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National Security Act of 1947.Xml G:\COMP\INTEL\NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.XML NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 [Chapter 343; 61 Stat. 496; approved July 26, 1947] [As Amended Through P.L. 116–283, Enacted January 1, 2021] øCurrency: This publication is a compilation of the text of Chapter 343 of the 80th Congress. It was last amended by the public law listed in the As Amended Through note above and below at the bottom of each page of the pdf version and reflects current law through the date of the enactment of the public law listed at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/comps/¿ øNote: While this publication does not represent an official version of any Federal statute, substantial efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of its contents. The official version of Federal law is found in the United States Statutes at Large and in the United States Code. The legal effect to be given to the Statutes at Large and the United States Code is established by statute (1 U.S.C. 112, 204).¿ AN ACT To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Depart- ment of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SHORT TITLE That ø50 U.S.C. 3001¿ this Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Security Act of 1947’’. TABLE OF CONTENTS Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. Sec. 3. Definitions. TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Sec. 101. National Security Council. Sec. 101A. Joint Intelligence Community Council. Sec. 102. Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 102A. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 103. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 103A. Deputy Directors of National Intelligence. Sec. 103B. National Intelligence Council. Sec. 103C. General Counsel. Sec. 103D. Civil Liberties Protection Officer. Sec. 103E. Director of Science and Technology. Sec. 103F. Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. Sec. 103G. Chief Information Officer. Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Sec. 103I. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community. Sec. 103J. Functional managers for the intelligence community. Sec. 104. Central Intelligence Agency. Sec. 104A. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 1 February 26, 2021 As Amended Through P.L. 116-283, Enacted January 1, 2021 VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Feb 26, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 9001 Sfmt 6611 G:\COMP\INTEL\NSAO1.BEL HOLC G:\COMP\INTEL\NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.XML NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 2 Sec. 105. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to the National In- telligence Program. Sec. 105A. Assistance to United States law enforcement agencies. Sec. 105B. Disclosure of foreign intelligence acquired in criminal investigations; no- tice of criminal investigations of foreign intelligence sources. Sec. 106. Appointment of officials responsible for intelligence-related activities. Sec. 106A. Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. øItem relating to section 107 was repealed by section 6742(a)(2) of division E of Public Law 116– 92..¿ Sec. 108. Annual National Security Strategy Report. Sec. 108A. National intelligence strategy. Sec. 108B. Annual reports on world-wide threats. 1 Sec. 109. Software licensing. Sec. 110. National mission of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United Nations. Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel—intelligence community as- signment program. Sec. 113A. Non-reimbursable detail of other personnel. Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, or mathe- matics positions. Sec. 114. Annual report on hiring and retention of minority employees. Sec. 115. Limitation on establishment or operation of diplomatic intelligence sup- port centers. Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection personnel. Sec. 117. POW/MIA analytic capability. Sec. 118. Annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets. Sec. 119. National Counterterrorism Center. Sec. 119A. National Counter Proliferation Center. Sec. 119B. National intelligence centers. Sec. 119C. Foreign Malign Influence Response Center. Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council. TITLE II—THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Sec. 201. Department of Defense. øItems relating to sections 202–204 were re- pealed by section 6742(a)(4) of division E of Public Law 116–92..¿ Sec. 205. Department of the Army. Sec. 206. Department of the Navy. Sec. 207. Department of the Air Force. TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS Sec. 301. National Security Agency voluntary separation. Sec. 302. Authority of Federal Bureau of Investigation to award personal services contracts. Sec. 303. Advisory committees and personnel. Sec. 304. Reporting of certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees. Sec. 307. Authorization for appropriations. Sec. 308. Definitions. Sec. 309. Separability. Sec. 310. Effective date. Sec. 311. Succession to the Presidency. Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions. TITLE V—ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 501. General congressional oversight provisions. Sec. 502. Reporting of intelligence activities other than covert actions. Sec. 503. Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions. Sec. 504. Funding of intelligence activities. Sec. 505. Notice to Congress of certain transfers of defense articles and defense services. 1 The toc item of section 108B does not match the section heading. The toc item reads ‘‘world- wide’’ while the section heading reads ‘‘worldwide’’. See amendments made by section 617 of division W of Public Law 116-260. February 26, 2021 As Amended Through P.L. 116-283, Enacted January 1, 2021 VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Feb 26, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 9001 Sfmt 6611 G:\COMP\INTEL\NSAO1.BEL HOLC G:\COMP\INTEL\NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.XML 3 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 Sec. 506. Specificity of National Intelligence Program budget amounts for counter- terrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and counterintel- ligence. Sec. 506A. Budget treatment of costs of acquisition of major systems by the intel- ligence community. Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community. Sec. 506C. Vulnerability assessments of major systems. Sec. 506D. Intelligence community business system transformation. Sec. 506E. Reports on the acquisition of major systems. Sec. 506F. Critical cost growth in major systems. Sec. 506G. Future budget projections. Sec. 506H. Reports on security clearances. Sec. 506I. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sec. 507. Dates for submittal of various annual and semiannual reports to the con- gressional intelligence committees. Sec. 508. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements. Sec. 509. Auditability of certain elements of the intelligence community. Sec. 510. Significant interpretations of law concerning intelligence activities. Sec. 511. Annual report on violations of law or executive order. Sec. 512. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. TITLE VI—PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Sec. 601. Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence of- ficers, agents, informants, and sources. Sec. 602. Defenses and exceptions. Sec. 603. Extraterritorial jurisdiction. Sec. 604. Providing information to Congress. Sec. 605. Definitions. TITLE VII—PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES Sec. 701. Operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec. 702. Operational files of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Sec. 703. Operational files of the National Reconnaissance Office. Sec. 704. Operational files of the National Security Agency. Sec. 705. Operational files of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Sec. 706. Protection of certain files of the Office of the Director of National Intel- ligence. TITLE VIII—ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION Sec. 801. Procedures. Sec. 802. Requests by authorized investigative agencies. Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent. Sec. 804. Exceptions. Sec. 805. Definitions. TITLE IX—APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 901. Stay of sanctions. Sec. 902. Extension of stay. Sec. 903. Reports. Sec. 904. Laws subject to stay. TITLE X—EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Subtitle A—Science and Technology Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate degrees in science and technology. Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training. Subtitle B—Foreign Languages Program Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence community. Sec. 1012. Education partnerships. Sec. 1013. Voluntary services. February 26, 2021 As Amended Through P.L. 116-283, Enacted January 1, 2021 VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Feb 26, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 9001 Sfmt 6611 G:\COMP\INTEL\NSAO1.BEL HOLC G:\COMP\INTEL\NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.XML Sec. 2 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 4 Sec. 1014. Regulations. Sec. 1015. Definitions. Subtitle
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