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In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing By David L. Bashow, OMM, CD, MA 28 In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 Editor’s note: This article was provided as part of a letter to the editor (Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol 2, No. 4) written in response to “Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris” by Major Lynne Chaloux (Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol 2, No. 2). Much of the material contained in this article was taken from the author’s book, None But the Brave, published in 2009. Introduction strong continental army, loath to revisit the abattoir of massive armies stalemated in bloody confrontation that hile few of even his most ardent had characterized the Western Front critics would judge Sir Arthur during the First World War, and realizing Travers Harris, the longest-serving that a naval blockade of Germany was Wwartime commander of Royal Air Force impossible in this war (due to the (RAF) Bomber Command, as anything strength of the German navy), the bomber less than an outstanding war leader, offensive became the only viable means this does not mean that his leadership of striking back. It provided a massive was flawless or that it did not generate diversion to the Soviet allies at a time considerable controversy. However, those when none other was possible, and it flaws need to be placed in perspective constituted the very embodiment of and measured against the wartime gains an overall guerrilla warfare strategy, to Allied victory that were generated by attacking the enemy on its peripheries, the strategic courses of action he followed in this case its industrial centres. with such dogged determination. To that end, this article will attempt to address From 1942 onwards, the Combined the majority of the controversial elements Bomber Offensive (CBO) was a highly associated with his leadership, with effective, prolonged, cooperative overall emphasis upon the success/failure effort between the American United of the strategic area bombing campaign. States Strategic and Tactical Air Force (USSTAF) and the “British” or Bomber And now, to war Command camps. While both camps at times placed the emphasis of efforts upon different components of the enemy’s For much of the war, the bomber war-making capabilities, there was a offensive constituted for Britain and tremendous amount of overall synergism the Dominions the only viable form of and mutual support. For example, the offensive action against a thoroughly combined efforts of Bomber Command evil, repressive regime. Lacking a and the USSTAF ultimately destroyed In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing 29 THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 virtually all of Germany’s coke (which London and demoralize its citizens by is coal after the removal of associated bombardment but also paralyse Britain’s gases), ferroalloy and synthetic rubber broader industrial and commercial industries; 95 per cent of its fuel, hard capabilities. In sum, therefore: coal and rubber capacity; and 90 per cent of its steel-making capacity.1 Conversely, Inch by painful inch, both British Bomber Command attacked many and German policies were slipping precision manufacturing targets during from ones aimed at precise the course of the war. objectives to ones of area bombing with psychological overtones. On Very early on, Bomber Command 2 September, for example, Portal determined that daylight attacks were [Sir Charles Portal, Air Officer cost prohibitive in terms of aircrew Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) and aircraft losses, accepting the fact Bomber Command] observed that that the protective mantle of darkness although he was not yet involved in would also, until improvements could be attempts to burn down whole towns, made, adversely affect navigation and “that stage would come.” The next bombing accuracy. Then followed a long day Churchill asked that Bomber period of changing attack priorities and Command “pulverise the entire lacklustre, indecisive bombing results. industry and scientific structure” And, in terms of policy inputs from of the German war economy; and, senior leadership, as early as 8 July 1940, three days later, he called for a series Churchill had written: of “minor” but “widespread” attacks on smaller German towns intended When I look round to see how we to destroy the population’s faith in can win the war I see that there their air defences.3 is only one sure path. We have no continental army which can defeat While enemy oil assets continued to be the German military power. The a high priority target when the weather blockade is broken and Hitler has cooperated, on 9 July 1941, yet another Asia and probably Africa to draw policy directive postulated that “the from. Should he be repulsed here weakest points in [the enemy’s] armour or not try invasion, he will recoil lie in the morale of the civilian population eastward, and we have nothing to stop and in his inland transportation system.”4 him. But there is one thing that will This directive would pave the way bring him back and bring him down, for even broader policy changes, and and that is an absolutely devastating, henceforth, Germany would be bombed exterminating attack by very heavy more frequently, with greater intensity bombers from this country upon the and with less target discrimination. Nazi homeland.2 Throughout the first half of 1941, it In counterpoint, on 9 October 1940, was becoming increasingly obvious that after repeated attacks upon the British the night campaign was not meeting cities, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, damage expectations. Delivery accuracy Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was still woefully inadequate. A 1941 made public a plan to not only obliterate analysis commissioned by Churchill’s 30 In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 scientific advisor, Frederick Lindemann daylight raids—was considered just (later Lord Cherwell), and known as the too dangerous. Butt Report ultimately stressed the need to examine bombing techniques and to In sum, the Butt Report deemed the improve navigational procedures, as bombing—with respect to accuracy the only realistic alternative—massive and results obtained for the costs In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing 31 THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 incurred—pathetic. In the near future, told his deputy to tell Bomber Command in acknowledgement of existing and Headquarters that ‘the aiming points are anticipated capabilities, less target to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, discrimination would be demanded and the dockyards or aircraft factories where more aids to navigation and targeting these are mentioned.’”7 This last point would be developed. Lord Cherwell, deserves emphasis, for it acknowledges a firm believer in the efficacy of area the command’s non-precision capabilities bombing and in full agreement with at this particular point of the war as the Butt Report, presented a seminal well as the generalized propensity paper to Cabinet that advocated area in the Western world for building up bombing as the keystone of a concentrated suburbs around industrial complexes. strategic bombing campaign against the It is also important to understand that Axis forces. The plan proposed attacking aiming for the hub of an industrial city Germany’s industrial centres in order to was likely to inflict damage upon key destroy as much working-class housing as transportation and communications nodes, possible in order to displace the German such as telephone and telegraph command work force and to disrupt/reduce their services, railway stations and marshalling ability to work.5 yards, since they tended to be centralized within urban developments. The next pivotal bombing policy direction came on 14 February 1942, with And while it is probably fair to say the release of Policy Directive #22. Issued that urban centres of the industrial cities by Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, were the default aim point of Bomber former AOC-in-C Bomber Command Command throughout much of the war, and now Chief of the Air Staff, and as it must be emphasized that the industrial a direct result of the Butt Report and city bombing constituted only a portion Cherwell’s approved Cabinet presentation, of the command’s efforts. To be precise, Portal mandated that, henceforth, the of Bomber Command’s wartime total of primary objective of Bomber Command nearly 1,000,000 tons [907,000 tonnes] was to be “the morale of the enemy of ordnance expended—or half the civil population and in particular, of Anglo–American aggregate dropped upon the industrial workers.”6 These attacks the Third Reich and its proxies—only were to be manifested as large raids 431,000 tons [391,000 tonnes] (43 per cent) upon selected area targets in the major were dropped upon the industrial cities. industrial areas of Germany, and while Quite simply, Bomber Command was industrial, military and infrastructure not a force dedicated to the assault of aim points were always to be identified Germany’s economic system.8 and specified, collateral damage in terms of “dehousing” the civilian population A new helmsman was considered an acceptable, indeed a desirable, adjunct to the bombing. The Ruhr area, especially Essen, as well On 24 February 1942, Arthur Harris as Berlin, were considered of primary became the AOC-in-C of Bomber interest. Further, “to make sure there Command. Throughout the war, Harris was no misunderstanding about what would remain hostile to the concept of was being called for, the next day Portal “panacea” targets, specific elements 32 In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL.
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