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Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, Mr NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPERS 23 N A The Atlantic Crises V AL Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States W AR COLLEGE NE WPOR T P AP ERS N ES AV T A A L T W S A D R E C T I O N L L U E E G H E T R I VI IBU OR A S CT MARI VI 23 William Hopkinson Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Cover The Naval War College campus on Coasters Harbor Island—a view from the south. The buildings are, from left to right, Pringle Hall, Luce Hall, McCarty Little Hall, and Founders Hall (the origi- nal home of the College, now containing the Museum and offices of the Maritime History Department and of the Naval War College Press). Above Luce Hall, to the right of the cupola, is a portion of Conolly Hall. In the foreground is Dewey Field, site of June graduation exercises and summer Navy Band concerts. T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 23\Ventura\NP23.vp Wednesday, May 18, 2005 8:18:01 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen The Atlantic Crises Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States William Hopkinson © 2005 by William Hopkinson NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS Newport, Rhode Island T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 23\Ventura\NP23.vp Wednesday, May 18, 2005 8:18:03 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Naval War College The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the Newport, Rhode Island editor, the dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the President Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College consider of particular interest to Newport Paper Twenty-three policy makers, scholars, and analysts. May 2005 The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the President, Naval War College Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, U.S. Navy Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be Provost/Dean of Academics addressed to the editor of the Naval War College Press. To Professor James F. Giblin, Jr. request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions to Dean of Naval Warfare Studies the series, please either write the President (Code 32S), Dr. Kenneth H. Watman Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI Naval War College Press 02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax, or e-mail addresses given. Editor: Dr. Peter Dombrowski Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer Telephone: 401.841.2236 Fax: 401.841.1071 DSN exchange: 948 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.nwc.navy.mil/press Printed in the United States of America ISSN 1544-6824 T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 23\Ventura\NP23.vp Wednesday, May 18, 2005 8:18:03 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Contents Foreword, by Peter Dombrowski v Introduction: Why Another Book? 1 CHAPTER ONE The Beginning: The United States and Britain to 1940 9 CHAPTER TWO The Special Relationship Grows and Ends, 1940–1946 15 CHAPTER THREE The American Half Century, and European Contrasts 23 CHAPTER FOUR The United States and Europe in the Twenty-first Century 35 CHAPTER FIVE Whither Britain? 59 CHAPTER SIX New Relationships for Old 77 Notes 89 Abbreviations 93 Further Reading 95 About the Author 97 The Newport Papers 99 T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 23\Ventura\NP23.vp Wednesday, May 18, 2005 8:18:03 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 23\Ventura\NP23.vp Wednesday, May 18, 2005 8:18:03 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Foreword The transatlantic relationship has come under enormous stress from both sides of the ocean since the end of the Cold War and, especially, the election of President George W. Bush. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union threw American and European strategic thought into disarray as scholars and policy makers alike scrambled to formulate new rationales for Cold War institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the much-ballyhooed “special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, no one with the clear vision of the late George F. Kennan emerged to soften transatlantic squabbles over the Balkans, the post- Soviet space, and emerging security challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Bush administration officials and like-minded pundits miffed many Europeans with their causal unilateralist rhetoric and apparent willingness to abandon long-standing multilateral initiatives like the Kyoto Treaty. After a brief warming of relations follow- ing the horrific attacks of 11 September, American-European interactions turned sour once again as France and Germany led the effort to prevent the UN Security Council from passing a resolution authorizing the Iraq invasion. Of the major European powers only Great Britain offered substantial assistance to the American-led coalition, an arti- fact of Prime Minister Blair’s personal commitments and perhaps of the special rela- tionship. Today, the gradual disengagement of other European coalition members from Iraq and the reluctance of NATO to play a more active role there further fuels discon- tent in Washington policy circles. The 2003 announcement by Javier Solana of the Eu- ropean Union of a European Security Strategy rekindled American fears that the EU would either emerge as a challenger to U.S. primacy or, paradoxically, remain too weak to support American global initiatives. Aside from the ebbs and flows of politics, the fate of the transatlantic alliance remains a major strategic question for both the United States and its various European partners. A serious, long-term breach of the close security cooperation that characterized most of the Cold and post–Cold War periods would force both sides to rethink their defense policies. From a naval perspective, the transatlantic relationship remains one of the strategic touchstones for the American navy, even as the geostrategic focus of the United States has shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Asia. European navies—not only those of Great Britain but of France and Germany, and others as well—support American- led operations across the globe. In the Indian Ocean, for example, Europe provided T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 23\Ventura\NP23.vp Wednesday, May 18, 2005 8:18:03 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen vi THE NEWPORT PAPERS ships and aircraft to enforce embargoes on material destined for Afghanistan and Iraq prior to the campaigns of 2002 and 2003. Across the globe, European allies have partic- ipated in exercises associated with the Proliferation Security Initiative. With The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, Mr. William Hopkinson weighs in with a commonsensical and timely overview of the origins and evolution of the transatlantic relationship since the Second World War. He pays partic- ular attention to the U.S. relationship with Great Britain and its impact upon intra- European debates. He reminds us that while the transatlantic relationship has never been as smooth as some would have us believe, common interests and values have al- lowed all parties to adjust, and readjust, to changes in the security environment and particular national goals. However, and perhaps most importantly, Hopkinson recog- nizes that the current breach may be far more serious than those of the past and thus that greater efforts may be required to reach accommodations in the future. Mr. Hopkinson is especially well placed to comment wisely on transatlantic relations. He served at senior levels in the British Ministry of Defence navigating the shoals between Great Britain, the United States, and the Continent. Since leaving government he has thought and written extensively at several of the finest think tanks in Europe, including Chatham House and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, publishing a series of well-thought-of analyses of contemporary security issues. We at the Naval War College Press are pleased to be able to publish this important look at the past, present, and future of one of the most important strategic issues facing the United States. PETER DOMBROWSKI Editor, Naval War College Press Newport, Rhode Island T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 23\Ventura\NP23.vp Wednesday, May 18, 2005 8:18:04 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Introduction: Why Another Book? Europa, meantime, could see no end to this crazy sea crossing. But she guessed what would happen to her when they hit land again....The bull knelt down in front of her, offering her his back. And the moment she climbed up, he made a dash for the sea. It would in any case have been desirable to review the transatlantic relationship more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, taking account of the interlinked processes of globalization and a changing security agenda. The events of 11 September 2001 and the publication of the U.S. national security strategy in September 2002 reinforced the need. A review was made imperative by the fissures opened up within Western alliance and security structures, as well as globally, by the action of the United States and United Kingdom against Iraq, and arguably the requirement was further reinforced by the reelection of President George W. Bush in November 2004. Whatever the longer- term outcome of that reelection and of Iraq, transatlantic relations have changed, as have intra-European ones. It is time, especially for Britain, to think hard about what has happened and what the next steps should be. The British, and in large measure other (Western) Europeans, have acquiesced in a form of U.S. hegemony for at least the greater part of half a century.
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