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Creating Legitimacy in Decentralized Indonesia: Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo’s Path to Legitimacy in Solo, 2005 - 2012

Wawan Mas’udi

Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

February 2017

Faculty of Arts, Asia Institute The University of Melbourne

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Abstract

This dissertation analyses the process of creating political legitimacy in Indonesia’s decentralized transitional democracy. In a transitional context, the authoritarian mode of legitimation was no longer effective, but the way in which new political leaders could create legitimacy based on democratic values had yet to be developed. Many political leaders in fact preferred to embrace patronage. By examining the case of Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s emergence in Solo, Indonesia, I argue that one way of creating legitimacy in a transitional context is by developing effective policies and an inclusive style of leadership which both addresses community vulnerabilities and interests in reform as well as facilitating the interests of dominant elite groups. In a democracy, legitimacy is not a political given, but needs to be created as a result of interactions between political leaders and their constituents. Adapting Stillman's compatibility of government’s output with public demands and Rothstein and Theorell's quality of government approach as a starting point for analysis, I found that the effectiveness of Jokowi’s policies on basic public services and urban informality helped him to create legitimacy, in part because they protected the common interests of the people. However, these popular policies did not threaten the interests of dominant elites. On the contrary, these and other policies Jokowi adopted as mayor of Solo facilitated the interests of political and economic elites, with which he identified. Jokowi’s capability to effectively manage competing interests in the city was largely due to his leadership style of intimate consultation and direct communication with various elite actors and the broader community in the process of governing. In addition to the effectiveness of this approach, such a style of leadership was integral to his political legitimacy. In the absence of an established pattern of legitimation in post New Order Indonesia, Jokowi’s path to legitimacy is just one possible approach. However, Jokowi’s approach has had political resonance well beyond the distinctive, but not unique society of Solo. The broader resonance or significance of Jokowi's path to legitimacy is evident in his rise to power in a more complex and plural cultural and political setting by similar means – first as Jakarta governor and then as president – in a way that local patronage politicians have not been able to match.

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Declaration

This is to certify that: 1.! The thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated in the preface, 2.! Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, 3.! The thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Melbourne, 17 February 2017

Wawan Mas’udi

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Acronyms

ASKESKIN – Asuransi Kesehatan Health Insurance for Poor Family Keluarga Miskin ASKES PNS – Asuransi Kesehatan Health Insurance for the State Employee Pegawai Negeri Sipil Asmindo – Asosiasi Mebel Indonesian Furniture Association Indonesia BEM – Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa Student Executive Board BOS – Bantuan Operasional School Operational Subsidy Sekolah BPMKS – Bantuan Pendidikan School Subsidy for People of Surakarta Masyarakat Kota Surakarta DAK – Dana Alokasi Khusus Special Allocation Fund DAU – Dana Alokasi Umum General Allocation Fund DPKS – Dewan Pendidikan Kota Surakarta Education Board Surakarta DPP – Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Central Leadership Board DPR – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat People Representative Council or Parliament DPRD – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Local People Representative Council or Local Daerah Parliament FKKBS – Forum Komunikasi Solo Becak riders Communication Forum Keluarga Becak Solo FPIS – Forum Pembela Umat Islam Surakarta Islamic Defender Forum Surakarta GAM – Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Free Aceh Movement Golkar – Golongan Karya Functional Group Golput – Golongan Putih Non-voting Group GRAK – Gerakan Rakyat Anti Anti-Yellowization People Movement Kuningisasi HIEC Hailai International Executive Club HMI – Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Islamic Student Association HPPK – Himpunan Pedagang Pasar Pasar Klewer Traders Union Klewer IPGI Indonesian Partnership for Governance Initiative JAMKESMAS – Jaminan People Health Insurance Kesehatan Masyarakat Kadin – Kamar Dagang dan Industri Trade and Industry Chamber Kesbanglinmas – Kesatuan Bangsa Office of National Unity and Societal dan Perlindungan Masyarakat Protection KOMPIP – Konsorsium Consortium for Public Institution Pemberdayaan Institusi Publik Empowerment KPK – Komisi Pemberantasan Commission for Corruption Eradication Korupsi KPU – Komisi Pemilihan Umum General Election Commission KSKMB – Komite Solidaritas Committee for Mega-Bintang Victim Korban Mega Bintang Solidarity KTP – Kartu Tanda Penduduk Residence Identity Card

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LPTP – Lembaga Pengembangan Institution for Village Technology Application Teknologi Pedesaaan MPR – Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat People Representative Assembly MTA Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran MUI – Majelis Ulama Indonesia Indonesian Ulama Council Musrenbang – Musyawarah Forum for Development Planning Rencana Pembangunan NU Nahdatul Ulama NGO Non Government Organization P3S – Paguyuban Penataan Parkir Surakarta Parking Attendants Association Surakarta P3TN – Paguyuban Pedagang Pasar Nusukan Market Traditional Traders Tradisonal Nusukan Association PAN – Partai Amanat Nasional National Mandate Party Panwaslu – Panitia Pengawas Electoral Supervision Committee Pemilu Papatsuta – Paguyuban Pasar Surakarta Traditional Market Association Tradisional Surakarta Pappan – Paguyuban Pedagang Nusukan Market Traders Association Pasar Nusukan Pasker – Paguyuban Semangat Working Spirit Association Kerja PATTIRO – Pusat Telaah Informasi Center for Regional Information Research Regional PD – Partai Demokrat Democrat Party PDI – Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Indonesian Democratic Party PDIP – Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle Perjuangan PDS – Partai Demokrasi Sejahtera Democratic Welfare Party Perda – Peraturan Daerah Local Regulation Perwali – Peraturan Walikota Mayor Regulation PGTTI – Persatuan Guru Tidak Indonesian Casual Teacher Union Tetap Indonesia Pilkada – Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Local Leader Election PKI – Partai Komunis Indonesia Indonesian Communist Party PKL – Pedagang Kaki Lima Street Vendors PKMS – Perlindungan Kesehatan Surakarta Society Health Protection Masyarakat Surakarta PKS – Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Justice and Welfare Party PMS – Paguyuban Masyarakat Surakarta Society Association Surakarta PPBI – Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Central for Indonesian Worker Struggle Indonesia PPMS – Paguyuban Partai Politik Surakarta Political Party Association Masyarakat Surakarta PPP – Partai Persatuan United Development Party Pembangunan PRD – Partai Rakyat Demokrasi People's Democratic Party PUSKESMAS – Pusat Kesehatan Community Health Centre Masyarakat

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RUTRK – Rencana Umum Tata General Planning for Land and Territorial Use Ruang dan Kawasan Spek-HAM – Solidaritas Women's Solidarity for Humanity and Human Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan dan Rights HAM Satpol PP – Satuan Polisi Pamong The Civil Service Police Unit Praja SD – Sekolah Dasar Primary School SDI – Sarekat Dagang Islam Islamic Traders Association SI – Sarekat Islam Islamic Association SKK – Solo Kota Kita Solo Our City SK Walikota – Surat Keputusan Mayoral Decision Walikota SMID – Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy Indonesia Untuk Demokasi SOMPIS – Solidaritas Masyarakat Surakarta Marginal Community Solidarity Pinggiran Surakarta TAF The Asia Foundation TPKD – Tim Penanggulangan Team for Local Poverty Eradication Kemiskinan Daerah UNS – Universitas Negeri Surakarta Surakarta Public University UPT – Unit Pelayanan Terpadu Integrated Service Unit VOC – Vereenigde Oost-Indische Dutch East India Company Compagnie WKRI – Wanita Katolik Republik Indonesian Catholic Women Indonesia

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Acknowledgements

Completing this dissertation is one of the most important milestones in my journey as a student of political science. Nonetheless, I owe much to many generous individuals and institutions during this painstaking, but ultimately worthwhile process of research and writing up this manuscript. My greatest intellectual debt is to three dedicated scholars who have enthusiastically guided me through the PhD experience. Dr. Richard Chauvel has been keen to be my supervisor since I started my PhD at Victoria University, Melbourne, in August 2011. He knew very little about me at that time, but his willingness to be my supervisor had already shown a big-heartedness of a senior scholar to help the young researcher like me in progressing his academic career. Richard has not only been my mentor in preparing the proposal, conducting the research, and drafting thesis chapters, but also a tireless supporter when I faced complicated administrative circumstances including my transfer to the Asia Institute at The University of Melbourne. He was more than an academic supervisor, but also a compassionate personality, from whom I found inspiration for being a better lecturer and scholar upon my return to my home university in Jogjakarta. Dr. David McRae (Dave) is another excellent person that I have been fortunate to work with. Dave generously agreed to be my supervisor when I moved to the Asia Institute in early 2015, and since then he spent countless hours reading patiently my imperfect drafts and arguments. His sharp and detailed questions and comments have enabled me to build a more solid and comprehensive structure for the dissertation. In addition to valuable substantive suggestions, he also helped me overcome some administrative issues. Dating back to my time at Victoria University, Dr. Max Lane was a supportive co-supervisor. Many of his sceptical questions and point of view in understanding the development of Indonesian politics stimulated me to construct a deeper analysis. In sum, the constant support from my supervisors has made my PhD journey much easier and intellectually richer. This dissertation was developed from material collected during field research in Solo in mid 2012 and 2014. During field research many people assisted me with their knowledge and information about the dynamics of the city. I am grateful, especially to Akhmad Ramdhon (UNS), who was my initial contact and later a friend. Many NGO activists have also been willing to share their experiences including Akbar, Pargito, Setyo,

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Andwi, Rifa’i, Putut and Mbak Nunung. From my contacts in Solo Pos (the main newspaper in Solo), Ikhwan, Pardoyo, and the crew of Litbang (research and development), I am most grateful for their generosity to access the newspaper’s database and their own insights shared in interviews. Another senior journalist who provided me with detailed stories was Mas Hud of Kedaulatan Rakyat. My informants in Solo were also from the political parties and DPRD. I express my thanks, especially to Pak Rudy and Pak Kasno (PDIP), M. Rodhi (PKS), and Supriyanto (PD) for sharing their experiences as politicians. In the bureaucracy, informants like the late Pak Budi, Pak Bagyo, Bu Etty, Pak Danang, Pak Hexa, Pak Joko, and many others provided me with their insights about how the administration worked. In the Solo electoral commission, Didik and Agus helped me obtain insights into the dynamics of elections in the city. Writing up thesis chapters were the most challenging phase of my PhD. During this process in Melbourne, I benefited from a lively academic atmosphere and social life. The academic communities at VU, especially the individuals at Building E, were sources of inspiration when I got stuck so many times in drafting the arguments. My deep thanks go to CIDRN and community psychology scholars and students, especially Chris, Adrian, Monika, Dicky, Amy, Kristen, Cynthia, Mema and Leila who were part of informal postgraduate roundtable discussions. To my colleagues in Asian Studies, Nanang, Riaty, Ahyar, Saefur, Ali, Rimsky, Dwi and Budi, I am also grateful for your critical discussion and comments during our monthly gatherings. My transfer to the Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne, has enriched my intellectual perspective and widened academic networks. The postgraduate group at the Institute is excellent for further broadening my academic horizons. I extend my thanks, especially to Kylie, Danton, Asako, Agus and the group of Chinese Studies students for their friendship and academic enthusiasm. At the Asia Institute, I have benefitted from the generous support of Professor Pookong Kee and his staff since the transfer of my enrolment to the University of Melbourne. I greatly appreciated Professor Pookong Kee’s support for the extension of my studies that enabled the completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank Diane Brown for editing my manuscript according to the Australian Standards for Editing Practice (2013). In my case, completing the PhD is not just a personal ambition, but also part of the academic development strategy to which my department at Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia is committed. I started my academic career at the Department of Politics and Government as an assistant researcher at the end of 2000, after I obtained my bachelor degree from this outstanding department. DPP Fisipol UGM, as a department of renown, is

!|!Page! 8! ! ! more than just a workplace, but a learning community that provides a vibrant environment and financial support for pursuing an academic career and achievement. My deep gratitude goes to all individuals in my Department. To the most senior members of DPP, Pak Josef Riwu Kaho, Pak Mashuri Maschab and Bu Sri Djoharwinarlien, thanks a lot for all the academic and life teachings. To the senior staff, Pak Pratikno, Pak Haryanto, Pak Purwo Santoso, Mas Cornelis Lay, Bu Ratnawati and Pak Bambang Purwoko, I am indebted to your unconditional support, opportunities that arose and encouragement, not only during this doctoral process, but even since I have been part of DPP. To the rising generation, Mas Abdul Gaffar Karim, Mas Ari Dwipayana, Mbak Amalinda Savirani, and Mas Mada Sukmajati, your attention and motivation were constant during this period of study. To the younger generation of the department, Nanang Indra, Nur Azizah, Miftah Adhi Ikhsanto, Sigit Pamungkas, Hasrul Hanif, Novadona Bayo and Bayu Dardias, thanks a lot for being such excellent colleagues. I learnt that doing a PhD is a worthy academic voyage. Beyond the academic staff, my appreciation goes to the team of administrative staff at DPP who always helped me. In the Faculty of Social Political Sciences UGM, the Dean, Dr. Erwan Purwanto and his staff also provided tremendous support towards completing this degree. To the Rector of UGM, I also express my gratitude for administrative and financial support, especially in the final months of my stay in Melbourne. My gratitude extends to the Department of Higher Education, Indonesia, from which I was awarded the scholarships for 3.5 years. The family is always the primary source of strength and optimism. My parents in Magetan, Bapak Sakun Rosjid and Ibu Kasmiati, have always supported me with their encouragement to achieve what I dream in this life. I know that their midnight praying and unconditional blessings have helped me to find the way and overcome any difficulties. An equal gratitude is to my parents-in-law, Bapak Pinudji Wasis and Ibu Tusrini for their endless support. To my brothers and sisters, Nur, Ida, Aris and Agung, thanks so much for taking responsibility to care for our parents during my time away in Australia. Last but not least, I feel so fortunate for having three gorgeous angels in my life. My wife, Nin, as always, shows her endless love and toleration of my work habits. Camila is an excellent motivator with her tag ‘don’t give up, Ayah’, while Qanita has told me a true writing mantra ‘Ayah, hook the reader in and find the catchy word’. Their favorite question, ‘which chapter are you up to’, has been a pure motivation to keep me writing and completing this thesis manuscript.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ...... 2 DECLARATION ...... 3 ACRONYMS ...... 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 7

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ...... 12 1. Background ...... 12 2. Framing political legitimacy ...... 21 a. Legitimation in Indonesian politics ...... 21 b. Legitimacy and creation of legitimacy ...... 26 c. Locus of legitimation ...... 33 d. Approach: legitimacy as a contested object ...... 36 3. Research questions ...... 39 4. Research methods ...... 40 a. Jokowi in Solo: a select case ...... 40 b. Data collection ...... 44 c. Procedure of analysis ...... 49 5. Structure of thesis ...... 50

CHAPTER TWO THE RECALCITRANT CITY: POLITICAL HISTORY OF FRAGILE LEGITIMACY ...... 52 1. Introduction ...... 52 2. Culture of recalcitrant as collective memory ...... 53 a. Massive scale of political resistance ...... 54 b. The everyday and small-scale resistance ...... 60 c. Popular resistance as a prelude to political reform ...... 70 3. Tracing the roots of popular resistance ...... 75 4. Conclusion ...... 78

CHAPTER THREE THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY: MAYOR SLAMET SURYANTO, 2000– 2005...... 80 1. Introduction ...... 80 2. The changing political landscape and Slamet’s struggle for mayor ...... 82 a. The changing landscape of local politics ...... 82 b. Slamet’s background and his struggle for mayor ...... 86 c. Public expectations ...... 90 3. Dealing with basic public needs: low quality triggers popular scepticism ...... 94 a. Ineffective policies for informal and traditional economy ...... 96 b. The poor condition of basic public services and infrastructure ...... 102 4. Trouble with relationships with governance actors ...... 107 a. Constant tensions with the DPRD ...... 108 b. Strained relations with civil society elements ...... 111 c. Losing support from the political base ...... 116 5. Conclusion ...... 118

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CHAPTER FOUR THE EMERGENCE OF JOKOWI IN 2005: CREATING ELECTORAL LEGITIMACY ...... 121 1. Introduction ...... 121 2. Direct local election reform and the response in Solo ...... 123 a. Deepening democratization? Motives of change towards local direct elections124 b. The expectations of civil society in Solo ...... 127 c. The parties’ responses ...... 129 3. Non-party, but a compatible figure: Jokowi’s selection in PDIP ...... 133 4. The struggle for electoral legitimacy: agenda and style of campaign ...... 141 a. Rite of candidate registration ...... 142 b. Similar policy agendas ...... 144 c. Style of popular engagement ...... 147 5. Conclusion ...... 152

CHAPTER FIVE CREATING LEGITIMACY POST ELECTION: JOKOWI’S STYLE OF LEADERSHIP AND POLICY FOCUS ...... 154 1. Introduction ...... 154 2. Contested expectations: familiar issues, a new tone ...... 156 3. Creating legitimacy in government: popular style of leadership and policies ...... 161 a. The style of direct communication and popular engagement ...... 162 b. Peaceful relocation of Banjarsari street vendors: nurturing the image of ‘Wali Kaki Lima’ ...... 172 c. Broadening grassroots legitimacy: social policy and administrative reform .... 179 4. Re-election in 2010: confirmation of increased legitimacy ...... 190 5. Conclusion: popular politics as instrument of elite legitimation ...... 194

CHAPTER SIX CREATING LEADERSHIP LEGITIMACY IN TRANSITIONAL CONTEXT ..... 197

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 206 APPENDIX: INDEX OF CHANGES ...... 221

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Chapter One Introduction

1.! Background This dissertation is about the process of creating political legitimacy in decentralizing Indonesia. The phenomena will be examined by understanding the emergence of Joko Widodo (hereafter Jokowi) in Solo, when he was elected mayor and thereafter created strong popular legitimacy. The political trajectory of Jokowi from the mayor of Solo, a small city in Central Java (2005–2012), to governor of Jakarta (July 2012 – October 2014), and finally to the presidency (in 2014) is unusual in Indonesian politics. His political emergence has shaken the established presidential pattern, formerly dominated by Jakarta- based politicians and a political class with backgrounds as either military generals, members of the prominent political dynasties, national conglomerates, outspoken political activists, or senior national government officials. Compared to his predecessors, Jokowi has a different political path. His emergence at a national political level is due to his popularity as a local government leader with a strong legacy in implementation of government reform, particularly when he was mayor in his hometown, Solo. He was not a political activist prior to his election as mayor, but a well-known figure in the furniture trade, including his position as head of the Indonesian Furniture Association (Asmindo) in the city. His involvement in politics began in the first direct mayoral election in 2005. The emergence of a political figure like Jokowi could not be separated from the democratic transition in Indonesia, and in particular decentralization and local democratization. Under decentralization, government authorities, mainly in basic public services, are transferred from national to local (districts and cities) government. This has also opened the door for broader popular involvement in governance and more substantial political representation.1 Decentralization has set a more direct and closer connection between people and local government. Democratization at the local level is expressed as public participation, citizen-based evaluation, and local elections (i.e. legislative and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 See for example M. Ryaas Rasyid, “The Policy of Decentralization in Indonesia,” in Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia: The Big Bang Program and Its Economic Consequences, ed. James Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Sri Mulyani Indrawati (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 65–74.

!|!Page! 12! ! ! executive). The introduction of direct elections for local government leaders in 2004/5 has created a new setting for closer connection between candidates and voters. One of the main characteristics of local direct elections is the centrality of figures in political competition. Political parties are certainly central to candidate nomination. But in many places non-party figures are becoming more appealing and have even become the first preference of political parties. These non-party figures may have different origins such as businessmen, bureaucrats, professionals, religious leaders, local aristocrats and community leaders. Though not formally affiliated with political parties, these figures usually possess certain political capital (i.e. socio-cultural capital and economic affluence). For political parties, the entry of non-party figures into politics can be a dilemma. On the one hand, non-party figures could supply resources that political parties lack such as financial resources, grassroots networks, and technocratic capability. On the other hand, they could become a threat to party political activists in competition for candidacy. However, as political parties at the local level in general lack the capacity for winning direct elections, non-party figures can become key players. The phenomena of ‘parties for rent’, means that for short-term gain and pragmatic electoral interests, parties sell tickets for candidacy to outsiders for financial compensation. A similar situation can be found in many transitional contexts wherein institutionalization of political parties remains weak.2 A weak party provides the opportunity for candidates and elected leaders to create personal political support and legitimacy with a degree of independence from the party(ies) which have nominated them. In the absence of clear and definitive party direction, political figures could develop either their own political campaign – in terms of strategy, issues and styles – or when in power could create their own policies and leadership. The autonomy of candidates and elected figures in creating political support and legitimacy are not necessarily negative for parties. Popular legitimacy may help political parties strengthen their political roots at the local level or to implement party ideology as concrete government policy. In the case of Indonesia, credible candidates and elected leader with their own popular legitimacy could strengthen party legitimacy at the grassroots level, which under Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime was unlikely to be developed.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 See for example Scott W. Desposato, “Parties for Rent: Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil’s Chamber Deputies,” American Journal of Political Science, 5 (2006).

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Figure-based politics has become a general trend in Indonesian democracy, particularly following the introduction of direct presidential elections and the open-list legislative electoral system. Under this open-list system candidates are elected based on the popular vote, irrespective of their position in the party’s list.3 This change has shifted patterns of relations between political elites and the people or between political candidates and voters, both during and post elections, when authority is exercised. As a trend, the candidates develop direct and close communication with the people, along with promises to deliver concrete programs in order to satisfy people’s demands. And the publics normally re-adjust their support for a political leader and government based on their capabilities in managing governance and delivering public goods. In a new democracy like Indonesia, the established political culture of patronage and client networks plays a considerable role in creating political support and legitimacy.4 Nevertheless, in many local election campaigns the agenda of better provision for health and education services, local economy development, and good governance reform emerged as successful campaign strategies.5 And many local government leaders who initiated and implemented social policies in basic services were successful in maintaining popular support, and were even described as exhibiting best practice of decentralization. In some cases local figures combine popular policies with an inclusive and popular style of leadership in the form of direct communication with the people and participatory governance. Programmatic policies on basic services and popular styles of leadership appear as popular instruments for political leaders to attract voters and to create political legitimacy in the emerging Indonesian democracy. This pattern is different compared with the centralized regime of the New Order, wherein the legitimacy of local political authorities depended on support from the central government. Because such support was much less relevant in the context of decentralization and democratization, political authorities at the local level need to adjust how they create legitimacy. One way of gaining popularity in the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3 Further reference on open-list electoral system see Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, The Politics of Electoral Systems (OUP Oxford, 2005), 5–6. 4 Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, “Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets: BIES 41 (1), April 2005,” 2005, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074910500306619; Vedi R. Hadiz, “Understanding Social Trajectories: Structure and Actor in the Democratization Debate,” Pacific Affairs 81 (Winter2008 2009): 527–36; Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective (Stanford University Press Stanford, 2010), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/node/32369. 5 See for example Edward Aspinall, “Health Care and Democratization in Indonesia,” Democratization 21, no. 5 (2014): 803–823.

!|!Page! 14! ! ! creation of political legitimacy is the combined capability of political leaders and government to respond to local interests, and to cope with the agenda that emerges during decentralization and democratic transition. Jokowi entered Solo politics in the first direct elections in 2005, in the period when democratization and decentralization as a political norm had been established. In spite of promising the development of democratic legitimation in the form of free and fair elections, political practices that undermined democracy were dominant. Non-democratic practices, which combined a lack of government capability in public goods provision with the failure to adopt a reform agenda, triggered popular discontent. This situation reflects the vacuum of effective legitimacy. In Solo, this vacuum was created in part by the failures of the first post-reform mayor, Slamet Suryanto, who held office from 2000 until 2005. In the above context, Jokowi, a successful Solo furniture businessman, won the election. He received support from the biggest party in the city, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle or PDIP). The party's leader in Solo, F.X. Hadi ‘Rudy’ Rudyatmo, ran as Jokowi’s deputy mayoral candidate. The pair won the election with 36% of the vote, a percentage similar to PDIP's share of the vote in the 2004 legislative election. The electoral support for both Jokowi and Rudy was overwhelming for their re-election in 2010, as the pair received more than 90% of the vote. The result indicated broad popular support, beyond Jokowi’s initial support in 2005, which supposedly came from traditional PDIP voters. Such a huge electoral win reflects a high degree of legitimacy created by political leadership. Accordingly, it is the aim of this thesis to understand one possible way of how a political leader in a transitional political context can create political legitimacy, through examining Jokowi’s policies and style of leadership as Solo Mayor in managing public expectations. Solo, a city of about half a million people, is located in the southeastern part of Central Java province. Two descendants of the Mataram Kingdom, Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran, still exist in the city, though their political power and influence has declined. Jokowi grew up in a poor family, with no entitlement to traditional sources of legitimacy embedded in the two royal families. He emerged as part of the business elite through his success as a furniture maker and businessman, which later became political capital for entering the election. After he became mayor, he was known for his performance in effective leadership and in government in managing the city. With reference to his mayoralty, many described Jokowi as a good practitioner of decentralization and local democracy, and particularly for his profile of inclusive

!|!Page! 15! ! ! leadership and his achievements in governance reform.6 Some described him as a local leader with a true commitment to developing the local economy and democracy, particularly for business permits reform, participatory planning, budget transparency, and other basic service improvements.7 The dialogue approach he adopted to handle the problem of the informal economy (i.e. street vendors) was also popular in Solo and beyond.8 And when he won the election in 2012 as Governor and the Presidential election in 2014, scholars described the Jokowi phenomena as a kind of populism and even saw him as the savior of Indonesian democracy.9 In this study, I start with the assumption that Jokowi’s political emergence reflected a process of how political legitimacy is created in the context of decentralization and democratization. Scholars like Hadiz, Buehler and Davidson argued that at local level, decentralization and democratization had facilitated the consolidation of patronage and predatory power rather than supporting democratic consolidation.10 At the outset, the emergence of Jokowi in politics and the way he exercised authority as mayor seemed to navigate a different path, as he adopted democratic reform in some policies and developed a base for legitimacy other than the established pattern of patronage politics such as capitalization. Jokowi’s political emergence in Solo, which continued at a national level, expressed a particular process of creating political legitimacy (or power legitimation) in the post crisis and democratic transition context. In democracy, political legitimacy and the process of creating such legitimacy should be based on civil consent (e.g. voters in election and general public will)11, and not, for example, based on the carrot and stick approach or contrived electoral process, as in the authoritarian regime of the New Order. Producing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 “10 Tokoh 2008: Mereka Bekerja Dengan Hati Menggerakkan Daerah,” Tempo, December 28, 2008. 7 See Rushda Majeed, “Defusing a Volatile City, Igniting Reforms: Joko Widodo and Surakarta, Indonesia, 2005–2011,” Innovation for Successful Society, Princeton University, Http://www. Princeton. edu/successfulsocieties/content/data/policy_note/PN_ id199/Policy_Note_ID199, Accessed on 14th April, 2013; Arianto A. Patunru, Neil McCulloch, and Christian von Luebke, “A Tale of Two Cities: The Political Economy of Local Investment Climates in Indonesia,” Journal of Development Studies 48, no. 7 (2012): 799–816. 8 See M. Pratikno, “Citizen Participation in Surakarta Municipality, Indonesia,” Citizens in Charge, 2004, 167; Sudarmo Sudarmo and others, “Participation Efforts of Solo’s Street Vendors in Policy Formulation during the Reform Era but without Results,” ALAR: Action Learning and Action Research Journal 15, no. 1 (2009): 107. 9 Marcus Mietzner, “How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 4 (2014): 111–125; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Jokowi Saves Indonesias Democracy (and Maybe Southeast Asia’s Too),” in East Asian Forum, vol. 28, 2014, http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/185599/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/98f78687- 10ba-4f71-974f-3504604d6eb5/en/jokowi-saves-indonesias-democracy-and-maybe-southeast-asias-too.pdf. 10 See for example; David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson, “In the Name of Adat: Regional Perspectives on Reform, Tradition, and Democracy in Indonesia,” Modern Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (2008): 815–852; Buehler Michael, “Local Elite Reconfiguration in Post New Order Indonesia: The 2005 Election of District Government Heads in South Sulawesi,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 41 (2007): 119. 11 See for example Dolf Sternberger, “Legitimacy,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D.L. Sills, vol. 9 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 244.

!|!Page! 16! ! ! quality government is crucial for the creation of political legitimacy. Even a non- democratic regime still needs to produce some quality of government to follow societal demands in economy and welfare, as part of legitimizing power (see for example Charon & Lapuente).12 With regime changes, the basis for political legitimacy also changed. At the local level, with the introduction of decentralization and direct local elections, it is assumed that political leaders need also to adjust to a new mode of legitimacy. Jokowi in Solo is one such model. Jokowi’s political background is instructive. He came from outside the political establishment in the city, with no previous formal affiliation with a political party, nor experience as an official of the state bureaucracy (civil or military), and nor was he affiliated with traditional authority. This background begs the question as to how he forged a path to enter politics and create legitimacy as a leader. The main intention in this research is accordingly to explore: 1) the actions and policies he took during his term of office as mayor in Solo, 2) the extent to which those actions and policies were compatible with community expectations, and 3) the impact upon the creation of personal political legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of the city government and his political party. By examining the case of Jokowi, I expect to enrich the narratives in other studies of Indonesian contemporary politics. First, studies on Indonesian democratization tend to focus on the achievements of procedural and institutional transformation. Despite praise for the development of electoral mechanisms, the liberalization of parties and freedom of expression, and some dimensions of citizenship rights, democratic reforms remain overshadowed by entrenched practices of corruption and political patronage.13 As a result, although most people still believed in democracy as a regime, they were also skeptical regarding the performance of political leaders and institutions in answering people’s expectations.14 Such public discontent shows the volatility of legitimacy faced not only by

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 12 Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, “Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?,” Studies in Comparative International Development 46, no. 4 (2011): 397–423. 13 See for example Paige Johnson Tan, “Reining in the Reign of the Parties: Political Parties in Contemporary Indonesia,” Asian Journal of Political Science 20, no. 2 (2012): 154–179. In this article, the author showed that parties failed to become institutionalized, instead relying on charisma and platitudes, which frustrated and split the people. See also Ulla Fionna and Gwenael Njoto-Feillard, “Junctures of the Old and New: The 2014 Indonesian Elections,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2015, no. 1 (2015): 139–153; Louay Abdulbaki, “Democratization in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation,” Asian Journal of Political Science 16, no. 2 (2008): 151–172; Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen, eds., Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Resilient Civil Society,” Democratization 19, no. 2 (2012): 209–229. 14 See for example Kompas Cyber Media, “Survei LSI: Kepercayaan Publik Terhadap DPR Ada Di Titik Terendah,” KOMPAS.com, accessed March 26, 2016, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/12/17/14485741/Survei.LSI.Kepercayaan.Publik.terhadap.DPR.Ada.di.Titik.Tere ndah; Kompas Cyber Media, “Survei: Tingkat Kepercayaan Pada TNI Paling Tinggi, Parpol Terendah,” KOMPAS.com, !

!|!Page! 17! ! ! politicians and government, but also democracy as a political regime. This study will offer a different perspective in understanding Indonesian democratization from the perspective of how political legitimacy is developed, especially in the period of post election. Second, studies that examine the process and outputs of Indonesian democracy at the local level arrive at two conclusions. One group is confident that political change has politically empowered people and fostered good governance reform of local governments, which is on the right track in relation to promoting more prosperity and democracy.15 The other group is however skeptical or critical about the development of local democracy, as decentralization and local elections have become an arena for consolidation of old- patronage structure and practices of power that undermine norms of democracy, such as political clientalism and corruption, and also the entrenched interests of particular elites.16 This group is skeptical as to whether genuine transformation towards real democracy and good local governance will emerge in the post New Order Indonesia. The above studies have definitely provided a rich and sophisticated picture of the state of local democracy and decentralization in Indonesia. However, the question that specifically addresses how political authority in the local arena creates legitimacy is still largely unexplored. In this regard, some aspects need more attention in the study of local democracy and decentralization in Indonesia, such as: why people trust (or distrust) local government and political leadership; what local government leaders do in order to create legitimacy and to what extent their efforts are compatible with people’s needs; and the implications for the legitimacy of government and other political institutions at the local level. By focusing on the process of creating legitimacy, this research aims to address those questions. Studies on legitimacy and the process of creating legitimacy in Indonesian politics are however not without precedent. One of the best known studies is Benedict Anderson’s

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! accessed March 25, 2016, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/01/12/22100771/Survei.Tingkat.Kepercayaan.Pada.TNI.Paling.Tinggi.Parpol.Tere ndah. 15 On the positive impacts of decentralization for public services improvement, see for example World Bank, “Decentralising Indonesia: A Regional Public Expenditure Overview Report” (Washington DC: World Bank East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 2003); Susannah Hopkins Leisher and Stefan Nachuk, “Making Services Work for the Poor: A Synthesis of Nine Case Studies from Indonesia,” World Bank, Jakarta, 2006, http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/11247.pdf. 16 This stream of analysis is developed by scholars like Vedi R. Hadiz, see for exampleVedi Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010); Henk Schulte Nordholt & Gerry Van Klinken, see for example Henk Schulte Nordholt and Geert Arend Van Klinken, Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).

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“The Idea of Power in Javanese Society”17, which was developed to understand power in Indonesia post independence from the perspective of Javanese elites. With reference to the political history of the Javanese Mataram Kingdom, Anderson developed characters of power in Javanese conception, which he compared with western power. In the west, power is described as abstract, having multiple sources, could be declining or increasing, and needs legitimacy from the people. Meanwhile in Javanese conception, the legitimacy is embedded in concrete manifestations of power, and its source is the ‘unseen world’ or divine right. Popular endorsement is not necessary, and therefore people have no choice but to accept power and authority, where power needs no popular legitimacy. Hence, the nature of power is characterized as homogeneous and non-distributive, and power relations are seen in zero-sum game models. Anderson’s analysis of Javanese power explained the leadership legitimacy of Presidents Sukarno and Suharto. William Liddle and Mohtar Pabotinggi discussed the specific character of New Order legitimacy. According to Liddle, in establishing personal legitimacy, General Suharto had accepted the principle of popular sovereignty in the form of elections. But in practice the election had been highly manipulated to ensure that the government party, Golkar, achieved a majority at the expense of themarginalization of other parties, and to provide a sort of base for popular legitimacy for his presidency. Furthermore in the name of political stabilization required for economic development, political parties other than Golkar were merged into two – the PPP for Islamist and PDI for nationalist parties. And to destroy political party roots, the organizational branch below district or city level was banned. The opposition power was effectively trashed, as the military, bureaucracy, and Golkar controlled absolute politics and government.18 Studying the moral base of the New Order legitimacy, Pabotinggi argued that the legitimacy of the regime was developed through imposing discourses such as political stabilization, fostering economic growth and development and the state's definition of social harmony.19 The collapse of the New Order did not only indicate the declining capacity to maintain those pillars, but also triggered a question about what kind of legitimacy and process of creating legitimacy was relevant to the context of democratization. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 17 Benedict Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Society,” in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972). 18 See R. William Liddle, “The 1977 Indonesian Election and New Order Legitimacy,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 1978, 122–26. 19 See Mohtar Pabotinggi, “Indonesia: Historizing the New Order’s Legitimacy Dilemma,” in Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995).

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The transition to democracy would generally change the foundation of political legitimacy from government autonomy or state-centric sovereignty to governance-based or plural authority.20 Public consent becomes a more important basis for creating legitimacy, to replace the sovereign and coercive regime. Election is a necessary mechanism for democratic legitimacy, but maintaining legitimacy goes beyond the election process. As the subject of continuous public scrutiny, the state of legitimacy is fluid and changing constantly. Performance of a democratic regime or more precisely performance of the elected government and political leaders in responding to popular demand is one important element in creating legitimacy. Describing legitimacy in the context of transitional society, Alagappa argued that in the absence of established democratic procedure, political legitimacy is more a result of contingent and accidental events, than intended, planned legitimation.21 In a new democracy like Indonesia, popular support for and trust in political authority is supposedly affected by, among others, capability and performance of the elected leader and government in delivering public expectations. In this regard, the case of Solo post reform would be informative to understand one type of legitimation process that occurs in the transitional political context. The locus of political legitimation examined from this case study will be specific, namely the legitimacy of a political leader. However, since it is impossible to distinguish one locus of legitimacy from another, the analysis will also cover the impact of the political leader’s legitimacy on other political institutions in the city, especially the city government and the political party of the mayor (PDIP). From the study of Jokowi’s mayoralty in Solo, I expect to enrich the discussion on how legitimacy has been created in Indonesia in the context of the democratic transition and decentralization. It is assumed in the literature on democratization that the people’s consent and the performance of government are important as a basis for legitimation. And to offer more grounded analysis, the following outlines the framework for and process of creating legitimacy including the issue of legitimation in Indonesian politics.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 20 The process of transition to democracy is not simply the shifting from authoritarian regime to the democratic one, but may take various directions that are not always end with democratic consolidation. The transition is basically arena of power struggle between the democratizers and the holdovers of old regime. Samual Huntington identified three possible scenarios of in transition, namely; transformations, replacement, and transplacement. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, vol. 4 (University of Oklahoma press, 1993), 109–163, (Chapter 3 Process of Democratization). 21 Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford University Press, 1995).

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2.! Framing political legitimacy a.! Legitimation in Indonesian politics The dynamics of Indonesian politics over time is problematic and presents legitimacy and legitimation issues. Particularly in the period of political changes, political authorities – the state, regime, government, and political leadership – would constantly encounter popular tests regarding the right to rule. Challenges to the legitimacy of each political authority are different; therefore the way legitimacy is created and maintained is not alike, although it is frequently interrelated. The state legitimacy, after the fall of the late President Suharto and New Order military rule, was tested by the strengthening of secessionist aspirations, particularly in three regions that have long political disputes: Timor-Leste (Timor Timur), Aceh and Papua (previously known as Irian Jaya). Beyond these regional tensions, the model of an Indonesian Unitary State came about due to fear of national disintegration, but was then moderated by the adoption of local autonomy. Somehow, the challenges toward state legitimacy in post New Order reignited the 1950s regional rebellion, but the process of negotiation and resolution of tension took a different path. The Timorese struggle for an independent state that originated during a political dispute over the Indonesian annexation of this ex-Portuguese colony in 1975 was solved through a referendum on 30 August 1999. The result of the referendum ended the claim made by the New Order regime that the region was part of legitimate territory and thus Indonesian sovereignty.22 The emphatic referendum result revealed that Indonesian rule was not legitimate to East Timorese, even

before the referendum was held. Another challenge of state legitimacy arose in Aceh. The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM) had struggled to establish an independent state of Aceh since the 1960s. The movement heightened during the political reform, but the enormous humanitarian tragedy caused by both earthquake and tsunami on the eve of Christmas 2004 laid a new platform for peace talks between GAM and the Indonesian government.23 Indonesian state legitimacy in Aceh is prevailing at the cost of a high degree of political autonomy.24 Papua, the most eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago is now the region

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 22 For discussion about political struggle towards an independent East Timor see for example Damien Kingsbury, Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence, 54 (Monash Asia Institute, 2000). 23 For analysis of Aceh’s political challenges see for example Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009); Edward Aspinall, “Combatants to Contractors: The Political Economy of Peace in Aceh,” Indonesia, no. 87 (2009): 1–34. 24 See Undang-Undang No. 11 Tentang Pemerintahan Aceh, 2006.

!|!Page! 21! ! ! where challenges to Indonesian state legitimacy are most visible.25 Despite the implementation of special autonomy law and other affirmative policies, resolution of this dispute remains elusive until recently. Some other regions are also demanding more local power and authority, but so far this is resolved within the framework of decentralization (including the special arrangement of local autonomy), without becoming a serious threat to state legitimacy. Beyond such challenges to the legitimacy of the nation state, a wave of democratization in the 1990s ruined the legitimacy of the New Order regime and its political leadership. New Order legitimacy was to develop on the basis of support for the regime with the pillars of political coercion, state-led economic growth and socio- economic distribution. Political coercion manifested in a militaristic approach and rule in order to control society and to eliminate political opponents. Economic policies were based on a growth model of development combined with a benevolent model of socio-economic distribution as instruments to generate political loyalty.26 National–local relations were based on a highly centralized political system. This system had positioned local government as the extension and instrument for achieving the interests of central government. Local government was driven merely by the national agenda, not based on local aspirations.27 Under the centralized regime, the local leaders had little need and limited opportunity to create a base for legitimacy, apart from central government. This was because political legitimacy originated from above, rather than having roots in local communities. For local government leaders, to have responsibility and accountability (as a means of political loyalty) to central government was more important for legitimacy. Therefore they tended to undermine their responsibility to local constituents. The regime's legitimacy declined severely as it failed to maintain socio-economic and political capacity, due to the impact of the financial crisis and a growing wave of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 25 On Papua’s roots of problem see for example Richard Chauvel, Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaption (Washington: East-West Center, 2005); Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, “The Papua Conflict: Jakarta’s Perceptions and Policies,” Policy Studies, no. 5 (2004): I; and Muridan Satrio Widjojo, Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present, and Securing the Future (Kerja sama LIPI, Yayasan Tifa, dan Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2009). 26 On the New Order political economy regime see for example Harold Crouch, “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia,” World Politics 31, no. 04 (1979): 571–87; Benedict Anderson, “Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective,” The Journal of Asian Studies 42, no. 03 (1983): 477–96; and Hal Hill, “Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation,” 1994. 27 On the centralized New Order system see for example Syaukani H. R, Afan Gaffar, and M. Ryaas Rasyid, Otonomi daerah dalam negara kesatuan (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar dan Pusat Pengkajian Etika Politik dan Pemerintahan, 2002).

!|!Page! 22! ! ! democratization. The crisis of legitimacy had opened up the opportunity for democratic change, namely electoral and political institutional reform, decentralization, and participative mode of state – society relations. These shifts had changed the nature of political legitimacy from state-centered and nationally based to more people-centered and locally based legitimation. The capability of political authority to respond to popular consent becomes more important as a basis for acquiring and maintaining democratic legitimacy. It is manifested in effective government and leadership in addressing the post crisis situation and also the governance reform agenda, which was promoted by proponents of democratization. The election will be the base of political legitimacy, but its sustainability depends on the government’s effectiveness to meet popular expectations in post election. The transition to democracy would imply the emergence of a new mode of legitimacy and process of creating legitimacy. The coercive approach and carrot and stick methods of political legitimation, as practiced by the New Order regime, were unfit for the democratic setting. A new way of creating legitimacy is however not automatically established. The political actors in the new regime would therefore struggle to fabricate their own way of creating legitimacy. In this process, political authority faces constant challenges from the people. Legitimacy is therefore not a given and is constantly changing, as a result of dynamic interactions between political authorities and the people.28 In the specific context of post crisis and democratic transition, the main challenges of legitimation are associated with the vacuum of effective legitimacy in fulfilling public expectations. It is hypothetical that political legitimacy will be created if political leaders fill the vacuum by performing authority that satisfies people’s expectations. As mentioned earlier, the democratic transition was also marked with the implementation of decentralization and local autonomy. The policies had transformed local government to be responsible in many areas of public service, and also the arena of democratization to meet the growing demands of popular inclusion or participatory governance. Transformation affects the way political authorities create political legitimacy, as now popular scrutiny is seen as more important. The implementation of direct elections for the local government leader in 2005 had also brought new challenges, as the candidates are motivated to develop campaigns to appeal to people by proposing a programmatic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 28 On the argument of legitimacy as a result of interactions between political authority and people, see for example David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority.

!|!Page! 23! ! ! agenda and image of people-oriented leadership. And the implementation of such populist politics will supposedly be key for sustaining the legitimacy of the elected leader. In contrast with the centralized regime, decentralization in sum has forced local political and government leaders to create legitimacy at the local level. The sources of legitimacy are no longer residing with central government, but with the local polity. In the decentralized regime, local politics is now an interesting arena for understanding the process of creating legitimacy in post New Order Indonesia. The expected pattern of democratic legitimacy is however not always confirmed in real political life. The literature shows that decentralization and direct local election had in part facilitated the revitalization of traditional legitimacy and growing practices of non- democratic politics, such as patronage politics, vote buying and corruption.29 In the period post election, leaders of local governments were also, in many cases, seen as incapable of managing authorities and public resources in the interests of the people, especially for public service improvement and local economic development, mainly due to the entrenched practices of self-serving or particular group interests. Amid the unexpected outcomes of democratization, some other cases promised to show evidence for democratic enhancement. Some good practice for governance reform appeared at a local level, mainly in the public service sector such as local health insurance, subsidized or free education policy, a participatory mechanism, and the adoption of an inclusive and consultative style of governance by political leaders.30 Those two contrasted practices show no single outcome of decentralization and democratization, but it may end with either a democratic or non-democratic mode of political legitimation. The latter practice seems however to attract increasingly more popular acceptance. The practices of democratic legitimation are appealing, since those address the underpinning structure of popular demands in a post crisis context (e.g. for better public services and more good governance). Within the framework of decentralization, leaders of local governments take initiative by creating various social policies in their respective province, district, or city. Some social policies were genuine local creations, and some were a sort of modification or effective implementation of national programs. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 29 See Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct electionss for Local Leaders (Pilkada) (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). See Henley and Davidson, “In the Name of Adat”; Jamie Davidson and David Henley, The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism (Routledge, 2007). 30 See for example Aspinall, “Health Care and Democratization in Indonesia”; and Andrew Rosser and Ian Wilson, “Democratic Decentralization and Pro-Poor Policy Reform in Indonesia: The Politics of Health Insurance for the Poor in Jembrana and Tabanan 1,” Asian Journal of Social Science 40, no. 5–6 (2012): 608–634.

!|!Page! 24! ! ! emergence of local social policies may generate the emergence of localized welfare schemes, which provide exclusive benefits for local people.31 And particularly in the post crisis situation, social policies could be seen as a political strategy of the ruling elites in order to prevent poor people from attempting radical action due to structural vulnerability.32 The financial crisis, combined with the growing aspiration for democratization that had forced President Suharto to resign, are the setting for democratic transition in Indonesia. The reduced government capacity in economy and public services was complicated by democratic transition. Therefore restoring government capacity and shifting the focus of government services, as well as adapting the agenda of governance reform is one possible path towards creating legitimacy for democratic politicians. But democratic politicians are not always successful at adapting the agenda. This captures democratic transition in a vacuum of effective authority in responding to the above challenges. The character of political legitimacy and process of creating that legitimacy in the transitional context of Indonesian democracy is therefore to a great extent shaped by the absence of effective government. The initiative by political leaders to develop policies to respond directly to popular expectations, such as basic public needs, could be one way to fill the vacuum. The policies to improve people’s access to health and education services, local economy, and other essential needs might prevent people from further vulnerability, and therefore may help political authority to create legitimacy. In the case of such popular-based ways of creating legitimacy, the beneficiaries are both for people and elites. For people, it will bring benefits for releasing stress, at least in the short run. For the ruling elites, it will provide a stronger basis for popular legitimacy. Beyond personal political legitimacy, the practice may also impact political institutions (e.g. local government and political parties), and enhance popular trust in democracy as a system in the long run. The emergence of populist politics to create political legitimacy at the local level is consistent with notions of best practice in governance reform. Furthermore it provides narratives about the shifting modes of creating political legitimacy in the context of Indonesian decentralization and local democracy. With this point of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 31 See Michael Keating, “Social Citizenship, Solidarity and Welfare in Regionalized and Plurinational States,” Citizenship Studies 13 (2009): 501–13. 32 See Daniel Mejía and Carlos-Esteban Posada, “Populist Policies in the Transition to Democracy,” European Journal of Political Economy 23, no. 4 (2007): 932–953.

!|!Page! 25! ! !

departure, I develop the framework for legitimacy and creation of legitimacy in this research. b.! Legitimacy and creation of legitimacy Legitimacy and creation of legitimacy are ‘central issues in social and political theory’.33 It is ‘the core for any political organization’ to survive.34 The question of legitimacy will guide us in understanding foundations of power structure and how the operation of power will imply the continuity or breakdown of authority.35 Legitimacy is required both by democratic and non-democratic political authority, as a moral ground to enforce rules and regulations, and to impose public policy.36 Depending on the mode of political regime, the nature of legitimacy and how it is created are different. But before progressing to discuss how legitimacy is created, it is worth clarifying the definition of legitimacy. Despite being central to political studies, scholars have different emphases for defining legitimacy, and what is considered legitimate or illegitimate power. The core of legitimacy is about ‘acknowledgement of the right to rule’. Jeremy Bentham argued that legitimacy relates to right of the state (political authority) to impose rule and regulation in a given territory.37 Sources of the right to rule, according to Max Weber may come from: 1) traditional authority – it has existed for a long period and is inherited among members of political elite; 2) charisma – a unique and distinct personal quality of leadership; and 3) legal-formal – it is in accordance with the accepted norms and principles of constitution, legal framework, and procedure.38 In democracy, the right to rule is not self-claimed, but requires people’s justification on the basis of actions and outcomes of political authority. Legitimacy therefore requires popular recognition of everyday practices of power.39 Seeing the people as a source of legitimacy, David Easton (as cited in Hurrelmann et al.) defined it as citizens’ attitudes, specifically the conviction that it is right and proper to obey the authorities and to abide by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 33 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 41. 34 Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford University Press, 1995), 3. 35 Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1993), 150. 36 Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority. 37 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power. 38 On the discussion of Weber’s theory of legitimacy and authority, see for example Peter M. Blau, “Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority,” American Political Science Review 57, no. 2 (1963): 305–316; Craig Matheson, “Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy,” British Journal of Sociology, 1987, 199–215. 39 In this regard, Johnson et al.. argued that legitimacy is as social process. See Cathryn Johnson, Timothy J. Dowd, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Legitimacy as a Social Process,” Annual Review of Sociology, 2006, 53–78.

!|!Page! 26! ! ! the requirements of the regime.40 The definition of the right to rule gives however a normative impression. The main challenge of the normative concept is to make it operational as a guide to understanding the real world. Robert Dahl offered one way to operationalize the concept of legitimacy, by giving a concrete illustration: that legitimacy and a degree of legitimacy are like a reservoir. So long as the water is at a given level, political stability is maintained, but if it falls below the required level, political legitimacy is endangered.41 Dahl’s description has two meanings to guide empirical inquiry of legitimacy, namely: 1) legitimacy and the degree of legitimacy are measurable, and 2) the degree of legitimacy is unstable and therefore is an object of continuous creation and re- creation that involves the governing and governed sides. Legitimacy is not a given and the degree of legitimacy is unstable. Peter G. Stillman defines legitimacy as conditions of relations between two poles in a power structure: the governing and the governed. Legitimacy is about ‘compatibility of the results of the government’s output with the value patterns of relevant systems’.42 Government output refers not only to the substance of policies but also includes mechanisms of governance, style of leadership, and other actions of government. The results of output are not always related to intended or expected responses, but also include unintended or unexpected results of government actions. Meanwhile, value patterns in society refer to popular imagination and expectations of political authorities in a certain period in time. Thus legitimacy is more or less created if either intended or unintended results of government actions are compatible with popular expectations. In the reverse case, political authority is leaning towards a state of illegitimacy. The compatibility definition brings some consequences for the study of legitimacy.43 First, the state of legitimacy is merely on compatibility between output of government’s actions and the structure of people’s values and expectations, and therefore could not simply be evaluated by popular feelings or opinions. Opinion polls and surveys are important as snapshots, but the focus of the study of legitimacy is to investigate to what extent the actions of political authorities (e.g. government and political leadership), is seen as compatible, or able to respond to people’s expectations of authorities. Second,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 40 Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek, Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7. 41 Dahl discussed notion of political legitimacy in his ‘Polyarchy’, especially chapter 8. Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press, 1973). 42 Peter G. Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy,” Polity, 1974, 32–56. 43 Ibid.

!|!Page! 27! ! ! compatibility cannot be conceptualised simply as two oppositional categories of compatible or incompatible, but is better seen as a matter of degree. There is no absolute condition of legitimate or illegitimate political authority. It is more reliable to define legitimacy as strong or weak, or declining or increasing. And third, legitimacy is desirable by governing and the governed, and is therefore an object of contestation. For the established authority, legitimacy is needed for staying power, while for political opposition it is needed to give ground for dismissing right to rule of the incumbent. The degree of legitimacy is a result of the relationship between the government and the people, or between the established political ruler (incumbent) and challengers to the ruler (opposition or actors of reform). There is no guarantee that incumbent authorities will always be in a winning position and be seen as successfully creating legitimacy. They may also be delegitimized and ousted from power if these authorities fail to accommodate voices for reform. In this research, the definition of legitimacy is following the argument of political compatibility: that popular acceptance of the right to rule of political authority is not a given, but is an implication of the state of compatibility between the actions of the ruler and structure of popular expectations. The state of compatibility is in constant flux, since the nature of relations between the actions of political authority and the structure of popular expectations is always in contestation. Political authorities (state, regime, and government leader) therefore need to create and re-create political compatibility in order to maintain or enhance legitimacy. This process is termed as ‘creation of political legitimacy’ or ‘political legitimation’. The creation of political legitimacy is not a singular and generic process, but is constrained by certain political moments and context. In non-democratic regimes, legitimacy is created through state political discipline and enforcement of sovereign rule, including the use of carrot and stick policies. People are merely positioned as objects of the process of legitimation.44 The legitimacy of the New Order Indonesia was created in this way. Democracy, on the other hand, features legitimacy in a different way, whereas legitimacy can only be created with the consent of the people plus compatibility between government action and popular needs.45 However, it is important to emphasise here that the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 44 On the discussion on non-democratic regimes and how this legitimates power, see Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Second Edition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), chapter 5. 45 See Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy”; Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105.

!|!Page! 28! ! ! character of legitimacy could not in fact be simplified in two broad categories, either democracy or non-democracy, but is more as a matter of degree.46 Also the state of legitimacy can not merely be seen from a normative point of view, but should include empirical inquiry. In a democracy, consent of the people is an absolute condition for political legitimacy. The basic formal procedure to confirm people’s consent is an election – wherein people decide who will have the right to rule. Winning the election is fundamental for a political leader to gain legitimacy, but electoral legitimacy will have little meaning if the elected leader and government fail to manage public authority in accordance with people’s interests. In reverse, if the elected leader and government can manage authority and resources in a way that is compatible with popular expectations, political legitimacy will be created. Therefore, the actual challenge for the elected leader and government is in the post-election period – when authoritative power comes into effect.47 The creation of democratic legitimacy requires accommodation of people’s interests in public policy and engagement of popular voices in the process of governance. This kind of inclusion will generate an acceptable degree of compatibility between government output and people’s expectations, which constitute the conditions for legitimacy. In a post-authoritarian regime, people usually expect the new government and political leaders to resolve the impacts of socio-economic and political crises, following the fall of the old regime. In this context, compatibility is usually developed through government effectiveness in formally addressing people’s expectations. The failure of a political leader to develop an effective government could jeopardize not only personal legitimacy and in turn government, but in the long run could also trigger popular trust in democracy. This situation could pave the way for anti-democratic actors to revitalize their political power.48 Drawing on the lessons from the context of an emerging democratic regime, S.M. Lipset argued that the new system would only survive government efficacy in fulfilling public expectations. He emphasized that successful economic development, as a principal element of government effectiveness, is a pre-requisite for stability of democracy.49

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 46 The discussion of legitimacy as a matter of power degree, see for example Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, 1990), 64–65. 47 Bo Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government,” American Behavioral Scientist, 2009, 311. 48 See Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.” 49 Ibid.

!|!Page! 29! ! !

Such compatibility inspires the study of legitimacy in transitional democracy. In this context, the old mode of autocratic legitimacy has declined, but the new political leadership and government are still struggling to develop a new legitimacy that fits democratization. The capability of political leaders in addressing popular expectations is critical. Brinkerhoff, Watterberg, and Dunn’s study of post war Iraq provided evidence that the installation of electoral democracy alone could not create legitimacy in the new system.50 However, the capacity of government to provide basic needs is key to sustaining legitimacy of democratization.51 In other post-conflict situations, the inability of government to fulfill basic needs erodes public trust and may trigger a legitimacy crisis for the new regime and in turn the political leader.52 Perez draws a similar conclusion in the case of Guatemala and El Salvador, arguing that growing public insecurity undermined the reform of security sectors, especially of the police.53 While in the case of Central Asia in the post-Soviet era, the legitimacy of democracy was to a great extent created by the presence of government’s effectiveness.54 And from the trajectory of European democracy, the state’s capacity in developing an effective welfare state system was an essential element for the consolidation of democratic regimes on the continent.55 To create government effectiveness is not an easy task, however, for the political leader and government in the context of transitional democracy. Such a transition that usually occurs in a climate of declining economic capacity and popular distrust towards a political regime can in turn trigger the collapse of the regime. But as shown in the case of Indonesia, the collapse of the regime and leadership brought no immediate recovery in either economic or governance capacity. At the outset, limited economic resources meant the political leader and government had only a few options for fulfilling popular needs. In Gallaroti’s view, a political leader who faces economic constraints tends to use maximum utilitarian principles to select which sectors of government will be allocated resources. He !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 50 Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Anna Wetterberg, and Stephen Dunn, “Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Evidence from Water Services in Iraq,” Public Management Review 14, no. 2 (2012): 273–293. 51 See for example the role of provision of water and sanitation in facilitating state-building process in Afghanistan. Michelle Kooy, Leni Wild, and Nathaniel Mason, “Doing Things Differently: Can Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Services Support Peace-and State-Building Processes?,” Development Policy Review 33, no. 4 (2015): 433–456. 52 Olivier Roy, “Development and Political Legitimacy: The Cases of Iraq and Afghanistan,” Conflict, Security & Development 4, no. 2 (2004): 167–179. 53 Orlando J. Pérez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 4 (2003): 627–644. 54 Anna Matveeva, “Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1999, 23–44. 55 See Steven Van de Walle and Zoe Scott, “The Political Role of Service Delivery in State-Building: Exploring the Relevance of European History for Developing Countries,” Development Policy Review 29, no. 1 (2011): 5–21.

!|!Page! 30! ! ! argues: “Like the rational investor, the state is assumed to select some optimal mix of governmental functions based upon the structure of its objective utility defined over the expected risks and returns of those functions”.56 In this regard the rationality of resource utility is shaped by popular needs in a given period of time. Scholars who focus on a quality of government approach like Rothstein, Stolle and Teorell suggested that a combination between effective capacity and impartial actions on the part of government in public goods provision are essential elements for creating legitimacy, particularly post election.57 While acknowledging electoral democracy as an indispensable part of a legitimate political system; Rothstein however argues that legitimacy is created, maintained and eventually destroyed, not by input (process and result of election), but output, which is the quality of government.58 This means that the process and results of implementation of authority post election is crucial for legitimation. The people, as a source of democratic legitimacy, would examine the capacity of the political leader and government to produce quality public goods, and on such a basis the process of political legitimation or de-legitimation takes place. In addition to impartiality as its normative basis that should be implemented by public officials, Longo argued that quality of government also determines relations that involve not only state, but non-state actors in public goods provision.59 Thus quality of government should not only be examined from the output or results of government impartial actions, but aspects of relationships among actors in the system. Public interest, which becomes the arena for the creation of political legitimacy, is however broader than the functions of government in economic development. In her assessment on how political leaders and government in Central Asia acquired legitimacy, Anna Matveeva identifies political capabilities in various sectors.60 These include capability in: 1) maintaining stability and avoiding open conflict; 2) effective use of economic means for political ends; 3) introducing new ideologies based on state- nationalism; and 4) developing international cooperation and regional security. The importance of government in producing other economic measures as important sources in creating political legitimacy is also, as mentioned above, found in the case of Guatemala !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 56 Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Legitimacy as a Capital Asset of the State,” Public Choice 63, no. 1 (1989): 43–61. 57 Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, “Social Capital, Impartiality and the Welfare State: An Institutional Approach,” in Generating Social Capital (Springer, 2003), 191–209; Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions,” Governance 21, no. 2 (2008): 165–90. 58 Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.” 59 Francisco Longo, “Quality of Governance: Impartiality Is Not Enough,” Governance 21, no. 2 (2008): 191–196. 60 Matveeva, “Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia.”

!|!Page! 31! ! ! and El Salvador on the issue of public security61, Iraq and Afghanistan on aspects of religious-nationalism and localism62, and in the literature on ‘failed states’.63 The literature suggests that the challenges of political authorities in transitional democracy to create legitimacy are not generic, but context bound. And despite the importance of context, the capabilities of political authority to deliver effectively public goods that are compatible with societal needs have been a dominant conclusion in studies about creating legitimacy, particularly in the setting of democratic transition. In my view, such a conclusion has at least two limitations, which I will address in this study. First, studies of legitimacy generally focus on national politics, despite the fact that the wave of democratization also brings substantial impacts at sub-national or local levels in the form of decentralization and local democratization. Some elements in the creation of legitimacy at a national level are certainly applicable to understand the local process, but the local-specific study would inform divergent, and even unique, narratives about not only local-specific legitimation but also interrelations between local and national in creating legitimacy. Second, dominant studies also tend to focus on linear relations between government and the state, rather than seeing the process of creating legitimacy as a contested arena of governance actors and interests. In a democratic transitional context, wherein the system of political institutions is still at the stage of development, the roles of personal figures are important in the process of legitimation. Analyzing the role of a political leader is therefore important to understand legitimation. It is not only the individual leader that needs to sustain legitimacy, but the actions of leadership would have implications for the other locus of legitimacy, that is, government and the political party. In this regard, to examine aspects of leadership style in managing the plurality of governance actors is important to comprehend the process of creating legitimacy in the democratic transition period.64

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 61 Pérez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity.” 62 Roy, “Development and Political Legitimacy.” 63 Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes,” Public Administration and Development 25, no. 1 (2005): 3–14. 64 Eva Sørensen, “Metagovernance the Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance,” The American Review of Public Administration 36, no. 1 (2006): 98–114.

!|!Page! 32! ! ! c.! Locus of legitimation Legitimacy and process of legitimation is necessary for all forms of political authority. Political authority here refers to institutions and actors that hold public office and exercise power, which include the state, regime, government, and leader. David Easton argued that it is multiple dimensions of legitimacy within a political system, namely lending support to the political community (i.e. nation state), regime, and personal ruler or leadership.65 The analysis of those dimensions of authority could be separated, but they are interrelated. The declining legitimacy of the state, for example, would impact the legitimacy of the regime or political leadership, while the capability of the political leader in performing government effectiveness could strengthen popular trust and support for the government and regime, and even nation state legitimacy. The following paragraphs make the distinction between each locus of legitimacy – the state, regime, and government (including personal political leader and political parties). The state, according to Max Weber, has the monopoly on coercive power.66 Legitimacy of the state prevails if coercive power within its territory is effective. In the Westphalian state model, the question of legitimacy of the state is apparent when the existence of the nation state is challenged by secessionist aspirations of a sub-national group. This challenge to state legitimacy could have different expressions: civil rebellion and secessionist movement; ethnic or sub nationalism-based political party; or the struggle for greater autonomy or self-governance. Socio-economic disparity and human rights issues are frequently the trigger; but the cardinal motive is the challenge to construct political and nationalist identity. In the history of postcolonial states, the anti-colonial struggle was an important source of nation state legitimacy. But at the same time the legitimacy of this new state entity is still in the making, particularly with regard to consolidation of national identity and territorial sovereignty. Such challenges are also found in some established democracies, wherein the secessionist movement and aspirations for greater autonomy are active.67 In Indonesia, the collapse of the New Order has enabled the re-emergence of a secessionist movement in some areas (i.e. East Timor, Aceh and Papua) and others are more moderate local political movements in the struggle for greater autonomy. Despite

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 65 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science (Knopf, 1953). 66 Blau, “Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority.” 67 We can cite Catalan (Spain), New Caledonia (France), and Quebec (Canada) as examples of persistence of regional movements to challenge the legitimacy of nation state.

!|!Page! 33! ! ! regional political aspirations, the collapse of the New Order did not cause destructive de- legitimation of state structure. But the collapse of the regime, which imposed a coercive approach to state making, was unavoidable. As a consequence, the new regime that emerged in a transitional democracy context posed a new approach to maintaining legitimacy. The next locus of legitimacy is regime, defined as the rules, regulations, and norms of institutions that become the foundation of authority in the existing political system.68 A regime is legitimate if citizens support power and public authority conducted within the framework of the established constitution. Popular protests to change the political system and an increase in popular scepticism are common signs of declining legitimacy of a regime. There are three separate but connected aspects of regime legitimacy: regime principles (core values of the political system), regime performance (functioning of the regime in practice), and regime institutions (actual institutions of government).69 People’s dissatisfaction with the performance of a regime can cause declining legitimacy in regime institutions, including political leader and government, but it doesn’t necessarily delegitimize core values of the political system. In this situation, people may either demand change in the way political institutions and leaders work to increase the outputs and performance of government, or they may punish the political incumbent in the election. In an established democracy, people tend to differentiate between politicians, the government and the system. Political leader and government will face continuous popular scrutiny on the basis of government effectiveness in producing public goods and the quality of public inclusion in the governing process. If people are dissatisfied with the performance of both leader and government, they will elect the alternative politician and parties in the election. In an established democracy, the popular belief about democracy as a system is relatively unchanged, and therefore the aspiration to replace democracy with another system is unlikely. Even radical right-wing parties in Europe, for example, do not seek to dismantle democracy as a political platform, though their xenophobic and ultra- nationalism political ideology contradict inclusive values of democracy.70 Still, the main political goal of this political party is to change government, not democracy as regime.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 68 On the definition of regime, see Mark Bevir, Encyclopedia of Governance (SAGE Publications, 2006). 69 Pippa Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government (OUP Oxford, 1999), 9–11. 70 In the case of right wing populism in Europe recently, the main political objective is to overtake power, rather than to replace the democracy with other system.

!|!Page! 34! ! !

Aspirations to change entire aspects of the regime usually happen in the case of popular movements to end coercive regimes and the people seek to replace it with a popular regime. This state of political change is known as democratic transition. In this context, people tend not to differentiate between the system, the institution and personal leadership. Personal leadership is regarded as key to the success or failure of democratization, and even the legitimacy of the new democratic regime is strongly influenced by political leaders’ capability to deliver the promise of democratization in actions and policies. This proposition leads to the discussion of personal political legitimacy. Personal legitimacy is attached to a political party and government leader. The head of government would encounter concrete challenges of legitimacy and legitimation not only during the election, but more intensely in the daily practice of authority.71 Therefore the legitimacy of the political leader is more fluid and fluctuates, commonly reflecting the degree of popular support for government policies and leadership performance. For the incumbent, leadership performance and effective results in government are important for political legitimation, as it will be the basis on which the people evaluate whether leadership and government are able to meet public expectations.72 In the setting of democratic transition, leadership performance would not only influence the sustainability of personal legitimacy of his/her government, but also affect the legitimacy of democracy.73 More precisely, it could, for example, affect public trust in democratic institutions, such as political parties and representative institutions, and also the system of government. The failure of leadership and government to deliver policy output that responds to people’s expectations, and to adopt an agenda of democratization in general, will impact not only the de-legitimation of leadership, but revitalise non- democratic elements. For this reason, the focus of this study is on personal political leader’s legitimacy and legitimation. The political leader’s legitimacy in the context of democratic transition will inform not only the process of creating personal legitimacy, but also the implications for legitimacy of government, the political party, and the democratic system in general.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 71 Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.” 72 Rothstein and Teorell, “What Is Quality of Government?”; Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.” 73 Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn, “Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States”; Roy, “Development and Political Legitimacy.”

!|!Page! 35! ! ! d.! Approach: legitimacy as a contested object The locus of legitimacy as mentioned above is multidimensional. A single study is therefore too ambitious to cover all aspects. As mentioned, my focus here is on personal political leader legitimacy. As it is impossible to isolate political leader legitimacy from other loci, the analysis will also examine to what extent such legitimacy impacts government, the political party, and the political system in general. As argued by Bruce Gilley: ‘the state and government legitimacy are two separate objects, but the overlap is undeniable since the performance of government (such as in area of good governance and poverty reduction) will also influence political stability of the state’.74 To understand personal political legitimacy, it is important to explore political leadership in implementing authority and to what extent such action helps to develop compatibility with public expectations in certain contexts in time and society. Focusing on aspects of personal leadership legitimacy is useful to understand transitional democracy in Indonesia, wherein figure based politics is becoming an emerging phenomenon.75 Also, as shown in many cases, government leadership is a key factor in maintaining public trust in the political leader and government. In the Indonesian case, democracy has been acknowledged as working successfully76, though political practices associated with the pre-democratic era are still part of this development.77 Initiatives from political leaders to embrace values and the agenda of democratic governance reform are therefore meaningful for maintaining popular support for the new system and political institutions. However, since the question of legitimacy in the recent Indonesian democracy is more related to personal leadership and government rather than state legitimacy, the implication will not specifically be discussed here. How then will the process of creating political legitimacy in this study be approached? As a starting point to studying legitimacy, I have used Stephen Holmes’s two contested views, namely; 1) legitimacy is static and based on pre-conceptions or a given

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 74 Bruce Gilley, “The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,” International Political Science Review 27, no. 1 (2006): 47–71. 75 The emergence of figure base politics is also confirmed in the survey of Power, Welfare, and Democracy, conducted by UGM and UiO in 2012-2014 (unpublished). 76 One of the analysis on the achievement and problem of Indonesian democracy, see for example Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Leo Suryadinata, Emerging Democracy in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 77 See From Reformasi to Institutional Transformation: A Strategic Assessment of Indonesia’s Prospects for Growth, Equity, and Democratic Governance (Harvard Kennedy School, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, 2011).

!|!Page! 36! ! ! moral view, and 2) legitimacy is changing and profane, as a result of interaction between political authorities and society.78 In the first concept, ‘legitimacy is depending upon its fidelity to an underlying moral reality or to highest-order moral norms, and society is regimented according to the principles of political regime’.79 This approach implies that the study of legitimacy should identify idealistic norms or values in a society to justify legitimacy. The definition of dominant norms or values is usually imposed by dominant power holders, rather than as a result of popular deliberation. Legitimacy is therefore the result of a top-down relationship, and the process is driven by the structure of the state or political elites. This approach is particularly useful to understand legitimacy in the authoritarian system. Benedict Anderson’s ‘The Idea of Javanese Power’ is an example of this approach.80 In Javanese conception, legitimacy is based on a given structure of norms and values, and people have no option but to obey these principles of power outlined by the state. And since the source of legitimacy is constructed as originating from a supra natural world, there is no incentive for the power holder to be accountable to the people. In the latter approach, the state of legitimacy is seen as fluid and changes over time. Holmes argued that ‘we can attribute legitimacy to a regime simply because it provides the necessary conditions for a variety of heterodox and non-official conceptions of the good to be lived out side by side. … (to develop legitimacy) the government adapts itself to a plurality of institutions and beliefs already existing in society'.81 In this view, legitimacy is first of all about the dynamics of the relationship between political authorities and society. The source of legitimacy lies not in the pre-determined normative conception, but in the form of de-facto popular support to political authorities in a particular context of time and place. In creating legitimacy, political authorities need to commit with actions and policies compatible with existing societal demands and structure. This approach is fundamental to studying legitimacy in democracy (and incidentally democratic transition), wherein compatibility is the main element that links ruler and ruled. Thus, the creation of legitimacy needs popular consent. To this end, it is necessary for political leaders and government to develop adequate responses to popular aspirations. I developed this research using this approach. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 78 Stephen Holmes, “Two Concepts of Legitimacy: France after the Revolution,” Political Theory 10, no. 2 (1982): 165– 183. 79 Ibid. 80 Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Society.” 81 Holmes, “Two Concepts of Legitimacy”: 182.

!|!Page! 37! ! !

That state legitimacy is fluid and an object of creation has a conceptual link with Stillman’s aforementioned definition of legitimacy as the degree of compatibility between government output and societal values. Compatibility of governance is certainly not a given, but is subject of creation. It is the result of dynamics relationship between the government’s actions and popular aspirations in a certain context of time and place. The process of creating legitimacy is neither based on the above claim (i.e. political elites) nor normative structure. Instead, legitimacy requires consent and confirmation from below (i.e. society).82 Since the legitimacy and its creation is as results of reciprocal relationship and/or contestation between political leaders and the people, the political leadership and government needs capability to adjust the de facto beliefs and expectation of the society. Further, the process of creating legitimacy in a democracy involves contestation among multiple actors. In a post-authoritarian context, civil society actors are usually active in pressing the new political leadership and government to adapt the agenda of reform. In this way, political leaders adapting the agenda of reform are objects of popular criticism. According to Pippa Norris, citizens are critical and will always scrutinise suspicious leadership and government performance as the basis of their assessment for supporting or otherwise political leadership and government.83 And the mode of relationship between political authorities and the people appears to accommodate conflict. Such conflict occurs when the gap between actions of political leaders (and government) and popular expectations is unmanageable. One example is when people express their discontent during an election by voting to oust the incumbent political leader or government. In democracy, leaders realize the importance of popular consent as a social basis for legitimacy. Therefore they tend to accommodate grassroots aspirations, since the process of creating legitimacy will include an aggregation of people’s interests in policies and the adaptation of public participation in the governance process.84 Democratic legitimacy is thus not only created from government’s effectiveness in adapting to the agenda of reform and provision of public goods, but also from elements of governance that accommodate public participation. In observing the process of creating legitimacy, aspects of governance process have equal significance with government output.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 82 Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.” 83 Norris, Critical Citizens. 84 Bernard Manin, Elly Stein, and Jane Mansbridge, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” Political Theory 15, no. 3 (1987): 338–368; Jack Knight and James Johnson, “Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy,” Political Theory 22, no. 2 (1994): 277–296.

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Furthermore, legitimacy and its creation are contextually bounded. People could therefore have a different base of justification and level of acceptance to those of political authority. This justification is based on their preferences and experiences with the structure and actions of political authority. Popular perception as to what is considered legitimate or illegitimate could be tracked by reviewing the historical conjuncture of legitimacy and legitimation in a particular society. The analysis of political history in society provides information about the dynamics of legitimacy such as the basis for legitimacy and how it was developed in the past and what made legitimacy increase or decline over time. From the discussion above, I approach legitimacy as an object of creation, and therefore constantly changing and in a state of flux, and as a condition of an acceptable degree of compatibility between results of government’s outputs and structure of societal needs in particular context of time and place. Stillman's perspective on compatibility between government's actions with public demands provides a starting point for analysis, in synthesis with Rothstein, Teorrel, and Stolle's arguments on the quality of government in post-election period. In addition, analysis on the process of creating legitimacy will also include the dynamic role of actors in governance and their relationships, rather than focusing exclusively on the results of governance. As this study pertains to interactions between political leaders and other actors of governance, legitimacy is hypothetically the result of such an interactive process.

3.! Research questions With the above background and framework, I developed the research questions with two assumptions. Firstly, the context of transition to democracy and decentralization has provided space in which political leaders at the local level have been able to create legitimacy in different ways. Secondly, democratization and decentralization have changed the nature of relationships between governing and governed, or between political leader and electorate. These relationships are more direct and closer on the basis of increased political accountability. Given the case of Jokowi in Solo, I propose the following main research questions:

How did Jokowi create political legitimacy during his leadership in Solo, and what can we learn about the character of legitimacy and process of legitimation in the context of Indonesia’s democratic transition?

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Details of the research questions are as follows: a.! In what sort of socio-economic and political setting did Jokowi emerge, and to what extent did such a setting create public expectations in local government and leadership? b.! To what extent did Jokowi create legitimacy in the process of winning the first direct election for mayor? c.! In what ways did Jokowi’s policies and style of leadership develop his personal legitimacy, and to what extent did his legitimacy as mayor enhance the legitimacy of the city government, and also the political party (PDIP)? d.! What does the mode of political legitimation developed by Jokowi in Solo tell us about changes and sustainability of character of legitimacy and process of legitimation in the context of democratic transition in Indonesia, and beyond?

4.! Research methods This section presents how this study was conducted. I will start by outlining the justification of selecting the case of Jokowi’s mayoralty in Solo for understanding the process of creating political legitimacy in the context of Indonesia’s democratic transition. The following is a personal narrative of the research process, including types of data and how the data were collected. In the last part of this section, I explain how the data were analysed and used for developing the argument. a.! Jokowi in Solo: a select case When I started this study in 2011, decentralization and local government reform in Indonesia had been implemented for ten years. Along with the reform, direct elections for the local government leader at province, district, and city levels was also implemented for the first time in 2005. Proponents of reform – scholars, civil society, community groups and donor agencies – shared their approval that the packages of local governance reform are essential for advancement of democratic development. But sceptical analyses have also appeared, particularly addressing quality and capability of leadership and government resulting from the democratic mechanism, to respond to substantive popular expectation and adapting the agenda for reform. The main criticisms are that decentralization and local

!|!Page! 40! ! ! democratization had been captured by practices that originated from the pre-democratic regime. Amid such scepticism, some local leaders and government brought new hope with their good performance in areas of governance reform. This sort of ‘positive’ development had been labelled as good practice in local governance reform. As distinct from this view, in this study I assume that such development reflects a certain mode of creating political legitimacy in the context of Indonesian political transition. The basis of legitimacy and process of legitimation is certainly different with the autocratic mode of the New Order, but the characterization of legitimacy and legitimation that continues to emerge is puzzling. In this study, I select a case study of Jokowi in Solo – one of the most well- known local leaders at the time I started this study in 2011, and one year later was elected Governor of Jakarta in 2012 and then President in 2014. From this case study, I hope to contribute to the discussion about the process of creating political legitimacy in the context of democratic transition, and more specifically to the study of Indonesian contemporary politics.

Map of Solo

Source: Bappeda Solo ! The map provides a social and political overview of Solo. The city is located in the southeastern part of Central Java Province and is known as the main transit point for the train and bus network in the southern region of Java. The city is divided into 5 sub-districts (kecamatan) and 52 kampongs (kelurahan). Three sub-districts – Jebres, Serengen, and

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Pasar Kliwon – have the largest clusters of poor kampongs and are the main basis of support for PDIP, the party of the commoners. Batik clothes and accessories are the most important industries of the city, and sub-district Laweyan has been since the period of Kasunanan known as the center of the industry. The Islamist political parties are relatively strong in Laweyan, though PDIP is still the largest party. Banjarsari is the sub-district, where most of public facilities (government offices, train station, bus terminal, and stadium) and also where wealthier neighborhoods are located. Jokowi’s residence is in the one of the wealthiest clusters. Nonetheless, most of the kampongs include poor sections of the city population. Like in other sub-districts, PDIP is dominant power in Banjarsari. Jokowi was mayor of the city, when I conducted the first field research in early to mid-2012. He was elected Governor of Jakarta in September 2012, and two years later I witnessed his victory in the presidential election during the second field research in July 2014.85 Despite his meteoric political rise, I focus my research on the period during his early political career, when he was mayor in Solo. The focus on this period is mainly to understand how he created political leadership legitimacy in Solo. The select case study and limitation to this period are based on the following reasons. Firstly, it provides one example of how a local government leader was successful in managing opportunities for decentralization and direct elections for creating legitimacy by projecting himself as a democratic reformer, in the midst of undemocratic practices that overshadowed Indonesian politics after the reform. Jokowi’s emergence signalled the shifting pattern of political legitimation in post-Suharto Indonesia. The New Order regime became a strong centralized system, which disempowered local governments with an absence of substantial political autonomy and authority. The main role of local governments was to implement national policies. The legitimacy of its leader depended on support from central government, which also had the power to oversee and control the local authority. Decentralization and democratization fundamentally shifts the nature of legitimacy, as local popular support becomes the principle source for legitimacy.86 Judgement from the people about how local government and its leaders are able to meet popular expectations is a crucial factor in political legitimation. In Solo, Jokowi was known for his effective policies to address the problem of delivery of basic public services

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 85 In Solo, Jokowi won almost 84% of the vote in the presidential election. 86 The first regulation on local autonomy was adopted in 1999 (UU 22/1999), which then was replaced with UU 32/2004. At the moments, there are aspirations for making another amendment which basically to strengthen the authority of national government and provinces.

!|!Page! 42! ! ! and urban informality, and also for his low profile and inclusive style of leadership. By focusing on his early political career, this study allows us to understand in more detail the trajectory and dynamic events that expose how he created political legitimacy in the city. Secondly, in the context of Indonesian democratization, he was among the growing phenomena of leaders from non-political backgrounds who were successful in winning their party’s nomination and going on to win the election. However, the scale of his success and the profile he created outside Solo as a successful local leader was exceptional, as his legacies as mayor became a strong basis for the successful political struggle that followed in the 2012 Jakarta Governor election and subsequent 2014 Presidential election. Dating back to Solo, Jokowi was an astonishing electoral phenomenon when he and vice-mayor, FX. Hadi ‘Rudy’ Rudyatmo, were re-elected in 2010 with a massive landslide victory with 90.06% of the vote. This election was acknowledged by civil society and electoral watchdogs in the city as fair with a minimum of money politics. Jokowi’s support upon re-election much higher than the 36% of the vote he obtained in the 2005 mayor election, a percentage that reflected political support from PDIP’s mass base rather than resulting from his personal appeal. The great electoral victory in 2010 also showed that support for his leadership came from across communities and political groups in the city. In my view, the victory wasn’t simply an electoral phenomenon, but reflected a deeper process of how political legitimacy is created in the context of emerging democracy in a post crisis society like Solo, wherein the effective legitimate ruling power was absent for years. And thirdly, in Solo there were distinctive, but not unique, features of a tradition of popular recalcitrance and urban socio-economic problems, particularly after the 1990s crisis. Jokowi’s astonishing re-election in 2010 as mentioned above was a result of successful policies and leadership style he adopted to manage those challenges. And his reputation outside Solo rested, in part, on his seeming success in managing issues that were prevalent in many Indonesian cities. Jokowi’s emergence seemed to provide different narratives other than many studies that arrived at the conclusion that the new democratic political system would revitalise neo-patronage and traditional power holders.87 The ground for this view was the emergence of clan-based politics, revitalization of local monarchy, and various practices of patron-client politics in the wake of local !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 87 See the discussion of, for example, Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective; Nordholt and Van Klinken, Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia; Davidson and Henley, The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.

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democratization and decentralization. Solo is the city in the Javanese heartland, the residence of Mataram Sultanate inheritance – Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. The monarchies have tried persistently to regain political power by following the procedural norms of local democracy, but until recently they had failed to regain political ascendance, except for the success of some family members in local legislative elections.88 Instead, it was Jokowi – local businessman with a commoner background – and other PDIP figures that had dominated city politics since the political reform. And Jokowi’s political success relied on his ability to manage the challenges and agenda that emerged in post crisis Indonesia. This pattern of legitimation is outside the Javanese idea of power, as suggested by Anderson.89 b.! Data collection The collection of data is a crucial stage of research. I applied two main strategies commonly used in qualitative case methods, namely interview and documentary study. Documentary study is important to obtain a picture of past events including in this case the process and substance of public policies.90 Types of documents collected in this research are miscellaneous, ranging from official government publications, mass media (printed and digital) reports, and publications of non-government organizations. Government publications include among others: 1) public policies in the form of city’s priority, programs of development and budget allocations; 2) reports on the implementation of programs; 3) local regulations (Perda), mayor’s decisions and decree (SK Walikota), and other operational guidance for policy implementation; and 4) statistical data. These are considered as primary resources, and mostly not published but the public can access via the archival system of government. The government documents I collected are not limited to the period of Jokowi, but also accessed from previous periods. These documents are useful to give historical background to government actions, socio-economics and the political context pre Jokowi. I collected, for example, statistical data from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, which are relevant to socio-economic change (and continuity) in the city. Data on city’s budget also covers

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 88 There was only limited success by members of noble families in Solo during the election. Some were elected as DPRD members and a DPR member, but their efforts to compete in the election for mayor have been unsuccessful. 89 See Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Society”. 90 On the importance of archival material for qualitative case study see Louise Corti and Paul Thompson, “Secondry Analysis of Archived Data,” in Qualitative Research Practice, ed. Clive Seale et al. (London: Sage Publications, 2004).

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Slamet Suryanto’s mayoralty, budget capacity and its public services and developments have also been available for city regulations (Perda and SK Walikota) since the 1970s. Government documentation is open for public access via the archives; however, a letter of data request must be submitted or application for a research permit must be made to the relevant government office. Obtaining access depends on the contact person we seek for assistance. Staff of the government office may respond differently in processing the request. The City Agency of National Unity, Politics and Society Protection (Kesbanglinmas), for example, implemented a protracted and complex procedure until the research permit was finally approved. The agency still applies a screening procedure for research, especially regarding the topic of politics and government. A researcher needs to follow a hierarchical procedure to obtain a permit from province to city level. Following this procedure would imply a lengthy waiting time until official permission is granted. Other city agencies however applied no complex bureaucracy to access documents. As long as we could explain the topics of research and the information to be requested, they would assist with the relevant documents. Based on my experiences, some city agencies have a simple procedure for accessing documents via the Bureau of Documentation and Public Relations, Planning Agency, Bureau of Statistics, and the legal section of the city secretariat. Another way to collect government documentation is from civil society organizations, which become partners of the city government in implementing programs related to governance initiatives. The compilation of the city’s annual budget, for example, could be collected from Pattiro, a NGO focused on budget transparency, while Kompip at that time advocated for participatory planning and helped me access documents for city planning. From this process, I learned that a researcher needs to imagine different possibilities in collecting government documentation, not only due to bureaucratic procedures, but also the fact that many local governments in Indonesia don’t yet have a system to pool all archives, which instead are scattered across government agencies. Another kind of documentation I collected during this research is NGO publications. These include reports of community empowerment programs, bulletin or monthly publications and policy papers. Such publications provide different points of view about problems and perspectives on various issues of livelihood that emerge in the urban community of Solo. The NGO perspective is usually critical and provides more evidence based reports about the real situation at grassroots level, as well as counter information regarding government claims about policy output and results. The report of Yayasan Kakak on community empowerment, for instance, describes a more factual picture about the

!|!Page! 45! ! ! conditions of living in slum areas and crowded cities (kampongs). Furthermore, NGO reports provide more detailed and reliable data about the quality of infrastructure, public facilities and socio-economic conditions in each kampong, compared to official data from the Bureau of Statistics. One example is provided by Solo Kota Kita, which published basic profiles of 52 kampongs in Solo. NGO documentation is useful for either data verification or to make comparisons with the government’s version. It is also useful for completing information that is not available through government. The final documentation is mass media, printed and digital. The collection of newspapers published in Solo provides a daily record of events related to socio-political dynamics in the city. One important printed source is Solo Pos, a newspaper with the largest readership in the city. Solo Pos was first published in 1997, and has since become the main print media reference on the dynamics of Solo. During field research, I managed to develop fruitful contact with the Research and Development unit of Solo Pos, and received generous assistance in accessing documentation since 1997. Another newspaper is Suara Merdeka, a Semarang based print media, which published daily a section on Solo. Both newspapers offer digital versions that helped me access and update information on events in relation to this study. Solo is also considered a national political barometer. The political dynamics in the city have a direct connection with the mayor and political events in Indonesia including anti-colonial movements, the communist uprising, anti-Chinese riots, terrorism, and most recently the presidential election (as Solo is the hometown of Jokowi). Therefore, Jakarta based mass media are also important sources of information, especially reports on Solo. For this information, I mainly used digital news and video records. Let me now turn to the operationalization of interviews that I conducted during my visit to Solo. Some documentation as mentioned above was compiled during my field research in Solo. However, the main purpose of field research is to conduct interviews and observation. What I mean by observation is to have direct experiences in the field related to the object of study. In this regard, I visited kampongs and neighborhoods in the city and talked with members of the community, to obtain their views about the city’s government and leadership through informal conversations. I also joined in as observer in some discussion on issues of public services, especially health and education sectors. Such procedures were fruitful to get people’s opinions and expectations about the education subsidy, health insurance, and the kampong development fund. From these observations, I obtained natural and relevant information firsthand of how people express their support

!|!Page! 46! ! ! and/or discontent toward government and political leaders in the city. From a discussion attended by some leading figures in the community, for example, I gleaned insights on their critical views of Jokowi’s leadership, in spite of his emerging popular image at that time. Whereas conversations with people working in informal sector, such as becak riders and street vendors, I learned about expectations of common people regarding the city government. The information I grabbed on these occasions tended to be scattered rather than structured, since my position, as researcher, was to follow the flow of conversation. For more structured interviews, I targeted informants, categorized in three main groups: actors of government (including mayor/vice-mayor and bureaucrats), politicians (including party leader and DPRD members), and non-government actors (including NGO activists, community figures, academics, journalists and local electoral commissioners). I conducted in-depth interviews in two phases in 2012 and 2014, with a total of 46 informants. From these three groups I grabbed different points of view about socio- economic and political dynamics in the city that would be useful to develop a comprehensive and critical analysis of the state of legitimacy and process of legitimation in the city. I also applied different approaches to access informants. With the bureaucracy, for example, the formal approach was useful initially, while the actual process of interviewing was more informal. For informants in the community and politicians, the informal approach was more productive. The following highlights the interview process and how primary data was gathered from each group of informants. With government actors, interviews were mainly conducted to gain insight about government priorities and the process of policy formulation and implementation. During Jokowi’s leadership, sectors of basic public services (health and education) and local economic development (traditional market and informal economy) were at the top of the policy agenda list. From interviews conducted with bureaucrats in those sectors, I collected information about process and challenges during policy making and implementation. I learned about the importance of leadership direction (in this regard mayor/vice-mayor) in policy process and delivery. Other interviews with bureaucrats at a lower level (sub-district and kampongs) confirmed that leadership supervision in the implementation of policies could generate more motivation for these bureaucrats to perform better and impress communities in general. During my field research I also had the opportunity to talk with the vice-mayor, Rudy, and also to attend a gathering where Jokowi delivered a key speech. On both occasions, I obtained information on; 1) the vision of leadership the mayor and his

!|!Page! 47! ! ! deputy adopted in Solo, 2) the government's policy and agenda priorities and dynamics, and 3) the allocation of responsibilities between mayor and deputy mayor. The politicians, mainly DPRD members, expressed different views about the practice of governing. Generally, DPRD members are not comfortable with the recent position of legislative body at the local level, as their powers in policy process, budgeting and overseeing the executive were, by law, limited. Regarding the performance of Jokowi’s leadership, the figures of political parties in DPRD had different opinions. The key figure of PDIP in DPRD, for example, claimed that Jokowi’s policy and leadership delivery were part of a strategy of three pillars embraced by the party, namely the unification of party in the executive, legislative and grassroots. Therefore, the success of Jokowi in governing the city could not be separated from PDIP. Figures of non- government parties, mainly the PKS and Demokrat, on the other hand, had different judgements, as they saw governance innovation in Solo as a result of collective efforts, wherein DPRD was part of the process. In relation to the policy of Solo health insurance (PKMS), for example, they argued that policy was possible due to DPRD endorsement during policy formulation. Non-PDIP members also complained about the absence of impartiality, since the beneficiaries of city policies and programs were mainly PDIP voters. Finally, last but not least important, were non-government actors. In democracy, sources of legitimacy are at grassroots level, not only because people are the sources of ballots, but more importantly, their expectations of and demands regarding political authority. Among principle characters of Solo politics are the vibrancies of civil society and people’s enthusiasm on political matters. It is also evident that many government initiatives originated from agendas promoted by civil society actors. From this group, I gained a strong impression about the cardinal roles of non-government actors in shaping Jokowi’s main agenda including budget transparency, participatory approach and managing urban informality. In general, the informants in this group were impressed by Jokowi’s direct communication and inclusive leadership, as well as acknowledging the effectiveness of his policies in addressing Solo’s problems. However, they also believed that despite the personal popular legitimacy of Jokowi, the roots of community problems in Solo have not been eliminated, but managed in a better way.

!|!Page! 48! ! ! c.! Procedure of analysis The next stage after data collection is analysis, the initial step in the write-up process. This stage is basically about how the dataset will be used to develop arguments in order to answer research questions. In this study I adopt triangulation for data analysis. The triangulation technique indicates the use of two or more sources of data in order to cross-check the information, to develop more comprehensive and credible analysis from different standpoints to present a balanced picture of the phenomena.91 Following Denzin’s category of methodological triangulation, the data collected in this study, as explained in the previous section, includes a series of interviews, various kinds of documentaries and observation.92 Interviews were conducted with different governance actors – politicians, bureaucrats and community figures – in order to gauge different points of view. Also different documentation sources provide richness of information about the case under study. I start the write-up process by formulating an advanced outline of arguments in the thesis, by combining the theoretical framework and main findings from the field study. The outline serves as a backbone of preliminary arguments in chapters, and also guidance as to how the dataset will be used to support such arguments and/or develop more advanced analysis. The dataset collected in this study is rich and diverse. The initial step in analysis is to make three broad categories of data, namely interview notes, documentaries, and field observation notes (including photos or images). In each category of data, I then develop sub-category. For interviews, the sub-category is based on informants and substance of interviews, and then locating where arguments will be placed in the thesis. Interview notes could be useful for developing analysis in one or more arguments. As an example, the notes from interviews with NGO activists are useful to identify key political issues and process of policy making, the character of relationships between government (including mayor/vice- mayor) with communities and critical views about the city government. Some interviews however are only relevant for certain parts of the chapter, such as the interview with the officer from the city’s health agency that focused on health services. A similar procedure is applied for primary and secondary documents, but with a different basis of categorization. I organized the documents in the first phase based on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 91 Paulette Rothbauer, “Triangulation,” in The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods, ed. Lisa Given (SAGE Publications, n.d.), 892–94. 92 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Sage Publications, 2008).

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sources and types, and year order. For example, government documents were sorted by policy area and its chronology. For mass media sources, I applied a combination of issues and publication dates. With those models of data categorization, I could identify data type and substance in a more organized way, which makes it easier to select relevant information for supporting or developing narratives and arguments in each chapter. The ultimate aim of analysis is to produce strong arguments to address the research questions. Key to developing strong arguments is that information should be verified. This step is strength of the triangulation procedure. For example, I checked the claims of one actor by contrasting his statement with that of other actors. By explaining the formulation of health insurance, I not only use the claim of government, for example, but seek information from other actors such as DPRD and NGOs. Another instance is about budget transparency or street vendor relocation that in fact involved to a great extent the role of NGOs, in spite of the political leader’s claim. Verification and examining events from different perspectives is beneficial in building the analysis in two ways. First, this process provides a comprehensive picture regarding the roles of political actors in governance in the dynamics of political legitimation, and how Jokowi benefitted from these dynamics to enhance his personal legitimacy. Second, the procedure enables me to support my argument that the process of creation of legitimacy occurs in multiple contested relations among different actors of governance.

5.! Structure of thesis In this section, I outline the structure of chapters and key issues discussed in each chapter. In the Introduction, I outline the reasons as to why a study on legitimacy is important, and to what extent the case of Jokowi in Solo is justified in relation to creating legitimacy. I discuss the research framework and approach to the study of legitimacy and its relevance to Indonesian democratic transition. The last section in this chapter explains the process of data collection and analysis. The process of creating political legitimacy is contextually bound. Chapter two discusses popular resistance in Solo in the context of political legitimation. I explain the various expressions of popular recalcitrance and develop arguments as to why they appeared so frequently in Solo. I argue that the tradition of recalcitrance emerged due to the absence of effective authority in managing public expectations, which also had its roots

!|!Page! 50! ! ! in socio-economic vulnerability in the city. Regarding the process of governing, political authorities need to respond to this societal context otherwise their legitimacy will be in limbo. Chapter three discusses early political reform in Solo, and more precisely the leadership of Slamet Suryanto, the first mayor to hold office in the reform period from PDIP. The discussion covers how Slamet emerged as mayor in the elite’s election and why he failed to maintain legitimacy, by examining aspects of his government policies and leadership approach. I close this chapter by analysing to what extent Slamet failed to respond to popular expectations and to develop actions compatible with the agenda for democratic reform, and the implication of failure regarding his political legitimacy. Chapter four outlines the emergence of new political leadership in the context of the electoral process of legitimation. I explain how Jokowi gained power from the perspective of electoral legitimacy and how public expectations emerged during the election. In a democracy, the election is crucial for political legitimacy, but the more important process of creating legitimacy is when political authorities are effectively implemented. In chapter five, I explain how Jokowi maintained and broadened political legitimacy by promoting policies on local basic needs and through his inclusive style of leadership. I conclude by analysing to what extent the legitimacy he developed in Solo influenced the legitimacy of political institutions and his own political career. The last chapter will conclude the analysis to answer the research questions and set out the contribution I offer in this thesis regarding the process of creating political legitimacy. I close this chapter by offering a characterization of political legitimation in transition in Indonesia. I expect this characterization will enrich our understanding about Indonesian democratization and the creation of political legitimacy more generally.

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Chapter Two The Recalcitrant City: Political History of Fragile Legitimacy

1.! Introduction This chapter discusses popular resistance in Solo in the form of a political grassroots culture to counter the hegemony of elites. People in this city are proud of tradisi perlawanan (tradition of recalcitrant); through which common people resist the dominant power structure in the social, economic and political life of the city. As it will be shown in this chapter, the experience of resistance has become part of collective or popular identity, which is contrasted with elite identity. A respected Indonesian social scientist, Kuntowijoyo, described, in Solo ‘… the common people (rakyat jelata) developed [their] own popular tradition to counter the dominant tradition of the elite (priyayi)’.93 The records of popular resistance in Solo are abundant, either in the form of massive mobilization in riots and demonstrations fostering political change, or scattered individual and group actions in everyday life. The tradition of popular resistance is certainly not unique to Solo, as this phenomenon is evident elsewhere in Indonesia and other urban communities. However, the tradition of recalcitrant does not only influence changes in structure and relations of power in the city. More importantly, it has appeared as collective memory that legitimizes popular actions to challenge the political legitimacy of elites and the local state in various political regimes, from early colonization to contemporary democracy. The emergence of popular resistance was triggered by either national or local factors. The local politics of Solo was not and is still not autonomous, but is merely a part or extension of national political dynamics, such as the decline of Mataram Sultanate in the colonial period, the struggle for independence, communist party dominance and its destruction in the 1950s and 1960s and political reform in the 1990s. These occurrences relate to fundamental change in political regimes, surrounded by mass riots with severe social and economic consequences. Beside nationally driven mass resistance, locally driven and smaller scale resistance has also been a part of Solo dynamics. This type of resistance was mainly due to the deprivation of urban living conditions, and could take the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 93 Kuntowijoyo, Radikalisasi Petani: Esei-Esei Sejarah (Bentang, 1993). From a Gramscian perspective, the rise of the popular movement is seen as part of counter hegemony to dominant culture, ‘a process that confronts the central principle of a hegemonic order’. See Owen Worth, Rethinking Hegemony (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 147.

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form of individual or community based resistance. Urban deprivation reveals the declining capacity of city government for the provision of local services and this aggravates the crisis at a national level. Recurrent recalcitrance is claimed by civil society activists to be a form of popular political autonomy in relation to dominant power structures and the elite class in the city. Popular political independence has shaped a difficult environment for political authority and to sustain effective political legitimacy. On many occasions, political authority failed to deliver outputs of government that were compatible with people’s expectations; this has resulted in further difficulties in creating legitimacy. In order to have a comprehensive understanding about the tradition of popular resistance in the city, this chapter will discuss: (1) how popular resistance was created as collective memory, (2) why it occurred recurrently, and (3) the extent to which the tradition of popular recalcitrance challenges political authority’s capacity to create legitimacy. To this end, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part shows that popular resistance has become collective memory in Solo, but such resistance is viewed differently among the commoners (wong cilik) compared to the elite (priyayi). According to grassroots political activists, recurrent resistance expresses popular traditions of political independency in the face of dominant authority and elites, while for the priyayi resistance was seen as a social disease. In the second part, the discussion shifts to the underlying causes of recurrent resistance. And since such resistance amplified popular challenges to political legitimacy, it reveals lack of political authority in order to create compatibility between actions of government and popular expectations. The third part discusses the legacy of recurrent popular resistance in identifying the agenda and issues for creating popular legitimacy. The focus here is on political resistance in Solo during the 1990s as a prelude to political reform.

2.! Culture of recalcitrant as collective memory People who live in Solo claim to have a collective memory about recurrent popular resistance that has significantly affected the social and political landscape of the city. Such resistance however has different meanings among political agencies and community. State actors, including the elite class in general, perceive popular resistance as disruptive to government rule and authority. Grassroots’ activists, however, in line with Kuntowijoyo’s argument of counter culture, are of the view that resistance was an expression of popular

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culture in Solo to counter the power of hegemony. They characterize Solo people as politically dynamic and who openly express their autonomy.94 In the political realm Solo has come under both modern and traditional political structures. Two traditional authorities, Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro, retained political and government power until the early years of independence. But rather than resting on popular roots, the legitimacy of the two courts depended on support from the colonial government, following the partition of Mataram in 1755. The culmination of popular dissent was the anti-swapraja revolution that followed the proclamation of independence in 1945 and resulted in the partition of Surakarta territory into autonomous districts and a city. Modern political authority established in the city after the revolution also faced recurrent popular resistance, triggered by either national or local dynamics. As counter hegemonic culture, popular resistance manifested itself on a massive scale with everyday resistance. a.! Massive scale of political resistance The emergence of such a groundswell of political resistance in Solo could not be separated from the political dynamic and struggle for power in the national context. In Solo, however, there is a collective consciousness among grassroots political activists and community figures that political reform was an outcome of the popular political movement. Dating back to the early years of independence, the establishment of Solo as an autonomous city was as a result of the anti-swapraja revolution. This social revolution also dismantled the legitimacy and political authority of the Javanese courts residing in the city. The importance of popular politics in generating political change in the city was recurrent including the communist party’s dominance in the 1950s and early 1960s and political transition in 1998. These events had nurtured the tradition of popular political autonomy.95 The people’s political independence is claimed to have had its origins in the early history of Solo as an autonomous village (desa praja), before it was developed as a new capital of Mataram Sultanate, Surakarta, in 1741.96 The establishment of Surakarta was a consequence of the destruction of the old capital, Kartasura, during the Chinese war in 1740. The war initially started in Batavia, following the massacre of Chinese by the Dutch East Indies Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) in October 1740, but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 94 Interview with Putut Gunawan, June 19, 2012. 95 Ibid. 96 Interview with Sudharmono, June 25, 2012; Hari D. Utomo, May 10, 2012.

!|!Page! 54! ! ! then spread to inland Java. The war turned out to be a multifaceted conflict that involved Mataram Sultanate, VOC, the Chinese community and the Maduranese.97 The war ended with political catastrophe for the Sultanate that could only survive with support from the VOC. Following the war, the VOC divided Mataram into smaller courts. The partitions of Mataram into Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro, made the courts dependent upon the Dutch, rather than relying on support from their people. The significant intervention of the VOC and the inability of the courts to develop political independence had created a wedge between aristocratic elites and the people. And the legitimacy of the two courts in Solo was undermined after the popular anti-swapraja revolution post independence. The social revolution during the struggle for independence did not only happen in the city of Solo, but also surrounding districts dominated by the peasants. Various elements involved mass actions, including the people’s army (laskar rakyat) that was dominant during the independence revolution, led in Solo by the communist party (PKI).98 The support for PKI was significant during the revolution, due to the propaganda of land reform and distribution, which attracted mass support, not only from the poor peasants, but also the urban poor.99 The revolution destroyed the political authority of the courts, along with the partition of Surakarta into smaller autonomous districts, and one autonomous city.100 The social revolution was a culmination of popular resistance to the authority of the courts. And in this regard, the PKI had imbued popular revolution with counter hegemonic power to displace the culture of traditional political power. After the social revolution, political hegemony of the courts was shattered. The new political authority that emerged from the counter hegemonic movement was none other than the PKI. After years of struggle for national sovereignty, the Indonesian government conducted national election in 1955 and local elections in 1957. The four biggest political parties of the 1955 election were the PNI, Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama and PKI.101 PKI was

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 97 For further description of the partition of Mataram, see M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), chapter 10 “Java and the VOC, c. 1745-92.” And for the specific analysis on the establishment of Surakarta, see Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo and M. C. Ricklefs, “The Establishment of Surakarta, a Translation from the‘ Babad Gianti,’” Indonesia, no. 4 (1967): 88–108. 98 Solo was among the cities where a branch of PKI was established in the early independence period. It was also the headquarters of Lasjkar Merah, the PKI paramilitary wing that conducted political and military training. See George McTuran Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), 343. 99 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. 100 See DPRD Sementara Surakarta, Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1953 (Surakarta: Kota Surakarta, 1954). As the result of anti-swapraja movement, Surakarta residency was then divided into six ‘independent’ districts: Klaten, Boyolali, Sukoharjo, Karanganyar, Sragen, and Wonogiri; and city of Surakarta. Officially the City of Surakarta or Solo was established in 16 June 1946. 101 For the complete result of the election, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Equinox Publishing, 2006), 434–37.

!|!Page! 55! ! ! the most successful political party in Solo. In both elections, PKI gained more than 50% of the vote.102 The PKI win in Solo can certainly be linked to the anti-swapraja revolution, but in a deeper sense it reflected the revolutionary character of the people. Following this electoral result, Utomo Ramelan, the Communist leader, became mayor of the city. With regard to the revolutionary political legacy of PKI in the city, mayor Utomo’s government was the political authority, established on the basis of popular legitimacy as a result of popular struggle against the dominant political structure of the courts. Another kind of revolutionary movement, sponsored by the military, destroyed the PKI’s power during the tragedy of 1965. In the post-independent period, political development in Solo was characterized with a counter hegemonic political movement. However, it needs to be said that beyond specific local factors, the developments that took place in that period were also a part of the nationwide political spirit of revolution, and signalled the early process of state making. Popular resistance in Solo not only occurred during the politically turbulent years, but also prevailed during the New Order authoritarian regime, which established political hegemony by imposing the 'floating mass’ politics103 and tight control of political order.104 But in Solo, political resistance intensified from the outset of government’s intervention into the PDI leadership dispute from 1994 to 1996, and political disputes that followed ahead of the 1997 election, which involved the opposition parties, PPP and PDI, against the city authority and Golkar, the government’s party. Further details on political party resistance will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter. Political party resistance reflected the character of the popular revolutionary movement of the 1940s and 1950s, but with a different context and political output. Political resistance in the 1990s resulted in national regime change including the end of hegemonic New Order political structure. The result of popular resistance was democratic reform, which changed the political landscape, including at the local level in Solo. The popular movement of the 1990s in Solo was arguably a part of national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 102 Ibid. The discussion for the local election of 1957, especially the domination of PNI and PKI in central Java, see Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Equinox Publishing, 2009), 112– 15. 103 The floating-mass policy was the New Order's strategy to detach the masses from political parties, and was developed to ensure the divisive party based politics linked to ethnicity, religion and ideology did not resurface to distract from the government’s agenda of development. See, Dauglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), 29. 104 Harold Crouch discussed how the New Order developed political stability. See Harold Crouch, “The New Order: The Prospect for Political Stability,” in Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, eds. J. J. Fox et al. (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1980). For an analysis of the moral authority of the regime, see Pabotinggi, “Indonesia: Historizing the New Order’s Legitimacy Dilemma.”

!|!Page! 56! ! ! dynamics. It is however worth noting that the intensity of political resistance in Solo was a reflection of the tradition of popular resistance. In other words, the popular movement in the 1990s was on the one hand a continuation of the tradition of popular resistance to political authority, while on the other hand it strengthened the collective memory of political autonomy of the people in the face of formal authority. And indeed, such collective memory of resistance is created from a longer history of recurrent recalcitrance as presented in the following table.

Table 2.1: History of resisting authority

Period Riots and Resistance Details 1945 – 1.! Anti-Swapraja, 1946 •! Social revolution to reject 1949 swapraja region proposal. •! People destroyed and burned the symbol of aristocratic government, kepatihan complex (office of colonial bureaucracy). 2.! The burning of Pasar Gedhe •! Paramilitary groups (people’s (the largest market complex army) ruined the building, as in Solo) and the city hall, it was symbol of colonial 1947. strength in economy and politics. 3.! Indonesia – Nederland •! The four-day clash involved Military dispute in 1948/49. the paramilitary who defended the city from Dutch attack. 4.! PON resurgence, September •! Peaceful opening of the first 1948 Indonesian National Olympics (PON) turned into a riot the following day. PKI was accused as the mastermind of riot. 1960-1966 5.! Agrarian Revolution, 1963 •! Implementation of Agrarian Law 1963 motivated poor people to occupy state land, mainly along the riverbank and the dam built to protect the city from floods from the Bengawan River. The areas were occupied mostly by PKI supporters. 6.! Famine, early 1965 •! Food crisis caused looting at several food depots. 7.! Anti PKI and anti-Chinese •! PKI supporters were hunted actions, September 1965 and down and seized, and many

!|!Page! 57! ! !

months later. were believed to have been executed by anti-communist groups with military backup. •! The seizure of Chinese assets, mainly those involved in Baperki, by the military and anti-communist/anti-Chinese groups. 8.! Economic crisis and famine •! People attacked and looted after big floods, 1966 logistic depots. The main target was the Chinese food warehouses. 1970-1998 9.! Pasar Kliwon (Arab) riot, •! Stores and shopping facilities 1974 owned by Arabs and Chinese merchants were attacked and burned. The riot was triggered by street fighting involving a becak driver with an Arab man. Many believe that economic inequality was the main cause of the riots. 10.! Anti-Chinese riot, 1980 •! In two weeks, a lot of Chinese kiosks, stores, and business assets were attacked and destroyed. It started from street fighting involving a Javanese and Chinese boy. The riot was systematic as there was a circulation of written information on targeted properties owned by the Chinese. The riot had just ended when the national security agency (Pangkopkamtib Soedomo) investigated. 11.!Anti-New Order (anti •! The two-day riot almost Suharto) movement, 1998 totally destroyed the city. Hundreds of buildings and economic facilities (again, mainly Chinese) were torched, along with hundreds of human casualties. 1999 12.!Megawati’s failed •! Megawati supporters burned Presidential bid, 1999 city hall complex, following mass demonstrations due to her failure to be elected President. Note: This table is based on various mass media sources, official reports and interviews.

!|!Page! 58! ! !

Popular resistance, as explained earlier, is related to direct confrontation with political authority. Beyond this resistance, collective memory is expressed in records and reports of conflict in the city. On many occasions, such conflict was a reflection of popular discontent in response to economic domination. And popular resistance was more likely to emerge if the government failed to accommodate and moderate social and economic disparities. One such conflict as a result of economic rivalry was in early 20th century between Javanese Batik producers and Chinese merchants. Solo was known for its batik industry, which originated in Kampong Laweyan. Tension in the early 20th century was due to Javanese batik producers’ resentment with Chinese merchants’ domination of the batik industry. And in order to counter Chinese merchants’ domination, the batik industry owners who resided in Laweyan and surrounds, established Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) in 1912, which transformed into a nationalist political organisation, Sarekat Islam (SI).105 The competition between Javanese traders and the Chinese culminated in a massive riot in 1916. Another riot occurred in 1981. It was started by a youth brawl between Javanese schoolboys and a young Chinese boy, but then provoked street protests and ended with attacks on Chinese properties.106 During the protest, a leaflet that contained a list of properties in the city’s main street that belonged to Chinese was circulated among the crowd. As a result, dozens of properties and shops owned by Chinese businessmen were destroyed during the riot.107 A similar motive was the catalyst for another riot in 1998, which again blamed the Chinese, and smaller riots that ensued in the Arab quarter of Pasar Kliwon.108 These ‘racial’ riots could be provoked and orchestrated by outsiders. According to the report of the joint fact-finding team, the riot was ‘a focal point for the meeting of two basic processes – an intensifying struggle among the political elite and a worsening of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 105 Takeshi Shiraishi discussed the development of SDI/SI in Solo as part of early nationalist movement in Indonesia. See Takeshi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). 106 On details of the riot of 1998, see Anggit Noegroho and Bambang H Irawan, Rekaman Lensa Peristiwa Mei 1998 Di Solo (Solo: Aksara, Solopos, 1998). 107 Details can be found in Benny Setiono. See Benny G. Setiono, Tionghoa Dalam Pusaran Politik (Jakarta: Elkasa, 2002), 1025–29. For the discussion of anti-Chinese violence from 1966 to 1999, see Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (NUS Press, 2006). 108 Another smaller race riot involved the Arab community in the sub-district of Pasar Kliwon, in 1974. It started with a dispute between a becak (pedicab) rider with his Arab-background passenger, but then turned into uncontrolled mass anger, which ended with the destruction of the Arab merchant’s property. The information was shared in interview with Sudharmono (local historian) and Hari D. Utomo (KR senior journalist).

!|!Page! 59! ! !

economic and monetary situation’.109 And from the perspective of social and economic disparities in Solo, the riot expressed popular resistance to economic domination, which unfortunately caused a racial divide. Such expressions of resistance revealed also the state’s incapacity to address such disparities. And as channels for countering domination did not exist, the people resisted hegemony by attacking tangible symbols of economic domination, such as shops and warehouses. Recurrent popular resistance, as explained above, brings significant meaning in creating collective memory of popular political autonomy from political authority. Such resistance was certainly not self-generated, but rather reflected a broader political dynamics. But in the local context of Solo, recurrent resistance has created a specific political environment, since resistance has brought about a decline of political hegemony in the city. In other words, popular resistance is part of a counter hegemonic culture to challenge the dominant mode of power operating in the city. For the Solonese, popular resistance has become a political presence that not only appears as massive disruption, but manifests itself in everyday urban life. b.! The everyday and small-scale resistance Popular resistance to political authority doesn’t necessarily translate as mass recalcitrance, but it may also take a silent form of resistance as part of the everyday struggle. In his study on informal urban economy in the Middle-East, especially Egypt, Asef Bayat coined the term ‘non-movement resistance’ to describe the poor individuals’ struggle or group actions in order to survive in an urban context.110 Bayat described the resistance in forms of encroachment into public spaces by the informal sectors and their everyday struggle of resistance. In Solo, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, everyday resistance was a part of post-crisis city life. Recurrent small-scale resistance has two aspects: 1) further expression of popular counter-hegemony to political authority in everyday format, and 2) material aspects of public expectations that should be addressed by political authority. The way political authority responds the resistance shapes the necessary conditions for creating political legitimacy. Apart from mass political resistance, as explained above, expressions of popular autonomy also manifested in everyday issues related to the demand for basic public goods. Resistance emerges when people are in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 109 “Politics and Violence,” Jakarta Post, November 4, 1998. 110 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, second edition (Stanford University Press, 2013).

!|!Page! 60! ! ! difficulty in relation to sustaining basic needs such as housing, limited access to basic public services and poverty in general. Different from popular mass movements, this type of resistance is usually on a small scale and involves individuals or small groups. Despite being scattered and not coordinated, everyday resistance reflects government ineffectiveness in basic public goods provision, and its emergence shows a prevalence of powerlessness. Small-scale narratives of everyday popular resistance here are drawn from the early years of political transition in the 1990s and early 2000s. Everyday resistance in Solo during this period was driven by basic needs fulfilment during the economic crisis. Here, I highlight two significant cases that dominated this period: the need for space for settlement and economic activities. In general, the struggle for space was in form of encroachment or illegal occupation of public space and empty lands by the poor segments of society. Encroachment on public space is symptomatic of greater problems faced by poor people in relation to access of basic public services such as health and education. Furthermore, space encroachment, as a part of popular resistance to the city’s authority, indicated the difficulties faced by the authority to entrench their political legitimacy. The following are case studies of resistance as expressions of Solo's recalcitrant tradition.

Case 1: Land grabbing for shelter Let me start with my personal impressions. One evening during the field research in 2012, the Head of Solo DPRD invited me to his residence in the eastern part of the city. On the way to his house, given his high political position, I imagined he lived in an expensive housing complex. But the fact was that it was difficult to find his house, and I even had to ask passers-by several times. After I walked through narrow laneways, which were squeezed between small houses on both sides, I arrived in his residence. The living room of the house was small and untidy, without any luxurious furniture. I was stunned when at the start of the discussion, he told me that he and his neighbours had no legal right of ownership, as the area was and is still state-owned land. In the past, the area was a barrier developed by the Dutch to protect the city from the regular floods from the Bengawan Solo stream in the eastern part of the city. Now, the barrier has been congested with thousands of small houses, the neighbourhood of the poor. They occupied the area through encroachment. The popular actions to grab state-owned land also happened in other parts of the city for various purposes.

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Solo is a densely populated, small city. The territory is about 44 square kilometres, with a population of about half a million.111 It means that the density is about 13,600 per square kilometre. The struggle of commoners for land access, either for housing or economic purposes is intense. It seems a common practice that the poor people encroach on land owned by the state, such as in the case of neighbourhood where the Head of DPRD lives. The government view of land grabbing is that it is certainly illegal, but it was common practice during the 1990s political transition period, as in the following examples. Facing the scarcity of land and incapability to access property legally, some residents of Kampong Pucang Sawit (located in the eastern part of the city) trespassed on and occupied land owned by a foundation, Yayasan Batik, in 1997. The residents claimed the land had not been used for a long period of time, and the land would therefore be more useful for poor families. The Yayasan Batik certainly rejected the claim and asked the residents to leave the property immediately.112 Still in the area nearby Pucang Sawit, numbers of traders in the traditional market, Pasar Ayu, converted the place for selling commodities into shelters for sleeping at night.113 The market authority responded to the action by issuing a regulation to prohibit such conversion. Pucang Sawit is a high-density kampong located on the Bengawan Solo riverbank. The residents were trapped in poverty, and housing has been one of the main problems. Actions by residents to occupy vacant land or encroach on public facilities like the market were part of the popular struggle to meet their basic needs. In another part of the city, similar land grabbing occurred in April 1997, when some families erected temporary houses in Ledoksari Public Park in southern Solo.114 The neighbourhood residents lodged a complaint with the city administration, but there was no appropriate response. Reacting to illegal settlement, a member of DPRD said that such an illegal compound, on the one hand, reflected the decline of respect for rule and regulations, but, on the other hand, he admitted that such negative action was due to social and economic pressures.115 After pressure from the community, the government took action, demanding the so-called land-grabbers knock down their shelters.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 111 BPS Kota Surakarta, Statistik Daerah: Kota Surakarta Tahun 2011 (Surakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Surakarta, n.d.), 6–7. 112 “Kasus Tanah Di Pucang Sawit Berakhir, Yayasan Batik: Warga Mau Menyerobot,” Solo Pos, November 1, 1997. 113 “Komisi D: Tindak Tegas Penyalahgunaan Kios Pasar Ayu,” Solo Pos, November 7, 1997. 114 “Bangunan Liar Muncul Di Lapangan Ledok Sari,” Solo Pos, April 6, 1998. 115 “Kasus Bangunan Liar Di Lapangan Ledok Sari, Raharjo: Eksekutif Jangan Lamban, Solo Pos, 9 April 1998.,” Solo Pos, April 9, 1998.

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Another example of popular land grabbing was the mass occupation of government land in Kampong Silir in the southeastern part of the city. In July 1997, hundreds of people from the nearby kampong claimed the unused city government-owned land as their property by erected fences and boundaries. The officials at sub-district and kampong level were unable to prevent such action, but reported the land grabbing to the city government. The people involved claimed they had a right to the land for farming and housing. Some of them even said their actions to grab state-owned land were inspired by actions in other parts of the city. Another case that sparked intense debate between the residents and government was in Pedaringan, in the eastern part of the city, when the government attempted to relocate settlers to public housing.116 The encroachment on land owned by the state was not a new phenomenon in the 1990s, but had been occurring since the revolutionary period in the 1940s and has continued since then. Parts of kampongs in the eastern part of city, for example, including the neighbourhood of head of DPRD, were the result of popular land grabbing of state- owned land. This did not appear to be problematic, but tension became evident when legal status of ownership was required. One example was Kampong Clolo, in the Banjarsari district in December 1998. The residents requested the city government to issue a certificate of ownership for 1,583 hectares of government land they had occupied for farming purposes since the 1950s. People were confident they had the right of ownership, despite the city government refusing to issue certificates.117 And in order to defend their claim, the residents asked the DPRD to back their fight against the government. A similar case was at Kampung Baru, in the Laweyan sub-district, when the occupants of government land demanded a certificate of ownership.118 Popular land grabbing for housing did not only target the vacant and unproductive land, but also the public areas. Solo is a hub of the Java railway system. The line connects Solo with other cities such as Semarang, Yogyakarta and Jakarta, and Surabaya via Madiun. On railway sidings clusters of kampongs appeared and due to overpopulation, the residents occupied areas allocated as safety zones for the railways. In August 1998, the residents of Kampong Trunosutan occupied areas on both sides of the railway track. A similar case occurred at Kampong Margoredjo where residents erected semi-permanent

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 116 “Bumi Pedaringan Mencekam. Pemda Ngotot Memagari, Pengkavling Siapkan Senjata,” Solo Pos, November 22, 1999. 117 “Penduduk Clolo Protes Tindakan Petugas Kecamatan,” Solo Pos, December 22, 1998. 118 “Raharjo Akan Perjuangkan Impian Warga Kampung Baru,” Solo Pos, December 1, 1998.

!|!Page! 63! ! ! houses. The state-owned railway company resisted these encroachments, but did not take further action to remove the occupation.119 Interestingly, this case also involved the railway workers, who have had a history of strikes since the social revolution.120 Popular encroachment on government land and in public spaces in urban areas is typically associated with actions by poor communities. However, political elites in Solo were also involved in some cases. In the case of Kampong Semanggi, the mass media reported that people were confident to claim city government land since they received support from members of the monarch’s family, who still did not accept that the anti- Swapraja revolution in the 1940s had ended their effective control of land in Solo and surrounds. Elites in government bureaucracy were also involved in the manipulation of public housing projects, such as the case of Pucang Sawit projects in the early 1990s. Housing clusters should have been allocated for lower and middle-income workers, but in fact some units were distributed among government officials. In general, the response of government to land grabbing for settlement purposes was ineffective in solving the issue. The officials, including the mayor, insisted that land grabbing was illegal and certification of ownership as demanded by the people was not granted. But the government’s order to residents to vacate the land they occupied was simply ignored.121 The people even made counter attacks by pressing the city government to take legal action on bureaucrats who engaged in manipulating the city’s assets.122 The popular move followed the DPRD’s investigation of the government’s misuse of Pucang Sawit housing project and manipulation of city assets in the Solo police complex.123 Land grabbing for housing was an expression of popular resistance at a time of crisis, when government lacked the capacity to meet housing needs. The government’s approach to counter land grabbing with legal-formal instruments was not effective, but rather provoked further popular resistance. Such legal based actions were incompatible with people’s demands for housing settlement. Land grabbing is an example of struggle of the poor for settlement and constitutes a challenge for the political authority to address in order to create legitimacy. During the economic decline of the 1990s, land grabbing was extensive as the informal economy flourished. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 119 See for example “Giliran Tanah Perumka Dikavling Warga,” Solo Pos, August 31, 1998; “Kadaop VI Lakukan Pengecekan. Dihentikan, Pengkavlingan Tanah Miliki Perumka,” Solo Pos, September 2, 1998. 120 See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Equinox Publishing, 2007), 149. 121 “Walikota: Tertibkan Pemukiman Liar,” Solo Pos, November 5, 1997; “Walikota Tolak Keinginan Warga Kampung Baru,” Solo Pos, December 21, 1998. 122 “Tindak Tegas Pejabat Bancakan Tanah,” Solo Pos, November 8, 1997. 123 “Komisi A Desak Penuntasan Pucang Sawit,” Solo Pos, December 23, 1998.

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Case 2: Space encroachment on the informal economy In the period post reform, street vendors (Pedagang Kaki Lima – PKL) occupied public spaces such as parks and pedestrian paths for trading. In Slamet Riyadi St. (city’s main road), for example, hundreds of street vendors built shelters on both sides of pedestrian paths, even though the city administration designated the area as a PKL free zone. A similar example was at Alun-alun Utara (the northern square of palace) and surrounds (including the complex of the Great Mosque), as a number of shelters, temporary kiosks and makeshift tents changed the public area into a PKL compound. Solo’s economy is mainly small-scale industry, an informal sector of household industries and street vendors and traditional markets, in addition to bigger retailers and medium/small scale businesses categorized as the formal economy.124 Batik is the main industry in the city. The structure of informal sector in Solo is however a shared characteristic with other third world cities. As previously argued by some scholars, the emergence of the informal economy was a consequence of the absence of industrialization125, uncontrolled urbanization, but slow urban development126 and the impact of the financial crisis.127 Facing economic constraints, the urban poor would, as a consequence, find alternative ways to survive by engaging in the informal sector as street vendors and illegal settlers.128 The informal sector would occupy ‘vacant’ spaces in order to conduct activities to create what Mike Davies dubbed the planet of slums in urban areas.129 Their status in the city system is illegal, though in fact they have become a part of the city’s dynamics. With regard to growth of the informal economy, urban areas in Indonesia, including Solo, have similar characteristics with cities in South America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The emergence of an urban informal sector in Indonesia by nature is similar to what Fernando de Soto described in Peru and Asef Bayat in Egypt as rapid urbanization that was not followed with industrialization. Furthermore the city is also incapable of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 124 According to the economic indicators published by Bappeda, textile, batik and furniture constitute the three main industries in Solo. See Bappeda Kota Surakarta, Indikator Ekonomi Kota Surakarta Tahun 2009 (Surakarta: Bappeda Kota Surakarta, 2009). Most people in Solo work in trade, service and informal sector. See BPS Kota Surakarta, Statistik Daerah: Kota Surakarta Tahun 2011, 9–11. 125 Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 126 Ibid. 127 Bayat, Life as Politics. 128 Soto, The Other Path. 129 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London & New York: Verso, 2007).

!|!Page! 65! ! ! accommodating the boom in population.130 But in the 1990s, the economic crisis generated a boom in the informal economy as an integral part of urban areas such as Solo. The informal sector in Solo includes street vendors of food and drink, second hand clothing and other goods as well as providers of transportation - pedicab/becak and motorcycle-taxi/ojek), and street parking. Solo is also the home of small merchants in traditional markets and cottage industries. Most informal actors, except for the small merchants, create the space for ‘business’ through actions of encroachment, particularly occupying public facilities such as parks, pedestrian paths, sections of the road, and corridors in bus or train stations. The city administration used to identify the informal sector as a social problem to be eliminated, rather than to acknowledge it as an integral part of the city’s economic structure. However, implementation of policies to eliminate the existence of the informal sector caused resistance, and the result was far from successful. In the case of the informal economy, there has been visible tension between actions of government and demands of informal actors. Solo is well known as a transit city and its bus terminal is a gateway for thousands of passengers who arrive and depart. It is an everyday scene that among the passengers, men/women offer refreshments, dairy products, cigarettes and other goods as they walk around the terminal area in order to sell their commodities. These petty traders are known as asongan and are part of the transport terminal’s economy, along with formal traders who rent the kiosks. Also a part of station life is the street music performer known as pengamen (buskers) who seek small donations. In the view of government informal traders and buskers cause disruption at the terminal. In an attempt to restore the balance in November 1997 the city administration planned to ban asongan from this area in accordance with city regulation number 5/1995.131 The asongan resisted the plan immediately. Their argument was that the city authority did not conduct consultation regarding the ban.132 The DPRD members from PPP surprisingly supported the resistance, and said that the implementation of the local regulation would violate the rights of asongan to sustain their life.133 Furthermore they insisted that government facilitate and protect asongan, and not remove them. This was a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 130 See Peter J. M. Nas and P. Nas, The Indonesian Town Revisited (LIT Verlag Münster, 2003), especially Part II “Urban Growth and Crisis” . 131 “Soal Tuntutan Pencabutan Perda No.5/1995: Pengasong Terminal Akan Dibina,” Solo Pos, March 9, 1999. 132 “Pengasong Tirtonadi Minta Pemda Bijaksana,” Solo Pos, November 10, 1997. 133 “‘Perda Larangan Asongan Di Tirtonadi, PPP: Melanggar HAM,’” Solo Pos, November 13, 1997; “Legalkan Pengasong Terminal,” Solo Pos, November 12, 1997.

!|!Page! 66! ! ! contentious issue for some weeks, and asongan and buskers continued to operate at the terminal. Another formal act of resistance to asongan occurred in March 1999. This time, the government issued a policy of ‘empowerment’, but the asongan association, Pasker (Paguyuban Asongan Semangat Kerja) rejected the policy. The Pasker even demanded that government annul the city regulation on asongan, as they saw it as threatening to their sustainability. Furthermore, in order to defend its existence, the Pasker coordinator pressed the government to acknowledge and respect asongan as part of city life.134 The argument was that the difficult economic situation had forced poor people to become asongan. Facing such persistent resistance, the city government could not enforce such a policy for eliminating asongan and other informal actors from the terminal. This resistance shows how the powerful presence of the informal economy challenged the right to rule of city government. The Asongan counterparts, the street vendors or PKL, were also in conflict with the city government. There is no verified official number of PKL, but the clusters are visible throughout the city areas, occupying pedestrian paths, public parks, areas outside market buildings and other vacant spaces.135 The number of PKL had increased, particularly after the economic and political crisis in the 1997/8. Solo, as mentioned earlier, was also hampered by riots that caused massive damage to economic infrastructure and public facilities, which affected social life. The city economy was in crisis and thousands of people lost their jobs. A figure released by Solo’s Statistics Bureau shortly after the riots showed that more than 50,000 people lost their job almost instantly, while the numbers of poor people increased to more than 100,000, around one-fifth of the population.136 The PKL emerged as the new informal urban cluster of the economy. They occupied strategic locations, such as the Banjarsari Monument Park, pedestrian walks of Slamet Riyadi and Veteran streets, the park at Manahan stadium, and the northern area of Sebelas Maret University of. The Banjarsari cluster was among the most popular during this period. Banjarsari was a popular public park and also a monument to the revolution, but the existence of nearly 1000 shelters had changed its face to become instead a crowded and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 134 “Pengasong Boleh Berjualan Di Terminal,” Solo Pos, November 10, 1999. 135 “Pemda Solo Segera Inventarisasi PKL,” Solo Pos, January 7, 1998. 136 BPS Solo, Solo Dalam Angka 1998 (Solo: BPS Solo, 1998).

!|!Page! 67! ! ! irregular market.137 In the period of economic crisis accompanied by the declining capacity of government in all aspects of public affairs; the PKL emerged as a reliable alternative for the urban poor to sustain life. The emergence of the PKL was however always contrary to the view of the city government that saw them as illegal clusters rather than a part of the city’s social and economic life. This negative view has been the standard response by government to PKL, while in contrast the PKL demanded recognition from the government. As happened elsewhere, the standard policy adopted by the city government with regard to PKL and other informal economy issues was prohibition or relocation. Solo was no exception, as the government’s master plan was to ban or relocate the PKL to other public spaces on the outskirts of the city.138 In general, the PKL resisted the policy, as in the case of PKL occupation of the northern square (alun-alun utara) at Kasunanan palace and PKL Jagalan in the eastern part of the city.139 A well-known case of resistance was the relocation of PKL from the Banjarsari cluster. The plan to relocate this cluster was drawn up in early 2000, but not completed until 2006 after a series of approaches by city administration (see chapter 5 for more detail). In the case of Solo, each cluster of the PKL formed an organization to defend their interests. In the resistance to government policy, this capacity to organise was strengthened by support from civil society organizations. PKL resistance reflected a contentious situation between the PKL, who grabbed the spaces for economic survival, and actions of political authorities in law enforcement. During transition, government’s policies to manage PKL have prompted resistance from the informal sector. The failure of government was apparent as it was incapable of implementing its decisions effectively; a situation that indicated the declining legitimacy of political authority. Widespread land grabbing had been part of Solo’s political dynamic, not only during and after 1998, but also in the preceding period. This demonstrated the needs of people who lived on the edge of vulnerability to sustain their livelihood, for housing and economic survival. In the absence of government provision and access to the formal

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 137 On the history of street vendors at Banjarsari, see Hendra Try Ardianto, “Jebakan Logika Best Practices dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan: Studi tentang Dinamika Partisipasi sebagai Arena Negosiasi antara PKL dan Pemerintah Kota Surakarta” (Bachelor Thesis, Department of Politics and Government, FISIPOL UGM, 2011). 138 “PKL Veteran Minta Kepastian Soal Lokasi Baru,” Solo Pos, November 22, 1999. 139 This event was recorded in Solo Pos, December 1997 – January 1998. See for example “Keraton Tolak Pelegalan PKL Alun-Alun Utara,” Solo Pos, January 5, 1998; “Khawatir Digusur, 29 PKL Jagalan Mengadu Ke FKP,” Solo Pos, December 30, 1997; “Merasa Diteror, PKL Jagalan Kian Resah,” Solo Pos, January 2, 1998; “DKP: Lokasi PKL Di Jagalan Dipersiapkan Untuk Taman Kota,” Solo Pos, January 5, 1998.

!|!Page! 68! ! ! economy, such encroachment was an expression of powerlessness. In their judgement, people felt they had the right to occupy public space. But in the view of political elites and government officials, these actions were certainly illegal and the existence of such groups was seen as part of the urban problem. Therefore, the government tends to adopt actions and policies with an aim to remove rather than integrate these people into city life. As a result, the resistance of the informal sector to political authority was heightened. The resistance shows that such bureaucratic and formal legal approaches to deal with such a problem did not match group expectations, and therefore would not be effective in creating legitimate policy.

Case 3: Individual and community protests Beside the above actions, the entrenched tradition of popular resistance appeared also in the form of individual or group protests in response to specific situations. Such an agenda is of specific interest to individuals or community. This kind of protest has no definitive leadership, is ad hoc, and is an expression of discontent, regarding issues to do with basic everyday life. In June 1997, for example, residents of Kampong Joyontakan organized a demonstration in front of a luxurious housing complex, Puri Gading. The protesters demanded the development of a public facility and financial compensation for the problem caused by the development of the complex.140 The neighbourhood blamed the Puri Gading complex for flooding that according to them was due to inappropriate waterway infrastructure. This accusation might be true, but it served as merely a trigger rather than the real problem. At the heart of the matter was a visible gap in wealth between the exclusive gated-complexes and the poor kampongs. Another protest occurred in Jebres, where residents rejected the development of a fertilizer factory in 1999.141 People were worried about chemical waste, but the real reason behind the protest was the refusal to provide financial compensation to the neighbourhood. Another factory in this area was also forced to cease production after local residents (backed by an environmental NGO, Gita Pertiwi) organized a protest against inappropriate waste management. The neighbourhood pressed the factory to apply standard waste

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 140 Solo Pos, June 29, 1997. 141 “Warga Petoran Protes Kehadiran Pabrik Pupuk,” Solo Pos, March 27, 1999.

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management before re-opening for production.142 The factory owned by the outsiders was located in a densely populated and poor neighbourhood. The neighbourhood protest was as expression of the struggle to press the factory for a material (financial) contribution. Another case of community action was that of former Mega-Bintang supporters. After electoral success in 1997, Mudrick M. Sangidoe, Solo PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) leader, confronted a group protest named Komite Solidaritas Korban Mega Bintang or KSKMB (Solidarity Committee for Victim of Mega Bintang). This group accused Mudrick and PPP of failing to fulfil their campaign promises after the election.143 PPP leaders offered a dialogue to mediate the protest, and the concrete answer was the establishment of Mega-Bintang Cooperation in May 1998, a charity enterprise to help the poor in Solo. KSKMB action was further evidence showing that commoners in Solo were politically aggressive and had the confidence to pressure even a respected political leader such as Mudrick. From the above explanation, some lessons can be drawn to strengthen the argument of tradition of popular recalcitrance. First, small-scale resistance was a form of expression that challenged dominant power structure. The motives of poor people and street vendors’ actions to occupy state-owned land and public space was, on the surface, economic, but at the same time expressed the decline of political authority’s capacity to maintain legitimacy. Second, popular resistance underpinned the aspiration of people for more deliberative and accommodative governance, rather than a formal legal approach to managing problems. From this perspective, it supposes that for city’s authority to focus on government output alone is not sufficient, but should also engage with an inclusive governing process to manage community problems. The cases above were specific to Solo, but they reflect problems in many Indonesian cities post crisis. Such everyday popular resistance was therefore becoming an important context for discussing how political authority developed support and legitimacy in the period of democratic transition. c.! Popular resistance as a prelude to political reform In Solo, explicit popular resistance to the New Order regime has emerged since the first half of the 1990s, when the regime was considered as still strong. Political transition was merely a part of national dynamics; but in Solo it found a fertile political environment.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 142 “Buntu, Penyelesaian Masalah Lingkungan Hidup,” Solo Pos, February 12, 1999. 143 “Protes Mega-Bintang Akan Dibahas Di Muskercab PPP,” Solo Pos, December 1, 1997.

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The New Order created political hegemony and stability through imposing floating-mass politics to ensure people’s obedience.144 The regime pushed people outside the political debate and discourse by banning political parties at grassroots level, and exerting strong military control to monitor people’s activities. Golkar, the government party, was the only party having organizational networks at grassroots level, while two opposition parties, PPP and PDI, had no formal channels to the electorate. In Solo, the New Order’s political dogma faced significant political resistance, mainly from the local PPP and PDI. The resistance from local branches not only affected legitimacy of local authority, but also the regime’s legitimacy in general. In order to have a clearer perspective on the 1990s popular resistance in Solo, it is worth making the distinction between the periods before and after political reform. Solo, like other local governments, came under the framework of centralized national politics. The political dynamics in the city was much affected by national discourse. However, the tradition of resistance embedded in Solo history coloured political dynamics in the city differently. In the period following the 1997/8 crises the local conditions of livelihood fostered the rise of popular resistance. The focus here is the political parties’ resistance that became a prelude to political reform. The resistance reflects a prevalence of traditional, popular, political autonomy, even in setting the authoritarian system of the New Order. In the midst of such entrenched political control, the politics of Solo shifted direction. In the 1990s, the Islamic political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP, emerged as strong political opposition to the city government. In spite of electoral success in almost all provinces, Golongan Karya or Golkar (the government party) suffered a decline in popular support in Central Java, including Solo, in the 1992 election. Post election, in order to win back the absolute majority, the Golkar Party in Central Java launched a political campaign, kuningisiasi (yellow-ization).145 Kuningisasi was a political order issued from the Governor of Central Java, Suwardi, to the head of districts and mayor of cities in the province to paint public facilities yellow. This politics of colour was also to include the obligation of people in general to paint their properties with Golkar’s colour. Governor Suwardi announced that that Kuningisasi was to mark the golden celebration of Independence Day in 1995. He also insisted that the yellow is the colour of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 144 On the discussion of floating-mass politics, see for example Beng Huat Chua, Communitarian Politics in Asia (Routledge, 2004), 155–56. 145 In Indonesian politics, yellow is the color associated with Golkar.

!|!Page! 71! ! ! the province’s mascot, the kepodang (a bird). The Jakarta Post reported, ‘… The Central Java Governor Suwardi denied political motives behind the yellow policy. … It was simply a promotion of the province's mascot, the Black Naped Oriole bird, which happens to be yellow.’146 As the leader of Golkar in Solo, Mayor Imam Sutopo imposed the colour policy by ordering bureaucrats to paint all public facilities yellow including the zebra crossings. The yellow-ization went further as it also touched the palace complex by painting the wall and fences with Golkar’s color. The yellow-ization triggered political resistance, organized firstly by Mudrick and PPP that launched the putihisasi (white- ization) movement. In resisting Mayor Imam Sutopo, Mudrick led the PPP supporters and broader public to paint the yellow public facilities white. His argument of putihisasi was that public facilities should not be associated with colours of political parties. Arguably white was ‘politically’ neutral. He also encouraged people not to follow the mayor’s instruction for painting their properties yellow. The movement was effective political resistance to the city government. Following Mudrick’s move, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI launched merah-putihisasi, by painting the trees in front of the party office red and white.147 Kasunanan also reacted negatively, particularly to the government’s decision to paint the palace complex yellow. Furthermore, the resistance to Kuningisasi came also from students and other mass organizations, such as: GRAK (Gerakan Rakyat Anti Kuningisasi); SMID (Student Solidarity for Democratic Indonesia); workers and labour activists of the independent trade union Centre for Labour Struggle (PPBI); Peoples' Democratic Union (PRD); and the Surakarta United People.148 It was the view of city government that the putihisasi movement was illegal, and therefore Mayor Imam Sutopo issued instructions to repaint with yellow, and insisted that ‘choosing the color of public facilities is the government's prerogative.’149 Furthermore, a spokesman for the Surakarta mayoralty, Handartono, reacted strongly: ‘…whatever their reason might be, changing the colour of public facilities without the government's consent is illegal. They are acting against the government.’150 This war of colour between Mudrick

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 146 “Golkar Critizices Anti-Yellow Drive,” The Jakarta Post, January 18, 1997. 147 “PDI Enters Surakarta’s Political Color Battle,” Jakarta Post, February 19, 1997. 148 James Balowski’s report in Aksi News Services, August 18, 1995. 149 The dynamics of ‘kuningisasi’ versus ‘anti-kuningisasi’ had also attracted attention from the international media. See for example “A War of Colors,” The Jakarta Post, January 16, 1997; “In Surakarta, Colors Have Political Meaning,” The Jakarta Post, January 13, 1997; “Indonesian Mayor Sees Red Over Party Paint War,” Reuters News, January 12, 1997; “Political Color War Heats Up Indonesian Town,” AFP, January 12, 1997. 150 “PDI Activists Promise to Expand Color War,” The Jakarta Post, February 22, 1997.

!|!Page! 72! ! ! and the mayor led to a legal dispute, which ended up in the courts, but the case did not conclude. In despite of the legal dispute, the anti-kuningisasi politics was strong evidence of a tradition of revolutionary popular resistance in Solo. Solo political observer, M.T. Arifin, was of the view that the colour war was a manifestation of the public's disgust at the state's domination. ‘It is a cultural resistance against the state's domination.’151 The resistance also shows that people challenged the right to rule of the New Order regime as an anti-policy movement. The figure of Mudrick was central in Solo politics in the mid-1990s. Beyond resistance to government politics, he also organized action to help the poor community with concrete assistance. He managed charity action to provide the poor with basic needs such as food and also political advocacy. The distribution of rice to the people living in slums and squatters’ compounds was an action to prove his concrete popular commitment in a time of crisis.152 Mudrick’s benevolent action was meaningful, as the crisis had pushed the poor into deeper vulnerability. At the same time, the city government was unable to show appropriate capacity for assisting them. Mudrick and PPP also played a role as a political intermediary and advocate, by acting as a channel for the workers, disadvantaged groups and also anti-government activists in Solo. Mudricks’s legacy in coining slogans of political resistance for Solo reform was notable ahead of the 1997 election, when he campaigned for the Mega-Bintang movement. Mega-Bintang emerged at the outset of the PDI leadership dispute that culminated in tragedy on 27th July 1996. The dispute started when Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno, was elected as PDI leader in the Surabaya congress in 1994. The government of the late President Suharto however feared her political popularity and thus supported a rival PDI Congress in Medan, which elected Soerjadi as party leader. PDI has since been sharply divided into pro-Mega and pro-Soerjadi factions. The dispute ended in a bloodbath, when pro-Soerjadi thugs attacked Megawati supporters at the PDI central office in Jakarta on 27 July 1996.153 The dispute at national leadership level was echoed in local politics, including in Solo, the base of Megawati’s support. As a result of the dispute, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 151 Ibid. 152 The issue of food (rice) sustainability has been political commodity at the period of crisis, as the government claimed that people did not suffer, while the opposition, PPP, had own fact of the shortage of food among the poor section of Solo people. See for example “Soal Warga Makan Nasi Aking, PPP Ancam Lapor Ke Mendagri,” Solo Pos, October 5, 1997; “Gubernur: Siapa Bilang Ada Warga Solo Makan Nasi Aking,” Solo Pos, October 8, 1997; “Warga Kenteng Demo Ke DPRD Solo. Bantuan Beras Mudrick Dikembalikan,” Solo Pos, October 11, 1997. 153 On the deposing of Megawati as PDI’s Leader and the tragedy of 27th July 1996, see Stefan Eklof, Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and Decline of the New Order (1986- 98) (NIAS Press, 2004), especially chapter 11 “The Deposing of Megawati.”

!|!Page! 73! ! ! government banned Megawati and her faction of the PDI from participating in the 1997 election. The political status of Megawati and her supporters was uncertain ahead of the election. In Solo, Mudrick closely observed the situation. Solo was known as one of the main basis of Megawati's supporters. At a meeting in early 1997, Mudrick approached Megawati to allow her supporters to join his election campaign. It was reported that Megawati responded to the request with a smile, which was seen by Mudrick as a sort of green light. He then responded to Megawati’s so-called signal by declaring Mega-Bintang, the political slogan of unification between PPP constituents and Megawati supporters. Mega-Bintang was successful in mobilizing crowds in every PPP public campaign, not only in Solo, but also in cities such as Pekalongan, Yogyakarta and Semarang. Megawati herself however did not indicate a willingness to join Mega-Bintang. A few days before the election, she even announced not to vote (or Golput).154 In spite of Megawati’s announcement, PPP in Solo won 15 seats of DPRD, while PDI of Soerjadi, Megawati’s rival, only took a single seat. Golkar was still the biggest party with 17 seats. But the real political winner was PPP, which was successful in mobilizing unprecedented popular support. The result in 1997 in Solo was evidence of political opposition challenges to established rule in the form of electoral legitimacy. Another instance of party based political resistance organized by Mudrick was his dispute against the Civil Servants Police Unit (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja – Satpol PP) during the 1997 campaign period.155 During the trial process, thousands of people gathered in front of the magistrate building to support him. After the court decision to close the case, Mudrick’s supporters flooded the main streets to celebrate the decision.156 Political party opposition, led by Mudrick M. Sangidoe in the 1990s, reiterated the popular challenges to the legitimacy of not only city government, but also the regime which developed with political oppression and domination. The opposition was also to signal the tradition of active political society, which should be incorporated in the process of creating legitimacy in Solo post reform.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 154 On Megawati declaration of no vote in 1997 election and reactions of her call, see for example “Opposition Leader Urges Boycott Of Indonesian Elections,” New York Times Abstracts, May 23, 1997, sec. Section A; “Don’t Follow Megawati, Says Abdurrahman,” Jakarta Post, May 24, 1997. 155 “Sidang Mudrick vs Satpol PP, Sebaiknya Damai Saja,” Solo Pos, December 19, 1997; “Mudrick Siapkan Tiga Lembaga Hukum,” Solo Pos, December 16, 1997. 156 “Mudrick Bebas, Dakwaan Batal Demi Hukum,” Solo Pos, January 14, 1998.

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And in addition to this political party opposition, the popular resistance that emerged in Solo during the democratic transition was mass political action. This organized action is similar to a classic political movement, in the form of labour protests, religious protests, and student/activist movements.157 The agenda of each political group is different, but all reflect popular challenges to political authority and signal a popular agenda that affected the process of creating political legitimacy in Solo during the political transition.

3.! Tracing the roots of popular resistance The roots of popular recalcitrance in Solo can be traced from the dynamic of social structure in the city. Well known as the heartland of Javanese culture, the social structure in Solo is basically associated with two contrasting social divisions; the wong cilik (little people) and the priyayi (gentry).158 The wong cilik points to the commoners, meanwhile the priyayi is the elite in society, with high social and political status. In Solo, the class of priyayi is associated with the families of the courts and bureaucracy of city government; meanwhile the wong cilik is the urban population in general.159 In between these contrasts, another segment of Solo society is the affluent business people (i.e. Chinese and Arab merchants and Batik producers and traders). This segment is however closer to priyayi. Despite political changes and democratization, the categories of priyayi and wong cilik are still relevant to identify the basic structure of Solo community.160 This social structure defines a pattern of political relations between the people and political authority in the city, which in general represents political distrust. Such popular distrust of political authority doesn’t only relate to good governance, but originated in the social history of power in this city. In this regard, the reflection of the anti-swapraja revolution is evident. As mentioned earlier, the popular movement to reject the status of special autonomy of Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro under the new independent Republic of Indonesia was strong. The people perceived that the courts were merely an extension of colonial authority, rather than the protector of common people from deeper grievances due to colonialism. The trust of the people in the court families has been broken since then. George Kahin described popular discontent for the monarch: “… It was commonly

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 157 The various popular actions in Solo in this period are well documented in the Section of Research and Development, Solo Pos, 158 See Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Oxford University Press, 1989). 159 On the structure and cultural orientation on Javanese class structure, see Soejatno and Benedict Anderson, “Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950,” Indonesia, no. 17 (1974): 99–111, doi:10.2307/3350775. 160 Interview with, Y.F. Sukasno, May 21, 2012; also Putut Gunawan.

!|!Page! 75! ! ! whispered, by the end of the Dutch period, that the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro were like the slender, feathery tjemara trees that line the streets of Surakarta – they grow tall and beautiful, but they offer no shade to people.”161 In other words, there was incompatibility between the courts’ political status and aspirations and the people’s expectations. This incompatibility represented the roots of social revolution to abolish the Swapraja region that had caused a further decline in the courts’ political legitimacy, which ended with the partition of the courts' territory into several autonomous districts. In a small and compact city such as Solo, the tradition of popular resistance has become a shared narrative across social categories and economic classes. People in general recall the mass riots, as well as awareness about small actions such as land grabbing, tension between informal economy and authorities and conflicts among communities. In general, a local historian described the dynamics of Solo as affected by a pathology of riots162, while NGO activists note that the shared memory of resistance is due to rapid and intense circulation of information and stories in the informal arena such as hik (traditional Javanese Cafe) and paguyuban (community association). One anecdote: ‘if a needle drops in one corner, in a second it will be heard by people on the other corners of the city’ has become a popular expression in Solo.163 The memory of resistance is even institutionalized in a negative attribute of Solo as a ‘short-fuse society’, which means easily organised protests and riots.164 The tradition of popular resistance however has different meanings among social groups in the city. For the community, resistance is seen as an expression of political autonomy and a channel of political presence. It is one instrument to express and to defend their interests in the face of political authority, particularly if the channel for political aspiration is not accessible. For the Solonese resistance has become social memory that gives legitimacy to political action. The head of DPRD, who originated from a slum area, explained that wong cilik in Solo are used to develop community based association, called paguyuban. Paguyuban’s function is not only for managing community affairs, but also acts as a political channel to voice their policy aspirations to city authorities.165 The paguyuban is the social base of Solo society that prospective governments and political leaders should focus on in the process of governing. Hence, civil society activists believe !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 161 See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 350. 162 Sudharmono, interview. 163 Interview with Setyo, May 10, 2012; Sammy, June 4, 2012. 164 Hari D. Utomo, interview. 165 Y.F. Sukasno, interview.

!|!Page! 76! ! ! that the people of Solo are politically active. They regard Solonese as always having updated knowledge about the social and political situation, and confidently express their political voice.166 Active community figures and organizations and how they influence governing seem to concur with Robert Dahl’s study on the prominent role of community power in the case of city governance in New Haven, America.167 To the elite classes popular resistance is mostly traumatic. They observe that popular resistance would be a threat to their interests and establishment. In the case of land and space grabbing, for example, government officials would see it as people’s disobedience to state rules, and hence such deviant action is described as part of the social problem.168 Government officials will in general exercise caution towards any case of people’s recalcitrance. But the views of elites in relation to the tradition of resistance are not unipolar. Rather than being seen as a threat, political elites whose origins are from non- traditional priyayi tend to use the tradition of resistance as an instrument for mobilizing support or to create legitimacy for their position in politics. They manage such tradition through acting as a representative channel for popular aspiration in the governing process and also by providing concrete basic needs to respond to directly demands from the people. In the 1990s, Mudrick’s political phenomenon is a good example. Popular resistance is an inherent element in Solo political life. It can occur for different reasons, and be either locally or nationally driven. During the political transition, various forms of popular resistance were generally interplay between the structure of local grievance and national political stress. In some specific areas, cases were however very local. Popular resistance embodied in the political history of Solo reflected either a state of deep popular discontent to socio-economic conditions in the city or incompatibility between actions of political authority and popular demands, and/or a combination of these factors. And specifically in the context of political transition, popular resistance also reflects the genuine popular aspiration for mode of democratic legitimacy that should be adapted by new governments and political leadership. Given that political culture of resistance is not just a popular reaction to the state of declining capacity of political authority in addressing social economic grievances; but

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 166 This expression was shared in the interviews with some civil society activists, such as Didik, Setyo, Andwi, and Putut. 167 Robert Alan Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2005). 168 The formal approach had been standard for the city government to address problems of informality, such as poor people settlement. See for example “Walikota: Tertibkan Pemukiman Liar”; “Walikota Tolak Keinginan Warga Kampung Baru”; “Bumi Pedaringan Mencekam. Pemda Ngotot Memagari, Pengkavling Siapkan Senjata.”

!|!Page! 77! ! ! more importantly, reflects a popular autonomy rooted in the face of political authority, the process of creating political legitimacy poses the following challenges. First, legitimacy could be established through the provision of popular basic needs. In the context of Solo, a sound capacity for government and political leaders in the provision of public goods could prevent the community from further vulnerability. This output-based capacity runs alongside the second challenge, namely the process of governing. The resistance in Solo has largely emerged since political authority has been undermined or public voices disregarded as part of the governing process. The challenge in creating legitimacy is accordingly to build an effective channel of representation and accommodation for popular aspiration in policy. Finally, popular resistance reflects a counter-hegemonic culture of the grassroots to challenge the dominant culture of elite or priyayi from the bottom up. It can’t be assumed that the installation of democratic procedure and changing leadership removes this entrenched culture instantly. The very challenge of creating political legitimacy is therefore to absorb the culture of resistance in governance.

4.! Conclusion This chapter discussed the political culture in Solo, which features recurrent popular resistance. People in Solo believed that popular resistance has become collective memory to legitimate the claim of people’s autonomy in the face of elites and political authority. The tradition of resistance has been a constant challenge for political authority to create effective legitimacy, most notably in the period of political transition. The impact of mass or everyday resistance to the legitimacy of political authority, at its strongest, caused a severe decline in legitimacy of established authority, which triggered fundamental political changes. Hence, the recurrent resistance indicates the state of incompatibility between political actions and government response to popular demands over time. In this regard, popular demands were not necessarily caused by local discontent, but the interaction of national and local factors – where a local society with a ‘habit of resistance’ responds to and interacts with national developments. And this habit of resistance has nurtured collective memory in Solo society.

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People’s resistance to political authority could thus be explained from different perspectives, for example, the relative deprivation theory169, the struggle of the powerless in response to power domination170, or contentious politics.171 Thus the emergence of popular resistance in Solo could arguably be linked to social deprivation, particularly in relation to land grabbing and other protests due to socio-economic vulnerabilities. The cases expressed are about popular disobedience to political authority. Other cases of resistance displayed a kind of popular movement to resist the domination or hegemony imposed by established authority, particularly during the anti-swapraja revolution and 1990s political opposition. Hence, the tradition of popular resistance is about the structure of power relations in Solo, which display two opposing political cultures: priyayi (Javanese elites) and wong cilik (the commoners or little people). Resistance that emerged due to the priyayi political culture, which manifested in the city’s political authority failed to recognise the commoners’ voices and expectations as important sources in the process of governing. From the perspective of political legitimacy, recurrent popular resistance has posed challenges to authority in creating effective legitimacy. And in the particular context of democratic transition, political authority needs to address popular resistance to create legitimacy through: performing capability to provide basic public needs, practicing modes of inclusive governance, and more importantly, the adaptation of a people-centric approach or non-priyayi elite culture as the mindset of governing. For political leaders in Solo post political reform, the capability to address those challenges would determine the fate of their political careers. I will now turn to how a political leader in Solo failed in creating political legitimacy in the era of democratic transition. More specifically I will discuss how Slamet Suryanto, the first mayor in the reform period, failed to maintain political legitimacy, despite previously enjoying strong popular legitimacy during a long political career.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 169 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). 170 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 171 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).

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Chapter Three The Struggle for Legitimacy: Mayor Slamet Suryanto, 2000–2005

1.! Introduction In this chapter, I will examine how the local government leader in the city of Solo struggled to create political legitimacy in the early years of decentralization and democratization. The nature of legitimacy of local government leaders (governor of province, head of district, and mayor of city) shifted in 2000 from national endorsement to local support, when the indirect election of these officials by local parliaments (DPRD) commenced. In this new system, the direct source of legitimacy for the elected mayor was not the people, but instead came from a group of political elites (DPRD members) and political parties as the authoritative channel for candidacy. Beyond this electoral process, the sustainability of leadership legitimacy post election was determined by the extent to which other political actors and the community recognized the implementation of authority as being effective in responding to popular demands. The following discussion of Slamet Suryanto, Solo’s first mayor during the period of decentralization and local democratization, will explain: 1) the political candidate’s struggle for support from party elites and the DPRD as the main sources of legitimacy in the indirect elections; 2) what the elected leader did to maintain support and to broaden his base of legitimacy; and 3) to what extent these efforts were useful in sustaining the legitimacy of the political leader. Slamet was elected as mayor by the DPRD in 2000. At the time of the election, he was the leader in Solo of the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan - PDIP), the dominant political party in the city. His leadership position was advantageous for legitimizing his mayoral campaign for election. Although he won the office of mayor, he received only qualified support from PDIP members in the DPRD, due to elite contestation and disunity within the party over its selection of a candidate. During his leadership, Slamet strived to maintain support and broaden his base of legitimacy from both the elites and the people, but the result was disappointing. His trajectory from leader of the New Order-era opposition party to be a mayor who led the city's bureaucracy would inform the challenges of leadership to create legitimacy in the

!|!Page! 80! ! ! new setting of decentralization and democratic transition. And in the specific case of Solo, the mayor would deal with the tradition of popular resistance as explained earlier. The state of legitimacy is not static, but changes constantly. In the post-election period, it would depend on to what extent the results of implementing authority satisfied the structure of popular demands. In general, compatibility relates closely to the capability of local government to implement decentralized authority in public services and in local policies. With regard to Solo, it means to address the causes of popular resistance (as explained in chapter 2), namely socio-economic deprivation and the absence of effective political authority. From the popular point of view post election, legitimacy would be created on the basis of the government's ability to fulfil public needs (i.e. basic public services provision).172 In addition, such a capability of political authority to adapt to the agenda of local democratization, such as the inclusion of popular voices in governance, would be helpful in legitimizing power. This chapter will examine whether Slamet saw the process of creating legitimacy from this point of view or from another point of view. The analysis of Slamet’s emergence and how he developed the basis for legitimacy in this chapter is to a great extent developed using information sourced from newspapers (mainly Solo Pos, the most circulated daily newspaper in the city) and government archives. Additional views are sourced from interviews with NGO activists, journalists and retired bureaucrats who witnessed firsthand Slamet’s leadership. During field research in 2012, I was not able to personally interview Slamet due to his poor health. It was a common view in Solo that Slamet’s leadership had failed, simply due to many unresolved problems in the city during his term and his unpopularity in the 2005 direct mayoral election. However, rather than being influenced by such judgements, I will focus on what Slamet did, as mayor, to deal with the complex challenges of governance. The period of his mayoralty gives us an interesting lesson in the complexities of creating leadership legitimacy in the early period of decentralization and local democratization. This chapter is organized as follows. First, it describes the changing political landscape after the 1998/99 crises and how Slamet struggled to become the first mayor in the post reform era. Two important events that shaped the political landscape of Solo during this period were PDIP domination in the 1999 legislative election and decentralization including the indirect mayoral election. Slamet’s victory as mayor heavily !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 172 See Bo Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government,” American Behavioral Scientist, 2009, 311; Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, “What is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions,” Governance 21, no. 2 (2008): 165–90.

!|!Page! 81! ! ! relied on his position as PDIP leader, but his legitimacy was engulfed by the disunity of party elites during the election process. Second, this chapter discusses how Slamet, as mayor, understood the challenges post crisis that he would face when elected mayor in 2000. His government inherited manifold problems such as the unregulated informal economy, illegal land occupation, public infrastructure damage and declining capacity of government in public services. To what extent Slamet’s approach and policies could address those problems would be essential elements for sustaining his legitimacy. The creation of legitimacy post election is also affected by his style of political leadership in shaping relationships with other actors in governance. Third, Slamet’s relationships with multiple actors, mainly his political party, DPRD and civil society will be discussed. The mayor is the central figure in the city’s political system; but good relations with other political actors are necessary for securing support and hence legitimacy. The final section summarises Slamet’s approach to recreating political support from both elites and popular society in general, and outlines why his defence of legitimacy was ineffective. Slamet’s failure was a prelude to the emergence of Jokowi in the 2005 direct elections.

2.! The changing political landscape and Slamet’s struggle for mayor a.! The changing landscape of local politics Two aspects of political reform had changed the political landscape at the local level. These were the 1999 democratic election and the policies of decentralization and local autonomy. One important political change post 1998 reform was the adoption of the democratic multi-party election, to replace the New Order’s three-party electoral system, designed to produce a substantial Golkar majority.173 There were 48 political parties that participated in the 1999 election, but only 10 were represented in DPR (national parliament). PDIP emerged as the biggest party with 33.12% seats in parliament, which ended the domination of Golkar, the New Order’s governing party.174 Decentralization and local autonomy was another fundamental reform, to end the centralistic system of politics and government. Decentralization policies boosted a transfer of massive government

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 173 The legal framework for the changes of political system was adopted in 1999. See Undang-undang Partai Politik (Law on Political Parties), 1999; Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum (law on General Election), 1999. 174 The official result of the 1999 Legislative Election can be found at the official website of Indonesian General Election Commission, www.kpu.go.id

!|!Page! 82! ! ! authority from national to local (mainly district and city), along with financial transfer.175 The policy also granted local political autonomy including the election of the local government leader by the DPRD. The full implementation of decentralization took place in January 2001, but the election of local government leader had been implemented a year earlier. The 1999 election confirmed the popularity of the New Order opposition, that is, Megawati Sukarnoputri and her party, PDIP. In Solo, the PDIP emerged as the dominant power in a much fairer and more competitive election – compared to the New Order system. The party was supported by around 63.5% popular votes and dominated the DPRD by 23 seats (out of 45). 176 This domination was incredible compared to the devastating result in the 1997 election, when PDI won only one seat. PDIP representatives in the DPRD were mostly party activists, owners of small local businesses, and even workers in small industries in the informal sector. Hence, the domination of PDIP over other parties was more visible, if we examine the results in each sub-district (see the following table). In the sub-district where the number of poor people was higher, such as in Jebres, the vote for PDIP reached 71.6%, while in other sub-districts the support was between 56% and 68%. PDIP domination in Solo was just under its representation in Bali (where PDIP won 45 out of 55 DPRD Province seats), which far exceeded the national result (33.74%).177 The election of party leader Slamet Suryanto as mayor in 2000 completed PDIP’s triumph in the city. Table 3.1: The big five political parties in Solo, 1999 election

Parties Sub-district TOTAL Bj. Jebres P. Kliwon Serengan Laweyan Sari PDIP 50420 46288 24257 16754 26443 164162 (with %) (58%) (71.6%) (59%) (61%) (56%) (63.5%) PAN 11303 7046 7516 4926 9415 40208 GOLKAR 12061 8171 4739 3694 7161 35826 PPP 2397 1812 3336 1232 2688 11465 PKB 1560 1351 1269 858 1781 6819 TOTAL 86741 64668 41117 27468 47488 258.480 Source: PPD (Election Committee) Solo, published in Solo Pos, 23 June 1999.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 175 The decentralization policy post 1998 reform came under two laws on local government and fiscal transfer. See Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah (Law on Regional Autonomy), 1999; Undang-undang Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat Daerah (Law on Central - Regional Fiscal Balance), 1999. 176 Total membership of DPRD in Solo in 1999 was 45, but five of them were appointed from the military. 177 On the results of PDIP in 1999 and the next elections, see Suluh Bali, “Bali Tetap ‘Kandang Banteng,’” accessed March 24, 2016, http://suluhbali.co/bali-tetap-kandang-banteng/.

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PDIP’s resounding win in Solo in 1999 was at the cost of Golkar and PPP that in 1997 had gained 16 and 14 seats in the DPRD respectively. In this last New Order election, PPP was successful in attracting Megawati’s supporters under the Mega-Bintang banner. But it could not hinder the return of Megawati’s supporters on their own basis, despite popular PPP city-level leader Mudrick’s benevolent actions to help poor communities and mass media advertisements to flag PPP as the genuine advocate of wong cilik (party for small people).178 In the 1999 election, PPP won only two DPRD seats, and even at Mudrick’s voting station, his party only received 26 votes, while PDIP won 184 votes. From the perspective of aliran politics (Clifford Geertz’s category of Javanese political-religious cleavages, namely santri, abangan, and priyayi), the election result confirmed that Solo is the home of abangan aliran, with PDIP as its main political representative. While most of the population are identified as followers of Islam, in terms of political culture they are mostly abangan. Although smaller in size, both the santri and priyayi aliran are present in Solo. However, as it will be discussed in the emergence of Jokowi (Chapter 4), aliran politics was a significant influence in the 2005 mayor election. PDIP domination of the 1999 election in Solo confirmed the party’s status as a political channel for the tradition of popular resistance. As discussed in chapter 2, the resistance manifested in various popular actions including the SI (Sarekat Islam) movement179, the youth revolution for independence180 and anti-swapraja revolution.181 In the 1990s the political party that was successful in representing the tradition was PPP, which under Mudrick emerged as opposition power to challenge the New Order government in relation to anti-yellowization and the Mega-Bintang campaigns. Dating back to the 1950s, the communist party (PKI), the political power behind anti-swapraja revolution, was the political home of people with recalcitrant traditions. In the 1950s, PKI was dominant, holding almost 60% of seats in the city’s legislature, and its leader, Utomo Ramlan, was mayor. Certainly, PDIP doesn’t have any organizational association or inheritance with either PPP or PKI, which at one time had become the political shelter for people associated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 178 See political advertising of PPP in Solo Pos, April 1999. 179 See George D. Larson, Masa Menjelang Revolusi: Keraton dan Kehidupan Politik di Surakarta, 1912-1942 (Translated by A.B. Lapian. Original title, Prelude to Revolution: Palaces and Politics in Surakarta, 1912-1942) (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990), especially chapter 2. 180 See Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Equinox Publishing, 2006). 181 Ibid., 358–368.

!|!Page! 84! ! ! with the tradition of resistance. PDIP claims to be the inheritor of Sukarno’s Nationalist Party, renowned for its marhaen ideology.182 The domination of PDIP in Solo could not be separated from the political resistance organized by the pro-Mega movement, which spread to the lowest level of community structure, namely kampong. The party was also successful to claim image as party for wong cilik, the poor clusters living at the populated kampongs and peripheral areas of the city.183 The tradition of popular resistance is therefore not exclusively attributed to a certain political stream, but PDIP is successful as a channel for people in Solo post reform. The result in 1999 and elections that followed signified the transformation of recalcitrant elements into the party with strong and relatively constant popular support. Beyond the specific local situation, the political landscape in Solo was also influenced by national policy on decentralization and local autonomy, which granted local governments with unprecedented political autonomy and authority, along with substantial fiscal transfers from national to local level. Another important change under decentralization was the election of the local government leader by DPRD. The regulation on election was firstly implemented in 2000, and Solo was among local government cities to elect the mayor in that year. In the new system, each faction in the DPRD (parties and military representation) had the right to propose candidates for mayor and vice-mayor, but it was the political parties that were more active in selecting candidates. Following administrative verification, the DPRD would decide on the final candidates, and members of the DPRD would then vote at an assembly.184 The result of the election was final, but would be inaugurated by central government.185 This indirect local election fundamentally changed the source of legitimacy for local government leaders. Under the New Order, Golkar and the military faction completely dominated the election of local leaders. The DPRD would elect the candidates approved by the central government, but still the final decision would be subject of national government endorsement.186 In the early decentralization, locals would have more

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 182 Marhaenism was an ideology introduced by Sukarno during the national revolution against Dutch colonials in Java. It referred to people who own small means of production for sustaining their living. 183 On this socio-cultural category see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976). See also the analysis from Murtidjono that the PDIP win affirmed Solo as the cluster of abangan society. See Murtidjono, “Solo Itu Kanthong Abangan,” Solo Pos, June 10, 1999. 184 See Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah (Law on Regional Autonomy). 185 Details of election procedures were regulated in Government Regulation (PP 151/2000) and Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation (KepMen 2 and 3/2000). 186 On the procedure of New Order election for local government leader, see Undang-Undang Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Law on Local Government), 1974.

!|!Page! 85! ! ! autonomy to select their government leaders, but the process was determined by political parties’ elites and DPRD, rather than develop a connection and engagement with people. In other words, the indirect elections would result in a political leader with elite-based rather than popular-based legitimacy. b.! Slamet’s background and his struggle for mayor Slamet Suryanto emerged as a political leader in the above political environment. Slamet was a PDIP local politician par excellence, as his leadership at the end of 1990s had helped the party to consolidate its political base in the city. It meant that he was more a party politician than a community or civil society activist who organised political protests and a democratic movement against the New Order. His background thus stood in contrast to another Solo figure, Mudrick Sangidoe (Solo PPP leader), who actively organised people at the grassroots to challenge New Order policies and hence struggled for democratization. Slamet’s political engagement with the nationalist politics could be traced to his youth, when he was an activist and one time leader of Pemuda Marhaen, Sukarno’s youth political organization in the 1960s. From 1977 to 1982, Slamet was a PDI representative in the DPRD, but then resigned from politics to develop his business, but was unsuccessful. He returned to politics in the 1990s as the leading figure in Solo to defend Megawati at the helm of party leadership in 1994/95.187 Solo, along with other ex-Surakarta regencies, was known as the basis of PDI in Central Java, which supported Megawati during the leadership dispute. Slamet rose as a central figure in Solo politics during PDI national leadership dispute between Megawati, who was supported by the party’s grassroots, and Soerjadi, who was backed up by the New Order government, in early 1990s. In Solo, PDI also split between pro-Megawati and pro- Soerjadi factions, and Slamet led the takeover of local PDI leadership from Makyo Sumarto, who had attended Medan Congress that appointed Soerjadi as PDI leader. Slamet played an active role in consolidating pro-Mega supporters in Solo and its surrounding regions. In the 1997 presidential election, PDI Solo under Slamet’s leadership proposed Megawati as the candidate and asked the People’s Representative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat – MPR) to accommodate this aspiration.188 In the midst of President Suharto’s hegemony, there was no chance that such an aspiration could come to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 187 See Slamet Suryanto’s biography. Erwan Tetuko, Erick Nurmandityo, and Sutoto, Slamet Suryanto: Kisah Kehidupan, Keyakinan, dan Harapan (Solo: Medio, 2004). 188 “PDI Pro mega Minta MPR Akomodatif,” Solo Pos, January 13, 1997.

!|!Page! 86! ! ! pass, but it strengthened Slamet's image as a pro-Mega loyalist. His role in strengthening pro-Mega in Solo and surrounds was even more active during the political crisis. With fellow party activists, he pressured the city government to terminate PDI pro-Soerjadi189, and hence to acknowledge PDI pro-Mega.190 Slamet also demonstrated his loyalty to Megawati ahead of the first PDIP Congress held on 8-10 October 1998. He made statements in local media: ‘as long as it is Mbak Mega who leads the PDIP, we will give 100% of support.’191 While such a statement was certainly normal for such a loyalist, his greater political enthusiasm was evident when he prepared Solo as the host city for the Central Java party delegation, before they departed to the Bali Congress.192 The evidence reflected his influence as regional party figure in Solo and its surrounding regions. And with Farid Badres and F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo, Slamet represented PDIP Solo for the congress.193 Slamet developed the base for political legitimacy by expressing his loyalty to Megawati and then as leader of PDIP Solo at a time of political change. With such party- based legitimacy, he aimed for further political achievement. For Slamet, who was in 1999 elected as a member of the national parliament (DPR), the position of Solo mayor seemed more attractive. And in order to consolidate support for him as the mayoral candidate, in early March 1999, Slamet stated: ‘I’m optimistic for 60% of the vote in the election. If we get more than 60%, PDIP would be the strongest faction in the DPRD. And it is likely, the political faction with the most seats decides for the mayor’.194 PDIP dominated the Solo city DPRD formed out of the 1999 election, and so occupied pole position to win the mayoral election. The last New Order mayor, Imam Sutopo, had vacated the position in early 2000.196 As PDIP held an absolute majority in the DPRD, its own internal party dynamics would crucially affect the outcome of the competition for mayor. If PDIP elites in the DPRD could maintain political cohesion, the party’s candidate would be elected as the first mayor in the reform era. But sharp political tensions arose within the PDIP over the selection of a mayoral candidate, and the disintegration of PDIP elites was imminent.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 189 “PDI Perjuangan Bentuk Tim Likuidasi PDI Soerjadi,” Solo Pos, July 29, 1998; “Massa Mega Duduki Balaikota,” Solo Pos, August 25, 1998. 190 “Pro Mega Solo Tuntut Keadilan,” Solo Pos, July 25, 1998. 191 “Warga Banteng Solo Tetap Pilih Nama PDI Perjuangan,” Solo Pos, September 15, 1998. 192 “Warga PDI Solo Bersepeda Ke Bali,” Solo Pos, October 3, 1998. 193 “PDI Perjuangan Tetapkan 3 Wakil,” Solo Pos, September 20, 1998. 194 See “Megawati Menggebrak Yogya, Kota Solo Merah Total,” Solo Pos, March 1, 1999.

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In the election of 23 March 2000, Slamet Suryanto, party leader, was finally elected as mayor, along with vice-mayor, J. Suprapto, a candidate of the military faction. DPRD members that voted for the pair were 18 (14 PDIP and 4 military representations). Slamet’s narrow victory reflected deep political division and tension within PDIP elite ranks during the process of election, a situation that meant Slamet endured ongoing political challenges during his term of leadership. The following is Slamet’s campaign for the office of mayor. As a prominent pro-Mega activist and leader of the dominant party, Slamet Suryanto was supposedly first on the PDIP list to fill the highest political position in the city. The discussions on PDIP candidates for mayor and vice-mayor started in early November 1999, two months before Imam Sutopo’s term ended. Surprisingly, some PDIP elites in the DPRD proposed figures other than Slamet to be the party's mayoral candidate. They claimed that the party would propose non-PDIP figures in the election. Solo Pos reported, ‘it is not yet official, but the PDIP faction in the DPRD admitted a batik businessman, Soehendro, [who] will be the front-runner candidate for mayor’.195 While for vice-mayor, the secretary of the city has actively approached the elites of the PDIP for political endorsement.196 Slamet’s name was not mentioned in public until mid-November 1999. A deputy PDIP leader insisted that Slamet was entitled to be the mayoral candidate, given his position as party leader.197 Since then, however, disintegration of PDIP elites for the mayoral election was revealed. Confident with support from some elites of PDIP in DPRD, Soehendro declared he would challenge Slamet.198 In the throes of PDIP’s internal battles, DPRD Solo scheduled the election for 15 December 1999, although the date was subsequently postponed until 23 March 2000. The delay was due to the Ministry of Home Affairs not confirming the protocol for the election until mid-January 2000. In the Indonesian system, a law generally requires more detail protocols to be drafted to guide implementation, typically in the form of government regulations and ministerial guidelines. For the local government election, these regulations and guidelines that followed up Law 22/1999 were adopted on 26 December 1999 and 19

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 195 “Dewan Ngebut Pilih Walikota,” Solo Pos, November 4, 1999. 196 “Sekwilda Solo Akhirnya Dilaporkan Ke Gubernur,” Solo Pos, November 26, 1999. 197 “Bursa Cawal and Cawawal Solo: Direstui DPP PDIP, Posisi Slamet Menguat,” Solo Pos, November 17, 1999.Bursa Cawal and Cawawal Solo: Direstui DPP PDIP, Posisi Slamet Menguat, Solo Pos, 17 November 1999. 198 “PDIP Solo Pecah: Soehendro Siap Saingi Slamet,” Solo Pos, November 18, 1999. Soehendro announced to challenge Slamet as mayor candidate after he made political tours to all factions in DPRD for communicating his bid for mayor.

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January 2000 respectively.199 In the eyes of politicians, the rescheduling meant more time for political lobbying and consolidation of support. But for the PDIP it caused deeper internal political confrontation. The official selection for the candidate of mayor in the PDIP occurred on 6 January 2000, as the party held a special convention to name four mayoral candidates, and another four standing for vice-mayor. At the convention attended by the city’s party executive and representatives of party organization at kecamatan (sub-district) and kelurahan (kampong) level, Slamet failed to win impressive political support. His name was less favourable compared to Soehendro, who was chosen by the majority.200 The result of the convention (including candidates for vice-mayor) was then submitted to PDIP central leadership (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat – DPP) in Jakarta for final recommendation. The decision of DPP in mid-January was a blow for Slamet, as it recommended Soehendro (a businessman and non PDIP figure) for mayor and Abimanyu (director of city water, also non PDIP) for vice-mayor.201 Slamet was disappointed with the recommendation. To maintain his chance for election, he challenged the decision in two ways. First, he considered running for election as a candidate of the non-PDIP faction.202 Slamet was confident since he believed the majority of PDIP members in the DPRD were on his side, and some factions had even considered him as their candidate.203 Second, his supporters urged the central leadership of PDIP to review the candidate selection process. One of his strategies was to make accusations about money politics executed by Soehendro for mobilizing support during the convention. His claim was supported by a statement from the deputy secretary of the party who admitted receiving travel funds from Soehendro for lobbying in Jakarta. And to exert more pressure on the DPP, Slamet sent some grassroots party activists who witnessed these practices in Jakarta to give testimony. For Slamet, whether the accusation of money politics was proven or not did not seem to be the issue, since his main goal was to delegitimize Soehendro. Slamet’s move to challenge the DPP decision was also supported by other factions in the DPRD that also reacted negatively to Soehendro’s nomination.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 199 On the government regulation for local government election, see PP Tata Cara Pemilihan, Pengesahan, Dan Pemberhentian Kepala Daerah Dan Wakil Kepala Daerah, 1999. For the ministerial regulation, see Pedoman Tata Cara Pemilihan, Pengesahan, Dan Pemberhentian Kepala Daerah Dan Wakil Kepala Daerah, 2000. 200 “Peta Cawal Berubah Lagi, Jago Romo Tunggul Tergusur,” Solo Pos, January 7, 2000. 201 “Selangkah Lagi, Soehendro Duduki Kursi Walikota Solo,” Solo Pos, January 16, 2000. 202 “Duet Soehendro – Abimanyu Terancam Lagi, Slamet Siap Terjun Lewat Fraksi Lain,” Solo Pos, January 19, 2000. 203 PAN identified public preference for mayor candidates by hotline telephone. See also the reaction of Slamet’s supporters, “Liek Palali: Rekomendasi DPP PDIP Bukan SK Tuhan,” Solo Pos, January 19, 2000.

!|!Page! 89! ! !

Some factions even planned to engineer a deadlock by not proposing any other candidates to compete with Soehendro.204 In the event of a single candidate, the election would be delayed. Slamet’s move caused anxiety for the DPP. Soehendro’s optimism that he would become mayor seemed diminished, as the recommendation was annulled by the DPP on 18 January 2000. The secretary general of the party explained that the DPP had received reports of money politics during the city’s party convention in January, and accordingly ordered a new process for selection.205 But after some members of PDIP faction flew to Jakarta to submit a letter of assurance to elect Soehendro-Abimanyu, the DPP re-endorsed Soehendro the days after they revoked his candidacy. The speaker of the DPRD, who was also a PDIP member, commented via the media that the DPP's flip-flop decision was due to a sharp division between supporters of Slamet and Soehendro within the party, at grassroots level and in the DPRD.206 Despite the DPP's anxiety, Slamet worked persistently to strengthen his political support in DPRD, including approaching the military faction. And after some weeks of uncertainty, the PDIP faction finally proposed three pairs of candidates. Soehendro – Abimanyu were proposed as the primary candidates, while Slamet – J. Suprapto (military faction) and Satryo – Suwarto were appointed as the secondary candidates.207 The decision to propose multiple candidates reflected a political compromise due to the aforementioned sharp division within the PDIP. However, a day before the election, the DPP issued a letter to instruct its representatives in the DPRD that they could choose whichever of the three PDIP candidate pairs they preferred. Finally, Slamet won this long process of political struggle, but without full support from his own party. I argue that Slamet’s legitimacy as mayor was more elite- and party based than popular. It is however important to note that the support from PDIP was not unqualified, and this would present difficult political challenges during Slamet’s term as mayor. c.! Public expectations Though Slamet’s election was elitist, public expectations toward the new government soared. Solo was hit severely by two mass riots in 1998 and 1999 which exerted more pressure on the new leadership and the city government. The riots damaged !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 204 “Duet Suhendro – Abimanyu Dinilai Masih Labil,” Solo Pos, January 18, 2000. 205 “PDIP Solo Diinstruksikan Ulang Rakercab, Mega Anulir Soehendro-Abimanyu,” Solo Pos, January 20, 2000. 206 “PDIP Urung Anulir Soehendro-Abimanyu,” Solo Pos, January 20, 2000. 207 “Iringi Soehendro-Abimanyu, Rakercab Setujui Paket Pendamping,” Solo Pos, February 28, 2000; “Slamet Suryanto Dan Satryo Dampingi Soehendro,” Solo Pos, February 29, 2000.

!|!Page! 90! ! ! most of the economic infrastructure and caused socio-economic grievances. Also post reform, civil society was active in driving public discussion, particularly on the issue related to city recovery. A prominent Solo historian, Sudharmono, said that the public in general expected Slamet’s government to take immediate action to overcome the impacts of crisis, such as to restore the city’s social life, rebuild public infrastructure damaged during the riots, and restore the local economy.208 Another scholar from the University of Sebelas Maret (UNS) emphasized the main task of Slamet’s government: to build basic public services as well as bureaucracy reform.209 Similar sentiments were voiced by an NGO consortium, which urged the city government to improve basic public services and adopt an approach to democratic governance. In public discussions ‘Wong Solo Mencari Walikota Ideal’ (the Solonese look for ideal mayor) held by Gita Pertiwi, reform in administrative services (i.e. identity card) appeared to be the most important concern. Another NGO activist, Didik Wahyudiono, urged the city’s government post crisis to consider a plan for city restoration prepared by the consortium of NGOs in Solo.210 The challenge for Slamet as mayor and PDIP leader was the fact that most supporters of the party were poor Solonese. The living conditions in Solo were generally worsened by declining welfare and public infrastructure damage as a consequence of the economic crisis and riots. The number of families living in absolute poverty increased to more than a quarter of the population.211 The majority of the poor supported PDIP in the 1999 election. In Banjarsari, Jebres and Serengan, where the poor population mostly resided, the support for PDIP was overwhelming, reaching 75%. While in the wealthier sub-districts of Pasar Kliwon and Laweyan, the support was lower, but still 60%. This percentage confirmed that the poor people in Solo could be identified as the mass reserve for the PDIP. For these people, as explained in chapter two, their expectations of the city government was mainly for the provision of basic public services in areas such as health, education, community infrastructure, economic sustainability, and security of basic needs such as food and housing. During the mayoral election, these issues did not appear to be the central agenda in political debate, due to the elitist mode of political competition. But !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 208 Solo Pos, January, 2000. 209 Solo Pos, April, 2000. 210 Interview with Didik Wahyudiono, May 16, 2012. He informed me that consortium NGO in Solo had set a plan of city recovery, namely City Development Strategy. 211 BPS Solo, Solo Dalam Angka 1998. The specific information can be found mainly in the figures on poverty measures.

!|!Page! 91! ! ! this doesn’t mean that those substantive policy issues lost their relevance, as they were responsibility of the local government under the decentralization reforms. Slamet was elected as mayor in a changing local political and government system, wherein the mayor acts as the chief executive with wide ranging authority in public services and city development. In this institutional context, the local government leader would represent the state at the closest level to deal with concrete needs of the people.212 Therefore, the administrative and technocratic capacities of local leaders to make government work would be key for maintaining people’s trust, not only trust in the personal political leader but also trust of the government more generally. Slamet was also a leader that emerged from the party, which claimed to be the representative of poor people, the PDIP. In spite of the elite split within PDIP, given his position as mayor, Slamet held authority to manage government resources for addressing public expectations for basic service improvements, revitalization of city infrastructure, restoration of the economy and social aspects. Such public expectations were concurrent with decentralization and local autonomy policies, which put local government at the centre of public services delivery. During the mayoral election and 1999 legislative election, Slamet’s views on policy substance to address public demands and problems in the city (as discussed above and in chapter two) were unclear. It seemed, for Slamet, that the most interesting vision was politics itself. In the 1999 election campaign, for example, he said: ‘for PDIP in Solo, the speech in campaign is not effective, since the party supporter is already consolidated. The most important is to campaign for three targets (tri tekad) of Bali Congress, namely: participation in the election, to win the election, and to secure Megawati for presidential election’.213 And even when a civil society consortium invited potential candidates for mayor to present their visions and agenda, Slamet did not attend. Slamet’s plans for government was revealed in his media statement after the inauguration, as he indicated two important points as to which direction he would manage regarding the government and his leadership approach.214 The first, on policy focus, concerned economic development and welfare. He mentioned specifically street vendors (PKL) relocation, and said that the process would not harm their welfare, promising to work towards a common agreement with vendors for the process of relocation. And

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 212 See Cornelis Lay, “Cornelis Lay, Desentralisasi Dan Ke-Indonesian,” Jurnal Sosial Dan Politik FISIPOL UGM, 2002. 213 “Banteng Mega Goyang Solo,” Solo Pos, May 21, 1999. 214 See,“Saya Kini Milik Rakyat Bukan Partai,” Solo Pos, April 13, 2000.

!|!Page! 92! ! ! second, on his vision for leadership approach, he promised to have closer ties by easing bureaucracy protocols that limited his interaction with people, fostering transparency, and building direct connection, amongst others, weekly Friday prayers from one mosque to another. He made a clear statement after his inauguration as mayor: ‘I am now owned by [the] people, not the party’.215 Though Slamet’s leadership legitimacy was initially based on party and elite support, it seemed that Slamet intended to develop a stronger base for popular legitimacy. Slamet’s complete plan of development was revealed a year after the election, when he and the DPRD agreed on a vision and mission for government and strategic planning development.216 The statement on vision for city planning was to develop Solo as a cultural city by focusing on trade, services, education, tourism and sport. To achieve this vision, the government would focus on seven areas, namely: 1) optimizing cultural capital and identity of Solo; 2) optimizing Solo as the hub for services; 3) creating regional cooperation; 4) people economy revitalization; 5) community participation in development; 6) strengthening law enforcement; and 7) developing equal public services for all segments of society. This document alone is insufficient to assess whether Slamet’s government was effective or not in responding to public demands. It is true that this document showed Slamet’s government list of to-do policies, but it provided only broad statements about the government's priorities. Therefore, the discussion in section 3 and 4 of this chapter on the practices of authority will be helpful to understand the ways in which Slamet created political legitimacy during his leadership. The discussion in this section thus far suggests the nature of political leadership legitimacy in Solo in the early years of political reform, greatly affected by the changing political landscape, namely the domination of PDIP in 1999 election, the adoption of indirect elections and further implementation of decentralization. As the first mayor in the democratic era, Slamet’s initial legitimacy was based on PDIP endorsement of his candidacy and support from members of the DPRD, particularly the PDIP faction. PDIP support for his leadership was however not unqualified, since many PDIP elites preferred another candidate. The disunity in the party had been an intrinsic challenge for Slamet as mayor. Other challenges faced related to popular expectations of the capabilities of the new government to overcome the crisis and the agenda for governance reform. Though

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 215 Ibid. 216 The Vision and Strategic Planning of the city was promulgated in the Solo Local Regulation (Perda) No.10/2001.

!|!Page! 93! ! ! these challenges had their origins in democratization and decentralization that also affected other regions, Solo was specifically influenced by the tradition of popular resistance and increasing activism of civil society. In such a changing political landscape, the challenges for Mayor Slamet were multifaceted. First, he had to deal with challenges from political elites and factions in the PDIP that did not fully support him. The capability to maintain good relations with the DPRD and party elites would be key to running effective government. Under decentralization, the DPRD had key roles in local government, not just its authority to elect the leader, but in policy processes and budget allocation. Furthermore, the DPRD could exercise power through its review of the government’s annual report, as the mayor could be impeached if the DPRD rejected the report. As the biggest faction in the DPRD, the support of PDIP was significant in determining outcomes. As will be shown in the following section, many of Slamet’s policies and actions were incompatible with popular demands at that time. This situation had twofold negative impacts for Slamet217: 1) Slamet’s opponents in the PDIP delegitimize his leadership by highlighting the ineffectiveness of his policies in addressing popular demands; and 2) his failure to develop support from the grassroots. The process of creating legitimacy, as discussed in the first chapter, relates to capacity and action on the part of political authority to develop compatibility between government output and popular demand. The following part of this chapter will examine Slamet’s actions as mayor in relation to popular demands, namely improving government capacities in delivering the provision of basic public services, and how he developed relationships with other political actors. Hence, the discussion clarifies to what extent Slamet’s way of implementing authority was useful for creating political legitimacy.

3.! Dealing with basic public needs: low quality triggers popular scepticism The tradition of popular recalcitrance, as discussed in chapter two, was in part triggered by socio-economic grievances and difficulties in accessing basic needs. Capability of political authority in answering those challenges is hypothetically important for managing recalcitrance. In this regard, one essential element for creating political

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 217 Slamet’s opponents in this period were mainly from the executive of Solo PDIP led by Rudy.

!|!Page! 94! ! ! legitimacy is the provision of basic public needs, a concrete demand of people post crisis. Even in a non-democratic system, political authority can still maintain quality public services to maintain public trust, and thus strengthen legitimacy of the system. In the New Order, while retaining a repressive approach, the regime still maintained economic welfare measures through, for example, subsidies for food and other basic needs, and improving education and health services in order to maintain political loyalty and legitimacy.218 Failure to sustain those welfare capacities would contribute to the declining legitimacy of the regime, such as the fall of the New Order.219 Another lesson in an extreme situation of pos-twar and post-conflict societies, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that the capacity in basic services provision was also an important element for creating political legitimacy, other than the installation of procedural democracy.220 A similar notion can be drawn from the history of Western European nations: the legitimacy of the state relied heavily on the state’s capacity to develop equal public services for their citizens.221 In Indonesia post-reform, undoubtedly procedural democracy is important, but the capacity of the political authority to address substantial needs of the people, such as public services provision, was also an essential element of democracy. Thus the capabilities of political authorities in developing effective output of governance would be important sources for creating legitimacy.222 In Solo post crisis, the growing number of hawkers, street vendors, poor public infrastructure, and low performance of government in public services indicated a difficult socio-economic situation and declining conditions for people’s livelihood. The vulnerable condition of the city in the immediate post crisis period reflected as well the declining capacity of government, in the midst of unclear prospects for recovery. Furthermore, the economy was also dominated by the informal sector. During the crisis, the biggest number of workers was in small industry, traditional trading, and other informal sectors. In the peak years of crisis, 1998 and 1999, the number of people working in the non-formal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 218 Even the political regimes that are categorized as non-democratic use the social policies and welfare economy to maintain legitimacy, such as in China and Singapore. See for example China Dvpmt Res Foundn, Constructing a Social Welfare System for All in China (Routledge, 2013); Kandiah Satku, Singapore’s Health Care System: What 50 Years Have Achieved (World Scientific, 2015). 219 It is important to note that the fall of new order was combination of factors, involving the movement for democratization and political-economic crisis. On this account, see Stefan Eklof, Indonesian Politics in Crisis: The Long Fall of Suharto, 1996-1998 (NIAS Press, 1999). 220 See for example Olivier Roy, “Development and Political Legitimacy: The Cases of Iraq and Afghanistan,” Conflict, Security & Development 4, no. 2 (2004): 167-79. 221 See Steven Van de Walle and Zoe Scott. “The Political Role of Service Delivery in State-Building: Exploring the Relevance of European History for Developing Countries.” Development Policy Review 29, no. 1 (2011): 5–21. 222 Ross H. McLeod and Andrew Macintyre, Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), especially the articles by Sharon Bessel, pp.138-57 and Staffan Synnerstorm pp.159-77.

!|!Page! 95! ! ! sector was about 41%, or 167,454 out of 398,158 workers.223 The labour in this sector had no guarantee of stable income, job insecurity and no access to social insurance. The vulnerability of this group was even higher because access basic services, such as health, education, or even food security, was limited or even unaffordable. Such a general profile of socio-economic vulnerability had created high popular demands that Mayor Slamet and his government needed to deal with, regarding low capacity in local government to manage programs and services. The following is a discussion about Slamet’s policies and actions and to what extent they were compatible with demand. Two highlighted cases are informal/traditional economy and basic public services. a.! Ineffective policies for informal and traditional economy Informal and traditional economy issues prevail in Solo. Small-scale sectors were dominant, since as many as 41% of the people sustained their livelihood and welfare in areas of small and medium economy, such as informal and traditional traders, small or household industries workers, and other urban informal sectors (e.g. on-street parking, becak riders and buskers). Similar to many third world cities, the main concern of informal sector is sustainability for fulfilling basic needs and their economic activities.224 In general, they expect government assistance in order to maintain economic surveillance.225 Despite the fact that Slamet’s political legitimacy was initially from elite support, his leadership performance in addressing substantive issues would affect his legitimacy for the people. Informal sectors have been an integral part of Solo’s economy and have served as an alternative for many Solonese in the difficult period during and after the 1990s crisis. Government concern for street vendors and hawkers could be traced back to the period of Mayor Imam Sutopo (1995–2000). Two city regulations (Perda) that related to this sector (Perda 5/1995 on Bus Terminal and Perda 8/1995 on Street Vendors) were adopted in 1995. In Perda 8/1995, street vendors are defined as every person who sells goods of any kind in a public space such as a pedestrian walk, park, and/or other places categorized as state-owned land and property. Hawkers, buskers and shoe polishers are included in this category.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 223 BPS Surakarta, Surakarta Statistical Year Book 1999 (Surakarta: BPS Surakarta, 2000). 224 See for example Davis, Planet of Slums; Soto, The Other Path. 225 Beyond Indonesia, this is also the case of other third world economies. See Soto, The Other Path.

!|!Page! 96! ! !

The regulation was hostile to the existence of informal sectors, however, since it defined them as illegal, and therefore government apparatus could apply authority to relocate without the consent of vendors, forceful closing down, and even confiscate vendors' goods. Protests from street vendors and hawkers associations were sparked in response to the regulation. They accused the mayor of having no empathy regarding their poverty and economic circumstance, and therefore refused any actions from the government to ease their existence. The city government was never able to implement the regulation effectively. During the period of crisis, the mass media reported routinely about street vendors and hawkers that encroached on public spaces without restraint and the failure of the government to manage their existence. In 1997/98 for example, the city government planned to prohibit hawkers or asongan in Tirtonadi, the main bus station, but it was unsuccessful. According to the Perda on Bus Terminal, it was only retailers and traders with permits that could operate inside the terminal, while hawkers, buskers and others were prohibited. The hawkers association, SARI, resisted the regulation by arguing that the government did not consult them, while insisting that being hawkers, buskers and the like was the only possible way for them to survive in the crisis situation.226 Some DPRD members, particularly from PPP, supported the hawkers’ rejection, by asking the mayor to withdraw the policy. They warned that mistreatment of hawkers, street-vendors, buskers and others in the informal economy could cause more popular unrest in the city, since the numbers were large and well organized. Such mistreatment would instigate radical action.227 Despite such support from some DPRD members, the DPRD as an institution did not take further action to annul the regulation. Mayor Slamet inherited the problems of the informal economy in the city. Even though Slamet did not specify any policy concerns during the process of election, he made promising statements after the inauguration about the issue. He pledged to give attention for problems of street vendors by considering their welfare as the principle of government policy.228 The commitment was then formulated in an official document of development platform, adopted in 2001. A concrete plan to deal with the problem of street vendors was the development of a permanent market and shelter for this informal sector, as a condition

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 226 “Pengasong Tirtonadi Minta Pemda Bijaksana.” 227 “‘Perda Larangan Asongan Di Tirtonadi, PPP: Melanggar HAM.’” 228 “Saya Kini Milik Rakyat Bukan Partai.”

!|!Page! 97! ! ! of relocation. But the process of relocation never happened during Slamet’s leadership. One reason was vendors resisted the plan from the beginning. Street vendors in Solo were relatively well organized. Each cluster had its own association, whose main function was to defend common interests against the government's plan of relocation or eviction of the vendors. In the early stages of his leadership, Slamet pledged to conduct direct talks with vendors to discuss the plan for relocation. Given his background as a politician emerged from the grassroots level, it seemed that he had indeed communicated directly with vendors to achieve agreement. But from the case of Banjarsari vendors, the biggest cluster, the reality was different. In fact, there was no proof that Slamet had conducted direct communication or made other personal approaches to persuade vendors in Banjarsari to follow the plan for relocation. Instead, he tended to use formal authority to draw up a plan for relocation, and even informed vendors that relocation plans had been prepared by his bureaucracy.229 In the absence of Slamet’s direct approach and communication, the Banjarsari vendors went to the DPRD to voice their concerns.230 But the meeting was not able to reach a solution, since the policy for relocation was in the hands of the executive. As a result, Slamet’s plan for relocation was never implemented due to resistance from vendors. The leader of the vendors’ association – Guyub Rukun Klithikan – for example, even insisted they would defend the shelters, and suggested that government should allocate the budget to refine illegal shelters, rather than build a permanent market.231 And until the end of Slamet’s term, there was no single story of vendors’ relocation. Most public spaces in Solo turned into semi-permanent markets. Another priority in government economic development planning was revitalization of the traditional market. This market is a kind of bazaar economy, wherein small traders display their commodities (mostly food) in relatively open space. For the Solonese, the traditional market is not only for economic purposes, but has become a part of Solo cultural identity. In the Javanese world, the traditional market is not only a place for economic activities, but more importantly for social interaction: a meeting point for Javanese commoners.232 There are around 40 traditional markets including the two most

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 229 “PKL Banjarsari Tetap Harus Dipindah,” Solo Pos, June 16, 2000. 230 For instance, in the case of Banjarsari and Kauman. See “PKL Banjarsari Menolak Dipindah,” Solo Pos, May 4, 2000. 231 Solo Pos, 6 April 2005. 232 On the traditional sector of the economy, see J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

!|!Page! 98! ! ! popular ones, Pasar Klewer233 and Pasar Gedhe.234 Despite this sector being explicitly mentioned in Slamet’s policy documents as a priority, only a few concrete programs were deployed in this sector, for example, the renovation of the market’s building or assistance for small traders. One of the largest projects was the restoration of the iconic market, Pasar Gedhe, which was destroyed by fire in late April 2000.235 Many had praised Slamet’s decision to prioritize the renovation of Pasar Gedhe rather than redevelop the city hall, also razed in the October 1999 riots.236 But Slamet’s pro-traditional market image was challenged months later. It was triggered by the dispute surrounding the revitalization of Pasar Nusukan, located in the northern part of Solo. Slamet’s plan to renovate Pasar Nusukan was rejected by the traders, as he decided to appoint the private sector for development. As a concession, the developer would be granted authority to decide prices for the new shelters and kiosks. The association of Nusukan traders objected to the plan, since they were worried that the developer would only consider its self-interest in deciding on prices. At the protest, traders appealed to Mayor Slamet and his government to intervene regarding kiosk rent by considering the traders’ limited financial capacity. Furthermore, they were also dissatisfied with the mayor’s indecisiveness that had caused delays with development. Beyond this case, in general, traditional market traders were also unhappy with the limited financial assistance provided by Slamet’s government. One trader put it this way: ‘we build our little space for selling goods with [our] own money, but the government only comes to collect levy’.237 This was an indication of disappointment regarding Slamet’s lack of concern for this traditional sector. It seemed that although the traditional market was the icon of the city’s economy and also the backbone of the people’s economic sector, Slamet failed to deliver impressive concrete programs. Whereas Slamet’s policies in the informal and traditional sectors were generally not sympathetic, he was supportive of the interests of bigger economy players and larger- scale capital. His attitudes about being friendly towards the bigger economic players were

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 233 Pasar Klewer is the central market for the Batik industry in Solo and surrounding regions. The history of the market is as old as the establishment of Surakarta Palace, and historically is claimed as part of the palace’s property. 234 The official name of the market is Pasar Gedhe Hardjonegoro. This is the biggest traditional market in Solo and was built during Dutch government occupation, but had been renovated several times, mainly due to fire. The architecture is however still preserved as it was in the 1930s. 235 “Pasar Gedhe Kobong,” Solo Pos, April 29, 2000. 236 “Walikota Slamet Suryanto: Uang 1 Miliar Untuk Pasar Gedhe, Bukan Balaikota,” Solo Pos, May 24, 2000. 237 Pojok Pasar, corner of market, is a Solo Pos rubric to highlight the condition of small traders in traditional market, as well as to oversee the condition of market facilities. The traditional market characterises the Solo economy, and there is around 36 markets.

!|!Page! 99! ! ! reflected in the following cases. One notable case was his immediate action to respond to Robby Sumampouw’s proposal for investment, a well-known conglomerate from Solo. Robby’s track record in Solo was controversial. Dating back to the Hartomo and Imam Sutopo’s period in the 1990s, one of Robby’s controversial business plans was to develop a luxury hotel and shopping mall on the iconic heritage site in the city, the Vastenburg fort. People rejected the plan, but he still retained the right to utilize the site until recently. He was unsuccessful in business ambitions in the mid 1990s, but in 2003 he developed an elite leisure centre, Hailai International Executive Club (HIEC), that according to the city spatial planning (RUTRK) was located in an area earmarked for business, not leisure. But what Slamet did was to order the bureaucracy to reassess spatial planning in order to grant him legal judgement to issue a permit for the club. In addition, Slamet argued that the club would generate a positive impact for the city’s economy.238 In April 2003, Slamet was even formally asked to host the ceremony for the opening of the club, in the midst of protest from DPRD members and elements of society. Some DPRD members, mainly from PPP and PAN, opposed the decision. They criticized Slamet and his government’s lack of commitment to enforce the city regulation on spatial planning. A PPP spokesperson condemned the government for losing its moral grounds for law enforcement, and disregarded Slamet’s claim that the club would foster other investment. A sceptical DPRD argued that the facilitation of big business by breaching spatial planning was in stark contrast to Slamet’s unclear policies about managing street vendors and traditional markets. A council member expressed his view: ‘while the street vendors were prosecuted, big business enjoyed the privilege.’239 The PDIP faction did not take an official stance on this matter, but nor did it provide any public support for Slamet’s decision. The DPRD's reservations could not change Slamet's decision, since the business permit was a part of the executive’s authority. Outside the DPRD, protests also came from Muslim Youth of Hizbullah and the Surakarta Islamic Defenders Front (Forum Pembela Islam Surakarta - FPIS), both of which were suspicious about the lack of transparency, and accused the HIEC of running undercover illegal businesses, such as prostitution, selling alcohol and narcotics transaction.240

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 238 Slamet endorsement to HaiLai can be traced in Solo Pos, weeks 2-3, April 2003. 239 “Soal Dikeluarkannya Izin Operasional Hailai, Hasan (Dkk.) Akan Gunakan Hak Meminta Keterangan,” Solo Pos, April 23 and 24, 2003. 240 “Hailai Diresmikan, FPIS Demo,” Solo Pos, April 23, 2003.

!|!Page!100! ! !

Another example of Slamet’s policy in favour of capital was dozens of permits issued for the development of modern retail outlets including shopping centres, supermarkets and minimarkets. His main argument was that the development of a modern market would help economic recovery in the city. Some of the most well-known permits he granted were for three giant malls: Solo Grand Mall, Solo Square and Solo Centre Point, in addition to dozens of minimarkets. It is however important to note that the rise of the modern market has been a part of economic globalization241, which has also affected economic development in many Indonesian cities since the 1990s. And its growth has been even faster post crisis, as per the implication of economic liberalization adopted in the national policy (i.e. Presidential Decree No.99/1998 and a Decision Letter of the State Minister of Investment No. 29/SK/1998) that stipulated investment in modern retailing.242 Many in Solo, including traditional market traders, worried that the government decision to issue permits to modern retailers would threaten their sustainability and ownership of smaller shops and kiosks.243 Some DPRD members shared similar concerns, but Slamet’s policy for modern market permits went unchallenged. Although in his earlier statements Slamet had shown concern for the informal and traditional sectors of the economy, which were subsequently also mentioned in his policy platform, his favouring of investment in the modern economy triggered public disappointment. Local leaders like Slamet had certainly only limited power to block growing investment facilitated by national policy. The policies in favour of the modern economy would not negatively impact Slamet’s legitimacy, if at the same time he could implement effectively the policies for the informal and traditional sectors of the economy in Solo. Since the effective implementation of policy in this grassroots sector was absent, Slamet had difficulties in maintaining political support for his leadership and later on for his re-election in the 2005 direct mayoral election.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 241 See for example Thomas Reardon, Spencer Henson, and Julio Berdegué, “‘Proactive Fast-Tracking’diffusion of Supermarkets in Developing Countries: Implications for Market Institutions and Trade,” Journal of Economic Geography, 2007, https://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2007/05/10/jeg.lbm007.full. 242 See Ronnie S. Natawidjaja, “Modern Market Growth and the Changing Map of the Retail Food Sector in Indonesia,” in Presented at Pacific Food System Outlook (PFSO) 9th Annual Forecasters Meeting. May, vol. 10, 2005, 13, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ronnie_Natawidjaja/publication/248708443_Modern_Market_Growth_and_Changi ng_Map_of_Retail_Food_Sector_in_Indonesia/links/02e7e51e172f27baa0000000.pdf. 243 “Pusat Belanja Modern vs Tradisional. Pedagang Pasar Tradisional Menuntut Perhatian,” Solo Pos, August 29, 2005; “Pedagang Pasar Sampaikan Petisi Ke Dewan: Pemkot Telah Gagal Kelola Pasar,” Solo Pos, February 18, 2005. The crititiques were also from NGOs, see for example Nino, “Gagasan Nino: Matinya Pasar Tradisional Akibat Salah Kebijakan,” Gagasan Nino, February 4, 2013, http://ninohistiraludin.blogspot.com.au/2013/02/matinya-pasar-tradisional- akibat-salah.html.

!|!Page!101! ! ! b.! The poor condition of basic public services and infrastructure For political leadership in a democratic system, the capability to manage basic public services provision is a crucial element in maintaining popular support for government and to create legitimacy. The types of public services are however different in each society. In Solo during and after the 1990s crisis, for example, the most crucial public services, as discussed earlier, were related to basic needs such as public infrastructure, and access to education, health and housing. The following discussion is about Slamet’s policies and actions to cope with these issues, and the implications for his political position. The legacies of two New Order mayors in the 1990s – Hartomo and Imam Sutopo – from whom Slamet inherited the state of public services, will also be discussed. Education was among the services that were prioritised for development on Slamet’s government platform. In January 2004, the Secretary General of the Ministry for Education visited Solo with one important mission: to discuss with Mayor Slamet and the Head of DPRD, Bambang Mudiarto, the local budget allocation for education. It was a concern of the ministry at that time that the local contribution for the education sector in Solo’s 2004 budget was recorded as among the lowest in Indonesia.244 In the ensuing discussion, the ministry advised the Solo government to increase spending for education. But the budget was however unaffected. In March, the Mayor and the DPRD agreed on the 2004 budget with an allocation for education at 9 billion rupiah from about 349 billion rupiah in the total budget.245 The decision caused a negative response from the education community. The coordinator of the Solo Education Board (Dewan Pendidikan Kota Solo – DPKS) reacted disappointedly: ‘if that was the final decision, how could we believe that the city government has empathy with the education sector.’ And despite community disappointment, the allocation for education was 2.5%, from about 357 billion rupiah, in the following year.246 This percentage did not include the salaries for teachers. It seemed that the ministry’s concern about a small portion of the budget being allocated to education was the main concern of the Solo government. In response to such criticism, Slamet’s government and DPRD members (including those from PDIP) justified the decision by

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 244 “Sekjen Depdiknas Temui Walikota Dan Ketua DPRD Solo, Anggaran Pendidikan Solo Terendah Se-Indonesia,” Solo Pos, January 16, 2004. 245 “Anggaran Pendidikan Solo Dinilai Terlalu Kecil. Direncanakan Rp 25M, Disahkan Rp 9M,” Solo Pos, March 10, 2004. 246 Ibid.

!|!Page!102! ! ! claiming it was due to a budget deficit. 247 But, on the other hand, bureaucratic spending and the DPRD’s budget allocation were increased.248 The small budget allocation for education during Slamet’s leadership bore implications for basic facilities for education. In January 2004, for example, the primary school 124 (SD 124) building in Serengan, Jebres sub-district collapsed, but there was no appropriate response from city government. A senior teacher of the school told the media: ‘since the building was developed 35 years ago, there was no government project for renovation. A room for the teacher’s meeting was even developed voluntarily by the parents’.249 Another example of the government’s lack of attention to school infrastructure dated back to 2003, when flooding affected some schools in eastern Solo. The city government did not take any responsibility for recovery and school activities and offered no interim solution such as a temporary school or restoration of the building.250 The disappointment regarding Slamet’s education policy was also due to his inconsistency in implementation of policy. For example, he issued a mayoral decree for the establishment of a School Accreditation Council for overseeing the quality of schools, but never allocated a budget to the Council to perform its tasks.251 In light of the constitutional requirement to allocate 20% of public spending for education, Solo under Slamet had hardly been able to fulfil this requirement. The perception of community actors, such as DPKS, was that Slamet’s government had paid little attention to improving education services, particularly when compared with increased spending for salaries and other bureaucratic expenses. Regarding decentralization, the policy for budget allocation is basically a shared authority between the executive (the mayor and bureaucracy) and legislative (DPRD). The executive would prepare the draft, including the names of each project and its allocated budget. The draft would be discussed with the DPRD for agreement. As the mayor who commanded the bureaucracy, Slamet had powerful authority to set the priority and drive the drafting process. Despite this authority, in fact it was the bureaucracy that actually prepared the budget allocation. And, as will be shown in section 4 of this chapter, Slamet’s relations with the bureaucracy were

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 247 “Anggaran Pendidikan Kota Solo Hanya 2,5 Persen,” Tempo Nasional, accessed May 29, 2016, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2005/02/22/05856870/anggaran-pendidikan-kota-solo-hanya-2-5-persen. 248 After the implementation of decentralization, there was a substantial increase in the transfer from national government to local government. In Solo, like many other local governments, the allocation for bureaucracy spending was up to 65%. 249 “Saya Pingin SD Ini Diperbaiki Karena Mau Lulusan,” Solo Pos, January 15, 2004. 250 Solo Pos, January 2003. 251 “SK BAS Turun, Tapi Tak Dianggarkan APBD,” Solo Pos, March 13, 2004; “Soal Tiadanya Dana Pembentukan BAS Dalam APBD, Walikota Harus Bertanggung Jawab,” Solo Pos, March 15, 2004.

!|!Page!103! ! ! frequently at a standstill, and therefore he could not effectively direct the bureaucracy in implementing the city’s policy platform. For health there was also no breakthrough under Slamet’s leadership. During Imam Sutopo’s leadership, health services became a popular concern, as the government planned to increase the services levy at PUSKESMAS – the community health-centre located in sub-district and kelurahan. The users of this facility are mainly the poor or low-income families. At the peak of the crisis, the city government proposed to increase the services levy by 6 times, from 500 to 3000 rupiah.252 Community figures and CSO activists, who were concerned about poverty issues, including some DPRD members, were also hesitant about the plan. As a result, the government declined the plan. Under Slamet’s leadership, health services were also a city priority. But in terms of budget allocation, it mostly covered routine services, and there was no specific Solo policy to improve access by the poor to these services, except for national programs to improve access to health services.253 Another important basic need in that period was community infrastructure. Built on lowlands, the city is prone to flooding. Among the important infrastructure built to prevent flooding is a set of barriers, especially in eastern Solo and the city centre. In the past, the Dutch colonial government anticipated the hazard by developing flood barriers in eastern Solo and building a canal in the middle of the city. Post independence, one massive works built to prevent flooding was in the early 1990s, when Mayor Hartomo initiated Kali Pepe normalization – the canal that flows from west to east through the middle of the city.254 Mayor Imam Sutopo, who succeeded Hartomo in 1995, developed a flood barrier along the stream of Kedung Jumbleng on the city’s eastern outskirts. But the project turned out to be another disaster, as the barrier broke during torrential rains, due to poor construction. Allegations of corruption involving the contractor and some city officials emerged at the outset of the disaster.255 Imam Sutopo’s plan for city infrastructure in 1998/99 proposed 20% of the city’s budget allocation for the poor neighbourhoods, under a government

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 252 “Soal Kenaikan Tarif Di Puskesmas, Rahardjo: Jangan Beratkan Rakyat Kecil,” Solo Pos, March 3, 1997. 253 Some national programs for health services in that period, for example, ASKESKIN and JAMKESMAS. 254 See Kenang-Kenangan Dari Solo, Pemkot Surakarta, 1995. For years the canal had filled with thick sediment, while the banks were crowded with illegal slum neighborhoods. Flooding in the area was a yearly pattern as a result. Hartomo’s government initiated projects of normalization along with a program called neighborhood infrastructure upgrading. The project was financially supported by the national government with donations from Solonese business networks in Jakarta.The revitalization was successfully implemented, and many of the Solonese, in particular senior figures and citizens, praised Hartomo’s legacy. 255 Solo Pos, March 1999.

!|!Page!104! ! ! funded community infrastructure program.256 The program was however never fulfilled, and the Solonese witnessed more decline in public infrastructure.257 Slamet inherited a negative record of government in managing public infrastructure. Except for the solid achievement of Hartomo’s Kali Pepe normalization, another infrastructure project to protect the city from flooding was indeed fragile. During Slamet’s term, the city was not free from flooding, such as in January 2004 when Bengawan Solo and Kali Jenes swept through some kampongs in the eastern sub-district, Pasar Kliwon and Jebres (the biggest PDIP clusters). The government’s response was very slow and there was no plan for disaster management. Instead, communities were left to anticipate the flood, by preparing rafts from bamboo or banana trees and erecting temporary shelters.258 After the flood, these communities demanded the government build infrastructure to prevent future flooding and to restore public facilities such as schools. However, Slamet failed to show empathy or absorb the community aspiration for policy. Another infrastructure of public concern was housing. As discussed earlier, illegal land grabbing had become a big problem by the end of the 1990s. Unhealthy housing conditions also contributed to poverty in the city. This seemed to be a sustainability problem. A survey conducted in the mid 1980s showed that around 50% of housing was semi- or non-permanent, while house size was on average around 50 to 60 square metres.259 This figure did not change in the 1990s. The number of poor houses was in line with Jeremy Evans’ report in a household survey in 1984. He noted that many Solonese lived in small houses in congested neighbourhoods with a narrow lane in between.260 It was common practice for more than one family to live in a small house. Young married couples still lived with their parents, due to the scarcity of public housing and economic hardship. An initiative to develop public housing was taken by Hartomo in the early 1990s, as he developed a complex for labourers and low-income people. But some government officials misused the project, as they took over the units. Slamet had to deal with the housing issue early on in his leadership. Just days after his inauguration on 10 April 2000, hundreds of people from Kampong Kentingan marched !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 256 “Proyek Padat Karya Diprioritaskan,” Solo Pos, March 13, 1998. 257 One example was many traffic light in the city’s intersections were broken. See “Di Solo, Hanya 7 Traffic Light Berfungsi Normal,” Solo Pos, May 3, 2000. 258 See Solo Pos, January 2004 259 See Kantor Statistik Solo, Solo Dalam Angka 1986 (Solo: Kantor Statistik Solo, 1987). 260 Jeremy Evans, “Definition And Structure Of The Household In Urban Java: Findings Of A Household Census In Suburban Surakarta,” Urban Anthropology 13, no. 2/3 (Summer-Fall 1984): 145–96.

!|!Page!105! ! ! to his office to demand legal certification for land ownership. Some years before, the government had in fact ordered the same residents to vacate their houses, since they were built on state-owned land. Slamet’s initial response was to take action in favour of the people. Without any consultation with the office for land administration and other related agencies, he granted the certificate of ownership to them, as well as to other clusters of residents who lived on a nearby riverbank. Slamet’s response was certain to please the poor, but also caused internal bureaucratic tension. The land administration office rejected Slamet’s decision on the grounds that granting a certificate of ownership would lead to legal and administrative chaos, and furthermore could prompt more land grabbing.261 Slamet was new to office when this issue arose. And as a political leader coming from outside the bureaucratic system, his experience on aspects of government policy was still limited. He had not consulted the authoritative agency (i.e. land administration office) before making his decision. It seems that his quick response was more influenced by his grassroots background. This case merely confirms a reactionary approach, rather than systematic policy to overcome popular demands for housing. And apart from this action, his government did not produce any other substantial policy on housing. In the post crisis context and particularly in a vulnerable society like Solo, basic public services and infrastructure were key elements that showed commitment of leadership and government to popular demands. As mentioned above, Slamet’s legitimacy was initially not from people, but as a result of tight elite competition within his party and the DPRD. Even within this elite circle, Slamet had only qualified support from his own party. But the challenge for Slamet was not just consolidation of elite support, but how to respond to popular demands. With reference to his pledges during inauguration and his policy platform, improvement of public services and managing the informal economy were among his priorities. Nevertheless, Slamet proved to be ineffective in implementing the government's plan and budget for producing outputs of government that would answer the structure of popular demands. Ineffective implementation of Slamet’s pro-poor policies can be explained from two perspectives. First, Slamet led the city government during the immediate post crisis period and so faced the challenge of limited financial capacity to undertake recovery efforts. During his five years, the average city budget was just under 400 billion rupiah. Up to 60% of this amount was for bureaucracy spending (including salaries and other office !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 261 On this matter, see Solo Pos, 30-31 July 2002.

!|!Page!106! ! ! costs) – a general trend in almost every local government in Indonesia post decentralization. Slamet had limited power to finance all of his plans. Notably, when Slamet left office, the budget was in deficit. In the midst of this limited financial capacity, a second problem arose. Slamet failed to define policy priorities and implement government programs effectively. For example, he allocated money to erect streetlights along the main city road, at a time when spending for education was low. This decision triggered internal criticism within his party. Slamet also delegated the implementation of strategic programs, such as street vendors’ relocation, to his bureaucracy, which tended to adopt a formal approach. In general, his plan for relocation was unsuccessful. The outcome might have been different if Slamet had talked with vendors face to face, an approach that he had promised from the outset as mayor The result created a vacuum for effective government in providing basic public services and infrastructure as expected by the people. Such a vacuum triggered public discontent towards Slamet and his government. Apart from policy substance, the elite and the public discontent towards Slamet stemmed from his tense relationships with other governance actors in the city.

4.! Trouble with relationships with governance actors Beyond popular demands for effective government and being the mayor in the context of democratic transition, Slamet also faced the growing importance of other government and non-government actors. In the previous chapter I argued that in the Solo context, democratization signified a triumph for recalcitrant actors in challenging the established elites. Furthermore, from the perspective of creating legitimacy, the state of relationships between the political leader and other actors of governance is also an important element. In this regard, the commitment of the political leader in adopting an agenda of governance is not just manifested in effective outcomes, but also in good relations with other governance actors. Emerging during fundamental political change, Slamet Suryanto was better known as a political activist of PDIP, rather than as a leader of the democratic movement. Furthermore, since he was indirectly elected by the DPRD, his political legitimacy as mayor was initially determined by elite support in his party and the DPRD, rather than the popular vote. However, since the state of political legitimacy is not constant, but in flux during the course of leadership, how he developed relationships with other actors would be

!|!Page!107! ! ! a key to political stability. Because he enjoyed only qualified support from PDIP elites, the character of relations between Slamet and other actors was even more important to inform the way he created legitimacy, and to what extent his leadership approach was compatible with the popular mood of democratization. The following discussion illustrates Slamet’s relationships with: 1) other government actors (the DPRD, the vice-mayor and the bureaucracy), 2) the political community, and 3) his party, the PDIP. a.! Constant tensions with the DPRD Under decentralization, executive leaders (governor, head of district and mayor) are central in local politics, but their authority is not absolute. In early decentralization, the legitimacy of local government leaders depended on the election in DPRD, and therefore its sustainability is much relied on the support from the DPRD. Beyond this aspect, the DPRD played a greater role in government, given its authority in local regulation making, budget formulation, the control and supervision of policy implementation, in addition to which it had the authority to impeach a local leader if it rejected the government accountability report.262 Therefore, the executive needed to develop support from the DPRD in order to run the government effectively and hence maintain political legitimacy. The power of DPRD in the decentralization era is the antithesis of its weak political position during the New Order. Other actors that may affect government effectiveness are the vice-mayor and the bureaucracy. As will be presented below, Slamet’s relations with these actors were generally dominated by tension, rather than cooperation as a necessary condition for delivering effective government. Slamet’s relationship with the DPRD, dominated by his fellow PDIP politicians, was in disarray. His difficult relationship with the DPRD can be traced back to his narrow election win. As mentioned, the election process was surrounded by uncertainty due to unclear protocols and the PDIP’s internal split. The split indicated that political support for Slamet, particularly from inside the PDIP, was faltering. Fragile support from the DPRD manifested in Slamet being challenged early on. After the inauguration, DPRD members from the PPP appealed that an independent team should be appointed to investigate assets and properties of the mayor and vice-mayor.263 They argued that such investigation was important for transparency, and also it would be on the public record for scrutinizing the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 262 See Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah (Law on Regional Autonomy), especially the section on DPRD. 263 “Kekayaan Walikota Dan Wakil Dipertanyakan,” Solo Pos, April 14, 2000.

!|!Page!108! ! ! wealth of mayor and vice-mayor after their retirement. Slamet rejected the appeal, arguing there was no formal ruling for the mayor to declare his assets and wealth.264 Furthermore, the criticism from the DPRD towards Slamet was audible in the first year’s budget and policies.265 The strongest criticisms came from the PDIP faction, which examined the budget draft. In their view, the draft lacked priority in regard to the vision of government for social and economic revitalization. The faction’s evaluation was that the budget was dominated by programs on physical development, while the allocation for human development (including basic services in education and health) was very low. Thus the PDIP proposed an independent committee of experts (e.g. economy, politics, law, psychosocial, representatives from CSO and public figures) to draw up a list of priorities for the city’s budget. Without an independent review, they were doubtful the consultation between the DPRD and the executive would be effective to amend the draft. Slamet rejected the suggestion of the PDIP representatives, however. He argued that the budget formulation was the co-authority of the DPRD and the executive, not external actors.266 The DPRD was was even more critical of Slamet’s budget allocations when it evaluated the government’s annual spending report. According to Law 22/1999, the DPRD had the right to examine the government’s annual accountability reports, and then decide to accept or reject the report. In the latter case, the DPRD could have a no-confidence vote that would lead to impeachment. In 2002, for example, Slamet was under pressure because most DPRD factions were inclined to reject the 2001 government reports on policy implementation and budget spending. PPP, PAN and Golkar evaluated Slamet as incompetent in running the government, as indicated by improper implementation of government projects, and corruption and misconduct in the management of city assets.267 But the biggest blow to Slamet’s leadership came from the PDIP. His own party observed that he had failed to show a genuine commitment to the poor – the party’s main constituents. Outside policy performance, Slamet was also criticized for disharmonious relations with the vice-mayor, J. Suprapto. DPRD members observed that Slamet had not clearly delegated tasks and/or authority to the vice-mayor. Adopting a stronger tone, the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 264 “Soal Walikota Menolak Diaudit, Ketua FPAN: Itu Hak Pribadi Pak Slamet,” Solo Pos, April 24, 2000. 265 See “Perjalanan Pembahasan RAPBD Solo (II): RAPBD Tak Mencerminkan Visi Kota Solo?,” Solo Pos, May 16, 2000. 266 Ibid 267 “FPAN & FP Akan Tolak LPj, Tiga Fraksi Belum Terbuka,” Solo Pos, April 17, 2002; “Yang Menerima LPj, Tak Bisa Menilai Walikota,” Solo Pos, April 19, 2002.

!|!Page!109! ! !

DPRD even suggested that if the pair failed to restore their cooperation, one of them should step down.268 Slamet responded by saying the DPRD’s criticisms were flawed, without directly answering the concerns of DPRD members. His response spurred the DPRD to vote on a no confidence motion on Slamet’s leadership, risking his impeachment. Slamet survived, but only due to intervention from the national PDIP leadership. On the day of the vote, a delegation from DPP PDIP embarked to Solo with a specific mission to brief members of the PDIP faction in the DPRD, and to persuade the military faction (J. Suprapto’s backers) not to reject the reports.269 Finally, 27 DPRD members accepted, while 14 members rejected the reports. Of the 27 votes, it is likely that 23 came from PDIP members, whereas four likely came from the military faction. After that critical moment, Slamet’s relations with the DPRD continued to be tense. The DPRD launched another attack on Slamet in 2004, a year before the end of his term. After examining the government report of 2003, members of DPRD across factions accused Slamet of being dishonest, since the report he submitted to DPRD contained only positive claims about government achievements, whereas in fact many of the city’s problems remained unresolved, such as bureaucratic reform, lack of coordination among government agencies, and problems with the informal economy. Slamet’s response to the DPRD only caused more tension, as he argued that the list of problems highlighted by the DPRD should not be discussed, since the policies had been implemented correctly.270 Unhappy with the response, the PDIP proposed they form an ad hoc committee to verify the reports comprehensively, as they believed the reports contained false information and manipulation of facts.271 Despite constant criticism and challenges from the DPRD, Slamet completed his five-year term. In the broader setting of early decentralization, the relations between the executive and local legislatures were affected by the increasing political authority of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 268 The disharmonious relationships between Slamet and his deputy had been a major concern for DPRD members. See for example “Wawali: Terima Kasih Kalau LPJ Ditolak,” Solo Pos, April 2, 2002; “Wakil Walikota J. Suprapto Dinilai Kekanak-Kanakan,” Solo Pos, April 3, 2002; “Faried Badres: Wawali Lebih Baik Mundur Saja,” Solo Pos, April 4, 2002. 269 “DPP PDIP Turun Tangan, LPj Walikota Aman (Divoting, 27 Menerima, 14 Menolak, 1 Abstain),” Solo Pos, April 18, 2002. PDIP’s central office admitted consolidation. They refused it as political intervention, but as a part of ‘pembinaan’ (disciplining). Gunawan Wirosarojo in the briefing reminded them that Slamet was elected by the PDIP and therefore it would be politically unacceptable if he was deposed by PDIP members. He also reminded them of the importance of the three pillars: PDIP in executive, legislative and at grassroots level. In order to secure Slamet Suryanto from impeachment, PDIP approached the TNI faction in Solo DPRD. In the 1999 election, TNI was still granted numbers of appointed representatives at all levels of the parliamentary body. 270 “Walikota, Kasus ABT Tak Perlu Disinggung,” Solo Pos, April 1, 2004. 271 “Diusulkan, Pansus Usut Ketidakjujuran LPj Walikota,” Solo Pos, April 2, 2004.

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DPRD, which under the New Order was basically disempowered by the national government. In many cases around Indonesia, contentious relations led to political deadlock and impeachment, while in other cases it ended with corrupt cooperation.272 Dysfunctional relations between Slamet and the DPRD originated during the election, wherein Slamet’s position in DPRD, including among PDIP members, was weak. When he failed to impress the DPRD with good performance in government, his position became weaker during his leadership. As a result, Slamet was unable to create strong political support from the DPRD. Tense relations with the DPRD over the period of his leadership reflected a failure to develop formal representational support from the Solonese. The tensions between Slamet and DPRD, at one point, could be seen from the perspective of effective checks and balances, wherein the legislative would play a role in scrutinizing the power of the executive in managing government authority. But from a power relations point of view, these tensions reflected continuous disagreement and counter legitimacy from Slamet’s opponents, mainly inside the PDIP, dominant powers in the DPRD and at grassroots level. As mentioned earlier, Slamet, since the beginning, had not been seen to address the interests of the poor, upon which the party claimed its ideology. In this regard, criticisms from his opponents in PDIP reflected disenchantment with Slamet’s performance. For Slamet, this situation was disastrous for his political ambitions regarding re-election. And negative relations with factions in the DPRD made him uneasy about finding political parties that were enthusiastic to select him as their candidate in the 2005 direct mayoral elections. b.! Strained relations with civil society elements While DPRD tensions haunted his leadership, Slamet was also having difficulty building trusting relations with civil society actors. For a political leader in a democracy, building good relations with agencies or actors that represented the interests of the people would be key to building popular political support. Though Slamet was not elected directly by the people, their support would help strengthen his political legitimacy. Legitimacy is about compatibility between political authority and popular demand. In the context of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 272 See for example Aribowo, “Legislatif Rente: Persekongkolan Politik Kepala Daerah-DPRD Sebagai Dasar Penyebab KKN Di Jawa Timur,” accessed May 29, 2016, http://journal.unair.ac.id/filerPDF/03_aribowo_LEGISLATIF.pdf.

!|!Page!111! ! ! democratic transition, responding to popular demands also required a non-elitist and democratic leadership approach. Slamet started his leadership by making a promising statement that he was no longer the exclusive asset of his party, PDIP, but the servant of the Solonese people.273 He also promised to develop direct communication with people and ease the bureaucratic procedure, as well as to have more informal relations with people.274 His inauguration illuminates his popularity, as he marched along the main road in the city to greet thousands of people who cheered him as mayor.275 But throughout the course of his leadership, relations with elements of grassroots politics turned into conflict rather than cooperation. A good democratic leader means to be a true representative of the people. In terms of leadership, this may manifest as a popular style of communication and leadership capability to integrate interests and concerns of society into policy. The following discussion is about the way Slamet developed engagement with grassroots politics (i.e. civil society actors) during his leadership as mayor. The character of his public engagement with the people would guide further analysis on the nature of Slamet’s legitimacy. In democracy, mass media plays a significant role in generating public discourse. In Solo, newspapers have been a popular source of information. At community centres and many public meeting points, one can easily find a noticeboard with the latest edition of newspaper installed behind the glass. The most circulated newspaper in the city since 1997/98 is Solo Pos. The paper is part of the Jakarta-based Bisnis Indonesia network, and was first printed in the city on 19 September 1997. Solo Pos is considered to be the main Solo newspaper, not only because it is printed in the city, but also because it informs Solonese about the dynamics in their city and surrounds. Solo Pos journalists in general have a student activist background, and many still maintain active engagement with civil society organizations as a part of community empowerment.276 Their position has largely contributed to disseminating concerns or giving voice to civil society regarding problems in the city and criticizing government. Other less circulated papers are Suara Merdeka of Semarang, Kedaulatan Rakyat of Yogyakarta, Radar Solo of Jawa Pos Surabaya, and some Jakarta newspapers such as Kompas, Koran Tempo and Media Indonesia. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 273 “Slamet Tak Lagi Hanya Milik Partai,” Solo Pos, April 14, 2000; “Saya Kini Milik Rakyat Bukan Partai.” 274 “Saya Kini Milik Rakyat Bukan Partai.” 275 On the reports of Slamet’s inauguration, see Solo Pos, April 11, 2000. 276 For example, a senior researcher in the research and development section of the newspaper is member of City Education Committee, while one of the editors is still active in social advocacy.

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With regard to Slamet’s leadership, Solo Pos frequently published news about policy ineffectiveness and various government wrongdoings. According to my observations of the 2000 to 2005 editions of Solo Pos, issues on corruption, mismanagement of government projects, problems with street vendors, disharmony between the mayor and vice-mayor, controversy on bureaucracy promotion, and tensions between Slamet and the DPRD were among the stories most covered. To facilitate public voice, the newspaper published a reader’s forum called Kriiiing SOLOPOS, which highlighted readers’ comments, criticisms and appreciation of the government and Slamet’s leadership. But in general, the forum contained negative comments in relation to government. Observing that Solo Pos seemed to be critical of his leadership and government, in mid-August 2003, Slamet and some of the higher echelon bureaucrats visited the Solo Pos office. The mission was to complain about the recurrent negative coverage of city government. The catalyst was a headline on his comments about a dispute in the city soccer club. Slamet accused Solo Pos journalists of being provocateurs, and complained that the paper did not seek confirmation from him before publishing the article. He was also unhappy with Kriiing SOLOPOS, since it tended to publish negative public comments on his leadership and the government. At the closure of the meeting, Slamet advised the newspaper to publish articles with more ‘civilized and respectful’ headlines.277 Slamet certainly had a right to make a complaint, and such action is practiced by political leaders everywhere, including in established democracies, to ask the media for favourable coverage. But in the context of a post-authoritarian system like Indonesia, such behaviour reinforced of the idea that the government was allergic to criticism. And the media, still experiencing trauma due to tight constraints on freedom of expression during the New Order, would react negatively. Slamet’s action was not helpful in building his image as an open-minded democratic leader. Slamet’s relationship with civil society activists was generally also quarrelsome. The activists in the city are proud to claim Solo as the home of Civil Society Organization (CSO), referring to various CSOs working towards an agenda such as promotion of public participation, community development, advocating the rights of vulnerable and marginalized sectors, empowerment, and democratic governance in general.278 Lembaga

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 277 Solo Pos, August 14-15, 2003. 278 Didik Wahyudiono, interview; Akbarudin Arif, May 11, 2012.

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Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan (LPTP) Surakarta, part of the earlier generation of CSOs in the city, promotes issues of community economic development and empowerment279, while Gita Pertiwi, founded in 1991, focuses on issues of environmentalism and environmental change regarding development.280 The younger generation of CSOs pay more attention to urban marginal sectors and the informal economy such as hawkers, hookers, street vendors and becak riders. Sompis (Solidaritas Masyarakat Pinggiran Surakarta), for instance, is active in building the engagement of marginal groups via policy making. While regarding the agenda of budget transparency and participatory planning, prominent proponents are Kompip (Konsorsium Monitoring Pemberdayaan Institusi Publik) and Pattiro (Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional). Other social problems that attracted CSOs like Spek-HAM (Solidaritas Perempuan untuk Kemanusian & HAM), Yayasan Kakak and Yayasan SARI are women and housewives’ empowerment and child protection. Initially, civil society activists had high hopes for Slamet Suryanto to resolve complex problems in the city, particularly given his background that emerged during political reform and originated from the non-elite class in Solo. But activists soon realized that despite his leadership vision and programs that seemingly promised to respond to popular demands, in practice most of Slamet’s policy implementation was not supportive and even went against the interests of the common person and marginalized groups. This was in contrast to his promise to prioritize issues such as economic development and basic services for the people. Some activists were also disappointed in Slamet regarding his frequent rejection of requests for consultation to discuss community problems. This attitude was in stark contrast to his promise to have more engagement with the community and to ease bureaucratic procedures. Some also organized protests at city hall to express their concerns about the lack of policies implemented in favour of the interests of the poor. The CSOs that promoted community participation were also disappointed in Slamet, since peoples’ aspirations proposed during the participatory planning forum (musrenbang) were not accommodated in government policies or the budget. Civil society actors are important elements in transitional democracy, as to a large extent they generate social and political change.281 Hence, they would also take on

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 279 See LPTP website; http://www.lptp.or.id/index.php?id=1 280 Gita Pertiwi is part of Indonesian environmental CSO network (e.g. Walhi, KPA, MANI, JakerPro and FPPM), as well as the international network (e.g. IFOAM, PANAP, ANGOD and INFOG-International). 281 On opposition to the New Order regime and President Suharto, see for example Arief Budiman, State and Civil !

!|!Page!114! ! ! important roles to represent popular voices and demands in relation to political authority. In Solo, the CSOs played such an active role to generate political and government reform. In the early days of reform for example, a consortium of CSOs formulated a blueprint for Solo’s recovery based on community aspirations.282 But Slamet seemed to disregard them in the process of governing. As a consequence, there was a growing distance between Slamet and civil society actors, a situation that apparently brought negative perceptions to Slamet’s public profile. Such bad relations with civil society contributed to Slamet’s unpopularity. In relation to the tradition of popular resistance for political leaders in Solo, it would seem that to have good relations with community and/or agencies representing community is a necessary condition for winning the hearts of people. A close style of relationship could bridge the gap between elites and people in the nature of Javanese hierarchical society like Solo. The case of Hartomo (Mayor, 1985–1995) is one noteworthy example. Despite being appointed by the central government, Hartomo pursued a leadership approach that allowed him to maintain close relations with the community. This approach centred on close and direct communication with the people, and direct involvement in various community works. In the Jum’at Bersih (clean Friday) program, for example, he not only gave instructions, but also participated actively in cleaning up neighbourhood environments. Such an approach is relevant to the popular Javanese teaching, ing ngarso sung tulodho (i.e. a leader should be a frontrunner and be part of the action). In Javanese society, common people would respect the leader who provided them with something concrete and was willing to build direct interaction with them. Hartomo’s leadership style seemed compatible with such a worldview, and therefore he is still remembered as a good leader for the city.283 Hartomo’s story also shows that even a leader appointed in a non-democratic system can generate political legitimacy by adopting a popular leadership style. Slamet’s background was as a prominent figure in the party, who claimed to represent the people at grassroots level, particularly those in poor sections in the city. These people were not only associated with socio-economic vulnerability and needed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Society in Indonesia (Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990); Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World (St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005). 282 Didik Wahyudiono, interview. 283 From interviews, I gained similar appreciation of Hartomo’s style of leadership from various informants. Interviews with Didik, Dardiri, and Sudharmono,

!|!Page!115! ! ! government assistance, they also represented the Javanese culture of communitarianism.284 However, it seemed that he was unable to transform popular culture and community expectation into a leadership approach that could win the hearts of the people, as exemplified in Hartomo’s leadership. In contrast, Slamet was inclined to adapt an elitist mode of leadership, by developing distance from the people. He failed to perform a close relationship with community agencies and the people in general: an important element for creating support for the changing nature of popular legitimacy ahead of the 2005 direct elections. c.! Losing support from the political base While his relationship with other actors of governance in Solo was fractured, Slamet also experienced difficult relations with his political base, the PDIP. As explained earlier in this chapter, Slamet was a political figure who developed legitimacy on the basis of political party support. Given the background of the political split in his party during the election, Slamet finally fulfilled his political struggle for mayor. But the cost of the win was a prolonged uncomfortable relationship with the PDIP. There are several explanations as to why Slamet lost PDIP support. First, many PDIP activists were disappointed in his attitude early in his leadership. They observed Slamet as unwilling to accommodate the interests of the party and constituents regarding government policies. A month after his inauguration, some PDIP activists were already critical, as Slamet had had too many celebrations for his election as mayor. Party activists at sub-district level, for example, rejected a plan of wayangan (Javanese leather-puppet performance) to celebrate Slamet’s election. They had not been consulted at grassroots level. A prominent figure at Jebres sub-district branch opposed the celebration by saying, ‘...should we have celebration all the time? Solo is in mourning (due to impact of crisis). The mayor should give example of non-hedonism, but why having celebration so frequently? So, when will he think about the people?’285 And during his leadership, PDIP politicians in the DPRD were also critical, as they observed most city policies contradicted the interests of poor and marginal sectors, the main cluster of PDIP’s constituents. A move by the PDIP faction to investigate Slamet’s government reports, as

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 284 The notion of characters of Javanese society is explained in Koentjaraningrat and Southeast Asian Studies Program (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), Javanese Culture (Oxford University Press, 1989). 285 “Dipertanyakan, Hajat Wayangan DPC PDIP,” Solo Pos, May 16, 2000.

!|!Page!116! ! ! described earlier in this chapter, was a strong indication of declining political support for Slamet’s leadership. The second factor relates to Slamet’s style of communication. His fellow PDIP’s activists perceived him as arrogant, as he tended to distance himself from the party, as well as his constituents and fellow politicians in DPRD. They were disappointed as he rarely consulted the party regarding government policies and decisions. They even accused Slamet of being self-centred and becoming even more bureaucratic. For example, the DPRD needed to make a formal appointment to have a meeting or discussion with him.286 Such bureaucratic procedure diminished Slamet’s popularity in the eyes of the people and the PDIP. Rudy, the PDIP’s leader in Solo during this period, accused Slamet of being elitist, and said that Slamet tended to distance himself from the people, highlighting instances such as limited access for common people to city hall and the exclusive meeting to present the mayor’s annual report to the DPRD and a limited number of community elites.287 As mayor, who should embrace all segments of Solo society, Slamet was right when he stated that he would no longer be an exclusive part of PDIP. But politically, such an explicit statement was a faux pas in a PDIP stronghold like Solo. The fact that many of Slamet’s policies did not favor the interests of the poor, PDIP’s main constituents, eroded his party-based legitimacy further. The third factor, the most crucial, was political consolidation among the younger generation of PDIP Solo that aimed to replace Slamet. The leader of the group was F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo (or Rudy), an influential grassroots politician. In the October 2000 local party congress, Slamet was removed as party chair, and Rudy took over the leadership with absolute support from sub-district representatives.288 Rudy’s election as party leader effectively curtailed Slamet’s influence. In his speech, Rudy stated that the function of the PDIP as a political party was to provide checks and balances in power, and the party would therefore be critical of the leadership of Slamet as mayor. For Slamet, one-time leader of PDIP Solo and Megawati loyalist, his removal was a clear indication of declining political legitimacy from inside the party. As he had no control over the party, his political legitimacy relied heavily on his personal performance as mayor, which unfortunately was not positive.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 286 This information was shared by a journalist of Kedaulatan Rakyat. Interview with Hari D. Utomo. 287 Solo Pos, February 2003. 288 Rudy Terpilih Ketua PDIP, Solo Pos, April 2000.

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As demonstrated above, most political actors in Solo perceived Slamet’s policy record as mayor in responding to public demands to have been disappointing and unfit to remedy the main problems post crisis Solo faced. At the same time, his relationship with actors inside government and political agencies was also dominated by conflict and distrust, rather than positive cooperation. His legacy as a successful grassroots PDIP leader in the year of political crisis has been replaced by an image of a bureaucrat who distanced himself from his constituents. Inside the PDIP, Slamet had struggled for support in the mayoral election, which ended with elite division. And in his first year as mayor, his political base was cut by a new party figure in the city. In sum, Slamet fell short in maintaining and recreating legitimacy essential for staying in power. Slamet’s political de-legitimation peaked in the direct elections of 2005. He failed to gain PDIP’s endorsement, and when he ran for re-election on a different party ticket, he was unable to win significant popular support. Instead, Slamet was replaced by a fresh figure, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who won election as mayor on with Slamet’s successor as the head of PDIP Solo, Rudy as his vice mayoral running mate.

5.! Conclusion This chapter has shown that in the changing landscape of indirect elections, the early stages of decentralization and, in particular, post crisis, the local political leader’s struggle in creating legitimacy was affected by maintaining support from the elites and his inability to address popular demands with concrete and effective policies. The struggle for elite based legitimacy had begun at the outset of the election. A leader of the dominant party such as Slamet was supposed to easily win the election, but in fact he faced internal elite division. Following a tight competition within his party, PDIP, Slamet was elected as mayor by the DPRD, but from the beginning elite support of his leadership was qualified. After the election, Slamet strived to maintain elite and party based legitimacy, but he was unsuccessful. He faced constant challenges from the DPRD, which deemed his annual reports on policy implementation to be unsatisfactory. These challenges led to a growing perception that Slamet was a weak leader. From inside the PDIP, Slamet’s influence was diminishing, particularly after a new generation of the party’s leadership adopted a party pledge to be critical of his leadership. Slamet failed to win back PDIP support.

!|!Page!118! ! !

In the midst of declining support from party elites, Slamet’s efforts to develop popular support were also ineffective. Many have argued that decentralization and local democracy in Indonesia failed to promote popular political empowerment, but instead facilitated the consolidation of patronage politics.289 The political leader would use his power in government to develop support by offering benevolent programs to satisfy the people’s demand in certain public services. Benevolent policies and resource accumulation for self-interests have been common features in Indonesia. As mayor, Slamet understood that developing popular support was key to sustainability legitimacy. His intention to manage street vendors, budget for the community (such as subsidising neighbourhood activities and allocating funds for participatory planning), and improve basic services were certainly part of his strategy to manage popular support. However, many of his plans were poorly implemented due to his lack of policy priorities and because Slamet did not directly involve himself personally in public programs. Beyond his personality, as mayor in the immediate post crisis and early years of reform, Slamet faced limited government financial capacity, and a bureaucracy that adopted a traditional approach to public service. Civil society actors in the city were also generally dissatisfied with Slamet due to his distant relationships with the community and because his policies, as implemented, did not address societal concerns. Slamet’s rise and fall as a local political leader in early decentralization and local democratization provides some interesting lessons. First, there was an irony in his leadership, in the midst of unclear patterns of creating legitimacy in a post-centralized New Order system. He was a pro-Megawati local leader of the PDIP, the strongest opposition force against the New Order. But when he was in power he tended to adopt an elitist approach to leadership – a political character commonly attributed to the non- democratic regime. Such an approach was perceived negatively by his own party (which during his term as mayor seemed to distance him from the PDIP) and also by the community in general. Second, in the early years of democratization, legitimacy of the local government leader was mainly a result of competition for power among elites in the DPRD and the party. Though the involvement of popular voice was limited, post-election

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 289 See for example Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective; Nankyung Choi, “Batam’s 2006 Mayoral Election: Weakened Political Parties and Intensified Power Struggle in Local Indonesia,” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct electionss for Local Leaders (Pilkada), ed. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 74-100; Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth, Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond (Psychology Press, 2004).

!|!Page!119! ! ! the political leader could not rely on support solely from elites in recreating legitimacy, but needed to demonstrate a capability to address popular demands. Third, in relation to the second point, it appears that Slamet’s track record as a party activist legitimized his struggle to become mayor, but was of less help to him in performing his role as chief of the city government and bureaucracy. Slamet’s political rise and fall demonstrated that the administrative skills of a public leader are an important element in making government work effectively, a necessary condition to sustain political legitimacy.290 The absence of the skill to implement policies effectively can jeopardize leadership legitimacy, especially when the support from political elites is also waning. Popular negative perceptions of leadership and government, combined with loss of elite support, caused severe political de-legitimation. In the context of a society affected by crisis and early democratization, the pattern of legitimation is unsettled. But we can understand such legitimation by analysing how the new authority is capable of addressing public demands that stem from the impacts of crisis and the new environment of democratic governance. Slamet emerged in such a context, but the political actors and community in Solo perceived that his approach in managing relations with the community and other governance actors, as well as the outputs of his policy implementation, were incompatible with popular demands in that period. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the negative perceptions of Slamet’s leadership style among the public and political elites ultimately paved the way for his defeat in the 2005 direct mayoral elections by another PDIP candidate, the furniture maker Joko Widodo.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 290 This remains us with Herbert Feith thesis on two groups of leadership/elite in early independent Indonesia, namely solidarity maker and administrator. See Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 1962.

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Chapter Four The Emergence of Jokowi in 2005: Creating Electoral Legitimacy

1.! Introduction This chapter discusses the factors that facilitated Jokowi’s political emergence in 2005, how he won PDIP nomination and the election, and to what extent direct elections changed the pattern of political legitimacy. Jokowi (Joko Widodo) was a local furniture maker who had no political experience, but nevertheless emerged as a central political figure in the first direct mayoral election in Solo. Popular among political parties in the city, it seemed he was a figure with the greatest capability for winning the direct elections. He finally won nomination at the convention of the PDIP, the largest party to emerge in the city beginning with the 1999 election. Jokowi benefitted from the support of F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo (Rudy), PDIP leader in Solo, who ran alongside Jokowi as candidate for deputy mayor. The pair won the election with 36.62% of the vote, to defeat two other businessmen (Hardono, Golkar and Purnomo, PAN) and the incumbent mayor and former PDIP leader, Slamet Suryanto. The emergence of non-party local elite figures, which in Solo’s case came mostly from the business community, is a product of the adoption of direct elections for local government leader (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung -Pilkada).291 As a continuation of political liberalization initiated by President Habibie in the 1998/99 democratic reforms, Pilkada abolished the authority of DPRD at provincial, district and city levels to elect the governor, head of district and mayor. Voters for the first time had the right to choose directly the executive leader of the local government from among the candidates nominated by political parties. This shift had changed the nature of political legitimacy from elite based to popular preference. In the early years of reform, the election of candidates for the legislative and executive at all levels of government depended on political parties. In the 2004 election, the introduction of an open-list representation system

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 291 The first direct local election was regulated in the law of local government, UU 32/2004, as revised in 2015. See “Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 8 Tahun 2015 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang No. 1 Tahun 2015 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang No.1 Tahun 2014 Tentang Pemilihan Gubernur, Bupati, Dan Walikota Menjadi Undang-Undang,” 2015.

!|!Page!121! ! ! for legislative election (DPR and DPRD) and direct presidential election292 followed by direct local elections since 2005, has challenged party domination. Party support was still crucial for candidacy, but candidates had to build their personal political appeal in order to attract voters. To understand how Jokowi created electoral legitimacy, this chapter examines the direct elections for mayor and Jokowi’s eventual success in two phases. First, the nomination process through which parties pre-selected their candidates for election took place. As the nomination process was conducted within the respective parties and the local political elite, the legitimacy of prospective candidates rested on the support they could develop from these circles rather than the broader community. Why parties, including the dominant PDIP, were attracted to non-party businessmen like Jokowi will be explored. Likewise, the interest businessmen and other non-party actors had in public office are examined. Second, the campaign period is crucial for candidates as it shows how political leaders attempt to create popular legitimacy. Political campaigns take many forms, but in general they relate to policy issues and communication styles. In this regard, some aspects explored in this chapter are: what agendas Jokowi and the other candidates developed for their campaign; how Jokowi’s campaign agenda and style differed from other candidates; and how the campaign helped identify the initial base of Jokowi’s political legitimacy. My main arguments on the emergence of Jokowi are: First, his emergence was facilitated by nationwide electoral changes in 2004, which promoted the importance of figures in Indonesian politics. These changes opened up the possibility for local non-party figures to compete. Second, key to Jokowi’s electoral legitimacy in 2005 was support from the PDIP and its leader, Rudy, who ran as candidate for deputy mayor. The nomination of non-party candidates like Jokowi and other businessmen was however influenced by pragmatic and fluid relationships, rather than ideological differences between parties and candidates. And third, compared to other candidates, Jokowi developed greater resonance with popular expectations in the political campaign, but it was his approach to campaigning rather than the substance of campaign promises that set him apart from his rivals. His campaign agenda focused on a generic discourse of governance reform and was similar to that of other candidates. His approach and style of campaign, including the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 292 The open list system facilitated intra-party competition. See Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, The Politics of Electoral Systems (OUP Oxford, 2005): 559. And for the legal framework of the election see UU No.12/2003 ‘tentang Pemilihan Anggota DPR, DPD, dan DPRD’, particularly from article 105 to 107. For the legal framework of presidential election, see UU 23/2003 ‘tentang Pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden’.

!|!Page!122! ! ! ceremony of registration, was however distinctive as he (and Rudy) developed closer and direct engagement with community and civil society groups. The popular approach and style of campaign seemed to be compatible with people’s expectations of a grassroots approach to leadership, and was central to Jokowi’s electoral legitimacy.

2.! Direct local election reform and the response in Solo

The introduction of direct elections for local government leaders (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung - Pilkada) in 2004/5 enabled the emergence of Jokowi as a political figure along with other candidates who were not political party cadre.293 According to Mietzner, the domination of non-party candidates in the direct elections was due to: 1) more money to help the party with financial resources; 2) expertise and skill that leaders of political parties lacked – party officials knew how to run a party organization and mobilize support, but not necessarily how to run effective government; and 3) even the appointment of a candidate who had close ties with the New Order government did not cause a decline in popularity.294 Pilkada reflected the aspirations of both national and Solo civil society and marked a further stage of the democratization process including direct presidential election and the open list system in the 2004 legislative election.295 Although parties had to respond to popular pressure for direct local elections, they nevertheless retained control of the nomination of candidates. In Solo, these circumstances produced a set of mayoral candidates dominated by businessmen, at once addressing community demands for non- party figures while also serving internal party interests. To understand the Pilkada reform and how it facilitated the political emergence of Jokowi in Solo in 2005, this part presents three dimensions of analysis. First, what motivated the DPR, party politicians and national government to adopt direct local elections? It seemed that far from a deliberate vision of parties to enhance democracy, the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 293 The emergence of non-political figures in direct elections was discussed, for example, by Pratikno, Mietzner and Buehler. See Pratikno, “Political Parties in Pilkada: Some Problems for Democratic Consolidations,” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct electionss for Local Leaders (Pilkada), eds. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 53-73; Michael Buehler, “Decentralization and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalization Of The Public Sphere,” Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, 2010, 267; Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Direct electionss: Empowering the Electorate or Entrenching the New Order Oligarchy?,” Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy, 2010, 173. 294 Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Direct elections: Empowering the Electorate or Entrenching the New Order Oligarchy?” Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy, 2010, 173. 295 It is important to note that in 2004, the open list system was not effective. It was only the candidate with votes above the BPP (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih) – a kind of electoral district threshold – that would be automatically elected. If there was no one, the party would decide the successful candidates from the party’s list.

!|!Page!123! ! ! reform was more affected by the pressure from civil society for greater democracy. Second, is to discuss demands of civil society and community leaders in Solo to political parties adopting open selection for candidates. And third, is to discuss responses from political parties in Solo to electoral changes and demands from civil society. Most parties, including the PDIP, were committed to open selection but the parties tended to have pragmatic motives for selecting non-party figures. a.! Deepening democratization? Motives of change towards local direct elections In the first Pilkada, June 2005, parties or coalitions of parties needed 15% of the vote in the preceding general election or 15% of seats in the DPRD to nominate a pair of candidates for mayor and deputy mayor. To win office, these pairs of candidates needed a plurality of at least 30% of valid ballots in the election. If no candidate reached this threshold, the two top-ranked candidates competed in a second round election. With such a mechanism, Pilkada shifted the basis of political legitimacy of local government leader from elite’s choice to voters’ ballots, though it doesn’t require an absolute majority of 50%+1. The fact that popular direct election had been adopted five years after reform indicated democratic reform in Indonesia occurred gradually and was a consensual process – perhaps an ad hoc process rather than as part of a grand design for democratization – that accommodated the old regime’s elites.296 In the early phase, democratization was criticised as half-hearted, but it was successful in achieving stability and consolidation.297 In the election for local government leaders, political parties and elites were placed as dominant mediators between candidates with the people, and hence the election of the local leader depended on the elite’s support.298 In contrast, Pilkada has given voters a prominent role in deciding local leadership. Though the parties retained control in the nomination process, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 296 On inclusionary mechanisms of old elites in transition to democracy, see for example Sujian Guo and Gary A. Stradiotto, Democratic Transitions: Modes and Outcomes (London and New York: Routledge, 2014): 36-42. See also, Dwight Y. King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003): 1-2. 297 As Highley and Gunther argued, it reflects ‘the establishment of substantial consensus among elites concerning rules of the democratic political game and the worth of democratic institutions’. See John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1992): 3. In a similar vein, Sartori argued that ‘democratic stability requires that elites understand politics as “bargaining” rather than “war” and that they see political outcomes as positive – not zero sum’. See Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited: The Contemporary Debate (Chatham House Publishers, 1987): 224-6. 298 The impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in 2001 and Slamet’s difficulties in building effective governance in Solo reflected the decline of elite based legitimacy. See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, “The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems,” http://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter12Bhakti.pdf., and chapter 3 of this dissertation.

!|!Page!124! ! ! they still needed to anticipate that their candidate would be able to forge a direct relationship with the people and to commit to a popular agenda. Political parties as mediator between candidates and voters have been weakened and no longer monopolise these relationships. The motive for adopting direct elections was initially to curb the widespread practice of transactional politics in indirect elections by DPRD. Direct elections are expected to be more democratic and accountable. As argued by Buehler, the change was inevitable since party leadership at the national level learned that often DPRD members tended to use their new power in electing local government leaders for simply rent seeking, and in fact the national leadership found it difficult to make sure local politicians supported the candidate recommended by their respective party.299 Also, as noted by Erb and Sulistyanto, the justifications for direct elections were; 1) to minimise electoral abuses that often occurred in the indirect elections for heads of local government after 1999, and 2) to open up more space to nurture the emergence of local democracy denied by the New Order regime.300 Though the DPR and national government enacted the electoral changes, the initiative for reform came mostly from civil society and other proponents of democracy.301 These proponents expected that direct elections would enhance local democracy as voters enjoyed a direct role in political recruitment, strengthening legitimacy of the local government leader, and overall bringing government closer to the people.302 In some cases, such expectations were fulfilled, but direct local elections also further entrenched elites, the growing influence of patronage ties and gangster politics and extensive vote buying.303 The Pilkada did not minimize money politics, but simply shifted it from the local assembly (DPRD) to political parties, which had privileged authority for the nomination of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 299 See Buehler, “Decentralization and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalization Of The Public Sphere.” 300 Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), Book, Whole (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 3. 301 See f.e. IRDA Laporan 5, November 2004 prospek PilkadaLangsung, pp. 12-14. 302 See “Political Parties in Pilkada: Some Problems for Democratic Consolidations.” 303 On the practice of money disbursement in direct elections, see for example Hidayat, “Pilkada, Money Politics and the Dangers of ‘Informal Governance’ Practices”; Benny Subianto, “Ethnic Politics and The Rise of the Dayak Bureaucrats in Local Elections: Pilkada in Six Kabupaten in West Kalimantan,” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), ed. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 327-51; Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Pilkada in Bantul District: Incumbent, Populism and the Decline of Royal Power,” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), ed. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 190-210; and Michael Buehler, “The Rising Importance of Personal Networks in Indonesian Local Politics: An Analysis of District Government Head Elections in South Sulawesi in 2005,” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), ed. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 101-24; and Jim Schiller, “Electing Districts Heads in Indonesia: Democratic Deepening or Elite Entrenchement?,” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), ed. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 147-73.

!|!Page!125! ! ! candidates.304 In Solo, the civil society was also cautious regarding such negative practices, but expected parties to be more transparent and open in recruiting candidates. The growing influence of undemocratic practices had undermined the direct elections as a mechanism for creating greater legitimacy. Furthermore, the Pilkada had also broadened the opportunity for non-party figures to compete for power.305 In the 2005 local elections, only 22% of candidates had party backgrounds, while the rest were career bureaucrats (36%), business people (28%), and a smaller proportion were retired military and civil society figures.306 The non-party figures were popular due to their social networks, economic resources and particular leadership skills to engage people – useful assets for competing in popular elections that unfortunately many party politicians lacked. The relations between non-party figures and parties were however not necessarily ideological, but in many ways pragmatic, fluid and transactional.307 The influx of candidates from the business community was also evident in the 2005 elections, with the emergence of Jokowi and other candidates from the business community. The motive for Jokowi and other businessmen to enter politics was however at the beginning not evident, or tended to be highly normative. It is generally assumed that the main motive for business people entering politics was entrenched economic interest. Hadiz’s study in East Java and North Sumatera showed that, ‘many local entrepreneurs now seek to reinforce their economic position through possession of direct political power’.308 The local entrepreneur did so to advance their business fortunes and sought access to state projects and patronage, by either being a candidate or providing financial support for the candidates in the local election.309 This kind of entrenched political and economic motive defied normative discourse such as obsession for bureaucratic and public services reform and local peoples’ economic empowerment.310 In the next chapter I will

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 304 See “Political Parties in Pilkada: Some Problems for Democratic Consolidations.”; Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, “Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province,” Indonesia, no. 84 (2007): 41–69. 305 See f.e. Nankyung Choi, “Local Political Elites in Indonesia:‘ Risers’ and‘ Holdovers,’” SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 29, no. 2 (2014): 364–407. 306 Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Direct electionss: Empowering the Electorate or Entrenching the New Order Oligarchy?,” Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy, 2010, 190. See also, Buehler, “Decentralization and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalization Of The Public Sphere.” 307 “Political Parties in Pilkada: Some Problems for Democratic Consolidations.” 308 Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective, 92. 309 See for example Choi, “Local Political Elites in Indonesia.” 310 In some interviews, Jokowi claimed this kind of normative motive. See Andy Narendra, Wawancara Dengan Joko Widodo (Jokowi), accessed May 21, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpk9bxkmYEg., accessed 11 March 2016. !

!|!Page!126! ! ! discuss Jokowi’s motives to enter politics in more detail by analyzing his policies and leadership approach as mayor. b.! The expectations of civil society in Solo In Solo, public excitement about the Pilkada began as early as July 2004, when the regulation was formulated in Jakarta. As manifested in the voices of civil society and those of community activists calling for leaders who had the capability to resolve the city’s problems and focus on community problems. In their view, the Pilkada should open up the opportunity for non-party figures to participate in candidate selection as a necessary requirement for democratic election. Civil society anti-party sentiments resonated with the deep-rooted recalcitrant tradition in the Solo community, wherein people tended to be suspicious of dominant power. These sentiments focused on the DPRD, including the head and his deputies as well as with the Mayor, Slamet, and reflected civil society’s distrust of party politicians.311 Hence, they expected parties to conduct an open recruitment process. Statements made before the election illustrate the expectations of civil society groups regarding the mayor and the types of candidates parties should nominate. The association of Becak riders (FKKBS), for example, expected the new mayor to accommodate the interests of marginal people.312 Another community association, the Foundation for Military Veterans (Yayasan SU4H), expected the mayor to manage the city’s socio-economic problems such as street vendors, illegal housing and stagnation of the economy.313 Such a concern was in line with the Union of Traditional Traders (HPPK) and youth organizations such as the Islamic Student Association (HMI), who expected the mayor to assist the small and medium economy, and be committed to revitalising the traditional market, the informal sector and to restrict the permits for modern markets.314 On the issue of basic services, a union of casual teachers (PGTTI) saw the direct elections as a chance to choose a candidate who had an agenda to improve education services.315 Such demands reflected what people thought about leadership and government. The public in general was disappointed with Slamet’s leadership, mostly due to ineffective !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Also see “Nyali Perintis”, Najwa Shihab, Jokowi@Mata Najwa, accessed April 17, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSKhyzPtKys., accessed 11 March 2016. 311 “Terkait Dugaan Korupsi DPRD Solo: Gubernur Didesak Keluarkan Izin Pemeriksaan,” Solo Pos, August 4, 2004. 312 “FKKBS Siapkan Paket Cawal-Cawawali,” Solo Pos, August 8, 2004. 313 “Walikota Mendatang Harus Bisa Tertibkan PKL,” Solo Pos, August 28, 2004. 314 “Walikota Mendatang Harus Aspiratif Di Bidang Ekonomi,” Solo Pos, August 24, 2004. HPPK stands for Himpunan Pedagang Pasar Klewer (Union of Traders in Klewer Market). Klewer is the biggest traditional market for batik textiles in the city. “Harus Lakukan Pendewasaan Politik,” Solo Pos, August 31, 2005. 315 “PGTTI Akan Gandeng Karang Taruna,” Solo Pos, September 6, 2004.

!|!Page!127! ! ! implementation of policies and his elitist approach to leadership. Accordingly, the public tended to define criteria for a good mayor as something that would be in contrast to Slamet’s weakness. One local university academic advised that the next mayor should have adequate managerial skills, and argued that such qualifications belonged to a professional rather than party politician.316 Some religious communities echoed a similar view, by outlining capabilities in city planning, commitment to the agenda of reform, and a good personal record as important criteria for mayor.317 Beside the personal qualities of leadership, community aspirations for the prospective mayor were also parochial. In September 2004, Islamic organizations in Solo, MUI (Islam Council), NU (Nahdatul Ulama), Muhammadiyah, and MTA (Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran) established team 11 to select a mayoral candidate, and set Islamic background as the main criterion for candidate choice. For this reason, the MUI representative explained the particular view of Solo people, as they complain if a leader is too Islamist, but will also protest if their government leader is not a Muslim.318 Politically, the message was addressed to PDIP whose leader, Rudy, was a Christian. The Islamic organizations wanted the PDIP to select a candidate with an Islamic background. For its part, NU Solo expected the candidate to understand cultural aspects and social dynamics in the city, and more specifically to protect traditional and religious practices of NU.319 Public discussion highlighted the identity of ‘Solo-ness’ of candidates. In the discussion held by Spek-HAM (Solidaritas Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan dan HAM), for instance, one expectation was that candidates should have originated from Solo or at least hold Solo residency. This was to ensure that candidates would understand the problems and character of Solo people.320 A survey in January 2005 revealed 74% of respondents were in favour of a local figure (putra daerah) for mayor.321 Many argue that the putra daerah discourse emerged mostly in regions outside Java, but in Solo – the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 316 “Walikota Mendatang Harus Aspiratif Di Bidang Ekonomi.” 317 The criterion was echoed by Youth organization of Muhammadiyah, the Surakarta Christian Church Assembly (Badan Antar Gereja Kristen Surakarta, BAGKS), and also MTA. BAGKS sought a mayor with adequate skills in managing the city, regardless the religious background. On the other hand, the MTA would support the candidate who is capable to take public responsibility, and showing willingness to be a servant of the society. See “Kalangan Gereja Rancang Kriteria Calon Walikota,” Solo Pos, October 6, 2004. Also, “Siapkan Cawali-Cawawali Tokoh Islam Bentuk Tim 11,” Solo Pos, September 1, 2004. 318 The statement is: ‘Frankly speaking, Solo society is unique. If too Islamist they will object, but if not they will also grumble. Therefore, we need to have intense communication in order to choose the candidate who represent Islamic community, and who would not do harmto Islam. See “Tim 11 Inventarisasi 12 Nama Calon Walikota,” Solo Pos, September 2, 2004. 319 “NU Solo Siapkan Kriteria Cawali,” Solo Pos, February 12, 2005. 320 See “Perlu Kriteria Batasan Masa Tinggal Cawali,” Solo Pos, December 1, 2004. 321 “Hasil Penelition Circum, 74% Warga Ingin Walikota Putera Daerah,” Solo Pos, January 22, 2005.

!|!Page!128! ! ! heartland of the republic – it was also a part of popular discourse ahead of the mayoral election.322 Not only did people expect a competent mayor; they also expected a process of open selection. By law, political parties were the only channels for nomination.323 Civil Society Organizations (CSO or NGO) and community organizations were concerned the parties’ prerogative could limit opportunities for independent candidates. In their view, it would also facilitate practices of money politics between parties and wealthy power- seekers in the process of selection.324 In pressuring parties to become more transparent in their recruitment of candidates, M. Jamin, a respected academic, suggested that the KPU Solo order political parties to accommodate non-party figures in their nomination of candidates.325 Furthermore, CSOs requested the candidates’ track record be publicly assessed.326 In their view, the Solo leader should be a reform-minded figure with a pro- poor vision.327 The next aspect of Pilkada reform was how political parties in Solo responded to public demands for the suitable mayor and to the process of open recruitment. c.! The parties’ responses In line with the expectations of a vocal civil society, most political parties in Solo planned to hold open recruitment for mayor and deputy mayor candidates. The motivation for parties to invite non-party figures, however, seemed to be different from civil society’s interest in deeper democratization. Such motivation for political parties to recruit external figures was however driven by pragmatic calculations for electoral victory. The external candidate, especially the affluent person, would help compensate for a shortage of suitable candidates created by the de-politization policies of New Order Government that made it

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 322 The emergence of Putra Daerah (son-of thesoil) in Indonesian local politics has widely been discussed in the literature of Indonesia post New Order. See for example Subianto, “Ethnic Politics and The Rise of the Dayak Bureaucrats in Local Elections: Pilkada in Six Kabupaten in West Kalimantan”; Buehler, “The Rising Importance of Personal Networks in Indonesian Local Politics: An Analysis of District Government Head Elections in South Sulawesi in 2005”; N. Choi, “Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Riau Archipelago,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 37 (2007): 326- 45; Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). 323 And more specifically it was only the party or coalition of parties with a minimum of 15% of DPRD members or total popular votes that could nominate candidates. 324 See “Tanpa Calon Independen Pemilihan Walikota Tidak Sehat,” Solo Pos, August 29, 2004.; “Lewat Pintu Parpol Rawan Money Politics,” Solo Pos, September 9, 2004. 325 “KPU Diminta Wajibkan Parpol Gelar Penjaringan,” Solo Pos, October 16, 2004. See also, “Tak Sah, Bila Tak Sertakan Calon Independen,” Solo Pos, October 21, 2004. 326 “Track Record Cawali Mulai Diselidiki,” Solo Pos, December 3, 2004. 327 “Sompis Dukung Cawali Pro Kaum Miskin,” Solo Pos, October 4, 2004; “Parpol Didesak Buka Pintu Pencalonan,” Solo Pos, October 9, 2004.

!|!Page!129! ! ! difficult for parties to develop cadre capable of assuming public office. The candidate with prospective electability would be attractive for parties, regardless of their ideology or non- party attachment. The other reason for parties to look beyond their own members was the need for financial resources for campaigns and other political expenses. In general, parties at the local level did not have enough resources; especially given their resources had been drained for legislative and presidential elections the year before.328 Hence, the party would tend to be pragmatic by selecting wealthy figures supposedly able to finance the election. This situation might create transactional relations between party and candidates. The party had the prerogative of nomination, while the outside figure, such as a wealthy businessman who aspired for political power, could ‘buy’ party support with resources, including professional skills and networks. Business people dominated the candidate nomination process for the 2005 Solo election. In the run up to the election Jokowi was a popular candidate among parties like PAN, PD and PKS. His popularity was based on his record as a successful businessman in the furniture industry and a good reputation as leader of the furniture industry association (ASMINDO) branch in Solo. He was known for implementing effective programs for improving skills and market networks for small and medium furniture businessmen. It was his colleagues in ASMINDO who initially encouraged him to run for mayor. Beyond this record, Jokowi was however also proactive in testing his political prospects, as he had communicated with politicians in a number of parties, even before the nomination process, as well as having intensive discussions with various elements in the Solo community.329 Interestingly, at this stage there was no evidence of his political relations with PDIP. A member of KPU Solo in 2012, who was a student activist in 2005, informed me that Jokowi was even the first preference for mayor among Islamist parties.330 Apart than Jokowi, some other businessmen also showed their interest in nomination as party candidates. The non-party figures’ interest got the green light as all main parties in Solo planned open selections. PDIP, the biggest party in the city, left the door open for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 328 See Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Direct Elections: Empowering the Electorate or Entrenching the New Order Oligarchy?” 329 Mohammad Rodhi, May 7, 2012. 330 Agus Sulistyono, May 8, 2012.

!|!Page!130! ! ! outsiders, but yet insisted that applicants follow party rules.331 As will be discussed, the PDIP nominated Jokowi for mayor along with party leader, Rudy, as deputy mayor. Other parties in the DPRD (i.e. Demokrat, PAN, Golkar and PKS) also left the door open for non-party candidates, and finally figures from the business community won parties nomination.332 Hardono, Trade and Industry Chamber (Kamar Dagang dan Industri – Kadin) businessman333, was selected as mayoral candidate by the party leaders of the Demokrat- Golkar coalition. His deputy was Dipokusumo, a member of the Kasunanan family.334 The pair also received support from the PKS, which had previously attempted to form a coalition with Demokrat.335 PAN also selected a businessman as candidate for mayor. Purnomo, a batik entrepreneur and trader with Islamic background, won the convention that was overshadowed by the issue of vote buying.336 The only mayoral candidate with a party activist background was the incumbent, Slamet, who received support from a coalition of 14 small parties (Paguyuban Partai Politik Masyarakat Surakarta – PPMS) led by the PDS.337 His deputy was the PDS leader, Hengky. The domination of businessmen in the 2005 direct elections was evidence of parties’ pragmatic considerations in selecting candidates, mainly the appeal of financial capacity. It was known that Hardono was the wealthiest, with assets totalling more than 49 billion rupiah, followed by Ahmad Purnomo with 41 billion. Jokowi had less wealth with 9 billion rupiah and a few thousands US dollars. Slamet, the only non-businessman, had less than half a billion rupiah. Among the candidates for deputy mayor, Dipo was the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 331 PDIP Solo leader, Rudy said: ‘the party is ready to welcome independent candidates; however the candidates should follow the party’s regulation’. See “Rudy: PDIP Tak Harus Andalkan KK,” Solo Pos, October 23, 2004. 332 See “PAN Buka Pintu, Golkar Tunggu KK (Koalisi Kebangsaan),” Solo Pos, October 22, 2004. 333 As part of the New Order patronage network, Kadin businessmen were used to receiving benefits from government projects, and most of them channeled their political aspirations through Golkar. 334 The appointment sparked protest from Golkar’s grassroots members who suspected transactional practices. The coalition of PD-Golkar was called Rakyat Membangun (People Developing), established in late March 2005. See ; “Hardono Diusung Sebagai Cawali, PD Dan Golkar Belum Satu Suara Soal Cawawali,” Solo Pos, March 31, 2005. 335 PD formed a coalition with Golkar after failure of a coalition attempt with PKS, due to a dispute between the two parties about mechanism of candidate selection. See “Tim Cawali Koalisi Perubahan: Ada Yang Memanfaatkan Untuk Cari Uang,” Solo Pos, January 26, 2005; “PKS-PD Akan Beri Sanksi Peminta Duit Cawali,” Solo Pos, January 27, 2005. “Sejumlah Cawali Minta Penjelasan KP,” Solo Pos, March 7, 2005; “Pak Je: Dari Awal PD Memang Sudah Keluar Jalur,” Solo Pos, March 8, 2005. 336 “Amien: Bersihkan Benalu PAN, Tidak Ada Rekomendasi Dalam Pilkada,” Suara Merdeka, April 1, 2005. “Ichwan: DPD PAN Harus Tindak Tegas Praktek Money Politics,” Solo Pos, March 30, 2005. Also see “Amien Tegaskan Tak Ada Rekomendasi Dalam Pilkada,” Solo Pos, March 31, 2005. It was important to note that when PAN announced the convention in October 2004, the party claimed there were around 7non- party figures who had expressed interest in nomination, including Jokowi. See “Calon Independen Mulai Lamar PAN,” Solo Pos, October 28, 2004. 337 “Hengky: Kami Tetap Di Posisi AD 2 Saja. 16 Partai Kecil Dan PDS Resmi Koalisi,” Solo Pos, March 31, 2005. The coalition included PNI Marhaenisme, PBSD, Partai Merdeka, PPDK, PPIB, PNBK, PKPI, PPDI, PKPB, PKB, PBR, PDS, Partai Patriot Pancasila, & PPD. A coalition of small/non DPRD parties was possible after the MK decision on judicial review for the right of small parties to develop coalitions, SM 26/4/2005.

!|!Page!131! ! ! wealthiest, while Rudy’s assets totalled nearly half a billion rupiah.338 The background of the candidates was however different from the entrenched pattern of the New Order’s bureaucrats or retired military officers in many local elections. Except Hardono, who was affiliated with Kadin Solo (Chamber of Trade and Commerce established during the New Order), Jokowi and Purnomo could be considered as ‘independent’ local businessmen, who had no direct connection with the New Order. Other candidates, such as Slamet and Rudy, had originated from the New Order’s main opposition party. The influx of business people explains some fundamental patterns in local politics after the implementation of Pilkada. First, political parties were not the only source for political recruitment, but still they had control in the process of candidacy.339 Party support however is not enough to win direct elections340; therefore the candidates needed to develop political campaigns to appeal to the electorate. Second, the Pilkada has opened up the opportunity for non-party figures. In Solo, local businessmen were dominant, supposedly for their strength in economic resources and their personal skills that were useful for appealing to voters. And third, the parties’ nomination processes tended to be pragmatic and fluid, without any firm base of ideology. The potential candidates negotiated with a number of parties, as the nature of party coalitions is fluid in many regions as well as national level. Despite pragmatic motives, the response of parties to conduct open selection seemed to be compatible with public demands represented by a vocal civil society. The openness of party selection for external candidates suggested responsiveness to such political aspirations. For non-party figures, the selection process is the initial step to compete for electoral legitimacy by winning the support of political parties. In the 2005 Solo election, almost all parties in the DPRD showed an interest in Jokowi, but he ultimately chose to nominate for the largest party in Solo, the PDIP. The next part will discuss how Jokowi won that nomination at the PDIP convention.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 338 Solo Pos, June 2, 2005. 339 The parties’ monopoloy of canidate nomination was changed by the Constitutional Court decision that permitted independent candidates in 2007 (No. 5/PUU-V/2007). In recent regulations on local elections, the independent candidates are also permitted. 340 In 2007 the Constitutional Court decided that independent candidates could run for election without party support. The candidates should be able to gauge support from the people. Independent candidates should mobilise support from 2.5% of voters, verified with copies of identity cards. Since then some independent candidates have nominated for and won the local elections, but candidates nominated by parties still predominate.

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3.! Non-party, but a compatible figure: Jokowi’s selection in PDIP This section discusses the rise of Jokowi at the PDIP convention. To win PDIP nomination, Jokowi needed to secure both grassroots party support and endorsement from party leaders, while overcoming resistance within the party to an external figure. Beyond his electoral prospects, his collaboration with PDIP’s city chairperson, Rudy (as his running mate) was decisive in overcoming these challenges. The nomination also reflected, despite his non-PDIP background, Jokowi’s personal appeal was compatible with party’s need to win the mayoral election. In the broader national setting of the first Pilkada elections in 2005, his emergence was only one case of a non-party figure; there were many other successful business people, civil society figures and bureaucrats. Before we move on, the following paragraphs review the continuing domination of PDIP in the city following the legislative and presidential elections in 2004. Though the PDIP was not as dominant as it has been in 1999 when the party won 51% of the vote, it was still the largest party in the 2004 legislature election with 36% of the vote.341 The domination suggested that PDIP’s mayoral candidate would enjoy the advantages of strong party grassroots support. With the threshold for nomination being 15%, only PDIP and PAN could nominate candidates independently. Other parties could form coalitions to meet this requirement.342 Besides the legislature, the 2004 presidential election was important background for gauging political party support in Solo. In the second round, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla, supported by a coalition of Demokrat, PBB, PKPI, and PKS, defeated PDIP leader, Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi, backed by a coalition of PDIP, Golkar, PPP and PDS, with 60.62% of the national vote. In Solo, support of SBY/JK was just 1% below that of Megawati/Hasyim, although SBY’s Demokrat party and JK’s Golkar won just four and five of the forty seats, respectively, in the DPRD.343 Despitestrong support for Megawati, PDIP’s Solo branch could not assume their support in the legislative election would be enough to guarantee the success of their mayoral candidate in the Pilkada election. In spite of a disappointing presidential election result, the mayoral selection of this largest political party in the city attracted wide attention. PDIP began to focus on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 341 In the DPRD, PDIP had 15 seats (out of 40), far above the second largest, PAN (7 seats). Other parties were Golkar (5 seats), Demokrat (4 seats), PDS (4 seats), PKS (4 seats), and PPP (1 seat). 342 The threshold for political parties to nominate candidates was 15% of popular votes or DPRD’s seats (Law 32/2004, article 59 (2)). 343 For the result of the presidential election see KPU Solo’s report 2005.

!|!Page!133! ! ! election for mayor in October 2004, declared that the party would not depend on coalitions with other parties and also intended to conduct an open convention to select their mayor and deputy mayor candidates.344 In the view of PDIP leadership (Rudy) the ideal was a figure with a vision on welfare and security, having the capability to manage problems in the city and not take an autocratic approach, given the socio-cultural characteristics of Solo.345 The convention allocated the biggest number of votes to the ranting (lowest level) structure, to reflect the importance of grassroots support for the candidate and to reveal the mass-based character of the PDIP organization. It was evident that candidates would compete for 411 votes, with most of them being ranting (Kampong or Kelurahan) representatives (357) and anak cabang (sub-district or kecamatan) leadership (43). The party leadership at city level (cabang) only received 11 votes. The final decision of candidacy was however still in the hands of national leadership of the party. The overall mechanism showed that in spite of open selection and grassroots support, the party leadership retained decisive power in candidacy selection.346 Regarding the protocols for the convention, PDIP set the following rules. It adopted a joint ticket system of application for mayor and deputy mayor, which meant that the committee would not accept individual applications for just one of the positions. The application opened on March 7, 2005, and the fee was 10 million rupiah for each pair of candidates.347 For non PDIP figures, the basic requirement was support from at least 1000 voters, with a list of names and signatures, while for the internal candidate the requirement was three years or more experience as a member of party executive.348 It was in the interest of PDIP that the candidates should be able to engage with the party at grassroots level. Hence, the committee required candidates to attend debates at sub-district level in order to develop more direct relations with the people. The convention was accordingly an initial step to create popular support, a necessary condition for competing in direct elections.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 344 “PDIP Siapkan Penjaringan Cawali,” Solo Pos, November 2, 2004; “PDIP Gelar Konvensi Calon Walikota,” Solo Pos, November 24, 2004. On PDIP’s plan to propose candidate independently, see “Rudy: PDIP Tak Harus Andalkan KK.” On open conventions see the party’s rule, SK.429/DPP/KPTS/XII/2004. 345 “Tim Penjaringan PDIP Tak Murni Kader Partai,” Solo Pos, December 6, 2004. Bimo was known to have strong influence and networks in PDIP grassroots including his position as chief supporter of city’s soccer team, Pasopati. 346 In a similar vein of argument, see Schiller, “Electing Districts Heads in Indonesia: Democratic Deepening or Elite Entrenchement?”, 152. 347 The convention committee was led by Bimo Putranto, a member of DPRD and close ally of Rudy. See “7 Maret PDIP Buka Pendaftaran Cawali,” Solo Pos, February 25, 2005. Other requirements for application see announcement for PDIP Convention published in Solo Pos, March 5, 2005; “Rudi: Sistem Paket Di Konvensi Sudah Final,” Solo Pos, January 4, 2005. 348 See “Ikut Konvensi PDIP Harus Didukung 1000 Orang,” Solo Pos, January 3, 2005.

!|!Page!134! ! !

The PDIP convention was attractive for outsider figures including Jokowi. In a media statement, he joined the PDIP convention on the basis of political calculations and communication with PDIP leadership in Solo.349 Jokowi’s decision to run for mayor at the convention could not be separated from Rudy’s support. In spite of his leadership position in the PDIP and a strong grassroots network, he decided to run as deputy mayor.350 The move to promote Jokowi seemed compatible with public expectations for a professional non-party figure for mayor. Not all PDIP activists and elites were however happy with such openness to an outside figure. Many complained, as Rudy made strategic decisions without having consulted other party leaders, particularly at kecamatan and kelurahan levels. Some grassroots leaders expected Rudy to compete for AD-1 (code for mayor), not AD-2 (code for deputy mayor). The party leader in Jebres (the largest cluster of PDIP supporters), Yulianto Indratmoko said, ‘I’m disagreeing with Pak Rudy’s decision to run for AD-2. He is the leader of the winning party, but why did he only run for AD-2?’351 Another leader, Winarno Saputro (Laweyan), had a similar opinion: ‘as PDIP cadre and head of sub- district party organization, I could not accept Pak Rudy’s decision for running AD-2. PDIP is the winner in Solo. If he runs for AD-1, a lot of people will support him. Many PDIP activists are even ready to run with Pak Rudy. But why did he choose an outsider and only running for AD-2?’352 Rudy’s colleagues in the city leadership were also disappointed, and asked Rudy to step down (or at least become non-active) as head of party during the convention in order to avoid a conflict of interest between his position as party leader and candidate. The disappointment continued even after the convention was resumed. Rudy’s response to the voices of discontent was firm. First, he rejected the demand to step down. He assured his colleagues that the decision was based on careful calculation and considerations he could not disclose to the public.353 He said, ‘I have made careful consideration before deciding to run. To Pak Jokowi, I proposed a condition; if we are

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 349 “Jokowi: Saya Pasti Ikut Konvensi PDIP,” Solo Pos, January 6, 2005. It was most likely that Jokowi discussed his bid with Rudy, the leader of PDIP. 350 “Jokowi-FX. Hadi Rudyatmo Daftar Di PDIP,” Solo Pos, March 8, 2005. See also “Jokowi Masuk Nominasi PDIP Dan Forum Ulama,” Solo Pos, December 8, 2004. 351 He resisted the decision by stating: ‘I’m sure that most of party activists and cadres will not accept this situation. We will not choose Pak Rudy at the convention, since we don’t want PDIP cadre positioned at the second position (deputy mayor). A claim that 80% of PDIP cadre and activist support Pak Rudy is just his own’. 352 “Jokowi-FX. Hadi Rudyatmo Daftar Di PDIP,” 353 “Rudy Diminta Mundur,” Solo Pos, March 15, 2005. In a personal interview with Didik (NGO activist and head of Solo election commission, 2008-2013), I obtained information that Rudy had assured PDIP grassroots that Jokowi had inherited a nationalist ideology, by explaining to PDIP supporters that Jokowi’s father had been a member of PNI guardian in the 1950s.

!|!Page!135! ! ! elected, our priority is to implement program related to people’s needs’.354 For his part, Jokowi admitted that he and Rudi had been involved in intensive discussion to develop a common platform. And when he submitted the application, Jokowi claimed confidently that he had 80% supports from the ranting network.355 Rudy was a grassroots party leader. His political career began as a member of Satgas, a kind of party guard. One of my informants said he was even the boss of preman (gangsters) in the city.356 In 1999 he was party leader in Jebres sub-district, one of the largest PDIP mass strongholds. He was also one of three Solo delegates (two others were Slamet and Farid Badres) in the first PDIP congress in Bali in October 1998. In 2000, Rudy was elected as PDIP leader to replace Slamet. As party leader, he distanced the PDIP from Slamet’s leadership as mayor, and even criticized many of Slamet’s policies and his leadership approach. In 2004 Rudy was elected as DPRD member. While the leader of the largest party would usually run for a top political job, this was not the case for Rudy in the 2005 direct elections. There were several reasons for Rudy’s decision to run as Jokowi’s deputy, instead of mayor. Many were of the view that his Christian background was the main hurdle to persuade the majority of nominal Moslem voters in the city. As mentioned earlier, though many Moslems in Solo are syncretic (abangan), rather than pious (santri) Moslems357, many believed people would hesitate to vote for a mayor with a Christian background. Beside the personal qualities of leadership, community aspirations for the prospective mayor were also parochial, as the religious background of candidates was a matter of concern for some Islamist elements. In this regard, the religious composition was a relevant factor to analyze the emergence of candidates. As shown in the following table, Islam is the largest religion in Solo (73%), while the Christians (Catholic and Protestant) make up about 25%. In the legislative election, as explained in Chapter 3, the religious composition had less correlation with aliran politics, as PDIP, as the major secular nationalist party could claim to represent both the abangan aliran and the Christians,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 354 Ibid. 355 Ranting is the lowest unit in the organizational hierarchy of PDIP, located at the kelurahan level. 356 Setyo, interview; Hari D. Utomo, interview. 357 In Clifford Geertz’s analysis, Abangan refers to Javanese people who are Muslims, but practice a much more syncretic version of Islam than the santri people who are pious Muslims. The Abangan people will still practice rituals derived from Hindu traditions, such as slametan, while santri regard such practices as not Islamic. Geertz’s categorization of abangan, santri and priyayi has been widely discussed and has received critical reviews, but it is still one of the main references to understand social identity of the Javanese. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), especially part one, The ‘Abangan’ Variant and part two, The ‘Santri’ Variant.

!|!Page!136! ! ! dominated the local legislative. In the 2005 mayor election, religious sentiment and the religion of candidates were issues in public discussion.

Table 4.1: Religious Composition

Religion District Total Islam Catholic Protestant Hindu Budha Laweyan 87465 10443 10586 532 421 109447 Serengan 48123 7322 6257 69 93 61864 Pasar Kliwon 67349 10230 8929 178 832 87518 Jebres 96342 21767 22473 857 1850 143289 Banjarsari 113004 24603 21726 505 1409 161247 TOTAL 412283 74365 69971 2141 4605 563365 Source: Solo dalam Angka, 2009!

A more political reason for Rudy to pick Jokowi, a wealthy businessman, was linked to the nature of direct elections that required significant financial resources for campaigning and other political financing. Rudy himself had strong networks in the party’s grassroots, but he and PDIP Solo did not have the capacity for financing the election campaign. Rudy was realistic about financial weakness and the religious factor, and choosing Jokowi, a Moslem and wealthy local businessman, could match the social

358 compatibility and financial capacity required for winning direct elections. The choice for Jokowi was pragmatic and a strategic calculation, rather than based on party ideology. It also seemed that delegates at the convention were pleased with Jokowi’s ability to relate to people in a culturally acceptable and familiar manner, and saw this as a political asset to win the election. The pair formed a business and party political collaboration, which represented a unification of financial resources and grassroots networks. After Rudy decided to run as deputy mayor with Jokowi, two other PDIP figures entered the mayoral contest. The incumbent mayor, Slamet, lodged his application on the last day, after delaying several times, experiencing difficulties finding a running mate.359 He picked Abimanyu (Director of City Water), his political rival in 2000, to run for deputy mayor.360 Slamet insisted his main motive at the convention was to save the reputation of PDIP, and reminded the masses about his achievements in the political struggles of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 358 It is worth noting that in 2015, Rudy won election as mayor on his own, with his deputy, Purnomo, the batik businessman and moderate Muslim politician. 359 “Slamet Suryanto Gandeng Abimanyu,” Suara Merdeka, March 17, 2005. 360 “Slamet Maju Bareng Abimanyu,” Solo Pos, March 17, 2005.

!|!Page!137! ! !

1990s. He rejected offers from other parties to show loyalty to PDIP361, though in the end he ran as mayor with a ticket from the small parties’ coalition. Another PDIP figure entered the contest was Farid Badres, head of DPRD. Farid insisted that as the largest party, PDIP should have its own mayoral candidate. He picked Joko Trisnowidodo, a Solo academic, as the candidate for deputy.362 The fourth candidate was Warsito Sanyoto, a Jakarta-based lawyer and self-proclaimed PDIP cadre. To prepare his candidacy, he established a ‘charity’ organization called Waras in October 2004 for giving donations to the poor. His running mate was Fathoni, a doctor and PAN activist.363 They had the least connection to PDIP, and at the same time submitted their application as candidates at the PAN convention, which further illustrates the pragmatism of candidates in direct elections.364 Despite pragmatic political moves, the candidates still needed to show their substance on policies. At the party’s general meeting on 20th March, the candidates presented their vision and programs before the delegation. The city’s economic development was a shared agenda among candidates, but the focus was diverse. Jokowi focused on a people-oriented economy, especially the management of the informal and traditional sector, and also promised to use his business experience to create jobs. Slamet and Faried proposed a different economic agenda based on an evaluation of the city’s regulations, with the objective of creating a more business-friendly environment. On the other hand, Warsito’s focus was tourism. Other agendas discussed during the meeting included public services improvement, mainly education and health. Surprisingly, the specific focus on these sectors was provided by Warsito, who promised free education for the poor, from elementary to junior high school, and allocate 20% of the local budget for health services. The three other candidates did not discuss this crucial issue. The 2005 direct elections were influenced by the good governance reform agenda promoted mainly by proponents of decentralization and local democracy. In this regard, Jokowi promised to encourage public participation in the city’s planning and budget allocation processes.365 The issue was appealing as the police and Solo’s attorney were investigating corruption involving DPRD members and Mayor Slamet. Slamet himself

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 361 “Slamet Suryanto Daftar PDIP,” Suara Merdeka, March 14, 2005. 362 “Farid – Djoko Mendaftar Di PDIP,” Solo Pos, March 18, 2005. 363 “Warsito – Fathoni Resmi Berpasangan Di PDIP,” Solo Pos, March 12, 2005. 364 “Daftar Di PAN, Loyalitas Dipertanyakan,” Suara Merdeka, March 21, 2005. 365 He said, ‘for budget transparency, we will not keep the information secret. People and cadre of party would have access to information about the city budget.“Para Cawali PDIP Sampaikan Visi Dan Misi,” Solo Pos, March 21, 2005.

!|!Page!138! ! ! focused on budget policies, particularly to increase block grants for the community. Warsito promised to develop more equal relations and partnerships with communities in governing the city. The following table summarises the candidates’ main programs. Table 4.2: Summary of PDIP candidates’ programs

Candidates Main programs

Jokowi – Rudy •! Budget efficiency and transparency. •! Strengthening the popular economy; trade (including traditional and informal) and industry. •! Foreign cooperation (he claimed that some overseas cities are ready to cooperate with Solo) Warsito – Fathoni •! Free education for the poor •! Moral education based on Solo’s cultural strengths •! Developing Solo as a tourism destination •! Engaging community in city development •! ‘Gotong royong’ (community voluntarism) for development •! Partnership and synergy in governing the city Farid – Joko Trisno •! Strengthening trade sector •! Reviewing city’s investment-related regulations Slamet – Abimanyu •! Developing more business-friendly environment and policy •! Increasing block-grants for community/neighbourhood development Sources: Solo Pos366 and Suara Merdeka367

These program promises identify policy intentions and early commitments of the candidates to address community problems, as well as identifying the respective directions their leadership may take. But policy promises were certainly not the decisive factor in the political struggle for nomination. In the PDIP convention, the result was largely influenced by the political networks candidates had in the party, certainly in the case of Rudy, who controlled party structure and grassroots networks. Such political capital played a decisive role at the convention. And at voting on 23rd March 2005, Jokowi/Rudy won with strong support, as they were elected by 251 delegates and thus defeated Slamet, who received 57 votes. Other PDIP figures were: Farid Badres who gained five votes, far below Warsito’s

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 366 Ibid. 367 “Daftar Di PAN, Loyalitas Dipertanyakan.”

!|!Page!139! ! ! with 52 delegates. Jokowi said that the result had been predicted, but the win confirmed Rudy’s extensive networks in the party he had led since 2000. The nomination of Jokowi/Rudy as PDIP candidates was officially announced in the party’s recommendation letter number A-998/In/DPP/III/2005. The letter also instructed PDIP members and leaders in Solo to support the candidates. But other candidates challenged the decision. Slamet and Farid questioned its validity, as it did not have the endorsement (signature) of Megawati as party leader. They were also unhappy because there was no official notification about the recommendation.368 Farid expressed his disappointment by saying: ‘PDIP should propose an internal figure for mayor, since the party’s campaign to win the legislative election was based on the assumption that the party should have its own candidate. Now, an outsider has been given the opportunity. It’s up to us, should we use the vehicle for our own interests, or rent it to an outsider?’369 Realizing the internal resistance, Jokowi/Rudy aimed to consolidate soon after receiving the recommendation. They placed an advertisement, in Solo Pos, to thank voters for their nomination and to introduce the slogan Berseri Tanpa Korupsi (Brilliant without Corruption).370 They also congratulated Megawati for her re-election as party leader in the Bali Congress, in late March 2005.371 The advertisement could be seen as a strategy to make the nomination legitimate and to maintain party unity, Rudy proposed a sanction for those who opposed the recommendation. Rudy’s move was specifically to attack Slamet who sought support from other parties.372 Despite complaints, there was no re- consideration of Jokowi’s nomination. With the support of the largest party in the city, Jokowi commenced the election campaign. His rivals were two fellow businessmen, Hardono (PD, GOLKAR and PKS) and Purnomo (PAN), and the incumbent Slamet (PPMS Coalition). With regard to the backgrounds of candidates, the Solo direct elections in 2005 had turned out to be a political struggle for electoral legitimacy between three prominent local businessmen. Jokowi finally won with 36% of the vote, a similar percentage to PDIP’s vote in the preceding legislative election in 2004. The following section discusses how Jokowi won

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 368 “Rekomendasi Jokowi – Rudy Dipertanyakan,” Solo Pos, April 6, 2005. 369 “Slamet: Saya Maju Untuk Selamatkan PDIP,” Solo Pos, April 12, 2005. 370 Berseri – stands for bersih, sehat, ramah and indah (clean, healthy, friendly, & beautiful) – the Slogan of Solo. Jokowi/Rudy added ‘without corruption’, which was cunning, since corruption had become the topic for public discussion in the years before the election. 371 SP 6 April 2005. 372 Until the day of the election, the PDIP did not announce any sanction against Slamet. Supposedly, the PDIP did not sanction Slamet because he had helped establish the party, then consolidate it during the difficult years of the 1990s.

!|!Page!140! ! ! the election, by examining his campaign agenda and political strategy. A comparison with campaigns of other candidates is also included to examine the extent to which Jokowi’s campaign was distinct.

4.! The struggle for electoral legitimacy: agenda and style of campaign The campaign is a crucial stage for candidates to develop political appeal with the voters. Jokowi’s policy agenda focused on aspects of local governance, such as public services and reform, were in general similar to his rivals. But his style of communication with the people and civil society elements was distinctive, as he engaged in direct and intense relations with these sources of electoral legitimacy. From the campaign, we can also gain insights regarding the way Jokowi would develop his political legitimacy as mayor. In policy, his intention was to focus on basic public services improvement, manage the informal economy and adopt a governance reform agenda. The policy platform was even less concrete, but he attracted more mass media coverage for his use of common language and a popular mode of communication. This brings us to another aspect of the way he developed legitimacy, namely popular engagement. One of Jokowi’s strengths was his capability to develop direct communication, not only with elites, but more importantly with commoners. His popular political style was subversive compared to the established elitist style of political leadership. However, it needs to be noted that the electoral success was not ultimately decided during the campaign, but to a great extent due to Rudy’s capability in retaining the loyalty of PDIP voters. As in many other local elections during the first round of pilkada, money politics was evident not just during the campaign, but also in the party nomination processes.373 Civil society activists considered these practices were a consequence of transactional relations between parties and candidates, particularly businessmen.374 During the campaign and election, cash disbursement and other in-kind gifts were given to sway the voters, but it brought no serious consequences to the legitimacy of the election in general including its result.375 Despite the party’s machinery and money politics, the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 373 “PD Bantah Diikat Dana Oleh Jokowi,” Solo Pos, November 11, 2004. 374 “Preseden Buruk Jika Parpol Dibeli Pengusaha,” Solo Pos, November 22, 2004; “Pasti Ada Money Politics,” Solo Pos, November 12, 2004. In the interviews, some NGO’s activists also expressed their suspicions about money politics, for example; Pargito, May 11, 2012; Andwi Joko, May 12, 2012. 375 For evidence of money politics for vote buying see, “Menggelar Kampanye Memanjakan Wong Cilik,” Solo Pos, June 16, 2005. Solo Pos reported as following: ‘Kalo bisa seperti ini terus, ya saya senang. Soalnya tiap hari dapat gratisan. Entah itu sembako, kaus, bahkan duit. … Saya pernah menerima 50.000 dari salah satu Cawali. Tapi yang paling sering warga Cuma dapat 10.000. Jumlah itu memang itungane kecil. Namun, bagi wong cilik seperti saya, !

!|!Page!141! ! ! political campaign provided insights into the policy agenda and style of leadership Jokowi intended to employ post election. The following three sub-sections discuss the rite of candidates’ registration, agenda and style of campaign and community initiatives. a.! Rite of candidate registration The registration of candidacy at the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum – KPU) was the first opportunity for candidates to set the tone for their campaign, or show their political support. Jokowi used the rite of registration to confirm that he was the official candidate of the PDIP and sought to develop a popular image. Amongst his rivals, only Slamet adopted a similar popular style, while two other businessmen portrayed themselves in elitist style. The candidates’ registration at KPU is a new political rite in the direct elections. This is a formal stage of the election, as candidates lodge their application to be an official contestant in the election. For many candidates registration is the moment to project a political identity and even to demonstrate political power. Taking an example from the 2014 Indonesian Presidential election, by looking at the rites of registration of two presidential candidates at KPU, we can identify the nature of the political base and campaign approach taken by both Jokowi and Prabowo.376 In Solo in 2005, Jokowi/Rudy displayed a populist style during registration, similar to that of Slamet/Hengky, which contrasted with the formal elitist style of Hardono/Dipo, and Javanese-Laweyan priyayi in Purnomo/Istar’s appearance. The following details Jokowi’s rite of registration, and its different approach compared to other candidates. Jokowi/Rudy were the first candidates to register at KPU on 6th April 2005. Overall, the image they projected was as candidates for the commoners. Wearing red-shirts and black PDIP uniforms, they lodged the application accompanied by hundreds of supporters including the party executive – party secretary, coordinator of convention and some DPRD members – and certainly ‘wong cilik’ supporters such as housewives and becak riders. The crowd marched from Grha Sabha Buwana, Jokowi’s own conference !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! jumlah sebesar itu jelas lebih dari cukup. Bisa buat njajakke putu. Kandidat juga menyediakan piknik gratis. …. Kalau saya dan keluarga mana bisa pernah piknik seperti itu. Jangankan untuk Piknik. Untuk makan sehari-hari saja butuh ngubetke dhuwit jhe.” (The report describes that people are happy during the campaign period, as they would usually received free stuff such as T-shirt and food, and cash from the candidates. The amount of cash is not much, but for those who lived in poverty, it was very valuable. Also, the candidates would usually offer a free picnic for the targeted voters and their family). 376 The video documents the presidential candidates’ registration and can be watched via the following link: Jokowi-JK Mendaftar Di KPU, n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f8rUhYEzrqc; Prabowo Mendaftar Di KPU, n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArvJ9Lw_9XY.

!|!Page!142! ! ! hall located in the elite neighbourhood complex of Manahan, to the KPU office at the Manahan Sports Complex.377 The presence of the PDIP executive and cadre was to bring home the message that they were the official and legitimate candidates of the party. This message was specifically to delegitimize Slamet’s candidacy, and to show solid support from the party. Slamet/Hengky, who registered their candidacy on 11th April 2005, also displayed a humble populist image. They marched to KPU accompanied by all 14 party representatives, carrying their flags and banners, and a parade of becak.378 Hardono/Dipo with their elite style, displayed a contrasting appearance. They came to KPU in formal dress code, without mobilizing a big number of supporters, but accompanied by leaders of the parties.379 Purnomo/Istar who lodged their registration on 8th April 2005 displayed a similar elitist style. They wore Javanese traditional dress and rode on horse carts, a symbol of Javanese elites or priyayi.380 The formal Javanese clothes and horse carts were symbolic of independent Laweyan elites, while the becak riders who followed behind the carts were to show a patronage relationship between priyayi and common people. Regardless of different images projected at the registration, all candidates were certainly part of the socio-economic elite in the city. Although Jokowi and Slamet cultivated a humble image in the rite of registration, like the other two candidates they were part of Solo’s wealthy elite, as shown in the profile of wealth mentioned earlier. Civil society activists were suspicious about the validity of wealth declared in the report. Slamet was the main target of criticism, as civil society activists were doubtful he owned less than half a billion rupiah after five years in power.381 The outgoing incumbents tended to have a significant increase in wealth, but perhaps as the Solo economy based on trade and services, with a significant informal sector, did not provide much opportunity for rent seeking and corruption. A commissioner of KPU however admitted the report could be invalid, as there was no verification of the facts.382 In spite of the debate about its validity, it was evident that in Solo as in other places, the 2005 election had become an arena of political competition for the elite class. This was consistent with the argument that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 377 See “Puluhan Pendukung Iringi Pendaftaran Cawali. Jokowi-Rudy Dan Hardono-Dipo Resmi Mendaftar Ke KPU,” Solo Pos, April 7, 2005. 378 “Slamet Hengky Daftarkan Diri, Sebelumnya Tidak Pernah Direncanakan,” Suara Merdeka, April 12, 2005. 379 “Dua Pasangan Daftar Ke KPU: Berkas Belum Lengkap,” Suara Merdeka, April 7, 2005. 380 “Pasangan Cawali dan Cawawali dari PAN Ahmad Purnomo – Istar Yuliadi secara resmi mendaftar ke KPU Solo Jum’at 8/4”. 381 “Verifikasi Ulang Kekayaan Cawali,” Solo Pos, June 5, 2005. 382 KPU underlined that a candidate may face prosecution if the wealth report is false. See “Soal Daftar Kekayaan Cawali-Cawawali, Jika Laporan Tak Jujur Bisa Digugat Secara Hukum’,” Solo Pos, June 4, 2006.

!|!Page!143! ! ! election had facilitated the entrenchment of elites, but it is important to emphasise here that elites competing in the Solo election were not a part of the old regime structure.383 The next sub-section will discuss how candidates in the 2005 Solo election struggled to appeal to the electorate, by examining their agenda and style of campaign. Jokowi’s victory in 2005 was largely due to Rudy’s support, but from the campaign we can see that the policy agenda and his style of popular engagement elevated his profile as the candidate who could address the challenges that followed the crisis and engage with the emerging agenda of local democratic reform. b.! Similar policy agendas In terms of policy agenda, Jokowi’s campaign did not differ from that of other candidates, particularly in basic public services provision, informal and traditional economy management, and bureaucratic reform. Jokowi’s campaign agenda seemed even vaguer when compared to his rivals. Campaign agendas did not seem to be a decisive factor in the electoral victory, but they showed that Jokowi advocated a policy agenda, in keeping with that expected by the people during this period. Also, an examination of his campaign agenda is a useful means to understand Jokowi’s initial effort to create electoral legitimacy and to anticipate which policies he would focus on during his term as Mayor. In regard to creation of legitimacy, the campaign is not just an arena for the candidate to make promises, but more importantly it is an arena for the electorate to examine political compatibility of each candidate. It is assumed that the candidate who could develop the agenda in in keeping with popular demand would more likely win the most votes. The elected candidate is the one who offers the agenda most compatible with the expectations of the people. It is however interesting that Jokowi’s campaign agenda was largely similar to other candidates. On crucial issues, other candidates were even more concrete in their promises. The KPU’s protocol for the official campaign period was three weeks, following the announcement of eligible candidates until about a week before the ballots were cast.384 The election campaign started on 10 June, when the candidates delivered political speeches before the DPRD assembly, and ended on 23 June 2005. As in many other elections,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 383 For arguments about elections as an arena for elite’s competition, see for example; Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Direct electionss: Empowering the Electorate or Entrenching the New Order Oligarchy?”; R. H. Taylor, The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 384 See KPU decision KPU decision No. 270/07/SK/V/2005, 6 May 2005.

!|!Page!144! ! ! candidates would present their policy focus and programs, which in the Solo 2005 direct elections were about the role of government in the provision of basic public services, local economic development, and commitment for transparency and service orientation. Comprehensive promises and each candidate’s policy agenda could be tracked during mass meetings and public dialogue. The provision of basic needs and public services improvement were among the foci in Jokowi’s campaign. From his speeches delivered over three open campaigns (14, 18 and 22 June 2005) he promised to increase welfare by creating jobs, providing free education for children, implementing the anti-corruption program and improving public services. For education, he promised to provide poor people with free education in elementary and junior high school. However, no further details for this education program were announced, except his promise to increase the budget allocation.385 In bureaucratic reform, Jokowi pledged to cut complex procedure for applying for an identity card (KTP) by applying a one-day service and fixed fee. Furthermore, he also promised to eradicate illicit fees (pungutan liar – pungli) in public services and to reduce corruption in government. A specific issue highlighted by Rudy concerned the popular soccer club in the city. He promised to provide a subsidy to help the club gain promotion to the Indonesian super league. This key campaign promise would attract thousands of Pasoepati members, loyal supporters of the club. Jokowi’s focus was however not just on programs, but also guided people as to how to mark the ballot paper, as well as to ask his supporters to watch for ‘serangan fajar’ (morning attack), money distributed by the candidates in order to change the minds of voters on election day. Jokowi said; ‘Be careful with possibilities of ‘serangan fajar’. All have to stay awake during D-1, D-2 and D-3 before the voting time. Being watchful to the ‘flying envelopes’ (local phrase for money politics), and don’t be distracted by that’.386 Given the fact that most PDIP supporters were from lower income families and social status, they were prone to vote buying, and therefore such messages were part of the effort to retain voters’ loyalty.387 Compared to other candidates, Jokowi’s agenda during the campaign was not specific. Hardono/Dipo’s also campaigned on basic needs, more specifically to promote !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 385 “Janji Cawali: Orasi Jokowi Dalam Kampanye Selasa 14 June 2005,” Solo Pos, June 19, 2005. Ibid. 386 “Jokowi: Jangan Tergiur Serangan Fajar,” Solo Pos, June 23, 2005. D-1, D-2, and D-3 means the last three days before the voting time. In Solo 2005 election, any campaign activities were prohibited during these days, but there was always suspicion that the candidates would silently take actions to influence the voters, including money politics. 387 Ibid.

!|!Page!145! ! ! pro-poor policies. They pledged to develop welfare and transform Solo to become a dignified and civilized city.388 On education, Hardono would provide subsidies, infrastructure upgrading, and develop a Solonese model of education by inserting Javanese culture and values in the curriculum. While on economic development, his main promise was to provide employment and develop the city without enforcing relocation of the informal economy. In the campaign on 15 June 2005, Hardono was confident that his competence in managing the economy as an entrepreneur would be to his advantage for creating programs aimed at eliminating unemployment and to stimulate economic development.389 On the hot issue of street vendors, Hardono’s promise was even sympathetic, as he promised not to impose relocation policy on vendors. He said, ‘[the] street vendor is part of us. I and Pak Dipo would reject any plan for relocation. We will develop Solo without relocation’.390 Later he insisted ‘we cannot relocate them. My commitment is to empower pro-people economy’.391 And to lend greater credibility to his popular economy promises, he invited well-known campaigner Sri Edi Swasono to deliver a speech on the importance of pro-people economic policies as a basis for Solo’s development.392 And to emphasize the Javanese identity of the pair and show a commitment to Javanese culture, Hardono entertained people with three wayang kulit (Javanese puppet made of cow/buffalo-skin) performances across the city at night during the final campaign days. Jokowi’s agenda was also not different from that of PAN candidates, Purnomo/Istar. Purnomo promised even more concrete policies, as he would allocate up to 20% of the local budget for education and encourage community participation to improve the quality of education. He also insisted on cheaper education services and even pledged there would be no more school fees.393 Another promise was to provide cheaper health services. On this issue, he was the first candidate who mentioned specifically a plan to improve health services. Slamet’s campaign was less programmatic, as the main focus was to defend his legacy as mayor and former PDIP leader. He was also busy countering allegations of corruption and other negative perceptions about his role as mayor.394 He made excuses for his lack of a programmatic campaign by saying: ‘we cannot promise !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 388 “Hardono Ingin Angkat Kesejahteraan. Tagih Janji Cawali Terpilih,” Solo Pos, June 20, 2005. 389 “Janji Cawali: Orasi Hardono Dalam Kampanye Rabu 15/06/2005,” Solo Pos, June 19, 2005. 390 “Massa Pendukung Padati Kota Barat Dan Losari. Hardono Janji Tak Gusur PKL,” Solo Pos, June 16, 2005. 391 “Hardono Janji Bela Rakyat,” Solo Pos, June 24, 2005. 392 Ibid. 393 SP 15 June 2005, speech in campaign on 14 June 2005. 394 “Janji Cawali: Orasi Slamet Suryanto Dalam Kampanye Minggu 12/6,” Solo Pos, June 17, 2005.

!|!Page!146! ! ! vision and too many programs, but we will prove that we are at the side of small people’.395 His deputy candidate, Hengky, filled the program gap by promising a subsidy and free education. On health, the pair proposed free services and development of better community health centre’.396 From the above discussion, the political campaign in the 2005 Solo direct elections revealed many agenda similarities among candidates. A commitment to provide basic public needs, more pro-people economic policies, and bureaucratic reform were the common campaign issues, though the rhetoric was different. In direct local elections, campaigns tended to focus on more concrete issues and programs related to local needs. Such a campaign agenda was popular, and seemed to match popular expectations for mayor and government to deliver more on daily needs and overcome impacts of the crisis. If the campaign agenda was the only standard to measure compatibility and commitment, Jokowi was no exception, not only because his rhetoric was not that different to other candidates but at some point his promises were vague and less specific compared with Hardono and Purnomo’s. Not all aspects of the campaign were about platforms and policy focus, but also about the way political campaigns were organised, for example, figures who accompany candidates, cultural performance, character of supporters mobilized during the campaign, and how candidates developed their engagement with the electorate. In this regard, Jokowi’s style of campaign featured some distinctions compared to his rivals. c.! Style of popular engagement Though Jokowi’s agenda in general did not differ from other candidates, and was even seen as unclear, the way he communicated the agenda was attractive, because he used simple language and direct communication. His communication style meant his promises attracted more attention from the public and mass media, even though they were less substantive and concrete compared to his rivals. Also, from the time he entered politics, Jokowi was known for his direct engagement with community and his open-minded attitude in relation to the voices of civil society. Beyond the policy agenda, his style of popular engagement and leadership during the campaign seemed to be more important for his victory. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 395 “Slamet Juga Bicara Pemangkasan Birokrasi.” 396 “Slamet-Hengky Mulai Tawarkan Visi-Misi. Polisi Tindak Arak-Arakan Massa,” Solo Pos, June 17, 2005; “Slamet Juga Bicara Pemangkasan Birokrasi,” Solo Pos, June 21, 2005.

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The political campaign could be seen as an effort by candidates to develop aspects of compatibility with the electorate; not only in relation to the policy agenda, but also in the way candidates developed relationships with the community. In the 2005 Solo election, Jokowi developed close and direct engagement with the community including civil society groups. His style was in contrast to the outgoing incumbent Slamet and other businessmen, who were stuck in the elitist mode and distanced themselves from the community. Jokowi’s style seemed to have great compatibility with the people’s expectations of grassroots political leadership. The candidates had different campaign styles. The incumbent Slamet, perceived as having an elitist style leadership, realized the importance of popular engagement. He was known for the slogan nguwongke uwong, a platform of Javanese leadership based on principle of respecting common people’s voices and interests, but he failed to transform this slogan for running government effectively.397 Therefore, during the campaign he promised to change his style by inviting the people to Loji Gandrung (the official residence of mayor) to discuss their concerns.398 Beyond his rhetoric, from the time of candidate registration at KPU and during the campaign, Slamet tried to mobilise popular support, but he rarely showed direct engagement with community and tended to avoid open discussions with civil society. Hardono however was strong in popular rhetoric, but he tended to see the elites’ support as more important. He announced political endorsement from President SBY (Demokrat leader) and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (Golkar leader), for example, in his closing remarks of the campaign. Purnomo also had an elitist mindset. In the campaign he supported various charities to impress poor people, the very character of Javanese affluence and benevolence. For example, he hosted a wedding for 34 brides from poor families399, which gave him political confidence, and the national PAN leadership and Jakarta celebrities attended his last campaign event.400 Hardono and Purnomo seemed to represent middle-upper class social groups. As distinct from the elitist model, Jokowi developed a style of direct relations and closer engagement with the community during his campaign. To sway voters, especially

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 397 Nguwongke Uwong is principle of leadership that respects the importance of people as subjects, not objects of power. Slamet implemented leadership in this way, see “Dalam Memimpin, Saya Nguwongke Uwong,” Solo Pos, January 19, 2005. 398 “Slamet Janji Loji Gandrung Akan Selalu Terbuka,” Solo Pos, June 17, 2005. 399 SM 17 June 2005. 400 See “Purnomo Janji Perhatikan Olah Raga,” Solo Pos, June 22, 2005.

!|!Page!148! ! ! the masses in PDIP, during the campaign he conducted ‘blusukan’ (impromptu visit) to kampongs, riverbank communities and other clusters of poor residents. He did so to understand real community needs. He said, ‘I and Pak Rudy had in six months visited kampongs, riverbanks, and having chats with people living in poverty. Many of them live in soil-floor houses and eat less nutritional food. The condition made us in deep sorrow. In spite of the city development a lot of citizens live in poverty.’401 It was these blusukan visits that gave Jokowi inspiration for pro-poor policies. It is evident that since the beginning of his political career, Jokowi had developed a specific style of leadership. Blusukan, impromptu visits to neighbourhhoods and clusters of community to observe directly the people’s problems had become Jokowi’s trademark political style and mode of engagement with society, especially marginalised Solo society. However, Jokowi did not invent the blusukan style of political engagement. Indonesian political leaders like President Sukarno and President Suharto used similar ways of having direct communication and engagement with people. Even in Solo, mayor Hartomo (1985- 1995) was popular for his routine visits to communities and having direct communications with people. Jokowi’s rites of blusukan seemed to resonate with a Javanese ideal way of engagement between political leaders and people in context of emerging democratization. During the campaign, Jokowi consistently accepted community invitations to meet directly with poor people. An example was in the meeting organized by the Parking Employee Association (Paguyuban Penataan Parkir Surakarta – P3S) and the Solidarity for Marginal Community (Solidaritas untuk Kaum Marginal – Sukma). The purpose of the meeting was to unite marginal communities (buskers, hawkers, household servants, becak riders and slum inhabitants). In the gathering, Jokowi even signed a ‘social contract’ to protect the interests of marginalized groups.402 Another example was his presence at a unique community event of ‘one kilometre shake-hand’ in Kadipiro. In this unusual event, members of the community formed a long queue and candidates were asked to shake the hand of all neighbourhood members. Jokowi and Purnomo participated in this event. Jokowi’s also focused on the minorities in the city. He attended the Chinese Surakarta Community Association (Paguyuban Masyarakat

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 401 “Arak-Arakan Massa Meriahkan Kampanye Putaran Kedua. Jokowi Janji Entaskan Kemiskinan,” Solo Pos, June 19, 2005. 402 Solo Pos, May 30, 2005.

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Surakarta PMS) meeting for a declaration of a peaceful election.403 In one of his advertising campaigns, Jokowi even promoted the character of a multiethnic and multicultural society in Solo as the social capital, to develop the city.404 To strengthen his popular image he called a gathering on the last night of the campaign to serve hik, a traditional Solo food stall, to his supporters. Beyond his popular image, Jokowi’s engagement with community was also about the substance of policies. The direct elections had created an opportunity for communities and civil society actors to express their policy interests to candidates. In Solo, these groups were active in organizing public discussions on certain policy agendas by inviting candidates. Among these candidates, Jokowi was the most confident to use public discussion as an arena for developing direct and closer community relations. On 19 May 2005, the state university in Solo, UNS, invited candidates to a public forum to present their political platforms and policy agendas. Education services were the most discussed issue. In a similar vein, candidates planned to increase the budget for services and to develop better education facilities and infrastructure. The focus of mass media reports was however on Jokowi, who promised to increase the budget by 15 to 20% within five years, to guarantee access for compulsory education, and to re-introduce ‘the surrogate parents in education’ program for children of poor families. Hardono and Purnomo, whose programs were also pro-poor, received in contrast minimal media attention. Furthermore, Jokowi’s statement on clean and professional government was also cited extensively, as he said; ‘within 16 years in furniture business, I never got facilities from government, and I will keep the principle (not to abuse government for individual interest)’.405 The media might have had their own agenda by highlighting Jokowi, but in an interview, a senior journalist explained that Jokowi’s simple language and informal style of communication had appealed to audiences including reporters of mass media.406 An agenda of good governance reform, such as transparency and accountability, community participation and improvement of public services provision, were popular agendas in the early phase of Indonesia’s democratic transition. These agendas were mainly promoted by international agencies in cooperation with domestic NGOs, scholars and other civil society actors. In Solo, civil society was also active in pursuing a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 403 Coordinator of PMS, Sumartono, acknowledged that the event aimed to introduce and connect the candidates with the Chinese community in the city, and to increase community awareness about the election. SP, end of May 2005. 404 Jokowi’s political advertising in Solo Pos, June 2005. 405 “Para Cawali Mulai Umbar Janji. Siap Mundur Jika Korupsi,” Suara Merdeka, May 20, 2005. 406 Interview with KR senior journalist and SoloPos editor.

!|!Page!150! ! ! governance reform agenda. One was the Indonesian Partnership for Governance Initiative (IPGI) in Solo. On 4 June IPGI organized a forum to discuss candidates’ vision on governance reform. But only Jokowi and Hardono accepted the invitation. In the forum, Jokowi focused on two issues: 1) economic development through increasing investment and territorial based economic planning; and 2) participatory governance through public involvement in planning and budgeting. Hardono however emphasized inter-regional cooperation for developing the city’s economy. IPGI and other NGOs were concerned about local governance reform, and Jokowi’s presentation seemed to fit the initiative of reform promoted by civil society elements.407 Others were the Spek-HAM and Indonesian Catholic Women (Wanita Katolik Republik Indonesia WKRI) forum, which invited candidates to discuss issues on women and children on 29th May 2005. Jokowi was again to attend the forum, along with Hardono and Purnomo. The above discussion shows how Jokowi developed closer relations with community and civil society actors in his efforts to win the election. Apart from being the mechanism of popular ballots, direct elections have made the relationships between political candidates and voters closer. Political candidates should be able to develop a compatible campaign style and relationship with the electorate. It is likely that the elected leader is the candidate with the most compatibility regarding people’s expectations of popular leadership style. In the indirect elections in 1999, there was no need for candidates to develop such popular compatibility, since the sources of legitimacy were from the party and elites. In direct elections, to have direct engagement with the people could be the main factor for electoral victory. Genuine direct and closer engagement between political leaders and the electorate seems to be a critical element in direct elections and a way to develop greater popular appeal. In local elections, the nature of engagement between candidates and voters is even more influential, given the smaller scale of politics and that policy issues are much more concrete and relate to daily needs. It is likely that in a small political arena like Solo, the familiarity of voters with candidates is also greater, and accordingly the relations between candidates and the people are more direct and intense. Decentralization has also made local government’s provision of basic public services delivery and other local matters more important.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 407 See “Debat Cawali – Cawawali Dihadiri Hardono Dan Jokowi. Disorot Soal Mal Dan Becak Di Solo,” Solo Pos, June 5, 2005.

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In Solo in 2005 three local businessmen promised similar policy issues with some differences in focus and rhetorical style, but in their respective campaigns, they developed different modes of engagement with voters. Jokowi sought direct engagement with the people and to identify himself with common people, the main constituents of PDIP. Others candidates adopted a similar campaign style, but when engaging with commoners they did so as elite priyayi, rather than as fellow commoners. The way Jokowi developed engagement with the community during the campaign provided him with a specific platform for creating community based legitimacy. His interaction with community was the beginning of his direct engagement with people as the main source of legitimacy in the direct democracy he maintained during his term as mayor and perhaps beyond. After months of electoral process, from pre-selection of candidate at the end of 2004 to voting day at the end of June 2005, Jokowi was elected the new mayor in Solo. Solid PDIP support was key; but his win of 36.62% also resonated with compatibility regarding a populist approach and discourse. This approach was something Jokowi and Rudy had adopted during the political campaign. Jokowi’s political legitimacy as mayor was based on support from more than one third of Solonese voters, but it had provided him with greater authority for creating a broader base of political compatibility, and hence legitimacy in the popular arena.

5.! Conclusion This chapter investigated the creation of electoral legitimacy in the setting of Indonesia’s direct local elections or Pilkada, by specifically examining what factors facilitated Jokowi’s emergence, how he won the PDIP nomination, and to what extent Pilkada changed the nature of political legitimacy. Jokowi’s emergence in Solo in 2005 was possible due to direct elections that opened up the opportunity for non-party figures to enter electoral competition. Though political parties still controlled the process of candidate selection, they tended to select non-party candidates for several reasons, including the lack of credible party politicians and for pragmatic reasons such as resources for financing the election. The chance for non- party figures to be selected as candidates was also promoted by civil society that pressed parties to be open to independent candidates with a professional background. The emergence of candidates from the business community, like Jokowi and other candidates in Solo in 2005, were part of a general trend towards elite domination in Indonesian local

!|!Page!152! ! ! elections. But different to the New Order’s intra-elite competition in many Pilkada, the composition of non-party elites in the 2005 election was dominated by elites who had no direct link with the structure of the New Order regime. In Solo, non-party figures competed for candidate nomination. In the Pilkada 2005 Pilkada, parties were the only channels for candidate nomination. Jokowi won the nomination of the largest political party in Solo, the PDIP, at a grassroots style party convention. Key to Jokowi’s nomination was however full support from PDIP Solo’s chairperson, Rudy, who ran for deputy mayor. Beyond this political support, Jokowi had also developed close grassroots engagement with the party, regularly visiting the cluster of PDIP voters. Together, the pair constituted a combination of professional managerial skills and financial capacity (i.e. Jokowi) and a strong party activist and political organizer (i.e. Rudy). The Pilkada had changed the nature of political legitimacy, from party elite based to more popular consent. In the previous local elections, the party’s elite supporters were absolute, not just in the election, but also in maintaining the legitimacy of the elected leader. Party support was important, especially for nomination, but the parties’ candidates needed to develop greater engagement with the people. The crucial period to develop such engagement was during the campaign. Jokowi’s agenda in 2005 was not that different from other candidates, and even lacked clarity on many issues, but he developed a style of direct communication and closer engagement with community, which turned out to be the key to his electoral victory along with strong PDIP support. The campaign also provided an important clue as to what policies Jokowi would focus on in government as well as his prospective style of leadership. The following chapter will discuss how Jokowi created broader popular legitimacy as mayor in the period following the election.

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Chapter Five Creating Legitimacy Post Election: Jokowi’s Style of Leadership and Policy Focus

1.! Introduction This chapter discusses what Jokowi did to implement authority after his election in 2005 and to what extent this broadened his legitimacy and leadership base. As mayor, Jokowi was known for his successful implementation of pro-people policies and programs such as facilitating informality and providing better access to health and education, as well as for administrative reform initiatives. Outside policy substance, Jokowi’s style of direct communication and engagement with the people and with other governance actors was also part of his popular image. I argue that this popular image made it possible for Jokowi not only to maintain support within his party, the PDIP, but also to enhance his image in Solo society. And in 2010, he was re-elected for another five-year term as Solo mayor with more than 90% of the popular vote, a result that indicated broad popular acceptance of his leadership in the city. His performance as mayor was also recognized beyond Solo, as he was selected as one of the best local leaders by TEMPO Magazine in 2008408; he was honoured with the Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award in 2010409 and received other awards.410 Furthermore, it was this leadership legitimacy that would see Jokowi elected as Governor of Jakarta in 2012 and ultimately as President of Indonesia in 2014, suggesting that the legitimacy and profile he developed in Solo was largely personal rather than party (PDIP) or government (City of Solo) based. Many scholars have analysed Jokowi’s political emergence from different perspectives. Some argue that he was one success story of democratic reform and decentralization, in the midst of unexpected practices of entrenched corruption and patronage politics following the reform.411 Others discuss his emergence from the small- town arena to the national stage in terms of whether it foreshadows the emergence of new

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 408 “10 Tokoh 2008: Mereka Bekerja Dengan Hati Menggerakkan Daerah.” 409 “Jokowi Dan Herry Zudianto Meraih BHACA 2010 | Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award,” accessed December 2, 2012, http://bunghattaaward.org/?p=94. 410 See Jokowi’s CV submitted to KPU for Presidential Election 2014. 411 See for examples: Ida Widianingsih and Elizabeth Morrell, “Participatory Planning in Indonesia: Seeking a New Path to Democracy,” Policy Studies 28, no. 1 (2007): 1-15; Majeed, “Defusing a Volatile City, Igniting Reforms.”

!|!Page!154! ! ! national leadership.412 His emergence has also been analysed as a sort of populism phenomena, particularly in works that describe Jokowi’s political success in the Jakarta gubernatorial and Indonesian presidential elections.413 Focusing on his mayoral term in Solo, this chapter offers insights about the dynamics of Jokowi’s policies and style of leadership that helped him to create a popular profile as successful local government leader, based on his personal political legitimacy. In understanding the extension of Jokowi’s legitimacy base in government, the starting point of analysis in this chapter is Stillman’s definition of legitimacy as a condition of compatibility between government actions and popular expectations414, combined with Rothstein’s perspective on post-election legitimation by examining government effectiveness in responding to public interest on the basis of impartiality.415 The proposition of this framework, as mentioned in chapter 1, is that the sustainability of electoral legitimacy would depend on the extent to which people accept and acknowledge the government’s actions in implementing authority. Such actions are however not autonomous, but influenced by other actors in the polity. Likewise, the structure of popular expectation is not constant and may be shaped by dominant power in the society. And to examine the broadening base of legitimacy, the discussion will focus on Jokowi’s policy choices and leadership style. The main argument developed here is that during the mayoralty, Jokowi’s political legitimacy had broadened across sections of the community, mainly for his capability to manage various and (sometimes) conflicting interests in many areas of urban governance. This capability was fortified by the effective implementation of policies, which on the one hand addressed concrete popular needs in basic services, while on the other hand served the interests of elite in the city. His style of leadership, which was open-minded, and a willingness to build direct communication and closer engagement with various actors and the community in the city, was also popularly recognized. Jokowi’s policies and style benefitted the marginalized community, but it doesn’t mean that he sidelined elite interests or sought to alter elite domination in Solo. Instead, his policies and style of leadership !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 412 Dave McRae, “Indonesian Politics in 2013: The Emergence of New Leadership?” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 49, no. 3 (2013): 289-304. 413 See Abdul Hamid, “Jokowi’s Populism in the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33, no. 1 (2014): 85-109; Marcus Mietzner, “Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia,” Policy Studies, no. 72 (2015). 414 Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy.” 415 Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy versus Quality of Government,” 1. See also Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, “What is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions,” Governance 21, no. 2 (2008): 165-90.

!|!Page!155! ! ! largely maintained the status quo more effectively and, in part, more equitably. In Solo, Jokowi was able to develop policies and leadership that effectively managed conflicting community interests. This outcome helped him to create legitimacy as leader because it was a good fit with both the local agenda and the discourse of democratic reform more generally. The impacts of Jokowi’s mayoralty on either party or government legitimacy are doubtful, however. This chapter is organized as follows. The first part reviews contested public expectations faced by Jokowi in most areas such as the informal sector, traditional markets and aspirations for reform. Rather than simply listing these agenda, I will explain that expectations were to a great extent expressing contested interests among actors. The second part examines Jokowi’s policies. I argue that it is evident that Jokowi was able to generate broad support for his policies by accommodating grassroots ideas and interests into his policies and implementing them, while also facilitating the interests of elites (including business) in the city at the same time. Beyond the policies, his style of openness and direct communication also helped Jokowi to manage conflicting interests, as well as to gain more inputs to make his policies more acceptable. Finally, in the conclusion I will show that the process of creating legitimacy in government is not simply a matter of compatibility, but also reflects dynamic relations between actors and contested expectations. In this regard, Jokowi could position himself as a skilful conductor in managing the plurality of interests and resources into government outcomes that were acceptable to most sections of the Solo community.

2.! Contested expectations: familiar issues, a new tone Emerging from the image of Slamet’s government and his weak leadership performance, Jokowi also faced different and contested public expectations in governing the city. In relation to key agendas such as informal sector management (i.e. street vendors and traditional market) and governance reform (i.e. improvement of public services and administrative reform), Jokowi needed to deal with various sections of the community, which had different and (sometimes) conflicting interests. The challenges of Jokowi’s leadership resonated in the Central Java Governor’s speech during the mayoral inauguration on 29 July 2005. The Governor highlighted several agendas that required immediate action from Jokowi and Rudy: to deal with the problems of land and space grabbing (including by street vendors), development of the under-developed area of

!|!Page!156! ! ! northern Solo, and budget efficiency.416 The public expectations Jokowi faced were not only broad in terms of the scope of issues, but also reflected contested interests among different actors and segments of the Solo community. One of the most widely discussed issues was how to deal with the informal economy (mainly in managing street vendors and traditional markets). The unregulated street vendors (Pedagang Kaki Lima – PKL) had been a topic of discussion in Solo post 1998. For many Solonese who lived in poverty, PKL was an alternative to sustain their economy, especially in the aftermath of crisis and riots in the 1990s. But for other sections of the community, growing numbers of PKL had been a source of untidiness and loss of public space, since these vendors occupied pedestrian walks, parks and other unused land. Also, the government’s view in that period was that the PKL were perceived as a problem, rather than acknowledged as part of the city’s economic life. In order to handle the existence of PKL, Slamet’s government had planned policies such as relocation, refurbishment of vendors’ stalls, and development of a permanent market place. Some of these policies were partially implemented, but in general they were not effective, mainly due to the reliance on a bureaucratic approach and lack of direct communication to persuade vendors.417 In general, the PKL resisted the government’s plans, particularly in the case of plans to relocate them to the outskirts of the city; as such a move would affect their income sustainability.418 On the issue of permanent traditional markets, contested interests were also visible. Besides being a popular sector of the economy, the traditional market had been a cultural icon in Solo. Within a radius of 44 square kilometres of city territory, there are 36 traditional market buildings, with thousands of shelters and kiosks for small/traditional traders. These marketplaces are not just for commercial activities, but also serve as an arena for social interaction.419 Despite their importance to the city’s social and economic

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 416 See “Empat Persoalan Diminta Diselesaikan,” Suara Merdeka, July 29, 2005. A controversy clouded the ceremony. Pattiro examined the cost of inauguration and found it was too expensive, due to large numbers of invitations, especially Jokowi’s team. Jokowi himself did not deal with details of the ceremony, as it was organized by DPRD. To ease the controversy, the coordinator of Jokowi’s team, Bimo Putranto (PDIP politician & DPRD member), returned the invitation. On the day of inauguration PDIP supporters gathered outside city hall. 417 See for example, “PKL Banjarsari Tetap Harus Dipindah”; “Pemkot Beluk Sikapi PKL Jl. Bhayangkara,” Solo Pos, January 23, 2004; “Satpol PP Bongkar Paksa Kios PKL Di Solo Baru,” Solo Pos, January 29, 2004. The criticism of Slamet’s government’s approach to manage street vendors was also reflected in the interviews with activists of Pattiro and Kompip. 418 The resistance of vendors during that period could be traced to newspaper (Solo Pos and Suara Merdeka) coverage, from October to December 2015. In the interviews, some CSO activists also shared their stories about contested interests during PKL relocation. 419 In Furnivall’s dual economy, the traditional market was described as the face of Indonesian traditional economic life. See Furnivall, Netherlands India.

!|!Page!157! ! ! structure, the conditions of traditional market buildings were generally poor, with muddy floors, dirty walls and unsafe electricity installation. As the socio-cultural icon of the city, it was a more visible symbol of poverty and economic vulnerability. Moreover, their sustainability was also under threat due to the growing numbers of modern stores (malls, superstores and minimarts), as a result of the government granting permission for development. Prior to 2005, the city regulation that related to traditional markets only covered fees payable for traders. Traders and community figures had voiced the interest in protection and revitalization of traditional markets, but it seemed that government was not concerned. The traders from the traditional market were active in articulating their interests. Their association (Paguyuban Pasar Tradisional Surakarta – Papatsuta) drew up a petition, asking the city government to: 1) review the plan of traditional market revitalization on the basis of participation and Solo's socio-economic character; 2) amend the local regulation 8/1999 on fee retribution, as it was an added burden for traders; 3) not discriminate against the traditional economy sector and to protect the sustainability of the traditional market from the influx of the modern market.420 More specific and concrete demands arose for each market. One example was the traders of Klewer market, the central market for batik products (Javanese traditional garments), who proposed that the building should be renovated due to its poor condition and unsafe electricity installation.421 Slamet’s government did not renovate this market, despite this demand. Another example was the plan to re-develop the Nusukan market in Northern Solo, after it was damaged by fire in July 2004. The contested interests between the government and traders emerged as the proposal for development was launched. The traders rejected the government’s plan for a two-storey modern building as it was seen as inconsistent with the character of the traditional market, in addition to which the lease for the kiosk and shelter was expensive. The conflict of interests around the plan of redevelopment also involved the local

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 420 “Pedagang Pasar Sampaikan Petisi Ke Dewan: Pemkot Telah Gagal Kelola Pasar.” 421 Klewer market is popular not just in Solo, but also in the surrounding regions and even beyond. The market evolved along with the development of Kasunanan palace, but the recent building was developed at the end of the 1960s and opened formally by the late President Suharto in 1971. The market is under dual authority as it is culturally a part of Kasunanan, while the management comes under the city government. The fears of traders were realised as the big fire completely destroyed the market in early 2015. Association of Klewer Market Traders (Himpunan Pedagang Pasar Klewer – HPPK).

!|!Page!158! ! ! neighbourhoods, as they rejected the temporary market, which would be built on the community sports ground.422 Other contested interests that involved members of the Solo community and the government were land grabbing and illegal settlement. As explained in chapter 2, popular land grabbing was extensive during the 1990s crisis, at a time when government capacity was also weak to enforce the law and regulations regarding popular land grabbing of government land, riverbanks, railroad sidings and other uninhabited land.423 From the government's perspective, land grabbing was certainly illegal; however many settlers demanded legal status by asking the government to issue a certificate of ownership. Another public expectation, but less contested in public discourse, was public sector reform. The voices for such reform were not however exclusively in Solo, but part of good governance agenda promoted across the country in post 1998, wherein the expectation for greater roles of government to restore the economy and improve public services provision were high, though the capability of government itself was limited and still under reform. One of the vocal aspirations from civil society activists in Solo related to issues of transparent government and anti-corruption, bureaucratic reform, and improved provision of public services. They noted that Slamet’s government was ineffective in responding to their interests on a reform agenda, and was involved in corruption.424 Interestingly, the aspirations to improve basic services, such as health and education, especially for poor people’s access, were not as popular as the anti-corruption agenda among activists. With regard to bureaucracy reform, a strong voice for administrative services, particularly regarding the business permit process, was also aspiration of the candidates who were mostly from the business community.425 On this issue, Jokowi expressed his great interest.426 As he wrote in an article in Solo Pos, “Solo Harus Lebih Baik” (Solo Must Be Better), one of his main intentions was to boost the city’s economic productivity and investment in services, trade and the tourism sector.427 To do so, his first priority was

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 422 See “Warga Tetap Tolak Pasar Darurat Prawit,” Solo Pos, August 31, 2005; “Forkommas Gelar Malam Keprihatinan. Walikota: Segera Selesaikan Polemik Pasar Darurat Prawit,” Solo Pos, August 6, 2005. 423 On this problem, see; “Pengkavling Terbanyak Di Bantaran Kalianyar,” Solo Pos, August 27, 2005; “Camat Dan Lurah Diinstruksikan Mblabak. Walikota: Selesaikan Pemetaan Kavling Liar Dalam Sepekan,” Solo Pos, August 9, 2005. 424 Interview with Didik Wahyudiono, interview; Setyo, interview; Akbarudin Arif, interview. 425 As explained in chapter 4, during campaign the candidates such as Hardono and other candidates in PDIP convention spoke about the need for business permit reform. 426 See Joko Widodo, “Kota Solo Harus Jadi Lebih Baik,” Solo Pos, November 12, 2005. 427 Ibid.

!|!Page!159! ! ! to develop a more business friendly environment through reforming the bureaucracy for business permits. He believed in the potential of the city’s economy, but before he offered the business opportunity to the investor, he needed to reform the quality of services. It seemed that his background as a businessman influenced his way of seeing the city as a kind of commodity. Jokowi’s vision for the importance of economic development was confirmed in his speech after a minor riot between two groups of gangsters in 2012, when he insisted on the importance of city stability as an absolute condition for economic development.428 A similar vision was revealed in his interviews with the mass media, as he frequently cited the importance of management of product, as the strategy to advertise the city.429 From inside the DPRD, members also echoed the need for more effective government in public services, bureaucratic reform, and more coordination between the mayor and his deputy. Abdullah A.A., DPRD member of PAN, for example, insisted that Jokowi had to implement his slogan of ‘Berseri Tanpa Korupsi’ (Brilliant without Corruption) in bureaucracy and public services improvement.430 As a legislator from a small party, he reminded Jokowi to avoid nepotism and partisanship, and to pursue fair leadership for all, regardless of party affiliation. PKS Solo leader, Haryanto, adopted a similar tone, insisting that Jokowi commit to anti-corruption in government, provide cheaper or free education and health services for the poor, and make the bureaucracy more professional.431 The bureaucracy made no initial statement regarding the reform agenda at the outset of Jokowi's term in office, but as will be shown in on the sub-section on administrative reforms below, it subsequently resisted his efforts at administrative reform. On the importance of coordination between the mayor and his deputy, Faried Badres (head of the DPRD) expected the pair to avoid the disharmony that had characterised the previous government. He insisted on a clear job division between the mayor, deputy mayor and secretary of the city.432 Furthermore, Faried also underlined good relations between the executive and the DPRD as a condition for effective government. On this issue, Rudy promised to develop a more coordinated leadership. He

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 428 This is the main point of Jokowi’s speech in the reconciliation meeting after the minor riots that involved two gangster groups in May 2012. 429 See for example, Andy Narendra, Wawancara Dengan Joko Widodo (Jokowi), accessed March 21, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpk9bxkmYEg. 430 “Buktikan Berseri Tanpa Korupsi,” Solo Pos, July 28, 2005. 431 Ibid. 432 “Harus Ada Pembagian Tugas,” Suara Merdeka, July 29, 2005; “Rudy Mundur Jika Diperlakukan Seperti Pak J,” Solo Pos, July 29, 2005.

!|!Page!160! ! ! pledged to resign if he failed to develop good relations with the mayor. But given his position as PDIP’s leader and the figure who had played a significant role in Jokowi’s emergence, Rudy’s pledge reflected his desire for substantial power-sharing in government. And to remind the public about Jokowi’s promises, on the day of inauguration, Solo Pos highlighted Jokowi’s platform and campaign agenda on the front page, including the slogan of ‘Berseri Tanpa Korupsi’ and the main points of the campaign. (These were a commitment to assist the poor, cheaper or free basic public services, bureaucratic reform, and his pledge to resign if he failed to fulfil his promises.)433 Jokowi faced high public expectations at the outset of his term, for two reasons. The first was the nature of his electoral legitimacy, directly elected by the people. Direct elections, as explained in the previous chapter, had forced the political leader to develop closer relations with the people and to implement authority in favour of public interests in order to maintain support and trust. And the second factor was public discontent with Slamet’s government in addressing problems in the city and the reform agenda. In terms of substance, the public aspirations (and associated controversies) outlined in this section had mostly been present in Solo since the beginning of the post 1998 democratic transition, but the emergence of a directly elected mayor had made these familiar issues more popularly attractive. The following section discusses what Jokowi did in government to address those challenges, and the extent to which his policies and approach were effective, which helped him expand his base of political legitimacy.

3.! Creating legitimacy in government: popular style of leadership and policies Over the course of his mayoralty, Jokowi not only maintained his base of legitimacy in the PDIP, but also broadened this base across parties and sections of the Solo community. I will demonstrate here that his strong legitimacy was a result of popular policies and his style of leadership, which maintained intimate interaction with various actors in the city. Those factors had helped Jokowi to manage contested interests in the city, which in turn helped him create a broader base of legitimacy. Similar to other popular local leaders in post decentralization Indonesia, Jokowi adopted social policies to deliver concrete benefits for the poor section of the community.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 433 “Hari Ini, Gubernur Lantik Jokowi - Rudy,” Solo Pos, July 28, 2005.

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His policies to address the informal sector were also appreciated as he was seen to have empathy with traders. Similar, Jokowi’s bureaucracy reforms enabled him to deliver better administrative services for Solo citizens. Jokowi’s achievements in these areas do not mean that he only served popular interests. In fact, the policies he adopted also facilitated the interests of social and economic elites in the city, rather than sidelining them. Even his vision on city economic development was in line with the interests of dominant elites, as he envisioned economic productivity and investment in services, trades and the tourism sector. And, as previously mentioned, one of his first priorities in government was to develop a more business friendly environment through reforming the bureaucracy for business permits. But still, for most people, what Jokowi had delivered seemed to be compatible with their demands and this was confirmed in the re-election result in 2010 and beyond. Furthermore, the people of Solo admired Jokowi’s leadership style, typified by direct and intimate communication with all segments of the community (people and elites) and his ability to get the job done. To a greater extent, his leadership style was effective for managing conflicting interests in many areas of policy, as well as to harness the tradition of popular recalcitrance. It seemed that, for Jokowi, politics is an art to reach proportional consensus between contradictory elements, rather than a zero-sum game or a winner takes all model. And the way in which he managed different (and sometimes conflicting) interests reminds us how a furniture maker assembles different sizes and pieces of wood to become a fine chair, table, etc. Jokowi appeared to apply similar logic in managing the city. Rather than focusing on one aspect and putting aside another, he tended to accommodate various and different streams of interests (and actors) into one big picture of Solo’s polity. The following is a detailed discussion of how Jokowi managed different and conflicting interests during his mayoral term, by focusing on his leadership style and select policies. a.! The style of direct communication and popular engagement Direct communication and popular engagement with the people had been Jokowi’s leadership trademark. Such a style was a part of his success in winning electoral legitimacy in 2005, and this approach remained consistent during his mayoralty. The style was not only in contrast with the previous mayor’s, but was also uncommon from the perspective of noble Javanese political culture. In the Javanese noble conception, legitimacy of power was developed through mystical narratives and people were positioned as objects rather

!|!Page!162! ! ! than as the subjects of power; therefore they had no right to question the source of legitimacy.434 Originating from commoners, a political figure like Jokowi (in spite of his status as an economic elite) would have no legitimacy to claim the Javanese noble basis of power, and therefore his political emergence offers a different perspective on how leadership in Javanese society legitimizes power other than the established elitist conception. Direct engagement with the people is certainly part of the general discourse of democratic culture, but in the specific context of Solo, it also has strong compatibility with popular conceptions such as ‘pemimpin merakyat’, a leader with grassroots origins and orientation.

Origins of style Jokowi nurtured the style of direct communication and engagement during his candidacy and campaign, and maintained that style after formally being inaugurated as mayor. On the first day in office, he had even shocked the bureaucracy by asking the heads of city departments to accompany him when visiting the clusters of poor communities in the city. After a short introductory meeting, Jokowi asked the bureaucratic leaders to follow him to get out from the city hall for unannounced visits to kampongs and slum areas –where poor people and other social-economic disadvantaged groups lived. A Semarang- based newspaper, Suara Merdeka, labelled the event with a Javanese term, blusukan. The newspaper reported the following passage: The first day in office, Solo Mayor, Ir. H. Joko Widodo led heads of city departments to do blusukan (impromptu visit) to slum neighborhood who settled illegally on the state-owned land. The first kampong he visited was RW 7, Kentheng, Semanggi, Pasar Kliwon, where he found families live in a very poor condition, in inappropriate housing. He found a similar situation in Kampong Kragilan, Kadipiro, where about 35 families occupied the state-owned land too. In those kampongs Jokowi met some kids not able to go to school because the parents could not afford to pay school-fee. The mayor called the head of education department, H. Kuswanto, and asked him to take action to enrol them in a school.435

The impromptu visit had surprised members of the community and many were enchanted that their leader had made an unannounced visit.436 While for the head of departments who were used to working mostly in offices, the visit had given them an idea of the type of mayor they would deal with. Jokowi’s blusukan had symbolically challenged the established style of pejabat (public official leader or pejabat) culture, associated with an

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 434 See Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Society.” 435 “Walikota Blusukan Ke Perkampungan,” Suara Merdeka, July 30, 2005. 436 “Walikota Jokowi Bikin Ngos-Ngosan Pejabat Pemkot,” Solo Pos, July 30, 2005.

!|!Page!163! ! ! image that the elites in government and politics should have a distant relationship with the common people. Jokowi’s ritual of blusukan was not merely a one-off event. He maintained regular visits during his term as mayor, and blusukan have become his trademark as Jakarta Governor and as President. In a more formal process, in Solo he institutionalised community visits, called mider projo – a Friday morning tour to neighbourhoods in order to check on the progress of government projects and to listen directly to community aspirations on various issues. With mider projo, Jokowi could not only create an opportunity for meeting people and listening to their expectations, but to collect firsthand information about concrete problems at the grassroots level, such as: 1) children who were not able to obtain basic education due to parents’ poverty; 2) housing problems faced by the poor and illegal land grabbers; and 3) the daily life of people who endure vulnerable socio-economic conditions. With blusukan and mider projo, Jokowi could identify community problems and take immediate and concrete solution to solve them. One example was the dropout rate of students. When he found school-age children stayed at home because their parents could not pay their school fees, he gave a direct order to the head of the education department to enrol them at the nearest school, and granted a fee waiver. He then established a taskforce for identifying dropout students in each neighborhood and putting them back in schools.437 In the subsequent section on adoption of social policy, I will explain that Jokowi transformed his concern on difficulties of poor families to access basic education into social policy on education subsidy. A similar action was taken on illegal settlement and land grabbing including increasing numbers of street vendors. From his blusukan, Jokowi then established an inter-departmental team to identify clusters and numbers of illegal settlements in each kampong. He realized however that these problems could not be resolved immediately, as the roots ran deep in socio-economic vulnerability, and therefore he insisted that forceful relocation was not part of the solution. Blusukan and mider projo reflect a view that the leader of government and political elites should develop close relationships with the people, an antithesis to the established mindset of the distant pejabat style. With his style, Jokowi had imposed a new culture of melayani (to serve) upon the leader of bureaucracy that used to be associated with the established pejabat style of dilayani (to be served). Furthermore, he also gave instructions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 437 “Siswa Putus Sekolah Difasilitasi,” Suara Merdeka, August 1, 2005.

!|!Page!164! ! ! to the head of sub-district (kecamatan) and kampong (kelurahan) to stay at their official residence. In his view, their presence in the community would be useful for developing closer engagement between the bureaucracy and the community, and furthermore it would foster more responsive and responsible government. Jokowi also expected the bureaucracy leaders at this level to submit factual reports on socio-economic problems such as clusters of illegal housing and street vendors. By asking the bureaucracy to prepare a factual report, Jokowi seemed to eliminate the culture of asal bapak senang (making a fake or hyped report to please the leader) that has been a part of the bureaucratic patrimonial culture. Not all bureaucrats were happy with Jokowi’s style, but among the young generation of bureaucrats such a style was inspiring.438 Jokowi himself realized that it was difficult to change the established culture of bureaucracy, but he insisted that he would dismiss those from leadership positions who could not follow his agenda.439 In addition to blusukan and mider projo, Jokowi also aggregated popular expectations on policy issues by providing a new channel of communication. He introduced the SMS hotline number that was popular in that period to obtain direct input from the public on various issues.440 Within just two months after launching the hotline in August 2005, around 13,000 SMS texts were received on issues such as street vendors and illegal housing relocation, education subsidies, and other popular issues such as the increase in fuel prices.441 A number of SMS messages reflected public enthusiasm for the new channel to express aspirations. On Jokowi’s part, he used public voices such as compilations of SMS messages to claim that the policies he adopted on hot button issues, such as street vendors and illegal settlement relocation, were in line with popular aspirations. Another channel was a weekly column in Solo Pos, Walikota Menjawab. But rather than aggregating public interest, this column served more as a medium for socialization of government policies, such as the implementation of national program on school operational subsidies (BOS), street vendors’ relocation, and business permit reform.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 438 Interviews with Harjana, June 12, 2012 and Subagyo, May 31, 2012. 439 During a TV interview Jokowi claimed he had sacked some heads of districts and departments as they were not supporting his agenda for business permit and KTP reform, see Shihab, Jokowi@Mata Najwa. Also, the deputy head of the DPRD, M. Rodhi said in an interview that many times Jokowi shared the stubbornness of bureaucracy in Solo towards the idea of change. 440 “Walikota Tampung Saran Dan Kritik Lewat SMS,” Solo Pos, August 2, 2005. 441 Solo Pos, October 2005.

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The above methods of communication and interest aggregation were evidence that Jokowi had tried to develop a role as a direct representative of the people.442 Those were evidence that Jokowi had tried to develop a role as a direct representative of the people. As explained earlier, Jokowi’s style of direct engagement and communication has been attractive for the mass media in Solo. He was mindful about the importance of mass media to develop popularity. And the extensive coverage of the ways he connected with people shows the strategic role of media in framing what is seen as compatible with public demands. In this regard, the role of mass media in creating legitimacy is evident. In the dominant culture of political leadership in Indonesia, his style did not match Sukarno’s strong rhetoric and charismatic personality as appealing factors for solidarity. He was certainly different from the New Order Suharto style of militarized elite of priyayi and how they interacted with people on the basis of political subjugation and order. On his part, what Jokowi did in Solo was to develop an engagement with people by showing personal empathy to their problems, and to a certain degree accommodating their interests, while imposing technocratic capacities to run government effectively. With such a style he was successful not only in building closer relations with the people and nurturing his image as a genuine leader of the common people, but also in managing different interests in the city. His style proved to be effective in governing various issues in the city.

Effectiveness of direct communication and engagement The way Jokowi developed direct communication and engagement with people had made it possible for him to develop a broader legitimacy base for his policies and his position as mayor. At the operational level, he proved that his leadership style was effective in managing disputes and resolving contentious issues. In a government system that was run under the formal procedures of bureaucracy, which was ineffective in addressing various competing interests in Solo, the informal and direct communication approach seemed to be a breakthrough. In the view of Rudy, who had introduced Jokowi to politics, the political leader in Solo should listen more to the people in order to solve problems.443 Jokowi himself admitted that actually people had a lot of ideas for developing their community, and therefore the main task of the political leader was to facilitate those

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 442 See Carlos Blanco, “Reform of the State: An Alternative for Change in Latin America,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 606, no. 1 (2006): 231-43. 443 Interview with FX. Hadi Rudyatmo, May 7, 2012.

!|!Page!166! ! ! ideas.444 Community members praised Jokowi’s openness, saying that in the case of creative performance, Jokowi had actively facilitated and even played a part in preparing many cultural and art events in Solo.445 The following discussion details the effectiveness of leadership style to manage conflicts in the city. One test of Jokowi’s leadership in his early months in government was to resolve the dispute for the redevelopment of Nusukan market, after it was burnt in 2004. As mentioned before, the plan proposed by Slamet’s government had caused contention between traders and investors, and then with neighbourhoods as well. The traders’ association Paguyuban Pedagang Pasar Nusukan (Pappan – Association of Nusukan Market Traders) rejected the design of a two-storey building that out of character with the nature of the traditional market as well as plans for expensive rent for kiosks/shelters.446 The dispute had caused a split in the traders’ association and some traders established a new association, Paguyuban Pedagang Pasar Tradisional Nusukan (P3TN – Association of Nusukan Traditional Market Traders). Meanwhile, the neighbourhood rejected the temporary market at the local sports ground for sanitation reasons. The failure of the plan was due to government’s insistence on formal and bureaucratic measures to respond to traders’ aspirations, and the use of intimidation to pressure traders and the community. Jokowi adopted a different approach to implement the redevelopment plan. He invited all traders to a meeting at city hall on 25 October 2005. From about 489 registered traders, 330 attended the meeting. At the meeting Jokowi asked the traders to speak directly about their personal expectations and ideas for redeveloping the market. To ensure that traders spoke to their personal concerns, Jokowi did not allow the leaders of associations to speak. He insisted that the forum was for the real traders. By doing so, it was clear that Jokowi had placed the process of negotiation between himself and the traders, without any involvement from leaders of associations that used to claim legitimate representation. With such direct communication, Jokowi could aggregate the voices of traders, without any intervention from association leaders, some of whom were suspected to have a vested interest in acting as brokers for the lease of new kiosks.447 Also, Jokowi was able communicate his view directly to the traders.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 444 See Shihab, Jokowi@Mata Najwa. 445 Interview with Hari Mataya, July 7, 2014. 446 “Pedagang Tuntut Harga Los/Kios Lebih Murah. Walikota Diminta Tegas Soal Pasar Nusukan,” Solo Pos, October 15, 2005. 447 Ibid.

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As the previous policy process for redevelopment was elite-centric, direct communication could ease asymmetric information between the government and traders. For traders the meeting was the first opportunity to speak with the mayor about their concerns and interests in a direct way, and for most of them, the visit to city hall itself (the place wherein the highest political hierarchy in the city is seated) was an unusual experience. At the end of the meeting, Jokowi showed respect to all traders by shaking hands, an unexpected, humble demeanour from a political leader towards the people. The traders were pleased with Jokowi’s approach. At this point he had won trust from traders, a condition necessary for breaking up the standstill and further to develop his base of policy legitimacy. After some meetings, the traders accepted a new agreement for a cheaper kiosk/shelter rent and other arrangements for temporary shelter offered by the government. Jokowi applied a similar approach to discuss community opposition to the temporary market at the local sports ground. He spoke directly with communities, and then accommodated their concerns about sanitation and gave a guarantee that the government would return the land to a sports ground after the new market was opened. With such direct communication, Jokowi capably managed the competing interests surrounding the plan for redevelopment. Not all actors were impressed with the way Jokowi resolved the deadlock, however, particularly the associations that used to play a role as the representatives of traders. They could not regain their roles as legitimate representatives of traders, however, since most of them were in fact not genuine traders, and also their role had been sidelined by Jokowi’s approach, which made conflict management easier and culturally more acceptable. The competing interests still existed, but Jokowi had won support from traders and community to implement the project. In extending his base for leadership legitimacy, Jokowi had also developed close relations with civil society actors in Solo. In the early period of reform, civil society had a meaningful role in driving political change and in pursuing democratic reform. They were also effective at channelling the aspirations of marginalized groups. In early 2000, for example, the consortium of NGOs proposed a city development strategy, which concerned basic public services improvement and local economy recovery, to the city government.448 They were also strong advocates for participatory planning, adopted in 2004, and other reform agendas such as transparency and community development.449

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 448 Didik Wahyudiono, interview. 449 Interview with senior Solo Pos journalist, Ichwan Prasetyo, July 9, 2014.

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In spite of his lack of political background and experience, Jokowi appeared to realize the strategic position of civil society as influential actors in the community. In distinct contrast to Slamet’s relations with civil society actors that was seen as confrontational, Jokowi developed more cooperation regarding the policy process.450 In city planning, for example, he broadened community delegates in Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan (Musrenbang – a participatory planning mechanism) by accommodating the proposal of the NGOs consortium that marginalized sector representatives should take part, drawn mainly from the informal sector (e.g. traditional traders, becak riders and PKL).451 Jokowi also showed concern in the implementation of Musrenbang by attending some meetings at kampongs and those at the sub-district level. Though NGO activists and community figures were sceptical regarding planning outcomes, community members appreciated Jokowi’s presence at meetings. Civil society actors were also accommodated in the implementation of policies and programs. For poverty eradication, for example, Jokowi implemented a national program to establish the Team for Poverty Eradication (Tim Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah – TPKD) by involving NGO activists.452 There was similar cooperation for cultural events, as he facilitated community art workers to express their creative works.453 For community development and informal economy management, Jokowi’s cooperation with NGOs was also fruitful. He received assistance from Solo Kota Kita (SKK) to document socio- economic profiles and basic public infrastructure at 52 kampongs, under a project called kampong improvement program454, while on the issue of the informal economy, he received useful input from SOMPIS and KOMPIP.455 Jokowi’s cooperative relations with civil society were also manifested in budget transparency and accountability, which were popular issues after 1998. The aspiration for more accountable government was audible during the first direct elections in Solo, as some DPRD members (1999–2004) including Slamet were involved in local budget corruption. Jokowi’s slogan, Berseri Tanpa Korupsi (Brilliant without Corruption) was popular during the campaign, though he offered no clear details regarding anti-corruption policies or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 450 For analysis on the growing demands for citizens’ participation in democracy, see for example Andrea Cornwall, “Locating Citizen Participation,” IDS Bulletin 33, no. 2 (2002): i–x; Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, “Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance,” Politics and Society 29, no. 1 (2001): 5-42. 451 On the participatory planning mechanism, see Perwali Solo 10/2006. 452 Interview with Sammy, June 4, 2012. 453 Interviews with Hari Mataya, July 7, 2014 and Mayor Harianto, July 5, 2014. 454 Interview with Ahmad Rifa’I, May 15, 2012. An NGO, Solo Kota Kita, developed the profile of each kampong in Solo, which covered information on basic population statistics, community infrastructure and social conditions. 455 Akbarudin Arif, interview, May 11, 2012; Also with Pargito, interview, May 11, 2012.

!|!Page!169! ! ! programs. A concrete policy for implementing anti-corruption only appeared in 2006/07, after Pattiro Solo, an NGO concerned with budget transparency, persuaded Jokowi to publish the city’s development plan and budget. With support from an international donor based in Jakarta, this NGO helped Jokowi to implement budget transparency by publishing a budget summary in the form of a poster and pocket book.456 Beyond Solo, those budget transparency programs had lifted Jokowi’s profile as a local leader with anti-corruption commitment.457 Besides developing productive relations with civil society organizations, Jokowi was open-minded with the broader community and public in general. His openness to criticism about his leadership was tested in the first three months of his mayoral term, when he was perceived as unsuccessful in meeting public expectations. The Student Association of the Public University of Solo (BEM UNS) conducted a survey to evaluate the first 100 days of the new government, with bitter results for Jokowi. The majority of respondents were unhappy with the performance of his government.458 In the economy, particularly employment policy and the informal economy, 71% of respondents were disappointed in his leadership and law enforcement. On law enforcement, people in general were disappointed that Jokowi was yet to take concrete actions to regulate street vendors and illegal housing. At the end of 2005, Jokowi started to launch public consultations for street vendors regulation, particularly the Banjarsari Park cluster, which later on became one of the success stories of his consultative leadership. The most positive perceptions were about education, though only 41% of respondents were satisfied. Jokowi however responded in a positive way and perceived this feedback as input for improvement, rather than a political attack. In a statement to media, Jokowi said, ‘I did not set a target for 100 days, since what I’m doing now is part of the stages of management. And now it is still at the stage of policy mapping. The result will be apparent in two years’. Furthermore, Jokowi took on the evaluation as part of the government checks and balances and said he would learn from that. His expression was humble: ‘if the mark is still red (indicating a bad result), as a student I will work harder, so in the future the result will not be red anymore’.459 Jokowi

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 456 Interviews with Setyo and Andwi Joko, May 12, 2012. 457 As mentioned earlier, he received Bung Hatta Anti Corruption Award in October 2010. The award was established by the consortium of anti-corruption activists based in Jakarta, and would given to the public leader who was seen as committed to developing good and clean government. For further information, see http://bunghattaaward.org/ 458 “Hasil Penelitian BEM UNS: Kinerja Jokowi Rudy Belum Memuaskan,” Solo Pos, November 7, 2005. 459 “Soal Evaluasi 100 Hari, Jokowi: Sudah Pada Penetapan Konsep,” Solo Pos, November 8, 2005.

!|!Page!170! ! ! provided a more complete response to the evaluation in an article he wrote in Solo Pos, ‘Kota Solo Harus Jadi Lebih Baik’ (Solo Must Be Better). In the article, Jokowi expressed appreciation regarding the survey result as necessary criticism and public input, but he also explained his leadership strategy by detailing the stages of management – mapping, planning, formulating and implementation.460 Jokowi (and Rudy) invited the public to offer criticisms and input to the government when he held an open public meeting to evaluate his first year of leadership. At the meeting, praised by many as the new tradition of leadership and government openness to the public voice, Jokowi was also criticised.461 But rather than weakening his position, the openness seemed to generate more support for his government’s policies and specifically for his leadership. Jokowi’s responsiveness to the survey results shows that for him, public opinion was a factor in creating legitimacy. And rather than resisting it, he took it as an input for building stronger legitimacy. Direct communication and engagement has been Jokowi’s prominent strategy to manage relationships with various interests and actors in the city. Such a style was in contrast to the dominant mode of bureaucratic and Javanese elitism legitimation that relied on a formal approach and the application of state power. Also, as the local leader whose legitimacy did not depend on political support from the central government (as in the case of the New Order) or from the political elites or DPRD (as in early decentralization), Jokowi needed to develop the base for legitimacy among the people. And the way he engaged with the people through direct communication and consultation seemed to be an effective way to manage and develop consensus regarding conflicting interests. As a result, Jokowi could generate popular support. The contentious politics did not vanish, but with such an approach it was much more manageable. Jokowi seemed to change the attitude of the bureaucracy in his relations with the people. Some bureaucrats who worked in the city planning office, for example, saw that public input and criticism were important to improve the performance of government services.462 Still, it was doubtful whether this brought fundamental transformation in line with the ideal norm of a professional bureaucracy. The nature of patronage culture meant that bureaucrats needed to follow the direction of the political leader to survive. And many, especially at leadership level, associated with or imitated Jokowi’s style.463 The

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 460 Widodo, “Kota Solo Harus Jadi Lebih Baik.” 461 Solo Pos, August 18, 2006. 462 “Perlu Mekanisme Komplain Layanan Publik Di Pemkot,” Solo Pos, November 28, 2005. 463 Interviews with Hari D. Utomo, May 10, 2012; Harjana, June 12, 2012.

!|!Page!171! ! ! pragmatism of the bureaucracy was also part of the strategy to secure their position in government, politically controlled by the PDIP. Some heads of district government offices (sub-district and kelurahan) admitted their close association with not only Jokowi, but also with the deputy mayor, Rudy. During interviews, when they talked about the principles of government, for example, their terms were exactly the same as Rudy’s.464 Some heads of sub-district displayed their photograph taken with Rudy. Although the bureaucrats adopted Jokowi’s style, it appeared they did so for pragmatic reasons rather than because of a transformation of culture. In the context of declining popular trust in elites and government institutions in that period, with his style of direct communication and engagement, Jokowi had impressed most Solo people. He was able to manage conflicting interests, which created greater legitimacy for his policies. In other words, many of his policies were developed through the mechanism of public engagement, and therefore were more legitimate compared to policies developed through formal bureaucratic procedure. With regard to Javanese culture, this approach was compatible with the principle of ‘nguwongke-uwong’, that is, respecting the dignity of people by placing them as subjects rather than objects of power. Mayor Slamet claimed his leadership was based on this principle, but he failed to put the slogan into action. Jokowi/Rudy were both active in building direct communication with the people in many areas of policy. But rather than sidelining a particular interest, Jokowi accommodated competing interests under the Javanese cultural ideal of harmony, that is, the co-existence of various (and even contradictory) interests in society. With direct communication and engagement, Jokowi was able to harness the culture of recalcitrance, in a relatively small urban community like Solo. The following case of Banjarsari street vendors’ relocation shows how he effectively managed such recalcitrance. b.! Peaceful relocation of Banjarsari street vendors: nurturing the image of ‘Wali Kaki Lima’ The peaceful relocation of Banjarsari street vendors (PKL) to the Notoharjo Klithikan market had been a critical moment for Jokowi’s leadership popularity in Solo, and beyond. National mass media, such as the The Jakarta Post and Kompas, reported the relocation as an unprecedented peaceful relocation of street vendors in Indonesia, in the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 464 Interviews with Subagyo, May 31, 2012; Danang Sulandiriyanto, May 30, 2012.

!|!Page!172! ! ! midst of forceful relocations that had occurred in many other cities.465 When TEMPO selected Jokowi as one of the best local leaders in 2008, he was described as Wali Kaki Lima (the guardian or mayor of street vendors).466 And Jokowi’s visit to Notoharjo market, after the official announcement that he was the president-elect on 26 July 2014, seemed to confirm the importance of this relocation for his political career.467 The process of peaceful relocation had stamped the style of dialogue and consultation.468 Apart from the deliberation of relocation, in Jokowi’s view the PKL was a city economic asset. For him relocation meant city investment (that would bring benefits in the long run), rather than what civil society in Solo had imagined as a policy to empower marginalized groups. Banjarsari is a public park and a monument that commemorates the struggle of the Solo people against Dutch occupation. Located in one of the city’s wealthiest neighbourhoods, hundreds of PKL occupied the park in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis and riots. The number of vendors grew rapidly afterwards, and in 2005 there were nearly 1000 vendors, who defended their existence by establishing associations. There were four associations in Banjarsari, namely: Paguyuban Masyarakat Mandiri (coordinated by Latief Sirat); Guyub Rukun A (coordinated by Edi Sanyoto); Guyub Rukun B (coordinated by Maryadi); Paguyuban PKL 2000 (coordinated by Joko Sugiharto); and one coordinating association Panca Mandiri (coordinated by Edi Sanyoto). The aim of these associations was in general to protect their existence and manage their internal affairs. In terms of policy substance, Jokowi’s plan for the Banjarsari PKL cluster was similar to his predecessor’s: relocation to the outskirts of the city. His plan for relocation was revealed shortly after his inauguration, as he wanted to clean up the park for the 17 August Independence Day celebrations. The vendors responded furiously to the plan, as they would defend their existence at the park at all costs. Fearing that the relocation would trigger another riot, some NGOs suggested Jokowi hold off on the relocation. Instead, they convinced Jokowi to engage in a running dialogue with vendors. In an interview, a Kompip activist claimed: ‘Jokowi owed much to us, since the idea of a running dialogue was from us. At first, he had no genuine idea on how to relocate the vendors peacefully, until we proposed what we called as socio-cratic approach, a combination of social and technocratic approach. We believe that relocation is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 465 Blontank Poer, “Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo: Changing The Face of Surakarta,” The Jakarta Post, 2008. 466 “10 Tokoh 2008: Mereka Bekerja Dengan Hati Menggerakkan Daerah.” 467 Kompas Cyber Media, “Ke Solo, Jokowi Bernostalgia Di Pasar Notoharjo,” KOMPAS.com, n.d., http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/07/26/13403751/Ke.Solo.Jokowi.Bernostalgia.di.Pasar.Notoharjo. 468 “Menangani PKL Ala Solo,” Suara Merdeka, July 27, 2006, sec. Wacana.

!|!Page!173! ! ! not only moving the goods, but more importantly the people, the traders. A social approach therefore should be on top of technocratic one’.469 In response to the NGO activist’s aspiration, Jokowi finally decided to postpone the relocation, and to run a series of dialogues. In part this strategy had generated more legitimacy for the idea of dialogue, as civil society had intended that the voices of the traders be heard. His intention for consultation rather than forceful action was uncommon at a time when in other places relocations had turned into brawls and physical clashes between vendors and the state apparatus. At this point it seemed that he fulfilled his promise to place vendors at the centre of Solo’s socio-economic potential, rather than as a problem to be evicted. He launched the first meeting on 16 August 2005, by inviting coordinators of PKL associations to Loji Gandrung (the official residence of mayor) for lunch. For the vendors’ coordinators, it was their first experience of being invited to the mayor’s residence, let alone for lunch. Although the meeting was to discuss the relocation, as the host Jokowi did not talk specifically about the plan. Instead, he said over lunch: ‘there will be no formal discussion, nothing serious to talk about. We are here for a friendly chatting, having lunch, and [get] to know each other’.470 Furthermore, the deputy mayor, Rudy, added sympathetically; ‘Please don’t feel worried that you will be relocated. Once I was also unfortunate. Mr. Mayor was in the past also part of small people who had nothing, though now he is a successful businessman. So he understands your situation’.471 The meeting was certainly only a small step, but it was a breakthrough for further negotiation. Vendors’ coordinators appreciated the meeting, but tension emerged shortly afterwards. Jokowi made a media statement that his target was to restore Banjarsari Park before August 2006. The vendors’ reaction to Jokowi’s plan and timeframe for relocation was divided, as reflected by each association. Two associations would consider accepting the plan, but after Jokowi fulfilled their demands. In this group was Paguyuban Masyarakat Mandiri and Guyub Rukun B. Latief Sirat proposed some conditions for relocation (i.e. public transportation to the new marketplace, design of kiosk based on traders’ aspirations, rest- room facilities, electricity connection, a security system, and a guarantee from government that there would be no new vendors in Banjarsari after the relocation).472 Three

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 469 Akbarudin Arif, interview. 470 “Soal Relokasi PKL Banjarsari, Pemkot Lakukan Inventarisasi Masalah,” Solo Pos, August 18, 2005. 471 “Pemkot Tetap Merelokasi Pedagang Klithikan Banjarsari,” Solo Pos, November 23, 2005. 472 “PKL Banjarsari Ajukan 6 Syarat Pindah,” Solo Pos, August 15, 2005.

!|!Page!174! ! ! associations however rejected the entire plan for relocation; Paguyuban PKL 2000, Guyub Rukun A and the coordinating association Panca Mandiri. In their view, relocation was not a fair policy since the vendors had made a concrete contribution to the city’s economy by creating jobs in the midst of economic difficulty. One of the coordinators, Joko Sugiharto, said: ‘The government should not see us from just one side (as a problem). Though we occupied the revolutionary monument, it doesn’t mean that we disrespect the people who fight for independence (commemorated with the monument). We, PKL, are also heroes, since we survived during the crisis by creating our own jobs’.473 Other vendors emphasized: ‘The government should recognize and treat us (PKL) as a good example of how to survive in a crisis. Which one is better: to be a PKL or low-income migrant worker in other countries?’474 Furthermore, the vendors also asked the government not to take forceful action to relocation them.475 Jokowi pledged that repressive action would be the last choice.476 In the midst of the PKL’s rejection to the plan, other than dialogue, Jokowi also sought support from other parts of the Solo community. For example, he presented his plan at a seminar at the UNS, to argue that the increasing numbers of unregulated PKL and illegal settlement were as a result of government weakness in law enforcement, and therefore he argued that his plan was in accordance with the rule of law. But in doing so he would opt for dialogue and building understanding with all actors within the principle of fairness and wellbeing, rather than using a forceful approach. In supporting the mayor, Rudy insisted that the relocation be in line with people’s aspirations about the park being restored to its original function as a city forest and for communal activities. The way Jokowi’s government pushed the relocation was also through a discouraging discourse, by revealing that most PKL members were not official residents of Solo.477 He published the result of investigations that showed that of 1000 PKLs, only six were in residence at the nearby kampong. The rest were from other kampongs, and most of them came from surrounding regions. On the basis of that data, Jokowi said confidently: ‘Street vendors have to respect the rules of the city, since they are not Solo residents. If you are in Solo, so you have to follow the rules of Solo. For the vendors who reject the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 473 “PKL Banjarsari: Pemkot Jangan Hanya Lihat Satu Sisi,” Solo Pos, August 16, 2005. 474 Ibid. 475 “Tertibkan PKL, Pemerintah Butuh Anggaran 45 M,” Solo Pos, October 25, 2005. The coordinator of Paguyuban Pedagang Kaki Lima Surakarta (Surakarta Vendors Association - Gudang Kalimas), Edy Sanyoto, suggested the government not take forceful action in relocating vendors. 476 “Jokowi: Pemkot Di Masa Lalu Kurang Tegas,” Solo Pos, September 30, 2005. 477 “Warga Setabelan Dukung Relokasi Klithikan,” Solo Pos, September 21, 2005.

!|!Page!175! ! ! rules, we will take hard action’.478 Such discourse was clearly to weaken the position of the vendors, and to gain broader support for relocation. Public aspirations gathered via the SMS hotline, in favour of relocation, had given more legitimacy to the plan of relocation.479 With the aspirations favour for relocation, Jokowi could claim that most part of Solo population supported his policy for regulating the vendors. In spite of attacking the origin of vendors, Jokowi showed respect by promising that relocation would be implemented with fairness. He offered the vendors facilities such as grants to restart their businesses, free kiosks or shelters, free trade permits, and training for upgrading marketing skills.480 The commitment indicated his view that vendors were economic potential, rather than a burden for the city, but again they needed to follow the relocation plan. But, still the PKL defended their position, even by demanding legal status. Jokowi responded by stating that ‘the city government has been open to discussion, but the vendors still rejected the government proposal’. He expressed his impatience in Javanese ‘PKL dikasih hati nggrogoh rempela’481, which means I had done a lot to help vendors, but they still asked for more and more, instead of showing appreciation. He also rejected the accusation that he did not accommodate their aspirations. In a public consultation meeting at the end of 2005, ‘Konsultasi Publik PKL Kawasan Monumen 45 Banjarsari Solo’, Jokowi emphasized: ‘We had a concept, but we still need input from vendors. The government did not make the concept secretly, but we also asked for input from you’.482 According to Pattiro activists, who during the negotiation were on the side of the vendors, the persistence of vendors to reject the relocation was mainly for two reasons. First, they complained about not being involved in designing the area for relocation, and demanded to be included in all steps of relocation to guarantee their interests were represented. Second, the vendors in general admitted the government plan was workable, but there should be a concrete commitment to develop good access to the market and design the kiosk/shelter based on vendors’ needs. Kompip activists stated similar concerns that vendors rejected the plan because they had not been involved in planning and there was no guarantee from government that customers would visit the new location. And finally, after a series of more than 50 meetings and negotiation over seven months, the Banjarsari vendors agreed to the relocation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 478 Ibid. 479 Solo Pos, 20 November 2005. 480 “Tertibkan PKL, Pemerintah Butuh Anggaran 45 M.” 481 “Pemkot Tak Asal Relokasi PKL,” Solo Pos, December 31, 2005. 482 Ibid.

!|!Page!176! ! !

For Jokowi, the successful relocation had been a critical moment, not because the plan was finally implemented, but to develop legitimate policies and output on one of the most critical issues in Solo. The style of dialogue and negotiation as practised in Banjarsari relocation was time consuming, but accepted by both civil society and vendors since the approach was also what they expected. Furthermore, though Jokowi controlled the process, the details for relocation were basically the result of dialogue and consensus that in many ways accommodated the interests of vendors. Accordingly, the process of relocation had a strong base of legitimacy, not only from vendors but from broader segments of the Solo community. Jokowi celebrated the success by wrapping up the process of relocation in the Javanese traditional ceremony of boyongan, wherein Jokowi and Rudy led the long march of vendors from Banjarsari Park in the centre of the city to Notoharjo market, on the south- eastern outskirts of the city, on 23 July 2006. The boyongan ceremony emphasized a peaceful image and marked the relocation as a cultural process. Jokowi, Rudy, and vendors clothed themselves in Javanese traditional costume, while thousands of Solonese witnessed the march along the way. Thus, Jokowi nurtured a strong image as guardian of the PKL, despite the fact that the relocation plan was not fully in the interests of the PKL. Jokowi’s successful approach in relocating the Banjarsari street vendors attracted the attention from not only the local newspapers, but also the Jakarta-based media. The Jakarta Post in 2008, for example, reported the peaceful relocation and framed it as the meaningful effort to change the image of Solo as a city that had often been disrupted by mass riots.483 The peaceful relocation has also been important consideration for Tempo, the influential political magazine published in Jakarta, to name him as one among ten best local leaders in 2010.484 And not only the printed media, some Jakarta-based TV stations, invited Jokowi to talk on their programs. The attention of national media had promoted his reputation to a wider public. The interest of national media had been important for Jokowi in creating a broader national-base of political legitimacy. In spite of the success of dialogue and consultation to legitimise the Banjarsari relocation, Jokowi applied a more formal approach to other PKL clusters. When the PKL had strong associations with and back-up from NGOs his approach was more consultative. However, for PKL clusters that had no strong association or support from NGOs, he applied formal authority as a source of legitimacy for relocation. For example, the PKL

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 483 “Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo: Changing the Face of Surakarta”, The Jakarta Post, 2008. 484 “10 Tokoh 2008: Mereka Bekerja dengan Hati Menggerakkan Daerah”, Tempo, 2008.

!|!Page!177! ! ! occupied government land in front of the Tirtonadi bus terminal, and the city government ordered them to vacate the area that would be developed as City Park. Their demand for compensation was rejected, and the government even intimidated the PKL by using a forceful approach.485 Without an association to defend their common interests and in the absence of NGO support, the PKL cluster was powerless in the face of the city authority. A similar forceful eviction was to PKL at the Sukarno-Hatta monument at Jebres, in the eastern part of the city. Subagyo, the head of Jebres sub-district, justified the relocation by saying, ‘if the vendors occupied one place [that] was not immediately relocated, others would join, and the problem would be[come] more complicated’.486 In other cases, Jokowi adopted a different policy by providing vendors with better shelters and stalls, especially food vendors at Kleco and Galabo, which were ach part of Jokowi’s plan for city culinary attractions. The different treatment of vendors triggered critical examination from the DPRD, as Jokowi’s policy was ambiguous. On the one hand his government enforced relocation and even forcefully closed down the vendors, but on the other hand he facilitated them with better shelters and stalls.487 In spite of different treatment towards the PKL and the fact that relocation was not always helpful to sustain the economy of this informal sector488, the impacts of relocation on the income of the street vendors were unclear. There was no data published by the Solo Statistics Central Bureau (BPS Solo) on the income or other economic indicators of the informal sector, as the reports were based on data from the formal sector of economy. However, the Head of Solo Market Management Agency informed me during an interview that while for the informal sectors, like street vendors and traditional traders, there is no data on income, he claimed many of the street vendors have been successful as merchants after their relocation to the formal market. Nevertheless based on my direct observation, the impacts of relocation varied among vendors, as some gained more wealth, while most of them struggled to survive, while the economic fortunes of others declined. However, many in Solo still perceived the peaceful relocation of the Banjarsari vendors as a milestone in Jokowi’s humanist and participatory approach to manage the informal sector. His moderate resistance towards Banjarsari vendors through consultation, and leading the relocation in a Javanese festival ceremony had provided critical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 485 Solo Pos, September 21, 2005. 486 “PKL Jebres Mengaku Kebingungan. Lahan Alternatif Dikuasai Pedagang Lain,” Solo Pos, October 18, 2005. 487 “Fraksi Di DPRD Kritik Penataan PKL,” Solo Pos, December 1, 2005. 488 In fact, many street vendors could not survive in the new place, such as in Panggungrejo market and also most of the PKL ex-Banjarsari.

!|!Page!178! ! ! momentum for Jokowi to create a broader popular base of leadership legitimacy. Furthermore, he was confident that direct communication and negotiation were an effective approach to manage the city. The momentum of relocation, along with his style of blusukan had been important for Jokowi to create the impression that he worked for the interests of the small people. A senior NGO activist said: ‘from the process of relocation Jokowi knew that working for the interests of small people is politically advantageous.’489 From the process of relocation, Jokowi learned important lessons. First, he found that developing collaboration with NGO activists and other non-government actors was useful to get ideas and support for managing the city. Second, he realized that working for poor-groups would broaden his political base across most sections of Solo society, including the elites who benefitted from the moderation of the popular recalcitrant tradition. And third, with his strategy of dialogue and consultation rather than a formal approach, the government leader could enhance the legitimacy of authority by accommodating popular interests in policy. His political pilgrimage to Notoharjo market after his election as president underlines how important this episode and these lessons were to Jokowi’s political career. c.! Broadening grassroots legitimacy: social policy and administrative reform In the post crisis context, the political leader would utilize social policies and the agenda of reform to generate political support at the grassroots level. This section discusses Jokowi’s policies in the area of basic services provision, and explains how these policies helped Jokowi to maintain and broaden the base of leadership legitimacy. As explained earlier, in the midst of generally sceptical evaluations of the results of local autonomy and decentralization, some local leaders were able to implement social policies and bureaucratic reform to maintain their base of legitimate power in their respective regions. These cases were then popularly called ‘best practice’ of local government. Jokowi seemed to follow this path, as he also managed to develop concrete social policies, particularly in health and education. Such policies were not unique, as they were in line with the national policy framework, and inspired by other local governments. However, for most Solo people, these policies seemed to have great meaning for their broad coverage of services and simple procedures to obtain them. And for bureaucratic reform, Jokowi’s initiatives were to streamline and make administrative services transparent. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 489 Akbarudin Arif, interview.

!|!Page!179! ! !

Jokowi’s social policies and bureaucratic reform were meaningful to the extent that they showed that the government could deliver concrete and effective services for citizens. Dating back to the 2005 election, the agenda was not only promised by Jokowi, but also other candidates. Furthermore, the role of civil society in driving governance reform had also helped Jokowi to develop his image as a leader who was compatible with local reform. In some respects, his policies had certainly fulfilled public expectations on the greater role of government to provide equal access in public services. However, for Jokowi, the policies were also useful instruments for generating broader political support among elites and other sections of community, rather than reflecting the aspirations of civil society activists on deepening democratization through the fulfilment of social citizenship rights. The following subsection discusses how Jokowi developed social policies and bureaucratic reform and the implications for his personal political legitimacy.

Adoption of social policies Jokowi adopted two notable social policies to directly address the needs of the people: Surakarta Health Care (Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat Surakarta – PKMS), introduced in 2007/2008, and Surakarta Education Subsidy (Bantuan Pendidikan Masyarakat Kota Surakarta – BPMKS), introduced in 2010. The main beneficiaries were the poor sections of Solo society who were the main support base of PDIP. Social policies, as for many other local governments, had been effective tools for politicians to create a popular image and reform-minded leadership.490 The social policies in health and education were popular in Indonesia post crisis. The national government initiated policies to provide the poor with a social safety net.491 Such programs included ASKESKIN (Asuransi Kesehatan Keluarga Miskin – Health Insurance for Poor Family)492 and JAMKESMAS (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat – Society Health Insurance)493 for health and BOS (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah – School Operational Subsidy) 494 for education. After the implementation of decentralization, many local governments adopted their own style of social policies in various sectors, particularly to expand national programs. One of the most cited examples in early decentralization was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 490 See for example, Aspinall, “Health Care and Democratization in Indonesia.” 491 Many argue that social policies post crisis were part of global discourse after the Washington consensus. See for example Lutz Leisering, “Extending Social Security to the Excluded: Are Social Cash Transfers to the Poor an Appropriate Way of Fighting Poverty in Developing Countries?” Global Social Policy 9 (2009): 246-72. 492 ASKESKIN stands for Asuransi Kesehatan Keluarga Miskin (poor family health care insurance). 493 JAMKESMAS stands for Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (people’s health insurance). 494 BOS stands for Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (assistance fund for school operational).

!|!Page!180! ! ! health insurance in Jembrana District, Bali. In Solo, Jokowi adopted PKMS two years after he came into power, while BPMKS was launched in the final year of his first term. In spite of pre-existing national programs, for the Solo people PKMS was the first universal local health care insurance, since the program was not only for the poor. All Solo residences, who did not have other health insurance, were eligible for membership. Meanwhile the BPMKS is aimed to guarantee access of children from poor families to basic education. In a television interview, Jokowi admitted that his popularity in the 2010 re- election was mainly because of the effective implementation of PKMS.495 The PKMS was not one of his priorities in his early years of leadership, however, since the program was implemented three years after his inauguration.496 The implementation of programs nevertheless provided legitimacy to his leadership: that he was on the side of the small people. In principle, PKMS gives entitlement to all Solo residences to have access to basic health services, as everybody has the right to membership, except those who have other public insurance, such as health insurance for the poor (ASKESKIN), health insurance for public employees (ASKES PNS), and other social insurance. Despite the principle of universalism, people however need to apply for membership and pay the annual fee of 1000 rupiah (equal to 10 cents AUD). The city government issued two types of cards; the gold card for the very poor people and the silver card for the rest of the Solo population, regardless of their social and economic condition.497 According to the Deputy Head of DPRD (2009–2014), M. Rodhi, the universal principle was adopted in order to avoid conflict in the community, which had emerged due to the conflicting definition of the degree of poverty in the implementation of national policies of ASKESKIN and JAMKESMAS.498 In terms of services, the coverage of PKMS is broad including doctor visits and hospitalization. For silver membership, coverage is limited to general health services, but for gold membership, some advanced health treatments, such as for heart disease and chemotherapy, are part of the entitlement. In spite of the universalistic principle, the main target of PKMS is poor people. As stated in the mayoral decree No. 10/2009: ‘The allocation of the programme is primarily for strengthening health services access for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 495 See Shihab, Jokowi@Mata Najwa. 496 PKMS regulated for the first time in Mayor Regulation No.1/2008, January 7, 2008, on Health Retribution. See ‘Peraturan Walikota No.1/2008 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Peraturan Daerah Kota Surakarta No.8/2007 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Peraturan Daerah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Surakarta Nomor 7/1998 tentang Retribusi Pelayanan Kesehatan’. 497 Types of membership were regulated in Perwali/2007. 498 Mohammad Rodhi, interview.

!|!Page!181! ! ! poorer family, and therefore all expenses for gold card holder would be government cost, with the maximum coverage in accordance with health minister regulation on Jaminan Pelayanan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Jamkesmas – people health care insurance)’. Dating back to the 2005 campaign, the provision of better health services was a part of Jokowi’s campaign, though the concrete program was not mentioned. Health insurance was not even a policy priority, sidelined by the issues of the informal sector and administrative reform. The idea for developing local health insurance arose in Jokowi’s first year in government, when he met with other local leaders at a meeting organized by IPGI Solo and TIFA Foundation in September 2005.499 Local leaders known for their good practices in government attended the meeting of ‘Pertemuan Antar Bupati dan Walikota dalam Mendorong Inovasi Tata Pemerintahan yang Baik’ (Head of district and mayor meeting for fostering good governance innovation), which discussed the importance of local public service innovation, as part of the success story of decentralization. 500 In the forum Jokowi had personal discussions with Winase, a district head from Jembrana known as the pioneer of local health insurance and free education services.501 The meeting seemed to inspire Jokowi, who made a press statement: ‘Free health services, and also in education, would soon be granted to poor families’.502 As a follow up, he then formed a team to prepare policy for Solo health insurance. The secretary of the health agency revealed that the team had visited Jembrana to learn the practices of insurance.503 Besides learning from other local practices, Jokowi was also open to input from the community and other governance actors in the city. Jokowi told a senior journalist in an interview that after he became mayor, he found that many people came to his office everyday to ask for donations to visit the doctor and buy medicine or to pay for education. At the beginning, he helped them, but then he realized the importance of a more systemic solution. At that stage Jokowi accepted broad inputs to create city health insurance. The NGOs like KOMPIP claimed that since the start of Jokowi’s leadership, they had proposed the adoption of local health insurance, especially for ensuring access for poor families. M. Rodhi, the DPRD’s Deputy Head (a member of PKS), also said that the involvement of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 499 IPGI stands for Indonesian Partnership on Local Governance Initiatives. 500 Among the local leaders who attended the meeting were Bupati Winase (Jembrana/Bali), Bupati Latinro Latunrung (Enrekang/Sulawesi Selatan), Bupati Burhanudin (Sambas/Kalbar), Walikota Teuku Heri (Serdang Bedagai/Sumut) and Bupati Abdullah Yahya (Pidie/Aceh). 501 On critical analysis of social policy, see for example Rosser and Wilson, “Democratic Decentralization and Pro-Poor Policy Reform in Indonesia.” 502 “Dialokasikan Bagi Keluarga Pra Sejahtera, Layanan Kesehatan Gratis Akan Diterapkan,” Solo Pos, September 14, 2005; “Pemkot Solo Alokasikan 2 Miliar Untuk Beasiswa,” Solo Pos, October 11, 2005. 503 Interview with Yanti, June 6, 2012. She was the secretary of Solo Health Agency.

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DPRD during the process of policy formulation was intensive, including in the process of budgeting for the program.504 Such aspirations indicated that Jokowi’s initiative for developing local health insurance was compatible with the ideas of both civil society and the DPRD, and in fact met the concrete needs of most people. Jokowi’s openness was an important part of his engagement with communities in Solo and his input into policy making. The Solo local health insurance, PKMS, was implemented in 2008. And though the program was adopted from another district plus the involvement of DPRD and NGO in policy formulation, the biggest credit for the policies mostly should go to Jokowi. The fact that the scheme was finally regulated in the mayor’s decision (Perwali), not in a city regulation (Perda), which required approval from DPRD, indicated that Jokowi tended to identify PKMS as a political product of the mayor. And during the launching of PKMS, Jokowi personally distributed the membership card to communities. The image of PKMS was therefore clear: it was an exclusive product of Jokowi. In the global context, the adoption of PKMS was also compatible with the campaign for pro-poor social policies post crisis. In the logic of post-Washington consensus, the aim is mainly to protect people from further vulnerability and to justify financial and economic reforms conducted under market principles.505 In the national policy context, the adoption of local health insurance like PKMS could be seen as an expansion of the health insurance scheme. But in Solo the program was much more popular, due to everyone having the right to apply for membership and easier access to services. In spite of its small local scope, PKMS helped Jokowi to create an image as a local government leader with an effective policy to address concrete popular needs. Meanwhile the effectiveness of the program generated legitimacy for Jokowi as a mayor who could deliver concrete services for the people. Another social policy Jokowi introduced in Solo was in education services, namely the Surakarta Education Subsidy (Bantuan Pendidikan Masyarakat Kota Surakarta – BPMKS).506 Similar to the health sector, in 2006 the national government had also developed a program for financing basic education, namely the School Operational Subsidy (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah – BOS). In BOS, the role of the local government !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 504 This information of was shared both by the executive and legislative. Ibid.; Mohammad Rodhi, interview. 505 Kurt Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities,” Studies in Comparative International Development 31, no. 3 (1996): 3–31; Kurt Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How Much Affinity?,” Third World Quarterly, 2003, 1095–1115. 506 On BPMKS policy, see Mayor Decree Number 1/2010.

!|!Page!183! ! ! is mainly at implementation level (i.e. to provide data of school and student and to oversee the distribution). In a site visit in 2006, the Coordinating Minister for Welfare appreciated the implementation of BOS in Solo, as the transfer of funding had covered almost all students and schools in the city. As mayor, Jokowi had the capacity to effectively implement national policy. The BPMKS was launched in 2010, the final year of Jokowi’s first mayoral term. As mentioned earlier, one of the problems Jokowi identified during blusukan was that many children from poor families could not enrol in school due to financial constraints. Dating back to the election campaign in 2005, the improvement of education services was among Jokowi’s promises, and he even prioritised this issue in his article in response to the evaluation of the first 100 days of his leadership. The fact that poor families were having difficulty sending their children to school made the promise even more relevant. Furthermore, it is the mandate of the constitution that government at all levels must allocate at least 20% of the budget for education.507 Jokowi adopted BPMKS after he learned that social policy like PKMS was feasible to be implemented. The idea of the program was to provide financial assistance for poor families to access secure basic services in education. Along with BPMKS, Jokowi launched the Sekolah Plus (Plus School) program, a fully funded government school, including students’ amenities such as clothes, shoes, bags and books. Sekolah Plus targeted children from very poor families. People in general and also civil society actors were enthusiastic about the program, but as the momentum of the launch was in the months leading up to the election period in 2010, many criticized the program as motivated by Jokowi’s interest in re-election. Apart from leadership, the implementation of social policies would only be possible if the government had adequate resources to finance the program. In the first two years, Jokowi faced the constraint of a budget in deficit, and problems of inefficiency and mismanagement. Nevertheless, he still managed to implement social policies effectively. An important factor was large funds transfers from the national government to local government budgets. From 2005 to 2010, Solo’s overall budget increased sharply from about 450 million rupiah to 1.2 billion rupiah. There was a contribution from local revenue, but the biggest element of the budget was the transfer from national government via the General Fund Allocation (Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU) and Special Allocation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 507 The constitutional court allocated 20% of budget for education in 2006.

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Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus – DAK). The budget increase enabled Jokowi to implement his own social policies, though still he needed to do this within the national policy framework. Another factor was Jokowi’s capability to efficiently manage budget re-allocation, especially for administrative and bureaucracy spending. It is a common pattern at local government level in post decentralization for the largest part of the budget to be earmarked for administrative spending such as salaries, honorariums, travel and amenities. Jokowi minimized inefficiency to free up more funds to allocate to finance the social policies.508 Furthermore, the popular programs of PKMS and BPMKS are in fact low cost policies, as the annual average budget for these programs was about 30-35 million rupiah (from a total of 750 million rupiah, the annual average since 2006).509 While for other social policies such as house upgrading, Jokowi allocated a subsidy of 2 million rupiah for around 5000 families within five years. And for the Kelurahan grant, the allocation was proportional for each Kelurahan (on the basis of territory and population) from about 100 to 300 million rupiah. The PKMS and BPMKS had brought concrete benefits for the Solonese, especially the poor community, such as becak riders, traditional traders, informal and small industry workers, unemployed housewives and slum area residents in general. NGO activists who monitored the programs witnessed that people were enthusiastic to register for membership of PKMS.510 In the interviews, the head of sub-districts (kecamatan) informed that almost all poor families in their territories had registered with PKMS and BPMKS.511 The statistic data confirmed the popularity of these programs. In 2011, PKMS membership had covered 211,159 residents for silver and 12,857 for gold memberships.512 This number had increased significantly from 2008, the beginning of the program, when it was 142,975 for silver and only 3,661 residents for gold. A similar public enthusiasm was expressed for BPMKS. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 508 Andwi Joko, interview; Also with YF. Sukasno, May 21, 2012. 509 In the first year budget allocation for PKMS was about 20 billion, while for BPMKS was about 10 billion. The budget allocation increased in 2011 and 2012 budget to about 23-25 billion for PKMS and about 13 billion for BPMKS. The National Government’s Transfer of revenue to the Surakarta budget rose steadily during Joko Widodo’s period in office, from just about 275 billion in 2005, to about 614 billion in 2010. Meanwhile, local revenue only increased slightly, from around 96 billion in 2005 to about 114 billion in 2010. 510 Andwi Joko, interview; Pargito, interview. 511 Interview with some head of sub-districts, i.e. Danang Sulandiriyanto, interview; Anggoro Hexa, May 28, 2012; Joko, June 12, 2012. 512 There are two kinds of PKMS membership cards: silver and gold. The Silver card is issued for the ‘usual’ poor family, while the gold one is for the extremely poor family. The gold card members are covered for almost all health services, including major operations, while the silver card covers standard health services including third class bedding in hospitals. The coverage is detailed in Mayor Surakarta’s Regulation 1/2008.

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At the grassroots level, Jokowi’s social programs had been widely accepted. An expression of gratitude came from the coordinator of the becak riders union who said: ‘Jokowi became a leader that looks after us, masyarakat kecil (common people), (and therefore) we are not worried anymore if getting sick, and also our kids are guaranteed to go to school’.513 These sentiments are common among the poor and marginal groups in the city. With such general sentiments, this suggests that Jokowi developed broader support beyond just PDIP voters and elites. This popular support was an important source of personal political legitimacy for Jokowi. Social policies in Solo, as previously explained, drew inspiration from other local practices and also as part of implementation of national scheme. The strength of Solo's programs was mainly their principles of inclusiveness, meaning that all of the population had the right to be members, and simplified procedures for obtaining services. Also, Jokowi gathered ideas and resources at community level and from the DPRD in policymaking. Such openness made the programs more legitimate to the Solonese. The social policies had been an effective tool in maintaining and creating a solid base of political legitimacy. The 90.06% of the vote for re-election was a clear indication of how such policies worked towards political outcomes. The role of government in social policies was part of an emerging public concern post crisis. In the dominant discourse on democratic governance reform, it is part of the agenda to restore the function and capacity of the state in fulfilling citizenship rights in society and the economy. The benefit of social policies is however not only for poor groups who need concrete services, but also indirectly for the established elite class in society. Effective social policies would hinder further discontent of the poor community due to the sharp gap in wealth. Therefore, social policies could also be seen as instrumental, to protect the interests of dominant political and socio-economic elites by managing the popular discontent through provision of concrete goods and services. In the specific context of Solo, the implementation of social policies is not necessarily to remove or reduce the roots of popular recalcitrant and conflicting interests within this divided city. Nevertheless, social policy proved to be an effective tool to harness the tradition of popular recalcitrance. Also, in spite of optimistic arguments about the adoption of social policies and inclusive leadership, the elite’s initiative and discourse dominated, rather than grassroots politics in Solo. Civil society actors played an influential !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 513 Interview with Sardi, May 10, 2012. He was one of the coordinators of the becak rider association.

!|!Page!186! ! ! role in pushing the initiatives of reform, but in the end it was the government and political elites (Jokowi, supported by the bureaucracy and DPRD members) who decided on the policy direction. The adoption of social policies would strengthen the legitimacy of the leader as a patron of the people. Though the policies were aimed for the entirety of community, their impact on the development of democratic citizenship was doubtful. Jokowi tended to associate these policies with his personal leadership rather than as an institutional achievement. It was revealed that these policies grew out from Jokowi’s interactions with people who couldn’t afford basic services, and also have benefitted people with better access to the services. However, the impacts of the policies were rather to provide a solid base for the continuity of the established interests of the elites in the city, than for example empowering the people in general.

Administrative reform Administrative reform was essential in decentralization, as many civil administration services had been transferred to local government. Reform in this area was important in evaluating the performance of public services in local government. In Jokowi’s early leadership, administrative reform became his focus, particularly to streamline the procedures of business permits and ID card applications. The agenda of administrative reform - like social policies - was also a concern of NGOs and donor agencies that idealized the de-bureaucratization of services and a more responsive bureaucracy. During his campaign for mayor, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Jokowi was involved in NGO discussions on this topic. After the inauguration, one of Jokowi’s main priorities was to reform business permit services in order to create a business friendly environment. Pre-election, on many occasions, as a businessman, he had complained about the difficulties of applying for permits.514 In a public discussion in early 2005, for example, Jokowi argued that the bureaucracy of application for business permits was an obstacle to economic development in the city, and thus argued for deregulation and de-bureaucratization of services. And to implement his campaign, within a month of the inauguration, Jokowi launched a plan for business permit reform. He received wide support from some DPRD members and NGOs such as Partnership in Solo.515 In the DPRD, the support was not only from PDIP, but

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 514 Andy Narendra, Wawancara Dengan Joko Widodo (Jokowi); Shihab, Jokowi@Mata Najwa. 515 See “Solo Perlu Miliki Perda UPT,” Solo Pos, October 12, 2005.

!|!Page!187! ! ! across factions, such as M. Rodhi (PKS), who proposed the government establish an Integrated Service Unit (Unit Pelayanan Terpadu – UPT) for business permits. The UPT office finally opened on 7 September 2005, with the main goal being to reduce the time it took bureaucrats to issue business permits from 4 to 6 weeks to less than a week. The situation had caused uncertainty in terms of time (efficiency) and cost, and even the standard of applications. And besides, to pay for the official cost, the applicant paid extra money or bribed officials to fast track their application. Jokowi’s plan to establish UPT was to end such corruption. At the outset, the plan to establish UPT faced resistance from some departments, since their permit authority would be transferred to the new unit. For many officials, the UPT meant the loss of authority to generate extra income. Jokowi was unmoved, and simply replaced those officials who blocked his agenda. To demonstrate his commitment to this reform, he involved himself directly in selecting staff for the new office and selecting bureaucrats with customer-oriented skills. As the initiative for developing a business-friendly environment was in line with the agenda of the national government and international donor agencies in the early period of decentralization, Jokowi was able to generate support from either or both to implement the program.516 The implementation of UPT attracted extensive appreciation and was even considered best practice for bureaucratic reform in decentralized Indonesia.517 The Minister of Home Affairs and other institutions, for example, had rated Solo as one of the most pro-business cities in 2010.518 In Jokowi’s view, to develop a good business climate was the main priority for the city’s recovering economy and to implement his vision to develop Solo as the economic centre for the surrounding region.519 And through the establishment of UPT for business permits he developed trust and legitimacy from the business community in the city and beyond.520 Jokowi’s administrative reform was one of the most popular administrative services, that is, the application for Residence Identity Card (Kartu Tanda Penduduk – KTP). The process for KTP application was described as complex, procedurally unclear and corrupt. In one of his campaign speeches, Jokowi promised to simplify the KTP service and procedures. On 1 September 2005, he launched a program of ‘one hour KTP !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 516 In Solo, GTZ for example conducted survey for investment climate. 517 Majeed, “Defusing a Volatile City, Igniting Reforms.” 518 “Kota Solo Jadi Yang Terbaik Dalam Pelayanan Investasi -News » SOLOPOS.COM,” accessed May 22, 2016, http://www.solopos.com/2011/10/12/kota-solo-jadi-yang-terbaik-dalam-pelayanan-investasi-119396. 519 Widodo, “Kota Solo Harus Jadi Lebih Baik.” 520 Arianto A. Patunru, Neil McCulloch, and Christian von Luebke, “A Tale of Two Cities: The Political Economy of Local Investment Climates in Indonesia,” Journal of Development Studies 48, no. 7 (2012): 799-816.

!|!Page!188! ! ! printing’ – an initiative to shorten the procedure and processing time of application from weeks to within an hour.521 The official launching took place in Jebres, the sub-district with the largest PDIP constituency. Besides streamlining the process, the fixed priced for services (5000 rupiah, equivalent to 50 cents AUD) was also published in order to ease the practices of bribery. In media interviews Jokowi revealed that many bureaucrats at sub- district level were pessimistic and even reluctant when the program was initiated.522 But in the view of the Solo people, the program was widely cited as one of the most concrete administrative service improvements in the city. Another frequently cited track record of Jokowi’s mayoralty in Solo was the initiative for budget transparency. As mentioned earlier, the corruption and problem of government accountability had suffered under Slamet’s leadership. It was the civil society activists who initially campaigned for the agenda of more accountable government and anti-corruption platform. The trigger for the campaign was the case of corruption that involved Mayor Slamet and some members of the DPRD. During the election, Jokowi flagged a campaign of anti-corruption.523 At the meeting with student activists the day before his inauguration, he underlined his commitment to build a transparent, anti-corrupt government.524 The concrete program for implementing transparent government was the publication of the city budget by the mass media and distribution of the budget poster in community centres. Jokowi’s program on budget transparency strongly affected NGOs, especially Pattiro. In the first year, Pattiro even financed the program, using funds from The Asian Foundation (TAF).525 Budget transparency was a clear example of how Jokowi benefited from good relations with to civil society. The public response to the program was positive, and Jokowi promoted it as a milestone in budget transparency reform in the city. The program emerged when there was widespread, negative public perception towards the city government regarding corruption and limited information about the government budget. Therefore, a simple program, such as the budget poster and other publications, would be an effective tool to address public curiosity. But the publication of the budget did not necessarily mean that people had more access to or control in assuring the budget allocation matched popular interest. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 521 “Jokowi Luncurkan 1 Jam Pembuatan KTP’, Solo Pos, September 2, 2005. 522 Shihab, Jokowi@Mata Najwa. 523 As mentioned before, the tagline was “Solo Berseri tanpa Korupsi” 524 “Jika Terbukti Korupsi Akan Ditindak Tegas,” Suara Merdeka, July 28, 2005. 525 Interviews with Andwi Joko and Setyo.

!|!Page!189! ! ! budgeting process continued to be dominated by political and government elites. The influence of popular voices through, for example, participatory planning was considerably weak. The NGO activists admitted there were basically no substantial changes in the politics of budgeting in Solo, and the publication of the budget became nothing more than a routine step.526 But for Jokowi, the program of budget transparency had been an important element for creating his legitimacy as an anti-corruption figure.

4.! Re-election in 2010: confirmation of increased legitimacy In democracy, the election is the legitimate procedure for people to justify whether the incumbent will stay in power, or be replaced by another political contender. Hypothetically, people would re-elect the incumbent who proved capable of implementing popular authority.527 Such a pattern was evident in the Solo 2010 election, as Jokowi (along with Rudy) was re-elected with massive popular support (90.09%). NGO activists, journalists and even Jokowi’s opponents in the DPRD were of the view that Jokowi’s landslide re-election was due to his effectiveness in addressing critical city problems, such as informality, basic services provision and economic development. Supriyanto, a DPRD member from the Demokrat Party, said that Jokowi gained political benefit from the successful implementation of social programs.528 A similar opinion was expressed by the Solo Pos researcher, Pardoyo, who said that the main reason Jokowi was so popular was the relocation of Banjarsari and the implementation of PKMS, BPMKS and other programs to help poor people.529 Besides the successful implementation of programs, Jokowi's direct communication and engagement with the people was also attractive.530 In view of Jokowi’s strong popularity ahead of the 2010 election, a member of the Solo Election Commission said there was basically no real political competition in the 26 April 2010 election, since many had already predicted Jokowi’s easy win.531 The coordinator of Jokowi-Rudy’s tim sukses (the political campaign team) recollected in his interview that according to the internal survey, Jokowi would gain at least 75% of the vote.532

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 526 Skepticism was expressed by many activists including Pattiro, Sompis and even the journalist. 527 See Jessica Trounstine, “Evidence of a Local Incumbency Advantage,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 36, no. 2 (2011): 255-280. 528 Interview with Supriyanto, June 26, 2012. 529 Discussion with one of Solo Pos researcher, Pardoyo, 24 June 2012. 530 This view is mostly expressed by NGOs activists. 531 Interview with Agus Sulistyono, interview. He was the one of the Commisioner in Solo Election Commission. 532 Interview with Putut Gunawan, interview. Putut was the head of Jokowi-Rudy’s campaign team in 2010. Recently, he was the member of DPRD from PDIP (2014-2019).

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The use of surveys to predict the public support for his prospects of reelection was further evidence that survey results were a factor in his legitimacy. However, he was confident that the effective output of governance was more important for his legitimacy. Speaking in a post-election television interview, Jokowi identified that among the most crucial factors regarding his re-election were the implementation of two social policies, PKMS and BPMKS.533 But on more careful examination, I argue that Jokowi’s re-election was not simply due to his strong policy performance and style of inclusive leadership as mayor, but a result of intensive political lobbying with party elites and the use of public resources for political gain. In contrast to Slamet, who failed to maintain support from his party in the 2005 mayor election, in 2010 Jokowi faced no such challenge from within the PDIP. With unwavering political support from Rudy, Jokowi ran for re-election as a strong incumbent. The solid support from PDIP, and Rudy, for Jokowi’s second term reflected a strong mutual relationship between Jokowi and Rudy (and also PDIP). Many of Jokowi’s programs, as discussed above, had provided direct benefits to PDIP’s supporters. However, the key political support was the respectful division of responsibilities and also shared leadership between Jokowi and Rudy. As explained above, in general Jokowi looked after the strategic policies, while Rudy was responsible to mobilize support from within the bureaucracy and communities in their implementation. Also, like in the case of Banjarsari street vendors relocation, Jokowi didn’t claim it as his own success, but represented it as result of his joint leadership with Rudy. Jokowi’s respect for Rudy as the leader of the largest party in the city through mutual power sharing had been effective to sustain the PDIP’s confidence to his leadership.! Although he enjoyed support from PDIP, the largest party in the 2009 legislative election, Jokowi also lobbied other political parties for their support. He conducted intensive political lobbying with mainly the leadership of PAN and PKS, as parties associated with Islamic politics in the DPRD. In early February 2010, Jokowi held a meeting with PKS to seek their support his candidacy. After the meeting, he said ‘it is impossible to develop Solo without cooperation with other parties. A broad coalition would be much better.’534 In the days that followed, he continued to build a coalition by

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 533 Shihab, Jokowi@Mata Najwa. 534 “Jelang Pilkada, Jokowi Mulai Gencar Safari”, Solo Pos, February 2, 2010.

!|!Page!191! ! ! approaching PAN.535 By approaching PAN and PKS, it seemed that Jokowi sought support from the santri section of the Solo community, as well as seeking to ensure that these parties would not propose or support other candidates. This was strategic on Jokowi’s part, as it could prevent the emergence of rival candidates. PAN and PKS declared their support in the first week of February 2010, after Jokowi agreed to a joint political contract offered by both parties.536 The points in the contract were highly normative, such as commitment for improving bureaucratic reform and services, clean (anti-corrupt) government, and commitment to developing a just society. There was no verified information about political compensation in relation to support, but some NGO activists argued that PKS and PAN’s decision was pragmatic, as they did not have any internal candidates capable of challenging Jokowi’s popularity and also held the view that Jokowi was fit to represent Islam in the city government.537 Although Jokowi’s initial support was from PDIP, which represents secular-nationalist ideology, during his mayoralty Jokowi also showed interest in the Islamic community, at least symbolically, by organizing the Idul Fitri prayers and other Islamic celebrations at city hall.538 Beyond this symbolism, he also maintained communication with prominent Moslem figures, especially those associated with Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (prominent moderate Islamic organizations).539 With these two parties backing Jokowi’s candidacy, the only challengers were PD and Golkar. Similar to the 2005 election, the parties established a coalition, and appointed Eddy Wirabhumi (family member of Kasunanan and leader of PD Solo) as mayoral candidate with his deputy, Supradi

Kertamenawi (retired bureaucrat). As incumbent, Jokowi’s main campaign agenda was to continue his social policies and other programs related to city development as the economic centre in the region. It was clear that Jokowi had also exploited government policies that boosted his popularity. A prime example was BPMKS, the program for education subsidy, launched during the weeks of the campaign. And though Jokowi was not directly involved in membership distribution, his presence during the distribution was to show his association with the program. Like PKMS, the BPMKS program was well received in Solo, but NGO activists

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 535 “Jokowi Beri Sinyal Jajaki Koalisi”, Solo Pos, February 4, 2010. 536 “Jokowi Sepakat Tawaran PAN-PKS”, Solo Pos, February 5, 2010. 537 In light of Jokowi’s candidacy in the 2014 election, the view that Jokowi was fit to represent Islam politics in Solo was interesting to show that political identity could be effective means for either political legitimation or de-legitimation. 538 “Beda Rasanya Dapat Angpaw Dari Walikota,” Solo Pos, November 5, 2005. 539 Interview with KH. Dian Nafi, May 13, 2012.

!|!Page!192! ! ! learned as well that Jokowi had politicized the BPMKS for re-election. They argued that distribution of BPMKS during the campaign was similar to the illegal use of bureaucracy and government resources to attract voters.540 This kind of popular policy developed for electoral ends was not particular to Solo in that period. In examining the results of the 2009 election, Meitzner argued that the key to electoral victory for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his Demokrat Party was the extensive cash program delivered by his government in the final year of his first presidential term.541 In a broader context, such populist economic distribution was also practiced by Thaksin in Thailand, resulting in a similar electoral victory.542 Though the scale was smaller, BPMKS could also be categorized as a populist program developed for electoral outcomes. The bureaucracy however defended the launching of BPMKS as part of the government’s program that had been agreed by the executive and legislative, while the head of DPRD, Y.F. Sukasno, who was also the PDIP deputy leader, argued that the program was needed by the poor people. Jokowi did not face substantial attacks from his political opponents. The Wirabhumi camp were critical of the launch of BPMKS during the campaign and argued it was vote buying, and therefore they would submit a report to the KPK and Panwaslu (the election supervisory committee) regarding the misuse of public funds and programs in the political campaign.543 But there were no further actions or consequences from the protest. Outside the BPMKS issue, the team of Wirabhumi also criticized the mobilization of bureaucrats, especially at kelurahan level, to persuade people to elect Jokowi and Rudy.544 Both Jokowi’s team and the bureaucracy rejected this allegation. But as the incumbent had great access to the bureaucracy, and considering the stories detailed earlier in this chapter about the ‘bureaucrat’s close relations with Rudy’, such mobilization was very likely.545 For his part, Wirabhumi offered programs for economic assistance for community cooperation, incentives for small/medium economic assistance, and the establishment of a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 540 Interview with Pargito, interview. 541 See Marcus Mietzner and others, “Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party System,” Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/100187/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/dd53e6c2-57a0-4ebd- abcc-e7cccc637304/en/Mietzner_0509LowyAnalysis.pdf. 542 Kevin Hewison, “Thaksin Shinawatra and the Reshaping of Thai Politics,” Contemporary Politics 16 (2010): 119-33, doi:10.1080/13569771003783810; Kevin Hewison, “Crafting Thailand’s New Social Contract,” Pacific Review 17 (2004): 503-22, doi:10.1080/0951274042000326041. 543 “Pasangan Jo-Dy akan dilaporkan KPK”, Solo Pos, April 17, 2010; “Program BPMKS Dilaporkan ke Panwaslu”, Solo Pos, April 19, 2010. 544 Solo Pos, 20 April 2010. 545 During the presidential election in 2014, one head of kelurahan said informally that bureaucrats in Solo need to associate with or at least help PDIP interests if they want to secure their careers, and he even said it was normal for bureaucrat to have ‘hidden’ political association.

!|!Page!193! ! ! retirement fund.546 The campaign of Wirabhumi was however also under attack, especially for distributing food in some poor communities. The 2010 election result indicated Jokowi’s success in broadening his electoral base as a sign of strong leadership legitimacy. But his legitimacy was not simply a result of popular policies and leadership. It also involved support from party elites and the use of public authorities and resources for personal political ends.

5.! Conclusion: popular politics as instrument of elite legitimation The discussion in this chapter has showed that the implementation of policies served various interests in the Solo community. The style of popular leadership also helped Jokowi in maintaining and creating a broader base of legitimacy during his first term as mayor. This trend seemed to reflect that Jokowi was able to balance government actions and public expectations. However, the analysis in this chapter argued that this compatibility did not simply derive from effective implementation of government policies, as Stillman suggests, but largely reflected effective management of the competing interests within the Solo community. This chapter also suggested the importance of popular leadership style as key to managing various and conflicting expectations. Jokowi’s policies and leadership style also promoted impartiality, but the meaning was not necessarily in line with Rothstein’s ideal of citizenship. In Jokowi’s case, impartiality denotes a political capability to manage competing interests by addressing concrete needs in the community without disturbing the interests of dominant power, thereby maintaining the structure of domination. As a local leader, Jokowi was aided in this approach by the division of responsibilities in the Indonesian system, whereby it is the national government that has authority over policy areas that could be contentious in relation to the established elite class such as taxation or fundamental deregulation of the economy. The following points summarise how the process worked. First, the policies for marginal sectors and the poor had helped Jokowi create greater legitimacy since the ideas for those policies basically originated in the community of Solo. In the case of vendors’ relocation, adoption of health insurance and administrative reform, Jokowi tended to be open-minded to suggestions and aspirations from the community and civil society. In many cases, he even incorporated some aspirations of poor people and civil society activists to legitimate policies. This deliberative policy process !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 546 Kandidat Siap Adu Visi, Joglosemar, April 8, 2010.

!|!Page!194! ! ! was not the entirety of Jokowi's approach to managing competing interests, however. At times, he also developed alliances with other sections of the Solo community to balance or defeat opponents, such as in the case of Banjarsari vendors’ relocation, wherein he used part of public aspirations that supported relocation to press the vendors, or in the case of Nusukan market re-development, wherein he used the aspirations of the traders to delegitimize the position of the elite of traders’ association. Second, Jokowi’s direct communication and engagement with the community regarding social policies helped him manage different and conflicting interests in a more effective and culturally acceptable way. With such an approach he could moderate Solo's recalcitrant culture in different ways other than mass outrage and protest, but the differences and conflicting interests would not go away. Jokowi served the interests of both common people and the dominant class in the city. Under Jokowi, the domination of elites in Solo was not threatened, but even protected from popular hostility with the implementation of social policies and support for the informal sector. Third, the process of creating legitimacy could not be seen as linear relations between political authority and popular needs. Instead, it reflected a power contestation in the community. Jokowi was certainly a part of the contestation, but he could place himself as an effective conduit, to reach a sort of win-win resolution regarding competing interests. He managed to do so by developing closer interaction with various actors. Jokowi was known to approach people in a humble manner and used direct communication for developing political engagement. He developed such a style with Rudy’s (PDIP) strong influence and took inspiration from civil society activists in Solo. In policy making, Jokowi's open-minded manner had also been useful in aggregating a strategic agenda from the community. Jokowi could develop a distinct image compared to dominant, distant and elitist leadership styles. His popular style was accompanied with skills as an administrator to implement policy in an effective way. In relation to Javanese culture, other than applying power and mystical discourse as Javanese rulers used to do, Jokowi expressed a different manner of leadership by showing social empathy, capability to deliver concrete needs for the people, and skills to manage competing community interests.547 Such a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

!|!Page!195! ! ! humble manner and direct engagement enabled him to manage conflicting interests to develop consensual policy outcomes. And lastly, with effective policies and popular leadership style, Jokowi was able maintain political support within the PDIP, and even broaden his political base in other sections of the Solo community, both at grassroots and elite level. His re-election in 2010 by an emphatic margin was visible evidence of Jokowi’s strong personal political legitimacy. For the incumbent, the re-election would be a critical time to test whether the way in which a political leader implements authority while in government is acceptable to most of the population or not. In the case of Jokowi, from the above discussion, we can see that most of his policies were effectively implemented and less controversial than those of his predecessor as mayor, Slamet. This means that people mostly accepted his leadership. And the result of re-election was a sign of compatibility between Jokowi’s actions and policies and the expectations of people in Solo. Such a personality allowed him to develop political influence (and even hegemony) over the people and his political opponents. Still, such an expression of leadership does not necessarily mean democratization, but rather how political leaders can enhance their power. Also some civil society activists argued that his humble and inclusive style of leadership was an instrument of persuasion and co-optation, rather than meaningful popular representation.548 A senior civil society activist was critical and believed there had been no changes to social structure in the city under Jokowi. He described Solo as Sri Gunung (the beauty of mountain) – looking so charming from far away, but awful inside.549 In spite of such criticism, with the policies and style of leadership that he pursued in government, Jokowi was able to generate broader political support, and he gained acknowledgement well beyond Solo. Jokowi’s way showed the importance of effective and concrete policies, as well as a popular style of communication in maintaining and broadening the base of leadership legitimacy. With his track records and leadership style during his mayoralty in Solo, Jokowi has in fact set a new pattern of creating legitimacy in Indonesian democracy.

!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 548 For example, Akbarudin Arif, interview; Setyo, interview. 549 NGO activist in Solo, Didik Wahyudiono. Didik Wahyudiono, interview.

!|!Page!196! ! !

Chapter Six Creating Leadership Legitimacy in Transitional Context

In this final chapter I summarize my findings and reflect on them from the perspective of creating political legitimacy in the context of political transition. In this study I have explored how Joko Widodo (Jokowi) created political legitimacy during his mayoralty in Solo, to address the broader question of how political leaders maintain and broaden their base of legitimacy in transition to a democratized and decentralized political system. The case of Jokowi, as mayor in Solo, has been selected for three reasons. First, it provides one example of how a local government leader was successful in managing decentralization and direct elections to create legitimacy by projecting himself as a democratic reformer, in the midst of undemocratic practices that overshadowed Indonesian politics post reform. Second, in the context of Indonesian democratization, Jokowi was among the growing phenomena of leaders from non-political backgrounds who were successful in winning a party nomination and going on to win the election. However, the scale of his success and the profile he created outside Solo as a successful local leader was exceptional, as his legacies as mayor became a strong basis for his successful political transition in 2012 to win the Jakarta Governor election and subsequently also the 2014 Presidential election. And third, in Solo there were distinctive but not unique features of a tradition of popular recalcitrance and urban socio-economic problems, particularly after the 1990s crisis. Jokowi’s astonishing re-election in 2010 was the result of successful policies and leadership style adopted to manage the challenges. And his reputation outside Solo rested, in part, on his apparent success in managing issues that were present in many Indonesian cities. Legitimacy is central for authority (i.e. state, regime, government and political leader) in any kind of political system. Legitimacy reveals to what extent people acknowledge an authority's right to rule. To examine the legitimacy of a political leader, I approach the state of legitimacy as neither constant nor given, but shifting over time as a result of interactions between authorities and their subjects. Furthermore, as the starting point of analysis I adapt Stillman’s thesis that legitimacy reflects compatibility between the results of government output and popular expectations, which I combine with

!|!Page!197! ! !

Rothstein and Teorell’s government effectiveness and impartiality in public goods provision as the key factor in creating legitimacy in the post-election period.550 The character of legitimacy and how it is created, however, depends on the nature of the political system. During the centralized and authoritarian New Order regime, the local leaders’ legitimacy depended to a great extent on support from a national government that combined absolute power and the provision of public services as pillars of legitimation. However, there was the specific case of the Solo mayor in 1985–95, who managed to develop some basis for local support and legitimacy in the context of what was possible in that regime. The downfall of the New Order, followed by decentralization and local democratization, changed the character and process of creating legitimacy as it requires popular consent and local support. The old modes of legitimation seem less relevant, but the new ways of creating legitimacy are not yet consolidated. There is no well-defined pattern of how political leaders at the local level create or sustain legitimacy. In fact we can identify different modes of legitimation, not only through democratic representation, but also the persistence of non-democratic legitimation. The absence of an established pattern of creating legitimacy in a transitional context would open up the possibility for a new style of leadership (like in Solo) to emerge with new approaches to political legitimation that reflected the values of reform.

1.! Main arguments and findings: Jokowi’s legitimacy in Solo The case of in Solo demonstrates that one viable path to create political legitimacy in a transitional political context is the effective use of various rites of affirmation and accommodation to manage contested interests within the community, rather than understanding legitimacy simply as a function of compatibility between effective government policy outputs and popular expectations. I have shown that Jokowi was able to manage government authority and resources to produce policies that served various (and sometimes conflicting) interests in the Solo community, rather than catering to the interests of a single group. He managed to adopt a national framework of social policies through effective local programs to increase people’s access to basic services, while at the same time effectively managing specific problems of urban informality. Jokowi's policies and leadership did not disrupt elite domination in the city, but they did resolve some of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 550 Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy”; Rothstein and Teorell, “What Is Quality of Government?”; Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.”

!|!Page!198! ! ! issues in the informal economy and marginalized communities, at least in the short term. It was Jokowi's openness and capability to accommodate various (and frequently competing) aspirations and interests in the community that played a crucial part in legitimizing his government’s policies and programs, and also his political leadership. The emergence of this local leader, who was not part of the established structure of political elites, but who capitalized on the great changes consequent on implementation of decentralization and subsequently local direct elections (Pilkada). These changes have transformed the process of political legitimation in two ways. First, the Pilkada has shifted the base of local leader’s legitimacy from elite to popular support, so the parties are forced to seek candidates with skills and resources to appeal to voters, which most party politicians were incapable of. Second, the elected leader needs to address public demands for government action on local matters in order to maintain and/or extend the base of legitimacy, since decentralization has transformed local government into a more autonomous entity responsible for many areas of public services. But in this transitional setting, there is no road map as to how the base of legitimacy can be created. Following the implementation of decentralization, many local governments implemented programs to address the concrete needs of the people and other reform-based policies. Various of these programs preceded Jokowi's initiatives in Solo, and were larger in scale. Jokowi's policy focus in Solo was not a unique example of local government good practice. However, as I have argued before, policy output alone is not the explanation for the development of popular support as a basis for leadership legitimacy. In addition, Jokowi’s case shows that direct communication and engagement were useful to manage conflicting interests in the community. In the context of a society like Solo where civil society activism is vibrant and people have traditionally expressed discontent in various forms, such openness seemed effective to manage contentious interests. Also, such openness was helpful for Jokowi to cultivate actions and policies in response to popular voices and initiatives. Jokowi’s political legitimacy was initially rooted in party (PDIP) support. Subsequently, the way Jokowi conducted government by combining effective policy output and openness not only secured his legitimacy in PDIP, but also broadened it. Support for his leadership expanded from the party and specific clusters of voters to cross sections of community, both at elite and grassroots level. In this regard, PDIP in Solo (and its leader, Rudy) were appreciative of Jokowi’s leadership for two reasons: 1) many

!|!Page!199! ! ! government policies provided direct benefits to the party’s traditional supporters; and 2) Jokowi did not express any interest in contesting the leadership of the party with Rudy. Although PDIP claimed that Jokowi's achievements were as part of the implementation of the party’s three pillars strategy (the unity of the party in legislative, executive and grassroots), the legitimacy Jokowi developed in Solo was significantly personal rather than identified with the PDIP or the city government. PDIP’s support for Jokowi in Solo was critical (particularly in the 2005 election), but his political identity remained distinct. Although his personal electoral support had skyrocketed to 90% in the 2010 election, PDIP’s electoral support remained at the same level. Despite Jokowi’s popularity as mayor, the party only matched its 2004 election result (36%) for the city legislature in 2009. Jokowi’s legitimacy was not even transferable to his deputy, Rudy, who was also PDIP's leader in Solo. After Jokowi was elected as Jakarta Governor in 2012, as the vice-mayor, by law Rudy took over the mayor’s position. And as the incumbent, in 2015 he was re-elected as mayor in his own right, though he won ‘only’ about 60% of the vote. The politicization of Rudy’s Christian background remained an issue of public debate, ever since he replaced Jokowi in 2012. And to neutralize it, Rudy selected Purnomo, a successful Batik merchant and a moderate Islamic figure, as the vice mayor.551 And many in Solo believed that the level of support for Rudy’s re-election stemmed in part from support for Purnomo, which suggests that the issue of religion was still significant in Solo politics post-Jokowi. I argue that the personalization of Jokowi’s legitimacy in Solo occurred for two reasons. First, the design of direct elections positioned the mayoral or gubernatorial candidate as central to political competition. Although parties played a prominent role, the voters wanted to see how the candidates would approach the people during the campaign, and after the election the people would decide what the leader could produce for their interests. The decline of personal legitimacy for the leader would not necessarily affect support for their political party - Slamet's decline did not affect PDIP. Similarly, the emerging legitimacy of a leader does not automatically increase party support, as demonstrated by Jokowi. Second, many governance initiatives developed in Solo during Jokowi’s mayoralty were possible due to his leadership approach, rather than because of the direction of the PDIP or the agenda defined by local bureaucracy. Therefore, Solo's !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 551 Jokowi’s position as Governor of Jakarta, before the presidential election in 2014, might have helped PDIP in Solo to win more than 50% of seats in DPRD, an equal number with the result of 1999. The support for Jokowi in the city for presidential election was about 80%.

!|!Page!200! ! ! people regarded improvements in Solo as Jokowi’s work. In the early period of Indonesian democracy the political parties, especially at the local level, were short of policy platforms and internal figures fit to run for public office. As a consequence, good local governance was perceived as a good leader’s actions, and not the initiatives of political parties or the bureaucracy. Jokowi's way of creating legitimacy in Solo appears to have reflected his personal appeal, rather than stemming from non-democratic practices such as patronage and traditional power networks, common in local politics post New Order. For most sections of the community in Solo, Jokowi’s effective reform-minded policies and style of engagement with community, contrasted with that of his predecessor, Slamet. However, his policies and style did not disrupt the established structure of elite domination in Solo, for example by raising the city’s revenue at the expense of the rich. In fact, Jokowi may even have preserved and strengthened elite interests through the introduction of social programs and effective handling of urban informality. Such legitimation is possible in part due to Indonesian decentralization, wherein the main function of local government is mainly to manage public services and other locally based issues, whereas hot button policies that require additional revenue from taxation to pay for social programs and major political reform were the responsibility of the national government.

2.! Characterizing leadership legitimacy in a transitional context This dissertation confirms Alagappa’s argument that in a transitional context, where the procedural norms and institutional standards of political legitimation are absent or in the making, the mode of creating legitimacy is contingent and accidental, rather than planned or intended.552 In understanding how political legitimacy is created, as explained in the introduction, I started with Stillman’s framework on legitimacy as a condition of compatibility between the government’s actions and popular expectations. This framework indicates that legitimacy is the result of interaction, or even contestation, of interests among plural actors in the community. Political authority is considered successful in creating legitimacy if people accept the outcomes of actions in responding to public interests in a particular context of time and place. In this regard the literature on post-election legitimacy, such as Rothstein and Teorell, suggests that government performance and impartiality of authority are keys to power legitimation. On the basis of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 552 Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority.

!|!Page!201! ! ! the findings of this research and informed by Alagappa, Stillman, Rothstein and Teorell’s ideas, I propose the following characterizations of the process of creating leadership legitimacy in a transitional context like Indonesia. This study confirms that compatibility relates to effectiveness of policies in providing concrete answers to various public needs and expectations. The political transition post New Order Indonesia changed the leadership structure at the top of the pyramid in the political system, but did not automatically threaten the established elites’ structure and their interests.553 In the new political arrangement, this old group of elites and interests co-exists and contests new power aspirants and interests that have emerged during democratization. This study shows that Jokowi built legitimacy by accommodating the interests of various segments of society in Solo, including the elites, rather than by siding exclusively with the people’s popular demands. His legitimacy in government was as a result of mixed policies and leadership actions. In fact the way Jokowi governed actually preserved rather than threatened the dominance of elites in the city. Such a mode of creating legitimacy by accommodating cross-class interests seems to address the notion of impartiality, but with a different meaning. Whereas Rothstein and Teorell defined impartiality as equal citizenship, in the case of Solo impartiality was more about leadership and short-term political strategies to accommodate conflicting interests. In the longer term, Jokowi's version of impartiality would tend to preserve, rather than eradicate, the disparity between the poor and the elites. Beyond government output, this study also shows that the creation of leadership legitimacy needs to pay attention to the policy process, particularly how the political leader deals with community voices, since creating legitimacy reflects the dynamics of power relations in the polity. Reviewing the dynamics of legitimation also allows us to identify the mode of legitimation. From the analysis of Jokowi’s style of politics, it shows that his legitimacy is also about openness and intimate relations, embracing elements of the community and civil society. Jokowi not only managed to maintain closer relations with the people as a vital source of legitimacy in a democracy, but compiled ideas for policies from outside of the formal bureaucratic process. Jokowi could largely develop legitimate policies and programs because his decisions incorporated some aspects of the people’s aspirations. The importance of the political process adds to the established view !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 553 Juan J. Linz, “Transitions to Democracy,” Washington Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1990): 143-164.

!|!Page!202! ! ! that government output and performance is the main basis for legitimation of political authority postelection, as argued by Rothstein554, and more specifically in a transitional context, by Lipset and Gilley.555 My next point concerns the identification of elements of legitimacy within a specific context, in this case Solo society. Prior to Jokowi’s election, there was a general perception about the weakness of the previous mayor, Slamet, in governing the city. The analysis of social and political history of the city shows that people were used to expressing their discontent and resistance to dominant power structures in various forms. As previously explained, particularly in chapter two, popular resistance manifested in both mass riots during critical periods of political change and small-scale resistance (i.e. land grabbing for settlement) and the informal economy (i.e. street vendors and traditional market). The motives for recalcitrance were various and related to socio-economic deprivation, disobedience to government rules and regulations, and discontent with dominant or hegemonic authority. Further, recalcitrance reflected the nature of power relations in Solo, which displayed two opposing political cultures: the Javanese priyayi (elitism) versus the wong cilik (the commoners or little people). Such popular recalcitrance posed challenges for political authority in creating power legitimacy. For political leaders in Solo post New Order, the ability to address those challenges would determine continuity of legitimacy. With effective popular policies and the adaptation of a people-centric leadership style, as explained above, Jokowi could manage the tradition of popular recalcitrance to a considerable degree by involving competing community interests. Also, people in Solo tended to see Jokowi’s leadership as the antithesis of Slamet’s. The failure of the latter to defend the party and also popular legitimacy was ironic, as Slamet became entrapped in elite culture, despite being the leader of the party with a mass support base among the common people. In addition, Slamet's inability to manage the city government and hesitant attitudes toward the agenda of democratic reform meant that he failed to maintain legitimacy. In contrast, Jokowi, the businessman, was better at accommodating lower class interests. His effective policies and leadership openness seemed to resonate with the values and ideals of Solo society,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 554 Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.” 555 Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”; Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” in Einigung Und Zerfall: Deutschland Und Europa Nach Dem Ende Des Ost-West-Konflikts (Springer, 1995), 287-314; Gilley, “The Determinants of State Legitimacy.”

!|!Page!203! ! ! though in some cases the results of his decisions undermined the interests of marginalized groups, but secured his own vision and interests in dominant power in the city. Given his background as a commoner, Jokowi's success in business had lifted his socio-economic status as part of the new elite class in the city. However, Jokowi seemed to be able to build the image of a leader with non-priyayi (Javanese elites) attitudes, by appearing to be the guardian of interests for wong cilik (the commoners or small people). He was a kind of politician who cultivated non-priyayi leadership, an attitude that seems fascinating in the eyes of Javanese commoners. This study shows that one way for the priyayi elite to maintain political legitimacy is by developing associations with the culture and interests of the common people, rather than displaying the attributes and attitudes of elitism. The study thus reveals a different mode of how political legitimacy developed in the predominant Javanese political culture, outside the well-recognized argument that sees Javanese power as abstract and mystical based on legitimacy.556 In this more familiar view, legitimacy is a given and uncontested by popular consent. Jokowi, who entered politics within an electoral democracy framework, had developed his base for political legitimacy by implementing rational and concrete calculations when dealing with policies and programs. In part, the introduction of electoral democracy seemed to question the established conception of Javanese power. However, the humble and direct style of leadership he developed in relation to the people and his preference for ‘win-win solutions’ still reflected a common concept in Javanese culture such as political and social harmony. And in many events, he utilized symbols and rites of culture as an effective means to legitimize government actions and programs. Lastly, this study confirms the argument of contingent and accidental legitimacy in a transitional context. In the absence of established patterns of legitimation, the search for legitimacy in an emerging democracy will always be a challenge for students of political science. It is true that election procedures and standards of good government have been recognized as normative sources for legitimation of authority. But there is no generic pattern of struggle for legitimacy in real politics. Like other rational politicians, Jokowi’s intent was also to consolidate power. But from the trajectories of policies and actions he managed during his mayoralty, the broad base of his leadership legitimacy was as a result of openness and intimate relations with many actors. As mayor in the context of a city like Solo, Jokowi was not just successful in exploiting opportunities brought about by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 556 Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Society.”

!|!Page!204! ! ! decentralization and local democratization; he also managed conflicting interests in society for the purpose of political legitimacy. In the absence of established patterns of creating legitimacy in relation to the transitional context of democracy and decentralization, Jokowi’s leadership in Solo is one among various paths available to local leaders to create political legitimacy. Jokowi’s legitimation worked effectively in a small Javanese city, which shared many socio- economic problems and power dynamics in common with other Indonesian cities. With his mayoral legacy, Jokowi was successful in electoral politics beyond Solo. The broader resonance or significance of Jokowi's path to legitimacy is evident in his rise to power in a more complex and plural cultural and political setting by similar means – first as Jakarta governor and then as president – in a way that local patronage politicians have not been able to match.

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Appendix: Index of Changes

Reviewer 1

Previous Current Suggested changes Response/Changes page no. page no. (the points are taken from, mainly, the comment of the reviewer 1) Cover Cover Title: it is need the period of the study (when I agree with the suggestion, as it is important to show that this exactly the period of this thesis took place?) study focuses on the period of Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s political leadership as mayor in Solo, 2005-2012. Accordingly, I will add to the title, the period of his mayoralty, 2005-2012. The revised title of the thesis is: “Creating Legitimacy in Decentralized Indonesia: Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s Path to Legitimacy in Solo, 2005-2012” n.a. 41 A map of Solo, showing the administrative I realize that the map of the location of this study, the City of Solo, divisions, should be included in the thesis will be very helpful for readers, especially non-Indonesians, to have a geographic representation of the territory of Solo. Therefore, I added a map taken from the Solo Planning Agency document/Solo in Figures. I discuss the importance of the map in the analysis on page 41-42, following the sentence “From this case study, … Indonesian contemporary politics”:

“The map provides a social and political overview of Solo. The city is located in the southeastern part of Central Java Province and is known as the main transit point for the train and bus network in the southern region of Java. The city is divided into 5 sub-districts (kecamatan) and 52 kampongs (kelurahan). Three sub-districts – Jebres, Serengen, and Pasar Kliwon – have the largest clusters of

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poor kampongs and are the main basis of support for PDIP, the party of the commoners. Batik clothes and accessories are the most important industries of the city, and sub-district Laweyan has been since the period of Kasunanan known as the center of the industry. The Islamist political parties are relatively strong in Laweyan, though PDIP is still the largest party. Banjarsari is the sub-district, where most of public facilities (government offices, train station, bus terminal, and stadium) and also where wealthier neighborhoods are located. Jokowi’s residence is in the one of the wealthiest clusters. Nonetheless, most of the kampongs include poor sections of the city population. Like in other sub-districts, PDIP is dominant power in Banjarsari.”

38-39 38-39 The thesis is about creating political legitimacy. I am aware that there are different views on how political What are the indicators? Whether the study legitimacy is created, and on what basis. As I explained in the part explained popularity as mobilization and “iklan” of theoretical framework (Chapter I, sub.2), the development of type of politician, “idol” type of politician, which legitimacy depends on the type of regime, whether non-democratic is based on very strong basis such as capacity, or democratic. In a democratic transitional context, I argue that one networks, policy initiatives, communication skills possible way of creating legitimacy is through developing such as in his speech. (page 1 second paragraph). compatibility between outputs of government’s actions and the structure of popular demands. Government actions may include effectiveness in public services and the way a political leader developed a leadership style to respond and to enhance engagement with people. With such a framework, the indicators of legitimacy are on degree of compatibility in aspects of government’s outputs in public services and style of inclusive and popular leadership. In sum, the questions and comments of the examiner with regard to indicators of legitimacy and also the approach to legitimacy, I adopt for this research has been sufficiently explained in the framework of the study (the conclusion of framework on p. 38). The framework I develop for

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this thesis is in line with the comments on political leader’s popularity relates with the quality of government and skills of leadership. This type of popularity is different compared with ‘idol’ type of politician, which usually relates with ‘physical appearance’ of the leader. However, the policy initiatives and communication skills, mentioned by the examiner, are factors in my analysis of the creation of legitimacy.

38-46 38-46 Whether the assumption of this study political In the context of Indonesian popular democracy, ‘media idol’ has 83-85 83-85 emergence reflected of the legitimacy or created a been one emerging phenomena. However, in this study, I develop new model of “media idol?” my analysis on the assumption that in an emerging democracy, the PDIP as the winner of the 1999 election as the political legitimacy is about compatibility between outputs of other pendulum of the Soeharto Regime. Solo government and structure of public demands (p. 38). The area was one of the heartland of PNI compatibility could be achieved through quality of government, (Soekarnois). which is combined with an inclusive process of governing and What the role of Prabowo and the money of the leadership. brother of Prabowo’s brothers to bring Joko A leader who emerged through such a process could be a new Widodo to Jakarta with at least spent US$5.7 model of leadership that was attractive for the mass media. Jokowi millions (according information from the family himself, with a popular style of leadership, as I explained in of Prabowo). It means the path is also very Chapter 5, has been successful in attracting mass media attention. expensive and the money from different groups including his political party sponsorship was I agree with the examiner’s comment that Solo was one of the Gerindra. heartland regions of PDIP (Sukarnois) support, and therefore the (see page 16 second paragraph). party’s support base was one important element in Jokowi’s political leadership. I have discussed Solo as the stronghold of PDIP in Chapter 3 (p. 83-85) and chapter 4 (p. 133).

Jokowi’s political rise in Jakarta election 2012 is interesting to be discussed, including the influence of Prabowo in Jokowi’s political rise. However, the attention of national political actors, like Prabowo and also PDIP national leaders, in Jokowi was due to the

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popular profile he developed as mayor in Solo. Rather than discussing his emergence at national political stage, as I state in the Chapter 1 (sub research methods, p. 39-46), the thesis focuses on Jokowi’s political emergence in Solo and then how he developed political legitimacy. Prabowo’s support of Jokowi’s career commenced with Jokowi’s campaign for the governorship of Jakarta and was not a factor in Jokowi’s period as Mayor in Solo.

25-31 26-32 In term theoretical framework, creating legitimacy In the discussion of theoretical perspectives, particularly the based on Marx Weber need more consistency in section on ‘framing political legitimacy’ (p. 21-39), I discuss the chapters follows, as to answer the thesis’s various analyses of legitimacy, including Max Weber’s influential questions in page 39. concepts. I argue Weber does not adequately explain how legitimacy is created. Weber also understands the state of legitimacy as constant rather than changing over time. Accordingly, to understand the creation of legitimacy, I need other perspectives that provide us with a sufficient framework to understand the way legitimacy is created and the changing nature of legitimacy. I have explained sufficiently in the discussion of ‘Legitimacy and Creation of Legitimacy’ (p. 26-32), why I adopted Stillman’s approach, combined with Rothstein & Theorell’s, as the main framework of analysis and not that of Max Weber.

174 180 The data from the one who worked as Sekda Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo developed legitimacy after his election as 179-180 184-186 should be included in this thesis. Contestations of Mayor by combining the effective output of policies and a style of data and information. Whether the legitimacy inclusive leadership, as I have explained in Chapter 5. Especially base on the weak data or very strong data? with the policy outputs, Jokowi’s focus was mainly on basic services delivery, especially in health and education. I explained in this chapter (p. 184-186), the spending and the impacts of the policies to improve people’s access in the services. In addition to the statistical data, to examine the impact of policies on Jokowi’s legitimacy, I also used the qualitative data, mainly from interviews.

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By analyzing this data, as I argue in Chapter 5, one main pillar of Jokowi’s legitimacy in Solo was the effective output of policies (p. 180, adaptation of social policies). However, I’m aware, as Jokowi pursued his political career in Jakarta and as a Presidential candidate in 2014, he was the target of the black campaigns that questioned his achievements in Solo. One of the black-campaigns was organized by the ex-Sekda of Solo, who claimed that Jokowi was involved in maladministration and corruption. However, many informants in Solo did not consider the data from the ex-Sekda credible. There were no investigations conducted by KPK or other judicial institutions with regard to the issue of corruption in Solo under Jokowi. The KPK has successfully prosecuted many Mayors and Heads of District (Bupati) in other local government jurisdictions. n.a. 166 The most important question; how far the Part of Jokowi’s strategy to develop popularity, which then legitimation base on media framing and agenda contributed to his legitimacy, was to attract media attention by setting? Or based on the participation of popular performing unusual styles of engagement with the people, vote? including rites of blusukan and inclusive processes of policy decision making. In the thesis, as explained in chapter 5 (p. 165- 166), Jokowi was aware about the role of media, and even from the first day of his leadership as mayor, he already attracted the media attention when he made impromptu visits to some neighborhoods (p. 163-4). While the national media attention to Jokowi was started after his administration was seen as successful to relocate the street vendors/informal traders.

To give greater emphasis to the role of media in the creation of Jokowi’s legitimacy, I add some analysis on this aspect, on p. 166. After the sentence “The above methods of communication and interest aggregation were evidence that Jokowi had tried to

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develop a role as a direct representative of the people”, I add the following discussion: “As explained earlier, Jokowi’s style of direct engagement and communication has been attractive for the mass media in Solo. He was mindful about the importance of mass media to develop popularity. And the extensive coverage of the ways he connected with people shows the strategic role of media in framing what is seen as compatible with public demands. In this regard, the role of mass media in creating legitimacy is evident.”

For the popular vote, I argue that at first Jokowi’s legitimacy in 2005 was mainly based on party’s support (Chapter 4, p 121), but his re-election in 2010 with more than 90% of votes confirmed broader popular support. And this popular support was mainly due to his leadership and governance capabilities in addressing popular demands (Chapter 5, p.190). Accordingly, I believe the question about the popular vote as basis for legitimacy is sufficiently addressed in the thesis. No revisions have been made.

50 52 The sub chapter of history is very good. I’m grateful for the appreciation of the examiner. 188 194 How far the issue of popular resistance has The tradition of popular resistance in Solo has been important relation with the Joko Widodo path to gain context for Jokowi, in as much as many of his social policies and legitimacy? style of inclusive leadership addressed some of the roots of popular resistance. And to show the importance of popular resistance as a contextual factor in Solo, I developed the argument about the compatibility between Jokowi’s policies and style of leadership with tradition of popular resistance (Conclusion of Chapter 5, p. 194).

51-52 54-56 What is the feudal history of the Solo area has The City of Solo is the residence of two Javanese monarchies, the 75-76 78-79 relation to understand patron client system in the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. However, the influence of the 194-195 198 political party internal democracy and that two institutions in both politics or economy has declined,

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explained the Joko Widodo achievement of especially after the anti-Swapraja revolution in the early years of legitimacy? Indonesian independence (Chapter 2, p. 54-56). Despite the institutional decline of monarchies, as I argue in conclusion of Chapter 2 (p. 78-79), the patron-client relations as part of political culture in Solo is still alive, including in PDIP Solo. And, as I explained in Chapter 4, that Jokowi’s electoral success in 2005 was largely due to Rudy’s leadership of the PDIP. Rudy was able to mobilize the party’s support base. However, in building his own political legitimacy after the election, Jokowi didn’t rely on patronage networks, but by building effective outputs of governance and inclusive leadership, as I have explained in Chapter 6 (p. 198).

118-119 124-126 The internal party variables are so important so I agree with the comment on the importance of the political party does the external factors (local and national). This in building up Jokowi’s electoral legitimacy, especially when he chapter should address also clearly in term of was elected in 2005. In the chapter 4, I have explained about the internal versus external variables or indicators. role played by Rudy (PDIP’s leader in Solo) in mobilizing PDIP’s support for the election. To the external factor, i.e. the changing of electoral system at national level, I have also explained it as the new environment that had created new opportunities for non-party figures like Jokowi to emerge in electoral competition (Chapter 4, p. 124-126). The comments of the examiner confirm the arguments developed in the thesis.

113-116 116-118 This chapter is about the former mayor of Solo, The chapter on Slamet’s leadership (Chapter 3) is to show the 129 113 how far this chapter explained the differences emergence and the decline of a political leader’s legitimacy. 188-190 194-196 between the two mayors (Slamet and Joko Slamet was an established PDIP politician, as he led the party Widodo) since both are in the same party? during the political turbulence of 1996-2000, and then become the mayor in 2000. But, as mayor, he lost the confidence of his party due to his ineffectiveness in government. Slamet also lost the leadership of the PDIP to Rudy (p. 116-118).

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Jokowi had a completely different path to political leadership. In his early political career, he had no formal political relations with PDIP, but then he was nominated by PDIP as the mayor candidate, in the light of Slamet’s decline (Chapter 4, section ‘Jokowi’s Selection in PDIP’, p. 133). After becoming mayor, he proved to be a more effective government leader and responded to many of popular demands, which became an important basis for the stronger legitimacy. Jokowi’s leadership, as the conclusion of Chapter 5 (p. 194-196) argues, was a sort of anti-thesis to Slamet’s leadership (as explained in Chapter 3). The important question raised by the examiner had been addressed in the thesis.

81 84 Page 81 need more data on religious background I agree with the examiner’s comment that more discussion on of the Solo population. Whether religious aliran Solo’s religious composition is required. I have included a table on system is still important in this country? The the religious background of Solo’s population. The table shows argument, such as, why PDI Perjuangan was the that around 80% are identified as Moslem and 18% are Christian fusion of Nationalist Party and non-Muslim (Catholic & Protestant). Parties during Soeharto Era (1973). The label of To discuss the meaning of aliran politics in Solo, after the party which is dominated by non muslim is still sentence: “In the 1999 election, PPP won only two DPRD seats, very strong among the voters in Indonesia. and even at Mudrick’s voting station, his party only received 26 Therefore, PDI Perjuangan is always try to do votes, while PDIP won 184 votes.” (p. 84), I add the following coalition with Muslim Party such as PKB to discussion: “From the perspective of aliran politics (Clifford legitimate their party. Geertz’s category of Javanese political-religious cleavages, namely Page 88-104, need more data on public policy and santri, abangan, and priyayi), the election result confirmed that expenditure to give strong arguments of this Solo is the home of abangan aliran , with PDIP as its main thesis. Such as data on health, education. political representative. While most of the population are identified as followers of Islam, in terms of political culture they are mostly abangan. Although smaller in size, both the santri and priyayi aliran are present in Solo. However, as it will be discussed in the emergence of Jokowi (Chapter 4), aliran politics was a significant

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influence in the 2005 mayor election.”

I agree with comments on the importance of data on Jokowi’s policies and expenditure in basic services, such as health, education, and house upgrading. In the thesis (p. 184-187), I have presented statistical data on budget allocation for the programs, and also the qualitative information to identify the impacts of these programs on the common people. The reviewer’s comments have been sufficiently addressed in the manuscript. No further change is made in the text.

159-160 177 Page 108-109: the role of the media is very In 2005, Jokowi was a local figure, with a little known political important, but the media is more local media. background in Solo. The media coverage of Jokowi’s activities such as Blusukan was mainly in the local press: Solo Pos and Suara Merdeka as discussed in Chapter 5, p. 163-165. The national media became interested in his leadership following his successful and peaceful relocation of street vendors after a process of dialogue. To address the examiner’s comment, an analysis of the national media’s coverage of Jokowi’s political activities has been included in Chapter 5, (p. 177). The new discussion, after the sentence “Thus, Jokowi nurtured a strong image as guardian of the PKL, despite the fact that the relocation plan was not fully in the interests of the PKL.” is as follows:

“Jokowi’s successful approach in relocating the Banjarsari street vendors attracted the attention from not only the local newspapers, but also the Jakarta-based media. The Jakarta Post in 2008, for example, reported the peaceful relocation and framed it as the meaningful effort to change the image of Solo as a city that had often been disrupted by mass riots. The peaceful relocation has also been important consideration for Tempo, the influential

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political magazine published in Jakarta, to name him as one among ten best local leaders in 2010. And not only the printed media, some Jakarta-based TV stations, invited Jokowi to talk on their programs. The attention of national media had promoted his reputation to a wider public. The interest of national media had been important for Jokowi in creating a broader national-base of political legitimacy.”

120-128 124-132 Page 121: whether the argument of direct local The direct local elections are both a national and local issue. I elections is the national issue or the local Solo explain in Chapter 4 (p. 124-126) that the local election of 2005 issue? How far national issue has the important was part of national electoral reform, and was idealized as the way influence? of deepening democracy in Indonesia. Also, though the election was local, the party at the national level played significant role, mainly in the nomination of candidates. As I describe in Chapter 4 (sub ‘Non-part but Compatible Figure’, p. 133), Jokowi’s candidacy was possible due to the political decisions of the PDIP’s national leadership’s support for him, though in the process of selection some of the party’s executives in Solo rejected Jokowi’s nomination. The discussion in these pages identifies the national influences and factors in the local election in Solo.

However, as I have described in Chapter 4 (p. 127-132), the local dimension of mayor election had equal importance. In this regard, I explained the active role of civil society in the candidate nomination process, and also the issues debated by the candidates during campaign, which mostly related to local needs in Solo.

Furthermore the election in 2005 was marked by emergence of three businessmen (Jokowi, Purnomo, Hardono) as the foremost candidates, reflecting the decline in the incumbent’s support. As I have discussed in Chapter 4 (p. 124-132), the combination between

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national and local factors shaped the dynamics of the Solo election in 2005.

133 137 Page 129 stated the role non-party figure mostly I examined this question in chapter 4 (p.137) that one important from the businessperson including Joko Widodo. reason of why Rudy (Solo PDIP leader) supported Jokowi as the Whether the business background has strong mayor candidate was pragmatic; that the party needed money for cause of his legitimacy rather than the basis of his the election campaign. And the most suitable candidates to meet capacity? this need were wealthy local businessmen.

In 2005 election, as I argue in chapter 4, Jokowi’s business background and the support from PDIP was a strong factor in his legitimacy. However, when he was in power, the legitimacy he created relied on his leadership capacity in managing effective and responsive government (main argument in Chapter 5).

133 136-137 The data of religion is important, to use why Joko I agree, there needs to be more discussion of the religious Widodo selected as the mayor candidate together composition of Solo’s population in relation to the selection of with his vice mayor (Christian background?). Jokowi (Moslem) and Rudy (Christian) as PDIP’s candidates for mayor and vice-mayor. I added a table of religious composition, and after the sentence “…. A Mayor with Christian background …” (p. 136). I reformulate the analysis as follows: “Beside the personal qualities of leadership, community aspirations for the prospective mayor were also parochial, as the religious background of candidates was a matter of concern for some Islamist elements. In this regard, the religious composition was a relevant factor to analyze the emergence of candidates. As shown in the following table, Islam is the largest religion in Solo (73%), while the Christians (Catholic and Protestant) make up about 25%. In the legislative election, as explained in Chapter 3, the religious composition had less correlation with aliran politics, as PDIP, as the major secular nationalist party could claim to represent both the

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abangan aliran and the Christians, dominated the local legislative. In the 2005 mayor election, religious sentiment and the religion of candidates was an issue in public discussion.”

The table on religious composition is added after the above paragraph.

144-145 149 Policy agenda, followed the former mayor, but the ‘Blusukan’ is a Javanese term to identify a strategy through which style different? Is ‘blusukan” original of the Joko political leaders seek to build direct communication and relations Widodo or other leaders such Soekarno and with the community. I agree with the examiner’s comment that Soeharto did the same thing and others leaders in ‘blusukan’ is not Jokowi’s invention, as many political leaders in Indonesia? The program of “klompencapir” in the Indonesia have developed a similar style to more closely engage era of Soeharto? See page 144-145. with people, in authoritarian as well as democratic regimes. To emphasize that the blusukan as style was also practiced by other leaders, after the sentence “Blusukan, … had become Jokowi’s trademark political style and mode of engagement with society, especially marginalised Solo society” (p. 149), I add the following explanation: “However, Jokowi did not invent the blusukan style of political engagement. Indonesian political leaders like President Sukarno and President Suharto used similar ways of having direct communication and engagement with people. Even in Solo, mayor Hartomo (1985-1995) was popular for his routine visits to communities and having direct communications with people. Jokowi’s rites of blusukan seemed to resonate with a Javanese ideal way of engagement between political leaders and people in context of emerging democratization.”

However, in the context of Solo, where the culture is elitist with a feudal legacy, Jokowi’s ‘blusukan’ visits during political campaign in 2005 (and then continuing during his leadership as mayor) generated popular appreciation. My argument on this is developed

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in Chapter 5 (‘Thy Style of Direct Engagement and Communication’, p. 162)

185 191 Who then the one who do the bureaucracy jobs? Rudy, as deputy Mayor, was mainly responsible for the The role of the vice mayor who did mostly the management of the administration, including in coordinating administrations process. kecamatan/sub-district level, while Jokowi focused on innovative reform, as I explained in Chapter 5. To give a more explicit explanation about the division of responsibilities between Jokowi and Rudy, and the impact to Jokowi’s legitimacy, after the sentence “With unwavering political support from Rudy, Jokowi ran for re-election as a strong incumbent.” (p. 191), I add the following sentences: “The solid support from PDIP, and Rudy, for Jokowi’s second term reflected a strong mutual relationship between Jokowi and Rudy (and also PDIP). Many of Jokowi’s programs, as discussed above, had provided direct benefits to PDIP’s supporters. However, the key political support was the respectful division of responsibilities and also shared leadership between Jokowi and Rudy. As explained above, in general Jokowi looked after the strategic policies, while Rudy was responsible to mobilize support from within the bureaucracy and communities in their implementation. Also, like in the case of Banjarsari street vendors relocation, Jokowi didn’t claim it as his own success, but represented it as result of his joint leadership with Rudy. Jokowi’s respect for Rudy as the leader of the largest party in the city through mutual power sharing had been effective to sustain the PDIP’s confidence to his leadership.”

173 178 Is there any indicators data whether income in From my examination of the economic indicators published by the Solo increase or not after the relocation of Solo Statistics Central Bureau (BPS Solo), there was no specific traditional market? Or economic in general to give information or statistical data on the impacts of relocation on the

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strong argument that his leadership works? Or economy of the vendors. However, according to the claim of the only “media stunt”? such as “Mobil SMK”, there Head of Solo Market Management Agency and also based on my is no proof so far his achievement on mobil SMK observation, the impacts of relocation to vendors were different, as (high school vocational car). This policy was only some gained more wealth in their business, while the others just media stunt and people believe as his legitimacy. survived. To discuss further the impact of relocation on the economy of vendors, after the sentence “In spite of different treatment towards the PKL and the fact that relocation was not always helpful to sustain the economy of this informal sector” (p. 178), I add the following discussion: “The impacts of relocation on the income of the street vendors were unclear. There was no data published by the Solo Statistics Central Bureau (BPS Solo) on the income or other economic indicators of the informal sector, as the reports were based on data from the formal sector of economy. However, the Head of Solo Market Management Agency informed me during an interview that while for the informal sectors, like street vendors and traditional traders, there is no data on income, he claimed many of the street vendors have been successful as merchants after their relocation to the formal market. Nevertheless based on my direct observation, the impacts of relocation varied among vendors, as some gained more wealth, while most of them struggled to survive, while the economic fortunes of others declined.”

And as I explained in chapter 5, the principal importance of the relocations seemed not directly related with any increase of income, but rather to make the city more livable and clean. And for the mass media, what seemed to be interesting for them was not the impacts on the economy, but rather the process of relocation itself, such as the coverage of Jakarta Post, Tempo, and other national media. The analysis on national media attention on Jokowi’s leadership has been revised as detailed above and

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included in the revised thesis on page 177.

I agree that some of Jokowi’s policies and style of leadership were more a media stunt, like the Esemka Car, but others effectively answered what people expected from their political leader and government.

192 198 “Blusukan” itself for popularity doesn’t work for ‘Blusukan’ may have no direct impact people’s material welfare, as increasing the welfare of the people. How this it is merely a style of leadership to develop closer engagement with argument will give strong variable to influence the the community. However, blusukan had been effective strategy for increase of legitimacy? Jokowi to monitor directly the progress of government projects and also to aggregate the aspirations of community. To address the examiner’s comment, I argue in Chapter 6 (p. 198) that legitimacy is not only about the output of government’s effectiveness in economy and welfare. The element of governing process (inclusive leadership and closer engagement) with people, in case of Jokowi in Solo, had helped him in creating stronger political legitimacy.

154 157 The policy of dialog and peaceful relocation is not One of the clear differences between Jokowi and his predecessor, the argument of participation of the people, but Slamet, was the style of leadership in policy implementation. In how to implement the government policy. case of street vendors, as I explain in Chapter 5, Jokowi’s policy of Whether there is data that the income increased relocation was initiated by Slamet (p. 157), but then Jokowi after the relocation. It means that whether the conducted a “dialogue” as a means of negotiation with vendors welfare of the people were being important about the compensation they would receive as part of the argument for the policy implementation. For implementation of the policy. example, take how long Joko Widodo was solving For the relocation of Banjarsari vendors, Jokowi/Rudy took about the relocation of traditional market/”pasar”? 7 months for conducting 52 meetings during the negotiations for relocation.

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174 180 What is administration reform, which is more The examiner’s comments are related with my explanation in 194 200 national policy under national regulations? Chapter 5 (‘Adoption of Social Policies’, p. 180) about Jokowi’s Whether the policies were implemented? (Give program of social policies, which were mostly to implement in more data on the each issues; economic data, more effective ways national programs (such as BOS and health government expenditures, including 20 per cent of protection). Jokowi’s programs were not genuine Solo designs, but funding for education is the constitution mandate. as I explain in this sub chapter, Jokowi’s contribution was to implement national programs in health and education in a more The vice mayor took over his job before finishing effective way. his term as Mayor in Solo and moved to Jakarta. The same in Jakarta, only less then 2 years for 5 In case of Solo 2005, the religious background of the candidates years terms, and again Basuki Tjahaya Purnama was a factor in the electoral competition, as it has been discussed (non Muslim) filled in the Gubernoratorial in in Chapter 4 (p. 136-137). To give further clarification, Rudy was Jakarta. His policy on Health and education are Jokowi’s deputy mayor from 2005, and apart of his position in national policies. government, Rudy was also the leader of PDIP, which was the largest in Solo.

And to respond the comment on the emergence of Rudy, Jokowi’s vice-mayor who has Christian background, as mayor, after the sentence “Jokowi’s legitimacy was not even transferable to his deputy, Rudy, who was also PDIP's leader in Solo”, I add the following paragraph (p. 200):

“After Jokowi was elected as Jakarta Governor in 2012, as the vice-mayor, by law Rudy took over the mayor’s position. And as the incumbent, in 2015 he was re-elected as mayor in his own right, though he won ‘only’ about 60% of the vote. The politicization of Rudy’s Christian background remained an issue of public debate, ever since he replaced Jokowi in 2012. And to neutralize it, Rudy selected Purnomo, a successful Batik merchant and a moderate Islamic figure, as the vice mayor. And many in Solo believed that the level of support for Rudy’s re-election

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stemmed in part from support for Purnomo, which suggests that the issue of religion was still significant in Solo politics post- Jokowi. “

Chapter 6 Chapter What is the internal factors (Joko Widodo as To respond the examiner’s question, I argued in Chapter 6 that at 191-198 6 individual achievement) and PDI Perjuangan as first, Jokowi’s legitimacy was depended on PDIP’s support. 197-205 political Party which contributed to his path of However, as mayor he developed effective government and legitimacy? inclusive leadership, which in turn strengthened his legitimacy within the party and also in broader community. In sum, Jokowi’s political legitimacy in Solo was strong, as he managed to build on and broaden the party’ popular support. And he managed to create such legitimacy through effective output of government policies and style of inclusive leadership.

166, 172, 171, 177, What is the external factors contributed to his path I agree, apart from the internal factors (effective output of 185 191 of legitimacy: government and style of leadership), external factors such as media a)!Media electronic TV/Metro TV especially and coverage, national actors, and other power brokers contributed to ”Kompas” to promote his leadership?;Whether Jokowi’s path to legitimacy, especially in the national arena. the media is also inline with Islamophobia? b)!National actors: general Luhut Pandjaitan, The attention of national mass media to Jokowi was mainly due to general AM Hendopriyono and General his leadership in Solo, which was seen as politically appealing. I Prabowo. add some further explanation (p. 177) about the interest of national c)!Who has the money for each elections he media in Jokowi’s innovations in Solo, and the impacts of this contested (his campaigned always stated about national coverage on Jokowi’s growing national political profile. money politics of the opponents? Do you think On the attention of national mass media to Jokowi’s leadership in there is no money politics of his campaign? Solo, I have included a new paragraph to address the similar Who is the “pebotoh” the concept of the one comments, as detailed above. who paid the money politics in the central Jawa local election (according to the Doctoral Outside the PDIP elites, who supported his second term as mayor thesis in UNDIP, Fitriyah who study of in Solo, Jokowi’s profile had also attracted attention from other

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‘pebotoh”/Bandar in the local election in Jawa national actors, including some retired generals. However, with Tengah/central Jawa). According to the family respect to Jokowi’s legitimacy in Solo, these national actors of Prabowo, he gave US$ 5.7 Millions when outside PDIP played no role in the development of legitimacy. he undertook Joko Widodo for election in DKI The role of ‘pebotoh’ in elections is interesting. However in the Jakarta. Do you think, he was innocent for the Solo elections, 2005 and 2010, from the data that I obtained in issue of money politics or election relation to the development of legitimacy, the role of party’s manipulations, in Solo, in Jakarta and in structure (PDIP) was the most important factor for Jokowi’s Presidential Election? (for epilog?) victory in 2005, while for his re-election in 2010, the factor of d)!The role of the Surveys Body in elections such leadership success as the incumbent had also contributed to his as LSI and others, according to Adrinof legitimacy (Chapter 5, p. 194-196). Chaniago (who said that he was always supporting Joko Widodo since the mayoral In both 2005 and 2010 elections, the role of survey organizations election until Presidential election and finally to track the popularity of politicians was evident. In Solo, the he was appointed as the Minister for surveys in this period were mostly conducted by local Bappenas), he has strong relations with survey organizations like Solo Pos and BEM UNS (University Student body. However, even surveys are now became Association). As I explained in p. 170-171, a survey result on a tool to develop the popularity and may be Jokowi’s first 100 days in office showed the low degree of legitimacy. satisfaction with his leadership. I have discussed on p. 171 that Jokowi was aware of the result, and responded it by publishing an article in local media, which indicates that he tried to respond to the survey results. I have added the following sentences to show that the survey results become a factor for Jokowi’s legitimacy. In page 171, after the sentence “ … Jokowi’s openness seemed to generate more support ...”, I add “Jokowi’s responsiveness to the survey results shows that for him, public opinion was a factor in creating legitimacy. And rather than resisting it, he took it as an input for building stronger legitimacy.”

In page 191, after the sentence “… Jokowi would gain at least 75% of the vote”, I add “The use of surveys to predict the public support for his prospects of reelection was further evidence that survey

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results were a factor in his legitimacy. However, he was confident that the effective output of governance was more important for his legitimacy.”

Despite the importance of survey results, I argued in the chapter 6 (conclusion) that the legitimacy of Jokowi in Solo was not particularly related to survey results or the sympathies of survey organizations, but rather the support from PDIP, effective outputs of government, and style of leadership.

Reviewer 2

Previous Current Suggested changes Response/Changes page no. page no. In the second report, the examiner made numerous I appreciate the comments of the reviewer. I made some comments about my PhD Thesis, but there are no minor changes in the use of language. specific suggestions for revisions of the core arguments of the thesis. With respect to writing style, the examiner suggested that informal language be revised to reflect academic English norms. The second examiner wrote an encouraging appreciation, suggesting the thesis be published as a book.

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Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s: Mas'udi, Wawan

Title: Creating legitimacy in decentralized Indonesia: Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo’s path to legitimacy in Solo, 2005 - 2012

Date: 2017

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/127411

File Description: Creating legitimacy in decentralized Indonesia: Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo’s path to legitimacy in Solo, 2005 - 2012

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