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The Short-Term Danish Interbank Market Before, During and After the Financial Crisis

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The Short-Term Danish Interbank Market Before, During and After the Financial Crisis A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Abildgren, Kim; Albrechtsen, Nicolaj; Kristoffersen, Mark Strøm; Nielsen, Søren Truels; Tommerup, Rasmus Working Paper The short-term Danish interbank market before, during and after the financial crisis Danmarks Nationalbank Working Papers, No. 99 Provided in Cooperation with: Danmarks Nationalbank, Copenhagen Suggested Citation: Abildgren, Kim; Albrechtsen, Nicolaj; Kristoffersen, Mark Strøm; Nielsen, Søren Truels; Tommerup, Rasmus (2015) : The short-term Danish interbank market before, during and after the financial crisis, Danmarks Nationalbank Working Papers, No. 99, Danmarks Nationalbank, Copenhagen This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147428 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu November 2015 | No. 99 THE SHORT-TERM DANISH INTERBANK MAR- KET BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE FI- NANCIAL CRISIS Kim Abildgren, Nicolaj Albrechtsen, Mark Strøm Kristoffersen, Søren Truels Nielsen, and Rasmus Tommerup Danmarks Nationalbank 1 The Working Papers of Danmarks Nationalbank describe research and development, often still ongoing, as a contribution to the professional debate. The viewpoints and conclusions stated are the responsibility of the individual contributors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Danmarks Nationalbank. As a general rule, Working Papers are not translated, but are available in the original language used by the contributor. Danmarks Nationalbank's Working Papers are published in PDF format at www.nationalbanken.dk. A free electronic subscription is also available at this Web site. The subscriber receives an e-mail notification whenever a new Working Paper is published. Please direct any enquiries to Danmarks Nationalbank, Communications, Havnegade 5, DK-1093 Copenhagen K Denmark E-mail: [email protected] Text may be copied from this publication provided that Danmarks Nationalbank is specifically stat- ed as the source. Changes to or misrepresentation of the content are not permitted. Nationalbankens Working Papers beskriver forsknings- og udviklingsarbejde, ofte af foreløbig ka- rakter, med henblik på at bidrage til en faglig debat. Synspunkter og konklusioner står for forfatternes regning og er derfor ikke nødvendigvis udtryk for Nationalbankens holdninger. Working Papers vil som regel ikke blive oversat, men vil kun foreligge på det sprog, forfatterne har brugt. Danmarks Nationalbanks Working Papers er tilgængelige på www.nationalbanken.dk i pdf-format. På hjemmesiden er det muligt at oprette et gratis elektronisk abonnement, der leverer en e-mail notifikation ved enhver udgivelse af et Working Paper. Henvendelser kan rettes til: Danmarks Nationalbank, Kommunikation, Havnegade 5, 1093 København K. E-mail: [email protected] Det er tilladt at kopiere fra Nationalbankens Working Papers forudsat, at Danmarks Nationalbank udtrykkeligt anføres som kilde. Det er ikke tilladt at ændre eller forvanske indholdet. ISSN (online) 1602-1193 2 THE SHORT-TERM DANISH INTERBANK MARKET BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS Contact for this working paper: Kim Abildgren Nicolaj Albrechtsen Danmarks Nationalbank Danmarks Nationalbank [email protected] [email protected] Mark Strøm Kristoffersen Søren Truels Nielsen Danmarks Nationalbank Danmarks Nationalbank [email protected] [email protected] Rasmus Tommerup Danmarks Nationalbank [email protected] 3 RESUME Det korte danske pengemarked før, under og efter finanskrisen I papiret foretages en analyse af strukturen på det danske usikrede dag til dag-pengemarked før, under og efter finanskrisen. Handelsaktiviteten faldt i kølvandet på finanskrisen i 2008, hvilket kan afspejle øget opmærksomhed på kreditrisiko og en reduktion i antallet af kreditinstitutter som følge af fusioner og banklukninger. Handelsaktiviteten blev yderligere reduceret efter den store forøgelse af de pengepolitiske modparters rammer for indestående på foliokonti i Nationalbanken i forbindelse med introduktionen af negative renter. I de seneste par år er handelsaktiviteten ble- vet koncentreret omkring relativt få markedsdeltagere, hovedsageligt de systemiske institutter. Analysen er baseret på data for pengemarkedstransaktioner mellem Nationalbankens pengepoliti- ske modparter, som er estimeret på basis af betalinger i Nationalbankens betalingssystem, Kronos for perioden 2003-2015. ABSTRACT The short-term Danish interbank market before, during and after the financial crisis The paper studies the microstructure of the short-term uncollateralised Danish interbank market before, during and after the financial crisis. The financial crisis in 2008 was followed by a slowdown in trading activity which might reflect increased awareness of counterparty credit-risk and a reduc- tion in the number of banks due to mergers and acquisitions as well as bank failures. A further re- duction in trading activity followed the large increase of the monetary-policy counterparties' cur- rent-account limits in mid-2012 in relation to introduction of negative interest rates. In the most recent years, the trading activity has been concentrated on relatively few participants, mainly the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). The analysis is based on data on money- market transactions among Danmarks Nationalbank's monetary-policy counterparties estimated from payment flows from Danmarks Nationalbank's payment system, Kronos, for the period 2003- 2015. 4 KEY WORDS Interbank market structures; Day-to-day interest rates; Payment system data; Monetary-policy im- plementation; Interconnectedness. JEL CLASSIFICATION G21; G28; E42; E58. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to thank colleagues from Danmarks Nationalbank for useful comments on prelim- inary versions of this paper. Furthermore, the authors would like to thank Ib Hansen for his contri- bution on network representations in Section 5. The authors alone are responsible for any remain- ing errors. 5 NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY This paper studies the microstructure of the short-term Danish interbank market before, during and after the recent financial crisis. More specifically, we focus on Danmarks Nationalbank's mone- tary-policy counterparties' trading among themselves in the market for uncollateralised krone- denominated loan contracts with a maturity of one day. We pay particular attention to the inter- play between the money market and the Nationalbank's monetary-policy instruments. Further- more, we address the interconnectedness of the market participants from a financial stability per- spective. The analysis is based on data on money-market transactions among Danmarks National- bank's monetary-policy counterparties estimated from payment flows from Danmarks National- bank's payment system, Kronos, for the period 2003-2015. During the last couple of years the total daily turnover of uncollateralised day-to-day loans among Danmarks Nationalbank's monetary-policy counterparties has amounted to around 4,000- 5,000 million kroner per banking day. There has been a downward trend in trading activity – both in turnover volumes and the number of transactions – since the outbreak of the most recent finan- cial crisis in 2008. This might reflect increased awareness of counterparty credit-risk and therefore a switch towards a higher degree of collateralised lending which also has been seen in the euro area money market. There has been a further reduction in trading activity since the significant in- crease of the counterparties' current-account limits in mid-2012 in relation to the introduction of negative interest rates on Danmarks Nationalbank's certificates of deposit. The current-account rate remained unchanged at zero per cent which all else equal gave the counterparties an incen- tive to place funds at current accounts rather than in certificates of deposit or placements in the interbank market. Furthermore, the higher current-account deposits enabled the banks to manage large daily liquidity fluctuations without resorting to the interbank market. The overnight 1 segment has on average been slightly larger than the tomorrow-next 2 segment when it comes to trading volume among the Nationalbank's monetary-policy counterparties. Measured by the share of transactions, however, the overnight segment is much larger than the tomorrow-next segment. This probably reflects that tomorrow-next trades are planned in advance, while overnight trades
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