly for those who wear spats and direct the chancelleries of the great countries of Europe.”26 During his many travels, Crabitès visited many places and met numerous important dignitaries in Europe. Crabitès met and interviewed Edward Beneš, the first president of Czechoslovakia, on numerous occasions. He even came across Adolph Hitler while exiting an elevator in the Atlantic Hotel in Prague.27 Crabitès spent much time in Czechoslovakia from 1929-1936, and as early as 1934, in his biography of Eduard Beneš, Crabitès predicted the present crisis which had the world teetering on the edge of war. In his book, Eduard Beneš: Statesman of Europe, Crabitès attributed much of the hostility in Europe to the racial animosity between Czechs and Germans, “Czech racial pride, instinctive animosity to anything and everything bearing a German label, made itself felt as early as the ninth century. It has smoldered at different times during the past 1000 years, but at no time has it ever been eradicated.”28 He described Hitler as a “madman, a paranoiac, who is a menace to the world.”29 However, Crabitès offered a caveat, “But whatever we may call Hitler, we have to admit that he was intellectually honest. He did lay his cards on the table.”30 Crabitès was confident

25 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 26 Ibid. 27 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 28 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

245 that Beneš could save Europe: “Europe depends today more upon the brain, the tact and the activity of Beneš than upon any other factor.”31 Early on, Crabitès questioned Hitler’s ability to wage war on Great Britain and France. He felt Hitler was only feigning German unification. Crabitès believed Hitler was merely hiding behind a masterful propaganda designed to enhance his prestige. He predicted that Hitler would forfeit power should his propaganda campaign falter. He acknowledged that Hitler’s Nazism was much more than a brilliantly led propaganda machine and a passing fad but was rooted deep within the German psyche. It was too late to restrain Hitler before he grew too formidable.32 Regardless of the direction the United States was taking, Crabitès continued to oppose American entrance into the war: In the domain of international politics we, Americans, are babes-in-the woods. Slogans sweep us off our feet. Propaganda has so unbalanced our sense of the realities of life that we seem determined to fight under the banner of democracy without inquiring whether it is carried by clean hands.33 He was quoted in the Progress, a Left-leaning newspaper, questioning the pro- war and anti-Hitler movement, If we stop and ask ourselves why we are anti-Hitler, I think that most of us will agree that it is his treatment of the Jews which has made us so hostile to him. His unfairness to Protestants and Catholics has confirmed us in this antipathy. It is, nevertheless, his cruelty to the Jews which has made us doubly conscious of his injustice to Christianity.34 For Crabitès, this was the height of hypocrisy, as Britain and France, while opposing Hitler, had been simultaneously courting communist Russia, and anti- Semitic Romania and Poland: “We are hoodwinked by the mask of democracy

31 Ibid. 32 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 33 Progress, 14 July 1939. Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 34 Ibid.

246 worn by London and Paris.”35 He argued against allying with such countries as Britain and France, who were willing to subvert their own democratic principles for the sake of defeating Germany. That Left-wing newspapers were now quoting Crabitès could have been symbolic of a shift in the general tendencies of the American people towards engagement while he remained steadfast in his isolationism. Crabitès reasoned that the crisis in Europe was ultimately an economic one. He maintained that European states were attempting to deal with the Depression by purchasing armaments. He condemned the so called “Merchants of Death,” defense contractors who made a fortune on wars while young men died in battle. Although mobilization may possibly decrease unemployment, Crabitès took this philosophy to its logical conclusion, asking “Why have peace?”36 He speculated that Europe’s statesmen were weary of stabilizing their economies based upon more peaceful means of production: Armament building is filling stomachs. It is cutting down unemployment. It is subsidizing industry and bribing capital. It is creating the resemblance of prosperity which holds politicians in office. We are in a vicious circle. Nobody wants war, but no statesman can take chances on letting the other state get a drop on him. All nations are therefore going about armed to the teeth. They are thereby temporarily averting internal economic collapse. They are afraid to stop arming not merely because they cannot trust one another, but also because if they do not know how to prevent revolutions at home if they throw away their hundreds of thousands of munitions workers into the streets.37 Crabitès assumed that the Germans would never revolt against Hitler so long as Germany remained victorious on the field of battle, for “Nobody deserts a winner.”38 Crabitès asserted that the outcome of the war depended on food

35 Ibid. 36 Newspaper clipping, Progress, 1939. Mss. 73-87, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 37 Ibid. 38 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

247 production. He predicted that Germany had prepared well and would have great endurance for a long war, especially considering her efficient food-rationing. While he recognized that France could feed herself, England was incapable of self-sufficiency. Crabitès believed that Germany’s U-boat campaign was proficient enough to enervate Great Britain’s navy, thus causing a food shortage. Germany, like Japan, neither had enough food nor raw materials for the war, and so Germany must seek new lands, especially in the east. He thought that Russia could not cultivate enough food to assist Germany because she needed it to feed herself.39 Crabitès contended that Mussolini would ally with Germany because she wanted to find herself on the winning side after the war, “Italy’s efficient diplomatic machine will watch the war with undivided attention and when convinced of the winner, is more than likely to find an excuse to pitch in with the victorious side.”40 Crabitès reminded his audiences that Italy had been Germany’s ally during the initial stages of the World War I, only to switch sides and fight against Germany within a year. A believer in the cyclical nature of history, Crabitès predicted this to transpire once again, “Italy has more to gain with the Allies and knows where her bread is buttered.”41 He looked to Italy’s condemnation of Russia’s advance into Finland as evidence that the Italians were shifting their sympathies in favor of the Allied cause. As the war deepened, Crabitès became ever more convinced of the unavoidability of American involvement. By 1938, Crabitès realized the inevitability of American participation in the war. He anticipated that the Americans would enter the war by January 1941, should Germany not have won by that date: “With 90 percent of the American people in sympathy with the Allies, no president will stay out of the war. Roosevelt if he runs and is reelected, will not stand by and see Germany win because this country is not in sympathy with

39 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.

248 Germany.”42 Crabitès escalated his criticism of American decisions leading up to the war, “I consider the repeal of the embargo a hostile act to Germany and, from the point of view of America’s official interpretation of international law, a decision tantamount to a declaration of war by the United States against the German Reich.”43 He insisted that by providing arms to Britain and France and, at the same time, refusing to sell munitions to Germany, the United States “would be guilty of a hostile act toward the belligerent which desired to import munitions of war from the United States.”44 Crabitès stated that the reversal of American policy towards Germany, especially after the outbreak in hostilities, was equivalent to a declaration of war against the Axis.45 Eventually, he abandoned Roosevelt, whom he had previously believed could keep America safe from war, “I heartily approve of giving him the type of legislation which he asserts will keep America out of the war. I disapprove of any action, either positive or negative, which could serve as an alibi for permitting the president to have America drawn into the fighting.”46 Crabitès was one of the many traditional Southern Democrats who deserted Roosevelt over the course of his tenure in office, for they alleged that he had repudiated the long-established Democratic platform: “The president, however, is in a position to create conditions which practically nullify this provision. And I intend no disrespect to the present incumbent when I assert that he is just the type of man and of an executive to brush aside such a constitutional check upon his freedom of action.”47 It was only Pearl Harbor, in December 1941, that changed the minds of many of these isolationists. The Middle East and the War Crabitès’s knowledge of the Middle East certainly influenced his perspective of the region during the buildup to the war. Crabitès argued that neither Great Britain nor France could afford to go to war with Germany with the

42 Ibid. 43 Newspaper clipping, 12 November 1939. Mss. 73-87, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid.

249 situation in Palestine as a potential destabilizer. Instead, they would have to court the Arabs and gain their assistance before going to war.48 This was an opinion not altogether different from the arabists within the British administration of Palestine. It was not just the German military superiority that Great Britain and France should be concerned with but the possibility of an Arab rebellion in the Middle East while England and France were concerned with the Western Front.49 Crabitès declared that Chamberlain was busy placating Arab opinion in the Middle East while reneging on earlier compacts with the Jews; Great Britain simply could not recover from the loss of the Suez and the coveted Red Sea route to India. 50 According to Crabitès, the American public failed to fully comprehend the ramifications of Chamberlain’s task in the Middle East. He had to appease the Arab masses in regard to Palestine and continued Jewish immigration. The White Paper would not come until 1939. Crabitès claimed that the survival of world Jewry was contingent upon the victory of Democracy over Nazism and Fascism, but for Great Britain to have an opportunity to defeat the Germans and Italians and save the Jews, Chamberlain first had to placate the Arabs, regardless of the immediate effect upon Jewish immigration to Palestine.51 Essentially, the Jews of Palestine had to temporarily sacrifice their present rate of immigration because it was antagonizing the Arabs, who would have to cooperate with the Allies in order to win the war.52 Pragmatic Jews on the left were willing to accommodate the Allies, for they believed Hitler to be the more immediate and imperative threat; however, the ideological Jewish right refused to accept any deals restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine. Crabitès held the British responsible for the troubles in the Middle East and the Holy Land, and while Crabitès said that the Jews deserved sympathy,

48Jefferson Davis Parrish News, 9 March, no year given, Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Newspaper article, 7 April 1937, Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 52 Newspaper article, 1 March 1939, Mss. 73-87, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

250 Great Britain could not make Palestine into a Jewish homeland; otherwise, the British would arouse the anger of the Arabs across the Middle East. He thought that Great Britain should not implement the Balfour Declaration, for Arabs were still the majority in Palestine; and Crabitès was a believer in (Woodrow) Wilson’s concept of self-determination. Western leaders never took self-determination into account when marking treaties and drawing boundaries. Crabitès advocated allowing the Arabs and Jews to settle their differences without the intervention of external forces, instead of permitting the extremists on both sides to derail the peace process in Palestine.53 The British could not agree to the demands of individuals like Louis Lipsky, Vice President of the Zionist Organization of America, who contested limitations on immigration to the Holy Land. Crabitès insisted that Jewish victims of Nazi persecution should be allowed to immigrate to North America and Anatolia, where they could reside under the liberality afforded to them by Islam, a toleration they had lived under for many centuries.54 In 1935, Crabitès turned his attention to Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia. Even though Crabitès had a personal dislike of Ethiopians, accusing them of acting in a manner unfit for Christians and castigating them for their past involvement in the slave trade, he condemned Mussolini’s attack on Ethiopia.55 According to Crabitès, Mussolini negotiated non-intervention agreements with French Foreign Minister Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Minister, prior to his invasion of Ethiopia.56 The British foreign minister promised not to protest Italy’s invasion so long as Italy did not threaten the security of the Sudan and Egypt, and the parties gave assurance to protect the emperor’s “vital interests.”57 Crabitès believed that British and French sentiment was reluctant to accept the outcome of the negotiations, thereby causing the collapse of the settlement, so

53 Newspaper article, 25 October 1938, Mss. 73-86, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 54 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 55 Pierre Crabitès, Gordon: The Sudan and Slavery. (London: Routledge, 1933), 116. 56 Newspaper clipping, Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. 57 Ibid.

251 Mussolini courted Hitler instead.58 Italy’s rape of Ethiopia appalled Crabitès, and he recognized the Fascist threat to British and French interest in the region. Crabitès also acknowledged that Hitler and Mussolini were too hesitant in taking advantage of Allied unpopularity with the Arabs.59 Crabitès on Palestine Crabitès was an opinionated writer, often forcefully challenging earlier interpretations. His two unpublished manuscripts “Palestine and her Problem” and “Israel out of Egypt” were basically thematic in character. These works exhibit many of the qualities common among his contemporaries, such as numerous large quotes and a lack of citation. His unpublished manuscripts were his most controversial pieces, and their polemical character must have contributed to his difficulty in publishing them. These works challenge Western notions on the conflict in Palestine and the nature of anti-Semitism. They also clearly reveal his views on the Middle East during the interwar period. “Palestine and her Problem” Crabitès wrote his manuscript entitled “Palestine and her Problem” between 1936 and 1937. The exact date of the composition is not known; however, one is able to glean from the information contained within it that it was written after 1935 yet before his next unpublished manuscript titled “Israel out of Egypt,” which was authored in 1938. Crabitès made some startling predictions for the future of the Holy Land in this manuscript. While he accurately forecast Adolph Hitler’s ascendance and increasing militarism in Germany, he failed to foresee Hitler’s scheme to eliminate Jewry from Europe, which resulted in a tidal wave of Ashkenazic-Jewish immigration to Palestine. Even though his logic was unflawed based upon the data available to him at the time, one can understand why Crabitès, writing in “Palestine and her Problem,” was mistaken in his calculation that “as long as the Balfour Declaration, as now interpreted and

58 Ibid. 59 Newspaper article, 14 April, Mss. 73-89, Scrapbooks, 1919-1939, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

252 enforced, remains part of the British Mandate for Palestine, the Holy Land is destined to be either an armed English camp or a vast Jewish graveyard.”60 In “Palestine and her Problem,” Crabitès opened by stating that the ‘people of the book’ owe Islamic civilization a debt of gratitude for its treatment of them in the Middle East. Muslim tolerance permitted the ‘people of the book’ not only to remain in the Middle East but to prosper. The ‘people of the book’ were protected under Islam by their dhimmi status, and they not only had the right to be tried in courts of their own particular religious adherence, but they also had immunity from being conscripted into the army: Muhammadian [sic] liege lords constituted a warrior caste and cared, as a general rule, naught for trade and but little for agriculture, the ‘people of the book’ became the war profiteers of those benighted days. That carried with it the open door to ease. Money has a way of its own of begetting comforts and of engendering respect.61 Crabitès asserted that this system perpetuated a Muslim superiority complex by making the Jews and Christians essentially second-class citizens, yet the British Mandate for Palestine attempted to turn Middle Eastern society upside down by placing the Jews over the Muslims.62 Taking aim at specific articles in the Mandate for Palestine, Crabitès emphasized that it was British who had provided the Jews with a “most favored nation clause.”63 He pointed out that Article 6 promoted citizenship for newly arriving Jewish immigrants while mentioning nothing about Muslims and Christians.64 Crabitès claimed that the League of Nations was “determined to subordinate the Arab majority to the Zionist Organization.”65 Turning from politics to religion, Crabitès highlighted the significance of the Islamic religious connection to the Holy Land. He assumed that most westerners

60 Pierre Crabitès, Palestine and Her Problem, unpublished ms., Forward, p. I: Mss. 73-41: Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. [The pagination of this manuscript is by chapter and then by page, not consecutive.] 61 Ibid., Ch. 2, p. 9. 62 Ibid., Ch. 5, p. 4. 63 Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 4. 64 Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 7. 65 Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 6.

253 were aware of the importance of the Holy Land to both Christians and Jews, but appreciated little of the religious connection that Muslims have to the Holy Land, specifically to the Haram al-Sherif, or temple complex. On his journey to heaven in a dream recounted in the Qur’an, the Prophet (al-Nabi) Muhammad traveled to Jerusalem on his horse, Buraq, which had the visage of a woman, body of a horse, and tail of a peacock. Upon arrival in Jerusalem, he tied his horse to the temple wall before ascending to heaven. Muslims believe that the entire complex is holy because the Prophet Muhammad visited the Haram al-Sherif. Caliph Abdul Malek’s construction of the holy complex on top of the most holy site in Jerusalem in the year 691 C.E. represents a lengthy, unbroken line of Muslim tradition in the area. Crabitès focused not only on religion but law as well, an area in which he was an expert. He declared that the Muslims of the Holy Land created a foundation, or waqf, in 1321, to oversee the maintenance of the Buraq, the complex which derives its name from the prophet’s horse. Crabitès insisted that this provided an important legal basis to the conflict.66 Article 9 of the mandate reinforced his argument that the Muslims should be in control of this holy site: “In particular, the control and administration of the waqfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.”67 He contended that in 1929 the Chief Rabbi for Palestine had been requested to submit proof of Jewish customs or traditions at the Western Wall under the Ottoman government, but he was unable to do so.68 When the Ottomans sided with the Central Powers of Austro-Hungry and Germany during World War I, the Allies persuaded the Arabs in the Middle East to revolt against the Ottomans. The Allies made pretexts that they would grant the Arabs an independent state for their efforts on behalf of the Allies. Regretfully, according to Crabitès, the Allies’ promises did not directly refer to Palestine, for Allied assurances in the MacMahon correspondence with Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, dated 24 October 1915, were either inchoate or vague in

66 Ibid., Ch. 8, p. 3. 67 Ibid., Ch. 8, p. 4. 68 Ibid., Ch. 8, p. 9.

254 regard to Palestine.69 The Jews had the backing of the Balfour Declaration which emanated directly from Great Britain’s executive branch and directly contradicted Arab claims. The British were double-dealing throughout the war. Crabitès criticized the League of Nations as an entity comprised of a few select European countries bound together to dominate world relations. With the creation of the League of Nations, every country that participated in the League had to harmonize its past with the Peace Conference: “If there had been a peccadillo, the offending state bound itself to go to Canossa, or, at all events, to remain out of the pale of the League until its soul had been purged of wrongfulness.”70 In other words, any agreements or promises that the British made to both the Jews and the Arabs were null and void as of 28 June 1919. Under the direction of President Wilson, the Peace Conference focused on the concept of self-determination. Crabitès explained that by this logic, the Arab majority of the Holy Land should have been able to determine their future, yet, “President Wilson and his self-determination did not contemplate holding this Arab majority by the throat until it became a minority.”71 In his hostility to the Balfour Declaration, he maintained that the executive branch of the British government pushed the Balfour Declaration forward, even though the House of Lords announced their opposition in a motion on 21 June 1922, stating that it violated prior commitments that the British government had made to the people of Palestine.72 While Crabitès did not provide evidence of any argument supporting the Jewish claims to Palestine in this manuscript, he did refute Arab opinion of the Jews. Of the Arab contention that the Jews of Palestine were both atheists and communists, Crabitès posed the question, “Who would go to the Middle East other than for spiritual reasons when they could go to the wealth and

69 Ibid., Ch. 9, p. 2. 70 Ibid., Ch. 10, p. 3. 71 Ibid., Ch. 11, p. 9. 72 Ibid., Ch. 12, p. 1.

255 opportunities of the West?”73 Just because many of these Jews in Palestine were residing in communes, it did not necessarily make them communists. Following the outbreak of violence in Jerusalem on 16 August 1929, the British appointed Sir Walter Shaw to oversee a commission to investigate the causes of the aggression and to make recommendations for improving the situation. Crabitès concentrated on several salient facts from the commission’s findings. It was evident that the Jewish authorities had failed to adequately enforcing the restrictions on immigration into Palestine so as to avoid overloading the economic and agricultural capacity of Palestine. The report also stated that the Arabs in Palestine were afraid that they would lose their livelihood under the political domination of the Jews.74 Even though Crabitès viewed the Shaw Commission as decidedly “orientalist” in its recommendations to the British government, he tended to concur with some of their conclusions on the immediate causes of the outbreak in violence in the Holy Land. He found many egregious errors in the minority report on the same subject, which was produced at the same time as the Shaw Commission and direct contradicted it. To begin with, he attacked Mr. Snell, compiler of the minority report, over his opinion that the Arabs in the Holy Land should stop considering themselves victims. Crabitès rejected Mr. Snell’s position that the Arabs in Palestine stood to profit from Jewish enterprise, for the Zionists were entirely against supporting the Arabs when they had an obligation to aid the Jews.75 Crabitès placed much blame on the Zionists, who, in his estimation, were financing the massive Jewish immigration into Palestine despite the findings of the Hope-Simpson Report of 22 August 1930.76 The British government truly offended the Arabs when it failed to consider the conclusions of this report, which confirmed that the current situation in Palestine, both economically and agriculturally, could not continue to support the influx of Jewish immigrants.

73 Ibid., Ch. 13, p. 1. 74 Ibid., Ch. 14, p. 3. 75 Ibid., Ch. 14, p. 7. 76 Ibid., 148. [The pagination for the remainder of the book is consecutive.]

256 According to Crabitès, the Royal Commission Report, under the direction of Earl Peel, clearly identified why the Jews and Arabs were incapable of living together in harmony, for: The war and its sequel have inspired all Arabs with the hope of reviving a free and united Arab world with the traditions of the Arab Golden Age. The Jews similarly are inspired by their historic past. They mean to show what the Jewish nation can achieve when restored to the land of its birth. National assimilation between Arabs and Jews is thus ruled out.77 Before the British established the mandate, the Jews and Arabs of Palestine resided side by side in peace; therefore Crabitès asserted that the heart of the conflict was rooted in the terms of the mandate. Crabitès assailed the Royal Commission Report since it identified the strife as basically political in nature, “Politics no more brought the Jews to Palestine than the lure of lucre.”78 According to Crabitès, the Jews who immigrated to Palestine did so at a tremendous financial risk, so it must be concluded that they came for religious reasons. These Jews were not purely secular. The Arabs in Palestine intended to remain there for similar reasons. Crabitès condemned the Royal Commission Report for ignoring the religious character of the unrest, To overlook the religious aspect of the conflict and treat it as something purely secondary shows such a fundamental misconception of the Holy Land that even Mr. Ornsby-Gore [sic] tribute to the Royal Commission’s Report as ‘a literary work of art’ and as a document which will ‘stand for all time as the final statement of historical truth’ cannot make me believe that its authors know enough about the body politic of Palestine to be competent to recommend its dissection.79 While Crabitès placed the lion’s share of the blame for the conflict in Palestine solely on Great Britain, he empathized with the positions of both the Arabs and the Jews. He proposed his Arab defense thesis in the 1930s to provide for a peaceful resolution to the tribulations in Palestine. Although he

77 Ibid., 202. 78 Ibid., 206. 79 Ibid., 207.

257 failed to find guilt with those Jews who had moved to Palestine, he considered the Jews of England and America, especially those associated with Zionism, as somewhat culpable in regard to the atrocities that were occurring in the Holy Land. They were the financial machine that backed the Jewish immigration to Palestine and displaced the Arab population which had lived there since the seventh and eighth centuries. Crabitès placed very little, if any, responsibility for the problems in Arab hands. While this alone did not necessarily make him anti- Jewish, it does lead one to believe that he was very much pro-Arab. He argued that his position fell far short of anti-Semitism, for he reasoned that the Jewish position on the Holy Land was readily available to the Western media. He formulated a defense for the Arabs since there was nobody to stand up for them in the world’s media.80 In fact, his genuine empathy for these two peoples was readily exhibited in “Palestine and Her Problem.” That he was an ardent Catholic sheds some light on his pro-Arab stance in the conflict. The Catholic position on the partition of Palestine was that Jerusalem should be internationalized, a perspective that the United Nations would later assume. The Catholicism that Crabitès grew up under was decidedly anti-Semitic, so to understand his pro- Arab attitude on the conflict, the reader should keep this in mind. At the end of his manuscript, Crabitès tried to predict the future. He pointed out that Great Britain would stay in Palestine as a third party, yet only so long as she could foresee a profit. If the expenses incurred by remaining in Palestine to oversee the conflict and hinder the violence continued to escalate, and the British taxpayer became weary of paying for the maintenance of an army in the Holy Land, they would pull out and leave the Arabs to slaughter the Jews. This was a fairly accurate prediction. “Israel out of Egypt” In the course of one year’s time, from 1937 to 1938, much occurred in Europe, especially to the Jews. Considering the Jewish situation in Europe in 1938, Crabitès rethought many of the arguments that he had made in “Palestine and her Problem” for his next manuscript “Israel out of Egypt.” He still

80 Ibid.

258 maintained that the Holy Land should be under Arab control, for he still believed that they had a policy of toleration of the Jews down through the centuries, unlike the Occident. He suspected that the issue of immigration would remain a flash point because Palestine was too small an area to accommodate the Jews fleeing European persecution. In today’s world, much of what he had to say in “Palestine and Her Problem” could be interpreted as politically incorrect, or at least in poor taste. Regardless of his inability to accurately forecast the future of Palestine, much of what he had to say is still relevant today since he did an excellent job of examining the sources of the conflict. Crabitès composed his manuscript “Israel out of Egypt” in 1938 in an effort to combat what he perceived as the rising tide of anti-Semitism in the United States, which he believed was a threat to American religious freedom. Much of this manuscript was written in the first person, as it drew on many of his personal experiences in America, Europe, and the Middle East. This work is thematic in character, rather than narrative. This manuscript also attempted to explain how the situation in Palestine prior to World War II was jeopardizing the relationship that the Jews and Muslims had shared for centuries in the Middle East. He insisted that both the situation with the Jews in Palestine and America needed to be resolved, “If this is current be not arrested it will, in time, inevitably assume the more virulent form now so prevalent in Europe. Should that sad eventuality ever come to pass, Israel will need Islam to save her from the intolerance of Christendom.”81 While Crabitès was sympathetic to the plight of the Jews under the Nazis, he remained pro-Arab concerning the situation in the Holy Land. He concurred with the Arabs that Israel did not have the capacity to absorb the continuous influx of Jewish refugees from Europe. Crabitès thought that the Jews should be provided a safe haven in North Africa or Anatolia, where they could live in peace under Muslim toleration, yet this course had to be pursued with haste before this

81 Pierre Crabitès, “Israel out of Egypt,” unpublished ms. (c. 1938), p. ii, Mss. 73-23, Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

259 option passed because of the issue of immigration, he believed, was “antagonizing Islam.”82 A good portion of this work concentrated on the difference between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewry. Crabitès had made many Sephardic-Jewish acquaintances while sitting on the Mixed Courts’ bench for so many years, as there were many Sephardic-Jewish attorneys who practiced before him on the Mixed Courts. He envisioned Sephardic Jews as the aristocracy of the Middle East: Islam sanctions polygamy and there was a time, not far distant, when the wives of the ruling Muhammedan caste were recruited almost entirely from Circassian or Georgian slaves. This practice did not tend to build up an aristocracy of blood in a sense known to the Occident. And the Christian minority found itself so overshadowed by the greater prestige of co- religionists from abroad, that it appears to have effaced itself in favor of the elite of Jewry.83 Crabitès believed that the Levantine Jews ascended to such prominent social positions because of their family connections. Crabitès questioned, for example, why Jews in the Middle East were able to rise to such social prominence while American Jewry was discriminated against in Catholic Louisiana. He concluded that the United States was not anti- Semitic, has he had first supposed, but anti-Ashkenazic in essence. Recalling that only Sephardic Jews participated in the high society of New Orleans, such as the carnival organizations and men’s clubs, Crabitès inquired, “Is the world really anti-Semitic? Is it not merely anti-Ashkenazic ? And if it is, why this distinction?”84 He even described the discrimination that existed between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews. Crabitès explained that the two groups did not encourage intermarriage. As a matter of fact, the intermarriage of an Ashkenazic

82 Ibid., iv. 83 Ibid., 4. 84 Ibid., 15.

260 Jew with a Sephardic Jew, in his opinion, challenged the Jewish social structure in the Middle East.85 Crabitès devoted much time to examining the roots of the differences between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews. He began by tracing the path of the Sephardic Jews since their residence in medieval Spain, prior to the Reconquista in 1492. Crabitès characterized the Sephardic Jews as Spanish in language as well as culture, yet they preferred to live under the rule of Islam. While residing under Islam, the Spanish Jews were essentially exempted from service in the military, and although they had to pay a tax for this privilege, the Jews of Spain ultimately profited from the arrangement. Crabitès explained the relationship between the Muslims and Jews in Spain by stating that they coexisted in a system where the Muslims fought and the Jews thought, The Mohammedans did the fighting, but had no budgetary worries, and allowed themselves to drift into intellectual stagnation. The Jews furnished the wherewithal to carry on the wars and conduct the government. They became the war profiteers in those days. [sic] They used their wealth to obtain the leisure which permits of the most development of culture . . . The ruling Mohammedan caste found it most congenial to rattle swords without worrying about money. They Jews, upon whom the financial responsibility fell, considered it far more satisfactory to remain quietly at home while others lived unproductive lives in the Army.86 Crabitès described these Iberian Muslims as indolent and the Jews of Spain as industrious.87 The special position of Iberian Jews gave them social mobility and permitted them entrance into the aristocracy. According to Crabitès, while the Muslims of Spain allowed their Jews to participate in their administrations and better their social standing, the Christians of Europe prohibited Jews from working in government, and they were not allowed to possess land, so their situation greatly contrasted that of their brethren

85 Ibid., 24. 86 Ibid., 29. 87 Ibid.

261 in Iberia. Ashkenazic Jews were unable to advance socially. Crabitès was incorrect in this assessment, rather Jewish social advancement depended largely on their time and place. Later in his manuscript, he developed an analysis of anti-Semitism in the United States by arguing that America was moving in the direction that Germany had taken and this progression was fueled by stereotypes. Crabitès believed that it was these generalizations that were hampering the ability of Jews to assimilate into American society. This was often due to the American perception of Jewish immigrants, based upon generalizations, and applied to Jews who had been in the United States for years, thus inhibiting their ability to assimilate: I reasoned that as a linguistic bond linked together all branches of Ashkenazic Jewry, creating thereby an affinity between the Russian and Romanian Ashkenazic Jewish immigrants from the East, and the French and German from the West, every time one of the descendents of the latter began to climb the social scale, the Russian or Romanian newcomer hampered his ascent.88 Crabitès tackled the situation of the Jews in the Middle East by first studying the Qur’anic perception of Jews. While the Qur’an recognizes that there exists the Dar al-Islam (Land of Peace) and the Dar al-Harb (Land of War), it established a dichotomy between the ‘people of the book’ and pagans. Crabitès interpreted the Qur’an’s stance on the ‘people of the book’ as a “short-term truce,” stating that the Arabs only wanted to maintain a peaceful coexistence with the Jews, “I saw in the Arab support of the Balfour Declaration a demonstration of the sincere desire of Mohammedianism [sic] to prolong this truce indefinitely.”89 Crabitès believed that the situation in Palestine threatened to undermine the peace between Muslim and Jew and make them enemies. He held the British responsible for the present hostilities in the Holy Land. The British first pledged a Jewish homeland in the Balfour Declaration, and then they turned their backs on the Jews under the exigencies of war and issued the

88 Ibid., 43. 89 Ibid., 70a.

262 White Paper favoring the Arabs in 1939. The White Paper severely restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine. The British essentially played off the two sides for their own advantage. They had backed the Jews until it became more profitable to support the Arabs. Crabitès concluded that the Jews in Palestine must, out of necessity, become more conciliatory towards the Arabs, or they would eventually be slaughtered, for he believed that Muslim tolerance was waning in the face of a rising tide of anti-Semitism.90 Disturbed by the frightening implications of Nazi Germany’s anti-Semitic rhetoric, Crabitès challenged some of their arguments against the Jews. He made an effort to correct misperceptions of Jewish involvement in the financial collapse of Imperial Germany as a result of unrestrained inflation. Crabitès also disputed Jewish conspiracies to bring about the downfall of Germany during World War I. He said of their accusations, “They were blamed for having precipitated the collapse of the German Mark in order to be able to fasten upon the carcass of German prosperity.”91 In doing so, he examined the three most prominent Jews of Imperial Germany, Max Warburg, Albert Ballin, and Walter Rathenau, and he exonerated these men of all culpability for Imperial Germany’s economic woes and, instead, blamed Hugo Stinnes, a man he characterized as an “inflation profiteer.” Crabitès declared, “Even if I be mistaken in thus envisaging Hugo Stinnes, the Aryan of Aryans, as the high-priest of inflation, assuredly the blame for that orgy devolves upon either the German government, or the German bankers.”92 Crabitès made a case against the widely held German notion that the Jews were taking over Germany, “I argued that if Jewry exercised the occult power which Hitlerism insists upon denouncing, it would have attempted to corrupt the mind of the youth of Germany during the decade when it said to have

90 Ibid., 91c. 91 Ibid., 103. 92 Ibid., 105.

263 controlled the Reich.”93 He cited statistics showing that Jewish enrollment in universities had almost halved between 1896 and 1930.94 He next scrutinized Jewish banking houses in Germany, contending that their business practices closely mirrored those of the Christian-owned banks. He recalled that some wealthy Jewish families, such as the Mendelssohns and Bleichroeders, had converted to Christianity, and in his quest to prove false Nazi stereotypes he stumbled upon a question which he found profoundly disturbing: Was it the truths of Christianity or social ambition that had converted these capitalists? I asked myself how long the wealthy German Ashkenazic families of today, with their plebian origin of yesterday, would have been able to resist the enticement of having “von” precede their names if the Great War had not abolished the Imperial power?95 Crabitès responded, “I am free to say that I came to the conclusion that the blandishments of aristocracy, and the social ambition which wealth generates, are a greater menace to the ancestral faith of Jewish plutocrats than the power of Jewish wealth could possibly be to the body politic of Christendom.”96 Crabitès defended the Jews against German accusations of Bolshevism. He recognized that some Jews were communists, such as Marx and Trotsky, while others tended towards socialism. He disputed the idea that Jews were susceptible to communist propaganda because of their education and urbanization; however, they still comprised less than six percent of the communist party’s membership.97 Although the Bolshevik Revolution promised the Jews freedom from the oppressive czarist government, Crabitès believed that Jews did not regard communism as a panacea because it failed to promote private enterprise and threatened their independence.98 Having examined Crabitès’s major unpublished material of the 1930s, we now need to return to an examination of the final year of his life.

93 Ibid., 112. 94 Ibid., 112. 95 Ibid., 120. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid., 125, 126. 98 Ibid., 127, 128.

264 William “Wild Bill” Donovan and the Office of Strategic Services Originally, Crabitès had returned to the United States to procure government employment. With the difficulties of finding a job during the Depression, he accepted a position at Louisiana State University; however, he continued to utilize friends and connections to achieve his ultimate goal of an overseas post. He realized his dream in 1942, when William J. Donovan recruited him as an intelligence officer for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). William “Wild Bill” Donovan established the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency, and was a close friend of Roosevelt, even though he was a conservative Republican. Donovan clearly recognized the value of research in the intelligence business, so he endeavored to draft many intellectuals, such as Crabitès.99 Donovan was a pragmatic recruiter, mostly drawing from academics and professionals, especially lawyers, as he was a lawyer himself.100 Crabitès was well suited to Donovan’s tastes, as his early agents were socially prominent men with connections, and he was reluctant to reject applicants who came with recommendations.101 Throughout his career, Crabitès exploited his relationships to further his career. As General Erwin Rommel rapidly advanced across North Africa, Roosevelt aided the British in Egypt by invading North Africa. Although this strategy disappointed the Soviets, it surely assisted the British, for it endeavored to keep the Mediterranean open.102 Roosevelt enlisted Donovan’s help to gather information prior to the invasion, so when Donovan began the OSS’s North African Intelligence Project late in 1941, he dispatched agents across the whole sweep of North Africa, including Egypt. These men were fluent in French and had a good knowledge of North Africa, just like Crabitès. The OSS sent forth operatives under the cover of consular attachés and diplomats.103

99 Joseph E. Perisco, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage. (New York: Random House, 2001), 110-11. 100 Ibid., 353- 54. 101 Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (New York: Richardson and Steirman, 1986), 76-78. 102 Perisco, Roosevelt’s Secret War, 279. 103 Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, 62.

265 The OSS assigned Crabitès to the State Department as the special assistant to the minister at Cairo. Serving as the State Department’s coordinator of information, Donovan personally appointed him to the post.104 As the Coordinator of Information, Donovan instructed Crabitès on his duties while in Washington D.C., and Crabitès reported, ultimately, to Donovan; however, he was under the supervision of Alexander C. Kirk.105 His station was an attractive one. It commanded a salary of six thousand dollars per annum, plus traveling expenses. It appears that Crabitès inadvertently became caught up in the conflict between the OSS and the State Department. The OSS tended to be left-leaning and had a more anti-Imperialist perspective than the State Department. The State Department was more right-wing and promoted maintaining the status quo. While the OSS was decidedly anti-imperialist, the State Department sought to placate the British.

Return to Egypt In January 1942, the Afrika Korps, under the command of General Erwin Rommel, repulsed British forces from the Libyan desert. Crabitès arrived in Cairo three months later, under the threat of a Nazi victory in Egypt, just before the Nazis began to lose their foothold in North Africa in October when Montgomery defeated Rommel at El-Alamein.106 This time Crabitès parted company with his family in Louisiana and departed to Egypt alone. Ill fortune greeted him shortly after his arrival in Cairo when he became sick with dysentery and had to be hospitalized.107 Crabitès began his work during convalescence. He contacted Hassanein, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, and established a relationship with him, for Donovan charged Crabitès with coordinating palace-

104 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/5: From G. Howland Shaw, Asst. Secretary of State, to Alexander C. Kirk, American Minister, Cairo, Egypt. 14 May 1942. 105 State Department Document: 123 Crabites, Pierre/6: From G. Howland Shaw, Asst. Secretary of State, to Colonel Donovan, Coordinator of Information, Washington D.C. 14 May 1942. 106 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/2: From Alexander Kirk in Cairo, to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1942. 107 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/3: From Alexander Kirk in Cairo, to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1942.

266 embassy relations.108 As a judge, Crabitès had a reputation for being a pro- palace sympathizer. He gained access to the Abdine Palace archives and had composed several decidedly pro-Egyptian books, which reinterpreted history in a more favorable light for the royal family. Hassanein and Crabitès discussed the present situation in Egypt. It delighted Crabitès to learn how pleased King Farouq was to welcome him back to Egypt. While on the Mixed Courts, Crabitès had maintained a cordial and friendly relationship with the palace, often receiving invitations for an audience before both King Farouq and his father King Fuad. Hassanein conveyed the King’s belief that, He has long felt the need of having the counsel of a foreigner of his father’s generation who knows Egypt and who has no ulterior motive to subserve. There is no telling what blessing to Egypt, to the Allied cause and to a healthy understanding with England may not flow from your presence here.109 Before long, the State Department began to question the appointment of Crabitès to a post in Egypt. Although the State Department recognized his eminent qualifications for the position, they were fearful of his affiliation with the palace. According to Wallace Murray, Advisor on Political relations for the Department of State, The question of whether it is desirable to sanction the presence in Cairo at a time like this of an American citizen with intimate relations with the Palace is clearly debatable. However, if such contact is considered desirable, it seems clear that Judge Crabitès for a number of reasons is better qualified than any other American I can think of.110

108 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/7: Communiqué from Pierre Crabitès, transmitted by Alexander Kirk, Cairo, to Colonel Donovan, through the Secretary of State, 28 May 1942. 109 Ibid. 110 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/8: From Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State, to Welles, Under Secretary of State, 3 June 1942.

267 His anti-British sentiments continued to haunt him in Egypt and impair his career. American Minister in Cairo Alexander C. Kirk wrote Secretary of State G. Howland Shaw, The British Ambassador has now approached me regarding the matter of the presence here of Judge Crabitès which according to messages received by him from the Foreign Office in London sometime ago appears to be a cause for concern to the British Authorities owing to Crabitès’ previous relationship with the Palace.111 British concern over the palace during World War II was understandable. In 1939, King Farouq filled the position of chief of his royal cabinet with Ali Maher Pasha, who was decidedly anti-British, and later with Sidki Pasha, an avowed fascist sympathizer. By 1940, Sidki Pasha sought to take advantage of the precarious position Great Britain found herself in Egypt, but Sir Miles Lampson, British Ambassador to Egypt, coerced the Egyptian government into supporting the Allies. Ali Maher Pasha resigned, believing that the Axis would ultimately be victorious. The situation had reached such a threshold that by 1942 Lampson issued an ultimatum, virtually at gunpoint, to King Farouq, compelling him to promote Nahhas Pasha, leader of the Wafd, to be the new prime minister. Ironically, Lampson had forced the king to acquiesce to the appointment of a political adversary who had also displayed perpetual hostility towards the British presence in Egypt as well.112 The American Legation in Cairo, in coordination with the Allied war effort, sought to maintain a harmonious relationship with the British in Egypt. The legation considered Crabitès’s association with the palace detrimental to their rapport with the British, so they attempted to limit his contact with the palace. Actually, American Minister Kirk worried about the opposition drawing upon Crabitès’s connection to the palace to incite violence in Egypt.113 Essentially, the State Department feared Crabitès moving without prior approval from his

111 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/8: From Alexander Kirk, Cairo, Egypt, to the Department of State, 31 May 1942. 112 George Annesley, The Rise of Modern Egypt. (Durham, UK: The Pentland Press Ltd), 389 113 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/9: From Alexander Kirk, Cairo, Egypt, to the Secretary of State, 29 May 1942.

268 superiors. They needed Crabitès out of Egypt, so they tried to send him to Khartoum, but within just a couple short months before he could go, the American Legation in Cairo arranged for his transfer back to the States.114 These events indicate that in Crabitès’s particular case, the State Department proved to be an implacable foe of the OSS and more powerful than the OSS. It was paradoxical, for the OSS sent Crabitès to Egypt to gather information on the palace so that the Allies could profit by this knowledge to assist the war effort. Farouq’s intentions during the war concerned the Allies; yet it was the mere presence of Crabitès at Abdine Palace that alarmed the British. His tenure as a judge on the Mixed Courts was not easily forgotten, and the British still remembered his anti-British attitude. Crabitès’s poor constitution prevented him from traveling immediately, and he remained in Egypt. While in Egypt, Crabitès pressured the State Department, requesting a transfer to the American Legation in Beirut.115 In January of 1943, the State Department agreed to assign Crabitès to Beirut. The State Department thought it best that Crabitès act as a legal attaché to the American Minister in Beirut because of his expertise in Middle Eastern politics and law. Syria and Lebanon were former French protectorates, so Crabitès’s fluency in French certainly was an asset in Beirut. Mr. Wadsworth, of the State Department, commented on a possible role for Crabitès in Lebanon, “My suggestion that he could aid also by following political trends in Lebanese religious circles was rather by way of afterthought. But it is not an unimportant item.”116 The American Legation expected him to research the local political and legal conditions in Lebanon and Syria. Crabitès’s Last Year Crabitès never arrived in Beirut. Lebanon was under British military occupation at the time, and there was much apprehension regarding his possible

114 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/11: From Alexander Kirk, Cairo, Egypt, to the Secretary of State, 29 July 1942. 115 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/20: From Murray, American Legation, Beirut, to Wadsworth, Department of State, 16 January 1943. 116 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/21: From Wadsworth to Secretary of State, 20 January 1943.

269 anti-British sentiments. His former supervisor, Alexander C. Kirk, explained that Crabitès’s connection to the palace in Cairo had provoked uneasiness on the part of the British. Rather than risking a disturbance, the American Legation removed him. Kirk was not quite sure of the British reaction to Crabitès’s appointment to Lebanon. Crabitès’s health was a concern, as he was getting on in years and had not fully recovered from his bout with dysentery.117 After recuperating sufficiently to travel, Crabitès returned home for a short while. In May of 1943, the State Department assigned Crabitès to be the special assistant for legal affairs in the American Foreign Service Auxiliary; he headed off to the American Legation in Baghdad.118 Before he reached Iraq, the Legation in Baghdad attempted to pass him off to another legation. Mr. Wilson, of the American Legation in Baghdad, wrote the department, I should appreciate being informed of the duties expected of Special assistant for Legal Affairs in Baghdad. Unless this officer is charged with duties of a nature beyond the ability of individual members of the present staff the nature and volume of work here do not justify such an assignment and I respectfully submit that a man of Crabitès’ qualifications can be utilized elsewhere.119 This rejection probably had to do with reasons other than his personal convictions or relationships. Instead, the legation in Baghdad refused him because they deemed him to be of little assistance. Regardless of Mr. Wilson’s views, the State Department ordered Crabitès to Baghdad. At least the department would have him far from Egypt and in a place which would not arouse British anxiety because he was not intimate with Iraqi leadership, like he was with the Abdine Palace. While his wife Charlotte remained at their Washington D.C. residence in Aldie, Virginia, Crabitès boarded a sea plane and flew to Iraq in June of 1943. Most likely, he took the southern route from the

117 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/24: From Alexander Kirk, Cairo, Egypt, to Wallace Murray, Department of State, 10 February 1943. 118 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/25: From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, 8 May 1943. 119 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/28: From T. M. Wilson, American Legation in Baghdad, to the Secretary of State, 3 June 1943.

270 United States to Brazil and from Brazil to the west coast of Africa. He first landed at Accra, Gold Coast, and then later traveled east to Cairo. Crabitès stayed at the Shepheard’s Hotel in Cairo while his feeble constitution slowly acclimated to traveling. He still had not recovered from his sickness of a year earlier in Egypt.120 While he was recuperating at the Shepheard’s Hotel in Cairo, Paul H. Alling, of the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs, also questioned the necessity of sending Crabitès to Iraq when it was apparent that Mr. Wilson did not want Crabitès to come and “roost.” Alling was aware that Ato Deressa, a highly influential Ethiopian dignitary on mission to Egypt, was requesting an American legal advisor to assist the Ethiopian government. In an effort to expedite the process of transferring Crabitès to Ethiopia, Alling was able to gain the consent of the Foreign Service Auxiliary, securing Crabitès’s release from his position in Baghdad.121 Wallace Murray, Advisor on Political Relations for the Department of State, agreed with most of his colleagues on the subject of Crabitès’s qualifications and suitability for the job in Ethiopia. Crabitès exerted a significant amount of pressure on the State Department from his political contacts in Washington. It appears that some in the State Department believed Crabitès was interested in adventure, not hard work. In a letter to G. Howling Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, Wallace Murray described Crabitès as a man consumed by his own egotism, Judging by the methods employed by Judge Crabitès in forcing his services upon us in the present instance, and granting that his qualifications were considerable when he was a younger man and serving on the Mixed Courts of Egypt, I very much doubt whether he has the health or the punch to attack any such job as that suggested in Ethiopia. I have the unfortunate impression that Judge Crabitès is looking for

120 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/35: From Gaudin in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, 20 July 1943. 121 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/38: From Paul H. Alling, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, to Wallace Murray, Advisor on Political Relations, and Shaw, Asst. Secretary of State, 29 June 1943.

271 excitement and not hard work. He made that clear to us when it was suggested that his services might be utilized in the Legal Adviser’s office in the Department. If I had any confidence that he could or would go to Addis Ababa with a determination to knock the spots out of the legal problems facing Haile Selassie, I would be the first one to support his candidacy. Unfortunately, I fear that he might go there ‘for the ride’ and for the material he might be able to collect for a new book, but with very little intention to put his nose to the grindstone. I hope I am wrong but I am afraid I am not.122 Paul H. Alling joined Wallace Murray’s denunciation of Crabitès as a man who only had his own self-interest at heart when he applied for a diplomatic position in the Middle East. Alling applauded the idea of sending Crabitès to Ethiopia so as to disencumber themselves of him, yet he, like Murray, worried that Crabitès was ill-suited for Ethiopia, partly on account of his ailing constitution and partly because of his personality. Alling accused Crabitès of wanting nuance, declaring, “He completely lacks a judicial temperament.”123 Unless his responsibilities in Ethiopia provided for Crabitès’s partisan nature, Alling thought, he would most likely become involved in extracurricular activities.124 He believed that the problem with dispatching Crabitès to Ethiopia was that he might become an embarrassment to American prestige in the country; whereas, in Baghdad he could be better controlled. While Murray considered Crabitès’ credentials adequate for the position in Ethiopia, Alling called his qualifications into question, for Crabitès was a specialist in the French Code rather than English Common Law. He refused to post an American to Ethiopia to implement a system dissimilar to the form of justice administered in the United States. Rather than sending Crabitès to Ethiopia, Alling recommended Jasper Brinton, American judge on the Court of Cassation. He argued in favor of Brinton’s aptness for the job, citing two reasons: Brinton was more familiar with the American legal system

122 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/38: From Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State, to Shaw, Asst. Secretary of State, 29 June 1943. 123 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/38: From Paul Alling, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, to the Department of State, 29 June 1943. 124 Ibid.

272 than Crabitès, and he was more interested in legal systems than Crabitès, having written a book on the Mixed Courts.125 Wallace Murray agreed with Paul H. Alling, saying in July, “After the example and heroic services of Mr. Everett W. Colson, who literally gave his life in the service of the Emperor, I feel that Judge Crabitès would suffer by contrast with Mr. Colson, to the detriment of American prestige in Ethiopia.”126 It was immaterial how the State Department felt about stationing Crabitès in Ethiopia because Ato Deressa, Vice Minister of Finance, contacted the American government in Washington, requesting the services of Crabitès as a legal advisor in Addis Ababa. The State Department was more than willing to release Crabitès from his duties as special assistant for legal affairs in Baghdad so that he could assume the position in Ethiopia. At the time, Crabitès was stranded in Accra, Gold Coast, awaiting passage to Cairo. Once he arrived in Cairo, he was to contact the Ethiopian chargé d’affaires in order to discuss the offer and arrange for travel. 127 Crabitès finally arrived in Cairo from Accra in late July 1943. His stay, while brief, remained a concern for the American Legation in Cairo. The American Legation feared that Crabitès would return to his old habit of contacting the palace, so the Legation pressured him to sail on to Baghdad post haste. He never went to Addis Ababa. Crabitès arrived in Baghdad on the 29 July 1943.128 In August of 1943, Russell Barnes, of the Office of War Information, commissioned Crabitès to prepare an article entitled “Americans in the Egyptian Army,” an abridged version of the book he had published in 1938 under the same title. The Office of War Information in Cairo sought to publish the article in

125 Ibid. 126 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/38: From Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, to Shaw, Asst. Secretary of State, 29 June 1943. 127 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/38: From the Department of State to C. Lewis at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 29 June 1943. 128 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/42: From T.M. Wilson, American Legation in Baghdad, to the Secretary of State, 30 July 1943; State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre /43: From Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, to Shaw, Asst. Secretary of State, 22 July 1943.

273 Arabic and distribute it throughout the Middle East as propaganda for the war effort. 129 On 5 October 1943, doctors diagnosed Crabitès with a fever, which they attributed to the Iraqi climate and living conditions.130 Two days later he suffered a paralytic stroke.131 Crabitès died at 3:35 a.m. on 10 October “as the result of chronic nephritis with acute acerbation, high blood pressure and hemorrhage of the brain,” and was subsequently buried in the British Civilian Christian cemetery in Baghdad, along with another famous Westerner, Gertrude Bell.132 At his funeral ceremony, the Egyptian chargé d’affaires, on behalf of King Farouq, placed a wreath on his grave. His wife Charlotte was notified via telegram the following day. Charlotte wanted his body exhumed and returned to his home in the States as soon as possible, but she would have to wait eighteen months before they could exhume his body and ship it to America.133

129 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/44: From T.M. Wilson, American Legation in Baghdad, to the Secretary of State, 21 August 1943. 130 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/49: From Gaudin, American Legation in Baghdad, to the Secretary of State, 6 October 1943. 131 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/50: From Gaudin, American Legation in Baghdad, to the Secretary of State, 8 October 1943. 132 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/51 From Gaudin, American Legation in Baghdad, to the Secretary of State, 10 October 1943. 133 State Department Document: 123 Crabitès, Pierre/54: From Gaudin, American Legation in Baghdad, to the Secretary of State, 12 October 1943.

274 CONCLUSION

Crabitès played many roles throughout the course of his life, including judge, professor, OSS agent, and historian. He led a remarkable life, even though he failed to accomplish all of his lofty goals. His family and marriage connections helped elevate his judicial career. Crabitès served on the Mixed Courts for twenty-five years from 1911 to 1936, where he handed down several important decisions, including the rights to the sequestration of the Pharaoh Tutankhamen’s artifacts. Crabitès had an impact in international law as it related to Egypt; however, this is not a legal study but a biography. He was a special lecturer in law at Louisiana State University, and he served in the Office of Strategic Services under Colonel “Wild Bill” Donovan when he was stationed in Egypt and Iraq under the guise of an employee for the State Department. Crabitès’s inheritance and vocation provided him with the money and time to write. He was a prodigious writer. His writing reflects the environment in which he grew up. These works exhibit his anti-British sentiments and pro-Catholic proclivities, as well as other controversial opinions. He published thirteen books and twenty-eight articles. He also authored eight unpublished manuscripts and forty-four unpublished articles. While the effect of his research on American foreign policy is not clear, he did compose a pro-American propaganda piece based upon Americans in the Egyptian Army. Crabitès was one of the most important early American voices in the Middle East. A transitional figure, Crabitès bridged the nineteenth and twentieth century. In many ways, Crabitès had one foot squarely in the nineteenth century, as he reacted conservatively to the changes taking place around him, especially in terms of African-American civil rights and the encroachment of Anglo-Saxon- Protestant culture upon his Catholic-Creole New Orleans. Preservation of the status quo comforted him. Meanwhile, Crabitès had his other foot in the twentieth century, for he held progressive attitudes towards women, Jews, and Muslims.

275 As a result of his intellect and connections, Crabitès was capable of ascending the social ladder both in New Orleans and in Egypt, but his personal beliefs ultimately limited his ability to achieve his goal of securing a position as an American diplomat. His court decisions, close relationship with the palace, and anti-British proclivities were well-known to the State Department and Residency alike. In fact, he had been considered for an appointment to the Court of Appeals and later attempted to secure a diplomatic post, yet both times his political opinions and connections were questioned. His views and the relationships that he forged in New Orleans and Egypt, caused problems for him later in life when the State Department was reluctant to promote him, even attempting to reassign him out of Egypt as soon as possible. It is apparent that Crabitès’s knowledge of the royal palace and law in Egypt was not fully appreciated within the State Department, or they thought that his eccentricities overruled such knowledge. He could have accomplished much more while in Egypt, but he was prevented from doing so by the State Department and the British. The State Department hindered Crabitès while he was doing OSS work in Egypt because of British concerns with his association with the palace. Crabitès was trapped in the dynamic that existed between the OSS and the State Department. The OSS tended to recruit left-leaning intellectuals, while the State Department was clearly right-wing. Like Crabitès, the OSS was inclined to be pro-Arab, and the State Department was pro-British. His difficulties during his OSS mission could be, at least, partly attributable to the conflict between the OSS and the State Department. Crabitès certainly seemed to be a talking head for such organizations as the Catholic Church, Anti-Imperialist League, and the Egyptian monarchy. He generally followed the Catholic Church’s line on issues like nationalism and the dispute over Palestine. He even defended the Catholic Church from accusations of anti-Semitism during the Middle Ages. In terms of foreign policy, Crabitès was a staunch isolationist and clearly anti-imperialist. Furthermore, Crabitès had a close association with the Egyptian royal family. They invited him to Abdine

276 Palace on occasion and even permitted him to conduct research in their private archives. He published three revisionist histories which treated the royal family in a more favorable light, including Ibrahim of Egypt, Ismail: The Maligned Khedive, and Britain’s Debt to King Farouk. In terms of Palestine, Crabitès stance differed from many of his contemporaries, as he adopted a decidedly pro-Arab position on the dispute over the Holy Land. Crabitès shared a pro-Arab perspective with his colleagues in the OSS. He believed that the only feasible solution to the conflict over Palestine was to leave control of the Holy Land in the hands of the Arabs, who had coexisted peacefully in a climate of mutual tolerance with the Jews for centuries. He believed that Egyptian nationalism predated the arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century, and reached back to ancient Egypt. For Crabitès, Egyptian nationalism was more akin to Pharaonic Nationalism. His perspective on Egyptian nationalism was certainly rare for his time, especially for an American. At first glance, it appears that Crabitès’s life was one of missed opportunities. He was unable to gain promotion to the Court of Appeals, and he failed to secure a higher diplomatic post, settling for a less senior position. His diplomatic career was short and tumultuous, for he was quickly relieved of his duties while in Egypt and transferred to Iraq, where it was assumed that he would cause less trouble. He died in Baghdad not long after his arrival. In both cases, it was Crabitès’s anti-British sentiments which contributed to his ill fortune. His problems were rooted in his beliefs and his unwillingness to suppress them. Crabitès was opinionated and willing to share his thoughts. He did not approve of the British protectorate in Egypt or the British Mandate for Palestine, thus contributing to his pro-Arab perspective on the Middle East. His long-standing feud with Brunyate did not help his cause. Regardless, Crabitès still had a remarkable life and interesting career. He was an important figure in the history of American involvement in the Middle East in the early twentieth Century and an author of significance. This biography of Judge Pierre Crabitès will supplement the relative dearth of sources on the early American experience in the Middle East. By

277 researching primary sources from multiple archives, both foreign and domestic, I have been able to situate Crabitès as an important figure in Egypt at a time when the United States was largely uninterested in the Middle East. Crabitès’s noteworthy publications and his role as a judge on the Mixed Courts of Egypt have provided posterity with a keen insight into the struggle of Americans abroad, and especially in Egypt, to cope with the comparative minor role of the United States in the Middle East during the early twentieth Century. Crabitès provides an excellent example of what Americans had to deal with in the Middle East. This dissertation has addressed many of the inadequacies found in the earlier works on Crabitès. It extends far beyond my earlier study of Crabitès and that of Jamal T. Perkins in both depth and scope. It offers a broader view of his life and greater analysis of his writing, for it utilizes more primary sources and examines most of his salient compositions. It has placed a greater emphasis on the secondary sources to better understand Crabitès in the context of his time, thus presenting a more comprehensive perspective of his life.

278 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

Unpublished Documents:

British Foreign Office Documents. Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, United Kingdom. Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. Crabitès, Pierre, “Adolphe Thiers.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “America and the American Mediterranean.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The American Bar is not Self-Governing.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The American Negro and Communism.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “American Self-Respect and the Florida Canal.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Catherine of Aragon, the Woman.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “La Duchesse de Chevreuse.” (The Meddlesome Duchess.) Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Egypt’s Primacy in Islam.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Florence Nightingale: The Ministering Angel.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Franz Liszt: The Man and the Lover.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The French Girl and Her Palate.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Georges Clemenceau.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Giovanni Giolitti: A Bird’s Eye View of Italy of Pre-Fascist Days.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Charlotte Corday: The Irrational Idealist.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Heroine of the Nile.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Impending Jewish Pogrom in Palestine.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Isabella of Castille: The Queen of Queens.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Israel out of Egypt.” Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

279 ---. “The King’s Proctor: An Ostrich.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “A Kissing Test for Immigrants.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Lady Hamilton: The Shameless Siren.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Lady Hester Stanhope: The Chatelaine of the Lebanon.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Let Islam Save Israel.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Lord Grey, President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Louis Pasteur: The Man.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Lucrezia Borgia: The Maligned Mediocrity.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Madame de La Fayette and Her Friends.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Madame de Stael and Her Salon.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Madame Roland and the Girondists.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Omnipotence of British Justice.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Our Maleficent Legal Ethics.” Crabitès Collection. University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Palestine and Her Problem.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Partition of Palestine.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Paul Knabenshue.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Sarah Duchess of Malborough: Termagant and Tyrant.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Sesquicentennial of .” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Social Status of Women through the Ages.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Struggle of a Monopede.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Thomas G. Masaryk, the Man.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Truth about the Suez Canal.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Why England Overthrew Edward.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.

280 ---. “Why American Criminal Justice is a Failure.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Women of Firdausi.” Or “Women in Oriental Literature.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. d’Arthez. Pseudonym. “The True Inwardness of the Near East: An Analysis of the Effect upon Ottoman Christians of Certain Contingent Consequences of the War.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. Patton, Pier. Pseudonym. “The Armenian Massacres from another Viewpoint.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “Beards and their Psychology.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Kaiser, His Beard and His Bride.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. ---. “The Window Through the Ages.” Crabitès Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA. French Foreign Ministry Documents. Le Quay d’Orsay, Paris, France. New Orleans Civil District Court Records. Suit Records (Succession, Divorces, and related matters) from 1880 to 1925. New Orleans Central Library, New Orleans, LA. U.S. Census of 1880. National Archives I, Washington D.C. U.S. State Department Documents. National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. U.S. Supreme Court: Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S.33 (1909) 215 U.S. 33 Mrs. Frances E. Waterman, Wife of Charles A. Crane, Appt., v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Company, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Caroline Stannard Tilton, Deceased, et al. No. 306. Submitted February 23, 1909. Decided November 8, 1909.

Published Documents:

Articles:

Arminjon, Pierre, and Crabitès, Pierre. “Al-Azhar University.” Nineteenth Century 98 (1925): 540-549. Bassard, Leon Pierre Joseph, and Crabitès, Pierre. “Centenary of the Revue des Deux Mondes.” Nineteenth Century 106 (1929): 710-716. Brinton, Jasper, “The Closing of the Mixed Courts of Egypt.” American Journal of International Law 44 (1950): 303-312. ---. “The Egyptian Mixed Courts and Foreign Armed Forces.” American Journal of International Law 40 (1946): 737-741. ---. “Egypt: The Transition Period.” American Journal of International Law 34 (1940): 208-219. ---. “Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt.” American Journal of International Law 38 (1944): 375-382. ---. “The Mixed Courts of Egypt.” American Journal of International Law

281 20 (1926): 670-688. ---. “Suits against Foreign States.” American Journal of International Law 25 (1931): 50-62. Crabitès, Pierre. “The Abyssinian ‘Superiority Complex.’” Catholic World 142 (1935): 10-17. ---. “American Negro Mohammedans.” Catholic World 136 (1933): 559-566. ---. “American Presidential Election.” Fortnightly Review 130 (1928): 174-183. ---. “American Presidential Elections.” Nineteenth Century 96 (1924): 719-726. ---. “American Thoughts on the Suez Canal.” Asia 31 (1931): 40-45. ---. “Bust of Queen Nefertete.” Catholic World 139 (1934): 207-212. ---. “Britain’s Debt to King Farouk.” Foreign Affairs 19 (1941): 852-860. ---. “The Capitulations are in Harmony with the Present State of Egypt.” Tulane Law Review V: 245 ff. ---. “Charles de Foucauld: Explorer and Hermit.” Catholic World 127 (1928): 152-159. ---. “Chinese Gordon: Religious Enthusiast and Military Genius.” Catholic World 136 (1933): 385-389. ---. “Coptic Art and the Cairo Museum.” Catholic World 129 (1929): 275-283. ---. “Coptic Art in Old Cairo.” Asia 29 (1929): 712-715. ---. “Cultural Dominions of France.” Nineteenth Century 104 (1928): 176-183. ---. “Cyprus and Her Heritage.” Catholic World 134 (1931): 325-329. ---. “The Courts of Egypt.” American Bar Association Journal 11 (1925): 485- 491. ---. “The Diamond Jubilee of the Nile.” Catholic World 137 (1933): 535-541. ---. “Downing Street and Mussolini.” Commonweal 23 (1936): 397-398. ---. “Egypt, the Sudan and the Nile,” Foreign Affairs (1924). ---. “Egypt Signs a Treaty.” Current History 45 (1937): 93-99. ---. “Emancipation in Retrospect.” Commonweal 9 (1929): 650-651. ---. “England and the Suez Canal.” Commonweal 23 (1935): 5-6. ---. “England’s Fifty Years in Egypt.” Nineteenth Century 112 (1932): 36-49. ---. “Ethiopia and Africa.” Commonweal 22 (1935): 485-586. ---. “Fact and Fiction in Egypt.” Asia 25 (1925): 401-407. ---. “Ferdinand de Lesseps and the Suez Canal.” Nineteenth Century 100 (1926): 586-593. ---. “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt.” Nineteenth Century (1926): 364-372. ---. “Guarding Suez.” Asia 37 (1937): 24-25. ---. “In the Shadow of Al-Azhar.” Asia 29 (1929): 300-05. ---. “Is it time for a Catholic President?” Outlook 146 (1927):504-508. ---. “Islam, Divorce, and Decadence.” Catholic World 127 (1928): 660-668. ---. “Ismail the Magnificent.” Nineteenth Century 102 (1927): 108-119. ---. “A Jewish Political State in Palestine.” Current History 31 (1931): 749-757. ---. “Journalism along the Nile.” Asia 27 (1927): 992-997. ---. “Lesser of Two Evils.” Commonweal 26 (1937): 63-64. ---. “Madame Récamier and Her Admirers.” Catholic World 130 (1930): 687- 694.

282 ---. “Married Women’s Property Rights.” Nineteenth Century 92 (1922): 136- 151. ---. “Martyr of Khartum.” Asia 38 (1933): 118-124. ---. “A Master stroke of Psychology.” Catholic World 148 (1938):190-197. ---. “Maximillan and Charlotte of Mexico.” Catholic World 135 (1932): 700-709. ---. “Minorities in Egypt.” Commonweal 10 (1929): 641-642. ---. “Morocco, A Danger Spot in World Politics.” Current History 24 (1926): 829-838. ---. “Moslem Education in Egypt.” Catholic World 132 (1931):709-716. ---. “The Mother of Alphonso XIII.” Catholic World 133 (1931): 270-275. ---. “Mother of the Egyptians.” Asia 38 (1938): 21-22. ---. “Muhammad as a Champion of Woman.” Nineteenth Century 96 (1924): 137-145. ---. “Napoleon Bonaparte and the Code Napoleon.” American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927): 439-443. ---. “National Sovereignty.” Commonweal 23 (1935): 173-174. ---. “The Nile in International Politics.” Catholic World 142 (1935): 410-416. ---. “Nile Waters Agreement.” Foreign Affairs 8 (1929):145-149. ---. “The Omnipotent Bar of Islam and the Egyptian Captiulations.” American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927): 694-696. ---. “Our African Cotton Rivals,” The North American Review 223 (1926):16- 32. ---. “Palestine Problems.” Commonweal 11 (1930): 360-361. ---. “Palestine and Zionism.” Catholic World 146 (1937): 12-18. ---. “Partition of Palestine.” Current History 46 (1937): 36-39. ---. “President Roosevelt, Jefferson and the South.” Catholic World 146 (1938): 405-411. ---. “Price of British Withdrawal from Egypt.” Asia 26 (1926): 702-707. ---. “Princess des Ursins: An Ambassadress of France.” Catholic World 144 (1937): 444-452. ---. “Problem of the Nile.” Current History 32 (1930): 737-742. ---. “Rhodes, the Outpost of Rome.” Fortnightly Review 133 (1930): 229-232. ---. “Rome’s Opportunity.” Commonweal 16 (1932): 525-526. ---. “Rum Runners and Blockade Runners.” North American Review 225 (1928): 545-547. ---. “Republicanism in France and Germany.” Nineteenth Century 87 (1920): 874-884. ---. “Some Reflections on the Spanish Inquisition.” Catholic World 126 (1927): 389- 390. ---. “Spanish Politics of To-Day.” Nineteenth Century 99 (1926): 830-836. ---. “Spiritual Empire of France.” Catholic World 126 (1928): 600-606. ---. “Storm Rising in Palestine.” Atlantic Monthly 160 (1937): 101-107. ---. “Strategic Aspect of Palestine.” Commonweal 26 (1937): 509-510. ---. “Sudan Challenges the South.” Atlantic Monthly 143 (1929): 385-389. ---. “Suez Canal as an International Waterway.” Current History 24 (126): 216- 222.

283 ---. “Toward Peace in Palestine.” Catholic World 148 (1939): 553-560. ---. “Things Mahomet did for Women.” Asia 27 (1927): 44-45. ---. “Valeriano Weyler, Spain’s Veteran Soldier-Statesman.” Current History 31 (1929): 335-340. ---. “The Wage of the American Diplomatist.” Catholic World 130 (1930): 405- 449. ---. “What’s Wrong with Marriage?” Commonweal 12 (1930): 153-154. ---. “White South, or Black?” North American Review 227 (1929): 227-241. ---. “Who Rules France?” South Atlantic Quarterly 31 (1932): 366-373. ---. “Why Kill Foreign Trade?” Commonweal 17 (1933): 287-288. ---. “Woman and Her Purse.” Catholic World 131 (1930): 319-326. ---. “Woman and the Crisis in Egypt.” Asia 25 (1925): 568-572. ---. “World Court is not a Court.” Commonweal 12 (1930): 663-664. Crabitès, Pierre, and Uhler, J.E. “America, Noncombatant Belligerent.” Catholic World 151 (1940): 394-399. ---. “Calm Before the Storm.” Catholic World 150 (1939): 324-329. ---. “France is not a Democracy.” Catholic World 152 (1941): 664-672. ---. “Keep Marching Around Jericho.” Catholic World 149 (1939): 550-556. ---. “Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine.” Catholic World (1940): 22-27. ---. “Mufti of Jerusalem.” Commonweal 31 (1939): 71-72. ---. “Wishful Thinking and the War.” Catholic World 150 (1939): 138-144. ---. “Woman through the Ages.” Nineteenth Century 93 (1923): 140-147.

Books:

Brinton, Jasper. The Mixed Courts of Egypt. Rev. ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968. Crabitès, Pierre. Americans in the Egyptian Army. London: Routledge, 1938. ---. Trans. Armenia and the Armenians: From the Earliest Times to the Great War. New York: Macmillan, 1920. ---. Beneš, Statesman of Central Europe. London: Routledge, 1935. ---. Britain’s Debt to King Farouk. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1941. ---. Clement VII and Henry VIII. London: Routledge, 1936. ---. Gordon, The Sudan and Slavery. London: Routledge, 1933. ---. Ibrahim of Egypt. London: Routledge, 1935. ---. Ismail, The Maligned Khedive. London: Routledge, 1938. ---. Trans. Movables and Immovables. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Law Institute,1940. ---. The Spoilation of Suez. London: Routledge, 1940. ---. Unhappy Spain. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1937. ---. Victoria’s Guardian Angel: A Study of Baron Stockmar. London: Routledge, 1937. ---. The Winning of the Sudan. London, Routledge, 1934. Patton, Pier. Pseudonym. “Why the Peace Conference Should Requite Persia’s

284 Wrongs.” Paris: Imprimerie Georges Cadet, 1919. Lippmann, Walter. Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. Orig pub in 1914. Marshall, J. E., The Egyptian Enigma, 1890-1928. London: John Murray, 1928. Russell, Sir Thomas Pasha. Egyptian Service, 1902-1946. London: John Murray, 1949.

Newspapers:

Al-Ahram (Cairo), 1921-1936. Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 1921-1924. Le Journal du Caire (Cairo), 1921-1924. Le Temps (Paris), 1921-1924. Times (London), 1921-1924. New York Times, 1921-1924.

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285 Cohen, Michael J., and Martin Kolinsky, eds. Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943-55. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Collier, Basil. The Lion and the Eagle: British and Anglo-American Strategy, 1900- 1950. London: Macdonald, 1972. Conrad, Lawrence I. ed. The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry. Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1989. Coville, Alfred and Harold Temperley eds. Studies in Anglo-French History DuringThe Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Freeport, NY: Books For Libraries Press, 1967. Daniel, Robert L. American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960. Athens, OH:Ohio University Press, 1970. DeNovo, John A. American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1963. Diner, Stephen J. A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998. Ellis, Kail C. ed. The Vatican, Islam, and the Middle East. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987. Fage, J.D. and Roland Oliver eds., The Cambridge History of Africa, vols. 5-8, Cambridge, UK: 1986. Feldman, Egal. The Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, 1895-1906. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981. Field, James A. Jr. America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Finnie, David H. Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East. Cambridge, MA: 1967. Fisher, John. Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916-1919. London: Frank Cass, 1999. Ford, Corey. Donovan of OSS. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. Forth, Christopher E. The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of French Manhood. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. Goldschmidt, Arthur Jr. Historical Dictionary of Egypt. London: The Scarecrow Press, 1994. ---. Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1988. Grabill, Joseph L. Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971. Hass, Edward F. Political Leadership in a Southern City: New Orleans in the Progressive Era, 1896-1902. Ruston, LA: McGinty Publications, 1988. Hair, Wiliam Ivy. Carnival of Fury: Robert Charles and the New Orleans Race Riot of I900. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1976. Hayne, M.B. The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Hirch, Arnold and Joseph Logsdon eds. Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992.

286 Holt, Peter M. Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History. London: Longmans, 1966. Hoyle, Mark. The Mixed Courts of Egypt. London: Graham and Trotman, 1991. Hurewitz, J.C. Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1953. Hymoff, Edward. The OSS in World War II. New York: Richardson and Steirman, 1986. Jackson, Joy J. New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics and Urban Progress, 1880-1896. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. James, T.G.H. Howard Carter: The Path to Tutankhamun. London: Kegan Paul International, 1992. Johnson, Martin P. The Dreyfus Affair: Honour and Politics in the Belle Époque. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Keiger, J.F. V. France and the World Since 1870. London: Arnold, 2001. Kerr, William A. Doctoral Dissertation: American Involvement with the Vatican as a Moral Force in International Politics, 1939-1945. Florida State University, 1975. Link, Arthur S., and Richard McCormick. Progressivism. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1983. Mansfield, Peter. The British in Egypt. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Marlowe, John. Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism: A Study in Power Politics. London: The Cresset Press, 1961. ---. A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1956. 2nd ed. Hamden, CN: Archon Books, 1965. Marsot, Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid. A Short History of Modern Egypt. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Mathews, Joseph J. Egypt and the Formation of the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939. Mattar, Philip. The Mufti of Jersulem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement. New York: Press, 1988. Miceli, Augusto P. The Pickwick Club of New Orleans. New Orleans: Pickwick Press,1964. Mitchell, Reid. All on a Mardi Gras Day: Episodes in the History of New Orleans Carnival. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. Morley, John F. Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust, 1939- 1943. New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1980. Persico, Joseph E. Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage. New York: Random House, 2001. Pichon, Charles. The Vatican and its Role in World Affairs. Trans. Jean Misrahi. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1969. Polk, William R. The Arab World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. ---. The United States and the Arab World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969. Prümmer, Dominicus M. ed., Manuale Thaeologiae Moralius: Secundum

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288 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Brian R. Parkinson

Assistant Professor, Georgia Southwestern State University

Education:

Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History, Florida State University, Fall 2005 - Dissertation “Pierre Crabitès: A Bourbon Democrat in Egypt, 1877-1943” Summer Institute for Intensive Arabic Language and Culture (SINARC), Lebanese-American University, Summer 2004 - Advanced Classical Arabic and Advanced Colloquial Arabic M.A. in Middle Eastern History, with thesis, Florida State University, Summer 2002 -Thesis “Judge Pierre Crabitès: An American in Egypt, 1877-1943” B.A. in History, Georgia Southern University, Winter 1997

Awards:

Office of Graduate Studies, Dissertation Research Grant, February 18, 2005 Wright-Richardson Memorial Dissertation Research Grant, June 2, 2004

Teaching Experience:

Georgia Southwestern State University

Fall 2005- Assistant Professor: HST 1111, World Civilization I Fall 2005- Assistant Professor: HST 1112, World Civilization II Fall 2005- Assistant Professor: HST 4900, History of the Middle East

Florida State University

Summer 2005- Instructor of Record: ASH 1044, Middle Eastern Civilization Spring 2005 – Instructor of Record: ASH 1044, Middle Eastern Civilization Spring 2003 – Instructor of Record: WOH 1030, Modern World since 1815 Fall 2003 – Instructor of Record: WOH 1023, Modern World to 1815

Florida State University London Study Centre

Spring 2004- Instructor of Record: WOH 1023, Modern World to 1815: Non- Western World History - Instructor of Record: WOH 1030, Modern World Since 1815: The British Empire as World History

294

Tallahassee Community College

Spring 2005- Adjunct Professor: AMH 2020, History of the United States II Fall 2004- Adjunct Professor: AMH 2020, History of the United States II - Adjunct Professor: EUH 1001, Western Civilization II

Non-teaching Experience:

Summer 2003 - Research Assistant: Middle East Center, Florida State University, -Webmaster and System Administrator Fall 2002 - Graduate Assistant: Grader for American Civilization Florida State University Fall 2000 - Summer 2002: Research Assistant: Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University - Transcriber and Interviewer

Publications:

“Externalization vs Internalization: Adapting Central Asia to World History,” World History Bulletin, (Spring 2005) “Incorporating Central Asia into World History: An Outline,” World History Bulletin Vol. XX No. 2 (Fall 2004), 26-27. “1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon,” Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Wars (Forthcoming)

Unpublished Conference Papers:

International Presentations:

“Ariel Sharon and Operation Peace for Galilee” Association of Third World Studies Twenty-third Annual Meeting, November 20-22, 2005, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic “Sher Ali and the Fight to Save Afghanistan, 1876-1879” Invited Speaker: London University, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), February 16, 2004, London, United Kingdom “Elite Iranian Perspective on the Iranian Revolution” International World History Association Twelfth Annual Conference, June 26 - 29, 2003, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia

Regional Presentations:

“Flight from Iran” Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Southeast World History Association, October 17 - 19, 2002, Columbus, Georgia

295 "Preparing Future Faculty: Crossing the Boundary from Research I School to the Real World of Teaching World History” Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Southeast World History Association, October 17 - 19, 2002, Columbus, Georgia “Pierre Crabitès: An American Judge on the Mixed Courts of Egypt” Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Southeast World History Association, October 4 - 7, 2001, Tallahassee, Florida

Research Languages:

Foreign Language Research Competence- Introductory (1); Intermediate (2); Advanced (3); Proficient (4); Fluent (5): Arabic(4), French(3), German(4) and Latin(2)

Archives Consulted:

La Bibliotheque Nationale (Mitterand) - Paris, France The British Library, London, United Kingdom Le Quay d’Orsay - Paris, France Les Archives Nationales - Paris, France National Archives I - Washington D.C. National Archives II - College Park, Maryland Public Record Office (PRO) - London, United Kingdom

Teaching Fields:

Modern Middle East Modern North Africa World Civilization I World Civilization II Asia Sub-Saharan Africa American Civilization Ancient and Medieval Civilization Russia and Central Asia Western Civilization

Service:

2005-2007, Faculty Committee on Institutional Research 2003-2004, President: Phi Alpha Theta (History Honor Society) 2002-2003, Secretary: Phi Alpha Theta 1999-2000, Vice-President: Medieval Studies Student Organization

Computer Experience:

Summer 2003 – Fall 2003, Webmaster and System Administrator for the Middle

296 East Studies Center at Florida State University

Professional Associations:

American Research Center for Egypt (ARCE) American Historical Association Association of Third World Studies Phi Alpha Theta, History Honor Society World History Association h-Levant

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