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Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

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THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public CHILD POLICY service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and effective PUBLIC SAFETY solutions that address the challenges facing the public SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. 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RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY STUDY • PAPER 4 Money in the Bank Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, Paraag Shukla Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN 978-0-8330-4159-3 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This paper is a product of one of several RAND Corporation research projects examining U.S. political and military capabilities for fighting a spectrum of current and future insurgency threats. It should be of interest to academics, policymakers, military science specialists, intel- ligence analysts, and laypersons within the United States and elsewhere who may be interested in learning the applicability of lessons from past counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to the insurgencies the United States faces today and may face in the future. The six cases profiled in this paper include the Philippines (1899–1902), Algeria (1954–1962), Vietnam (1959–1972), El Salvador (1980–1992), Jammu and Kashmir (1947–present), and Colombia (1963–present). They were selected to explore COIN operations in regions with varied characteristics relat- ing to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency, and the level of U.S. or foreign involvement, among others. The issues addressed in this paper pertain to the success or failure of several counterinsurgency operations, the counterinsurgents’ ability to innovate and adapt, and the need for a way to recognize the threat and determine what is needed to confront it. The authors hope that this paper will add to the ever-growing body of literature on COIN and will abet the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for COIN in addition to those cited in the newly released U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5). This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of insurgency. Instead, it exam- ines a handful of insurgencies to determine which TTPs the insurgents and counterinsurgents employed and then develops some general conclusions on counterinsurgency operations that could be applied to the 21st century. To this end, the authors have included theories and les- sons learned from the past, as well as contemporary debates on the topic, which may not neces- sarily pertain to the lessons learned from these particular case studies. Although this paper had several authors, Lesley Anne Warner, as the lead author, was responsible for collating the various chapters, ensuring cohesiveness and continuity in the case study analyses, and enumerating overall lessons from the various counterinsurgency operations that are described here. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the iii iv Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James_Dobbins@rand. org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050. More information about RAND is available at http://www.rand.org/. Contents Preface .......................................................................................................... iii Figures and Tables ............................................................................................ vii Summary ....................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgments............................................................................................. xvii Abbreviations .................................................................................................. xix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO The Philippines (1899–1902) ............................................................................... 7 Origins and Characteristics of the Insurgency ............................................................. 7 Strengths of the Insurgents ................................................................................... 9 Weaknesses of the Insurgents................................................................................. 10 Strengths of the Counterinsurgents.......................................................................... 11 Weaknesses of the Counterinsurgents ....................................................................... 14 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 15 CHAPTER THREE Algeria (1954–1962)......................................................................................... 17 Introduction ................................................................................................... 17 Origins and Characteristics of the Insurgency ............................................................ 17 Strengths of the Insurgents .................................................................................. 20 Weaknesses of the Insurgents................................................................................ 22 Strengths of the Counterinsurgents ........................................................................ 23 Weaknesses of the Counterinsurgents ..................................................................... 24 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 25 CHAPTER FOUR Vietnam (1959–1972) ....................................................................................... 27 Introduction ..................................................................................................
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