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Outlook in Establishing an ASEAN Naval Force: an Emerging Concept

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Outlook in Establishing an ASEAN Naval Force: an Emerging Concept Outlook in Establishing an ASEAN Naval Force: An Emerging Concept Lt.Cdr.Jerson S. Sagusay, PN ASEAN and its Maritime Context Primarily dominated by the sea, the Southeast Asian Region has a unique environment making it known as the “home to maritime nations” which sits astride vital sea lines of communications and trade in the pacific.๑๓๘ Given its large marine eco-region with roughly ๘๐% of its area as water, ๖๐% of Southeast Asians live in or rely economically on the maritime zone and are thereby considered as the center of eco-diversity in the world. However, the sea is also the source of various dangers and threats that not only menace the growth of local populations but also directly threaten the region’s security. These dangers include territorial disputes, nonstate political violence, transnational crime, and environmental degradation. Among these threats present in the Southeast Asian regions, the most controversial of which is the territorial disputes which remain a challenge to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region. The most evident territorial dispute in the region is the claims in the West Philippine Sea. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Kim (๒๐๒๐), stated that ASEAN leaders conveyed their concern over activities and serious incidents in the West Philippine Sea which, according to them, have “eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions, and may undermine peace, security, and stability in the region.”๑๓๙ Drivers of this conflict are a combination of political agenda, economic interests, and competition over scarce natural resources. Case in point, the prevailing clashes of countries in ๑๓๘ Torrecampo, R. (2017). Perspectives on Naval Cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Maritime Review. Retrieved from https://maritimereview.ph/perspectives-on-naval-cooperation-in-southeast-asia/ ๑๓๙ US Embassy Manila (2020 July 16). The Philippines’ Future Floats in the West Philippine Sea. Retrieved from https://ph.usembassy.gov/the- philippines-future-floats-in-the-west-philippine-sea/ ๑๓๑ the maritime dimensions in the West Philippine Sea are associated with the rich petroleum resources in the archipelagic seas, not to mention the strategic location of the islands for support of sea-lane-control.๑๔๐ To be more specific, in the Southeast Asian region, controversies on territorial claims include the Philippines claims to Sabah, overlapping claims to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and other multilateral disputes over islands and waters in the West Philippine Sea. The conflicts in the maritime boundary claims over the West Philippine Sea involve at least six parties: China, which claims the largest area by far according to its infamous nine-dash line, Taiwan, and the five Southeast Asian states of Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Another predominant challenge identified along the Southeast Asian region is the rampant terrorist groups causing terrorism and insurgencies. Some of the identified terrorist groups in the region are al-Qa’ida, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, and Laskar Jihad who have threatened, if not suspected, to execute maritime attacks.๑๔๑ While these militant groups posed maritime attacks and operations, other groups have utilized the sea to conduct transnational maritime crimes such as piracy, smuggling, illegal migration, transportation of illegal contrabands, and trafficking, among many others. These crimes are mostly economically motivated but have a synergetic effect that aggravates interstate conflict. Considering these conflicts and challenges in the region, maritime security is an utmost concern to all countries residing in Southeast Asia.๑๔๒ To address such challenges, international cooperation amongst the ASEAN members has been responded to. Tony Tan, Singapore’s Prime Minister in ๒๐๐๓, emphasized that “individual state action is not enough. The oceans ๑๔๐ Bradford, J. (2005). The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/26394205?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents ๑๔๑ Ibid. ๑๔๒ Ibid. ๑๓๒ are indivisible and maritime security threats do not respect boundaries.”๑๔๓ At the forefront of defending the region against security threats from the sea are the navies of the ASEAN. Being true to its three community pillars, namely Political-Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural Community,๑๔๔ members of the ASEAN exercise unilateral and bilateral engagements amongst its navies. While the association prioritizes the tenets of accelerating economic growth, social progress, cultural development, technical, scientific, and administrative fields, ASEAN members also put great emphasis on maritime cooperation as part of its Political-Security pillar. This naval cooperation and agreements which can be traced back since the Cold War often include port visits, exchanges, information/intelligence-sharing, border patrol and training, and exercise provisions. This maritime cooperation has been evident in the various unilateral and bilateral maritime engagements of the Southeast Asian countries which deepen and strengthens their navies’ cooperation. Although ASEAN members have taken significant actions toward improving their maritime security cooperation, major maritime threats remain and continuously endanger their respective regions. As such, there is a call for enhanced maritime security cooperation that will better promote a more sustainable maritime security among the Southeast Asian countries. One of the initiatives that can be adapted to materialize the establishment of sustainable maritime security is the creation of an ASEAN Naval Force. This concept has been a common ground between Royal Cambodian Navy Commander Admiral Tea Vinh and Rear Admiral Loumer Bernabe, Philippine Navy representative during the meeting of the nav chiefs of the ASEAN in ๒๐๑๙. The creation of a naval force in Southeast Asia, in the perspective of ๑๔๓ Mindef Singapore. (2003). Remarks by DPM Dr Tony Tan at the IISS Conference Plenary Session on Maritime Security After September 11. News Release. Retrieved from https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/MINDEF_20030601001_3.pdf ๑๔๔ ASEAN Community. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://asean.org/storage/2012/05/7.-Fact-Sheet-on-ASEAN-Community.pdf ๑๓๓ the Philippine Navy, can “enforce shared ocean governance” which will enhance maritime domain awareness.๑๔๕ Now, the question is “Will the creation of the ASEAN Naval Force solve the maritime threats in Southeast Asia?” Before delving into the specifics, let us try to look into the perspective of the European Union Naval Force – a possible benchmark for this endeavor. The Case of European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) Establishing a joint naval force amongst regions and countries is not a novel concept in the naval community. With its eminent concern on the effect of Somali-based piracy and armed robbery at sea, the European Union launched the European Union Naval Force – Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR) in December ๒๐๐๘ and was extended until March ๒๐๑๒. This naval force functions within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law as a counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. Primarily, EU NAVFOR is mandated to ๑) protect World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia and the protection of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping; ๒) deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast; ๓) protect vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; ๔) monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.๑๔๖ ๑๔๕ Andrade, J. (2019 December 02). ASEAN Naval Task Force eyed. Inquirer.Net. Retrieved from https://globalnation.inquirer.net/182325/asean-naval- task-force-eyed?fbclid=IwAR2Gewi- Mn9Tpjvalj2UsvGPsQvVsS0qtlfjudepcELA-tbTDGx6XVgtCoU ๑๔๖ European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta. (n.d.). Information Booklet. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-navfor- somalia/pdf/eunavfor_brochure_en.pdf ๑๓๔ EU NAVFOR participation even goes beyond the EU Member States. Case in point, Norway, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine which are non-EU countries have contributed to the Operation. Likewise, EU NAVFOR operates in an Area of Operation within the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including Seychelles. The Area of Operation also includes the Somali coastal territory as well as its territorial and internal waters. Safeguarding the high-risk areas which is the Maritime Security Center – Horn of Africa was made possible with the contribution of various platforms and assets: Navy vessels (surface combat vessels and auxiliary ships, including embarked helicopters), Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA), Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) teams, and provision of military and civilian staff to work at the OHQ in Northwood, United Kingdom, or onboard units. From ๒๐๐๘ to ๒๐๑๑, with the robust and proactive stance of the EU NAVFOR, some notable accomplishments were recorded such as reduced number of vessels held for ransom in the Area of Operation; a lesser number of hostages (i.e. from ๗๔๓ in January ๒๐๑๑ to ๑๑๔ in December ๒๐๑๒); ๑๐๐% success rate protecting WFP
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