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Home , Isaiah Berlin, Political freedom, Positive liberty

1, IsaiahBerlin: Two Conceptsof ',

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To coerce a man is to deprive him of - freedom from what? Almost every moralist in has praised freedom. Like happinessand goodness,like nature and , the meaning of this term is so porous that there is little interpietation that ii seemsable to resisr.I do not propose to discusseitlier the history or the more than two hundred sensesof this protean word recordej by historians of ideas. I propose to examine no more than two of thl senses- but those central ones, with a great deal of human history behind thern, and, I dare say, still to come. The first of thes! political sensesof freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the ,What 'negative' sense,is involved in the answei to the question is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons- is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do o, be, without interference by other persons?' The second, which I shali call the .'What, positive sense,is involved in the answer to the question or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine some.oneto do, or be, this rather than that?, The two questions are clearly different, even though the answersro them may bverlap.

THE NorIoN oF 'NEGATIVE'FREEDOM

I am normally said to be free to the degreeto which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. polltical liberty in this senseis o@ Oxford_University Press 1959. Reprinted from Four Essayson Liberty, by Sir IsaiahBerlin (1959), by pirmission of University Press. 16 Two ConcePtsof Liberty 1,7 simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by othtrs. area could or should be. They gupposedthat it could not, as rhings If I ;; prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I were, be unlimited, becauseif it were, it would entail a ,t"t. in am to that degreeunfree; and if this area is contracted by other-men which all men could boundlesslyinterfere with all other men: and beyond a cettain minimum, I can be describedas being coerced,or, this kind of 'natural' freedom would lead to social chaosin which it may be, enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers men's minimum needswould not be satisfied;or elsethe every-formof inability. If I say that I am unable to-jump more than of the weak would be suppressedby the strong. Becausethey ten ieet in the air. or cannot read becauseI am blind, or cannot perceivedthat human purposesand activitiesdo n6t automatically understand the darker pagesof Hegel, it would be eccentric to say harmonize wirh one another, and because(whatever their officiar that I am to that degree enslavedor coerced. Coercion implies the doctrines) they put high on other goals, such as , or deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in ,or culture, or securiry,or uarying degreesof .qu"iity, which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom they were prepared to curtail freedom in th. i-nterestsof oth.. only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by hum-aqbeings.' values and, indeed, of freedom itself. For, without this, it was Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of .' impossible to creare the kind of association rhat they thought This is brought out by the use of such modern expressions as desirable.Consequently, it is assumedby these thinkers that ihe '' and its counterpart' 'economic '' It is area of men's free action musr be limited by law. But equally it is argued, very plausibly, that if a man is too poor to afford something assumed, especially by such libertarians as Locke Mill in on which theie is no legal ban - a loaf of bread, a journey round the England, and Constant and Tocquevillein France,that "ni there ought world, recourseto the law courts - he is as little free to have it as he to exist a certainminimum areaof personalfreedom which must on would be if it were forbidden him by law. If my poverty were a kind no account be violated; for if it is overstepped,the will of disease,which preventedme from buying bread, or paying for find himself in an area too narrow foi even that minimum the journey round the world or getting my caseheard, as lameness developmentof his natural facultieswhich alone makesit oossible prevents me from running, this inability would not naturally be to pursue, and even to conceive,the various endswhich men hold describedas a lack of freedom, least of all political freedom. It is or right or sacred.It follows that a frontier must be drawn only becauseI believethat my inability to get a giventhing is.due.to betweenthe areaof private life and that of public authority. where the'fact that other human beingshave made arrangementswhereby it is to be drawn is a marrer of_argument,indeed of haggling.Men I am, whereasothers are not, preventedfrom having enoughmoney are largely interdependent, and no man's activity is sJlom"pletely with which to pay for it, that I think myself a victim of coercionor private as neverto obstruct the livesof othersin any way. .Freedom slavery.In other words, this useof the term dependson a Particular for the.pike_is death for the minnows'; the liberty of some musr social and economic theory about the causesof my poverty or depend on the restraint of others. 'Freedom for an Oxford don'. weakness.If my lack of material meansis due to my lack of mentaL others have been known to add, 'is a very different rhing from or physical capacity, then I begin to speak of being deprived of freedom for an Egyptian peasant.' freedom (and not simply about poverty) only if I acceptthe theory-.' This proposition derives its force from something that is both If. in addition, I believethat I am being kept in want by a specific true and important, but the phrase itself remains a piJce of political arrangementwhich I consideruniust or unfair'.1speak of eco.nomic claptrap. It is-true_thatto offer political ,or safeguardsagainst slarrer!or oppression.'The nature of things does not madden us, intervention by the stare, to men who are half-naked. illit-erate. only iil will does',said Rousseau.The criterion of oppressionis the underfed, and diseased is to mock their condition: thev need pari that I believeto be played by other human beings,direcdy. or medical help or educationbefore they can undersrand,or ,t. indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating of, an increase in their freedom. rVhat is freedom to those-"k. who my wishes.By being free in this senseI mean not being interfered cannot make use of it? Without adequate conditions for the use of with by others. The wider the area of non-interferencethe wider my freedom, what is rhe value of freedom? First things come first: there freedom. are situations, as a nineteenth-century Russian radical writer This is what the classicalEnglish political philosophersmeant declared, in which boots are superior to ihe works of Shakespeare; when they used this word.a They disagreed about how n'ide the individual freedom is not everyone'sprimary need. For freedom ii 18 Two ConcePtsof LibertY IsaiahBerlin L9 not the mere absenceof frustration of whatever kind; this wou,ld curtailed to secure the freedom of others. Upon what influ,. the meaningof the word until it meanttoo much or too little. should this be done? If freedom is a sacred, untouchable value, The Egyptian p."iunt needsclothes or medicinebefore, and more there can be no such principle. One or other of these conflicting "p'.lto""i ,ft"r, lib..,y, but the minimum. freedom that he needs rules or must, at any rate in practice,yield: not always and the grearer degree of that he may need for reasonswhich can be clearly stated,let alone generalizedinto ;;i;;,' -freedom ,o*oiro*, is noi ro-. tp.ii.s of freedom peculiar to him, but rules or universalmaxims. Still, a practical compromise has to be identicalwith that of professors'artists' and millionaires' found. what troubles the consciencesof western liberalsis not, I think, Philosopherswith an optimistic view of human nature and a the belie{that the freedom that men seekdiffers accordingto their in the possibility of harmonizing human interests,such as socialor economicconditions, but that the minority who possessit Locke or and, in some moods, Mill, believed that have gained it by exploiting, or, at lea.st,averting their gazefrom' social harmony and were compatible with reserving a ih. u"r, maiority who do not. They believe,with good reason,that largearea for private life over which neitherthe statenor any other if individual liberty is an ultimate end for human beings,-non' authority must be allowed to trespass.Hobbes, and those who should be deprivei of it by others; least of all that some should agreed with him, especiallyconservative or reactionary thinkers, enjoy it at the expenseof others. Equality of liberty; not to treat argued that if men were to be prevented from destroying one jungle otheis as I should not wish them to treat me; repaymentof my debt another and making social life a or a wilderness,greater to those who alone have made possiblemy liberty or prosperityor safeguardsmust be instituted to keep them in their places; he enlightenment;justice, in its simplestand most universalsense - wished correspondinglyto increasethe area of centralizedcontrol it.i. rhe foundationsof liberal . Liberty is not the only and decreasethat of the individual. But both sidesagreed that some ".. *."i"f men. I can, like the Russiancritic Belinsky,say that i{ others portion of human existencemust remain independentof the sphere ire to be deprived of it - i{ my brothers are to remain ln poverty' of socialcontrol. To invade that preserve,however small, would be scualor. and chains- then I do not want it for myself, I reiect it despotism. The most eloquent of all defendersof freedom and But nothing privacy, , who had not forgotten ,Jiif, uoirr handsand infinitely'terms. prefer to sharetheir fate. the Jacobin is gained by a confusion of To avoid glaring inequality or dicta.torship, declarbd that at the very least the liberty of , wiiespread- misery I am ready to sacrificesome' or all, of my opinion, expression,property, must be guaranteedagainst arbitrary I am freedom: I may do so willingly and freely: but it is freedom that invasion. Jefferson, Burke, Paine, Mill, compiled different cata- ;i;l;; ;o fo. ih. sakeof iuitice or equalityor the love of my fellow logues of individual liberties, but the argument for keeping iren.*l should be guilt-stricken,and rightly so, if I were not,.in some authority at bay is always substantiallythe same.We musr preserve circumstanc.r,..""dy to make this sacrifice.But a sacrificeis not an a minimum area of personal freedom if we are not to 'degrade or increasein what is being sacrificed,namely freedom,however great deny our nature'. We cannot remain absolutelyfree, and must give the moral needor the compensationfor it. Everythingis what it is: up some of our liberty to preservethe rest. But total self-surrender is liberty, not equality or fairness iu-sticeor culture, or is self-defeating.What then must be the minimum be?That which a liberty -or hurnan happinessor a quiet .lf the liberty of my-selfor man cannot give up without offending against the essenceof his rJ7hat my class oi n"tion depinds on the misery of a number of other human nature. What is this essence? are the standards which ttJ.n"n beings, the system which promotes this is uniust and it entails?This has been, and perhapsalways will be, a matter of immoral. Sui it t curt;il or lose my freedom,in order to lessenthe infinite debate. But whatever the principle in terms of which the increase areaof non-interference shame of such inequality,'others, and do not thereby materially is to be drawn, whether it is that of natural the individual liberiy of an absoluteloss of liberty occurs. law or natural rights, or of utility or the pronouncements of a This may be compensatedfor by a gain in iusticeor in happinessor categorical imperative, or the sanctity of the , or any in .but rhe ioss remains,and it is a confusionof valuesto say other concept with which men have sought to clarify and justify thJt although my 'liberal', individual freedommay g9 by the board, their convictions, liberty in this sensemeans liberty from; absence i"-. of freedom- 'social' or 'economic'- is increased. of interference beyond the shifting, but always recognizable, yct it"tt.."kini remalns true that the freedom of some must at times be frontier. 'The only freedom which deservesthe name is that of Isaiah Berlin 21 z0 Two ConcePtsof LibertY the truth, or to develop a certain type of character of which own good in our own way" said the most celebrated pursuing our Mill approved - critical, original, imaginative, independent,non- If"this is so, is compuliion ever iustified?Mill had ;i;;.h;ilions. conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on - and that truth that it was. since justicedemands that all indtvtdualsbe no doubt can be found, and such charactercan be bred, only in conditionsof to a minrmum of freedom, all other were of entirled freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, to be restrained, if need be by.force, from depriving and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one "...ttity tt it. Indeed, the whole function of law was the preventio.n would argue that truth or freedom of self-expressioncould flourish ;'i't;;"."L". t"lh .ollitions: the was reduced to what Lassalle or where dogma crushesall thought. But the evidenceof history tends .o.i*pr"ously described as the functions of a nightwatchman to show (as,indeed, was arguedby JamesStephen in his formidable traffic policeman. attack on Mill in his Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) that integrity, whatmadetheprotectionofindividuallibertysosa.credto..Mill? love of truth, and fiery grow at least as often in he declaresthat, unlessmen are left to live as fn nitl"-"ur.rr"y severelydisciplined communities among, for example, the puritan in the path which merely concerns themselves',civiliza- ;irt;i;t Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military disci- aduanc.; the truth wili not, for lack of a ,ioi' ."nrro, pline, as in more tolerant or indifferent ;and if this is so, to light; there will be no scoPe for spontaneity' in ia."t, come Mill's argument for liberty as a necessarycondition for the growth genius, f6r mental energy' for moral courage-'- oiininutitv. of human genius falls to the ground. If his two goals proved by the weight of 'collectivemediocrity'. Whatever ;ilT t; .i"rfi.d incompatible, Mill would be faced with a cruel dilemma, quite diveriified wilf be crushed by the weight- of c.ustom' i, ,iJ and apart from the futher difficulties created by the inconsistencyof his tendency to , which breeds,onlY by men's constant doctrines with strict , even in his own humane version capacities', 'pincired and hidebound', 'cramped and riri,tt.t.a - of it.5 beings. 'Pagan self-assertionis as worth.y as *urp.d' hu-an In the second place, the doctrine is comparatively modern. There thi errors which a man is likely to Ch;ir;i", self-denial'."'All seems to be scarcely any discussion of individual liberty as a advice and warning ate.far outweighed by the ;;;i;;g;inst conscious political (as opposed to its actual existence) in the to constrain him to what they deem is So9$" t n; of allowirig others ancient world. Condorcet had alreadyremarked that the notion of consisrs in the 'negative' goal of warding off ;.i.";. of" lib..ty individual rights was absent from the legal conceptions of the interference.To threaten a man with persecution unlesshe-submlts Romans and Greeks; this seemsto hold equally of the Jewish, he exercisesno choices of his goals; to block l"'" fif. L which Chinese,and all other ancient civilizationsthat have sincecome to door but one' no matter.how noble the prosp.ect 6.f"t. him every light.6 The domination of this ideal has been the exception rather opens, or how benevolent the motives of those who *ni.n it than the rule, even in the recent history of the \fest. Nor has liberty "ptt sin against the truth that he is a man, a being with is to in this sense often formed a rallying cry for the great massesof ^ir^ngrthis, to liv"e.This is liberty as it has been conceived by ;[f;t nii mankind. The desirenot to be impinged upon, to be left to oneself, "*n modern world from the days of (some liberals in the has beena mark of high civilization both on the part of individuals to our own. Every plea for and *r"ra say of occam) and communities.The senseof privacy itself,of the areaof personal every protest aBainst.exploitationand humilia- individuai rights, relationships as something sacred in its own right, derives from a encroa.h-.nt o-f public authority, or the mass tion, conception of freedom which, for all its religious roots, is scarcely "g"intt"the or organized propaganda,,springsfrom this hvpnori, of custom older. in its developedstate, than the Renaissanceor the Reforma- and much disputed, conception of man' indivldualistic, tion.7 Yet its decline would mark the death of a civilization, of an this poiition may bi noted' In the first place ih... facts about entire moral outlook. distincf notions. One is that all coercion is, in so Mill confusestwo The third characteristic of this notion of liberty is of greater human desires,bad as such, although it may have i", it frustrates importance. It is that liberty in this senseis not incompatible with ", to other' greater ; while non-interference' to b. Prevent some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absenceof self- "ppfi.d of coerciott, is good as such, although it is not *niift L'the opposite . Liberty in this senseis principally concerned with the the only g"oa. This is the 'negative' conception of liberty in its area of control, not with its source. Just as a may, in classicai f"orm. The other is that men should seek to discover 22 Two ConcePtsof LibertY Isaiab Berlin 23 kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, fact, deprive the individual citizen of a,greatmany libertieswhich it perfectly acts of will. I wish to be a subject,not an object; to be moved by t'r. have in some other form of society,.so .is a reasons,by consciouspurposes, which are my own, not by causes ."nl.i"u"Ut.-ight that a liberal-mindeddespot would allow his subiects his which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, large measure of personal freedom' The despot who leaves not nobody; a doer - deciding,not being decidedfor, self-directed ,uf,|..tt a wide ar-eaof liberty-may be uniust, or cncourage.the and not actedupon by externalnature or by other men as *iiA.t, inequalities,care little'for order, or ' or knowledge; if I were a curbs it less thing, or an animal, or a slaveincapable of playing a human role, buiprouided he does not curb their liberty, or at least that is, of conceivinggoals and policies of my own and realizing ;;;;;t oihe, .egimes, he meets with Mill's specification'o them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say I Freedom in this ,.nr.-i, not, ar any rate logically, connectedwith that am rational, and that it is my reasonthat distinguishesme as a human ;;;;;;;.y or self-government.$slf-gclvernment may'.9.1 th9 whole' being from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, orovide a better g,ra.anteeof the preservationof civil libertiesthan ro be conscious such libertarians'But of myself as a thinking, willing, active being,bearing responsibility irh., ,.gi-.r, has been defendedas .by "id for my choicesand able to explain them by referencesro my there is no na.assuryconnection between indtvtdual llberty ancl own is ideasand purposes.I feel free to the degreethat I believethis J.-t.r^ti. rule. Theanswer to the question'Who governsme?' to be true, and enslavedto the degreethat I am made realize logically distinct from the guestigJr'How far does government to that it is not. i'ie.f.re with me?' It is in this differencethat the great contrast in,the The freedom which consistsin being one's own master,and the between the two conceptsof negativeand ' freedom which consistsin not being prevented{rom choosing end, consists.,For the 'positive' senseof liberty comesto llght,li,we as I I freeto do or bei bul do by other men, may, on the faceof it, seemconcepts at no great trv to answerthe question,not'What am ' logical distance from each other - :Su *ht"- am I ruled?'or'Who is to saywhat I am, and wha.tI am no more than negative and positiveways of sayingmuch the samething. Yet ;,, ;-b. or do?' the connection between democracyand indi- the'positive' and 'negative' notions of freedom historically developedin vidual liberty is a good deal more tenuousthan it seemedto many divergent of both]the desireto be governedby mysel{,or at any directionsnot always by logically reputablesteps, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each "Juo."r.,rate to participate in the process by which my life ls to. be other. One way of making this clear is in terms of .ontroll.h, b. as deep a-wish as that of a free area for action' momentum which the, initially perhaps quite harmless,metaphor ura p..h"p,-"f historically older. But it is not a desirefor the same great of self-masteryacquired. 'l am my own master'; 'l am slaveto no if,i"*'. S. iiff.r.n, is it, indeed,as to haveled in the end to the man'; but may I not (as Platonistsor Hegelians ;;;f; ;i iJeologiesthat dominates our world' For it is this - the tend to say) be a 'positive'conceition of liberty: not freedomfrom, but freedom.to.- slaveto nature? Or to my own 'unbridled' passions?Are thesenot the so many speciesof the identical genus 'slave' some political ;-i;;; one prescribedform'of life - which the adherentsof - or 'negative' notion representas being, at times' no better than a legal, others moral or spiritual? Have not men had the experience of liberating themselvesfrom spiritual slavery, or slavery ro nature, tp.iiout disguisefor brutal tyranny. and do they not in the course of it become aware, on rhe one hand, of a self which dominates, and, on the other, of something in them which is brought to heel? This dominant self is then variously II identified with reason, with my 'higher nature', with the self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run, with my 'real', or 'ideal', or 'autonomous' self, or with my self 'at its best'; THE NOTION OF POSITIVE FREEDOM which is then contrasted with irrational impulse, uncontrollec desires,my 'lower' nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures,my 'empirical' The 'positive' senseof the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on or'heteronomous' self,swept by everygust of desireand passion, needing ,h. pl., of the individual to be his own master' I wish my life and to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the J..ilrion, to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever full height of its 'real' nature. Presently the two selves may be lsaiah 24 Two Conceptsof Liberty Berlin 25 would choose if he were something he is not, or at least nor yer, representedas divided by an even larger gap: the.real sel{ may be with what X actually seeks and chooses,is at the heart of'ali conceived as something wider than the individual (as the term is political theoriesof self-realization.It is one thing to say that I may normally understood),is a social'whole' of which the individual is be coercedfor my own good which I am roo blind to see:this may, an elemlnt or aspect: a tribe, a race' a church, a state' the great on occasion,be for my benefit;indeed it may enlargethe scopeof societyof the livrng and the dead and the yet unborn. This entity my liberty. lt is another ro say that if it is my good, rhen I am not is then identified as being the 'true' self which, by imposing its being coerced,for I have willed it, whether I know this or nor, and ,or 'organic', single will upon its recalcitrant'members', am_free (or'truly'free) even while my poor earthly body and l achievesiis own, and theref:oretheir,'higher' freedom.The perilsof foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle-againstthose who seek using organic metaphors to justify the-coercionof some men by however benevolentlyto imposeit, with the greatestdesperation. otheis in" order to iaise them to a 'higher' level of freedom have This magical transformation, or sleight of hand (for which often beenpointed out. But what givessuch plausibility as it has to \William James so justly mocked the Hegelians),can no doubt be this kind of l"ngu"g" is that we recognize that it is possible' and at perpetratedjust as easily with the 'negative'concepr of freedom, times justifiable,to coercemen in the name of some-goal(let us say, where the self that should not be interferedwith is no longer the justice or public health) which they would, if they were more individual with his actual wishes and needsas rhey are noimallv enlightened, themselvespursue, but do not' becausethey are blind conceived,but the 'real' man within, identifiedwith the pursuit of or ilnorant or corrupt. This renders it easy for me to conceive of some ideal purposenot dreamedof by his empiricalself. And, as in *yt.tf as coercing others for their own sake, in their, t9-t my, the caseof the 'positively' free self, this entity may be inflated into inierest. I am thentlaiming that I know what they truly need better some super-personalentity - a state,a class,a nation, or the march than they know it themselves.What, at most' this entails is-that of history itself, regardedas a more 'real' subjectof attributesthan they would not resist me if they were rational and as wise as I and the empirical self. But the 'positive' conceprionof freedom as self- ,r.rierstood their interests as I do. But I may go on to claim a good mastery,with its suggesrionof a man divided againsthimself, has, deal more than this. I may declarethat they are actually aiming at in fact, and as a marrer of history, of doctrine and of pracice, lent what in their benighted state they consciously resist, becausethere itself more easily to this splitting or personality into rwo: rhe exists within them an occult entity - their latent rational will, or transcendent,dominant controller, and the empirical bundle ol their 'true' purpose- and that this entity, although it is beliedby all desiresand passionsto be disciplinedand brought to heel.It is this that they ou.ttiy feeland do and say,is their 'real' self,of which the historical fact that has been influential. This demonstrates (if poor empirical'selfin spaceand time qay.know nothing or litde; demonstrationof so obvious a trurh is needed)thar conceptionsof and thai this inner spirit is the only self that deservesto have its freedom directly derive from views of what consrirures a self, a wishes taken into aicount.lo Once I take this view, I am in a person, a man. Enough manipulation with rhe definition of man, position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies,to bully, and freedom can be made to mean wharever rhe manipulator oppr.rt, tortirre them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' wishes. Recent history has made it only too clear that the issue is r.lu.t, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of not merelyacademic. man (happiness,performance of duty, wisdom, a iust-society, self- The consequencesof distinguishing between two selves will fulfilmenti *r,ti b. identical with his freedom - the free choice of become even clearer if one considersthe two major forms which the his 'true', albeit often submergedand inarticulate,self. desire to be self-directed- directed by one's 'rrue' self - has This paradox has been often exposed. It is one thing to s.aythat I historicallytaken: the first, that of self-abnegationin order to attain know what is good for X' while he himsel{ does not; and even to independence;the second, that of self-realizarion.or total self- I ignore his wishis for its - and his - sake;and a very differentoneto I identification with a specificprinciple or ideal in order to attain the iay that he has eo ipso chosenit, not indeedconsciously, not as.he selfsameend.... seemsin everydayiife, but in his role as a rational self which his tit empirical self'may not know - the 'real' self which discernsthe good, and cannot help choosing it once it is revealed' This iro.rit.or.rt impersonatibn, which consists in equating what X 26 Two ConcePtsof LibertY Isaiah Berlin 27 of hands. For unlimited authority in anybody's grasp was bound, III he believed,sooner or later, to destroy somebody.He maintained that usually men protestedagainst this or that of governorsas oppressive,when the real causeof oppressionlay in the merefact of LIBERTY AND the accumulation of power itself, whereverit might happen to be, since liberty was endangeredby the mere existenceof absolute I 'but The FrenchRevolution, like all great ,was, at leastin its authority as such.'lt is not the arm that is unjust', he wrote, the o.f the desire 'positive' weapon that is too heavy - some weights are too heavy for the Jacobin form, iust such an eruption -for i...do- of collective self-direction on the part of a large body of human hand.' Democracy may disarm a given oligarchy, a given Frenchmenwho felt liberated as a nation, even though the result privileged individual or set of individuals, but it can still crush was, for a good many o{ them, a severerestriction of individual individuals as mercilessly as any previous ruler. In an essay f.e.io-s. p"o.rrr."u had spoken exultantly of the fact that the laws comparing the liberty of the moderns with that of the ancientshe of liberty might prove to be austerethan the yoke.of tyranny' said that an equal right to oppress- or interfere- is not equivalent Tyrannf is sirvice to human-ot. masters. The law cannot be a tyrant' to liberty. Nor does universal consentto loss of liberty somehow Rlrrrr."u does not mean by liberty the 'negative'freedom. of the miraculously preserve it merely by being universal, or by being individual nor ro be interferedwith within a definedarea, but the .If I consentto be oppressed,or acquiescein my condition by all, and not merely by some' of the fully qualified with detachmentor irony, am I the lessoppressed? If I sell myself possession 'a of society of a share in the public power which.is into slavery,am I the lessa slave?If I commit suicide,am I the less 'Popular government entitled-e-bers to interfere with every aspect of every citizen's life. The dead becauseI have taken my own life freely? liberalsof the first half of the nineteenthcentury correctly foresaw is a spasmodic tyranny, monarchy a more efficiently centralized .positive' ihat liberty in this sensecould easilydestroy too.many of despotism.'Constant saw in Rousseauthe most dangerousenemy .negative' 'by giving myself the libertiesrhat they held sacred.They pointed out.that of individual liberty, becausehe had declaredthat why, even the soiereignty of the people could- easily destroy that o{ indi' to all I give myself to none'. Constant could not see 'everybody', viduals. MiTl explained,-patientlyand unanswerably,'that govern- though the sovereignis it should not oppressone o{ 'members' of course, ment by the people*u. not, in his sense,necessarily freedom at all' the of its indivisibleself, if it so decided.I may, a family, or For those *ho gbu.r.t are not necessarilythe same 'people' as tho.se prefer to be deprivedof my libertiesby an assembly,or It may give me an opportunity one *ho gou.in.d, and democratic self-government.is not the a class,in which I am a minority. I {eel I am gou"rn-.it".. 'of each by himself'-but' at best,of 'each by the rest'' day of persuading the others to do for me that to which of my liberty at the hands of my family tlill a"d his disciplesipoke of the tyranny of the maiority and of entitled.But to be deprived is to te depiived of it as effectively. the tyranny of 'the prevailingfeeling and opinion', and saw no great or friends or fellow citizens iust rate more candid: he did not pretend that a difference'bet*een that and any other kind of tyranny which Hobbes was at any he justifiedthis slavery,but at leastdid encroaches upon men's activities beyond the sacred frontiers of sovereigndoes not enslave: it freedom. private life. not have the effrontery to call Throughout the nineteenth century liberal thinkers maintained No one saw the conflict between the two types of liberty better, that if libirty .nvolved a limit upon the powers of any man to force or expressedit more clearly, than Beniamin Cbnstant' He pointed me to do what I did not, or might not, wish to do' then, whatever out tirat the transfer.n.. by a successfulrising of the unlimited the ideal in the name of which I was coerced,I was not free;that the authority, commonly called-sovereignty,from one set of hands to doctrine of absolutesovereignty was a tyrannical doctrine in itself. another'do., not increase liberty, but merely shifts the burden of If I wish to preservemy liberty, it is not enough to say that is must slavery, He reasonably asked. why a man should deeply .care not be violated unlesssomeone or other - the absolute ruler' or the wh.the, he is crushed by a popular government or by a monarch'-or popular assr.nbly,or the King in Parliament'or the or some even by a set of oppressive^laws.Hi saw that the main problem for ludges' iombination of authorities, or the laws themselves- for the laws those who desire'.negative" individual freedom is not who wields rl set t' may be oppressive - authorizes its violation. I must establish a this authority, but how much authority should be placed in any I ! 28 Two Conceptsof LibertY Isaiab Berlin 29 are ordered to denounce their parents, friends to betray one society in which there must be some frontiers of freedom which another, soldiers to use methods of barbarism; when men are nobody should be permitted to cross. Different names or natures tortured or murdered, or minorities are massacred because they m"v b. given to the rules that determine these frontiers: they may irritate a majority or a tyrant. Such acts, even if they are made legal t. i"Ll.fn"tural rights,or the word of God, or , or the by the sovereign, cause horror even in these days, and this springs demands of utility or of the 'permanent interestsof man'; I may from the recognition of the moral validity - irrespectiveof the laws believe them to be valid a piiori, or assert them to be my own - of some absolutebarriers to the imposition of one man's will on ,rLi-"r. ends, or the ends of my society or culture' What theserules another. The freedom of a society, or a class or a group, in this oi.o-*""dments will have in common is that they are acceptedso senseof freedom, is measured by the strength of these barriers, and widely, and are grounded so deeplyin the actual nature of men as the number and importance of the paths which they keep open for they (ave develo"pedthrough history, as to. be, by ngw., an essentiaL their members - if not for all, for at any rate a great number of pa.i of what we'mean by-being a normal human being' Genuine them.11 Lelief in the inviolability of a minimum extent of individual liberty This is almost at the opposite pole from the purposes of those ."oifr some such absoiute stand. For it is clear that it has little to is logically who believein liberty in the 'positive'* self-directive- sense.The f,"p. fo. from the rule of maiorities; democracy 1s.su5h former want to curb authority as such. The latter want it placed ,rnio--in.d to it, and historically has at times failed to protect it' in their own hands. That is a cardinal issue. These are not two while remaining faithful to its own principles. Few , it different interpretations of a single concept, but two profoundly t ur U..n obseived, have found much difficulty in causing !b.:it 'l divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life. It is as well subjectsto generateany will that- the. government wanted' he to recognize this, even if in practice it is often necessaryto strike a iri"mph of iespotism is to force the slaves to declare themselves compromise between them. For each of them makes absolute ii...-r', no force; the slavesmay proclaim their freedom claims. These claims cannot both be fully satisfied.But it is a ,i"..lly:-"y.,..d but they aie none the less'slaves.Perhaps the chief profound lack of social and moral understanding not to recognize ""*value for libeials of political -'positive'- rights,of participating.in that the satisfactionthat each of them seeksis an ultimate value the government, is as a means for protecting what they hold to be which, both historically and morally, has an equal right to be an uitimate value,namely individual -'negative'- liberty' classedamong the deepestinterests of mankind. But if ian, without ceasing to be democratic' suppress freedom, at least as liberals have used the word, wh.at *i"fa make a society truly free? For Constant, Mill, Tocqueville, belong, no society is ,t. liberal tradiiion to which they -free IV "nJunless it is governedby at any rate two interrelatedprinciples: frrst' can be regarded as absolute, so.that itr", poi.., but oniy righis,"gou.tnt ;li;.t;"o whateuer power them, have an absolute-right to THE ONE AND THE MANY r.ir:t. ,o behaveinhumanly; and, second,that there are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be inviolable, these One belief, more than any other, is responsiblefor the slaughterof f.trrii.., being defined in terms of rules so long and widely accepted individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals - justice that their observancehas enteredinto the very conceptionof what or progressor the happinessof future generations,or the sacred it is to be a normal human being,and, therefore,also of what it is to missionor emancipationof a nation or raceor class,or evenliberty act inhumanly or insanely; rules of which it would be absurd to itself,which demandsthe sacrificeof individualsfor the freedomof ,"y, fot ."a-ple, that they could be abrogated by. some,formal p.L..dur. on ih. part of iome court or sovereignbody' \flhen I society. This is the belief that somewhere,in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, ipeak of a man as-beingnormal, a part of what I mean is that he in the pronouncements of history or science,or in the simple heart ctuld not break theseriles easily,without a qualm of revulsion.it of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. This ancient is such rules as thesethat are broken when a man is declaredgullty faith rests on the conviction that all the positive values in which .'iif,o"r trial, or punished under a retroactive law; when children