THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014

In Praise of Harris and Area Bombing

By David L. Bashow, OMM, CD, MA

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Editor’s note: This article was provided as part of a letter to the editor (Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol 2, No. 4) written in response to “Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris” by Major Lynne Chaloux (Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol 2, No. 2). Much of the material contained in this article was taken from the author’s book, None But the Brave, published in 2009.

Introduction strong continental army, loath to revisit the abattoir of massive armies stalemated in bloody confrontation that hile few of even his most ardent had characterized the Western Front critics would judge Sir Arthur during the First World War, and realizing Travers Harris, the longest-serving that a naval blockade of Germany was Wwartime commander of impossible in this war (due to the (RAF) , as anything strength of the German navy), the bomber less than an outstanding war leader, offensive became the only viable means this does not mean that his leadership of striking back. It provided a massive was flawless or that it did not generate diversion to the Soviet allies at a time considerable controversy. However, those when none other was possible, and it flaws need to be placed in perspective constituted the very embodiment of and measured against the wartime gains an overall guerrilla warfare strategy, to Allied victory that were generated by attacking the enemy on its peripheries, the strategic courses of action he followed in this case its industrial centres. with such dogged determination. To that end, this article will attempt to address From 1942 onwards, the Combined the majority of the controversial elements Bomber Offensive (CBO) was a highly associated with his leadership, with effective, prolonged, cooperative overall emphasis upon the success/failure effort between the American United of the strategic area bombing campaign. States Strategic and Tactical Air Force (USSTAF) and the “British” or Bomber And now, to war Command camps. While both camps at times placed the emphasis of efforts upon different components of the enemy’s For much of the war, the bomber war-making capabilities, there was a offensive constituted for Britain and tremendous amount of overall synergism the Dominions the only viable form of and mutual support. For example, the offensive action against a thoroughly combined efforts of Bomber Command evil, repressive regime. Lacking a and the USSTAF ultimately destroyed

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virtually all of Germany’s coke (which London and demoralize its citizens by is coal after the removal of associated bombardment but also paralyse Britain’s gases), ferroalloy and synthetic rubber broader industrial and commercial industries; 95 per cent of its fuel, hard capabilities. In sum, therefore: coal and rubber capacity; and 90 per cent of its steel-making capacity.1 Conversely, Inch by painful inch, both British Bomber Command attacked many and German policies were slipping precision manufacturing targets during from ones aimed at precise the course of the war. objectives to ones of area bombing with psychological overtones. On Very early on, Bomber Command 2 September, for example, Portal determined that daylight attacks were [Sir Charles Portal, Air Officer cost prohibitive in terms of aircrew Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) and aircraft losses, accepting the fact Bomber Command] observed that that the protective mantle of darkness although he was not yet involved in would also, until improvements could be attempts to burn down whole towns, made, adversely affect navigation and “that stage would come.” The next bombing accuracy. Then followed a long day Churchill asked that Bomber period of changing attack priorities and Command “pulverise the entire lacklustre, indecisive bombing results. industry and scientific structure” And, in terms of policy inputs from of the German war economy; and, senior leadership, as early as 8 July 1940, three days later, he called for a series Churchill had written: of “minor” but “widespread” attacks on smaller German towns intended When I look round to see how we to destroy the population’s faith in can win the war I see that there their air defences.3 is only one sure path. We have no continental army which can defeat While enemy oil assets continued to be the German military power. The a high priority target when the weather blockade is broken and Hitler has cooperated, on 9 July 1941, yet another Asia and probably Africa to draw policy directive postulated that “the from. Should he be repulsed here weakest points in [the enemy’s] armour or not try invasion, he will recoil lie in the morale of the civilian population eastward, and we have nothing to stop and in his inland transportation system.”4 him. But there is one thing that will This directive would pave the way bring him back and bring him down, for even broader policy changes, and and that is an absolutely devastating, henceforth, Germany would be bombed exterminating attack by very heavy more frequently, with greater intensity from this country upon the and with less target discrimination. Nazi homeland.2 Throughout the first half of 1941, it In counterpoint, on 9 October 1940, was becoming increasingly obvious that after repeated attacks upon the British the night campaign was not meeting cities, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, damage expectations. Delivery accuracy Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was still woefully inadequate. A 1941 made public a plan to not only obliterate analysis commissioned by Churchill’s

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scientific advisor, Frederick Lindemann daylight raids—was considered just (later Lord Cherwell), and known as the too dangerous. ultimately stressed the need to examine bombing techniques and to In sum, the Butt Report deemed the improve navigational procedures, as bombing—with respect to accuracy the only realistic alternative—massive and results obtained for the costs

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incurred—pathetic. In the near future, told his deputy to tell Bomber Command in acknowledgement of existing and Headquarters that ‘the aiming points are anticipated capabilities, less target to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, discrimination would be demanded and the dockyards or aircraft factories where more aids to navigation and targeting these are mentioned.’”7 This last point would be developed. Lord Cherwell, deserves emphasis, for it acknowledges a firm believer in the efficacy of area the command’s non-precision capabilities bombing and in full agreement with at this particular point of the war as the Butt Report, presented a seminal well as the generalized propensity paper to Cabinet that advocated area in the Western world for building up bombing as the keystone of a concentrated suburbs around industrial complexes. campaign against the It is also important to understand that Axis forces. The plan proposed attacking aiming for the hub of an industrial city Germany’s industrial centres in order to was likely to inflict damage upon key destroy as much working-class housing as transportation and communications nodes, possible in order to displace the German such as telephone and telegraph command work force and to disrupt/reduce their services, railway stations and marshalling ability to work.5 yards, since they tended to be centralized within urban developments. The next pivotal bombing policy direction came on 14 February 1942, with And while it is probably fair to say the release of Policy Directive #22. Issued that urban centres of the industrial cities by Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, were the default aim point of Bomber former AOC-in-C Bomber Command Command throughout much of the war, and now Chief of the Air Staff, and as it must be emphasized that the industrial a direct result of the Butt Report and city bombing constituted only a portion Cherwell’s approved Cabinet presentation, of the command’s efforts. To be precise, Portal mandated that, henceforth, the of Bomber Command’s wartime total of primary objective of Bomber Command nearly 1,000,000 tons [907,000 tonnes] was to be “the morale of the enemy of ordnance expended—or half the civil population and in particular, of Anglo–American aggregate dropped upon the industrial workers.”6 These attacks the Third Reich and its proxies—only were to be manifested as large raids 431,000 tons [391,000 tonnes] (43 per cent) upon selected area targets in the major were dropped upon the industrial cities. industrial areas of Germany, and while Quite simply, Bomber Command was industrial, military and infrastructure not a force dedicated to the assault of aim points were always to be identified Germany’s economic system.8 and specified, collateral damage in terms of “” the civilian population A new helmsman was considered an acceptable, indeed a desirable, adjunct to the bombing. The Ruhr area, especially , as well On 24 February 1942, Arthur Harris as Berlin, were considered of primary became the AOC-in-C of Bomber interest. Further, “to make sure there Command. Throughout the war, Harris was no misunderstanding about what would remain hostile to the concept of was being called for, the next day Portal “panacea” targets, specific elements

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of the enemy’s military, industrial While Singleton’s report played down the and infrastructure capabilities and view that area bombing could win the war capacities that, if totally eliminated, by itself, he believed it would impede the would destroy its ability to wage war. German war effort and would also provide And although the accuracy of Bomber much-needed relief to the Soviet Union. Command increased remarkably over the He asserted that Germany’s war efforts course of the war, Harris believed that could be limited and hampered by attacks an enemy economy and social structure upon factories engaged in war work as could not be dislocated, thus forcing a well as by damage to communications political decision to capitulate, by an grids and public utility services. Reports attack on any single element. Electronic of the period coming in from citizens of aids, sophisticated marking techniques, neutral countries visiting the Third Reich stabilized automatic sights, vastly tended to bolster this view. Singleton improved weaponry as well as highly believed that significant gains could be refined and sophisticated attack tactics realized by tying-down enemy resources would significantly improve delivery required to defend against the bombing accuracies over the course of the war for threat and repair bomb damage, and he Bomber Command’s main force, although offered that enemy morale was also likely many of these refinements would not to be adversely affected by the bombing. fully blossom until the closing months He also saw a need for more sophisticated of the European war. However, with the target identification devices that were exception of several highly specialized, unaffected by atmospheric conditions, and precision-attack units (such as 617 he recommended the establishment of a and 9 Squadrons flying Lancasters specialized target identification force.10 and 106 Squadron of the Light Night Striking Force flying Mosquitos), the Harris and his planners took great heart bulk of Bomber Command remained “a from these findings, and accordingly, in blunt instrument,” generally incapable August, a specialized target identification of attacking targets with the uncanny and marking unit was officially precision, accuracy and reliability of established as the Pathfinder Force, today’s forces and munitions. This in #8 Group. Through trial and error as well mind, Harris pursued a broader strategy as the development and implementation that he believed would use that instrument of innovative techniques and equipment to best effect, and his dogged obstinacy for target detection and marking, the to reject all specific, exclusive types Pathfinders would significantly enhance of targets (notably ball bearings but the accuracy of the main-force bombing, particularly oil) would become the main particularly during the closing hours of objection to his wartime leadership of the European war. the command.9 However, in fairness to Harris, he had sound reasons for applying On an encouraging note for Bomber his broader strategy. Command during 1942, there was a growing body of evidence that, in spite The next pivotal policy determinant of the direct damage to German industry was “The Report on the Bombing of caused by the bombing raids, “the most Germany,” written by an independent serious problem confronting the German assessor, Mr. Justice John Singleton. authorities [was] that of re-housing the

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bombed-out population and providing demonstrations, unless the mass them with clothing and other necessities raids are successfully dealt with. of life.”11 Again, various source inputs But if the SS [Schutzstafel] has to appeared to be providing compelling be used against the civil population, proof of the validity of area bombing. a deplorable situation will arise. Citing a well-placed, clandestine source According to these officers the great of the period, in close touch with the danger is not an invasion, but the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM or systematic destruction of German German Air Ministry): towns by the RAF.12

At the moment the fear of the RAF The importance of bringing forward giant raids is far greater than any excerpts from these source documents anxiety about an invasion … . These is to make the point that the bombing big raids cause mass destruction. offensive was evolving and developing, In spite of the statements in the based upon capabilities, analysis and Wehrmacht reports, the destruction direct feedback from reliable intelligence of war production facilities is fairly sources. Bombing policies were not being considerable. The loss caused by developed in a void. the destruction of food stores and depots is extraordinarily great, as At this point in time, a few words with the food cannot be replaced. The respect to Harris’s relationship with his effect on the civil population of such wartime charges as well as his method raids is not to be underestimated. of command are perhaps appropriate. For instance, in Köln (), Although Harris was not able to visit his there were between 3000 and 4000 aircrew and ground crew as frequently as dead [officially only just over 100 he would have wished, he still managed were reported], which of course the to win and hold their respect, loyalty and population of Köln knew very well. trust, even when they were faced with the They spread the information, and most daunting odds, and he cared deeply this undermines confidence in the about his people. Harris’s biographer, Air reports of the Wehrmacht. In Köln Commodore Henry Probert, elaborates: there were at least 200,000 persons rendered homeless, who for the Harris’s firmness could easily be most part have been evacuated, as seen by others as stubbornness and in the city itself no new buildings or obstinacy; his single-mindedness temporary premises could be erected could come across as an inability quickly enough. The problem of the to see others’ points of view or to homeless people is the most difficult. appreciate the wider political and There is a shortage of houses and military constraints; his all too accommodation everywhere, in the frequent exaggerations, usually country as well as the towns. As intended as a means to emphasise a result, wooden hutments have to his views, were often considered as be erected everywhere … . In the lapses of judgment. There is truth in RLM there are officers of high rank such criticisms, and despite his good and influence who seriously fear work in his two Air Ministry tours of that the winter will see unrest and duty he was never cut out for top level

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staffwork, as he himself knew. He especially away from the immediate was essentially the sort of commander business, found him kind, generous, who emerges in a crisis, one for which humorous, compassionate, amply his knowledge and experience happen possessed of the human touch. He to have particularly prepared him. … did care for people, and never more than the men who served under Yet all too often Harris continues to him—including, most importantly, be portrayed as the hard, insensitive those who came from the nations of man, totally concentrated on using the Commonwealth and elsewhere. his bombers to beat the enemy Towards the enemy, while he by destroying his homeland, and hated the slaughter involved, his unconcerned about the implications feelings were dominated by the for the human beings involved. This conviction that the war must be is far from the truth. Certainly he won as quickly as possible, in their could be remote and difficult at interests as much as in those of his times but the many who knew him, own compatriots.13

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Friends join the fight its peripheries but postponing a cross- Channel invasion for the time being. Meanwhile, the combined forces of Commencing in July 1942, Britain Britain, the Dominions and the United and the Dominions would no longer States would mount a mighty CBO find themselves alone in their bombing against targets in the greater German campaign against the Reich. With Reich, the European Axis powers and characteristic American vigour and Occupied Europe. Sir Charles Portal, enthusiasm, the “Mighty Eighth” Air in particular, as Chief of the Air Staff, Force of the United States Army Air firmly believed that the CBO would Forces (USAAF) had begun a rapid render 25 million Germans homeless build-up in southern and central Britain. and, more importantly, would bring Between the and the war production to a complete standstill. many stations occupied by Bomber This campaign would entail “the Command, the little island nation was progressive destruction and dislocation soon transformed into a vast, stationary of the German military, industrial and aircraft carrier. Ultimately, the American economic system, and the undermining contribution would be huge, and from of the morale of the German people to January 1944 onwards, the Eighth Air a point where their capacity for armed Force would be joined by heavy bombers resistance is fatally weakened.”14 Within of the Fifteenth Air Force, operating that general concept, the primary from bases in North Africa and Italy. objectives at that time, subject to By early August 1942, advance crews of the demands of weather and tactical the Eighth had been pronounced combat feasibility and in order of priority, were ready, but based upon their own early war to be German submarine construction experience, the British remained highly yards, the German aircraft industry, sceptical of the American daylight-only, transportation targets, oil plants and massed-formation tactics. other targets within the enemy war industries. Every opportunity was to Nonetheless, in spite of British be taken to attack Germany by day, concerns, the Americans were bound destroy objectives that were not suitable and determined to implement a daylight for night attack (in other words, the bombing strategy. At the Casablanca American mandate), sustain continuous Conference of January 1943, a working, pressure upon German morale, impose synergistic bond was formed that would heavy losses upon the German day provide the blueprint for the cooperative fighter force, and contain German effort that would characterize the fighter strength and keep it away from bomber war over Europe until the end the Soviet and Mediterranean theatres of hostilities. After Churchill and of war. Roosevelt had reaffirmed their overall “Germany First” plan to defeat the “Bombing around the clock” became Third Reich and its cronies prior to an enormous Anglo–American strategic “finishing the job” in the Pacific, a cooperative effort which lasted for the strategic compromise was struck to following 16 months until the spring of carry the land war next to Sicily and 1944, when Bomber Command would Italy, continuing to attack the enemy on be seconded temporarily to Supreme

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Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Anglo–American differ- (SHAEF) under General Eisenhower, ences of opinion over the flying in support of the planned D-Day importance of enemy oil landings in France.

Within the overall broad strategy that A significant point of divergence had been agreed upon at Casablanca, the between Bomber Command and the two Anglo–American bombing armadas Americans was the importance initially would place their operational emphasis allocated to oil as a priority target. upon different mandated priorities with Furthermore, this divergence eventually respect to the enemy’s resources at would lead to a confrontation between different periods of the campaign, although Sir Charles Portal, as Chief of the Air there was also a great amount of synergism Staff, and Sir Arthur Harris in his role as and overlap conducted throughout. Bomber Command’s helmsman. By late- Nonetheless, until Bomber Command September 1944, once the land campaign was seconded to SHAEF in April 1944, had stagnated in northwest Europe and the it tended to favour attacks upon the strategic bomber forces had been returned broader Axis industrial base, particularly to the fold of their respective air staffs, the primary industries and associated Harris sensed that an unrestricted return infrastructure that supplied and fuelled to his general area-bombing campaign the precision manufacturing element, of the German industrial heartland such as production of coal, steel and pig was in the wind, but this was not the iron as well as transportation nodes, priority intention. At that time and for power sources and mines. By contrast, the immediate future, although earlier the Americans preferred direct attacks counter-air action no longer had any upon the aircraft-manufacturing and ball- particular priority, relative air superiority bearing industries and enemy oil resources. having now been attained, the generalized However, readers must bear in mind city offensive was only to be undertaken that Bomber Command had previously when conditions were unfavourable to identified enemy oil as a significant target executing the new priorities. These new much earlier in the war but had temporarily priorities certainly suited General Spaatz, abandoned pursuit of this target due to the since oil, which had been a priority target pinpoint accuracy required to successfully for the Americans since the summer attack the refineries and the concomitant of 1943, had been placed squarely in inconsistency this presented with the night the highest position by the British Air area-bombing strategy. Thus commenced Staff, which, by the autumn of 1944, in earnest the great, cooperative aerial had warmed to the American point of onslaught against Hitler’s Festung Europa view, and it was once again Harris who (Fortress Europe). It would result in over appeared to be out of synchronization. To 2,000,000 tons [1,814,000 tonnes] of Harris, oil remained the hated panacea ordnance being dropped upon European he had perceived it to be from the Axis targets. However, it would also outset, albeit for good reasons, given demand a very high toll in aircrew blood, the Soviet capture of Ploesti and the other including over 81,000 total wartime Rumanian oil fields in August 1944, the aircrew fatalities from RAF Bomber concomitant denial of Rumanian oil to Command and the USAAF. the Axis powers, and the fact that Bomber

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Command had already expended, as we aforementioned differences of opinion, have seen, considerable time and effort the counter-oil campaign was a highly with respect to enemy oil. Furthermore, successful cooperative effort. the relative accuracy required to hit these targets was hampered in both the The war against enemy American and the Commonwealth camps transportation by the vagaries of northern European weather during the period. That said, by late autumn 1944 and throughout 1945, An earlier joint effort known as the Bomber Command was actually outdoing Transportation Plan also proved to be a the Americans in sorties against enemy very effective precursor to the Normandy oil assets. However, according to Probert: landings. Designed to disrupt rail communications by attacking some 74 He [Harris] was still deeply key rail centres in France and Belgium suspicious of the prognostications as an obvious Operation OVERLORD of the Ministry of Economic Warfare; priority, on 15 April 1944, Bomber synthetic oil production was spread Command was allocated 37 of the rail over many plants, often small, in targets; the other half were assigned to different parts of Germany, and the Americans. By the eve of D-Day, some up-to-date intelligence about them 60 separate attacks had put at least two- was hard to obtain; the Germans thirds of the assigned Bomber Command under Speer were adept at dispersal targets out of action for a minimum of and repair; and effective attack a month, a much better record than that required a degree of accuracy which accomplished by the Americans against he was far from convinced his aircraft their assigned targets.16 And continued, could achieve, especially against unrelenting pressure by the strategic more distant targets.15 bombing forces upon Axis road, rail and waterways from this point onwards As Harris himself later recognized, oil until the end of hostilities would yield did prove more critical than he had judged very tangible results against an enemy at the time. Influenced by the views of transportation network that was already Albert Speer, Hitler’s Armament Minister, stretched to the limit, due to the dynamic Harris wrote in 1947 that in the final and changing operational requirements weeks of the war all the German armed and the tremendous additional burden of forces had been immobilized for lack forced industrial decentralization, which of fuel, rendering the triumph of the oil had been brought about by the bombings. offensive complete and indisputable. It was the one panacea that actually paid off. With respect to the overall trans- portation campaign, Bomber Command’s Nonetheless, there is no doubting the deliberate area bombing of industrial city ultimate success of the Oil Plan, and it centres from early in the war generated remains an unanswerable question as to a high, prolonged and sustained degree just how much, if at all, the European war of damage to core road and rail assets, could have been shortened had Harris a much more concentrated degree embraced the plan with more enthusiasm of damage than that waged by the at the outset. That said, in spite of the sporadic attacks of the Americans until

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they specifically targeted enemy city could scarcely manage 12 per cent of centres later in the war. Downstream throughput of critical resources to the from the pre-OVERLORD attacks, industrialized Ruhr, and this included Bomber Command devoted extensive the near-total curtailment of coal.17 Also resources against enemy transportation due to strategic bombing, the virtual networks and facilities. Perhaps none collapse of the transportation networks by were more effective than the attacks 1945 meant that Germany’s still-enormous upon the German waterway systems, field armies could no longer be reliably particularly those on the Rhine River supplied or armed. and the Dortmund Ems Canal. During the last four months of the war, Bomber Pounding the Reich Command devoted 15.4 per cent of its total efforts against enemy transportation assets. And between October 1944 and It was during the last calendar year of March 1945, the attacks on both rail the war that Bomber Command reached and water transportation networks its most productive and destructive apex. were so effective that the Germans Back on 3 November 1942, as a precursor

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to the Casablanca Conference, Portal, blind-bombing devices. Without with a major input from Harris, had these aids important targets would presented the British Chiefs of Staff with have enjoyed weeks or months of a blueprint for a joint Anglo–American respite and on several occasions major bombing offensive, which based their task forces failed even with radar bombing strategy on the assumption that to reach their objectives because a combined bomber fleet of 4,000–6,000 of adverse weather … . In mid- aircraft would be continuously available.18 November 1944, operations analysts And 1944–1945 was decisive for the of the Eighth estimated that nearly strategic bombing campaign, with over half the blind missions were near two-thirds of the total wartime bomb failures, or worse.20 tonnage being dropped on the greater German Reich from July 1944 onwards. Richard Overy takes this point Also, along with vastly declining German even farther: “The US air forces soon defensive capabilities, due in no small abandoned any pretence that they could measure to the overrunning of German bomb with precision, and two-thirds of early warning sites in the land battle their were dropped blind through for the Continent, Bomber Command’s cloud and smog. A staggering 87 percent monthly average number of sorties of all bombs missed their target.”21 increased from 5,400 in 1943 to 14,000 in 1944, and their average payload-per- In their defence, weather conditions sortie nearly doubled.19 And from the over the European continent were forcing summer of 1944 onwards, once relative the blind-bombing option upon both air superiority had been attained over camps. It is ironic, however, that while Northwest Europe, Bomber Command the USAAF had commenced in earnest to would complement its night attacks with make area attacks from late-1944 onwards, more frequent daylight operations. Bomber Command, on a selective basis, was now making precision attacks, both At this point, the frequently night and day, upon specific military misunderstood concepts of American and industrial targets. Technological precision, daylight bombing and British advances abounded. -H22 represented night area bombing need to be addressed a quantum leap in the development of and placed within a proper context. navigation systems, since it combined levels of accuracy comparable to Oboe23 In point of fact, from late-1943/ with the universal applicability of Gee. early-1944 onwards, both the British It had been introduced to service by and the Americans were area bombing 3 Group in 1943, and it was eventually or “blind bombing,” as it was referred used by other formations. Around the to in USAAF circles. From the official same time, the K-band Mark VI radar USAAF history: was also fielded, and this alleviated some system limitations over poorly defined or Approximately 80 percent of all obscured targets. Furthermore: Eighth Air Force and 70 percent of all Fifteenth Air Force missions Bomber Command coupled these during the last quarter of 1944 were new devices with revised tactics. characterized by some employment of Navigation was now so accurate that

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decoy fires and spoof raids could be the rest of the bombing campaign. By used within a few miles of the actual early 1945, in a further broad distillation route. The navigators and bomb- of precision bombardment and a tacit aimers were now sufficiently skilled acknowledgement that area attacks had to use an offset bombing point chosen become accepted American strategy, for its visibility, and to aim their a new crew member known as the bombs at a given range and bearing “togglier” frequently replaced the much from that point.24 more extensively trained (and usually commissioned) bombardier in American The final round bomber crews. Dresden By 1945, target-marking techniques in Bomber Command had reached new levels of maturity and sophistication, Operations by both Bomber Command including the increasing use of offset and the USAAF on 13/14 February tactics. The offset procedure reduced the 1945 against Dresden resulted in predictability and, thus, the vulnerability massive destruction and loss of life. of the attacking bombers. Also, multiple Conditions combined to produce a true streams consisting of simultaneous large- firestorm, one of just three that occurred scale efforts on different targets were in the European theatre, the others being at common by 1945, further confusing Hamburg in July 1943 and then at Kassel the defences and further reducing in October 1943. predictability. By this stage of the war, given the predominating weather over Dresden. … The city, and its very the Continent, Bomber Command had name, has become a poster child for the acquired so much expertise in blind opponents of the area-bombing campaign, bombing and the innovative use of but there is a lot of mythology that has radar and other electronic aids that its been generated over these late-war most experienced crews were generally raids. While it is true that the bombing as comfortable bombing in obscured destroyed much property and thousands conditions at night, with comparable of German lives, the number of fatalities results, as they were when bombing “in was greatly exaggerated from the outset the clear” by daylight. For their part, the (by a factor of up to 1,000 per cent)27 in an Americans had accepted that weather, extremely effective propaganda campaign navigation and target finding were waged by the German Propaganda significant problems affecting operations. Ministry through the neutral countries and the United States and then later by By early 1944, the Eighth Air Force had the USSR during the cold war. come to rely extensively upon “blind” attacking targets by and by .25 And contrary to popular belief, In fact, “on only one occasion in six weeks Dresden in 1945 was far more than just [during January and early February 1944] a beautiful baroque centre of cultural were the skies clear enough for visual significance. It was also an armed camp bombing.”26 And that reliance upon and was home, most importantly, to a electronic aids would only increase during vital communications and transportation

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hub as well as a control node for the historians would later consider “perhaps resupply and sustainment of Eastern Front the least felicitous,” well-expressed or operations. In addition, it hosted scores appropriate of all the prime minister’s of embedded factories that produced wartime correspondence.29 The minute goods vital to the German war effort, appeared to endorse all the latest public including the massive Zeiss-Ikon complex. criticism of Allied bombing policy, and Furthermore, it had been a long time it also seemed to shift the blame from since Zeiss-Ikon had produced anything the prime minister’s shoulders to those as innocent as a holiday snapshot camera. of the air commanders responsible for Dresden, in short, was a highly legitimate implementing the policy. The implication military target.28 was that Churchill had been misled and that his air leaders were conducting terror A certain duplicity bombing on their own initiative, without his knowledge, but both conditions were patently false.30 Portal immediately However, by the spring of 1945, the solicited Harris’s comments, who eddies of public disquiet generated by vehemently objected to the minute, the Dresden bombings were swirling. deeming it a serious slight against his By late March, perhaps with an eye cast aircrews who had endured so steadfastly towards his legacy, Churchill penned a throughout the campaign. Churchill also minute to his senior uniformed chiefs appears to have exercised a conveniently which Bomber Command’s eventual selective memory when he penned the

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offending minute, choosing to ignore political future, took effect rapidly. The the various telephone conversations, Air Staff recommendations that fell out memos and directives to the Secretary of the prime minister’s wishes were of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, subsequently approved up the chain of in January which had urged bombing command, and Sir Arthur Harris was so attacks upon the eastern cities. “Churchill informed on 6 April. However, Portal was well aware that the RAF was going very clearly articulated the purpose to attack Dresden …; the decision to do of, the justification of and the caveats so had originated in Cabinet and had his under which area bombing could, if full support.”31 Also, his enthusiasm for necessary, still be conducted. Portal using bombing as a punishment had led has been cited frequently, like Churchill, to excesses in rhetoric on occasion, and as having an eye to the historical record they frequently required others, including and distancing himself from Harris and Harris, to set Churchill’s moral compass Bomber Command’s campaign against the straight. The repeated considerations of industrialized cities. However, in spite of reprisal raids in response to the German the aforementioned disagreements with razing of Lidice, Czechoslovakia, Harris, Portal staunchly defended him to in 1942 and the Crossbow campaign those in higher authority, and he made against the V-weapons in 1944 constitute it very clear that area bombing still had ample proof of this trend in the prime its place. He remained convinced that it minister’s behaviour.32 Ultimately, was useful under certain circumstances, Portal enthusiastically endorsed Harris’s even at that late stage of the war. He also views with respect to the Dresden raids, made it clear that Bomber Command’s in particular, and with respect to area precision attack-capability was relatively bombing, in general. Sir Archibald newfound and that, even with all the Sinclair then asked Churchill to withdraw technological and tactical advances, it the offending minute, and on 1 April 1945, had its limitations, as precision-bombing Churchill substituted a replacement note. capabilities were still not widely practiced The revised minute contained no further by the bulk of the main force.34 reference to either terror attacks or to the raid on Dresden. Nonetheless, the damage Shortly thereafter, hostilities in Europe had been done, and in spite of Chairman would conclude, but a vast amount of of the Chiefs of Staff Lord Ismay’s unfinished business still remained in assurances to the contrary, the first minute the Pacific theatre. Strategic bombing also remained on file, and the effects of had truly come of age in the European public scrutiny and analysis of it in future theatre of operations, and many of the would be far-reaching.33 bloody lessons learned there would soon be applied to telling effect against the With a view to the future Empire of the Sun. Area bombing and the As spring 1945 continued to unfold, the Japanese war prime minister’s newfound determination to put an end to the bombing of the German cities, undoubtedly fuelled by Not the least of the wartime contri- concerns for both his legacy and his butions of the Allied bombing campaign

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in Europe was its influence upon the to commit the nation to mass suicide war against the Japanese empire. In the if necessary, calling “for the sacrifice Pacific theatre, B-29 Superfortresses of up to 100,000,000 Japanese lives, if started pounding the Japanese home necessary, to repel the Allied invasion of islands from bases in the Marianas the home islands.”37 The area bombing of in late-1944. However, their attempt Japan had certainly dealt a debilitating at from high blow to the Japanese war industries, and level using high-explosive weaponry the remaining factories were on the verge proved relatively ineffective. Early in of collapsing for wont of component March 1945, they borrowed a page from parts and damage to infrastructure. the area-bombing methods honed in However, there was also no shortage Europe; abandoned attempts at precision of suicidally inspired pilots available bombardment; and switched their bomb and willing to substitute courage for runs to delivery from medium level technological inadequacy and to dive their against area targets, commencing with aircraft into a massed Allied invasion incendiary laydowns. The high-water force. Furthermore, “orders went out that mark of these raids was that conducted every Japanese man between the ages of against Tokyo on 9/10 March 1945, 15 and 60 and all women aged 17 to 40 which left nearly 125,000 killed and would meet the invaders at beaches with over a million homeless. Overall, by sharpened bamboo poles. Allied peace war’s end, most major Japanese cities feelers were rejected.”38 had been laid to waste, and 42 per cent of the nation’s industrial capacity had At home, all the Allied nations were been destroyed.35 Intensely demoralizing, becoming increasingly war weary in light these raids brought Japan to the brink of of the extensive casualties endured during surrender. And yet, based upon the fierce the last calendar year of the European determination to resist an Allied invasion and Asian wars and the economies of the home islands, the Allied Executive that had been excessively “tapped” was gravely concerned about the blood by war expenses. Labour unrest was costs to both sides should an invasion of intensifying, particularly in Britain. the home islands prove necessary. Therefore, the perceived cost of invading the home islands, both in America and By the summer of 1945, extensive in Britain, posed serious challenges to planning was taking place for Operation public will and support. Although it DOWNFALL, just such an invasion, and was a painful decision for the Allies, on a scale dwarfing that accomplished the two atomic drops on Hiroshima and on D-Day. It was scheduled for Nagasaki—the epitome of strategic area commencement on 1 November 1945, bombardment—with the concomitant initially through the southernmost loss of an additional 150,000 Japanese island of Kyushu. Recent and compelling citizens—and many more to follow from research makes the point that the true radiation poisoning—when combined estimates Allied planning forces were with a rapidly worsening war situation, working with at the time with respect to the entry of the USSR into the Pacific their anticipated losses were 1.7–4 million war, and the continued decimation of casualties.36 Indeed, the Japanese the industrial cities, all helped convince Supreme War Council was determined the Japanese that further resistance

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was pointless. Defending against massed the gruelling campaign in northwest fleets of formidable, heavily protected Europe, and that industry could have been B-29 Superfortresses was difficult used to produce more weapons for these enough, but the atomic drops helped fighting services. However, proponents of convince the Japanese that they were this line assume that the weight of effort relatively powerless to defend the entire expended upon the bombing campaign nation from the high and fast flying, was inordinately high. Overy maintains singly penetrating B-29s that could be that it was actually rather modest. using atomic weapons on any part of “Measured against the totals for the entire the nation, the ultimate shell game, to war effort (production and fighting), draw an analogy. bombing absorbed 7 per cent, rising to 12 per cent in 1944–45. Since at least a Finally, on 10 August 1945, the proportion of bomber production went Japanese stated that Imperial Japan to other theatres of war, the aggregate would accept the surrender terms figures for the direct bombing of Germany previously announced at the Potsdam were certainly smaller than this. Seven Conference, provided the Allied powers per cent of Britain’s war effort can explicitly allowed Emperor Hirohito hardly be regarded as an unreasonable to remain as the country’s sovereign allocation of resources.”40 Further, some ruler. The underscoring of the futility Bomber Command squadrons were in fact of further resistance plus the guaranteed seconded to Coastal Command for limited preservation of the Japanese monarchy patrol duties, but Bomber Command’s spared the Japanese people from the operational fleet was not particularly obligation of being killed to the last suited to long-range maritime patrol. available man and woman.39 Therefore, As it was, these secondments diluted the strategic area bombing, honed in the resources of the command when it was European war, undoubtedly played its still not at its fully effective strength. part in preventing many casualties, Aerial relief in the North Atlantic, in the both Allied and Japanese, by helping to form of closing the so-called “black hole” eliminate the need for an armed invasion of patrol coverage, would eventually be of the Japanese mainland, the costs of provided through the acquisition of very- which, measured by any yardstick, would long-range Consolidated B-24 Liberator have been horrific. patrol aircraft, a type not included in Bomber Command’s inventory in Europe. The balance sheet Much of the criticism of the bombing campaign has focused upon the human Critics of the bomber offensive suggest cost, the unquestionably heavy loss rates that the materiel and human cost of endured by Anglo–American aircrews, the campaign far overshadowed the 81,000 of whom forfeited their lives gains and that the resources dedicated aboard 18,000 downed aircraft from the to it could have been more effectively Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command utilized elsewhere. They have argued alone. On the Axis side, approximately that the combat manpower could have 593,000 non-combatant fatalities are been better used in the other fighting attributable to the bombings. However, services, especially by the army during these losses need to be placed in

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perspective, especially when compared industrialized cities were frequently to 20–27 million war dead suffered by tactical rather than strategic, conducted the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the human in support of the advancing Allied land cost of the campaign was formidable. armies. For much of the first four years of the war, support for naval operations— During the war, Bomber Command’s particularly the mining of enemy littoral 125,000 airmen flew 364,514 sorties waters and the Western Baltic Sea, over Europe, and the majority of the attacks against the U-Boat production command’s tonnage was dropped from and operational facilities as well as the the summer of 1944 until the cessation destruction of six German capital ships of hostilities. Approximately 74 per cent (the entire only destroyed of the total tonnage was delivered after four)—comprised a significant portion of 1 January 1944, and 70 per cent of the Bomber Command’s overall effort,42 while total after 1 July 1944, from which time for much of 1944, it was extensively used forward the Bomber Command loss rates in support of the invasion of northwest were greatly reduced. “If the bombing of Europe. Additionally, Bomber Command Germany had little effect on production aircraft were utilized for reconnaissance, prior to July 1944, it is not only because propaganda missions, electronic warfare she had idle resources upon which to and deception operations, support to draw, but because the major weight of Occupied Europe’s resistance movements the air offensive against her had not been as well as humanitarian aid and mercy brought to bear. After the air war against missions towards the end of hostilities. Germany was launched on its full scale, Bomber Command was a true jack of all the effect was immediate.”41 trades, and it required the full resolution of its commander, Sir Arthur Harris, not The contributions to to become excessively and repeatedly victory of the Bomber diverted from its primary mandate, due offensive to all the competing demands upon its limited resources.

The gains not only were those directly That said, and with the benefit of “20/20 attributable to the bombing, such as the hindsight,” while Arthur Harris was actual destruction of targets, but also undoubtedly correct in his assessment constituted a host of indirect benefits of the need for a broad application of area brought on as adjuncts to the bombing. bombing during most of the campaign, his While part of the bombing effort was dogged rejection of the so-called panacea to be directed at Germany’s home-front targets later in the war appears to have military and economic structures, very been somewhat myopic. Albert Speer and large portions of the overall effort were others dreaded timely follow-on efforts directed at many other targets for which to the highly successful 1943 attacks Bomber Command’s aircraft were needed. on the Ruhr dams, Hamburg and the As Overy has mentioned, not even half the ball-bearing industry, and they believed Command’s total wartime dropped bomb that such a concentration of effort at the tonnage was dedicated to the industrial time would have been cataclysmic for cities. Also, during the latter stages the Reich.43 Similarly, an earlier and of the campaign, even attacks against more dedicated application of effort

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against the enemy’s oil resources, which of Air Chief Marshal Harris. From pitted the Commander-in-Chief Bomber the earliest days of the war there Command against the Chief of the Air was a continual diversion of bomber Staff, might have brought the European strength, with aircraft and crews sent war to a somewhat earlier conclusion. to North Africa and Italy, to Coastal But such is the fog of war, and Arthur Command and to the Far East. This Harris sincerely believed he was following steady drain prevented Harris from the correct course and was utilizing his ever achieving the size of force he command to inflict the most damage needed to carry out the instructions under the circumstances presented to him. he was given.44 [emphasis in original]

Furthermore, British historian Robin The bomber offensive made possible a Neillands believes that, unlike the later combat initiative that was deemed vital, atomic drops upon Japan, Harris simply not just for the damage it would cause the did not have the weapon to devastate Third Reich but also for the galvanizing of Germany in a manner that would both British and global support. It affected concomitantly crush the German will to American and Commonwealth opinion as resist. Neillands offers that Harris: well as that of potential allies and enslaved nations, telegraphing British resolve to was also hindered throughout his forcefully press home the fight against campaign by a classic piece of the tyranny of Nazism, alone if necessary. military miscalculation, a failure Its very prosecution assured Britain a by the Allied Combined Chiefs of pivotal say in the conduct of the war. It Staff to maintain the aim. also did wonders for home-front morale, bolstering the British public in a time The aim of Bomber Command of great need for reassurance and hope. operations, [apart] from the time they This evidence of commitment was never began in 1939, was to carry the war more important than after the German to the heart of the enemy homeland. invasion of the Soviet Union during the That was what the strategic bomber summer of 1941. The bombing offensive was for, and no one in authority constituted a second front, a significant disputed this. [Churchill had said,] source of relief to the beleaguered “There is one thing that will bring Soviets when no other offensive action him (Hitler) down, and that is an was realistic or even possible. Later, absolutely devastating, exterminating bombing’s contributions would become attack by heavy bombers on the a prerequisite to the successful invasion Nazi homeland. …” … [But] what of northwest Europe, “an independent [Harris] needed was more aircraft campaign to pave the way for a combined and a free hand. arms invasion of Hitler’s Europe.”45 From April until September 1944, the Instead, there was a failure, at all majority of Bomber Command’s activities levels, to maintain this intention and were conducted in lockstep with the carry it through. The main failure lay preparation, execution and aftermath in not providing Bomber Command of the invasion through Normandy. And with the wherewithal to carry out this in the wake of this effort, the command declared intention; it was not the fault would deal decisive blows to the enemy’s

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transportation and petroleum resources, a state of total war was declared only effectively paralyzing the Third Reich in after the German defeat at Stalingrad in its final hours. February 1943 and production then went to a frantic 24-and-7 mode from what had With respect to the charge that German been, at Hitler’s direction, a relatively war production actually increased after sedentary pace, since he was adamant the start of the CBO, that is because that the military endeavours of the Reich

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would not interfere with the consumer of indiscriminate area bombing by industries. And this vast acceleration of Germany, including Warsaw in 1939; production was borne largely on the backs Rotterdam, London and many other of millions of slave labourers dragooned British cities in 1940; then Belgrade, into service from the occupied territories Yugoslavia and additional British urban of the Reich. It is difficult to conceive of centres in 1941 and 1942. Area bombing just what the Germans would have been was really the only viable offensive tool able to accomplish had they not been available to the British at the time, and forced into a very demanding industrial it served due notice to friends and foes decentralization programme, had they alike that Britain could, and would, not been forced to honour the bombing fight back. It provided offensive relief threats through so much bolstering to the Soviets when no other form of of their homeland defences, had they concentrated, sustained attack upon maintained uninterrupted use and control the enemy was yet possible. Further, of their production facilities, and had substantial and repeated feedback from they maintained unimpeded use of their intelligence sources inside the Third very diversified transportation networks. Reich indicated that the bombing was scoring telling blows. Much of this The morality issue rationale was still applicable after the United States entered the war. Further, the Americans were exerting pressure As the late-war evidence of Nazi upon their British partners to conclude atrocities mounted, there developed a the European war as expeditiously as significant hardening of Allied sentiment possible and then to turn their combined to bring the German people so completely attentions against the Japanese. The to their knees that they would never Americans also learned—both through again contemplate bringing another associations with the British and from holocaust down upon the world. This their own combat experiences—that their was reflected in the partial tactical use of own bombing forces were also, in reality, strategic bombers during the push through “blunt instruments of destruction,” with Germany in the closing weeks. These little true precision-bombing capabilities. actions served to reinforce the points that This, in spite of the long-fostered, no citizen of the Third Reich was immune mythological public stance that they to or exempt from the bombing and that could deliver munitions precisely and further armed resistance was futile. The effectively in all weather conditions. deliberate demoralization of the enemy Much of the present-day abhorrence of undoubtedly helped shatter the German the wartime area-bombing strategy has will to resist, hastening the capitulation been fuelled by the current propensity for of German forces in the western urban viewing the campaign through the lens of centres and, thereby, saving many lives, today’s technological capabilities. While both Allied and Axis. existing “smart” weapons can surgically demolish a specific room in a building The British had been the first of without figuratively “rattling the china” the two great Western democracies to in an adjacent room, such technology, engage the Axis forces, and they had taken for granted today, simply was not been provided with many prior examples available during the Second World War.

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Today, along with Randall Hansen, The legal issue Margaret MacMillan and Robert Bothwell, there are others who continue to condemn the bombing. One of the Although the Red Cross Convention on most prominent recent examples is the the Protection of Civilians in Wartime was British philosopher Anthony C. Grayling, agreed upon in Stockholm in August 1948, who has implied a “moral equivalency” it was never formally ratified, and the between the Allied strategic bombing matter has only been fully codified since campaign and the 9/11 (11 September 1977 in the wake of the Vietnam War, 2001) attacks on the United States. when the First Protocol to the Fourth Part of the problem, I believe, is a Convention expressly forbade deliberate widespread current propensity to view military attacks upon civilians. And it historical decisions and the actions that should be emphasized that this particular resulted from them through the filtering legislation was made possible largely by lens of present-day sensitivities and significant technological advances with technological capabilities. History can respect to weapons delivery, which have, only be judged properly from within for the most part, rendered area bombing the context of the times during which it unnecessary. occurred. Hindsight invariably benefits from 20/20 clarity. Closing thoughts As to the frequently advanced argument, fatuous at best, that the Bomber Command played an essential Second World War was “Hitler’s war” part as a guarantor of Allied victory and that 78 million Germans wanted no during the Second World War. It provided part of it, those attitudes were not much an offensive tool that took the fight to the in evidence when Nazi legions were enemy when none other was available, and having their way with most of Eurasia it gave the citizens of the Allied nations during the first three years of the war. hope and pride while it did so. It provided Nor is that argument of any consolation Britain and the Dominions, through its to the ghosts of the millions who were very prosecution, a political dimension systematically exterminated in the by which it could influence the conduct death camps and elsewhere. Lost in of the war. It demanded a significant much of the debate is the fact that diversion of German resources away from Nazism was a thoroughly repulsive and the Eastern Front, thereby aiding the evil force bent upon world domination. USSR in its part of the combined struggle. Public opinion surveys from the war It struck substantial and unrelenting confirm widespread support for the blows against enemy morale. It threw bombing. Neither politicians nor Germany’s broader war strategy into historians of the period challenged the disarray, forcing it to adopt a reactive policy extensively at the time. Further, rather than a proactive stance though there was very little questioning of industrial decentralization, which placed the morality of the bombing during unsupportable burdens on a transportation the war, and what little that did occur network that was already stretched to came primarily from isolated British the limit. It delivered crippling blows religious leaders. to the enemy’s sophisticated and diverse

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transportation network, and it generated If Bomber Command reduced the length a loss of German air superiority, along of the war by one day how many Jews with doing much significant damage were saved? What if Bomber Command to the Reich’s war industrial base. It reduced the length of the war by a week? eventually starved the nation of petroleum By a month? Such a grotesque numbers products, and it made the way safer for game can never be accurately completed an Allied re-entry into northwest Europe and it would seem perverse to even in 1944. It effectively stymied German try. However, these numbers remind economic mobilization and technological us that when great evil stalked Europe and Britain had to take the fight to its development in many areas, and it goaded Nazi enemy, Harris more than anyone the Nazis into costly and ineffective else was prepared to embrace a lesser retaliation campaigns, such as the V-1 evil in order to defeat it. He never and V-2 vengeance rocket programmes, at shirked from his task, never denied it, the expense of technologies with greater never apologized and never regretted war-winning promise, such as the jet and his actions. Harris had blood on his rocket fighters and the Type XXI and hands and never tried to hide it, and XXIII U-Boats. Many military resources it was this that singled him out as a and personnel were diverted away from scapegoat. Churchill wanted his legacy the fighting fronts just to honour the and many in the country wanted to threats to the Reich, and massive amounts forget what they demanded of Harris of manpower and material were needed in the darkest hours when fear and to address the damage sustained by the danger were overwhelming. It is time bombing. While a great human price we remembered Harris’s role and moral was paid for these accomplishments on culpability in its proper perspective and both the combatant sides, in relative recall him from the wilderness.46 terms, the losses incurred to the Anglo– Americans were small when compared to At this juncture, it is perhaps fitting those suffered elsewhere, such as in the that Harris’s biographer, Probert, should USSR. And the overall cost was relatively have the last words on the man and low as a percentage of the total war effort, his command. considering the gains that were realized. So what of his achievements and those Wartime Bomber Command was a highly of the Command he led? For over viable and effective fighting force, led three years he directed its immense with great dedication and purpose by a build-up and endeavoured ceaselessly resolute and resourceful commander in to ensure its efficiency; he inspired Sir Arthur Travers Harris. not just the aircrew but also the hundreds of thousands in other roles Dr. Peter Lee, a Portsmouth University whose tasks were essential to its Principal Lecturer in military leadership support; he fought endless battles on ethics, based at the Royal Air Force their part at many different levels of College Cranwell, and a former RAF command; and he did his utmost to chaplain summarized Sir Arthur Harris’s publicise and explain their work. At tenure at the helm of wartime Bomber the same time, while always subject Command as follows: to the frequent directives he received

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from above, he made virtually all the Lieutenant-Colonel David L. Bashow key operational decisions. On top of (Retired) has written extensively in all this he gave unstinted help and books and select periodicals on a variety encouragement to his United States of defence, foreign policy and military colleagues—and in the process helped history topics. His published books have lay the foundations of the close ties been well received by academics and between the Royal Air Force and the general readers alike, and most have United States Air Force which have achieved best-seller status. In 2004, he been of such importance ever since. retired after 36 years of military service True, there were disputes over as an Air Force fighter pilot, a senior policies and methods, not surprisingly staff officer and a military academic. with such a forceful, independently His flying time includes nearly 2400 minded Commander-in-Chief. So, hours in the CF104/F-104G Starfighter, also not surprisingly, he had at times and he is a graduate of the United States to be overruled, but once the Air Force / German Air Force Fighter arguments were over he obeyed his Weapons School and the United States orders, and most notably when Navy’s Topgun at the postgraduate level. supporting the invasion operations In 2002, he was appointed an Officer and earning the undying gratitude of of the Order of Military Merit, and Eisenhower and his top-level he has also received the United States commanders. It was over Harris’s Meritorious Service Medal. Dave has also primary role, the bombing of received commendations from both the Germany itself, that the main disputes Canadian Forces and the United States arose, particularly in the final months Air Force for saving aircraft in extreme of the war, yet while there will always emergency situations. He is currently be debate over specific targets which Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Military he selected at different times his total Journal and an associate professor at the achievements and those of his Royal Military College of Canada. His Command are clear. They rightly latest commercially available book is took the war to the enemy in the only entitled No Prouder Place: Canadians way possible in the earlier days, they and the Bomber Command Experience and their American comrades-in-arms 1939–1945, and it represents more than forced his air forces on to the five years of scholarship and research. defensive, which was all-important It has received outstanding reviews and for the great sea and land campaigns has already had a second printing. He waged by the Allies; they caused has also been extensively involved in massive division of his resources of championing Canada’s Bomber Command all kinds; and they steadily wrecked veterans in their struggles against the his economic structure. It was a Canadian War Museum and what they unique offensive carried out in a believe was an unjust and inaccurate unique war, and for his conduct of it portrayal of their contributions to Sir Arthur Harris deserves to rank victory during the Second World among the great high commanders War. This has included publication of of modern history.47 several well-received opinion pieces and articles in prestigious journals and newspapers across the country and a

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highly successful presentation to the 4. Ibid., 544. Senate Sub-Committee for Veterans’ Affairs in July 2007 on the issue. Dave 5. Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His has subsequently had two additional Life and Times (Toronto: Stoddart, 2001), books dealing with the Second World 54; and Richard Holmes, Battlefields of War bomber offensive published the Second World War (London: BBC by the Canadian Defence Academy Worldwide, 2001), 183. Press in Kingston. 6. Charles Webster and Noble Abbreviations Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, ed. James Butler, vol. 4, Annexes and Appendices (London: Her AOC-in-C Air Officer Majesty’s Stationary Service, 1961), 144. Commanding-in-Chief CBO Combined Bomber 7. Air Historical Branch (AHB) Bomber Offensive Command Narrative, IV, 130, Directorate of PRO Public Records Office History (Canada), File 86/286. Bottomly to Baldwin, 14 February 1942, quoted in RAF Royal Air Force Webster and Frankland, vol. 4, 143–45. RLM Reichsluftfahrtministerium Portal to Bottomley, 15 February 1942, (German Air Ministry) as quoted in Charles Webster and Noble SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Allied Expeditionary Forces against Germany, ed. James Butler, vol. 1, USAAF United States Army Air Preparation (London: Her Majesty’s Force Stationary Service, 1961), 324, as quoted in Greenhous and others, 576. USSTAF United States Strategic and Tactical Air Force 8. “Royal Air Force Bomber Command Official History,” accessed May 15, 2005, Notes http://www.nucleus.com/twright/bc-stats/ html/ (site discontinued). Richard Overy’s research closely mirrors these findings 1. Edward Jablonski, America in and acknowledges the diversified effort in the Air War (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life many other areas. Other Bomber Command Books, 1982), 142. taskings included land operations, long- range reconnaissance, mine-laying, 2. Sir Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour: support to Resistance operations, attacks 1939–41 (London: on communications centres and airfields Heinemann, 1983), 655–56. as well as the war at sea. Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939–1945 (London: 3. Lord Portal, as quoted in Brereton HarperCollins, 1997), 51. Still other Greenhous and others, The Off icial diversions were designated precision History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, attacks, propaganda (leaflet) raids, vol. III, The Crucible of War 1939–1945 electronic warfare support as well as (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, humanitarian and relief missions towards 1994), 539. the end of hostilities. David L. Bashow,

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No Prouder Place: Canadians and the 178; and John Terraine, The Right of Bomber Command Experience 1939–1945 the Line: The Royal Air Force in the (St. Catharines, ON: Stoddart Publishing, European War 1939–1945 (London: 2005), 459. Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 678–79.

9. Overy, Bomber Command, 80. 20. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 10. John Singleton, “Report on the vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Bombing of Germany to Prime Minister Press, 1958), 6. Churchill,” 20 May 1942, in Public Records Office (PRO) Premier 3/11/4, 124. 21. Richard Overy, “Are We Beasts?” Literary Review (March 2007), 11. Air Intelligence Result of Recent accessed November 4, 2013, http://www. RAF Attacks Report to Prime Minister, literaryreview.co.uk/overy_03_07.html. 23 September 1942, in PRO Premier 3/11/12, 621. 22. Gee was the code name given to a navigation system used by 12. Air Intelligence Report No. the RAF during WWII. Originally 346 to Chief of the Air Staff, 22.9.42, designed as a short-range blind landing in PRO Premier 3/11/12, 627–29. system to improve safety during night operations, it developed into a long- 13. Probert, 413–14. range general navigation system. “Gee (navigation),” Wikipedia, accessed 14. Webster and Frankland, The November 4, 2013, http://en.wikipedia. Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 4, 153–54. org/wiki/GEE_(navigation). Officially the AMES Type 100, the Gee-H was a 15. Probert, 306. system developed during World War II to aid Bomber Command. 16. Ibid., 292. “Gee-H (navigation),” Wikipedia, accessed November 4, 2013, http://en.wikipedia. 17. Franklin D’Olier and others, The org/wiki/Gee-H_(navigation). US Strategic Bomb Survey – Overall Report – European War – September 23. “A British, aerial, blind-bombing 30, 1945 (Washington: US Government targeting system in World War II, based Printing Office, 1945), 62. on radio transponder technology.” “Oboe (navigation),” Wikipedia, accessed 18. Sir Charles Portal, Memorandum November 4, 2013, http://en.wikipedia. for the British Chiefs of Staff, 3 November org/wiki/Oboe_(navigation). 1942, in PRO Air 14/739A. 24. Bill Swetman, “,” 19. Martin Middlebrook, “Bomber in The Giant Book of World War II Command: The Turning Points,” Flypast Airplanes, ed. Jeffrey L. Ethell (Tokyo: no. 209 (December 2006): 85. Ancillary Zokeisha Publications, 1984), 417–18. data from Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945 25. The American development of (Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell Books, 1986), the British H2S radar. It was used by

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USAAF in WWII for daylight overcast 34. Note to Prime Minister (Top and night-time operations. “H2X radar,” Secret, undated) by Sir Charles Portal, Wikipedia, accessed November 4, 2013, at PRO Premier 3/12, 18–21. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H2X. 35. H. P. Willmott, The Second World 26. Robin Neillands, The Bomber War in the Far East, ed. John Keegan War: The Allied Air Offensive against (London: Cassell, 1999), 198. Nazi Germany (New York, Overlook Press, 2001), 293. 36. D. M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of 27. Probert, 320; and Group Captain Japan, 1945–1947 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Peter Gray, “Dresden 1945: Just Another Institute Press, 2009), xv, 92. Raid?,” Royal Air Force Airpower Review 4, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 5. 37. Transcribed by author during a visit to the Hiroshima Peace Museum, 28. For a more detailed discussion Hiroshima, Japan, 15 July 2002. The War of the Dresden raids, including the Cabinet, apparently figuratively, was calling justification, the results and recently for the sacrifice of every Japanese man, revised civilian casualty estimates, see woman and child, if necessary, to repel David L. Bashow, None but the Brave: the invaders from the west, since the total The Essential Contributions of RAF population of Japan, as late as April 1947, Bomber Command to Allied Victory during was just over 73 million. the Second World War (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 38. Jablonski, 169. Peter Jennings and Tod 151–53 and Chapter 3 Notes 85–88. Brewster, The Century (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 276. The Allied Potsdam Declaration 29. Charles Webster and Noble of 26 July 1945 called unequivocally for Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive the “unconditional surrender” of Japan, against Germany, ed. James Butler, but on 31 July, Emperor Hirohito made it vol. 3, Victory (London: Her Majesty’s clear that the Imperial Regalia of Japan (i.e., Stationary Service, 1961), 112. the royal throne) had to be defended at all costs. “Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and 30. Neillands, 373. Nagasaki,” access date not provided, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_ 31. Ibid., 372. of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki (content updated). Also, Koichi Kido, Yoshitake Oka, 32. For an extensive discussion of this and Kido Nikki Kenkyūkai,Kido Koichi nikki issue, including the offending minute and (Tokyo: Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), 1120–21. its eventual replacement, see David L. Bashow, Soldiers Blue: How Bomber 39. Giangreco, 110, Note 38. A third Command and Area Bombing Helped atomic weapon was going to be available Win the Second World War (Kingston, by mid-August, and 8 or 9 of them were ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, to be available for planned battlefield 2011), 55–61 and Notes 89–98. tactical use during the invasion of Kyushu in November, along with the planned use 33. Ibid., 61. of poison gas. Ibid., 201–2.

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40. Overy, Bomber Command, 200. 44. Neillands, 301.

41. D’Olier and others, 71. 45. Overy, Bomber Command, 183.

42. For a detailed discussion, see 46. Peter Lee, “Return from the Bashow, None but the Brave, 144–47. Wilderness: An Assessment of Arthur Harris’s Moral Responsibility for the 43. Albert Speer, Inside the Third German City Bombings,” Royal Air Reich (New York: Galihad, 1970), 286; Force Air Power Review 16, no. 1 and Joachim Fest, Speer: The Final (Spring 2013): 86. Verdict (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001), 166–67. 47. Probert, 414.

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