Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South , Vol. 139, p. 11–22, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010011–12 $4.00/1 Oliphant, the Father of Atomic Energy

anna binnie

Abstract: Sir Marcus Oliphant, perceived by several generations of Australians as the kindly public face of Australian physics, may be regarded as the individual who introduced the concept of an atomic bomb to the World. Oliphant did not discover fission, nor did he work on the fission process, but he was responsible for bringing together the people and the information required for the development of both the atomic bomb and civil atomic energy. Yet he was a man noted later for speaking out publicly against nuclear weapons, so how can these two statements be reconciled?

Keywords: Sir Marcus Oliphant, atomic energy, atomic bomb,

INTRODUCTION Rutherford and associating with the other gifted young men such as and John Oliphant had been living in Britain at the out- Cockcroft, both of whom would both play ma- break of the war and he had no hesitation about jor parts in the development of atomic science. becoming involved with the work of war. It was This association would result in what can best his work during the war, his position as be described as a brotherhood of Cavendish men Professor of Physics at University, and would include all Cavendish alumni. and his Cavendish network of colleagues that In October 1937, Oliphant took up a posi- gave him access to those in positions of author- tion as Professor of Physics at Birmingham Uni- ity that would bring about Britain’s commit- versity. As an experienced researcher, Oliphant ment to develop the atomic bomb. It was also wanted to follow research directions started at during the war that Oliphant insured that Aus- the Cavendish. He was determined to have his tralia had knowledge of the developments of the own accelerator so he could continue his re- British bomb project. After the war, Oliphant search into . The , a returned to Australia and became an advocate new type of accelerator developed by Ernest of the civil uses of atomic energy. He espe- Lawrence at Berkeley in California, could de- cially espoused the development of an atomic liver much more energy to the accelerated power station and a desalination plant in the than either the Cockcroft-Walton or Port Pirie region of his native . Van der Graaff designs of linear accelerators. He later became involved with the Industrial In fact, Oliphant wanted a bigger version of Atomic Energy Committee and it was through Lawrence’s machine [2]. This interest in the cy- his impatience and the actions that resulted clotron would bring Oliphant into contact with from this that lead to the establishment of the Lawrence, with whom he would form a working Australian Atomic Energy Commission. While relationship in the years to come. he was never a Commissioner and was never At the outbreak of the Second World War, employed by the Commission, his influence in Oliphant and many of his team at Birming- the development of Atomic Energy in Australia ham were working for the Admiralty on radar. is such that he can be considered as father of This work was a highly secret operation and atomic energy. those scientists resident in Britain who were foreign nationals or those regarded as being THE enemy aliens were left to do their own re- search. Two of these scientists who had made In 1927, Oliphant arrived at the Cavendish Lab- their way to Birmingham University were Otto oratory in Cambridge as an 1851 Exhibition Frisch and Rudolph Peierls. In early March Scholar[1]. Oliphant was to spend the next 1940, Oliphant received a short note from Frisch ten years at the Cavendish working with Ernest and Peierls, entitled ‘On the Construction of a 12 BINNIE

“Super-bomb” based on a Nuclear Chain Re- The MAUD Committee produced its report action in ’. The notion of using the on 30 June 1941, recommending that a bomb fission reaction to power a bomb had already was feasible and that atomic energy could also been discussed in scientific circles but it was be a useful source of electrical power [9]. A mi- thought that such a device would require sev- nority report produced by Blackett suggested eral tons of the rare uranium , uranium- that the full-scale plant to produce the bomb 235. The Frisch-Peierls note described that a be set up outside Britain, possibly in the US fission explosion could be achieved using only or Canada. This minority report was taken a few kilograms of pure metallic uranium made up by the Ministry of Aircraft Production [10]. up of the uranium-235 isotope. The note con- The MAUD Committee ceased to exist in De- tinued to discuss the possible method of obtain- cember 1941 but its work had been taken over ing this isotope in sufficient quantities (thermal by the Project that had been es- diffusion of uranium hexafluoride gas), the con- tablished in October that year to develop the struction of the bomb and possible radiation ef- British atomic bomb. fects of fission products after its explosion [3]. While those around him were involved in the The note is significant in that it was short; it uranium and fission work, Oliphant continued was written in a non-technical style so that a with his work on radar, specifically on mag- non- could readily understand most of netrons. Collaboration had been established be- its content but it contained enough technical in- tween Britain and the US in the development formation to allow to make their own of more sophisticated magnetrons. In August calculations in verification. 1941, Oliphant went to the US essentially to The memorandum had arrived on Tizard’s continue work on this partnership. However, be- desk by the 19th March with a covering note fore he left Britain he was approached by Thom- from Oliphant. The covering note suggested son who asked him to investigate why the US that a Committee be established comprising had not responded to the contents of the MAUD G.P. Thomson, , Oliphant and Committee Report which had previously been Tizard [4]. Tizard in turn sent a copy to Thom- sent to the US [11]. At this time Britain wanted son who wanted to discuss the contents with to establish a joint uranium project that in- Oliphant and Cockcroft [5]. On the 10th April, cluded exchanges of information [12]. When Thomson, Oliphant, Cockcroft and another ex- Oliphant was finally able to free himself from Cavendish physicist, Philip Moon, met under radar work to follow the mission entrusted to instructions from Tizard, at the Royal Society him by Thomson, Oliphant was shocked to dis- headquarters with the purpose of determining if cover that the MAUD Committee’s report had such a ‘super-bomb’ could be constructed [6]. languished unread in the safe of Lyman Briggs, the head of the National Bureau of Standards By June this small committee of essentially in Washington and Chairman of the Uranium ex-Cavendish physicists had grown to include Committee [13]. the Nobel Laureate and an- other ex-Cavendish man, C. Ellis. The Com- Oliphant now attempted to enthuse Briggs, mittee had become known as the MAUD Com- but failed. He then attempted to interest Van- mittee. Both Frisch and Peierls were excluded nevar Bush and James Conant (Bush was Pres- from the Committee but were included in the ident of the Carnegie Institution and Chair of Technical Sub-committee [7]. Oliphant would the National Defence Research Committee and himself be excluded from the MAUD Commit- Conant was a member of the Uranium Commit- tee in 1941 when it would undergo a reorganisa- tee ) in the findings of the MAUD Committee, tion. Oliphant was then relegated to the Tech- with a similar result to that experienced with nical Sub-committee [8]. However, Oliphant, Briggs. Oliphant was not easily deterred. He unlike other members of this Sub-committee, now went to Berkeley to visit would not be working directly on research into with whom he had been corresponding for a the bomb. number of years. The result of this visit was OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 13 the production by Oliphant of a summary of of producing 100,000 horsepower for very many the MAUD Committee report [14] and the in- years without any fuel whatsoever. It would spiration to produce through be of the greatest possible importance to Aus- electromagnetic separation using Lawrence’s cy- tralia, with her isolated coal-fields. I am con- clotron as a mass spectrometer [15]. Lawrence fident that the scientific and engineering prob- took Oliphant’s summary and met with Conant lems will be overcome and that Australian ura- and . This meeting ultimately nium, will prove as valuable to the country as led to a restructuring of the US Uranium Com- oil-wells have to America’ [17]. mittee and ultimately to the establishment of Casey made at least two copies of this note. the [15]. The original was sent to Prime Minister , (1894–1978), and what is remarkable is that very little was done with the information it FOREVER AN AUSTRALIAN contained. Political turmoil hit Australia within weeks of the despatch of the note, when the While in Washington, in August 1941, Marcus general election brought not only a change in Oliphant was invited to a dinner party hosted Prime Minister but also a change in the govern- by Dr Darwin, the grandson of Charles Darwin, ing party and consequently the memo was vir- and his wife at which Minister to tually forgotten. The new Prime Minister was the US, Richard Casey, was also a guest. It was . Curtin took office a few months in this capacity that Oliphant was introduced before the Japanese entered the war and hence to him. Oliphant initially discussed radar work had other more pressing matters to consider. with Casey but later mentioned a new scientific project that was currently being undertaken in Casey sent the two copies of Oliphant’s note, th Britain [16]. It was obvious from Casey’s replies on 17 September, to , as ‘Secret that he knew nothing of the MAUD Committee by Safe Hand’. Rivett was then the Executive or the uranium project, so Casey asked for a Officer of the CSIR [17] and the covering letter note on this matter. gives the impression that Rivett and Casey were The next morning, 26th August, Oliphant on familiar terms, Casey stated: sent Casey a four-page letter, effectively sum- ‘. . . I gather he (Oliphant) came from Ade- marising the findings of the MAUD Commit- laide in the first place and has been working in tee which at this time was secret. Oliphant, England for the last fifteen years. He seems to in his covering note, suggested that Australia be regarded as a man of some note. Darwin should ‘do some work on the energy machine, speaks of him with great respect. He has been so that if and when she wishes to exploit it she working on radio-physics for the British Admi- will have something with which to bargain’ [17]. ralty lately and is in this country in this connec- The other significant aspect of this note was the tion. ...Oliphant began to speak more gener- stress for the peaceful uses of the ‘Uranium En- ally of new applications of scientific knowledge ergy Machine’, but he did mention the require- to war purposes and in due course asked me if ments for a bomb and the possible radioactive I was aware of the work that is being done in after effects of such an explosion [17]. Oliphant England in connection with Uranium. . . . I said even suggested that this form of energy could that I was unaware of this – and pressed him use Australian uranium: for further information – whereupon he told me ‘It is possible to make a machine in which about it. I asked him if he would let me have the production of energy is less violent than in a short memorandum on the subject, which he the bomb and which could be used for the com- did the next day. . . . I have since discussed it mercial production of power. Such a machine with Munro – and he tells me that you will un- could be realized at the present time . . . by mix- doubtedly have been relevantly informed by Sir ing uranium oxide with “”, or deu- ’ [18]. terium oxide, or possibly also with carbon or Rivett responded to Casey on 8th November, beryllium . . . Such a machine should be capable stating ‘ . . . I am rather hoping that Madsen will 14 BINNIE come back with something in his head and in terials for magnetron research with him [20]. his bag about all this, and, in the meantime, I Frederick White (1905–1994) was then Chief of am treating the file as very strictly confidential’ the Division of Radiophysics in CSIR. [18]. Sir John Madsen (1879–1969) was Profes- On the 24th February, McDougall responded sor of Electrical Engineering at the University to Rivett that the British Admiralty, saying ‘Ti- of Sydney and was involved with the Australian zard wholly concurs desirable Oliphant go to Radar project and the CSIR (Council for Sci- Australia’ [20]. What Oliphant had hoped to entific and Industrial Research ). Australia was achieve is unknown but he was now to be re- also at war with Germany at this time. Rivett united with his family whom he had sent to the and the rest of CSIR were too much involved safety of Australia two years before. Events with the Australian radar project to be con- moved swiftly with Oliphant finishing up at cerned with some new research project that at Birmingham and leaving the United Kingdom the time was still of a theoretical and un- 19th March. Australia House wrote to CSIR on der a military classification. According to Tim 31st March informing them of Oliphant’s de- Sherratt, Rivett did not just ignore the note, parture [21]. The journey was not as swift as he ‘began to seek more information through his Oliphant had expected since Oliphant is next scientific contacts, and tried to arrange for in- heard from in Capetown on 23rd April request- creased Australian involvement in the work. He ing to return to Britain, ‘owing to transport de- was, however, unsuccessful’ [19]. lay and possibility of no return from intended destination’. The request was refused by the In December 1941 Japan attacked the US Australian High Commission in London. What Naval Base at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, bring- now followed was what could best be described ing the US into the Second World War. Within as a comedy of errors. Rivett had decided that months the Japanese military moved south to Oliphant was not required because the local occupy most of South-East Asia. Once Sin- group had made considerable head way on the gapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, radar project. Rivett then informed the Aus- Oliphant saw Australia as being under threat, tralian High Commission to allow Oliphant to and immediately offered his talents to the ser- return to the UK. However, the telegram recall- vice of his country, especially in the area of ing Oliphant ‘missed’ him. radar research. On the 14th Feb 1942, (1883–1967), the Australian High Com- During his entire journey, Oliphant had not missioner in London, sent a memo to the Prime been in contact with his family who by this time Minister, John Curtin, stating that Professor were quite naturally concerned about his wel- Oliphant was offering his services to Australia fare. His wife Rosa sent a letter to Rivett that and ‘In addition to RDF his knowledge covers arrived on 11th May stating that she was wor- other branches of Scientific Warfare’ [20]. RDF ried that she hadn’t heard from Oliphant for stood for radio direction finding, later called two months. On 13th May Rivett replied sug- radio location, and is now known as radar. gesting that Oliphant was on his way back to The other branches of Scientific Warfare re- UK since Rivett believed that Oliphant had re- ferred to his knowledge of atomic energy. Riv- ceived his message in Bombay. Letters were ett was swift to reply and on 18th February now passed between the CSIR and the Navy sent a note to the Prime Minister’s department in an attempt to discover where Oliphant ac- stating, ‘Am strongly recommending Minister tually was [21]. The search for Oliphant ended accept offer’ of Oliphant coming to Australia. on 26th May when Oliphant, who was in the The following day, Rivett sent another note to Physics Department at University of Western the Prime Minister’s Department stating ‘Mad- Australia in Perth, sent a telegram to Rivett sen and White welcome proposal’ and on 20th ‘please instruct authorities here urgent priority February Rivett sent a further memo to the act- air passage for me plane leaves six am Perth ing Australian High Commissioner in London, time tomorrow’. Oliphant arrived in Melbourne Mr McDougall, asking Oliphant to bring ma- on 29th May. That night Oliphant went to Syd- OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 15 ney with Madsen and White, where he started [27]. Rivett may well have thought his problems work at the National Standards Laboratory on with Oliphant were over but on 28th November 30th May [21]. Oliphant cabled Rivett with a request for money Rivett and the CSIR may not have wanted and a fast passage from Durban. Oliphant and Oliphant for the radar work and Oliphant cer- his family did not get their fast passage and tainly did not want to remain in Australia but were there until the 14th January. He arrived in he was part of the radar team and the CSIR the UK on 1st March 1943 [26]. was going to make use of his expertise. This ar- rangement was to be short lived with Oliphant and his family leaving Australia within months THE MANHATTAN PROJECT of his arrival. Before Oliphant left Australia, he made a short visit to Wellington in New Zealand When Oliphant returned to Birmingham in to address a meeting of New Zealand scientists early 1943, his work on radar was virtually com- who were working on radar. plete. The work on Tube Alloys was continuing Oliphant initially wanted to leave Australia but Oliphant was not a member of this project. with his family on 19th August but was forced to Yet he did manage to glean that progress was remain until October. On 27th August Oliphant very slow. The processes devised for the enrich- had presented to the CSIR a paper entitled ‘Re- ment of uranium were not producing a large port on Uranium as a Source of Energy’ [22]. enough yield quickly enough. Now Oliphant This was Oliphant’s attempt to encourage the suggested an alternate proposal, that of elec- CSIR to ensure that control of de- tromagnetic separation using a cyclotron [28]. posits was vested in the Commonwealth govern- He sent his proposal to Edward Appleton, who ment [23]. Oliphant himself claims that he did was secretary of the Department of Scientific not suggest that the government should control and Industrial Research under which Tube Al- the uranium deposits, but that ‘if there was ura- loys operated. Appleton sent his note onto the nium in the country that it would be wise not to leaders of the Tube Alloys project with the sub- let it go overseas unless they decided that they sequent request that Oliphant join the project didn’t want to use it themselves’ [24]. Regard- [29]. less of whether Oliphant used the term ‘control’ Britain had earlier been decided to move or not, he still attempted to alert the scientific some of the Tube Alloys work to the safety of community of the need for uranium and indi- Canada. Scientists in the US were working on rectly of the potential uses of atomic energy. their own uranium project. Negotiations be- The CSIR Minutes of Executive Meeting tween Britain, Canada and the US resulted in 23rd October 1942, under item 2 Uranium, Sir the , which was signed on David Rivett referred to secret correspondence 19th August 1943 [30], and it should be noted in connection to uranium [25], which could only that Oliphant accompanied the British delega- be related to the British request for uranium to tion for these discussions, returning to Birm- be used in the Tube Alloys project. At this ingham in September [31]. Australia was kept meeting Marcus Oliphant was also appointed informed of the developments concerning the as an advisor to the Radiophysics Division of lead up to the Quebec agreement by Oliphant, CSIR [25]. This was the division of CSIR that who had briefed Stanley Bruce in London on would ultimately be responsible for research 16th August. Oliphant again stressed that Aus- into atomic energy. tralia should secure its uranium deposits [32]. Oliphant was finally given permission to As Oliphant was well aware of the secrecy of leave Australia from Melbourne on 27th Octo- his mission to the US, one wonders what was ber [26]. On 31st October 1942, Rivett sent Oliphant’s motivation in attempting to keep a cable to the Australian High Commission in the Australian Government informed of these London, informing them of Oliphant’s return events. 16 BINNIE

With the agreement signed, all the Tube Al- AUSTRALIA WANTS ATOMIC loys personnel were transferred to continue work ENERGY in Canada or seconded to the US project, now called the Manhattan Project. In November Shortly after Oliphant returned to Britain in 1943 Oliphant was posted to Berkeley to work 1945, he became involved in another new with Ernest Lawrence on the electromagnetic project, that of setting up a British atomic separation of uranium . Oliphant, dur- energy research establishment. Cockcroft had ing his posting to Berkeley, returned to Britain been the Director of the Canadian Experimen- for visits during February and March 1944 and tal Atomic Energy Plant during the war and had again from November 1944 to early March 1945. also returned to Britain at the conclusion of the He left Berkeley and the Manhattan Project in war [36]. By April 1945, Cockcroft and Oliphant March 1945 [33]. toured a number of sites that were being consid- ered as possible locations for this new establish- While Oliphant was working at Berkeley, he ment. The site most favoured and hence recom- attempted to get other Australians working on mended was a disused airfield at Harwell near the project. In part, he must have realised that Oxford. By July, the British Atomic Energy the knowledge gained by these physicists could Research Establishment had a director, Sir Ed- be utilised in post war Australia. Oliphant ward Appleton, and the support of the newly went so far as to nominate whom he wanted elected Labour Prime Minister, . to join him and January 1944, Oliphant sent Harwell was to be the location of an experi- his request to David Rivett stating; ’Would you mental reactor which had been designed by the release Burhop for the duration to take part Group that had been formed in 1944 in urgent semi-theoretical work on tube alloys in Montreal [37]. problems ...On account of his past experience Australia wanted access to atomic energy in- Burhop could advance materially the use of the new weapon’ [34]. Burhop kept his superior in- formation, which it had been denied during the war. As soon as the war was over Australia formed of his work at Berkeley, writing to Rivett in June; ‘ . . . My own feeling is that this project again made overtures to Britain for this infor- mation. Ben Chifley, Australia’s Prime Minis- is very important for the future of Australia and ter, sent a cable to Stanley Bruce in London on the present time is a golden opportunity to get th knowledge of the techniques that, it seems, will 6 September 1945 stating: prove vital for the future of the country. In ‘Repeated attempts made throughout war my opinion there are in Australia several peo- have failed to obtain for Australia information ple who have had the right type of training that on research . . . on utilization of atomic energy. would make them suitable to pick up the vari- This development is of very considerable im- ous techniques involved and would enable them portance both in regard to its wartime appli- to make a significant contribution to the work’ cation and its peacetime possibility as a source [35]. of power . . . my Government would appreciate an opportunity of contributing to the research As is now well known the collaboration be- and . . . If the United Kingdom Government is tween the three nations did produce an atomic willing to release information to us . . . request bomb. In fact it produced three; one was made you endeavour to ascertain if Professor H.S.W. from enriched uranium and two were made from Massey or Professor O.M.L. Oliphant would be . The first bomb exploded was a plu- permitted to come to Australia to communicate tonium bomb. As a result the Second World this information’ [38]. War ended on 15th August 1945. With the end Chifley had thought that by supplying of the war both in Europe and in the Pacific, Britain with uranium ore during the war, many of the scientists working in Canada and Britain would in return provide Australia with the US wanted to return to their homes and information on atomic energy, but this infor- families. mation was not forthcoming. Chifley received OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 17 a reply, on the 26th September, from Evatt, more, he is anxious that if he should accept ap- who was in London and had been in contact pointment this should be done with the good- with Oliphant. Again Oliphant informed the will of his fellow scientists in the United King- Australian government that the British gov- dom and the United Kingdom Government to ernment was in the process of establishing whom he feels a considerable debt of gratitude. atomic research facilities that would research Furthermore, he points out that the work he both military and peaceful uses of atomic en- would do here should be regarded as part of ergy. Oliphant had recommended that since the general British Commonwealth contribution Britain would have the necessary facilities, Aus- to the development of knowledge in the field of tralia should seek to send scientists to be trained atomic physics and that he should have contin- in Britain. ued opportunity for consultation and collabora- The process for establishing the United Na- tion with fellow scientists working in the United tions Atomic Energy Commission commenced Kingdom’ [42]. on 3rd October 1945 when President Truman Oliphant had wanted to continue playing a announced to Congress that he was about to part in applied research into atomic energy and initiate talks with the UK and Canada ‘on the was not prepared to forego that type of involve- international control of atomic energy’ [39]. The ment on his return to Australia. notion of ‘control of atomic energy’ was a eu- Atlee responded to Chifley’s request on 4th phemism for maintaining the status quo and not March and stated: sharing atomic secrets with anyone. These dis- ‘ ...In so far as his work was concerned with cussions with the UK and Canada were only rel- fundamental physical research of a non-secret evant because Canada had a reliable source of character, we should hope that he might have uranium ore and the US had none, and the UK the fullest opportunity for consultation and col- had been involved in atomic energy from the laboration with fellow scientists working in the beginning and was badgering the US to share United Kingdom . . . There are as you know, the knowledge and technology that the US had aspects of atomic energy which much of our developed during the war years based on the in- knowledge in this country is derived from the formation that Britain had first shared with the work we did during the war in conjunction with US. the Americans and the Canadians. Professor On the 26th March 1946 Ben Chifley re- Oliphant who played such an important part in ceived a cable informing him of Oliphant’s ex- that work, will know that the war-time partner- pected visit to Australia [40]. Records from ship has placed hither to certain limits on our the National Archives of Australia indicate that freedom to co-operate on atomic energy with Oliphant had agreed in March to be part of Aus- other countries, even within the Empire. You tralia’s delegation to the Atomic will remember that I explained the position at Energy Commission [41]. I suspect that it was our meeting here last May’ [42]. during this visit that Oliphant and Chifley met This reinforced the conditions that the U.S. and not at the Commonwealth Prime Minis- had placed on both the United Kingdom and ters’ Conference that was held in Britain in May Canada concerning the sharing of knowledge 1946, as has been stated in the Oliphant biog- and information on atomic energy and related raphy written by Cockburn and Ellyard. technologies. th On the 4 February 1947, Chifley sent a Oliphant by this time had the ear of the note which had been drafted by Coombs, to Australian Prime Minister and over the next Atlee that stated: decade would continue to have this type of fa- ‘Professor Oliphant has made it clear that miliarity with Chifley’s successor, Robert Men- he could not take up a position here until zies. During the period 1946 to 1950, there his present obligations in the United Kingdom would be much negotiation between Oliphant are complete. And it is understood that this and the Australian officials who were attempt- may take another two or three years. Further- ing to bring him out. In August 1950 Oliphant 18 BINNIE

finally arrived in Australia [43]. He took up Development, a representative of CSIRO and the position of Director of the Research School three technical experts, under the chairmanship of Physical Sciences at the Australian National of Marcus Oliphant [46]. Oliphant had ‘agreed University. with the view that Defence and other aspects of Atomic Energy could not be separated’ [46]. However, in a note sent to the Secretary of De- INDUSTRIAL ATOMIC ENERGY fence by the Acting Secretary, it became obvious COMMITTEE that the Minister of Defence ‘did not wish De- fence to be associated at this stage with CSIRO Australia had, more from good fortune than on the committee, although he did say that De- by design, become involved in the international fence could be added later.’ The rationale for politics of atomic energy and its control by this Ministerial decision was evident later in this its membership of the first Security Council of note, ‘He (Dedman) mentioned that the govern- the United Nations and as such a member of ment was desirous of setting up an atomic pile the United Nations Atomic Energy Commis- in South Australia for the generation of electri- sion. This was a position that Australia wanted cal energy as a counterpart in that State to the to maintain. It was a new technology and at Snowy River Scheme’ [46]. the time there was no reason to suppose that Australia could not join the elite technologically This committee was later renamed as the In- dustrial Atomic Energy Policy Committee and advanced atomic club. After all, many of her th sons had been involved in the development of was established on 19 August 1949 by Chifley. the atomic bomb and were now working on the It was to advise the government on the possible development of atomic energy. industrial applications of atomic energy and to suggest a program for its development. It was John Dedman, as the Minister responsible answerable to the Minister responsible for the for the CSIRO, wrote on 27th June 1949 to CSIRO [47]. Oliphant was to be the Chairman the Minister of Defence (one notes with some and the other members of the committee were amusement that the Minister of Defence was also John Dedman), stating that ‘The executive representatives of the Departments of Supply and Development, Treasury and the CSIRO and of CSIRO has recently advised me that it is dif- ‘three technical men, familiar with the physi- ficult for it to formulate future policy on many different aspects of atomic energy with which cal, chemical and minerals problems that will require consideration’[48]. the Commonwealth Government may be con- cerned without collaboration of your Depart- Oliphant initially was involved with the ment of Defence and of the Department of Sup- works of the committee by correspondence but ply and Development’ [44]. He suggested that a was to take a more active role on his return to group of officers from the CSIRO, the Depart- Australia in 1950 [23]. Menzies, who by this ment of Defence and the Department of Sup- time was Prime Minister, endorsed Oliphant ply should meet ‘with the view to advising the as chairman but also included his own nomi- three Ministers concerned as to the interdepart- nees, one of whom was Professor . mental machinery which should be set up to Oliphant was an active chairman and made in- advise Cabinet on policy matters’ [45] concern- dependent submissions to Menzies concerning ing atomic energy. By 26th July a group repre- the development of atomic energy in Australia. senting the CSIRO, the Department of Defence When Oliphant discovered in February 1951 and the Department of Supply and Develop- that Menzies did not see Mr Clement Attlee, ment met at CSIRO Head Office in Melbourne the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, [45]. to discuss ‘cooperation in the field of atomic This meeting recommended the formation of energy’ [49], Oliphant went so far as drafting an Atomic Energy Policy Committee. Initially a note to Attlee stating that ‘Detailed explo- this committee was to have representatives from ration of uranium ores at Radium Hill in South the Departments of Defence and of Supply and Australia has proved that at least 600 tons of OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 19 uranium is recoverable as oxide’ [49] and that sponse other members of the Industrial Atomic since a joint program of development would be Energy Policy Committee were being brought useful to Australia, ‘authority be given for tech- secretly into the discussion. nical discussions’ between Oliphant and Cock- The first shot was fired by Harold Breen, on croft, who could then make recommendations in 23rd April 1951 when he sent a copy of Menzies’ the development of atomic energy in Australia letter to Attlee, with Attlee’s response, to the [49]. Secretary to the Department of Defence, with a This draft letter, based on a report that cover note stating that ‘No member of the Com- Oliphant had prepared on behalf of the Indus- mittee was aware of the first cable’ [50]. The trial Atomic Energy Policy Committee, which Secretary of Defence responded saying that the recommended the adoption of an atomic energy Defence Department had no official representa- program in Australia, was sent to Menzies, by tion on the Committee. By 4th May, Breen had Oliphant, with the instructions that Menzies met with two other members of the Committee, ought to send it to Attlee. Menzies obediently Martin and White, who were in general agree- cabled this letter, unaltered, to Attlee who re- ment as to what should be done. They produced sponded that there were issues of security due a report that was critical of Oliphant’s views on to the constraints of the tripartite agreement atomic energy, suggested that the Committee and that not all information available to Britain would need to be reconstituted. The cover note could be freely passed on to Australia [49]. to this report was written by Breen and sent to Specifically Attlee’s reply stated ‘We have Menzies on 7th June 1951. Breen refers to the to regard our commitments under the tripartite issue as the ‘Oliphant-Uranium matter’. The agreement between the United States, Canada final paragraph of the cover note states: ‘I am and ourselves. Complete separation of power particularly anxious to know if any Australian and military programs for the use of atomic scientific help may be needed by the United energy is not possible and a worthwhile pro- Kingdom in Australia in the near future because gram for industrial power could not be carried of a certain event which is being planned and out without the use of classified information. which may occur in Australia. You are aware of . . . In these circumstances we should in the first this possible project. White and Martin do not place need to have from you assurance that any know’ [50]. This is a reference to the forthcom- Australian project in the industrial field would ing British atomic tests which were to be held be dealt with as ‘classified’ to the extent that in Australia commencing in 1952. this is necessary under the rules agreed with Oliphant’s reply of the 28th May drew a ‘slap the United States and Canada.’ The response on the wrist’ by the Secretary of the Prime Min- concludes with ‘This need not, however, hold ister’s Department, suggesting that Oliphant up essential preliminary work such as ore min- should meet with the Industrial Atomic En- ing operations’ [48, 49]. Quite clearly Britain ergy Policy Committee and present a report. was unwilling to share information but it still Oliphant did what he had been asked [48]. The wanted its uranium ore. Committee met and recommended that it be Oliphant was shown a copy of this response disbanded and replaced by a new committee and in return responded, on 28th May 1951, ‘constituted under one of the Departments of with a willingness to accept the notion of se- the Defence group’ [51]. The machinations of crecy of any information made available from the Secretaries of the Departments of the De- Britain. He concluded: ‘Assuming that the fence Group resulted in The Industrial Atomic Government agrees to ‘classification’ of work Energy Policy Committee being reconstituted on atomic energy, I assume that the project under the Department of Supply. Howard Beale must be transferred to a Ministry which has sent a letter on 4th April 1952 inviting the re- the necessary machinery for dealing with clas- spective Departments to nominate their rep- sified information’ [49]. Even before Oliphant resentatives. Oliphant, however, did not hear had a chance to write a reply to Attlee’s re- about the changes to the new committee until 20 BINNIE almost three weeks later when he received a let- of Professor J.P. Baxter of the Atomic Energy ter from Menzies asking him to act as a consul- Commission, who said “I have known Mark for tant to the committee. Oliphant objected vocif- years, and cannot conceive of him harbouring a erously [51]. The committee remained in exis- disloyal thought”’[54]. The opinions expressed tence until November 1952 when it was reduced by Oliphant were shared by many loyal Aus- in size and changed in composition to allow for tralians. Another quote from the vetting pro- the easy transition for the new Commissioners cess for the Australian Atomic Energy Commis- who would run the new organisation once the sion stated ‘extensive enquiries failed to reveal Atomic Energy Act 1953 was enacted [52]. any evidence of Professor Oliphant’s interest in, or membership of, any organisation of security interest’ [54]. OLIPHANT AND NATIONAL Two later notes from Oliphant’s file indi- SECURITY cated that he was under some form of casual surveillance. On 11th June 1956 Oliphant re- It has already been noted that Oliphant had ceived gifts from Peter Kapitza. Kapitza had a somewhat relaxed approach to security. His been a fellow Cavendish student and had re- reputation was further damaged by two different turned to his native Russia just before Stalin ‘spy scandals’. The first was the revelation, in closed the borders of the USSR thus effectively March 1946, that had acted as making Kapitza a captive in his homeland. It a spy for the . Nunn May had been was quite natural for Oliphant and Kapitza to an undergraduate in Oliphant’s Physics Depart- correspond and even exchange gifts. A later en- ment in Birmingham. What added to the scan- try included that on 10th January 1957 Petrov dal was that Oliphant knew Nunn May’s family stated that Oliphant was known to him. Petrov who lived near the Oliphants in Birmingham had been a minor diplomat in the Russian Em- [53]. The second scandal was the famous Klaus bassy in and had defected dramati- Fuchs affair. Fuchs was arrested in Harwell in cally. Oliphant as Professor of Physics at the early 1950, as a Soviet agent. Fuchs had worked Australian National University had attended at Birmingham with Rudolph Peierls and Otto diplomatic functions and hence this comment Frisch and later on the Manhattan Project [53]. by Petrov had little impact. Both spies were Birmingham men and Oliphant was their Professor, so now Oliphant was tar- One insightful entry in Oliphant’s file, dated th nished by guilt through association. 14 July 1954, stated ‘there is evidence of ri- The Australian Security and Intelligence Or- valry existing between Professors Messel and ganisation, ASIO, had the responsibility of vet- Oliphant . . . a campaign is on the way to dis- ting all Public Service appointees. It also estab- credit Oliphant and have him removed from his lished files on individuals who may have posed post which would be taken over by Messel’ [54]. a security risk; the outspoken Oliphant had If Oliphant was aware of this rivalry, he cer- such a file established. The file contains alle- tainly did not exhibit any malice towards Mes- gations of a trivial nature which indicate that sel. Meanwhile Messel was busy establishing the Oliphant held strong views and was willing to first university fundraising foundation in Aus- express them. In 1953 there were two assess- tralia, at the . ments made of Oliphant; one dated 17th Au- Finally, Oliphant was not just concerned gust stated, ‘we have an unconfirmed report with atomic energy. He was also an advocate that he expressed horror at the dropping of the of other forms of energy production. An article bomb on Hiroshima, a civilian target, and ac- in the Sydney Daily Telegraph dated 19th July cused the American Government of a breach 1951 stated that Oliphant ‘ . . . suggested that of faith in that regard; his contention being Australia could build a solar radiation power that they had promised that if the bomb was station using huge aluminium mirrors to reflect produced, it would be used only on a mili- the sun’s rays and drive steam power generators tary target . . . I would also quote the opinion . . . ’ [55]. Oliphant was certainly a man of vi- OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 21 sion, he could see the potential of solar powered [18] Visits: Oliphant N.L. (Prof), National electricity generation more than 50 years before Archives of Australia A3300 (A3300/7) 217 the first solar pilot steam generating plant was [1941 File - Yellow Tab]. established by David Mills in the Hunter region, [19] T. Sherratt, On the beach: Australia’s north of Sydney in 2004 [56]. Oliphant would nuclear history, http://www.asap.unimelb. continue with his researches and would later be- edu.au/pubs/tps/tps on the beach.htm. come Governor of his home state, South Aus- [20] Visit of Professor M.L. Oliphant to Aus- tralia. By the time of his death in July 2000, tralia, National Archives of Australia A1608 Oliphant would have regained much of his ear- (A1608/1) A565/1/2 War Sector. lier reputation purely from his great integrity. [21] Professor Marcus Lawrence Elwin Oliphant, He was seen as a prominent opponent of the National Archives of Australia A8520 nuclear arms race. (A8520/11) PH/OLI/8. [22] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 7, 163, Rivett to Smith. REFERENCES [23] A. Moyal, The Australian Atomic Energy Commission: a case study in Australian sci- [1] S. Cockburn and D. Ellyard, Oliphant; The ence and government. Search, 6, 365–384 Life and times of Sir . Axiom (1975). Books, Stepney, South Australia (1991), p. [24] A. Moyal, Interview with Sir Marcus 31. Oliphant December, National Library of Aus- [2] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 73. tralia Oral History, 1992 P13 TRC-2890. [3] M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, [25] National Archives of Australia A688 1939–1945. Macmillan, London (1964), pp. (A8688/1), Book 14, Council for Scientific 389–393. and Industrial Research Executive Commit- [4] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 100. tee - 14th Minute book 8/12/41 to 25/11/42. [5] Gowing (1964), p. 43. [26] Australian National Archives A8520 [6] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), pp. 95, 100. (A8520/11) PH/OLI/8. [7] Gowing (1964), pp. 45–46. [27] Australian National Archives A1608 (A1608/1) A565/1/2 War Sector. [8] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 102. [28] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 110. [9] Gowing (1964), pp. 394–436. [29] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 111. [10] Gowing (1964), p. 92. [30] Gowing (1964), p. 171. [11] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 103. [31] Oliphant, Marcus Lawrence Elwin Pt3, [12] L. Arnold, A Very : National Archives of Australia A6119 British Atomic Weapons Trials in Australia. (A6119/62) 453. Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London [32] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 6, (1987), p. 3. 258, Bruce to Curtin. [13] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 104. [33] Australian National Archives A6119 [14] R.G. Hewlett and O.E. Anderson Jr, The (A6119/62) 453. New World: A History of the Atomic Energy [34] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 7, Commission, Vol. 1: 1939–1946. University 4, Rivett to White. of California Press, Berkeley (1962), p. 43. [35] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 7, [15] R.G. Hewlett and O.E. Anderson Jr, The 192, Burhop to Rivett. New World: A History of the Atomic Energy [36] Atomic Research Establishment – Eng- Commission, Vol. 1: 1939–1946. University land, National Archives of Australia A 816 of California Press, Berkeley (1962), p. 44. (A816/1) item 3/301/428. [16] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 112. [37] Gowing (1964), p. 281. [17] Atomic Energy- Prof Oliphant’s Memo, Na- [38] Outwards Most Secret, National Archives tional Archives of Australia A3300/7 218. of Australia A3196, 1945, Folder. 22 BINNIE

[39] Atomic Energy Commission, National [49] AAEC establishment and organisation, Archives of Australia A1838 (1838/283) item National Archives of Australia A1209 item 720/1 Part 1. 1957/4723 Part1. [40] National Archives of Australia A 816 [50] Australian National Archives A816/43 item (A816/1) item 3/301/428. 11/301/810. [41] Australian National Archives A1838/283 [51] Australian National Archives A816/43 item 720/1 Part1. 11/301/810. [42] Professor Oliphant, National Archives of Australia A461 (A461/7) BL 340/1/1. [52] Australian Atomic Energy Commission An- [43] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 171. nual Report No 1 (1953), p. 8. [44] Defence Representation on Atomic Energy [53] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 133. Research Advisory Committee, Australian [54] Australian National Archives A6119 National Archives A5954/69 item 1385/7. (A6119/62) 453. [45] Industrial Atomic Energy Policy Commit- tee, Australian National Archives A816/43 [55] Australian National Archives A6119 item 11/30/810. (A6119/62) 452. [46] Australian National Archives AA A5954/69 [56] Lecture Delivered to the Royal Society of item 1385/7. New South Wales on 1st September 2004 by [47] Australian Atomic Energy Commission An- Dr David Mills, Head of the Solar Energy nual Report No 1 (1953), p. 7. Group, Physics Department, Sydney Univer- [48] Australian National Archives AA A816/43 sity, entitled ‘Low Cost Solar Thermal Elec- item 11/301/810. tricity’.

Anna Binnie History and Philosophy of Science Department The University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia email: [email protected]

(Manuscript received 22.05.2006, accepted 03.07.2006) Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 23–38, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010023–16 $4.00/1 Ernest Marsden’s Nuclear New Zealand: from Nuclear Reactors to Nuclear Disarmament

rebecca priestley

Abstract: Ernest Marsden was secretary of New Zealand’s Department of Scientific and Industrial Research from 1926 to 1947 and the Department’s scientific adviser in London from 1947 to 1954. Inspired by his early career in nuclear physics, Marsden had a post-war vision for a nuclear New Zealand, where scientists would create radioisotopes and conduct research on a local , and industry would provide heavy water and uranium for use in the British nuclear energy and weapons programmes, with all these ventures powered by energy from stations. During his retirement, however, Marsden conducted research into environmental radioactivity and the impact of radioactive bomb fallout and began to oppose the continued development and testing of nuclear weapons. It is ironic, given his early enthusiasm for all aspects of nuclear development, that through his later work and influence Marsden may have actually contributed to what we now call a ‘nuclear-free’ New Zealand.

Keywords: Ernest Marsden, heavy water, nuclear, New Zealand

INTRODUCTION to nuclear weapons development – which he was happy to support in the 1940s and 1950s In the 1990s, Ross Galbreath established Ernest – changed in his later years. By necessity this Marsden as having been the driving force be- article includes some material already covered hind the involvement of New Zealand scientists by Galbreath and Crawford but it also covers on the Manhattan and Montreal projects, the new ground. The principal sources for this ar- creation of a nuclear sciences team at the De- ticle are the records of the DSIR, External Af- partment of Scientific and Industrial Research fairs Department, and New Zealand Atomic En- (DSIR), and the subsequent plans for a nuclear ergy Committee held at Archives New Zealand reactor in New Zealand [1]. In an article about in Wellington, and Ernest Marsden’s personal New Zealand’s involvement in the British hy- papers held at the Alexander Turnbull Library drogen bomb tests of 1957–58, defence historian in Wellington. Biographical pieces in the his- John Crawford identified Marsden as advising tory of science in some cases overlook the insti- Prime Minister Sidney Holland against allowing tutional and wider social context of science. In the United Kingdom to test bombs on the case of the present study, however, which New Zealand territory. Crawford also covered concerns both the very small country of New the joint United Kingdom-New Zealand plans Zealand and a field as focussed as nuclear sci- for the establishment of a heavy water plant ence, the very reverse is true. In this case, to provide raw materials for the British nuclear one person significantly shaped both the insti- energy and nuclear weapons programmes, but tutional setting and the wider social environ- it was outside the scope of his article to cover ment for his science and we learn much about Marsden’s initiation and encouragement of the the context precisely by examining his influence. heavy water project [2]. Ernest Marsden’s wide experience, outspoken- This article focuses on Ernest Marsden ness and apparent capriciousness towards nu- as the brains behind New Zealand’s nuclear clear weapons development makes him an in- schemes in the 1940s and 1950s, adds the con- teresting study, providing some insight into the text of his early work in the radiation and nu- changing attitudes to nuclear development in clear sciences, and examines how his attitude the nation of New Zealand as a whole.