The Odd Couple

Books

Th e Odd Couple least by being rooted in a knowledge of history, geography, and political thought Review by Christopher Hill and by displaying a capacity for empathy with the wide variety of human societies Ro b e r t Kaga n . Of Paradise and Power: Ameri- inhabiting our planet, which is essential ca and Europe in the New World Order. Ne w if we are to understand international York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, 103 pp. conflict. Anyone interested in the theo- $1 8 . 0 0 ry and practice of Euro-U.S. rel a t i o n s , or of modern foreign policy, would ben- Charles A. Kupchan. The End of the American efit from reading these volumes. Their Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the lucidity also makes them accessible to stu- Twe n t y - F irst Century. New York: Alfred A. dents, who as Kupchan points out, are Knopf, 2002, 391 pp. $27.95 ever more rar ely req u i r ed to engage in serious thought about strategy, forei g n Given the solipsism of much of what policy, and diplomatic history—not so passes as International Relations scholar- surprising in Sweden or Canada, but ship these days, it is a relief to come astounding in the great universities of the across two authors who set out to engage hy p e r p o w e r . with major real-world problems and who Their shared qualities, however, can- can communicate beyond the academy. not disguise the differences within this Both Robert Kagan and Charles academic version of Laurel and Hardy . Kupchan have produced books which, in Kagan’s book is short and somber; Alexander George’s phrase, “bridge the Ku p c h a n ’s large and cheerful. Kagan’s is gap” between intellectual life and the an expanded essay, first seen in Policy Review world of citizens and practitioners, not (N0. 113, 2002), which immediately

Summer/Fall 2003 [1 3 5] H I L L dr ew the attention of think tanks on both strongest suit. Nonetheless, his basic sides of the Atlantic and was fallen on in a argument req u i r es Europe, and particu- feeding frenzy for its sound-bite view that larly the EU, to take center stage. on strategic questions, “Americans are Ac c o r ding to Kupchan, the United States from Mars and Europeans are from is in dire need, in the post-Cold War era, Venus.” Kupchan’s lengthier and exten- of a big strategic idea with which to make sively footnoted book will provoke rea c - sense of itself and the wider geopolitical tions in a slower rhythm and reaches out environment. Containment and bipolar- more to the university market. ity have never been replaced. Nor is this In t e r estingly, both covers carry endorse- simply a matter of intellectual coheren c e ; ments from Henry Kissinger, whose use the United States has failed to understand of the word “seminal” indicates grea t e r that, through the cyclical processes of his- enthusiasm for the work of Kagan, which tory, its time as the dominant force in he believes will shape the discussion on international relations is drawing to a European-American relations “for years close. The new era will be one of multi- to come.” polarity, with the United States hardl y The two sets of arguments pres e n t e d reduced to the post-imperial condition in these two books are in some res p e c t s of Spain or the Netherlands in the eigh- alternatives. One suggests that the te e n t h century, but still req u i r ed to European Union is a vibrant, evolving accommodate itself to emerging rivals and entity that already constitutes a major alternative sources of power. rival for the United States, and could be These rivals will include the obvious a serious adversary (or indispensable candidates of China and Russia, but may partner) in the future. The other sees the well also be embodied in a more united EU as having talked up its strength well East Asia, and certainly a united, assertive beyond the point of plausibility, and as Europe, organized round and through rep r esenting no kind of serious con- the EU. Kupchan’s modified realism (he st r aint on American power. The policy believes in cycles but within a broad conclusions from these two interpret a - movement of evolution) leads him to tions naturally vary according to political state that the “central challenge of the taste. What is interesting is that both fu t u r e. . .will be the same as in the past— authors think that Europe’s world role is managing relations among contending worth discussing. The obsession with the centers of power,” of which Europe is “A s i a - P acific century” has abated. bound to be one (Kupchan, xviii). It is worth outlining the two contras t - History teaches us both that great power ing positions with special ref e r ence to the contains the seeds of its own decline, and fu t u r e, given the amount of futurology on that economic integration eventually view. Kupchan is especially bullish about produces political unity. Thus the what is likely to happen. Indeed, his con- Common For eign and Security Pol i c y stant assertions are a sign either of grea t (CFSP) of the EU will gradually gain intellectual self-confidence or of a weak st r ength through unity and the graf t i n g argument, or both. His book, as its title on of the Security and Defense Pol i c y suggests, is about far more than Europe, initiated by Britain and France at St. and its authoritative sweep through two Malo in 1998. The Euro, the rat i o n a l i z a - centuries of U.S. foreign policy is its tion of defense industries, the enlarge-

[1 3 6] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Books

ment process, and constitutional ref o r m espouse civilian power, to update the ar e all marching towards the point where Melian dialogue. Since the world as a Europe will not only have differe n t whole is still a dangerous place, other in t e r ests from those of the United States, stronger entities will take a different view but will be able to assert them effectively. and shape the international environ- Policy circles in Washington may feel that ment, including Europe’s own region, by they have something of a free run in the direct use of power. Thus Kagan, like international relations at present (al Kupchan, is a realist. The most he will Qaeda apart), but this is a passing phase concede to the Kantians is, with Robert and they had better wise up to new rea l i - Cooper, that some parts of the system ties on the horizon, which req u i r e multi- may be permanently pacified and civil la t e r al cooperation, not as a moral good and do not req u i r e us to follow the logic but as a strategic necessity. of anarchy. But this only means that Robert Kagan agrees that the those of us half in and half out of such a Europeans inevitably have differe n t pa r adise are compelled to practice the in t e r ests from their American partners, very “double standards” that so much of rooted in contrasting views of the world, the world accuses us of. If we play by the but draws the opposite conclusion. For kind of rules observed in the OECD

The obsession with the “Asia-Pac i f i c century” has abated.

him, Europe is mired in a self-reg a rd i n g world, we shall get screwed by those who Kantian “paradise,” where power is do not share our values—or our advan- ab j u r ed, partly because of the reg i o n’ s tages. The Europeans are being naïve if success in finally putting to rest the his- they think otherwise, but they can toric hatreds that cost so many millions indulge themselves because they are able of lives, but also because there is little to free-ride on a U.S. security guaran t e e . alternative. Europe, whether in the form Th e r e is a strong whiff of decadence in of individual states or the EU, cannot this portrait of the Europeans. compete with the United States, despite To a European eye, both Kupchan the greater res o u r ces it disposes of on and Kagan have a somewhat distorted paper. This is because the member states view of Europe and the EU, if for under- ar e unwilling to spend more money on standable reasons. Interestingly, they military force, and cannot agree to pool both rather overstate Europe’s impor- their res o u r ces. They largely rat i o n a l i z e tance—Kupchan most obviously, but also this situation in terms of opposition to Kagan, who rep r esents the school of ha r d power in international rel a t i o n s American commentators clearly stung by and a belief in the importance of institu- what are often insuffera b l y - k n o w i n g tions, cooperation, conflict prev e n t i o n , criticisms of U.S. foreign policy. He is and the like. But in truth, theirs is a pre- not so contemptuous of Europe as to be dictable philosophy born out of inferior- able to ignore it. Yet in the modern ity—the weak do what they must, and international system, the very success of

Summer/Fall 2003 [1 3 7 ] H I L L rendering Europe a conflict-free zone constant institutional tinkering, (with means that it is less a focal point for third th r ee treaties in ten years and another states, and an unlikely source of interna- Intergovernmental Conference on the tional crises. That is why, after the rel i e f horizon), are all serious distractions to at the bloodless dismantling of the effective action on policy substance. To Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it was the extent that they rep r esent change, it such a shock to find a nemesis in the is usually of the “procedure as a substi- Balkans. Those crises surmounted, how- tute for policy” variety identified by ever, it is unlikely that Europe will ret u r n William Wallace and David Allen twenty to being the cockpit of international years ago. There is no sign that the wish relations in the near future. and ability of states to defect from com- It is even more unlikely, pa c e Ch a r l e s mon positions is any less than it was at Kupchan, that the EU is on the brink of the time of the Maastricht Treaty, which becoming a superpower. Let us discount enjoined them, hopefully, to act “unre- the horrendous crash into the buffers servedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual rep r esented by Iraq. The CFSP has fallen solidarity.” Indeed, if anything, states apart at times of high crisis before and it li k e Germany, Italy, and Spain have will again. Under conditions of the ac q u i r ed more assertive and distinctive gr eatest stress, when controversial issues national foreign policies than they pos- of war and peace are at stake, the grea t e s t sessed during the Cold War. The states may stumble, let alone a loose pr o g r ess towards a common defense pol- amalgam of 15 (plus 10) separate states icy is indeed more rapid than many with diverse historical traditions and would have predicted five years ago, when domestic constituencies. But the CFSP Britain insisted on retaining the Wes t e r n will not be abolished because of the pub- European Union as a bridge between the lic spat over Iraq. It will continue with the EU and NATO. But talk of a European Sisyphean task of trying to construct army is still mere fancy, and no EU gov- common positions and joint actions over ernment would dare ask its electorate for a number of important and not always the kind of increases in defense spending well-publicized problems, because no that would be req u i r ed to fund even the member state wishes to stand wholly first steps towards the capability of a alone, and because, in general, there are superpower. The linked problems of obvious advantages in hanging together. British and French nuclear forces and Wh e r e Kupchan is misguided is in his their seats on the UN Security Council br eezy assumption of linear progres s , ar e too sensitive to raise, while the ele- and in his interesting but somewhat ments of supra-nationalism in forei g n facile analogies with the creation of the policy, minimal as they were, have now United States, the unification of virtually disappeared through the tri- Germany, and the splintering of the umph of inter-governmentalism, in the Roman Empire—with the EU seen as form of the European Council and the Byzantium to the American Rome. Council Secretariat, over the Given the extra problems the EU takes Commission and the supporters of on, and at a heroic pace, it is a mirac l e majority voting. that anything is achieved at all. Kupchan either willfully ignores these Enlargement, a new defense dimension, developments in his determination to

[1 3 8] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Books ma k e the case, or is simply unfamiliar with Europe, and the recent willingness of them. The lack of ref e r ences to serious Germany, not just Greece and Belgium, academic analyses of the EU, its policies, to go along with it? Kagan takes the view and its institutions is certainly a weakness. that “we have only just entered a long An d r ew Moravcsik’s book is cited but the period of American hegemony,” and that argument not confronted, and the exten- the only strategy the Europeans have open sive work done on EU foreign policy by to them is to try to “multilateralize” the Roy Ginsberg in the United States and United States (Kagan, 22). This is only Wallace, Wessels, Nuttall, and many oth- true up to a point. Hegemony is not ers in Europe is ignored. The same kind em p i r e, and it involves constant negotia- of ethnocentrism is present in Kagan’s tion over the form of international orde r book. Although, in many ways, he has a with friends, neutrals, and adversaries. good feel for Europe, he relies too heavi- Mu l t i l a t e r alism describes only process; ly on English-language sources, and in mo r e important are the underlying prin- particular, on the Centre for European ciples of international behavior and their Reform, a Blairite think-tank in London. so u r ces. Even allowing for U.S. pred o m - Fur t h e r m o r e, the grand scale of his gen- inance—and especially given the fact that eralizations allows little room for most Americans do not want to see their nuanced analysis of the range of country exercise power in a brutal, self- European political opinion, from reg a r ding way—some new consensus will Christian pacifists to Greek nationalists, be necessary on key issues such as the from Atlanticists to the Gree n s . exceptions to the presumption of non- If we brac k et out the polemical aspect intervention, the possession of nuclear of his book, Kagan’s picture of the EU is weapons, the use of force, the governance ne a r er the mark than that of Kupchan. of international institutions, and the But whereas the latter goes too far in his rules of international economic life. If enthusiastic projection of a perce i v e d the United States attempts to decide these tr end into the future, Kagan’s picture is issues on the basis of hand-to-mouth too static. Like most realists, he does not un i l a t e r alism, it will come unstuck, for all ma k e it easy to see where change comes its undoubted strength. from. Par adoxically, this is the more so This is where the Europeans come in. because when explaining the EU’s failure They will have different views on a num- to match its “amazing progress towards. . . ber of questions, with the will and perhaps in t e g r ation in recent years” (itself a mis- in c r easingly the confidence to oppose reading) with equivalent unity in forei g n Washington on some of them. But at the policy, he slips into identity politics. same time, they have no wish to slip into Europe is no superpower, it seems, an adversarial relationship with a long- because we have rejected power politics time ally. The EU possesses considerab l e and become born-again idealists, pref e r - diplomatic and economic res o u r ces and is ring the illusion that our own democrat i c in c r easingly deploying these to effect in peace is synonymous with international international institutions. If the United relations as a whole. States could bring itself to accept that Yet, if this is true, how do we explain compromises on particular issues may be France’s persistent belief that the United in its own long term interests, and that States must be balanced by a strong simply opting out of international discus-

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sions is likely only to delay, and probably President Bush, the Europeans are left worsen, the resolution of any given prob- with three possible scenarios for coping lem, it would see that working with the EU with what they see as the bull in the china can be a major advantage. This is not a shop. First, they can swallow their res e r -

If the United States attempts to decide these issues on the basis of hand-to-mouth un i l a t e r alism, it will come unstuck, for all its undoubted stren g t h .

matter of “tying Gulliver down,” but of vations, and row along with Was h i n g t o n , on the gr adually attempting to extend the circl e calculation that the protection on offer of civil, legalized international rel a t i o n s compensates for the extra enmity beyond the “post-modern parad i s e ” — in c u r r ed on a wider front by association which by the way includes the United with Uncle Sam. Second, they can co n t i n - States, not just Europe. How many citi- ue along the path of Europe as a civilian power, per- zens on either continent have a clear idea haps a civilian superpower if they can of what life is like in the more dangerous in c r ease integration and make better use regions of the world? Conversely, of their soft power res o u r ces. This would Europeans are just as vulnerable to the involve accepting Michael Mandelbaum’s nihilistic anger rep r esented by interna- designation of “foreign policy as social tional terrorism as is the United States, work,” trying to ameliorate a system and they have experienced it for longer. determined essentially by U.S. f o r c e Washington needs to avoid creating a ma j e u r e . Enlargement might make the EU world-wide coalition of the res e n t f u l into a more impressive geopolitical pres - against itself, even if it has the power to ence in the world, even if it still eschewed defy hostility. Endless friction in forei g n the build-up of a European military- relations has a wearing, destabilizing industrial complex. Third, they can pull effect at home as well as abroad. The up the drawbridge and behave like a large neu- worst scenario is one in which even the tr a l , not agreeing with Washington, but Europeans are so alienated that they are not opposing it, except perhaps in their driven, Kupchan-style, into competition own Near Abroad. In the post-Cold War for the hearts and minds of the rest of the world, Europe need have no fear that world. This is something, as Kagan gr eat power conflict in East Asia or else- points out, that the Europeans will do a wh e r e would lead to battles at home, and gr eat deal to avoid. They do not want to so they can safely sit on the sidelines over ac q u i r e superpower status, for a range of Ko r ea, or Taiwan, and even Kashmir. p ractical and moral reasons. Most They can try to avoid the worst of terror- Europeans do not even want the super- ism by behaving like Ireland or Sweden state that is its precondition. do today. This behavior carries the risk of If the United States continues along all neutralism, that the bluff may be the path currently being followed by called and pres s u r e exerted by aggres s i v e

[1 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Books outsiders. The EU is big enough to back on being, as the German analyst defend itself if roused, and if given suffi- Michael Stürmer recently put it, “a cus- cient warning, but it would have to gam- toms union deluxe.” What is clear is that ble that the United States itself would not Europeans themselves need to do more become actively hostile. That is the ulti- serious thinking about the future inter- mate nightmare scenario, at present too national role of the EU, and its rel a t i o n - un l i k ely to be worth worrying about. ship to American power, of the kind on At the time of writing, the second of display in the vigorous treatments of these options appears the most plausible Kupchan and Kagan. For whatever one’s path for the EU to follow, although the view or pref e r ences, the foreign policies gr eat challenges of enlargement and an of Europe and the United States are two uncertain international environment sides of the same coin. ma k e it difficult to make a confident judgment. It is more possible than at any Christopher Hill is Montague Burton Professor of point in recent years that the European International Relations at the London School of Eco- project might seriously stumble, and fall nomics and Political Science.

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