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‘Two Concepts ofLiberty’ Isaiah Berlin

Isaiah Berlin’s essay‘Two Concepts ofLiberty’*isoneofthe most important piecesofpost-warpolitical philosophy. Itwasoriginallygiven asalectureinOxfordin1958 andhasbeenmuch discussed since then. In thisextractfromthe lectureBerlinidentifiesthe two different concepts offreedom–negativeandpositive–which provide the frameworkfor his wide-rangingdiscussion. Negativefreedomis,roughly,amatterofwhich doors lie opentoyou,itisconcerned exclusivelywithopportunities; positivefreedomisaquestion ofwhetherornot you cangothrough the doors,whetheryou aremasterofyour life.Berlinpoints out that historicallythe concept ofpositivefreedomhasbeenused to controland repress individualsinthe name ofliberty.

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Tocoerce amanistodeprivehimoffreedom – from what? Almost every moralist inhumanhistory haspraised freedom. Like happiness and goodness,like natureandreality,the meaningofthisterm issoporous that thereislittleinterpretation thatitseems ableto resist. Idonot proposeto discusseitherthe history or the morethantwo hundred sensesofthisprotean word, recordedbyhistorians ofideas. Iproposeto examineno morethantwo ofthesesenses–but thosecentralones,withagreatdealofhumanhistory behindthem,and, Idaresay,still to come.The first ofthesepoliticalsensesof freedom or (Ishall usebothwordstomeanthe same),which(following much precedent) Ishall call the ‘negative’sense, isinvolved inthe answertothe question ‘Whatisthe area withinwhichthe subject–aperson or group of persons –isorshouldbelefttodoorbe whathe isableto doorbe,without interference byotherpersons?’ The second, whichIshall call the positive sense, isinvolved inthe answertothe question ‘What,or who,isthe source of control or interference,thatcandeterminesomeoneto do,or be,onething ratherthananother?’ The two questions areclearlydifferent,eventhough the answers to themmayoverlap.

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The notion of‘negative’freedom Iamnormally said to be free to the degree to whichno humanbeinginterferes withmy activity.Politicallibertyinthissenseissimply the area withinwhicha mancanactunobstructed byothers. If Iamprevented byotherpersons from doingwhatIcouldotherwisedo,Iamtothatdegree unfree;andifthisarea is contracted byothermenbeyondacertainminimum,Icanbe described as beingcoerced, or,itmaybe,enslaved.Coercion isnot,however,aterm that covers every formofinability.If IsaythatIamunableto jump morethanten feetinthe air,or cannot read becauseIamblind, or cannot understandthe darkerpagesofHegel,itwouldbeeccentric to saythatIamtothatdegree enslaved or coerced.Coercion impliesthe deliberateinterference ofother humanbeingswithinthe area inwhichIcouldotherwiseact. You lackpolitical libertyorfreedom only if youareprevented fromattainingagoalbyhuman beings.1 Mereincapacity to attainagoalisnot lackofpoliticalfreedom.2 This isbroughtout bythe useofsuch modern expressions as‘’ andits counterpart,‘economic slavery’. Itisargued,very plausibly,thatif a manistoo poor to affordsomethingon whichthereisnolegalban–aloaf of bread, ajourneyroundthe world, recourseto the lawcourts–heisaslittlefree to haveitashe wouldbeifitwereforbiddenhimbyLaw. If my poverty werea kindofdisease, whichprevented mefrombuyingbreador payingfor the journeyroundthe world, or gettingmy caseheard, aslameness prevents me from running, thisinability wouldnot naturally be described asalackof freedom,least ofall politicalfreedom. Itisonly becauseIbelievethatmy inability to getagiventhingisdueto the factthatotherhumanbeingshave made arrangements wherebyIam,whereasothers arenot,prevented from havingenough moneywithwhichto payfor it,thatIthinkmyselfavictimof coercion or slavery.Inotherwords,thisuseofthe term dependsonaparticular socialandeconomic theoryabout the causesofmy povertyorweakness. If my lackofmaterialmeans isdueto my lackofmentalorphysicalcapacity,thenI begintospeakofbeingdeprived offreedom (andnot simply ofpoverty) only if Iaccept the theory.3 If, inaddition,IbelievethatIambeingkept inwant bya specific arrangement whichIconsiderunjust or unfair,Ispeakofeconomic slavery or oppression. ‘The natureofthingsdoesnot maddenus,only ill will does’,said Rousseau. The criterion ofoppression isthe part thatIbelieveto be played byotherhumanbeings,directlyorindirectly,withor without the intention ofdoingso,infrustratingmy wishes. Bybeingfree inthissenseI meannot beinginterfered withbyothers.The widerthe area ofnon- interference the widermyfreedom. Thisiswhatthe classicalEnglishpoliticalphilosophers meant whenthey used thisword. 4 Theydisagreedabout how wide the area couldor shouldbe.

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Theysupposed thatitcouldnot,asthingswere, be unlimited, becauseifit were, itwouldentailastateinwhichall mencouldboundlessly interferewith all othermen; andthiskindof‘natural’ freedom wouldleadto socialchaos in whichmen’sminimum needswouldnotbe satisfied;orelsethe libertiesofthe weakwouldbesuppressed bythe strong.Becausetheyperceived thathuman purposesandactivitiesdonot automatically harmonizewithoneanother; and, because(whatevertheirofficialdoctrines) theyput high valueon othergoals, such asjustice,or happiness,or culture, or security,or varyingdegreesof equality,theywereprepared to curtailfreedom inthe interests ofothervalues and, indeed, offreedom itself.For,without this,itwasimpossibleto createthe kindofassociation thattheythoughtdesirable.Consequently,itisassumed by thesethinkers thatthe area ofmen’sfree action must be limited bylaw. But equallyitisassumed, especially bysuch libertarians asLockeandMill in England, andConstant andTocquevilleinFrance,thatthereoughttoexist a certainminimum area ofpersonalfreedom whichmust on no account be violated;for if itisoverstepped, the individualwill findhimselfinanarea too narrow for eventhatminimum development ofhisnaturalfacultieswhich alonemakesitpossibleto pursue, andeventoconceive, the various endswhich menholdgoodor rightorsacred.Itfollows thatafrontiermust be drawn betweenthe area ofprivatelife andthatofpublic authority.Whereitistobe drawn isamatterofargument,indeed ofhaggling.Menarelargely interdependent,andno man’sactivity issocompletely privateasneverto obstructthe livesofothers inany way. ‘Freedom for the pike isdeathfor the minnows’; the libertyofsomemust dependon the restraint ofothers.5 Still,a practicalcompromisehastobe found. withanoptimistic viewofhumannature, andabelief inthe possibility ofharmonizinghumaninterest,such asLockeor AdamSmithand, insomemoods,Mill,believed thatsocialharmony andprogress were compatiblewithreservingalarge area for privatelife overwhichneitherthe statenorany otherauthority must be allowed to trespass.Hobbes,andthose whoagreedwithhim,especially conservativeor reactionary thinkers,argued thatif menwereto be prevented fromdestroyingoneanother,andmaking sociallife ajungleor awilderness,greatersafeguardsmust be instituted to keepthemintheirplaces,andwished correspondingly to increasethe area of centralized control,anddecreasethatofthe individual. But bothsidesagreed thatsomeportion ofhumanexistence must remainindependent ofthe sphere ofsocialcontrol. Toinvadethatpreserve, howeversmall,wouldbedespotism. The most eloquent ofall defenders offreedom andprivacy,BenjaminConstant, whohad not forgottenthe Jacobindictatorship,declared thatatthe very least the libertyofreligion,opinion,expression,property,must be guaranteed

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against arbitrary invasion. Jefferson,Burke, Paine, Mill,compiled different cataloguesofindividualliberties,but the argument for keepingauthority at bayisalways substantially the same.We must preserveaminimum area of personalfreedom if wearenot to ‘degrade or deny ournature’. We cannot remainabsolutely free,andmust giveup someofourlibertytopreservethe rest.But totalself-surrenderisself-defeating.Whatthenmust the minimum be?Thatwhichamancannot giveup without offendingagainst the essence of hishumannature.Whatisthisessence?Whatarethe standardswhichit entails? Thishasbeen,andperhaps always will be,amatterofinfinitedebate. But whateverthe principleintermsofwhichthe area ofnon-interference isto be drawn,whetheritisthatofnaturallawornaturalrights,or ofutility or the pronouncements ofacategoricalimperative, or the sanctity ofthe ,or any otherconcept withwhichmenhavesoughttoclarifyand justifytheirconvictions,libertyinthissensemeans liberty from:absence of interference beyondthe shifting, but always recognizable, frontier. ‘The only freedom whichdeservesthe nameisthatofpursuingourown goodinour own way’,said the most celebrated ofits champions. If thisisso,iscompulsion ever justified?Mill had no doubtthatitwas. Since demandsthatall individuals be entitled to aminimum offreedom,all otherindividuals wereof necessity to be restrained, if needbebyforce, from deprivinganyoneofit. Indeed, the wholefunction oflawwasthe prevention ofjust such collisions:the statewasreducedto whatLassallecontemptuouslydescribed asthe functions ofanight-watchmanortraffic policeman. Whatmade the protection ofindividuallibertysosacred to Mill? Inhis famous essayhe declaresthatunless menarelefttoliveastheywish‘inthe pathwhichmerely concernsthemselves’,civilization cannot advance;the truthwill not,for lackofafree marketinideas,cometo light; therewill be no scopefor spontaneity,originality,genius,for mentalenergy,for moralcourage. will be crushed bythe weightof‘collectivemediocrity’. Whateveris richanddiversified will be crushed bythe weightofcustom,bymen’sconstant tendencytoconformity,whichbreedsonly‘withered capacities’,‘pinched and hidebound’,‘cramped andwarped’humanbeings. ‘Paganself-assertion isas worthyasChristianself-denial.’ ‘All the errors whichamanislikely to commit against advice andwarningarefaroutweighed bythe evilofallowingothers to constrainhimtowhattheydeemisgood.’ The defence oflibertyconsists in the ‘negative’goalofwardingoff interference.Tothreatenamanwith persecution unless he submits to alife inwhichheexercisesnochoicesofhis goals; to block beforehimevery doorbut one, no matterhow noblethe prospectuponwhichitopens,or how benevolent the motivesofthosewho arrange this,istosinagainst the truththathe isaman,abeingwithalife ofhis

158 READING 1‘TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY’ own to live.Thisislibertyasithasbeenconceived byliberals inthe modern worldfromthe days ofErasmus (somewouldsayofOccam) to ourown. Every plea for civillibertiesandindividualrights,every protest againstexploitation andhumiliation,against the encroachment ofpublic authority,or the mass hypnosisofcustom or organized propaganda, springsfrom thisindividual- istic,andmuch disputed, conception ofman. Three facts about thisposition maybe noted.Inthe first place Mill confuses two distinctnotions. Oneisthatall coercion is,insofarasitfrustrateshuman desires,bad assuch,although itmayhaveto be applied to prevent other, greaterevils;whilenon-interference,whichisthe oppositeofcoercion,isgood assuch,although itisnot the only good.Thisisthe ‘negative’conception of libertyinits classicalform. The otheristhatmenshouldseekto discoverthe truth, or to develop acertaintypeofcharacterofwhichMill approved – fearless,original,imaginative, independent,non-conformingto the point of eccentricity,andso on –andthattruthcanbe found, andsuch charactercanbe bred, only inconditionsoffreedom. Boththeseareliberalviews,but theyare notidentical,andthe connection betweenthemis,atbest,empirical. Noone wouldarguethattruthor freedom ofself-expression couldflourishwhere dogmacrushesall thought. But the evidence ofhistory tendstoshow (as, indeed, wasargued byJamesStepheninhisformidableattackon Mill inhis Liberty,Equality,Fraternity)thatintegrity,loveoftruthandfiery individu- alism growatleast asofteninseverely disciplined communitiesamong, for example, the puritanCalvinists ofScotlandor NewEngland, or undermilitary discipline, asinmoretolerant or indifferent ; andifthisissoaccepted, Mill’sargument for libertyasanecessary condition for the growthofhuman genius falls to the ground.If histwo goals proved incompatible, Mill wouldbe faced withacrueldilemma, quiteapart fromthe furtherdifficultiescreated by the inconsistencyofhisdoctrineswithstrictutilitarianism,eveninhisown humaneversion ofit.6 Inthe secondplace,the doctrineiscomparatively modern.Thereseems to be scarcely any discussion ofindividuallibertyasaconscious politicalideal (asopposed to its actualexistence)inthe ancient world.Condorcethasalready remarked thatthe notion ofindividualrights isabsent from the legal conceptionsofthe Romans andGreeks; thisseems to holdequally ofthe Jewish, Chinese, andall otherancient civilizationsthathavesince cometo light.7 The domination ofthisidealhasbeenthe exception ratherthanthe rule, eveninthe recent history ofthe West. Nor haslibertyinthissenseoften formed arallyingcry for the greatmassesofmankind.The desirenot to be impingedupon,to be lefttooneself, hasbeenamarkofhigh civilization both on the part ofindividuals andcommunities. The senseofprivacyitself, ofthe

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area ofpersonalrelationships assomethingsacred inits own right,derives from aconception offreedom which, for all its religious roots,isscarcely older, inits developed state, thanthe Renaissance or the Reformation.8 Yetits declinewouldmarkthe deathofacivilization,ofanentiremoraloutlook. The thirdcharacteristic ofthisnotion oflibertyisofgreaterimportance.Itis thatlibertyinthissenseisnot incompatiblewithsomekindsofautocracy,or at any ratewiththe absence ofself-. Libertyinthissenseis principallyconcerned withthe area ofcontrol,notwithits source.Just asa democracymay,infact,deprivethe individualcitizenofagreatmany whichhemighthaveinsomeotherformofsociety,so itisperfectly conceivable thataliberal-minded despot wouldallow hissubjects alarge measureof personalfreedom. The despot wholeaveshissubjects awide area ofliberty maybe unjust,or encourage the wildest inequalities,carelittlefor order,or virtue, or knowledge,but provided he doesnot curbtheirliberty,or atleast curbsitless thanmany otherregimes,hemeets withMill’sspecification.9 Freedom inthissenseisnot,atany ratelogically,connected withdemocracyor self-government. Self-government may,on the whole, provideabetter guarantee ofthe preservation ofcivillibertiesthanotherregimes,andhas beendefended assuch bylibertarians. But thereisnonecessary connection betweenindividuallibertyanddemocratic rule.The answertothe question ‘Whogovernsme?’ islogicallydistinctfrom the question ‘How fardoes government interferewithme?’ Itisinthisdifference thatthe greatcontrast betweenthe two concepts ofnegativeandpositiveliberty,inthe end, consists.10 For the ‘positive’senseoflibertycomestolightif wetrytoanswer the question,not ‘WhatamIfree to doorbe?’,but ‘Bywhom amIruled?’ or ‘WhoistosaywhatIam,andwhatIamnot,to be or do?’ The connection betweendemocracyandindividuallibertyisagooddealmoretenuous thanit seemed to many advocatesofboth.The desireto be governed bymyself, or at any rateto participateinthe process bywhichmylife istobe acontrolled, may be asdeepawishasthatofafree area for action,andperhaps historically older. But itisnot adesirefor the samething.Sodifferent isit,indeed, asto haveled inthe endto the greatclashofideologiesthatdominatesour world. For itisthis–the ‘positive’conception ofliberty:not freedom from,but freedom to –whichthe adherents ofthe ‘negative’notion represent asbeing, at times,no betterthanaspecious disguisefor brutaltyranny.

The notion ofpositivefreedom The ‘positive’senseofthe word‘liberty’ derivesfrom the wishon the part ofthe individualtobe hisown master. Iwishmy life anddecisions to dependon myself, not on externalforcesofwhateverkind.Iwishto be the instrument of

160 READING 1‘TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY’ myown,not ofothermen’sacts ofwill. Iwishto be asubject,not anobject; to be moved byreasons,byconscious purposeswhicharemy own,not bycauses whichaffectme, asitwere, from outside.Iwishto be somebody,not nobody; a doer–deciding, not beingdecided for,self-directed andnot acted upon by externalnatureor byothermenasif Iwereathing, or ananimal,or aslave incapableofplayingahumanrole, thatis,ofconceivinggoals andpoliciesof my own andrealizingthem. Thisisatleast part ofwhatImeanwhenIsaythat Iamrational,andthatitismyreason thatdistinguishesmeasahumanbeing from the rest ofthe world.Iwish, aboveall,to be consciousofmyselfasa thinking, willing, activebeing, bearingresponsibility for hischoicesandable to explainthembyreference to hisown ideasandpurposes. Ifeelfree to the degree thatIbelievethistobe true, andenslaved to the degree thatIammade to realizethatitisnot. The freedom whichconsists inbeingone’s own master,andthe freedom whichconsists innot beingprevented from choosingasIdobyothermen,may, on the face ofit,seemconcepts atnogreatlogicaldistance from each other–no morethannegativeandpositiveways ofsayingthe samething.Yetthe ‘positive’and‘negative’notions offreedom historically developed indivergent directions not always bylogically reputablesteps,until,inthe end, theycame into directconflictwitheachother. Onewayofmakingthisclearisintermsofthe independent momentum whichthe,initially perhaps quiteharmless,metaphor ofself-mastery acquired.‘Iammyown master’; ‘Iamslaveto no man’;but mayInot(as, for instance,T.H.Greenisalways saying)be aslaveto nature?Ortomyown ‘unbridled’passions? Arethesenot so many speciesofthe identicalgenus ‘slave’–somepoliticalorlegal,others moralorspiritual? Havenot menhad the experience ofliberatingthemselvesfromspiritualslavery,or slavery to nature, anddotheynot inthe courseofitbecomeaware, on the onehand, ofaself whichdominates,and, on the other,ofsomethinginthemwhichisbroughtto heel? Thisdominant selfisthenvariously identified withreason,withmy ‘highernature’,withthe selfwhichcalculatesandaims atwhatwill satisfyitin the longrun,withmy ‘real’,or ‘ideal’,or ‘autonomous’ self, or withmy self‘at its best’; whichisthencontrasted withirrationalimpulse, uncontrolled desires, my ‘lower’ nature, the pursuitofimmediatepleasures,my ‘empirical’ or ‘heteronomous’self, swept byevery gust ofdesireandpassion,needingto be rigidly disciplined if itisevertoriseto the full heightofits ‘real’ nature. Presently the two selvesmaybe represented asdivided byanevenlargergap: the realselfmaybe conceived assomethingwiderthanthe individual(asthe term isnormallyunderstood),asasocial‘whole’ofwhichthe individualisan element or aspect:atribe,arace,achurch,astate, the greatsocietyofthe living

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andthe dead andthe yetunborn. Thisentity isthenidentified asbeingthe ‘true’selfwhich, byimposingits collective, or ‘organic’,singlewill upon its recalcitrant ‘members’,achievesits own,and, therefore, their,‘higher’ freedom. The perils ofusingorganic metaphorstojustifythe coercion ofsomemenby others inordertoraisethemtoa‘higher’ leveloffreedom haveoftenbeen pointed out. But whatgivessuch plausibility asithastothiskindoflanguage isthatwerecognizethatitispossible, andattimesjustifiable, to coerce menin the nameofsomegoal(letussay,justice or public health)whichtheywould, if theyweremoreenlightened, themselvespursue, but donot,becausetheyare blindor ignorant or corrupt. Thisrenders iteasy for meto conceiveofmyself ascoercingothers for theirown sake,intheir,not my,interest. Iamthen claimingthatIknow whattheytruly needbetterthantheyknow itthemselves. What,atmost,thisentails isthattheywouldnot resist meiftheywererational, andaswiseasI, andunderstoodtheirinterests asIdo. But Imaygoontoclaim agooddealmorethanthis. Imaydeclarethattheyareactually aimingatwhat intheirbenighted statetheyconsciously resist,becausethereexists within themanoccult entity –theirlatent rationalwill,or their‘true’purpose–and thatthisentity,although itisbelied byall thattheyovertly feelanddoandsay, istheir‘real’ self, ofwhichthe poor empiricalselfinspace andtimemayknow nothingor little;andthatthisinnerspiritisthe only selfthatdeservestohave its wishestakeninto account.11 Once Itake thisview,Iaminaposition to ignorethe actualwishesofmenorsocieties,to bully,oppress,torturethemin the name, andon behalf, oftheir‘real’ selves,inthe secureknowledge that whateveristhe truegoalofman(happiness,fulfilment ofduty,wisdom,ajust society,self-fulfilment)must be identicalwithhisfreedom –the free choice of his‘true’,albeitsubmerged andinarticulate, self. Thisparadox hasbeenoftenexposed.Itisonethingto saythatIknow what isgoodfor X ,whilehehimselfdoesnot andeventoignorehiswishesfor its – andhis–sake;andavery different oneto saythathe has eoipso chosenit,not indeed consciously,not ashe seems ineverydaylife,but inhisroleasarational selfwhichhisempiricalselfmaynot know –the ‘real’ selfwhichdiscernsthe good, andcannot help choosingitonce itisrevealed.Thismonstrous impersonation,whichconsists inequatingwhat X wouldchooseifhewere somethingheisnot,or atleast not yet,withwhat X actually seeksandchooses, isatthe heart ofall politicaltheoriesofself-realization. Itisonethingto say thatImaybe coercedfor my own goodwhichIamtoo blindto see:thismay,on occasion,befor my benefit; indeed itmayenlarge the scopeofmy liberty; itis anothertosaythatif itismygood, thenIamnot beingcoerced, for Ihavewilled it,whetherIknow thisornot,andamfree –or ‘truly’ free –evenwhilemy poor

162 READING 1‘TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY’ earthly bodyandfoolishmindbitterlyrejectit,andstruggleagainst thosewho seekhoweverbenevolently to imposeit,withthe greatest desperation. Thismagicaltransformation,or sleightofhand(for whichWilliamJamesso justlymocked the Hegelians),cannodoubtbe perpetrated just aseasily with the ‘negative’concept offreedom,wherethe selfthatshouldnot be interfered withisnolongerthe individualwithhisactualwishesandneedsastheyare normally conceived, but the ‘real’ manwithin,identified withthe pursuitof someidealpurposenot dreamed ofbyhisempiricalself.And, asinthe caseof the ‘positively’ free self, thisentity maybe inflated into somesuper-personal entity –astate, aclass,anation,or the march ofhistory itself, regarded asa more‘real’ subjectofattributesthanthe empiricalself.But the ‘positive’ conception offreedom asself-mastery,withits suggestion ofamandivided against himself, has,infact,andasamatterofthe history ofdoctrinesandof practice,lent itselfmoreeasily to thissplittingofpersonality into two:the transcendent,dominant controller,andthe empiricalbundleofdesiresand passions to be disciplined andbroughttoheel. Thisdemonstrates(if demonstration ofso obviousatruthisneeded)thatthe conception offreedom directly derivesfrom the viewthatistakenofwhatconstitutesaself, aperson, aman. Enough manipulation withthe definition ofman,andfreedom canbe madeto meanwhateverthe manipulatorwishes. Recent history hasmade it only too clearthatthe issueisnot merely academic.

Notes * Thisversion ofthe essayisfrom A.Quinton (ed.) PoliticalPhilosophy ,OxfordUniversity Press,OxfordReadingsinPhilosophy,1967,pp.141–52. The quotations from ‘Two Concepts ofLiberty’ inthe maintext sometimeshaveaslightly different wordingfromthisversion of the essay. 1 Idonot,ofcourse, meantoimply the truthofthe converse. 2 Helve´tius made thispoint very clearly:‘The free manisthe manwhoisnot inirons,nor imprisoned inagaol,nor terrorized like aslavebythe fearofpunishment ... itisnot lackof freedom not to fly like aneagleor swimlike awhale.’ 3 The Marxist conceptions ofsociallaws is,ofcourse, the best-known version ofthistheory, but itforms alarge element insomeChristianandutilitarian,andall socialist,doctrines. 4 ‘Afree man’,said Hobbes,‘ishe that... isnot hindered to dowhathe haththe will to do.’ Lawisalways a‘fetter’,evenif itprotects youfrombeingboundinchains thatareheavier thanthoseofthe law,say,arbitrary despotism or chaos. Benthamsays much the same. 5 ‘Freedom for anOxforddon’,others havebeenknown to add, ‘isavery different thingfrom freedom for anEgyptianpeasant.’ Thisproposition derivesits force fromsomethingthatisbothtrueandimportant,but the phraseitselfremains apiece ofpoliticalclaptrap. Itistruethattoofferpoliticalrights,or safeguards,against intervention bythe state, to menwhoarehalf-naked, illiterate, underfed, anddiseased istomock theircondition; theyneedmedicalhelp or education beforetheycan 163 ARGUMENTSFOR FREEDOM

understand, or make useof, anincreaseintheirfreedom. Whatisfreedom to thosewho cannot make useofit? Without adequateconditions offreedom whatisthe valueoffreedom? First thingscomefirst:therearesituations,asanineteenth-century Russianradicalwriter declared, inwhichboots aresuperior to the worksofShakespeare, individualfreedom isnot everyone’s primary need.For freedom isnot the mereabsence offrustration ofwhatever kind;thiswouldinflatethe meaningofthe worduntilitmeans too much or too little.The Egyptianpeasant needsclothesormedicinebefore, andmorethanpersonalliberty,but the minimum freedom thathe needstoday,andthe greaterdegree offreedom thathe mayneed tomorrow,isnot somespeciesoffreedom peculiartohim,but identicalwiththatof professors,artists andmillionaires. Whattroublesthe consciencesofWestern liberals isnot,Ithink, the belief thatthe freedom thatmenseekdiffers accordingto theirsocialoreconomic conditions,but thatthe minority whopossess ithavegained itbyexploitingor,atleast,avertingtheirgazefrom the vast majority whodonot. Theybelieve, withgoodreason,thatif individuallibertyisanultimate endfor humanbeings,noneshouldbedeprived ofitbyothers; least ofall thatsomeshould enjoy itatthe expenseofothers.Equality ofliberty,not to treatothers asIshouldnot wish themtotreatme;repayment ofmy debttothosewhoalonehavemade possiblemy libertyor prosperity or enlightenment; justice,inits simplest andmost universalsense–thesearethe foundations ofliberalmorality.Libertyisnot the only goalofmen. Ican,like the Russian critic Belinsky,saythatif others areto be deprived ofit–ifany brothers areto remainin poverty,squalor,andchains –thenIdonot want itfor myself.Irejectitwithbothhandsand infinitely prefertosharetheirfate.But nothingisgained byaconfusion ofterms. Toavoid glaringinequality or wide-spread misery Iamreadytosacrifice some, or all,ofmy freedom: Imaydosowillingly andfreely:but itisfreedom thatIamgivingup for the sake ofjustice or equality or the loveofmy fellow men. Ishouldbeguilt-stricken,andrightly so,ifIwere not,insomecircumstances,readytomake thissacrifice.But asacrifice isnot anincreasein whatisbeingsacrificed, namely freedom,howevergreatthe moralneedor the compensation for it. Everythingiswhatitis:libertyisliberty,not equality or fairness or justice or culture or humanhappiness or aquietconscience.If the libertyofmyselfor my class or nation dependsonthe misery ofanumberofotherhumanbeings,the systemwhichpromotesthis isunjust andimmoral. But if Icurtailorlosemy freedom,inordertolessenthe shameof such inequality,anddonot therebymaterially increasethe individuallibertyofothers,an absoluteloss oflibertyoccurs. Thismaybe compensated for byagaininjustice or in happiness or inpeace,but the loss remains,anditisaconfusion ofvaluestosaythat although my ‘liberal’,individualfreedom maygobythe board, someotherkindoffreedom – ‘social’ or ‘economic’–isincreased.Yetitremains truethatthe freedom ofsomemust at timesbe curtailed to securethe freedom ofothers.Uponwhatprincipleshouldthisbe done? If freedom isasacred, untouchablevalue, therecanbe no such principle.Oneor otherof theseconflictingprinciplesmust atany rateinpractice yield: not always for reasons which canbe clearlystated, letalonegeneralized into rulesoruniversalmaxims. 6 Thisisbut anotherillustration ofthe naturaltendencyofall but avery fewthinkers to believethatall the thingstheyholdgoodmust be intimately connected, or atleast compatible, withoneanother. The history ofthought,like the history ofnations,isstrewn withexamplesofinconsistent,or atleast disparate, elements artificially yoked togetherina despotic system,or heldtogetherbythe dangerofsomecommon enemy.Induecoursethe dangerpasses,andconflicts betweenthe alliesarise, whichoftendisrupt the system, sometimestothe greatbenefitofmankind. 7 Seethe valuablediscussion ofthisinMichaelVilley, Lec¸ons d’HistoiredelaPhilosophie du Droit ,whotracesthe embryoofthe notion ofsubjectiverights to Occam.

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8 Christian(andJewishor Moslem) belief inthe absoluteauthority ofdivineor naturallaws, or inthe equality ofall meninthe sightofGod, isvery different from belief infreedom to liveasoneprefers. 9 Indeed, itisarguablethatinthe Prussia ofFrederickthe Greatorinthe Austria ofJosef II, menofimagination,originality,andcreativegenius,and, indeed, minoritiesofall kinds, wereless persecuted andfelt the pressure, bothofinstitutions andcustom,less heavy upon themthaninmany anearlierorlaterdemocracy. 10 ‘Negativeliberty’ issomethingthe extent ofwhich, inagivencase, itisdifficult to estimate.Itmight,primafacie, seemtodependsimply on the powertochoosebetweenat any ratetwo alternatives. Nevertheless,not all choicesareequally free,or free atall. If ina totalitarianstateIbetraymyfriendunderthreatoftorture, perhaps evenif Iactfromfearof losingmy job, Icanreasonably saythatIdid not actfreely.Nevertheless,Idid, ofcourse, make achoice andcould, atany rateintheory,havechosentobe killed or tortured or imprisoned.The mereexistence ofalternativesisnot,therefore, enough to make my action free (although itmaybe voluntary)inthe normalsenseofthe word.The extent ofmy freedom seems to dependon (a)how maypossibilitiesareopentome(although the method ofcountingthesecanneverbe morethanimpressionistic: Possibilitiesofaction arenot discreteentitieslike apples,whichcanbe exhaustively enumerated); (b)how easy or difficult each ofthesepossibilitiesistoactualize;(c)how important inmyplanoflife,givenmy characterandcircumstances,thesepossibilitiesarewhencompared witheachother; (d)how fartheyareclosed andopened bydeliberatehumanacts; (e)whatvaluenot merely the agent,but the generalsentiment ofthe society inwhichhelives,puts on the various possibilities. All thesemagnitudesmust be ‘integrated’,andaconclusion,necessarily never precise, or indisputable, drawn fromthisprocess.Itmaywell be thattherearemany incommensurabledegreesoffreedom,andthattheycannot be drawn up on asinglescaleof magnitude,howeverconceived.Moreover,inthe caseofsocieties,wearefaced bysuch (logically absurd)questions as‘Wouldarrangement X increasethe libertyofMrAmorethan itwouldthatofMessrs B, C, andDbetweenthem,added together?’ The samedifficulties ariseinapplyingutilitariancriteria.Nevertheless,provided wedonot demandprecise measurement,wecangivevalid reasons for sayingthatthe average subjectofthe Kingof Swedenisonthe whole, agooddealfreertodaythanthe average citizenofthe Republic of Rumania.Totalpatternsoflife must be compared directly aswholes,although the method bywhichwemake the comparison,andthe truthofthe conclusions aredifficult or impossibleto demonstrate.But the vagueness ofthe concepts,andthe multiplicity ofthe criteria involved, isanattributeofthe subject-matteritself, not ofourimperfectmethodsof measurement,or incapacity for precisethought. 11 The idealoftruefreedom isthe maximum ofpowerfor all the members ofhumansociety aliveto make the best ofthemselves’,said T.H.Greenin1881. Apart fromthe confusion of freedom andequality,thisentails thatif amanchosesomeimmediatepleasure–which(in whoseview?) wouldnot enablehimtomake the best ofhimself(whatself?) whathe is exercisingisnot ‘true’freedom:and, if deprived ofit,hewouldnot loseanythingthat mattered.Greenwasagenuineliberalbut many atyrant couldusehisformulato justifyhis worst oppression.,OxfordUniversity Press,OxfordReadingsinPhilosophy,1967,pp.141– 52. The quotations from‘Two Concepts ofLiberty’ inthe maintext sometimeshavea slightly different wordingfromthisversion ofthe essay.

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