NSA Global SIGINT Highlights US Sets NSA on Japan over Cherry Feud

WikiLeaks release: July 31, 2015

Keywords: National Security Agency, NSA, Top Secret, SIGINT, NOFORN, intelligence, intercept, espionage, United States, USA, Japan, European Union, EU, Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, MAFF, US Department of Agriculture, food imports, trade liberalization, agriculture, inspections, beef, cherries Restraint: TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN Title: Japanese Strive to Avoid Damage to U.S. Relations Over Cherry Imports Date: 2009 Organisation: National Security Agency (NSA) Author: Summary Services Office Link: https://wikileaks.org/nsa-japan Pages:1 Description This is a Secret US National Security Agency (NSA) 2009 report derived from intelligence intercepts of officials within the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The report indicates that the National Security Agency knew of the options under consideration within the Ministry for how Japan should seek to patch up bilateral relations with the US over a trade dispute concerning the import of US cherries. Among the options being discussed were the use of back channels to share information with Washington. The report indicates that the main Japanese incentive is the avoidance of politicization of the trade issue in Washington. Japanese Strive to Avoid Damage to U.S. Relations Over Cherry Imports (TS//SI//OC/NF)

(TS//SI//OC/NF) Officials in the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) appeared recently to be seeking ways to prevent damage to relations with the U.S. over the ministry's decision to delay the importation of U.S.­origin cherries, a decision driven by Japanese politicians and growers. MAFF was alarmed by the very strong reaction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to Tokyo's ruling that imports could not commence until the end of this month, when a pilot program involving inspections in the U.S. Pacific Northwest by a MAFF inspector is expected to be concluded satisfactorily. One approach under consideration is to have the ministry admit to Washington, through back channels, that the decision had been the product of political pressure. Also, it was recommended that the U.S. be notified that­­unlike in the beef dispute­­imports could begin as soon as the result of on­site inspection is confirmed, rather than after the inspector had returned to Japan and more tests conducted. The principal fear among the Japanese is that the issue will become similarly politicized, possibly at senior levels, in Washington.

Unconventional

Japanese governmental

Z­3/OO/515570­09, 221708Z