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Home , Aestetica, Argument from miracles, Asher Salah, David Nieto, Erasmus, Ezekiel 42

Yearbook of the Centre for Advanced Studies 2018 Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies

Edited by Giuseppe Veltri Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies 2018

Volume Editor Bill Rebiger The Yearbook is published on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies

ISBN 978-3-11-057560-6 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-057768-6 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-057624-5

This work is licensed under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

Bibliographic published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover: Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek , Ms Cod. Levy 115, fol. 158r: Maimonides, More Nevukhim, Beginn von Teil III. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com Contents

Editorial VII

Part I: Articles

Dirk Westerkamp Quaestio sceptica disputatadephilosophia judaeorum: Is thereaJewish ? 3

Hanna Liss Scepticism, Critique, and the ArtofWriting: PreliminaryConsiderations on the Question of Textual Authority in Medieval Peshaṭ 15

Bill Rebiger Sceptical Elements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqar against 47

GiuseppeVeltri Apologetic, , and Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto 67

Oded Schechter Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Critical 89

Diego Lucci Political Scepticism, MoralScepticism, and the Scope and LimitsofToleration in 109

Guido Bartolucci Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes: Jacob F. Reimmann and the Transformation of 145

LukasLang Reidian : An Antidote to Scepticism? 165

Ze’ev Strauss The Ground Floor of : Scepticismand Certainty in Mendelssohn’s 179 VI Contents

Andreas Brämer Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehre des Reformjudentums? 207

Asher Salah Are Karaites Sceptics? The Jewish of Karaism in Nineteenth Century 231

Libera Pisano Anarchic Scepticism: , Mysticismand in 251

Part II Reports

Activities and Events 275

Yoav Meyrav Report on the International Conference on Abraham Abulafiaand the Early Maimonideans: Trends, Approaches, and Sceptical Strategies (March 12–15, 2018) 307

SilkeSchaeper Report on the LibraryofJewish Scepticism 319 Editorial

The Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies 2018 is alreadythe third volume containing articles resulting from the research done by fellows and research associates in the first section as well as reports on the events which took place at the Maimonides Centre in the second section. In the first section, articles dealing with avariety of related to scepticism are chronologicallystructured from the to the earlytwentieth century. All articles have been to adouble-blind peer review.Inaprogrammatic way, Dirk Westerkamp’sarticle opensthis section, posing the question, ‘Is therea Jewishphilosophy.’ As his contribution wasfirst presented in aDialectical Evening at the MaimonidesCentre, the form of his article discussingthe pros and cons is rem- iniscent of amediaeval scholastic quaestio. In her article on textual authority in medieval peshaṭ exegesis, Hanna Liss exam- ines exegetical glosses in Ms Vienna,Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. hebr. 220. She focusses on the question whether,and in what manner,the gloss’scom- ments conveynegative criticism of RashiʼsTorah commentary,and how and in which waythey challengethe authority of this sage. With regard to her topic, Liss concludes that an extension of the term ‘scepticism’ beyond its epistemological ,actuallycauses more than it solves. Bill Rebiger analyses apassageattacking the Kabbalah from ʽEzer ha-Dat (‘In Support of the ’)written by the Jewish Averroist Isaac Polqar in the first half of the fourteenth century.Rebiger provides the reader with the first of the entire passageinto English and acommentary exposing the sceptical elements detected therein. GiuseppeVeltri presents some subtle sceptical strategies implemented by the Venetian Simone Luzzatto in his Discorso to substantiate the right of of the despite and because of their differencesinthe face of the Venetian and .Inthe sameway,Veltri studies Luzzatto’s Socrate which is the first existing treatise on scepticism written by aJew. The starting point of Oded Schechter’sarticle is the riddle first formulated by : Is Spinoza’sinterpretationofmiracles consistent with his literal-sense her- meneutics?Incontrast to Strauss’ view,Schechter suggests that closer readingofSpi- noza’scritique of both sceptic and dogmatic hermeneutics clears the path for solving the Straussian riddle. DiegoLucci reconsiders the impact of John Locke’smoral and soteriological con- cerns on his approach to religious toleration and, thus, on the scope and limits of Locke’sviews on toleration in their development from his ALetter concerning Toler- ation to TheReasonableness of . As aresult,hefocusses on the sceptical dimension of Locke’sthought. Guido Bartolucci’sarticle dealswith the Lutheran scholarJacob F. Reimmann who published ashortessayin1704under the provocative title “An Salomon fuerit

OpenAccess. ©2018 Giuseppe Veltri and Bill Rebiger,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-001 VIII Editorial

scepticus?” (“WasSolomon Sceptic?”)arguingthatthe of Jewish philosophy is scepticism. Actually, Reimmann’sclaim is the first evidence for this interpretation and Bartolucci studies its historicalbackground. Remaining in the eighteenth century,Lukas Lang discusses ’scom- mon-sense-basedversion of the well-known apraxia objection, as it appears to be im- mune to ’ replycountering it and so still has achance to succeed. The following three articles are devoted to the JewishEnlightenment in and Italy. Ze’ev Strauss explores ’sequivocal application of doubt in Jerusalem oder religiöse Macht und Judentum (JerusalemoronReligious Power and Judaism), and demonstrates that he, despite his rather unfavourable view of scepticism as a ‘disease of the ,’ nonetheless drawsheavilyonit. In his article on Abraham Geiger,one of the most influential in German , Andreas Brämer considers him to be asceptical pioneer of atheol- ogyofthe new Jewishtrend. While Geiger was interested in contemporary outcomes of Protestant theologyasarole model on the one hand and acontrasting on the ,atthe end he hesitated in writingamatchingtheologysuitable for Jewish Reform . Due to the manyunpublished German sources provided by the au- thor this article was not translated into English. Asher Salahsurveysthe Jewish perception of Karaism as ambivalent objects of attraction and repulsion in debates between traditionalists and reformers of nine- teenth century Italy. The selected texts the author discusses posethe leadingques- tion ‘Are Karaites Sceptics?’ In the last article of this section, LiberaPisano introduces the anarchic sceptic GustavLandauer and analyses his unique concepts concerning language, , and revolution. Pisano focusses on Landauer’splace within the German discourse of Sprachkrise at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century. The second section of the Yearbook consists of three reports.The first presents all activities and events taking place at the MaimonidesCentre between August 2017 and August 2018. Yoav Meyrav summarises the papers delivered at the international con- ferenceonAbraham Abulafia and the earlyMaimonideans hosted at the Centre in March 12–15,2018. Finally, the Centre’slibrarian Silke Schaeper reports on the new acquisitions of the Library of JewishScepticism. We would like to thank James Rumball who worked on the languageediting of this volume. First and foremost,weowe manythanks to the Deutsche Forschungsge- meinschaft for the generous funding that maintains the Centre, to the Board of - ees for their supervisory role, the advisory board for their engagement in selecting the fellows, and the President of the Universität Hamburg,Dieter Lenzen, the Chan- cellor,Martin Hecht,the Dean of the faculty,OliverHuck, and the head of the Phi- losophydepartment,Benjamin Schnieder,for all theireffortsthat have made the Maimonides Centre aunique venue in the scholarlyworld.

Hamburg, August 2018 Giuseppe Veltri (Chief Editor) Bill Rebiger (Volume Editor) Part I: Articles

Dirk Westerkamp Quaestio sceptica disputatadephilosophia judaeorum: Is thereaJewishPhilosophy?

Listen to the whoever speaks it. (Maimonides,Eight Chapters)

Quaestio

The question reads: Is there aJewishPhilosophy(JP) or Can there be aJP? Thisques- tion evidentlyentails the question: What is JP?

Videtur quod

It seems thatthere is aJP. JP is taught at departments of philosophyand Jewish thoughtaround the world. JP looks back on along history and rich tradition. Some- JP is put to use in public debates.¹ We speak of , Maimonides, Mendels- sohn and Lévinas as Jewish thinkers. JP is aphilosophical tradition and we should not underestimatethattraditions are important for (the history of)philosophy.² They are constituents of philosophical discourse and the simple fact that they emerge,changeorcome out of fashion over does not implythat they don’t or do not . So, yes, arguably thereissuch thing as JP. 1. However,since ontological, epistemologicaland methodological matters do not seem to be determinable as specifically ‘Jewish’,Tirosh-Samuelson/Hughes arguethat JP is not primarilyatheoretical enterprise but apractical philosophy ‘heavilyinvested in matters of Jewishpeoplehood and in articulatingits aims and

Paper given at the Dialectical Evening at the Maimonides Centre forAdvancedStudies, Universität Hamburg, August 22, 2017.Many thanks to all its participantsfor the helpful comments and the lively discussion. In order to encourageadebatethispaper waspresentedinthe form of ascholastic quaestio. It should be noted,however,thatthis is akind of sketch. Neither do Iwant to pretend thatitisabona fide Quaestio in the formalscholastic sense; nor do Ithinkthatthisstylised form of aQuaestio is the best and only waytodiscuss thismatter.Itrust thatthe of its pre- sentation does not distract from the seriousnessofthe arguments.

 Cf., e.g., Eliezer Schweid, New Gordonian Essays: Globalization, Post-, Post- and the JewishPeople [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv:Hakibbutz Hameuchad,2005).  Josef Stern, “What is Jewish Philosophy? Aview from the Middle Ages,” in Yearbookofthe Maimo- nides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2017): 199.

OpenAccess. ©2018 Dirk Westerkamp, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-002 4 Dirk Westerkamp

objectives.’³ To this aim, it constantlyand always had to applyideas of ‘non-Jewish’ origins ‘to Jewish and values.’⁴ Thus, JP is ‘in tune with certain of .’⁵ 2. JP aims at harmonising philosophyand the Jewish tradition;⁶ JP agrees with the ‘Jewishreligious tradition.’ JP ‘explain[s] and rationalize[s]’ the ‘essential core of Judaism.’⁷ Complementary to this essentialistaccount,the formalist account of JP maintains that ‒ JP is ‘anyphilosophyproduced by aJewish person, whatever the given for “Jewish”’⁸ (= necessarycondition); ‒ JP has to address Jewish issues to define aphilosophyasJewish (= sufficient con- dition): ‘While focusses on the Jewish content,moderate formalism rather takes into account the Jewish context.’⁹

3. It seems that there is JP as long as JP matches the standards of philosophical discourse: analysis,argument,distinction, critical evaluation, problem-solving.¹⁰ Likewise, Melamed argues that the

[…]for modernJewish philosophywas that most of its participants wereeither philoso- phers (Spinoza and Cohen) or well informed in Jewish texts (Mendelssohn, Krochmal, Soloveit- chik), though unfortunatelyinmanycases they were neither Jewishlyinformed nor good philos- ophers.¹¹

Thus, there can be JP if it meets the—given—standardsofstate of the philosophy (that seems to be one of the differences between JP and JewishThought, JT) plus the standards of erudite scholarship in Jewishstudies.Asfor Modern JP,then, it seems that the ‘real question is not “Is there aJewish Philosophy?”’ but: ‘Is Jewish philos- ophy(still) philosophy?’¹² On this view,therecan alsobeanAnalytic Jewish Philos-

 Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and W. Hughes, “Editors’ Introduction to Series,” in Eliezer Schweid: TheResponsibility of JewishPhilosophy,Library of Contemporary Jewish ,vol. 1, eds. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013): xi.  Ibidem.  Ibidem,xii.  Jospe, JewishPhilosophy:Foundations and Extensions,vol. 2: On Philosophers and Their (Lanham: Press of America, 2008), 20.  Stefan Goltzberg, “Three Moments in Jewish Philosophy,” Bulletin du Centrederecherche français à Jérusalem 22 (2011): 1.  Raphael Jospe, “TeachingJudah Ha-Levi: Definingand ShatteringMyths in Jewish Philosophy,” in Paradigms in JewishPhilosophy,ed. Raphael Jospe (London: Associated University Press,1997): 113.  Goltzberg, “Three Moments in Jewish Philosophy,” 2.  See Stern, “What is Jewish Philosophy? Aview fromthe Middle Ages,” 189.  Yitzhak Melamed, “Salomon Maimon et l’échec de la philosophiejuive modern,” Revue germani- que internationale 9(2009): 186–187.  Josef Stern, “Wasjüdische Philosophie sein könnte (wenn es sie gäbe). Ein mediävistischer Blick,” Zeitschrift fürKulturphilosophie 11 (2017): 296. Quaestio sceptica: Is thereaJewishPhilosophy? 5

ophyapplying the toolsoflogical and conceptual analysis for example to talmudic reasoning¹³ or to Wittgensteinian accounts of lifeforms.¹⁴ 4. In this sense, we mayspeak of JP if it is (i) philosophy(in the abovementioned sense) and (ii) concerned with Jewishreligious and cultural practices. Melamed seems to adhere to the essentialist rather than to the formalist account of JP:

Unlike manyothers,Ido not takeaJewish philosophertobesomeone who is (a) Jewish and (b) aphilosopher,but rather suggest that Jewish philosophyisthe attempt to provide awell-argued and informedaccountofJewish religious and cultural beliefs and practices.¹⁵

Being Jewish, then, would neither be anecessary nor asufficient condition for doing JP whereas providingan‘account of Jewishreligious and cultural beliefs and practi- ces’ would be the necessary condition. 5. JP is the philosophyofJudaism; it is ‘invested in matters of Jewish people- hood,’‘in tune with certain principles of rationalism,’ and providingan‘account of Jewishreligious and cultural beliefs and practices.’ It is contested, however,as to whether this essentialist account of JP has to be critical as well—meaning thatit should critically reflect JP’sown historicity: ‘The critical approach takes into account the history of the texts,their modification over time, their successive editions. This critical approach is philosophicallyand historicallyreceivable.’ From the non-critical essentialist’s point of view, ‘atext of Jewish philosophydoes not have to meet the criteria of the critical approach.’¹⁶ 6. According to the criticalessentialist view,JPand JT form a ‘dynamic space of thought’ (dynamischer Denkraum),¹⁷ consistingofthree ‘spatial’ elements: philoso- phy, mysticism, and . This space, however,issystematicallynuanced, the- maticallyinclusive (there can be more, for example the musar-movement etc.), and interculturallyopen.This essentialist view of JP is critical insofar as it holds that the essence of JP (and Judaism) is not static and stable but in constant transi- tion, , and dynamic. 7. Furthermore, the critical essentialist account of JP can be divided into two camps: (i) Either JP fully(though not without self-criticism) endorses, promotes and defends Jewishbeliefs, practices and convictions; or (ii) JP aims at rather a ‘philosophyofJudaism,’ implying that JP seeks to ‘achieveacritical understanding

 Cf., e.g., Hirsch, “ in the ,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 166–180.  Cf. , JewishPhilosophy as aGuide to : Rosenzweig,Buber,Levinas,Wittgenstein (Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 2008).  Melamed, “SalomonMaimon et l’échec de la philosophie juive modern,” 176.  Goltzberg, “Three Moments in Jewish Philosophy,” 4.  Frederek Musall, “JüdischesDenken denken,” in JewishLifeworlds and JewishThought (FSGrö- zinger), ed. Nathanael Riemer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012): 141– 149. 6 Dirk Westerkamp

of the foundational beliefs,logical structure, and articulated in its data, not to promote them.’¹⁸ 8. Some currents of the second strand of criticalessentialist account of JP can be interpreted as negativistic. On this view,webetter not define the critical essence of JP in positive terms (since its Denkraum is systematicallyand historicallyopen and shift- ing). Rather,itcan be determined through negative distinctions. Accordingtothe negativistic critical essentialist account,JPis – not aschool (for example Kalam; Aristotelians, Neo-Platonists), – not astyle (, phenomenology, hermeneutics), – not philosophydone by Jews (not an ethnic category), – not philosophywritten in Hebrew.¹⁹

Some positive attributes,however,can be formulated. Medieval JP,for instance,was anetwork of a ‘continuous dialogue’ of Jewish authors ‘embedded’ in the ‘tradition of Islamic philosophyand its Greek sources’ and, later,encounteringChristian scho- lastic philosophy.²⁰ Within this discourse-network, the question of the relation be- tween Philosophyand is debated. JP is ‘acausally-intraconnected discourse, or conversation, what Icalled a “tradition”’²¹ following the agenda of discussing the relation between philosophyand Torahset by Maimonides’ Guide.

Sed contra

On the other hand, the existenceofaJP is heavilycontested, abrogated, and denied. To highlight this, let me report asomewhat funny, yetilluminatingpersonal conver- sation Ihad with one of my academic advisors, Yossef Schwartz, while returning to the Hebrew University of JerusalemasaVisiting ResearchFellow (in 2000):

Schwartz: ‘What do youwant to studywith me while youare aVisitingResearch Fellow at the Hebrew University?’ Westerkamp: ‘Medieval Jewish Philosophy.’ Schwartz: ‘Ein davar—thereisnosuch thingasMedieval Jewish Philosophy. Studywith someone else or studysomethingelse.’

1. It can be argued against the formalist account of JP (see Videtur quod,2.) that since there is no Jewish ,noJewish biologyand no Jewish sociology(being radical- ly different from social studies on Judaism), there can be no JP.This is drasticallycan- vassed by Jospe, saying that some Jews playing football doesn’tmake theirplaying

 Stern, “Wasjüdische Philosophie sein könnte (wenn es sie gäbe).Ein mediävistischer Blick,” 278 (emphasis added).  Cf. Stern, “What is Jewish Philosophy? Aview fromthe Middle Ages,” 186–190.  Ibidem,198.  Ibidem,201. Quaestio sceptica: Is thereaJewishPhilosophy? 7

football aJewishfootball game. The formalist account of JP can be formalistically challenged also by the following example: Suppose that aphilosopher discovers at the end of her career that she was Jewish.Would this ‘retroactively turn’ her work ‘into acontribution to Jewishphilosophy’?²² Taking the example of the late Hi- lary Putnamwho towardsthe end of his life cared more and more about his ‘Jewish- ness’,does not mean that his earlier work becomes JP retrospectively.

2. Accordingtothe criticalhistoriographical account of JP (JPCHA), JP was simply ‘the creation of the academic discipline, the “History of JewishPhilosophy,” an arte- fact made by an academic discipline as much as the discipline studies it.’²³ Within the of JPCHA,however,there is an ongoing controversialdebate on the origins of this ‘artefact’.Whereas LeoraBatnizky claims that JP is a ‘modern academic con- struct,’²⁴ DanielFrank traces the of its tradition back to nineteenth century Ger- man-Jewish des Judentums. The Wissenschaft des Judentums soughtto legitimate Jewish philosophicaltexts as arespected academic subject.²⁵ Ihave shown that the idea of a philosophiajudaeorum perennis is even older,stemming from seventeenth centuryFrench-German discourse on ‘historiographical holism’²⁶ and German Enlightenment historiographyofJewishThought.²⁷ Even prior to that, so Giuseppe Veltri argues, the ‘first sketch of aJewish […]history of philosophy was formulatedbythe Venetian Rabbi Simone Luzzatto (1583–1663),’²⁸ consequently dating the ‘artefact’ of JP back into sixteenthcenturyhumanism.

3. In addition, JPCHA demonstrates that JP was not onlyahistoriographical inven- tion but also ahighly polemical one.²⁹ Within seventeenth and eighteenth century ‘historiographical holism,’ JP was introduced as an allegedlycontinuous tradition (from the [= philosophia haebraeorum]upuntil Moses Mendelssohn) only in the end to be expelled from the kingdom of ‘serious’ philosophy. Morebluntly: JP was invented for no other purpose thantobeexcluded as amere philosophia extra-graecanica or philosophia orientali. As aconsequence, anyessentialist account of JP has to question itself as to whether it wants—however unconsciously—to continue this polemicaltradition of

 Goltzberg, “Three Moments in Jewish Philosophy,” 3.  Stern, “What is Jewish Philosophy? Aview from the Middle Ages,” 186.  LeoraBatnizky, “The Natureand History of Jewish Philosophy,” in JewishPhilosophy Past and Present,eds.Daniel H. Frank and AaronSegal (New York and London: ,2016): 72.  Daniel Frank, “What is Jewish philosophy?,” in HistoryofJewishPhilosophy,eds.Daniel H. Frank and OliverLeaman (London: Routledge,2004).  Dirk Westerkamp, Die philonische Unterscheidung.Aufklärung, Orientalismus und Konstruktion der Philosophie (München: Fink, 2009); cf. also idem, “The Philonic Distinction. German Enlightenment HistoriographyofJewish Thought,” Historyand Theory 47 (2008): 533– 559.  Westerkamp, Die philonische Unterscheidung,15–90.  Giuseppe Veltri,”Die arabische Philosophie und der im modernen jüdischen Denken,” in JewishLifeworlds and JewishThought (FSGrözinger),ed. NathanaelRiemer (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2012): 100.  Westerkamp, Die philonische Unterscheidung,71–74. 8 Dirk Westerkamp

tradition-construction or not.Ifnot,this would mean either to write adifferent his- tory of the tradition of philosophia judaeorum perennis or to give up its very idea al- together.Insum: accordingtoJPCHA,there is no such category as JP prior to Early Modernity and, as aconsequence, Philo or Maimonides never were(and never have or could have considered themselvestobe) Jewish philosophers.

4. Accordingtothe anti-essentialist account of JP (JPAEA), JP is philosophicallyun- original; its philosophicalissues, methodsand solutions are second hand news. The ‘philosophy’ in JP is borrowed from philosophicallygenuine non-Jewishback- grounds:Greek thought, , scholastic thinking,and later (with re- gardtoMoses Mendelssohn and Hermann Cohen) from Leibnizian or Kantian philos- ophyetc. In this sense, Veltri and others (Stern, Samuelson, Leaman etc.) arguethat JP can not be conceivedofindependentlyfrom Muslim philosophyetc.; it can onlybedetermined in ‘interaction’ (Wechselwirkung)with other philosophical cul- tures.Hence, JP can be studied onlybytaking into account the multifaceted and un- derlying processesof‘culturaltransfer.’³⁰ Thisposition could be termedthe cultural- ist anti-essentialistaccount of JP (JPCAEA). 5. Even more radical, some interpreters claim the principal irreconcilability of Ju- daism and philosophy, the latter concerned with pure , the formerstemming from religious .’sJPAEA maintains the irreconcilability of reason and (this is, accordingtoAltmann, philosophy’scentral project in the mediaevum as well as in eighteenth century Enlightenment). Accordingly, it is

[…]futile to attempt apresentation of Judaism as aphilosophical system. […]Judaism is areli- gion, and the it teaches arereligious truths.They springfromthe source of religious ex- perience, not from pure reason.³¹

Altmann’sposition can be labelled the irreconcilabilist anti-essentialist account of JP

(JPIAEA).

6. JPIAEA leads to yetanother prominent anti-essentialistaccount of JP,the anti- universalist account of JP (JPAUA). Accordingtothis view,doing JP is ‘insular’, ‘paro- chial’–in all a ‘particularistic’ enterprise. Restricted to Jewishmatters,JPhas to give up the very ‘universalconcerns’³² which construct the coreofany serious thinking that maydeservedlybecalled ‘philosophy’.Thus, therecan be no JP,oratleast JP is not philosophyfor it does not exhibit a ‘universalcuriosity and auniversalques- tioning’³³ into the foundations of existence. Likewise, Veltri argues that the epithet ‘Jewish’ restricts philosophytoparticularistic (historical and cultural contingent) in-

 Veltri, “Die arabische Philosophie und der Islam im modernen jüdischen Denken.”  Alexander Altmann, “Judaism and World Philosophy,” in TheJews:Their History, Culture, and Re- ligion,ed. L. Finkelstein(: Jewish Publication SocietyofAmerica, 1949): 954.  Tirosh-Samuelson/Hughes, “Editors’ Introduction to Series,” x.  , “Is there aJewish philosophy?,” in JewishPhilosophy and Philosophers,ed. R. Goldwa- ter(London: Hillel Foundation, 1962):8. Quaestio sceptica: Is thereaJewish Philosophy? 9

terests, whereas philosophy(en sens large)has to ‘go beyond the contingent.’³⁴ JPAUA leads to the separation of general philosophyand Judaism. AccordingtoLeonRoth, there can be no such thing as JP maybea‘philosophyofJudaism’ whereas conceiv- able: as ‘the thinking and rethinking of the fundamental ideas involved in Judaism and the attempt to see them fundamentally, that is, in coherent relation one with an- other so that they form one intelligible whole.’³⁵

7. JPAUA has led to yetanother position: the paradoxical or self-contradictorycon- ception of JP (JPPARA): JP somehow is and is not. AccordingtoTirosh-Samuelson/ Hughes, Jewish philosophyis‘rooted in aparadox’—if not contradiction: ‘As philos- ophy, this activity makes claims of validity.’ Insofar as this activity is inter- preted as aJewish activity,philosophising becomes ‘an activity by awell-defined group of people’ and,therefore, ‘it is inherentlyparticularistic.’ Hence, JP is ruled by acontradiction as the ‘collision of particularistic demands and universal con- cerns.’³⁶ JP,then, would be aphilosophical tradition (or stance) which heroicallyac- cepts the impossibletaskoftrying to reconcile the irreconcilable: particularist and universalist reason, philosophical truths and religious practice. JP would accord- ingly be the heroic but (im)possible endeavour to at least try to bring the impossible into the form of philosophical discourse.

8. JPCHA,JPAEA,JPCAEA,JPIAEA,and JPAUA amount to the conclusion that (i) either there is no JP (as an essential or even formal entity) or (ii) that JP is an academicar- tefact or (iii) thatJPisnot possible(in terms of ‘consistentlyconceivable’)—or that JP is possible onlyasthe philosophical possibility of facing and formulating the phil- osophicallyimpossible (JPPARA).

Responsio/Dicendumquod

Forthe sake of the argument,Iseek to take adogmatist stance in the corpus articuli. Thus, Iwill—contre cœur (see Sed contra,3.)—arguefor an essentialist answer to the quaestio sceptica disputata. To do so, Iwill not onlyrefute the Sed contra-thesesbut develop further decisive arguments which amount to adefinition (or better:explica- tion) of what JP was and is. Among these arguments are: 1. an argumentum ad verecundiam or argument from authority; 2. an empirico-transcendental argument against performative self-contradiction (whichcan be read as an argumentum ad hominem as well); 3. apragmatic conceptual argument; 4. amethodological argument with regard to the distinctionofscientific subject

and (implicitly rejectingthe Sed-contra-arguments of JPCHA 2.–4.);

 Veltri, “Die arabische Philosophie und der Islam im modernen jüdischen Denken,” 99.  Roth, “Is thereaJewish philosophy?,” 8.  Tirosh-Samuelson/Hughes, “Editors’ Introduction to Series,” ix-x. 10 Dirk Westerkamp

5. an anti-dogmatic tertium datur-argument with regardtothe relation between

reason and revelation (implicitlyrejecting the Sed-contra-argument of JPIAEA 5.); 6. an anti-particularistic reductio ad-absurdum-argument (implicitlyrefutingthe

Sed contra-argument of JPAUA 6.); 7. an anti-positivist argument in favour of amethodologicallysound distinction be- tween scientific subjects and literary (implicitly refutingthe account

of JPAUA,namely Sed contra-arguments 1. and 7. ); 8. acounterfactual classification-argument; 9. an argument from ; and, finally, a 10.definition with the genus proximum ‘philosophy’ and threerestrictive differentiae specificae.

It has to be said that (dicendum quod)there is aJP. This conclusion becomes evident (ex ergopatet)from the following arguments that serveaspremises to the overall conclusion: 1. Eminent scholars work on medieval Jewishphilosophy; other prominent schol- ars in the field have edited book series such as the “LibraryofContemporary Jewish Philosophers” (Tirosh-Samuelson/Hughes). If we agree that these authorities are not ‘bluffers’ but actuallyknow what they are doing,wemust supposethat there is something that maybetermedJPorJT³⁷or at least thatthere are indeed ‘contempo- rary Jewish philosophers.’ 2. There are chairs of Jewish Thought and Jewish Philosophy(, US,Eu- rope).³⁸ In Germany, there are, to the best of my knowledge,atleast four chairs of JP or JT.³⁹ Denying that there is such athing as JP would be aperformative contra- diction for thoseoccupyingthe chairs. 3. The existential copula ‘is’ in the question ‘Is there aJewishPhilosophy?’ does not refer to aquantificational-ontologicalquestion on ‘what thereis’(as Popperian

 The between Jewish Philosophy(JP) and Jewish Thought (JT) mayrecall Heidegger’s distinction between ‘philosophy’ and ‘thinking’ (Denken). Whereas ‘philosophy’ became awatered- down form of philosophysuch as Betrieb or professionalised business,Heideggerfavours ‘thinking’ (as ‘real’ philosophy) over philosophy; for him, ‘thinking’ stands in proximity/neighbourhood (Nach- barschaft)topoetry (Dichten). Itrust that the differencebetween JP and JT does not implythe Hei- deggerian motive.  Just some random name-dropping: Paul Franks is Professor of Philosophy, Jewish Philosophy, and Religious Studies at ;Benjamin Pollock is Sol Rosenbloom Chair in Jewish Philos- ophyand AssociateProfessor of Jewish Thoughtatthe Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Haim Kreisel is Professor of Medieval Jewish Philosophyinthe Department of Jewish ThoughtatBen-Gurion Uni- versity of the ;Noam is Associate Professor of Jewish Philosophyand Chair (General Phi- losophy) at Bar-Ilan University.  Jewish Philosophyand Religion: Giuseppe Veltri (Universität Hamburg); Religious Studies and Jewish Thought: Sina Rauschenbach (Universität Potsdam); Modern Jewish Philosophy: WalterHomo- lka (Universität Potsdam); Jüd. Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte: Frederek Musall (Hochschule für Jüdische Studien, Heidelberg). Quaestio sceptica: Is thereaJewishPhilosophy? 11

world 1-objects, for instance). Instead it refers to something that matters for us. It re- fers, moreover,toacategory (a world 3-object/ object). These objects are not eternal but come into being through our scientific practices. JP is such acategory. That it was ‘invented’ or is an ‘artefact’⁴⁰ does not mean thatitdoes not matter for us now.The fact that Maimonides didn’tregard himself as aJewish (but as an Aristotelianphilosopher and apious ) because he didn’tknow of the artificial category ‘JP’ does not implythathewas not aJewishphilosopher. 4. There is adifference between doing JP (i.e. constituting/establishingthe cat- egory itself)and doing research in the history of JP (i.e. always alreadyusing the cat- egory). Even if it maybethat the history of JP was in fact an invention of the six- teenth- (Veltri), seventeenth/eighteenth- (Westerkamp),nineteenth- (Frank)or twentieth-century (Batnizky) scholarship and , JP (as the subject of this scholarship) is not.This would mean that and scholarship can some- times produce their scientificobjects. It is, however,asign of good scientific practice to clearlydistinguish the subjectand object of science (the of need not to be anationalist). With the help of arguments 3./4., one can reject the Sed-contra-arguments of

JPCHA (2.–4.). Ad 2. Even historiographical artefacts and categories exist (in the sense that they matter,that they can be useful scientific objects) since the subject of these artefacts are series or bundles of existing texts by real authors. Traditions maybe‘invented’ but can nevertheless have ahold on us. JP is such atradition. Ad 3. Against the polemical classification of JP as non-philosophy(and the argu- ment of JPCHA), Jewish philosophers mayinvoke the ‘counter-memory’ () of theirown tradition.

Ad 4. Against JPAEA’sargument of the ‘non-originality’ of JP (‘borrowed’ methods, rationalism etc.) one can show that in the history of philosophia perennis everyone borrows something from someone (so to speak). The scholastics thoughthighlyof the Islamic and Jewish philosophical pioneer-work in .Surely, cultural transfer is never aone-waystreet.Philosophical transfer always was a non-asymmet- rical or a transitive relation. There has been an immense ‘backflow’ from JP to philos- ophy(especiallytoscholastic thinking).

5. JPAEA (see Sed contra,5.) intends to develop an anti-dogmatist argument.Yet it is in itself highlydogmatic. The position according to which philosophyand Judaism or reason and revelation are irreconcilable, rests on adogmatic apriori assumption. It follows the problematic of tertium non datur. And it showsadeep misunder- standing of JP.Contrary to that,Jewishphilosophers like Maimonides tried to show that revelation is in itself rational. To saythat religion is onlyirrational is in itself dogmatic, at best arrogant.Inthis vein, Horkheimer/Adorno argued that al- readyhavesome inner rationalitywhereas pure and abstract reason can itself depra-

 Stern, “What is Jewish Philosophy? Aview from the Middle Ages,” 186. 12 Dirk Westerkamp

vateinto amyth and become aquasi-religious idol. So it seems thatJPAEA’sview is not onlydogmatic but extremelyahistorical and privileges arestricted modern view on historical matters. 6. Doing Jewish philosophydoes not necessarilyimplythat it is ‘insular’, ‘partic- ularistic’ or ‘parochial’,since being Jewishdoes not rule out (a) thatthis philosophy can at the same time be heavilyinfluenced by Hellenistic, Islamic, Christian, herme- neutical, analytical, phenomenological or anyotherstrand of thought.Denying that would ignore that,e.g., the medieval Jewish-philosophical enterprises wereclearly interculturaland interreligious enterprises.⁴¹ And it does not rule out (b)that JP makes universal claims pertainingtoevery living creature. That is to saythat philos- ophycan be particularisticallyJewishwithout giving up its ‘universal concerns’ (Tir- osh-Samuelson/Hughes). If specifying epithets cause problems of particularism then this would alsocast doubt on the possibility of anyanalytic, phenomenological or sceptical philosophyat all. Again, the sharp alternative between particularistic or universal philosophical claims rests on aproblematic , on abinary opposition ruling out anythird possibility.Ifany restriction of philosophyendangers its philosophicalsub- stance, then onlyontology (as first philosophy) could be (absurdly) called philoso- phy.

With this argument,wemay also refute Sed contra,6.(JPAUA): Every philosophy, every philosophical text (even Hegel’smajestic, allegedlyall-encompassingsystem) is somewhat particularistic. Any anti-universalist account of JP would have the bur- den of proof to show what insteadcould be afull-fledgeduniversalisticaccount of philosophy. What is philosophically ‘universal’ at all?Hence, the argument against ‘insularism’ collapses into itself. 7. Universalism and particularism do not necessarilycontradict.Something can universalisticallybephilosophybut particularisticallybedone in aJewishgarb; thus the analogy—if there a22Jews playing football it does not mean that what they do is Jewish football—does not hold; the sameistrue with ‘Jewish physics’ and the like. The analogyisbad since it contaminates two incomparable subjects. Philosophyisconcerned with and arguments (expressed in speech and text) not primarilywith natural objects. Since there can be aspecific Jewishliterature and aspecific Jewishtemple but no specific Jewish stone or planet,there can also be philosophical Jewish texts.Not to distinguish subjects and to conveythe samepasse- partout-method on them is positivism or logical empiricism. Both are bad philoso- phy. JP thus is a textual category. EdmundHusserlnever produced atext which falls under this category but both the phenomenologist Emmanuel Lévinas and the ana- lytic philosopher Hilary Putnam did.

 Stern, “What is Jewish Philosophy? Aview from the Middle Ages,” 198. Quaestio sceptica: Is thereaJewish Philosophy? 13

With this in , JPAUA—namely Sed contra,1.and 7. — can be rejected: Ad 7. The view that Jewish philosophyis‘rooted in aparadox’ is no Alleinstellungsmerkmal of JP but holds true also with regard to Islamic Philosophy(IP) and Christian Philoso- phy(CP) (e.g. Neo-). Ad 1. The formalist view is wrongsince it is not the Jewwhich makes philosophy Jewishbut that is acertain sort(and tradition) of texts that makes aphilosophical text belong to JP. 8. Letusconsider some simple yes/no-cases. WasSalomonaJewishphiloso- pher?Not in atechnical sense. WasPhilo of Alexandria aJewish philosopher?Def- initely! Maimonides? He too!Was Spinoza aJewishphilosopher?Not so much the au- thor of the Ethica but rather the author of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Husserl was not aJewish philosopher,Lévinas was. Scholem was not,being aJew but not a philosopher (calling himself a ‘historian of religion’). Were Benjamin and Derrida Jewishphilosophers?Difficult to say, at least not accordingtothe definition with which this paper concludes. So here comes the eighth argument: What would we do if the historiographical category ‘JP’ weremissing (or similar categoriessuch as ‘Islamic philosophy’ or ‘’)? How would we classify thinkers such as Maimonides, Crescas,Luzzatto?Thus, JP—if well-defined—seems to be ause- ful category. 9. As alreadyseen, it is not anecessary condition for JP that an author interprets him- or herself as aJewishphilosopher in order to be one. This does not imply, how- ever,that the self-attribution or self-understanding of authorsisgenerallyirrelevant. If some colleaguecame up to me and said, ‘IamaJewishphilosopher’—who am Ito disagree or tell he/she is not or he/she is avictim of a ‘scientific self-misunderstand- ing’ (Habermas). To agreat extent,simply out of sheer respect,wewould have to ac- cept the autonomous philosophical self-interpretationofthe other.Ifthere werea group of philosopherscalling themselvesJewishphilosopherswith good to back this up, then they actually are Jewish philosophersthat form the category ‘JP’. 10.Without debating what ‘philosophy’ or ‘philosophising’ exactlymeans and re- minding Nietzsche’sinsight that: we can onlydefine that which has no history,the following definition (or less technically: explication) of the term JP can be given: JP is aphilosophyofaspecific historical tradition which philosophises out of the sources of Judaism, involves an account of the relation between reason and revelation and accepts (or in aweaker sense – reflects) the truth claims of the Jewishtradition as developedinthe sources mentioned. Schematically: JP is philosophy(or philosophising) (genus proximum; genos) – in aspecific historicaltradition (‘-ish’)(species; eidos) –‘out of the sources of Judaism’ (H. Cohen) (i.e. Torah, , Talmud plus their commentaries) (1st specifica) – giving an account of the relation between reason and revelation (2nd differen- tia specifica) 14 Dirk Westerkamp

– accepting (or at least: reflecting) the truth claims of Jewishtradition developed in the mentioned sources (truth claims: One ,importance of ,liabil- ity of the Halakhah etc.) (3rd differentia specifica)

Some explanations of the differentiae specificae or sufficient conditions/restrictions maybeuseful. Ad 1st differentia specifica: The ‘sources’ of Judaism (however thatcat- egory is defined)may in themselvesalreadycontain ‘philosophemata’ or ‘theologou- mena’ or anyelements prone to philosophical thinking. Ad 2nd differentia specifica: Whatever ‘reconciliation’ means—it has to work with an ‘update’ of acertain philo- sophical terminologydevelopedinformer (Late-Antiquity,Mediaeval, or Enlighten- ment period) discourses on the topic. Ad 3rd differentia specifica: Acrucial, yetex- tremelydifficult question is whether one has to fullyaccept the truth claims of the Jewishtexts or mayone adopt aneutral stance towards them whendoing JP.Myun- derstandingisthat one has to fullysubscribe to these truth claims in order to write a JP.However,one could further distinguish between the attempt to ground the truth claims and to show how and whythey are possible (i.e. moderate foundationalist po- sition) and the attempt to show that they are not onlygrounded but that they are nec- essary and therefore have to be affirmed in toto (i.e. fundamentalist position). From all this we maydrawthe conclusion: If it can be proved that thereare au- thors and texts satisfying the conditions of this (internallyopen) definition, then there is JP. HannaLiss Scepticism, Critique, and the ArtofWriting: PreliminaryConsiderations on the Question of Textual Authority in Medieval Peshaṭ Exegesis

Theglossed book’slay-out, Glosses not only use avariety difficult to set up and copy, of strategies to preserve was reserved for works that were and create authority, among the most fully institutionalized […] but also to undermineand, the works of certain classical authors. occasionally,tousurp it. (Mary Carruthers) (Suzanne Reynolds)

1Introduction

‘Scepticism’ among the tosafists?Glosses as ameans for asceptical discourse? The two opening quotations¹ define the edgesofaresearch field whose outline may be delineated by the question regarding ‘scepticism’ in Northern French peshaṭ exe- gesis revealing ‘doubts about the claims of authorities’² on the one hand, and the ‘“authorizing” of atext’³ on the other.⁴

 ‘The glossed book’slay-out […]’ stemsfromMary Carruthers, TheBookofMemory: AStudy of Mem- oryinMedieval Culture (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2008), 265; ‘Glosses not onlyuse a variety of strategies […]’ is quoted from Suzanne Reynolds, Medieval Reading: Grammar,,and the Classical Text (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7.  Cf. the definition from the Maimonides Centre’smission : ‘One of the most importantre- searchobjectivesistoexamine whether the method of enquiry implied in the term ‘scepticism’ could be regarded an anthropological constant […]across both Eastern and Western philosophyand cul- ture.The assumptionwould be that people in every culture express doubts about the claims of au- thorities to truth, the reliability of texts, and their social or mystical relevance, doubts about the power and presenceofdivinities,orabout the power of reason and the controlling powerofsocial structures and their respective consequences […].’ (https://www.maimonides-centre.uni-hamburg. de; accessed March 2018).  Aterm introduced by Carruthers, Book of Memory,243.  This paperisbased on my article “‘Daneben steht immer ein klugerKopf’:Die Glossenformationen im Codex Wien hebr.220,” in Diligens scrutator sacri eloquii. Beiträgezur Exegese- und Theologiege- schichte des Mittelalters.Festgabe fürRainer Berndt SJ,eds.Hanns Peter Neuheuser,Ralf M. W. Stammberger, and Matthias M. Tischler (Münster: Aschendorff, 2016): 53–85,and was reworked under the respective topicduringmystayasSenior Fellow at the Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies—Jewish Scepticism, Universität Hamburg(October 2017–March 2018). My thanks to Jonas Leipziger whoarranged, in particular,the edition of the gloss material in this paper, Bettina Bur- ghardtwho translated parts of this paperfromGerman into English. Thanks also to all the staff mem-

OpenAccess. ©2018 Hanna Liss, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-003 16 HannaLiss

In its specific philosophicalsense, sourced in philosophy, scepti- cism and/or the sceptical approach seek to refrain from anyofits own regardingreligious beliefs or philosophicalviews. In that sense, the question is easi- ly declined:There is no philosophical scepticism among the tosafists, for the tosafists wereneither philosophers, nor did their critical glosses on the and the Talmud (more precisely: their critical notes and questions on Rashiʼscommentaries on the Bible and the Talmud) intend reachingastate of mind beyond anyaffirmation or de- nial of religious knowledge or beliefs.However,evenifwetake ‘scepticismʼ in an ex- tended sense, comprised of sceptical and critical strategies,concepts, and attitudes against elements of tradition,⁵ we would hardlylabel the tosafistsʼ exegetical dis- courses as ‘scepticism’ or sceptical thought,although they challengetraditionalrab- binic exegesis, and in some cases utter harsh criticism of the as theirexe- getical forerunners.For instance, in Ms Oxford, Bodleian Library,Opp. 34 (Neubauer 186), fol. 116v,⁶ we find various exegetical dicta attributed to ⁷ describingthe new exegetical approach ‘accordingtothe ways of the world’,thus criticising the for- mer exegetical explanations for being ‘neither in accordancewith the wayofthe world, [based on] common knowledge,nor in line with the [meaning of]the verse.’⁸ Moreover,inthe samecontext,wefind harsh criticism of his grandfather whose explanation of Deuteronomy20:19 is rejected, almostscoffed at,as ‘foolishness.’⁹ However,when dealing with medieval Jewishliterature, one always has to wrestle with the question of textual authority,and so we mayaccede the dic- tum conveys an undermining of the exegetical authority.But Iwould like to propose the question: Is textual authority identical with exegetical authority?¹⁰ And if so, must it be labelled asceptical mode or strategy, even in avery broad sense?Are these exegetical comments ameans for conveying sceptical thought? Is acritical at- titude towardsrabbinicunderstanding tantamount to asceptical approach?And

bers of the Centrefor their kind and attentive support,and my colleagues Bill Rebigerand Friedhelm Hartenstein for manydiscussions about the issue at hand.  See Bill Rebiger, “Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto’sPresentation of the Kabbalists in his Discorso,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2017): 53.  The manuscript is fullydigitised online (accessed March 2018).  This textwas written in asecond (later) hand on fol. 116v,after the poem at the end of Parashat Zot first) פב רת ׳ו ׳ר מש או בל מר יא זר ל״צ in line 26,and ימ וס רד ׳ב מש לאו ha-Berakha. It is signed with the words letterhardlyreadable due to page-cut). This text is not laid out as agloss to the Rashi commentary, but is acollection of biblical explanations attributed to Rashbam (startingwith Deuteronomy34:1in ” , פה טש תו מה חת שד םי : טק יע חם שד םי פמ רי שו תה רו לה שר ם״ב - ״כ י “ ,line 1); for the details see Moshe Sokolow AleSefer 11 (1984): 74–76. םא רי וא רה או םי יפ ור יש ק׳ וד ימ שם ונ יט לם דצ שפ אט רח עב ינ ני םי חא יר ים נת לו כב אי ני דם ךר רא לץ יפ כח תמ בד יר נב י  .(line 8–10) םדא , וא פכ ׳י ספה קו .(line 12–14) לה תא אר מה פה רי זש יק ינ צז ל״ [ … ] לה זא הה רבד לבה   See abovenote 2. Scepticism,Critique, and the ArtofWriting 17

last,but not least: in which wayhave ‘sceptical’ strategies,concepts, and attitudes to be qualified in relation to the literarygenre in which they appear? In the following studyonthe exegetical glosses in Ms Vienna,Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. hebr.220,Iwill present an edition of selected glosses¹¹ and examine, if, and in what manner, these gloss comments conveynegative criti- cism of RashiʼsTorah commentary,and how and in which waythey challengethe authority of the great sage. As some of these glosses have alreadybeen attributed to Rashbam, my studywill comparethem to the printed editions of Rashbamʼs Torahcommentary (henceforth RTC).¹²

2The Manuscript Tradition of Rashi and hisSchool

2.1 TextualWitnesses of RashiʼsTorahCommentary

The so-called peshaṭ exegesisbyNorthern French Jews of the eleventh and twelfth centuries,and the question of how exactlyitistobeunderstood, has engagedschol- ars of almost continuously for the last 150 years. The main focal point has been—and remains—the commentary by R. Shelomo Yiṣḥaqi ( Rashi; ca. 1040–1105), for even to this day, it is considered the fundamental text of Jewish Bible exegesis.¹³ His commentary is present in each and every traditionalBible edition. Re- garding manuscript tradition and contemporary printeditions, Jewish Medieval stud- ies are in amuch less comfortable position than their Christian counterparts.¹⁴ This has became even more so in recent years, when the relationship between the literary

 An edition of the entiregloss corpus is currentlybeingprepared. All the glosses will be diplomati- callyedited, and presented as an annotated digital edition according to their mise-en-forme and ar- rangement on the manuscript’sfolio. Iamdeeplyindebted to Clemens Liedtke,M.A., Center for Jew- ish Studies Heidelberg(Project Corpus Masoreticum; accessed March2018) for providingmewith the electronic tools for the digital edition.  See below section 2.3.  Amongothers see for instanceGilbertDahan, Gérard Nahon, and Elie Nicolas,eds., Rashi et la CultureJuive en du NordauMoyen Âge (:E.Peeters, 1997); Avraham Grossman, The Early Sages of France: Their , Leadership and Works [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 21996); Avraham Grossman, Rashi [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem:The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish His- tory,2006); English edition: (Oxfordand Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish , 2012); Kalman, “Medieval Jewish Biblical Commentaries and the StateofParshanutStudies,” Religion Compass 2.5(2008): 819–843; Robert Salters, “The Exegesis of Rashi and Rashbam on Qohe- leth,” in Rashi et la CultureJuive en France du NordauMoyen Âge, eds.Gilbert Dahan, Gérard Nahon, and Elie Nicolas(Paris:E.Peeters,1997): 151–161; Barry Dov Walfish, “An Annotated Bibliography of Medieval Jewish Commentaries on the ,” in TheBible in the Light of Its Interpreters: Sarah Kamin Memorial Volume,ed. SaraJaphet (Jerusalem: Magnes Press,1994): 518–571.  Cf. Matthias M. Tischler, Die Bibel in Saint-Victor zu Paris:das Buch der Bücher als Gradmesser für wissenschaftliche, sozialeund ordensgeschichtliche Umbrüche im europäischen Hoch-und Spätmittelal- ter (Münster: Aschendorff, 2014). 18 HannaLiss

heritageofRashi and the documentary evidence of his pupils came undercloser scrutiny. It was revealed that the Rashi commentary never reallyexisted,¹⁵ at least not before it made its wayinto the typographic world. The first printing of Rashi’s commentary on the Torahalso marks the beginning of Hebrew book printing per se (Reggio di Calabria, 1475).¹⁶ Even the handwritten text-witnesses existing todayoriginatefrom anoticeably later period and are everything but uniform: the oldest manuscript,MsMunich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, cod. hebr.5(commentary only) was copied in 1233 in Würzburgand also constitutes the oldest dated, illuminated Ashkenazimanuscript. The second important Rashi manuscript,MsLeipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, hebr.1 (B.H. fol. 1) originates from the thirteenth century (undated) and contains,aside from the Masoretic biblical text (with eclectic annotated Masoretic glosses), the Tar- gumand acommentary attributedtoRashi and is alsoaccompanied by anumber of glosses by Rashi’smost eminent pupil, Shemaʽya, and the scribe Makhir.¹⁷ The third manuscript,considered to be one of the most importantobjects for research into Rashi, Ms Vienna,hebr.220 (Schwarz 23)isalso undated, but originates from acon- siderably later period (thirteenth/fourteenth century). Strictlyspeaking,the printed editions are unusable for academic purposes: aside from the traditionalBible, edi- tions in the so-called Rabbinic (Miqra’ot Gedolot)are severelyflawed. Today one resorts to either Rashi’sTorah commentary in the ¹⁸ edition or the one contained in Miqra’ot Gedolot Haketer.¹⁹ There is as yet, no critical edition available, and of the existing Rashi commentaries,the deviations are occasionally overlyextreme. Such findingsresulted in numerous discussions among scholars on whether to describethe Rashi corpus as ‘author commentaryʼ or ‘compilatory commentary’.The discussions, however,werelargely too narrowly focussed (provid- ing basically no result).²⁰ Scholarlyresults emanating from Modern and

 See in particular the forthcomingbook by KayJoe Petzold, Masoraund Exegese. Untersuchungen zurMasora und Bibeltextüberlieferung im Kommentar des R. Schlomo ben Yitzchaq (Raschi) (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2018).  See, e.g., Hacker and Adam Shear,eds., TheHebrewBook in Early Modern Italy (Philadel- phia: University of PennsylvaniaPress, 2011); Moshe Rosenfeld, HebrewPrinting from its Beginning until 1948: AGazetteer of Printing,the FirstBooks and their Dates with Photographed Title-Pages and Bibliographical Notes [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem:M.Rosenfeld, 1992).  On the significanceofMsLeipzig, hebr.1,cf. Grossman, TheEarly SagesofFrance,187–193.  Abraham Berliner, Der Kommentar des Salomo B. Isak über den Pentateuch: nach Handschriften, seltenen Ausgaben u. dem Talmud (Berlin 1866;Frankfurt am Main: Kauffmann, 21905) drew on a wealthofmanuscripts but compiled an eclectic text.  MenachemCohen, ed., Miqraʼot Gedolot ‘Haketer’:ARevised and Augmented Scientific Edition of Miqraʼot Gedolot (Jerusalem and Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press,1996); online:Miqraʼot Ge- dolot ‘Haketer’ (accessed March2018).  See in particular the discussion between SaraJaphet, “The Natureand Distribution of Medieval Compilatory Commentaries in the LightofRabbi Joseph Kara’sCommentary on the ,” in TheMidrashic Imagination: JewishExegesis, Thought, and History,ed. Michael Fishbane (Albany: State Scepticism, Critique, and the Art of Writing 19

Medieval ²¹ studies alreadydealing in detail with literary theory in medieval lit- erature, gloss hermeneutics, and medieval readingtheories wereinsufficientlyinte- gratedinto studies of Hebrew material. However,anumber of important published studies conclude that neither the romantic of the ‘authorʼ as found in the nineteenth century nor the battle cry of the ‘ of the author’ based on aone- sided, exaggerated reception of Foucault’stheoriesare the onlyalternatives.²² I have demonstrated elsewherethat Rashi’scommentaries are better considered the first ‘JewishGlossa Ordinaria’,and in terms of their ambition,bear comparison with Gilbert of Poitiers’ (ca. 1080–1154) Media Glossatura or the Magna Glossatura compiled by Petrus Lombardus (ca. 1100–1160).²³ Rashi collects the most fitting Mid- rashim to highlightthe peshaṭ of averse or word, while simultaneouslyintroducing new exegetical and grammatical approachesand by intertwining them with classicalmaterial well known from the rabbinic texts.

2.2 Tosafist, Copyist, Writer,orAuthor

The problem of afluctuatingtradition, and the question of whether one single ‘au- thor’ (if so, which one?)may have been the guiding of the NorthernFrench ex- egetic tradition is not confined onlytothe Rashi tradition, but alsoincludes his school, i.e. the Bible commentators and tosafists he himself trained and bore connec- tion to his Beit Midrash.Aside from his acolyte and chronicler R. Shemaʻya (ca. 1060–1130),²⁴ this school include his grandsons R. Ya‘aqov ben Meïr (Rabbenu Tam; ca. 1100–1171)and R. Shemu’el ben Meïr (acronym Rashbam; ca. 1088–after

University of New York Press, 1993): 98–130,and Martin I. Lockshin, “‘Rashbam’ on Job: AReconsid- eration,” JewishStudies Quarterly 8.1(2001): 80–104.  See, e.g., Carruthers, Book of Memory;Michael T. Clanchy, From MemorytoWritten Record: Eng- land 1066–1307 (Oxford: Blackwell, 21993), esp. 224–252; 270–272; Alastair J. Minnis, “Discussions of ‘Authorial Role’ and ‘Literary Form’ in LateMedieval Scriptural Exegesis,” Beiträge zurGeschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur 99 (1977): 37–65;idem, Medieval TheoryofAuthorship:Scholastic Lit- eraryAttitudes in the Later Middle Ages (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1988); Reynolds, Medieval Reading; RichardH.Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, “Ordinatio and Compilatio Revisited,” in Ad litteram: Author- itativeTexts and Their Medieval Readers,ed. Mark D. Jordan (Kent Emery:Notre Dame, 1992):113–134.  , Schriften zurLiteratur (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer,1991).  Cf. Hanna Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds:Peshat Exegesis and Narrativity in Rashbam’sCommen- taryonthe Torah (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 35–44.  ReconstructingR.Shema‘ya’sbiography is beyond our ability,but he is known as the one who first disseminated Rashi’sliterary legacy.Rashi mentions him by name in his commentaries on Gen- esis 35:16and 42:11(source: Miqraʼot Gedolot Haketer). It is unclearifand to what degree they wererelated,byblood or by marriage.According to Grossman, he probablywas some sort of ‘assis- tant’ to Rashi: he edited his commentaries,augmented them with his own glosses (MsLeipzig,hebr.1 alone contains morethan 250ofShema‘ya’sglosses) and probablyalso influenced Rashi to no small degree on halakhic matters; cf. Grossman, Early Sages,esp. 43–45;132–133. 20 HannaLiss

1158),²⁵ and R. Yosef ben Shim‘on (ca. 1050–1125)²⁶ in particular.The latter had prob- atRashi’s Beit Midrash for his( ארק ablyalreadyreceivedhis epithet ‘Qara’ (Hebrew efforts as aBible teacher and reader. Abraham Geiger had alreadyreferredtoR.Yosef Qara as aglossator.²⁷ According to Geiger,R.Yosef commented less on the biblical text itself than on Rashi’scommen- עמ קית tary.Geiger relied on handwritten text-witnesses referringtoR.Yosef Qara as -scribe’).²⁸ Difficulties in the debate arise due to manyofthe He ‘ ) וכ בת copyist’)or ‘ ) brew manuscriptsnot labelling the various tosafists consistently, thus far no criteria have been established enablingaccurate attribution of text authorship and precisely its authorial . Terminological distinctions between scriptor, compilator, com- mentator and auctor,asknown from Latin medieval contexts,²⁹ cannot simplybe transferred to Hebrew settings, and the relevant manuscripts are at least 130 years more recent thanthe tosafists mentioned. Attribution of exegetic commentaries to specific tosafists is also problematic as existing text-witnesses specify the glosses differentlytoone another.There exist glosses labelled with the originator’sname (‘R. Yosef’; ‘R. Shemu’el’), and those without attributionand glosses that are similar to others yetbear differing names. With such the written evidence hasty attributions are ill-advised. The online resource AlhaTorah cites acomment on Genesis 41:7 in Ms Vienna, hebr. 220attributed to R. Yosef Qara’sTorah commentary³⁰ and cross-references it to commentaries by Rash- bam, Ḥizzequni, and Rashi (MsLeipzig, hebr.1), and they are, indeed, very similar to one another and very close to R. Yosef Bekhor Shor’scomment (twelfth century; Orléans). Before an exegetic attribution to one specific exegete is attempted and his ap- proach towards former(rabbinic) commentaries outlined,the gloss-inventory should be assessed and evaluated for each manuscript.The debates over attribu-

 On the discussionabout Rashbam’sbiographical data, cf. most recentlyLiss, Creating Fictional Worlds,57–61.  On R. Yosef ben Shim‘on Qara, cf. IngeborgLederer-Brüchner, Kommentarezum Buch Rut von Josef Kara.Editionen, Übersetzungen, Interpretationen: Kontextualisierung mittelalterlicher Auslegungs- literatur (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2017), 23–60;Qara’sbiographical datesare contested, cf. MayerI.Gruber, ed., Rashi’sCommentaryonPsalms (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 64,arguing for the dates 1060–1130,contraGrossman, Early Sages,258, whoassumes the period 1050/1055– 1120/1130.  Abraham Geiger, Parschandata. Die nordfranzösische Exegetenschule. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Bibel-Exegese und der jüdischen Literatur (: Leopold Schnauss, 1855), 20 [German part], 22 [Hebrew part]. AccordingtoGeiger,R.Yosef Qara added onlyglosses to Rashi’scommentary,be- cause he was not capableofcomposinghis own commentary.  Cf. Abraham Berliner, “Eine wiederaufgefundene Handschrift,” Monatsschrift fürGeschichte und ( עמ קית ) ’Wissenschaft des Judentums 6(1864): 218, whodistinguishes between an ‘unknown copyist and the author (of acommentary); see also the entry on Qara in AlhaTorah;online: Introduction to Qara’scommentary on the Torah(accessedMarch2018).  See Minnis, “Discussions of ‘Authorial Role’;” idem, Medieval TheoryofAuthorship,esp. 94–95.  AlhaTorah;online (accessed March2018). Scepticism, Critique, and the Art of Writing 21

tion thatused to focus on asingle commentator and/or his school can now be ex- tended to incorporate information on the geo-culturalbackground of aspecific manuscript and its scribaltradition. In addition, one can prevent the prematureat- tribution of agloss on one single Bible verse. Not all exegetic glosses relate the com- ment unambiguously, via aprefixed lemma or other paratextual elements (e.g.circles or ornaments), to one, and onlyone, Bible verse. The reason for this maybethat some glosses do referdirectlytothe biblical text,while others relatetothe already existing commentary as theirhypotext.AccordingtoSuzanne Reynolds, it is the teacher,the grammaticus,who ‘reads’ for the others, the pupils. In that,the glosses turn into ‘written traces of amuch fuller readingpractice.’³¹

2.3 RashbamʼsTorah Commentary: AGloss Commentary?

In his introduction to the edition of Rashbam’sTorah commentary, Rosin held the view that Rashbam had probablywritten his commentary as agloss commentary: and the ,[ פב תא פס יר קה שד ] Rashbam wrotehis commentary in the margins of his Bible editions whointroduces himself as ‘the young(man)’ and whowas apupil of ,[ סה פו הר אר וש ן ] first copyist R. Eli‘ezer of Beaugency,³² added the beginnings of the biblicalverses on which Rashbam com- mented [as lemmata]whenhecopied his commentary intoaseparate book, in order to render easier to understand.³³[ תפ ור ינ שר ם״ב ] Rashbam’sgloss explanations

Rosin understood Rashbam’scommentary on the Torahtobeagloss commentary,as it was away but not the onlyway of commentingonthe Bible and other (pagan) clas- sical texts in the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, Rosinʼsevaluation is remarkable, since the (compound) manuscript he usedfor his edition³⁴ was not aglossed Bible, but a Rashi commentary arranged accordingtothe weeklyTorah portions which, in most cases, were appendedbyRashbamʼscomments.Hencethe manuscript did not con- tain Rashbamʼscommentary as aseparate book but as acompilation (drawnfrom a different source), re-arranged accordingtothe Rashi commentary as its hypotext.Un-

 Reynolds, Medieval Reading,29.  Cf. the addenda in RTCtoDeuteronomy1:2;moreinDavid Rosin, Der Pentateuch-Commentar des Samuel ben Meir nach Handschriften und Druckwerken berichtigt und mit kritischen, erklärenden, ver- gleichenden und den Nachweis der Stellen enthaltenden Anmerkungen (Breslau: S. Schottlaender, 1881), 199 incl. n. 20.  Rosin, Pentateuch-Commentar,XXXVI [Hebrew; my translation]; similarly, also David Rosin, “R. -als Schrifterklärer,” Jahresbericht des Jüdisch-Theologischen Seminars Fraenck( שר ם״ב ) Samuel b. Meïr el’scher Stiftung (1880): 91.  Described in detail in Rosin, Pentateuch-Commentar,XXXII–XLIII; on this manuscript,see also Rainer Wenzel, Moses Mendelssohn, Einleitungen, Anmerkungen und Register zu den Pentateuchkom- mentaren in deutscher Übersetzung [Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften,JUB vol. 9,4: Schriften zumJudentum,vol. III,4, ed. Daniel Krochmalnik](Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2016), 41. 22 HannaLiss

fortunately, the manuscript of RashbamʼsTorah commentary is the onlymanuscript in existence. It found its wayinto the BreslauSeminary by wayofthe Mendelssohn and Fraenckel families and vanished as aresultofthe Nazi persecutions. The Rosin edition was re-edited and annotatedin2009 by Martin Lockshin.³⁵ In 1985, SaraJaphet and Robert Salters discussed the literaryform of Rashbamʼs commentary,and concluded with aqualitative distinction between ‘glossary’ and ‘well-structured, premeditated composition’³⁶ In their introduction to the Qohelet commentary,Japhet/Salterstook up aposition contrary to Rosin’sassumption, argu- ing that Rashbam’scommentary was ‘by no means aglossary,’ but a ‘well-structured, premeditated composition, the writing of which is guided by aliterary into the book of Qoheleth.’³⁷ In distinguishingbetween agloss and ‘acontinuous and flu- ent presentation, comprisingcompletesentences and written in abrief and concise idiom,’³⁸ Japhet/Salters (at least implicitly)characterised the ‘act of glossing’ as in- ferior to the ‘act of writing/composing.’ Japhet/Salters also attempted the same claim for Rashbam’sTorah commentary but had to acknowledge the dearth of available manuscripts—adearth far worse todaythan that of Rosin’speriod, as the very manuscript he used to preparehis edi- tion no longer exists. Similarly, Elazar Touitou rejects Rosin’sopinion with the argu- ment that it is hardlyconceivable that the spacebetween the lines or in the margins would allow for acommentary of such proportions.³⁹ He added that one would also expectacommentary noted in the margins to have been intended for privateperusal and not publication. The debate appears to have gone down ablind alley.Asaresult, this study pro- poses accessing the glosses differentlyand focussing on external parameters. To de- termine the function of agloss text it seems reasonable to not onlycomparethe glosses in amanuscript to othertexts in terms of their semantic content,but also to make the most thorough going investigations possibleoftheir placement on the page, their shape and form and as aresult, make theircommunicative function be- come apparent.Accessing the exegetic glosses via the manuscriptʼslayout, mise-en- page, mise-en-texte,and the direction of the writing can also focus attentiontode- tails, hitherto unnoticed, concerning the relationship between the gloss and the hy- potext.

יפ ור הש ות הר רל יב ונ מש או בל מן ריא . םע יש ונ יי ונ חס תוא , יצ נו מי וק תור , עה תור ,. Martin I. Lockshin, ed .[2vols. [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Chorev,2009) [henceforth quoted as:Lockshin, Perushha-Tora, מו תפ תוח  See SaraJaphet and Robert B. Salters,eds., TheCommentaryofR.Samuel ben MeirRashbam on Qohelet. Editedand translated(Jerusalem: Magnes Press; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1985), esp. 42.Cf. also Eran Viezel, “‘The Anxiety of Influence’:Raschbam’sApproach to Rashi’sCommentary on the Torah,” AJSReview 40.2 (2016): 290 incl. n. 47,who,inavery similar way, takes Rashbam as an ‘au- thor’ and, thus,regretsthe idea of gloss commentary.  Japhet/Salters, CommentaryonQohelet,42.  Ibidem,38.  Cf. Elazar Touitou, Exegesis in Perpetual : Studies in the Pentateuchal CommentaryofRabbi Samuel BenMeir [in Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 22005), 81. Scepticism, Critique, and the ArtofWriting 23

2.4 The Glosses in Ms Vienna, ÖNB, Cod. Hebr.220

Ms Vienna,Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. hebr. 220(Schwarz no. 23;⁴⁰ vel- lum; undated; thirteenth/fourteenth century) comprises 276folios and contains are- cension of Rashi’scommentary on the Torah, the Prophets (Nevi’im)and almost all Hagiographa (). Schwarz distinguishes twoscribeswho identify themselves .fol( בא םהר , בא םר ) fol. 16v (he penned1v–22v) and Avraham( םחנמ ) as Menaḥem 25rv,26v.⁴¹ The Rashi commentary is arranged in threecolumns⁴² of continuous text,almostwithout anyfurther formation and formal arrangement.⁴³ At first glance, there appears to be no distinction between biblical lemmaand commentary. The manuscript is heavilyglossed by several hands, especiallyonthe first 25 fo- lios (i.e. in the /;the Book of Exodus/ begins on fol. 26r).Atleast two groups of glosses, written in two hands, can be recognised: the first group GL1,which, accordingtoSchwarz, originates, from the first scribe (upon which we will focus subsequently) and asecond,GL2,which continues beyond fol. 22vand glosses intenselybeginning on fol. 25.GL2in particular,originatesfrom adistinctly later period; written in Italian cursive script indicates the late fifteenth and sixteenth century.The hypotext commented on is thus not the biblical text itself, but the recen- sion of Rashi’scommentary.Asaresult, from the outset,the glosses can have several functions: They mayre-explain the biblical text,largely independentlyofRashi, or perhaps expand upon, modify,ordisproveRashi’scommentary. GL1 was written with adifferent pen, but the same ink as the main text,allowing one to assume that the manuscriptʼsscribe (Menaḥem) is also responsible for the glosses.The script indicates the time of the manuscript’scopying,and in amarginal gloss on fol. 152v,the scribe ponders the fact that,inhis Vorlage the tribe of Gad was The glosses. או ינ כה תו תב המ ית לש מא אצ ית בש גט מד וצ ריי :missing in the listing of tribes from GL1 can be attributed to different (groups of)authors:⁴⁴

 See Arthur ZachariasSchwarz, Die hebräischen Handschriften der Nationalbibliothek in Wien (Wien, Prague and Leipzig:Strache, 1925); online: Manuscripta Mediaevalia, 28–29 (accessed March2018).  Cf. Schwarz, Die hebräischen Handschriften,28. The Catalogueofthe Institute of Microfilmed as( בא הר אם ןב נמ םח ) HebrewManuscripts (accessed March2018) names one Avraham ben Menaḥem scribe, but leavesopen whether other scribes contributed. However,different hands (in particular, Avraham over-elongates the Hebrewletters Quf and Nun)aswellasachange in ink areeasilyob- served (cf. the transit fromfol. 22vto23r). In addition,beginningwith fol. 30rv,fantastical ani- mal-creatures, depicted in the same ink used for the main text,start showing up. Finally, the peculiar distribution of the glosses (cf. the followingtable) points to achange of scribe.  With the exception of the transitional pages, fol. 20v, 21r, which are arranged in one or two col- umns,resp.  Onlythe beginning of the weekly Torahportions is highlighted.  Unfortunately, some pages arecut off at the bottom, makingitimpossible to discern ascriptions. 24 HannaLiss

R. Yosef ⁴⁵ ׳ר וי ףס .a -tosefet⁴⁶ (pl. ); ‘(supplementary or ex ת or ות mostlyabbreviatedas, ות תפס .b planatory) addendum;’⁴⁷ anonymous glosses,bythe so-called tosafists,tothe comments by Rashi that are, depending on the manuscript,occasionallyinte- grateddirectlyinto Rashi’scommentary R. Shemu’el bar Yiṣḥaq⁴⁸ ׳ר מש או בל יר קחצ .c R. Shemu’el⁴⁹ ׳ר מש לאו / ׳ר מש .d R. Shimshon⁵⁰ ׳ר מש וש ן .e R.[?] bar Yiṣḥaq from Lucena (?) or Luziza (?).⁵¹ ׳ר ? ןו רב י׳ חצ מק ול יצ אני .f

Furthermore, an entire array of gloss information in group GL1 does not provide an ascription (wewill see, however,thatatleast some implyanascription!). Moreover, one further group was prevented from giving us an ascription because the last and crucial line at the bottom or lateralmargin has been cutoff.⁵² The Torahsegment, beginning on fol. 23r, shows onlyfaint traces of the later glossator’sink (GL2).

׳ת ׳ר וי ףס  Torah: Fol. 1v;2r; 2v;3v; 4r; 6v;7r; 8v;9r; 12r;13r; 13v;14v;15r;16r; 17v; 18r;19r; 19v;20v as ‘ tosefet R. Yosef’;21r; haftarot and commentaries to the prophets:95r;101v;103r;103v;107v.  Explicitlyonfol. 2r.  Torah: Fol. 1v;2r; 3r; 4v;5r; 6r; 6v;7r; 8r; 8v;10v;11r; 11v;12r;12v;13r; 13v;14r; 14v; 15r;16r; 17v; 19v; 21r; 21v; 22r; haftarot and commentariestothe prophets:149r;149v.Tosafot are(anonymous) meta- commentaries by the tosafists (Ba‘ale ha-Tosafot), whether on Rashi’scommentariesonthe Bible or on the talmudic tractates.  Fol. 19r; cf. Efraim Elimelek Urbach, The Tosaphists:Their History, Writings and Methods [in He- brew] (Jerusalem:Bialik Institute, 41986), 630incl. n. 43,643 incl. n. 18. Urbach’sdiscussion shows a similar tangle of ascriptionsinthe Talmud commentaries); Simcha Emanuel, Fragments of the Tab- lets: Lost Booksofthe Tosaphists [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2006), 358, onlynames R. Shemu’el bar Yiṣḥaq ha-Levi of Worms,who is probablynot identical with the R. Shemu’el discussed here.  Torah: Fol. 8v;9v; 11r; 15v;16v.—On the question of whetherR.Shemu’el is indeed identical with Rashbam, Rashi’sgrandson, cf. in particular the discussion in section 3.4.3.  Fol. 18r;the identity of R. Shimshon,isimpossible to determine from this gloss alone. Anyat- tempt to resolve this issue, is dependent on the tosafists’ glosses beingcomprehensively documented and comparingthe results with their parallels in the Bible and Talmud commentaries  This last attribution is rather interesting, fol. 2v;Schwarz, Die hebräischen Handschriften,28, tran- -but without solvingthe problems of identity and location (Lucena?; Cór, וי ןד רב י׳ חצ מק ול יצ אני scribes doba province). Heinrich Gross, Gallia Judaica: Dictionnairegéographique de la France d‘après les sources rabbiniques (Paris:Publications de la Sociétédes Etudes Juives, 1897), 291, identifies the top- Lisieux/Lizieux, atown in Basse-Normandie, which would be fitting, sinceall of the ול יצ אצ onym as names identified so far,point to tosafists from Northern France.Regarding acommentary on Job, Leo- pold Zunz, Zur Geschichte und Literatur,vol. 1(Berlin: Veit und Comp., 1845), 79,mentionsShemu’el, in addition to Rashi and Qara (again without solving ול יצ אצ the grammarian, and acertain R. Meir of the problem of the toponym).  Torah: Fol. 1v;2r; 2v;3r; 4r; 4v;5r; 6v;7r; 8r; 9r;9v; 10v;11r;11v;12r;13v;14v;16r;16v;17r;18r;18v; 19r; 19v;20r; 20v; 21v; haftarot and commentaries to the prophets:95r;102v; 103r; 107v;108v;149r; 149v; 150v;151r. Scepticism, Critique, and the Art of Writing 25

Elazar Touitou and myself have alreadyedited some of the glosses attributed to one ‘R. Shemu’el’ (this is all we have with which to identify him) and analysed their relationship to Rashbam’scommentary on the Torah.⁵³ While Touitou acknowledges an attribution to Rashbam as secure, Ifeel this leavessome serious questions unan- swered raising fresh problems.They pertain, in particular,tothe relationship be- tween these glosses and the RTC.⁵⁴ It is important to state thatthe glosses have onlybeen evaluated thus far in terms of theirexegetic statements and not in light of their placement in the manuscript or outward appearance. Such an extension of the questions concerning the glosses,(bearing in mind that the commentaries could well have been used in ascholastic context), mayprovide importantresults, which, in turn, could assist in solving problems of the glosses’ authorship or, more generally, how peshaṭ comments wereactuallyimplemented in the Middle Ages. Indeed, it is notable that each gloss possesses aspecific mise-en-forme,evenifit is not quite consistentlyapplied. This finding has so farnot been taken into account. It is possiblethat it is nothing more than an arbitrary wayofembellishing the manu- script: The scribe did not wishing to write the glosses in the margins in a ‘boring’ manner.But the shape of the glosses maybeaclue to the utilisation of the manu- script.The glosses are certainlyeye-catching, since onlythe smallest part appears as rectangles or simplyunarranged. Sometexts go around corners and are arranged at right angles;⁵⁵ ‘balls’ or ‘heads’,i.e.circleswith or without directlyattached texts;⁵⁶ sharplypointed triangles (mostly, but not always when the gloss is closed tosefet/tosafot);⁵⁷ and combinations of circlesand triangles.⁵⁸ The glosses ׳ת with specificallyattributedtoR.Shemu’el are mostlyinthe shape of a ‘head’ (with or evolve via ׳ר מש לאו without ‘shoulders’). Perhaps the glossator let the abbreviation head’).⁵⁹ However,some glosses explicitlyattributed to R. Shemu’el ‘ ) שאר into ש״ר do not displayaheadʼsform, whereas some of the heads explicitlybearother signa- tures (e.g.R.Yosef).⁶⁰ Apagecut prevents some glosses to connect to aname, others remain anonymous.

 Cf. Touitou, Exegesis in Perpetual Motion,189–195 (however,Touitou missed some connections be- tween the glosses, havingascribed no significancetothe glosses’ shape); Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds,45–55;eadem, “Glossenformationen,” 24–26.  See abovesection 2.3.  Fol. 2rv;4rand on other folios.  Fol. 6v;7rand on other folios.  Fol. 1v;4rv and on other folios.  Fol. 4v;5r.  Thanks to Dr.Kay JoePetzold (Project Corpus Masoreticum; accessed March2018) for sharingthis idea with me. the; ׳ר וי ףס ״  See for instancefol. 6v that displays two heads,ofwhich the left one is signed with ; ׳ר וי ףס ״ the heads on the bottom of fol. 8v,9vare, again, signed with, ״ת head on fol. 7r is signed with see abovenote 44. 26 HannaLiss

The subject of book ‘forms’ (including mise-en-texte and mise-en-page)has come in for renewed academic scrutinyrecently. Implementing text-anthropological means here requires more than simply identifying the commentaries’ SitzimLeben but to consider the history of their materiality.Byusing materiality in its broadest sense, we have alsotoregard the people who dealt with the artefacts/manuscripts as the original ‘locus of the text’.⁶¹ Thegoal is not so much to write ahistory of the manu- script as to write the story of the people involved in it,byextrapolatingthe narrative contained in the materiality of the document.Sofar,this aspect has barelybeen con- sidered in Judaic Medieval studies, in spite of its potential to bear fruitful results. The following sample descriptions of several glosses in Ms Vienna,hebr.220,are to be understood as the first step towardsabetter understanding of the exegetical glosses of the Northern French exegeticschool and their disputes with elder exegetical tra- ditions. In order to relatean‘author’ to these glosses, Iwillfocus on some of the glosses explicitlyattributed to R. Shemu’el, and present adescription of the gloss, edition/translation, and ashortcomment.

3Edition, Translation, and Explanation of the Glosses

3.1 Fol. 8v

3.1.1 Description The first gloss explicitlyattributed to R. Shemu’el is found on fol. 8v,wherethe main text containingRashi’scommentary on Genesis 20:16begins. Thisgloss,written in the top margin abovethe middle column, is attributed in its first section to R. She- Furthermore, the gloss contains aFrench translation of the biblical .( ׳ר מש ו ) mu’el who [would have] said)from Genesis 21:7.Asthis translation is located ) ימ ללמ lemma after the name ascription, it is not entirelyclear whether it was part of the original comment.The glosswas centred abovethe second column, apparentlyconsciously arranged into acircular form, a ‘head’ of sorts; this is clear from the abbreviation row 8). Judging) יר ׳ row 7) and the inclusion of aspace filler) מש ׳ו of the name from the biblical lemma, it belongstothe Rashi text which begins in the middle col- :(lemma Genesis21:7). The Bible text says (Genesis21:7) ימ ללמ umn in row11with And shesaid: ‘Whosaid unto Abraham, that Sarah should give children suck?For I ימ למ לל בא ׳ have bornehim ason in his old age.’ The Rashi commentary reads:⁶²

 In this respect,this effort is committed to answeringthe basic questions put forwardbyHeidel- berg’s CollaborativeResearch Centre933 Material Text Cultures. One objective is to try and applythe notion of ‘textanthropology’ to various artefacts (including those from manuscript cultures);see in particular Markus Hilgert, “‘Text-Anthropologie’:Die Erforschung vonMaterialität und Präsenz des Geschriebenen als hermeneutische Strategie,” in Altorientalistik im 21.Jahrhundert: Selbstverständnis, Herausforderungen, Ziele,ed. Markus Hilgert (Berlin: Deutsche Orientgesellschaft, 2010): 85–124.  Ms Vienna, hebr.220,fol. 8v,middle column, row 11. Scepticism, Critique, and the Art of Writing 27

Whosaid ‘ אל רב םה של ןו בש וח שח בי ו רת וא ימ וה וא המ וה גא וד ול וש רמ בא חט מה טב חי עו שו ה unto Abraham—Thisisanexpression of praise and importance (in the sense of): “See, Who it is, and how great He is. He keeps (his) promise, he promises and per- forms!”’ However,the two comments—the glossand Rashi—are not connected with paratextual elements. This could be seen as aclue thatthis comment was intended not so much as asuper-commentary on Rashi, but as an alternative comment on the biblical text.Another clue pointing to this is the gloss being placed on top of the as aconcluding,almost categorically ימ ללמ French translation of the biblical lemma final, comment.

3.1.2 Edition and Translation

Whosaid to Abraham: This refers to [the previous verse] Everyone who hears will laugh with me (Genesis 21:6): Whobroughtmyfather the news and said, Aboy is born to you, and gavehim such joy ( 20:15), YetIhaveborne ason in his oldage (Genesis 21:7). [Anexplanationby] R. qui riseit/risoit,’⁶³ ‘ יק יר שי טיי [means in Old French] ימ ללמ [Shemu’el. [The Hebrewexpression ‘[Everybody] laughed [about it].’ Everybody who heard (Genesis 21:6) [such athing] laughed [about it].

/qy ryysyyṭ [riseit/risoit] is averbal form of the Old French ris (→ riser) ‘ יק יר ישי טי  The form laugh’;see the references in MousketR (online: Dictionnaire Étymologiquedel’Ancien Français), 29377: et cil risent(date: 1243), or ChevCygnePrNaissT (online: DictionnaireÉtymologique de l’An- cien Français), 100,4: s‘en risent moult boinement (date: end of thirteenth century).—Ithank Dr.Marc Kiwitt (former member of the team) and Dr.Stephen Dörr from the project Dictionnaire Étymologique יק ומ יש טי de l’Ancien Français for explainingand contextualisingthe Old Frenchgloss.The reading qui musait [Old French] = ‘qui imaginait’ as proposedbyTouitou, Exegesis in Perpetual Motion, 189–195,isunlikely. 28 HannaLiss

3.1.3 Explanation The gloss (G_8v/1)takes up the same lemma from Genesis 21:7 as in the Rashi com- mentary.Itbegins, using intertextual exegesis, by explaining the Hebrew expression -as directlyconnected with the preceding text (Genesis 21:6b), accord ימ למ לל בא הר ם ing to which Sarah interprets the laughter in the sense of ‘being laughed at.’ This un- derstandingisalso paraphrased in the last of the gloss:Anyone who heard about the two old people’sbliss would make of such news. By doing so, the gloss stands in direct oppositiontoRashi’scommentary in the main text body. Rashi jus- with the importance of the divine promise ללמ tifies the usageofthe uncommon verb and Sarah’sappropriatereaction to this great deed of God.RTC argues similarly.⁶⁴ -to be di ימ ללמ Therefore, bothRashi and RTCunderstand the subject of the lemma vine,⁶⁵ while our R. Shemu’el to whom the gloss is attributed assumesahuman sub- ject who is unable to comprehend such amiracle and thereforejokes about it: Divine greatness (in the indicative mode) is in contrastwith the expression of human doubt (in the subjunctive mode). In its first part (lines 1–7) the gloss insistsonadecidedly different understandingasinthe Rashi commentary (and in the printed RTC) without explicitlyrefutingRashiʼsexplanation. In order to leave no doubt about the intended exegetic messageofthe Hebrew expression, the gloss concludes with an Old French translation (pitron⁶⁶)that segues into another Hebrew summary.The fact that the Old French translation appears after the name ascription to R. Shemu’el leads one to conclude thatonlythe actual peshaṭ exegesis belongstoShemu’el’scommentary,and thatthe French gloss was added by in this context ללמ the scribe. Interestingly,thereisanother Old French renderingfor in this ללמ ,( דע ןא מת לל)in the so-called Glossaire de Leipzig:⁶⁷ DrawingonJob 8:2 -parla;inModern French: ‘affirma/déclara’).⁶⁸ Irre ) ַפ ְר אַל Glossaire it is translated as spective of our scribe knowing this translation or not,and from wherever he ob- tained this translation, it certainlyintends to support the peshaṭ at hand. The explan- atory gloss (pitron)isthe resultofFrench culturalcontacts,⁶⁹ indicating this

תו מא מר מי לל אל רב םה לכ מו יר עד וו בי ני כו הל וש עמ םי ימ וה הא לא יה שם למ לל בא הר לם יה תו ול ןב שמ הר [ … ] יכ  -She said: Who said to Abraham?, that means:Let all those whohear know and under ‘ יא גן וד כל לא םיה stand whoisthe God whosaid to Abraham that he would have ason from Sarah […]. Indeed, thereis none as great as God!’ (ed. Lockshin, Perushha-Tora,vol. 1, 33 [Hebrew quotationunvocalised].  This understandingwas takenupbyBenno Jacob, Das erste Buch der Tora:Genesis (Berlin: Schocken, 1934), 479.  Pitron (‘explanation’)isanexegetical gloss that often, though not always,arises out of atrans- lation intothe vernacular.  Menahem Banitt,ed., Le glossairedeLeipzig,Corpus glossariorum biblicorum Hebraico-Gallicorum medii aevi,vol. 1(Jerusalem: Acad. National des et des Lettres d’Israël, 1995), 45,#599. in Menahem Banitt,ed., Le glossairede רפ שרל()  Cf. the different reading in the gloss on Job8:2 Leipzig,Corpus glossariorum biblicorumHebraico-Gallicorum medii aevi,vol. 3(Jerusalem: Acad. Na- tional des Sciences et des Lettres d’Israël, 1995), 1305,#17095.  Cf. KirstenA.Fudeman, Vernacular Voices:Language and Identity in Medieval French JewishCom- munities (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,2010); MarcKiwitt, “The Problem of Judeo- Scepticism, Critique, and the ArtofWriting 29

manuscript wasstillused in aFrench-speaking and French-reading environment and auditorium. The French gloss does not simply support the peshaṭ exegesis, at the same time it demonstrates that here, the peshaṭ is guided by the protagonists’ logic insinuated in the narrative.Asthe gloss contrasts so vividlywith Rashi’sand RTC’sexplanations,one mayconsider either the glossator (as an independently thinking ‘head’)placed the explanation in its specific shape as asign indicating he favours R. Shemu’el’sexplanation (not merelyfor ease of access), or thathewish- ed, for the first time,toplace R. Shemu’el ‘ahead’ of his fellow scholars. To sum up: by presentingacomment on the samelemmaasinthe Rashi com- mentary yetnot in the margins of aBible codex, but in the margins of aRashi com- mentary as its hypotext,the gloss not onlyadds asecond, alternative reading, but by means of the French pitron exposes Rashiʼsunderstanding of the verse as erroneous, and, thereby, undermines his exegetical authority.

3.2 Fol. 9v

3.2.1 Description ;The first one (G_9v/1. ׳ר מש לאו On fol. 9v,three glosses are marked with the signature 4lines)iswritten upside down in the topmargin. This one, too, displays avery spe- cific form; its first two lines run preciselyabovethe middle and left columns, but its third and fourth onlyabove the left and,inaccordancewith the readingdirection, last columnonthis folio. The gloss is signed with the full name of R. Shemu’el. The biblical lemmaquoted at the outset contains the beginningsofthe of Genesis23:17–18. It is, therefore, related to the Rashi commentary thatstarts in the left column in row 30.Asinour latest example, there are no additional paratex- tual thatconnect the gloss to Rashi’scommentary.The commentary closes with asummarisingremark that encapsulates the whole explanation in one shortsen- tence. -directlyunder; וה יא חלש and G_9v/5 (starting with( יש נם א G_9v/4 (starting with neath G_9v/4)are located in the bottom margin, below the left column, and display several peculiarities. Firstly, they are clearlylinked together.Atthe end of each line, G_9v/4 is shaped into aleft-and up-turning peak; they are joined by aline from G_9v/5,moving upwards and curving in the direction of the circle/head. Judging by the form, one would expect this to be asingle gloss.However,the two lemmata are obviouslydistinct,having been takenfrom different verses and are introductions Atany. ׳ר מש לאו to twodifferent commentaries,each of which is expresslyascribed to

French: Between Languageand Cultural Dynamics,” International Journal of the Sociology of Lan- guage 226(2014): 25–56;idem, “Lesglossaires hébreu-français du XIIIe siècle et la culturejuive en Francedunord,” in Cultures et Lexicographie. Actes des Troisièmes Journées allemandes des diction- naires en l’honneur d’Alain Rey, eds.Michaela Heinz and Alain Rey (Berlin: Frank &Timme, 2010): 113–125; see Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds,229–249, 257–268. 30 HannaLiss

rate, row 6ofG_9v/4features aparatextual , acircle,pointingtoRashi’scom- mentary (left column, row 39), thereby identifying the gloss more as an engagement with Rashi’scommentary thanwith the biblical lemma itself. G_9v/5 comments on the biblical lemmafrom Genesis 24:7,one thatneither Rashi nor RTCdiscuss.⁷⁰ RTC,however,does comment on the very similarlystructured pas- sageinGenesis 24:40.

3.2.2 Edition and Translation

So Ephronʼsfield arose […]etc. to Abraham as his possession (Genesis 23:17): The silverwas paid in the presenceofthe Hittites, so that they witnessed the proceedings, and onlyafter he [Abra- ham] had buried her [Sarah], the text says: Thus the field […] passed fromthe Hittites to Abraham, as aburial site (Genesis 23:20). [Even] after the land passed from Ephron (to Abraham) as his possession in the presenceofthe Hittites, it did not yethavethe character of aburial site. [This was onlythe case] after he had buried Sarah, with the permission of the sons of the city.Onlythen [the pieceofland] […] passed from the Hittites to Abraham, as aburial site (Gen- esis 23:20). No one re-designates[apieceof] land as aburial sitewithout permission by the neighbouring[landowners]. [Anexplanation by] R. Shemu’el.

 On fol. 9v and 10r,Rashi’scommentary discusses placingthe hand under the thigh as the expres- sion of acovenant. Scepticism,Critique, and the Art of Writing 31

G_9v/4: Place your hand under my thigh (Genesis 24:2;47:29): Thereare [different] ways to seal a covenant in the Torah: Thecalf they cut in two (Jeremiah 34:18), [or rather] passingbetween its halves—that is a[wayof] sealingofacovenant. Thepalm of Zebah and Zalmunna in your hand (Judges8:6.15). If you havestood surety for your fellow,given your hand for another ( 6:1) —this is also a[wayof] sealingofacovenant.Wesee this placingofthe hand under the thigh [both] with the son—Josef—[and] with the servant—Eli‘ezer—when he makes an oath to the fa- ther or master,and the honouring by son and servant arecomparable, as it is written: Ason should honour his father,and aslave his master (Malachi1:6). And they had this custom in these days.[An explanationby] R. Shemu’el.

G_9v/5: He will send His beforeyou (Genesis 24:7): This is prophetic speech [byAbraham]: ‘Iknow that he [i.e. the servant] will succeed [in his mission].’ Likewise, [this refers to]the whole section: Just as he tookmeout of my father’shouse, he promised me that he would makeme successful. Therefore,Iam surethat youwill succeed in [fulfillingyour mission]. And she said: drink (Genesis 24:14) […]and Iknow that she [i.e., Rebecca] will say: ‘Drink!’ and will not rebuff me, which proves that [God] granted[him] some of the indications and omens [he had askedfor]. [Wecannot say anything to you], either bad or good (Genesis 24:50). They were not [?] and they could not delay[the matter], since the matter proceeded from YHWH (Genesis 24:50). We will call the girl (Genesis 24:57). Yousaid that your master was quitesurethat you would accomplish [your mission]. ‘If she will go with that man, we will know that it is from YHWH (Genesis 24:50) and that all your words were right.’ [Anexplanation by] R. Shemu’el. 32 HannaLiss

3.2.3 Explanation G_9v/1 discusses abiblical turn of phrase that, at first glance, seems redundant: ac- cording to Genesis 23:17, apiece of land passed to Abraham ‘as his possession’ (in the presenceofthe Hittites), while Genesis 23:20states that it passed to him ‘as aburial site.’ The gloss explains that initially, the piece of land is bought by Abraham and passes into his possession (witnessed by the Hittites), but that it took another act ‘from the Hittites,’ i.e. their permission, to convert it into aburial ground. This is also emphasised by the last sentence: onlywith the permission of surrounding real-estate owners can apiece of land be re-zoned as acemetery.Asaresult, R. She- mu’el’sexplanation agrees neither with Rashi’s⁷¹ nor with RTC’scomment.⁷² Rashi’s commentary is not at issue in this gloss at all, as its primary concern, on the basis of -from Genesis 23:17tosignify the ‘el םוק Bereshit Rabbah 58:8,isthe use of the root evation’⁷³ of apiece of land’sstatus when it passes into aking’shandsbyway of sale Rashi focusses on the changeover of the owner,and in .( דה טוי ) by aprivatecitizen addition exposes Genesis23:17 to be an incompletesentencethat has to be supple- mented by Genesis 23:18. RTCclaims, following the Babylonian Talmud, Qiddushin 27a, that Abraham’stransaction was onlybroughttoafinal and irrevocable end after he put the piece of land to use by burying his wife. But this aspect is not at issue in the handwrittengloss,asindicated by the last sentence, which does not con- cern itself with the act of purchase but with the social context in which it occurred. G_9v/1 presents a peshaṭ explanation that harmonises the social conventions of the biblical narrative with contemporary regulations, i.e. an exegesis compliant with the sensus historicus,orrather,what the exegete believed it to be.The question still re- mains as to whythe gloss was written upside down. Possibly, the writer wanted to make it obvious, even at first glance, thatinthis instance,apeshaṭ commentary is forwarded thatruns contrary to the usual aggadic and halakhic explanation as givenbyRashi and RTC. The argument is exposed rather indirectlyand with the help of graphic means(mise-en-forme; mise-en-page). We maythereforecharacterise the glossatorʼs ‘challengeoftradition’ afight with closed visor.

יו םק דש עה רפ ןו . קת מו הה תי לה שו צי מא די דה וי לט די למ וך שפ טו שו מל רק וא קי הם דש וה מה רע וה לכ עה לץ בא םהר  Ms Vienna, hebr.220,fol. 9v,left column, row 30): ‘So Ephron’sfield arose:Itwas araising) מל נק וה וג ׳ו [as regards the importance of its owner], sinceitpassed from the possession of an ordinary person into the possession of aking(cf. BerR 58:8). However,the plain meaningofthe verse is: Thefield and the cave and all the trees weremade sure (Genesis 23:17) to Abraham as apossession (Genesis 23:18) etc.’ אל רב םה מל נק קה לם חא נר ית תנ ףסכה , כדכ בית : נו ןת כה ףס קו לם ו , בא לל חא תז בק מר תא נב חי לת קא ום חה קז  ed. Lockshin, Perushha-Tora,vol. 1, 42) אל רב םה דע קש רב רש אה תש או וז םקי [ גו ׳ו ] אל זח קת רב אמ בת ינ תח [Hebrew quotation unvocalised]): ‘To Abraham as his purchase:whenthe money was given—as it is written ‘he shall givethe money and it will become his.’ However,itpassed [to Abraham] as aburial site from the children of Heth (Genesis 23:18), and was secured to Abraham [as his purchase] onlyafter he had buried Sarah, his wife. Onlythen it passed as aburial site fromthe children of Heth (Genesis 23:20).’ ’.rise ‘ םוק is the 3rd pers.sg. of the consecutive imperfectof יו םק  Scepticism, Critique, and the Art of Writing 33

Contrary to Rashiʼsexplanation,⁷⁴ whereheargues that aperson enteringinto a covenant has to takeaholyobject into his hand,e.g., aTorah scroll or , G_9v/ 4insists that ‘placing under the thigh’ has nothing to do with the bodypart,but, rather,with the mannerand degree of submission (son to father; servant to master). In addition,the gloss explains that biblical tradition knows of different ways to seal acovenant,and thatevenahandshake between parties was recognised. This line of argument fullyagrees with the sensus historicus. G_9v/5 expounds alemmathat is ignored by Rashi’scommentary.The relation to RTCisofparticularinterest in this instance, as G_9v/5 seems to elaborate on acom- mentary that RTCoffers as an explanation to Genesis 24:40–50,⁷⁵ accordingtowhich Abraham alreadyknew that they would succeed in their endeavour.G_9v/5 uses this literarycontext to ascribeprophetic qualities to Abraham,then extends this reason- ing to the whole paragraph, Genesis24:7–57 (with the resultthatall its protagonists are considered to have prophetic ability!). Notably, this means G_9v/5 tells us that even the servant wasendowed by God with prophetic powers,asheestablished a that he alreadyknew Rebecca would enact.Furthermore, contrary to RTC’sex- planation, stating the familyagreed to the terms rather hesitantly, here they are por- trayed taking amuch more positive stance for Abraham’s(prophetic) confidence helps to guarantee the servant’ssuccess. The ‘art of narration’ displayedinG_9v/5 is similar to RTCinasmuch as direct speech is interwoven with the commentary, turning it into more of aretelling thananexegesis, which is characteristic of the peshaṭ exegesis of the second generation afterRashi.⁷⁶ Thisgloss simply ignores its hypotext (Rashi) and refers directlytothe biblical narrative.

חת ית כר י . הש שנ עב : Ms Vienna, hebr.220,fol. 9v,left column, row 37—fol. 10r,right column, row 2 רצ ךי יל וט בל די חו ץפ לש צמ הו כ״ וג סן רפ ות הר וא ׳ת פת לי ןי , הו ימ הל יה הת צמ הו אר וש הנ ול אב לה עו יל יד עצ ור יה הת Under my thigh: Whoever takes an oath must take some sacredobject in his hand, such as ‘ בח בי עה יל וי aTorah scrollorTefillin (cf. bShev 38b). As circumcision was the first commandgiven to Abraham, and it was very special to him because he suffered great pains whilecomplying, he chose this (bodily) ‘object’ (cf. BerR 59:8).’ see also Rashi on Genesis 47:29. שי חל למ כא ו . וי עד נא י :([ Ed. Lockshin, Perushha-Tora,vol. 1, 47–49 [Hebrew quotationunvocalised יש נת ךלו . או רמ ׳ה לא יה דא ינ בא הר ום וג ׳ . לכ רא כי תו בד םיר , הל דו עי שם אמ הת דק שו רב ךו וה יא אצ דה רב [. … ] אל ונ לכ בד אר יל רך אע טו בו . אל סה ית הר לו הא נב ןי לת יו רב וצ וננ , יכ עב כל חר ונ , ור יצ ום אל ור םיצ , יכ קה וד בש ור הך או השע , He will send his ‘ הש כי לו בת ודי [ … ] קנ אר נל רע [ גו ׳ו .] םא רת הצ הל עת בכ מי םי וא שע רו דכ רב וני , וא ימ לד לי כך בד ךיר angel. Iknow that they will allow you[to take her]. AndIsaid: ‘Oh, YHWH,the God of my master Abraham,’ etc. The reason for the extended speech is to let them know [for sure] that the matter pro- ceeded from YHWH (Genesis 24:50). […] We cannot say anything to you, either bad or good.Neither destroyingnor establishing[the matter at hand] depends on us, since [it will happen] willy-nilly, whether we likeitornot,for YHWH, whoisall-powerful has arranged for it.[…]We will call the girl [in order to see] whether she would liketowait afull yearorten months (Genesis 24:55) as we suggested, or to go immediately, as yousuggested.’ On this paragraph, see in detail also Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds,61–63.  See Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds,esp. 120–135. 34 HannaLiss

3.3 Fol. 11r

3.3.1 Description Fol. 11r is atextbook example of how,and with what purpose in mind, the writer in- tegrated exegetic commentaries as glosses into his work. It alsoillustrates whyitis importanttopay proper attention to the glosses’ mise-en-forme. On fol. 11r,there are three glosses sitting side-by-side (G_11r/1–3, from right to left), twoofwhich are (discernibly) un-signed. Onlythe left one bearsthe signature ׳ת hereinafter:G_11r/3). The gloss in the centreissigned with the letter) ׳ר מש לאו of tosafot—the signatureappears in the middle of the gloss. Allthreeglosses werede- liberatelyshaped, with the use of abbreviations and/or space fillers, into R. She- mu’el’scharacteristic layout of ahead or circle form, and each was placed under one column of Rashi’scommentary.The first anonymous gloss (hereinafter G_11r/1) -and is found below the right col, נל חכ שא ות ,begins with the lemma to Genesis 25:21 umn, whose first row contains Rashi’scommentary to Genesis 25:16.⁷⁷ The second in the third rowand thereforeidentifiable ׳ת gloss (hereinafter G_11r/2), signed with a as agloss by an anonymoustosafist,islocated below the second column whose first row contains Rashi’scommentary to Genesis 25:20. The biblical lemma to G_11r/2, תא כב רו ית חקל however,does not begin there, but in the last row of G_11r/1⁷⁸ (with from Genesis27:36) and is thereforelinked to this commentary.The third gloss (G_11r/3)was placed below the leftmost column, which contains Rashi’scommentary to Genesis 25:22(starting alreadyinrow 31 of the middle column) and whose last row contains the commentary to Genesis 25:27, concluding on fol. 11v/row 10.Aparatex- tual link to Rashi’scommentary is absentinall threeglosses.

3.3.2 Edition and Translation

G_11r/1:[…]on behalf of his wife (Genesis 25:21): for his wife. If so,why do Iexist? (Genesis 25:22): She feared dyingofher affliction, but the answered her: Don’tbeafraid! Youwill not

 This commentary alreadybegins on fol. 10v,column 3, last row. . חקל fromthe word, ׳ל  It concludes with the spacefiller Scepticism,Critique, and the Art of Writing 35

die. It is just the wayofwomen who arepregnant with twins,because twonations are in your womb (Genesis 25:23). Behold, often enough Iamatthe point of death (Genesis 25:32), that is to say, close to the end of my days,like: He will bring my term to an end (Job 23:14). Thus did Esau spurn (Genesis 25:34): In the end he would regret it (afterall), sinceitiswritten (there): he [tookaway] (from me) my birthright (Genesis 27:36).

G_11r/2: He tookaway (from me) (Genesis 27:36), but (at that time) he had not yetseen the future. :(an anonymous,explanatory) addendum. Aside from the previous famine etc.(Genesis 26:1) [=] ת This (verse) is meant to conveythat,just as Abraham moved to in the days of the (first) famine, Isaac intended to movetoEgypt,(that is) throughthe Philistines’ land, because this was the shortest wayfromCanaan to Egypt.(But,) as it is written: God did not lead them by way of the (land of the) Philistines etc. (Exodus13:17), (so) it is also (meant) here, because the HolyOne said:

G_11r/3: Do not go down to Egypt (Genesis 26:2), as your father (once) did, since youare blessed in this land, and so one (thereafter) finds Isaac sowed etc.and YHWH blessedhim (Genesis 26:12).(An explanationby) R. Shemu’el.

3.3.3 Explanation G_11r/1–3are glosses on the biblical text of Genesis25:21–26:2.First of all, the exege- sis to Genesis 25:22f., which boththe Midrash and Rashi’scommentary conduct in a stronglyanti-Christian tone,⁷⁹ is here reduced to its peshaṭ:Rebecca’sworries were unfounded, as the prophet informs her,because her condition is the resultof being pregnant with twins. This exegesiscloselyparallels the commentary in RTC, though they are not verbatim copies.⁸⁰ The other comments,too, show close kinship

תי ור צצ ו . לע וכ חר הך קמ אר מוא לר דך רו יש ינ : Ms Vienna, hebr.220,fol. 11r,middle column, row 31–37 סש םת המ יה רא ציצ זה וו תכ אב כם לן המ הז נא יכ . בר תו ׳י רד וש וה של ׳ו יר הצ בוע תר לע תפ יח ות הר לש םש עו רב . יו בקע And [the children] struggled:You must admit ‘ ץר מו ׳פ מו רפ סכ צל תא וע רב עת פל חת עי ׳ז׳ עו וש פמ כר לס תאצ that this verse says “Expound me!” because it leavesunexplained what this strugglingwas about, and it writes [that she said]: “If it be so, wherefore do Ilive.” Our masters interpreted [this word] as an expression of running: Whenever she passed by the doors of the Torah[i.e. the School] of Shem and Eber)Jacob would run and jerked to go out,whenever she passed by the doors of [a placeof] idol , Esaujerked to go out.’ נל חכ בשב לי [ … ] דל ור אש הת ׳ . לא נה יב יא שם אב תו הן מי םי , דכ תכ בי דל שר תא ׳ה אמ ות , כו ית כב יי אב לא הי םע  דל שר לא םיה . יו מא הר הל׳ . לע די ני איב . נש גי םיו . לא ית אר י , יכ עצ הר יע וב שר ךל שב יב של נש תי וא ימ ים בש טב ךנ , מש בר צה רע עה וב שר של ינ מם יע וב אר דח [ … ] הנה נא יכ וה ךל מל תו . כב יל םו נא הי לו לך וצ חד וי בת עי יר הם צמ יו םי םש בד םי או יר תו חו וי רת תוע , או ינ סמ כו לן ומ לת המ הז [ יל ] הל תמ ןי לח בק רכ לה חא מר תי את יב ונ ? ךכ יפ שר בא יב רה רב יב אמ רי נמ חו ות בכ דו [. זו וה ] יו זב שע או הת כב הרו [ … ] יו זב שע ו . פל שי סל ףו תנ רח עט כל כך כד ית אב בת רכ ית ,ed. Lockshin) חקל , כל הן דק םי אכ לן וה יד שע וט ות . התע , שב תע כא הלי , זב אה הת כב הרו , בא לל סב ףו יה מה חת טר Perushha-Tora,vol. 1, 53–58 [excerpts; Hebrew quotation unvocalised]: ‘For[his wife]:for the sakeof […]to inquireofYHWH.From the prophets of those days,asin[one man] through whom we may in- quireofYHWH (1 Kings 22:8), and in it is because the people come to me to inquireofYHWH (Exodus 18:15).1(23)YHWH said to her through aprophet.Two nations.Donot be afraid! The discomfort of your pregnancyisbecause youare carryingtwins in your womb, and the discomfort of apregnancy with two [fetuses] is greater than of apregnancywith [only] one [child] […] “Behold, Iamabout to die:” Every dayIgo to hunt animals in the forest,where one can find bears and lions and other fe- 36 HannaLiss

not with Rashiʼscomments but with RTC, which is in part due to the fact that they also concern themselveswith the narrative’sliteraryarc—as the cross-reference be- tween Genesis 25:34and Genesis 27:36demonstrates. G_11r/1 deserves special attention; firstly, it appears to be an unsigned gloss and onlywhen closely scrutinised does it reveal itself to be closelytied to G_11r/2.Sec- ondly, it compresses amajor biblical literary arc (Genesis 25:21–34) into aform whose exegetic content parallels thatofRTC.InG_11r/2,however,this is labelled as atosafist’saddendum. At this point,itshould be clear thatthe circular form of R. Shemu’el’scommentaries is not chosen arbitrarily. There are two possible explan- ations for this: 1. The explanation to Genesis 25:34(includingthe referencetoGenesis 27:36) was available to the glossator as an anonymous tosafist’saddendum. He felt that it went well with other literary-theoretical peshaṭ explanations of R. Shemu’el, and therefore integrateditinto the triple configuration of glosses signed with R. Shemu’el. This being the case, he would have bestowed an ‘author’ upon an anonymous explana- enabling, ׳ת tion, but alsoleft ahint for future scholars by adding the attribution us to reconstruct how medieval gloss collections turned into ‘author’scollections’, like RTC, that provide commentary withoutany hypotext.Alternatively, 2. the commentary on Genesis 25:34(includingthe reference to Genesis 27:36) was available to the glossatorbot as an anonymous tosafist’saddendum and as an explanation by R. Shemu’el. In this instance, he would have wished to credit both originators (byusing signatureand head shape). G_11r/2 and G_11r/3 explain whygoing to Egypt would not have been in Isaac’s best interest,while pointedlydisagreeing with Rashi’scommentary on Genesis 26:2.⁸¹ In particular, drawingonthe Midrash, Rashi explains that Isaac is comparable to a (ʽolah)which one is not allowed to present on the wrongside of the curtain, for it would be rendered void. G_11r/3,however,insists (indirectly) on the peshaṭ thatfollows from the immediate literary context.There is no need for the Mid- rash.

rocious animals.Iam [always] in dangerofdying. What use is therefor me to await the shareofthe first-born after our father’sdeath?—Thus elucidated my father,R.Meir,may he rest in honour.[And this is the reason whythe textcontinues]: Thus Esau spurned his birthright (Genesis 25:34) […] And Esau spurned [his birthright].Since[according to the plot of the story] in the end he would regret this [arrangement]—as it is written [later on]: [First] he tookawaymybirthright (Genesis 27:36)—the biblical [author] anticipates this verse in order to makeknown his foolishness: “Now,” [i.e., at this point of the narrative]whenhewas eating, he spurned his birthright. However,later on he had re- grets.’ On RTC’sliterary-theoretical implications,cf. Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds,135–141. לא רת מד רצ המי . הש הי עד ות רל תד צמ יר כם ׳מ יש דר : Ms Vienna, hebr.220,fol. 11v,middle column, row 2 Do not go down to Egypt:Sincehe ‘ בא וי יב ימ רה בע .. לא רת מד רצ המי . אש הת וע הל מת מי ו׳ יא חן צו לה רא כץ יד ךלי thought of going down to Egypt as his father had gone down in times of famine. Do not go down to Egypt for youare aburnt-offeringwithout blemish, and [residence] outside the HolyLand is not wor- thyofyou.’ Cf. BerR 64:3 and TanB, Toldot 6. Scepticism,Critique, and the Art of Writing 37

Strictlyspeaking, G_11r/3 is alreadypart of fol. 11v,because Rashi’scommentary ad loc. begins there (second column,second row ff.). That it was nevertheless placed on fol. 11r can be explained by the desire to combine G_11r/3 with G_11r/1 and G_11r/ 2, therebyidentifying the three heads as aconnected commentary by R. Shemu’el. It is apparent thatthe glossator focussed much more on the biblical text as his hypo- text than on Rashi’s: the triple-form appears on the pageonwhich, with Parashat Tol- dot (Genesis 25:19–28:9), the specific narrative arc, to which these commentaries per- tain, arises.

3.4 Fol. 15v

3.4.1 Description There is onlyone gloss (G_15v/1)onfol. 15v that was written by the first scribe (Me- naḥem).⁸² It is attributed to R. Shemu’el, and it,too, is instantly recognisable as a Shemu’el ‘head’,asitwas giventhis form by filling in blank space wherenecessary. This gloss was placedbelow the first (right) column, in which the last rowofRashi’s and […] wrestled’)comes ‘ ) יו קבא commentary on Genesis 32:25 begins. The lemma with aparatextual reference(circle), which, however,isnot repeatedinthe gloss it- self, and is probablymeanttorefer explicitlytothe biblical lemmatolink the gloss to the biblical hypotextand not to Rashi’scommentary.

3.4.2 Edition and Translation

And therewrestled aman with him (Genesis 32:25). The Holy One, Blessed be He,promised him I will surely do you good (Genesis 32:13), but he did not believehim, and Jacob was greatlyafraid

and written in the later ך״ד  Thereis, however,anadditional gloss on fol. 15v,introduced with hand (below the left column). 38 HannaLiss

and distressed, and therefore, he was struck. Likewise, we find in the [storyofthe call of]Moses that the Holy One, Blessed be He,said to him: Go back to Egypt, and Iwill be with you,but he answered him: ‘Send someone else, whomever you want!’ (Exodus4:13), and [immediately] he was struck. YHWH met him and sought to kill him (Exodus 4:24).Similarly, in [the storyof] Ba- laam, God’sanger blazed up,because he wasgoing (Numbers 22:22),and [immediately] he was struck. Likewise, this happens to all those whodisobey avow that they will getstruck. [Anex- planation by] R. Shemu’el.

3.4.3 Explanation The commentary begins with the wrestlingmatch, which it interprets as apunish- ment for Jacob’slack of trust.Itattemptstoestablish acause-and-effect chain be- tween Jacob’sfear (Genesis 32:8) and the wrestling match at the Jabbok (Genesis 32:25ff.): Jacobdid not react properlytoGod’spromise and waspunished for it.In contrast to Rashi⁸³ who not onlyfocusses on the morphologyofthe verbal form whom he labels( שיא ) ’but also devotes significant attention to the ‘man, יו קבא the gloss tries to the greater narrative ,( רש שו על וש ) Esauʼsguardian angel arc, and additionallycites other examples from the Torah(Moses and Balaam) to provehow God punishes those who show reluctance in trusting in the divine word. It is clear the gloss is not dealingwith Rashiʼscomments on the immediate verse, but addressingthe biblical text directly. There is an analogous argument in RTC, in which the examples of Moses’ and Balaamʼsdivinepunishment are also present (though their inclusion feels rather forced).⁸⁴ However,the commentary in RTCisclearlyaccentuated differently, since

יו בא אק שי . נמ םח יפ שר יו עת רפ יא עש ומ של ׳ו קבא : Ms Vienna, hebr.220,fol. 15v,right column, last row הש וי עמ יל ען רברפ לג הי ען יל יד ינ נע עו ום יל רנ ׳א הש או של ןו יו קת רש . לו וש אן מר הי או תב מל דו תב דר בא קי הבו . או קיב הל מו בי לק וש ען ינ הב . כש דן ךר נש םי מה עת ה׳ תמ צע ימ לם פה לי יא אש רת הע ו . חש בו וק או בו זבוק ור וע ית ו . פו רי וש בר תו ׳י And there wrestled aman with him:Menaḥem [ibn Saruq]explained it as “aman ‘ הש או רש שו על וש .. coveredhimself with dust,” as an expression [belongingtothe semantic field of] “dust,” since they wereraisingthe dust with their feet through their movements.However,itappears to me that it means “he became bound up” (2 Kings 9:14)and this is an Aramaic expression, as in “after they be- came bound up [with it]” (cf. bSan 63b) and “and he would bound the [four threads unto the loop to form] aslipknot” (cf. bMen 42a)—an expression of entanglement,for such is the wayoftwo people whoare struggling to throweach other—that one hugs and twines himself round [the other] with his arms.Our Masters of blessed memory explained that he was Esau’sministeringangel (cf. BerR 77:3).’ יו קבא . למ ךא מע ו , לש יא כו לל חרב , יו אר קה םוי [ בה חט ות ] לש קה וד בש ור הך או , לש יא יז הק עו וש . יכ אל כי לל ו .  מה ךאל . רו הצ על רב לו רב בח לע רכ וח [ … ] מו שה קל יה קע וב צנ על , פל שי קה וד בש ור הך או בה וחיט , והו הא הי וב חר . כו מן יצ ונ כב הל וה כל םי דב ךר לש בא צר ןו קה וד בש ור הך או וא ממ נא םי לל תכ , נש נע וש . מב הש תכ בי לש נח בא די שת חל , יו רח ףא ׳ה מב הש [ … ] ךא פל הי טשפ , פל שי יה מה עת לצ לל תכתכ בו יו יה דב ךר מב ול ון פי שג וה [ ׳ה ] יו שקב מה ותי . כו בן וי הנ נש לב בע עמ הי הגד . כו בן לב םע יו רח ףא לא יה כם הי לו הך או , נו שע חה רגי , כדכ ית וב לת ץח [ תא ] לגר -ed. Lockshin, Perushha-Tora,vol. 1, 88–90 [excerpts;Hebrew quo) לב םע , יו ךל פש י , יח רג מכ וו פש עו מצ ית וי tation unvocalised]: ‘Butanangel wrestled with him,soastonot allow him to flee in order that he might see the fulfilment of God’spromise that Esauwould not harm him. When he saw that he could not prevail,i.e., the angel saw, and that [Jacob]was tryingtocross and flee against the angel’s will […]But the reasonthat Jacobwas punished and lamed was because the HolyOne, Blessed be He, promised him, but he still [repeatedly] attemptedtoflee. Similarly, we find that anyone who attempts Scepticism, Critique, and the ArtofWriting 39

its ‘retelling’,which deals with the motif of Jacob’sflight on an almost epic scale, re- flects another developmental stageofpeshaṭ exegesis, bothwith respect to literary technique and the psychological characterisation of the biblical protagonist.⁸⁵ If the gloss at hand in Ms Vienna,hebr.220,did indeed originate with Rashbam, it would be compellingevidence thatthe commentary in RTC should be attributed to a(later)scholar: mi-de-ve-Rashbam (Ps.-Rashbam) rather than Rashbam himself.⁸⁶

4Conclusion

Alreadythis initial glimpse on the casestudies presented here shows that these to- safists’ glosses do not comment on their hypotext,Rashi, but expound the biblical text by focussing on the plot of the biblical narrative and its story line, the psychol- ogyofthe biblical characters,oroncontemporary profane lore and knowledge.How- ever,with regardtotheir literary shape, it is important to underline that they do not constituteacontinuous and fluent presentation, but agloss commentary that along with its external mise-en-texte represents the consensus patrum, in this case: the con- sensus magistri,i.e.Rashi. By adding explanations on the biblical text into (a recen- sion of)the Rashi commentary,the tosafists not onlyshow that in the Christian en- vironment the Bible had become an important tool for their discourse at

ajourney or refuses ajourney against God’swill, is punished: In the [story of the call of]Moses it is written [first]: “Send someone else, whomever you want!” (Exodus 4:13), [and then the textgoes on]: And YHWH’sanger blazed up against Moses […]However,accordingtothe peshaṭ [thereisamore explicit perceivable effect]: SinceMoses was reluctanttogo, it came to pass on the way at the lodg- ing-place, YHWH met him and sought to kill him (Exodus4:24).Likewise, in [the case of]Jonah, who was swallowed up into the bellyofthe fish [as aresultofhis refusal to go](cf. Jonah 2:1). Similarly, in [the case of]Balaam, God’sanger blazed up,because he was going (Numbers 22:22),and [as aresult] he became lame, as it is written: And[the ass] squeezed Balaam’sfoot […](Numbers 22:25) and he ”Numbers 23:3)[which means] “lame,” [as in] “And his bones were dislocated)[ פש י ] went off lame (Job 33:21).’  Ihavedemonstrated elsewherethat RTCdisplays aquitefascinatingpsychological sensitivity.Ja- cob’sfear of Esauisthe main reason for his attempt to flee. However,RTC does not refertothis emo- tional stateofmind explicitly, but rather indirectlythroughthe motif of Jacob’sattempt to flee, i.e., the depiction of his preparations for escape and the events occurringtohim. Icompared this literary technique, in which acharacter’sactivities are indicators of his internal state of mind, to literary fea- turesinthe romancesofChrétien de Troyes (c. 1140–c. 1190) which often makeuse of this specific literary practice.Onthe whole subject,cf., in detail, Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds, 66–67,154– 161; eadem, “Kommentieren als Erzählen: Narrativität und Literarizität im Tora-Kommentar des Rash- bam,” Frankfurter Judaistische Beiträge 34–35 (2009): esp. 103–110 and 118–121.  This would also solve some of the problems that occur when comparingthe RTCwith the roman- cesofChrétien de Troyes and their literary features, sinceChrétien wrote his major poems and roman- ces(Erec and Enide; Cligès; Yvain, the Knight of the Lion; Lancelot,the Knight of the Cart,and Per- ceval, the Story of the Grail) in the last thirdofthe twelfth century,not earlier than 1170,adate in time that Rashbam did not experience anymore, as he died probablynolater than 1158. Iwill address this question in moredetail in the edition of the entiregloss material to follow. 40 HannaLiss

eye-level with the (Babylonian) Talmud, but also elevate(arecension of)the Rashi commentary to the status of a ‘canonical’ text:Instead of glossingthe Bible (any Bible manuscript) and therebylabellingitasthe basic authority,they chose a Rashi commentary to adhere the glosses to. In that,these glosses constituteRashi as an auctor (comparable to the biblical ‘auctor’), an authority thatfrom now on will become afurther authoritative source-text for all later generations. This means that,although their comments, in most cases, pointedlydisagree with their teacher Rashi (i.e. Rashi, the man), and therebyseem to undermine his exegetical authority, they createRashi for the first time, i.e. the Rashi commentary in toto as a textual au- thority:⁸⁷ the second torah alongside the Torah. In so doing,the tosafistsʼ writings from NorthernFrance match perfectlywith the formal Latin scribal culture: ‘This tex- tual format […]isthus an appliedmnemonic containingnumerous visual helps to memory in its features,and alsolaying out graphicallythe relationship of the auctor and all its progeny,includingtheir disagreements.’⁸⁸ Furthermore, by means of a gloss commentary the glossator does not intend to create asharp demarcation line between his own literarycreation and the hypotext to which he appends his glosses. Due to the fact thatthe glossator appends exegetical remarks on the Bible to aRashi text,the claim of authorities is hidden by means of aliterary form that supports the Rashi as atextual authority while at the same time refuting his exegetical results. In other words: The glosses transform an individual person—Rashi—as the exegetical teacher and author of aBible commentary into a textual authority.

Quite adifferent picture emergesincomparingmedieval gloss commentaries to Judeo-Arabicauthored works of which we find its earliest exponents,not by chance, in the works of savants living in the Islamic culturalcontext and active in the fields of either philosophyorgrammar in the tenth and eleventh centuries (R.Saadiah Gaon, R. Shelomo ibn Gabirol, R. JudahHalevi, Menaḥem ibn Saruq or Dunash ibn Labrat and, later,R.Abraham ibn ). The figures here reveal themselvesas authorsbyconstantlyexhibiting aclear-cut hermeneutical starting point and adis-

 Cf. the introductory quotebyReynolds, Medieval Reading (see note 1).  Carruthers, Book of Memory,268. Scepticism, Critique, and the Art of Writing 41

tinctive grammatical, exegetical,orphilosophical approach in their attempt to de- marcatethemselvesfrom other authors. In philosophical as well as in most of the grammatical and exegetical treatisesone findsanintroduction (haqdama), in which the authorʼsmethodaswellashis critique is explicitlystated, or,asinphil- osophical as well as (later)kabbalistic exegesis, forward the claim that anyexegetical endeavour should lead to the discovery of some deeper meaning ‘behind’ the literal surface.⁸⁹ A ‘doubting author’ sets up acounter authority about asubject,abelief, in medievalphilosophical terms: a res.Byconstrast,agloss does not necessarilyaim to explicitlydoubt anything,but to explain the issue at hand or append new ideas on a text:averbum.⁹⁰ Scepticism/sceptical thoughtalways expresses doubts about a res. We might,therefore, conclude at this point thatthe investigation of glosses in ame- dieval manuscript as aform of test case could provethatwhen dealing with medieval Jewishtosafist an extension of the term scepticism/sceptical thought be- yond its epistemological meaning actuallycauses more problems than it solves. In addition,futurestudies on the question of the different of critical thought in tosafist literature should be carried out far more in relation to the literaryform in which it is expressed than has been done up to the present.

 See Bill Rebiger, “The EarlyOpponents of the Kabbalah and the Role of Sceptical Argumenta- tions:AnOutline,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2016,eds.Giuseppe Veltriand Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2016): 51.  On the distinction between res and verbum,see also Carruthers, Book of Memory,esp. 234–237. 42 HannaLiss

Illustration I: Ms Vienna,hebr.220,fol.8v. ©Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Scepticism, Critique, and the ArtofWriting 43

Illustration II: Ms Vienna,hebr.220,fol.9v. ©Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 44 HannaLiss

Illustration III: Ms Vienna,hebr.220,fol.11r.©ÖsterreichischeNationalbibliothek Scepticism, Critique, and the ArtofWriting 45

Illustration IV: Ms Vienna, hebr.220, fol. 15v.©Österreichische Nationalbibliothek

BillRebiger Sceptical Elements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqar against Kabbalah

Introduction

As alreadyannounced elsewhere, Iamgoing to publish aseries of articles on the earlyopponents of Kabbalah focussing on sceptical elements and strategies.¹ Jewish philosophers—especiallythosewho were indebted, to one degree or another,tothe philosophyofAristotle as interpreted in the Middle Ages—presented amajor field of opposition to Kabbalah. The fundamental arguments of anyphilosophical criticism of Kabbalah had alreadybeen provided by Maimonides, although it appears he bare- ly knew anything of its esoteric lore.MenachemKellner’smonograph Maimonides’ Confrontation with Mysticism is avery useful starting point for understanding why Maimonides is so vital to manyopponents of Kabbalah.² According to Kellner,Mai- monides’ philosophycan provide the blueprint for anyphilosophicalcriticism of mystical and kabbalistic claims. Kellner’s ‘proto-kabbalistic’ examples of Maimo- nides’ criticism encompass Heikhalot literature and the Sefer Yeṣirah (‘Book of Cre- ation’)aswellasthe Jewish magical tradition.³ It is well known thatMaimonides’ philosophyisdeeplyengaged with Aristotle as the latter was transmittedand revised in the Arabic tradition. The commentaries of ,who was alsoknown as Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), on various works of Aristotle are especiallyimportant for the later Jewish reception of Aristotelian philosophywithin the tradition of Maimoni- dean philosophers.⁴

This article is aresult of along-term research project carried out at the Maimonides Centre forAd- vanced Studies at the University of Hamburg. Iamindebted to my colleagues thereand to our visiting fellows forpresenting and discussing different aspects of Isaac Polqar at severalReading and Dia- lectical Evenings as well as forpersonal conversations Ihave hadwith them. Iamespeciallygrateful to Racheli Haliva,Lawrence Kaplan, YuvalHarari, and ElisaCarandina.

 Bill Rebiger, “The EarlyOpponents of the Kabbalah and the Role of Sceptical Argumentations: An Outline,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2016,eds.Giuseppe Veltriand Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2016): 39–57.  MenachemKellner, Maimonides’ Confrontation with Mysticism (Oxfordand Portland, OR: The Litt- man Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006).  Ibidem,18–25.  Cf., e.g.,AlfredIvry, “Remnants of Jewish in the ,” in JewishThought in the Sixteenth Century,ed. BernardD.Cooperman (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983): 243– 265; Steven Harvey, “Arabic into Hebrew:The HebrewTranslation Movement and the Influenceof Averroes upon Medieval Jewish Thought,” in TheCambridge Companion to Medieval JewishPhiloso- phy,eds. Daniel H. Frank and OliverLeaman (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2003): 268– 272.

OpenAccess. ©2018 Bill Rebiger,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-004 48 BillRebiger

Regarding these preliminary considerations, it is not surprising that opposition to Kabbalah was to alarge extent formed by philosopherswho belong to the Aristo- telian–Maimonidean tradition. In particular, several JewishAverroists,among whom Iwould like to mention , IsaacAlbalag,IsaacPolqar,Moses Narboni, and Elijah Delmedigo, contributed against Kabbalah in their works.In fact,the designation of ‘JewishAverroists’ gathers together various distinctive philos- opherswho first and foremost share an interest in Averroes’ works,particularlyhis commentaries on Aristotle. As arule, this interestdoes not implythat every Averroist entirelyagreed with Averroes and vice versa.⁵ Another distinguishing feature of Jew- ish Averroists is clearlyoutlinedintheir efforts to somehow combine Averroes’ thoughtwith thatofMaimonides.The Averroistic precondition that ahuman being —provided he or she is aphilosopher—mayexplain not onlyeverythingthat exists, but alsothe underlying (s), leadstoageneral mistrust or even criticism of mystical and—in the Jewishcontext—kabbalistic interpretations. The knowledge for which the philosopher strivesevenincludes knowledge of God or—at least from the Averroistic point of view—of the .This is indeed adogmatic state- ment and apparentlyquite distant from anysceptical position regardingepistemol- ogy. However,despite the observation that manyJewish Averroists werenon-sceptics, at least in theirepistemological concepts, nonetheless certain sceptical elements or strategies can be detected in theirworks.Itisthe aim of my intended casestudies to discuss certain sceptical elements and strategies implementedbythe aforemen- tioned Jewish Averroists. The apriori of anypolemic is the assumption that the adversary’sknowledge is necessarilywrongand that his claims are to be refuted and disproved. Thus, the front line apolemic evokes must appear extremelyclear-cut.Inthis regard,any statement intended for the purposes of polemics appears in no wayakin to the sceptical ap- proach. In contrasttosceptical enquiry, discussion, or open-endeddispute— which, to be more specific, mayevenbewithout anyintention or purpose,following the tradition of Sextus Empiricus—the intention of polemics is at the very outset to affirm onlythe truth of one side, i.e. that of the polemicist.Inthis sense, criticism of Kabbalah, especiallyinthe camp of Jewish Averroists,isvery often non-sceptical or dogmatic insofarasthe final truth of their philosophical claims of knowledge is ob- viouslynot in question. What the rationalist philosophersactuallycriticise is Kabbalah’sall-too-frequent absenceofargumentation by reasoningaccordingtophilosophicalprinciples. Or,to put it another way, the kabbalistic discourse was considered to be completelydiffer- ent to the philosophicalone. Sceptical elements or strategies are especiallyfruitful when the participants of adebate do not share the samediscourse or logic of argu- mentationand proofs,asisexpressed in the Latin maxim contraprincipia negantem

 Cf., e.g., OliverLeaman, “Is Averroes an Averroist?,” in Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Re- naissance,eds.Friedrich Niewöhner and Loris Sturlese (Zürich: Spur Verlag,1994): 9–22. Sceptical Elements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqaragainst Kabbalah 49

non est disputandum. Thus, the argumentation against certain content-related claims is less important than the attempt to undermine the certainty,authority,orlegitima- cy of atext,person, or institution as asourceofknowledge.Therefore, the sceptical element found in manyanti-kabbalistic textsisoften expressed as doubt about au- thority and tradition as sources of knowledge,aswillbediscussed below.These sceptical elements could eventuallybeelaborated into sceptical strategies by later authors, such as,for instance,the Venetian Rabbi Simone Luzzatto (?1583–1663).⁶ When the rather simplistic doubting of authority and tradition termedhere as only a ‘sceptical element’ is transformed into asubversive method for systematicallyun- derminingthe reliability of sources of knowledge which are accepted onlybyauthor- ity or tradition, Iwould then like to call this a ‘sceptical strategy.’ In the following,myaim is to present acase studydevoted to the philosopher and polemicist Isaac Polqar (second half of the thirteenth century—c. 1330). The pres- ent article provides the reader with the first translation of apassagedealing with his attack on kabbalists into amodern languageand acommentary on it through aclose readingfocussing on the sceptical elements to be detected therein.

1Isaac Polqar

Isaac ben Joseph ibn Polqar⁷ livedinChristian , or more precisely, in the King- dom of Castile. Not much of his biographyisknown to us. Polqar was clearlyaphi- losopher in the tradition of Maimonides, Averroes, and .⁸ Accordingtoa poem dedicated to him by Samuelibn Sasson, Polqar was an expert in the studyof

 On my definitionofsceptical strategies such as relativisation,objectification, historicisation, in- dictment of ,and delegitimation, see Bill Rebiger, “Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto’s Presentation of the Kabbalists in his Discorso,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2017): 53 – 64.  Variants of the correct spellingofPolqar,such as Policar,Pollegar,Polgar, or Pulgar,can be found elsewhere.  On Polqar,cf., e.g., Racheli Halevi, Isaac Polqar—AJewishPhilosopher or aPhilosopher and aJew? AStudy of the Relationship between Philosophy and Religion in Isaac Polqar’s ʿEzer ha-Dat [In Support of the Religion] and Teshuvat Apikoros [A Response to the Heretic] (typescript, PhD McGill Montreal, 2015;Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,forthcoming); Sadik, “La différenceentre judaïsmeet christianisme selon deux averroïstes juifs espagnols,” Viator 47 (2016): 191–204; idem, “Negation of Political Success in the ThoughtofRabbi Isaac Pulgar,” AJS Review 39 (2015): 1–13 (Hebrew sec- tion); , “Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Jewish Philosophical Tradi- tion,” in JewishThoughtinthe Seventeenth Century,eds.IsadoreTwersky and BernardSeptimus (Cam- bridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1987): 499–521; idem, “Some Topics on Polqar’sTreatise ʿEzer ha-Dat and their Parallels in Spinoza’sView,” in Studies in JewishMysticism, Philosophy and Ethical Literature, Presented to Tishby on his Seventy-FiveBirthday,eds.Joseph Dan and Joseph Hacker [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press,1986): 395–457; ColetteSirat, AHistoryofJewishPhilosophyin the Middle Ages (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985): 315–322; IsidoreLoeb, “Polémistes Chrétiens et Juifs en FranceetenEspagne,” Revue des études juives 18 (1889): 63 – 70. 50 Bill Rebiger

the and the . He was alsoknown as apoet and and was an acknowledgedauthority in his congregation.⁹ However,Polqar is first and foremost known as the student of the Jewishscholar Abner of Burgos, whom he ad- mired as his beloved master. Abner livedbetween 1265 and 1347and eventuallycon- verted to Christianity between 1320and 1322.After his conversion, he adopted the Alfonso of Valladolid and began writing anti-Jewish polemics in He- brew.¹⁰ Abner’sconversion was an essential event for Polqar and one that caused him to question his Jewish self-confidence. As aresult, he began to compose his own polemics against Christianity in general and against Abner in particular. Most of Polqar’sbookshavenot survived. Among his lost works,hereportedly wrotecommentaries on the biblical books of Genesis, , and the . Nevertheless,onlytwo of Polqar’sworks exist today. The first is aletter addressed to Abner known by the title Teshuvat Apikoros (‘AResponsetothe Heretic’).¹¹ Unfortu- nately, this is the onlysurviving text of afar largercorrespondence between Polqar and Abner.The second of Polqar’sworks to have survivedishis magnum opus ‘Ezer ha-Dat (‘In Support of the Religion’). Iwill proceed by presentingthe chapter of this book that contains Polqar’sattack on the kabbalists and discussing it at length. In addition,one of his lost writings, abook entitled Musar ha-Banim (‘Instruction of the Sons’), is mentioned in the passagetranslated below. In his writings,Polqar attempted to defend the Jewishfaith not onlyagainst by birth, but also against Jewish converts, particularlythose well trained in biblical and talmudic sources. Polqar was afiery adept of Aristotelianphilosophy and Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’sworks.InPolqar’sview,Judaism is atrue religion because its beliefs are possible according to their philosophical principles.¹² Therefore, Judaism is superior to Christianity and its theological conceptsofthe Trin- ity and the Incarnation are beliefs which Polqar deemsand dismisses as logicallyim- possible.¹³ Another targetofhis polemics takes on other philosophicalschools as

 Cf. Yitzhak Baer, “Fragments fromCastilian Poets in the Fourteenth Century,” in Minḥah le-David: Collected Studies on JewishWisdom Presented to David Yellin for his Seventieth Birthday [in Hebrew], ed. Committee (Jerusalem: Ruben Mass,1935):200.  On Abner,see L. Hecht, The Polemical Exchangebetween Isaac Pollegar and Abner of Burgos/Alfonso of Valladolid according to Parma MS 2440 (PhD Diss., New York University,1993); Ryan Szpiech, From Testimonia to Testimony:Thirteenth-CenturyAnti-JewishPolemic and the Mostra- dor de justicia of Abner of Burgos/Alfonso de Valladolid (PhD Diss., Yale University,New Haven, CT, 2006); Shalom Sadik, “Abner de Burgosand the Transfer of Philosophical Knowledge between Juda- ism and Christianity,” Medieval Encounters 22 (2016): 95–112.  The onlymanuscript evidenceisMsParma, Pal. 2440,where no title for this letterisgiven; see Hecht, Polemical Exchange. However,the title TeshuvatApikoros is referred to by Isaac Polgar, Ezer HaDat. ADefense of Judaism [in Hebrew],ed. Jacob S. Levinger(TelAviv: The Chaim Rosenberg School of Jewish Studies,1984), 30 and 76.  Cf. Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,34–40.  On the distinction between possible and impossible religious beliefs according to Maimonides, cf. Daniel J. Lasker, JewishPhilosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages (Oxfordand Portland, Oregon: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2007), 28–43. ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance:Isaac Polqar against Kabbalah 51

well as astrologers and kabbalists. Polqar attacked the latter as they argued against the philosophicalinterpretationofthe Jewish religion, particularlyinits Aristoteli- an–Averroistic form. Afurther reason to attack Kabbalah layinthe probability that Abner had implementedkabbalistic ideas to support himself in his conversion.¹⁴

2Polqar against the Kabbalistsinhis ‘Ezer ha-Dat (‘In Support of the Religion’)

In literaryterms, ‘Ezer ha-Dat is made up of dialogues and essays.The first and fourth chapters are written as essays,while the second, third, and fifth chapters are composed in dialogue form. Iwould liketoemphasise that alreadyinthe last dialogue of the second chapter between the old traditionalist and the young philos- opher about the limits of human knowledge and the exalted rank of the prophets,the traditionalist mentions various secrets including,among others, divinenames, the kabbalistic concept of the tenSefirot,and the Sefer Yeṣirah.¹⁵ Accordingtothe tradi- tionalist,who evidentlybecame akabbalist duringhis life, the prophets transmitted these secrets to him via the chain of tradition. However,the against the kabbalists presented belowcan be found in the fourth chapter in which he attacks four different groups,accusingall of them of being Judaism’sgreatest enemies. Among these are the self-proclaimed true believers who reject science, the kabbalists,the philosophers who hold radical naturalistic views, and lastlyadeptsofmagic and . AccordingtoPolqar,the kabbal- ists are dangerous because they assert that they have knowledge that does not follow Aristotle’sphilosophicalmethods and logical rules.¹⁶ In contrast,the knowledge that the kabbalists claim to have is provided by an esoteric tradition reachingback to the time of the prophets,asthey claim. The Hebrew word ‘Kabbalah’ literallymeans ‘tradition.’ Both philosophyand Kabbalah express truth claims with regardtothe interpretation of texts. They both agree that truth is mostlyhidden and not obvious in the texts,orthat truth is nothing but the deeper meaningbehind the surface of the literal sense. Thus, kabbalists fre- quentlyqualify their interpretations of the Torah, for instance, as being found ‘by the

 Cf. Yitzhak Baer, “The UseofKabbalah in the Christological ThoughtofAbner of Burgos,” Tarbiz 16 (1909): 280–289; Shoshana Gershenzon, AStudy of Teshuvot La-Meḥaref by Abner of Burgos (PhD Diss., Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1984); but see the critique by Shalom Sadik, and in the Thought of Abner of Burgos (PhDDiss., Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2011).  See Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger, 84–87;however,the term ‘Kabbalah’ is not explicitlymen- tioned here.  Cf. the short summary in Carlos del Valle, “La critique de la Qabbale chez Isaac ibn Polgar,” in Expérience et écrituremystique dans les du livre,eds.PaulB.Fenton and Roland Goetschel (Leiden: Brill, 2000): 131–141. 52 Bill Rebiger

wayoftruth’ (‘al derekh ha-ʼemet in Hebrew). Among manyJewish scholars of Pol- qar’stime, Kabbalahwas firstlya‘generallyaccepted opinion’ and secondlyac- knowledgedasatradition receivedbytrustworthypersons. AccordingtoMaimo- nides’ Treatise on the Art of Logic,¹⁷ these two sources of kabbalistic knowledge— more precisely, generallyaccepted opinions and traditions—are not self-evidentbe- cause they depend solelyonthe social environment and testimony. Therefore, Kab- balah cannotbeaccepted as asourceofknowledge whose conclusions are already certain from the outset.However,the majorityofkabbalists would not accept this kind of epistemological argument simplybydint of the fact thatthey do not agree with Aristotelian standards of philosophyand logic. Furthermore, content-related at- tempts to falsify kabbalistic ideas would not be accepted because of the pluralistic hermeneutics concerning truth claims shared by most kabbalists. Therefore, another, more subversive waytounderminethe meta-level or frame of the kabbalistic self- imageappears to be more effective.Thus, the assertion that Kabbalah is indeedan ancient tradition, as the literal meaning of the term suggests, was something that Polqar particularlydoubted, and asceptical element can be seen in Polqar’sattempt to undermine the acceptance of his contemporaries’ kabbalistic opinions when he claims Kabbalah is neither an ancient tradition nor areal one. In this way, he at- tempts to undermine the reliability of kabbalistic genealogyand authorities. Polqar’s main sceptical elementistoassert doubts concerning the textual accuracy of kabbal- istic sources. He deconstructs Kabbalah’spresentation of itself as areliable tradition continuouslytransmittedsince antiquity.However,Polqar’sdogmatic stance con- cerningKabbalah is evident throughout this passage. In general, he has no doubt that Kabbalah cannot be accepted because of its non-philosophical means of argu- ing.Onseveral occasions,hegoes so far as to explicitlydebunk Kabbalah as ‘fool- ishness’ and castigates kabbalists as ‘ignorants.’ What follows is acompleteEnglish translation of the passagefrom ‘Ezer ha-Dat in which Polqar attacks the kabbalists.The translation is based on the Jacob S. Lev- inger edition of the original Hebrew text.¹⁸ The passagehas been divided into smaller portions to enable me to comment on them directlyinthe close reading. The Hebrew original of the quoted passages is giveninthe footnotes accordingtoLevinger’sed- ition.

 Cf. Hannah Kasher, “Maimonides:Halakhic Philosopher or Philosophical Halakhist?OnSkeptical Epistemologyand ItsImplications,” in Moses Maimonides (1138–1204): His Religious,Scientific,and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different Cultural Contexts,eds.Görge K. Hasselhoff and Otfried Fraisse (Würzburg: Ergon2004): 51– 63.  Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger, 156–158. ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance:Isaac Polqar against Kabbalah 53

3Translation and Commentary

After his attack on Jews defining themselvesastrue believers while actuallyrejecting science, Polqar commenceshis polemic against the second group, the kabbalists, with the following lines:

And the secondobjection is the objection of the groupofpeople who arecalled ‘kabbalists’ [me- qubbalim]inthis generation. And these arethose whosay that sinceman’sintellect is unable to apprehend anythinghidden through his contemplation, that is to say, by seekingaconclusion from known premises, the onlyway is that of aKabbalah [‘tradition’]that was takenfroma prophet.And (they furthermoresay)that they know and recognise in truth that the Kabbalah that todayisintheir possession is the one which was heard from the mouths of the prophets.¹⁹

The second group Polqar attacks consists of ‘people who are called “kabbalists” in this generation.’ In the beginning,Polqar alreadyemphasises that they are merely called ‘kabbalists,’ that is, ‘receivers of atradition,’ but they are not even such receiv- ers in his view.Inthis passage, Polqar tries to arguepreciselyboth thatthe kabbalists are not reliable receivers of the tradition and thatthe kabbalistic tradition itself is not reliable. However,the kabbalists wereobviouslyadistinctive group in the first half of the fourteenthcentury.Christian Spain, wherePolqar resided, was one of the most importantsites of kabbalistic writing in Polqar’speriod, as it had been in the previ- ous century.Major works of the kabbalistic tradition, such as the Sefer ha-,most of the texts later compiled in the Sefer ha-Zohar,and kabbalistic commentaries on the Hebrew Bible or the Sefer Yeṣirah,had alreadybeen written and disseminated. Crucialauthorsofvarious kabbalistic trends such as Isaacthe Blind (c. 1160 – 1235), (c. 1160—c. 1238), MosesNaḥmanides (1194–1270), Menaḥem Recanati (1223–1290), Moses de Leon (c. 1240 –1305), (1240—after 1291), Joseph Gikatilla (1248—after 1305), or Isaac of Acre (thirteenth to fourteenth century) had been active long before Polqar arrivedonthe scene. Nevertheless, Kab- balah was still aset of various lores studied first and foremost by the Jewish elite.²⁰ However,magical practices were much more popularamong less educated people, and in this period theybegin to interminglewith kabbalistic ideas.²¹ The results of

הו עט הנ שה ינ הת אי עט תנ תכ אה שנ םי נה רק יא בם וד זר מה וק לב םי , הו הם וא רמ םי יכ יא ן : Ibidem,156,lines 3–8 וש ים וכ תל שב לכ אה םד הל יש שג םו ענ םל הב בת נו ונ ות , ״ר בל קב וש ות דל מה קה מד תו די עו תו , יכ םא דב ךר בק הל קל החו . נמ איב , כו הי ים דו יע ום כמ רי םי אב תמ , יכ קה לב אה רש יה הא וי בם די הם אי נה מש תע פמ הי בנ אי םי  Forsurveysonthe earlyhistory of Kabbalah, cf., e.g., , Origins of the Kabbalah, trans. Allan Arkush (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society and PrincetonUniversity Press,1990); Joseph Dan, The Early Kabbalah (New York: Paulist Press, 1986); Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Philoso- phyand Kabbalah: 1200 –1600,” in TheCambridgeCompanion to Medieval JewishPhilosophy,eds. Daniel H. Frank and OliverLeaman (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2003): 218–257; Jona- than Dauber, KnowledgeofGod and the Development of Early Kabbalah (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012).  On mediaeval Jewish magic, cf. Trachtenberg, JewishMagic and Superstition. AStudy in Folk Religion (New York: Behrman’sJewish Book House, 1939;reprinted Philadelphia: University of 54 Bill Rebiger

this process wereeventuallydubbed ‘practical Kabbalah’ and, as we will seelater, they became of some relevancefor Polqar.²² Polqar introduces the kabbalists in avery significant way: surprisingly,hedoes not focus on kabbalistic ideas, but rather on the epistemological differencebetween kabbalistic and philosophical approaches for obtaining true and certain knowledge. In Polqar’sphilosophy, mengain truth with the assistance of the rational speculation of the intellectual faculty.Usingthe intellectual faculty,the philosopher is also able to apprehendhiddenthingsbymeans of Aristotelian reasoning and to draw acon- clusion from known premises.Bycontrast, the kabbalist deniesthis ability of the philosopher in particularand human beingsingeneral by means of avirtuallyscep- tical approach. Instead, the kabbalist prefers to relyonatradition that goes back to the prophets when it comestohiddentruths. Therefore, in an anonymoustext enti- tled ‘Chapter on the kawwanah,bythe ancient kabbalists,’ for instance, which ac- cording to Gershom Scholem wasprobablywritten by the earlykabbalist Azriel of Gerona, the following identification with prophecyisincluded at the end of apas- sagedealing with the kabbalistic concept of kawwanah or the required intention or devotion while praying or fulfilling the commandments:

And this [i.e. kawwanah]isthe path amongthe paths of prophecy, upon which he whomakes himself familiar with it will be capable of risingtothe rank of prophecy.²³

However,the most importantexample of aprophetic interpretation of Kabbalahis provided by Abraham Abulafia,who claimed to be aprophet,amystic, and the mes- siah all at once.²⁴ In Polqar’sview,prophecyhas nothing to do with true knowledge, since it is nothing but imagination.²⁵ Maimonides argues that every prophet is nec-

Pennsylvania Press,2004); YuvalHarari, JewishMagic beforethe Rise of Kabbalah (Detroit: Wayne StateUniversity Press, 2017).  On practical Kabbalah, cf. Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah (Jerusalem: Keter, 1988): 182–189;, “DefiningKabbalah: The Kabbalah of the Divine Names,” in Mystics of the Book:Themes,Topics, and Typologies,ed. Robert A. Herrera (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 97– 122; idem, “On the Theolog- ization of Kabbalah in Modern Scholarship,” in Religious Apologetics—Philosophical Argumentation, eds.Yossef Schwartz and VolkhardKrech (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004): 142– 145.  See Scholem, Origins of the Kabbalah,419.Onthe view of another latethirteenth-century kabbal- ist,Rabbi Joseph ben Shalom Ashkenazi, concerning the visualisation of letters and colours as atech- nique for achievingthe prophetic state,cf. Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives (New Havenand London: Yale University Press, 1988), 105–106.  On Abraham Abulafia, cf. the manybooks and articles written by Moshe Idel, e.g., idem, TheMys- tical Experience in Abraham Abulafia (Albany: SUNY Press,1987); idem, Studies in Ecstatic Kabbalah (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); idem, Language,Torah, and Hermeneutics in Abraham Abulafia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).  On Polqar’sinventive view of prophecyand the prophet’sknowledge beingdifferentiated from the philosopher’sknowledge,see also Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger, 88–89 and 116–118;cf. Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’sTreatise ʽEzer ha-Dat and their Parallels in Spinoza’sView,” 420 – 432; idem, “Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Jewish Philosophical Tradition,” 501–503; ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance:Isaac Polqar against Kabbalah 55

essarilyaphilosopher and thataprophet is provided with bothaperfect imaginative faculty and aperfect rational one.²⁶ In contrast,Polqar clearlydifferentiates between the prophet and the philosopher.Hemaintains thatalthough onlyMoses was both a perfect philosopher and aperfect prophet,all the other prophets are not philoso- phers because they use onlyimagination and intuition. In line with this, Polqar ac- knowledgesthe kabbalists insofar as they are similar to traditionalist Jews, for both maintain thatthe onlysourceoftrue knowledge is tradition that goes back to the prophets.Both reject the philosophers by dint of the alleged limitations of man’- tellectual faculty.²⁷ In this epistemological regard, both the kabbalist and the tradi- tionalist are sceptics. However,Polqar too is asceptic insofar as he continues to question the kabbalists on the certaintyoftheir own claims regardingthe sources of knowledge that they use:

But if one will saytothem [i.e. the kabbalists]: ‘Whencedoyou know this?’ or ‘How is it that you do not takenote and raise doubts (about your claim) and admit that it would be possible that these views (of the kabbalists) arenot those that were heardfromthe mouths of the prophets? For(the views of the prophets) wereforgotten and lost in the course of time in the crisis of changes, and in the troubles of which happened to our congregation duetoour .’²⁸

One major characteristic of the philosophical approach in general and the sceptical approach in particular is to question one’sown claims and enquire into their certain- ty.Obviously, this approach differs from the kabbalistic one, which accepts claims simplybyfollowing the tradition provided by the chain of genealogyand filiation from mastertostudent without anyopportunitytodoubt.The problem, Polqar states, is the fact that prophecyalreadycame to an end in biblical times. The historicalex- planationfor the end of prophecyhegives is also intriguing.Israel’ssins are the rea- son for the end of prophecyand the loss of the prophets’ knowledge.The long period between the end of prophecy and the Kabbalah of his contemporaries is what Pol- qar’smistrust is founded upon. How can one relywith certainty on atradition claim- ing to be that ancient?AccordingtoPolqar,the kabbalists would equate this situa- tion with the reliability of the Torahand the writingsofthe prophets:

They [i.e. the kabbalists] will replyand say: ‘Farbeitfromusthat we should cast anydoubt on those of our beliefs which were received[ha-mequbbalot]byusfromthe mouths of the people

Dov Schwartz, “Prophecy according to Isaac Polqar,Rabbi Shlomo Al-Konstantin, and Spinoza” [in Hebrew], Asufot 4(1990): 60 –61;Shalom Sadik, Trinity and Determinism in the Thought of Abner of Burgos,93–98;Haliva, Isaac Polqar,251– 268.  See Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed,II:35 – 38 and II:45.  Polqar alreadyascribes this view to the traditionalist in the last dialogueofthe secondchapter, but without mentioning the kabbalist; see Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,84–87. כו יש מא אר יל םה דא מם יא תן עד זו תא , או ךי אל שת ומי : Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,156,lines 8–12 בל םכ הל תס קפ ולו רמ יכ יא שפ שר אל יה דו וע את הל םה נה מש יע מם יפ נה יב םיא , יכ יה נו כש יח ום ענ רד םי אב רו הך מז םינ , בו לח פו הי נש יו םי בו רט תד תה אל תו שא קר ור עב ונו ית ונ על תד וני.? 56 BillRebiger

whoare approved in our eyes, just as we do not doubt either the book of our Torahorthe writ- ingsofour prophets, be upon them.’ And they aresobrazen as to compareand equatethe stories of their foolishness to the HolyScriptures.²⁹

Regarding the kabbalists’ equation of Kabbalah with Torah, anygeneral doubtre- garding the reliability of all these ancient texts would be inappropriate. This evokes asubtle dilemma for Polqar as he must avoid anyconflict concerning the acceptance of the Torahasasourceofknowledge while trying to argueagainst Kabbalah. At first,Polqar clearlystates, in avery dogmatic way, that the equation of Kabbalah with Torahisbrazen because the kabbalistic stories are to be considered nothing but foolishness. In mentioning ‘stories,’ Polqar is most likelyalludingtokabbalistic Midrashim to be found,for instance, in the Sefer ha-Zohar.³⁰ However,Polqar has to differentiatebetween the characteristics of Kabbalah and Torah. Thus, he presents two rather odd examples for the purpose of degrading Kabbalah as an allegedlyan- cient tradition. The first reads as follows:

And they (obviously) do not know that from the dayofthe death of Moses, our master,all the people of our nation made constant efforts,werediligent and occupied themselveswith preserv- ing the traditional text of their writings,sothat no (single) letter of them would be missed or others would be added. And all of them stated their intention to bequeath their children firm and wise³¹ books copied and checked fromone another until today. But despiteall their dili- genceand their efforts in (preserving) their traditional text, todaythere are to be found variants in the HolyScriptures in several places. And this is known to anyone whoexamines the book of the Torah, which is wellknown among us as beinginthe handwritingofEzrathe ,for thereare to be found in it words that differ from similar (words) in the other checked books which areinour possession.³²

In his first example, Polqar compares the transmission of the HolyScriptures and kabbalistic sources. The argument ad antiquitatem (appeal to antiquity or tradition) provides the general background: asourceisdeemed correct on the basis that it is correlated with some past or present tradition. The widelyaccepted idea is that the antiquity of the sourceguarantees the truth of its text.Inthis case, Polqar adopts

שי בי וו אי רמ חו ליל לה ונ למ וש שם םו פס בק מא נו [ ו ] ית ונ לא הה קמ בו ול את לצ ונ פמ י : Ibidem,156,lines 12–16 אה שנ םי מה חו קז םי עב ני וני , אכ רש אל סנ פת בק פס תר רו ית ונ בו תכ יב בנ אי ני עו ה״ , יו יע וז נפ הי לם שה וו ות דל ומ סת ופ יר . בה יל םה סל רפ הי שדק  Cf. Oded Yisraeli, Temple Portals:Studies in and Midrashinthe Zohar (Berlin and Bos- ton: De Gruyter, 2016).  The Hebrew nevonim editedherebyLevinger should probablybecorrected to nekhonim, ‘correct.’ לו יא עד כו מי וי מם תו שמ אה וד ינ ונ שה דת ול הו רח וצי : Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,156,lines 16–25 הו עת קס תו ימ כד אל שנ אי מו ית ונ שב ומ אר מת וס תר תכ יב םה דכ שי אל חת רס המ אם תו וא עת יד אף רח ות וכ םל מש ומ וכ תנ לם וה יר אש בת ינ םה פס יר ים רש םי נו וב ינ מם עו קת םי מו גו יה זם מה הז דע יה םו , עו כם חל יר וצ םת הו תש לד םתו מב וס תר נם אצמ יה םו נש יו םי כב בת הי וק שד מב צק מת וק תומ . זו יה וד אע לצ מה יע ןי סב רפ תה רו אה רש וה מא ופ םסר . צא נל שו וה כא ית תב די זע אר כה ןה , יכ מי אצ בו מו ול שת נו תו דל ימו ןה שב רא סה רפ םי מה גו יה אם רש יב יד ונ ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqaragainst Kabbalah 57

the traditionalview that the Torahwas revealedtoMoses and put into writingby Ezrathe priest,who was also called the scribe.³³ However,Polqar’simplicit premise states the fundamental differencebetween both literary traditions concerning the qualityand accuracy of the textual transmis- sion. Beginning alreadyinrabbinic literature, evidence of textual variants and emen- dations in the circulating copies of the Hebrew Bible was discussed and guidelines for accurate copyingwereintroduced.³⁴ In the history of , Christian authorssuch as of Alexandria (c. 184—c. 253) and (347–420) or Jewish authorssuch as (1089—c. 1167) and (1160 –1235) were earlyforerunners who wereaware of textual variants and related problems in the transmission of the Bible. Polqar seems to accept,atleast for amoment,thatKabbalah could indeed rely on ancient sources, onlyfor the purpose of his argumentation. Hence, he aims to implyaso-called qal wa-ḥomer conclusion or an argumentum afortiori: if there are variants in even the HolyScriptures despite the efforts made in copyingand checking them, then the kabbalistic sources must be all the more deficient and there- fore full of (scribal) errors and simply unreliable. But the implicit opposite case would probablybeevenmore subversive:should there be no textual variants in a specific kabbalistic sourceofpurported old age, such an absence of variants would provethat the sourcewas not an ancient one. Polqar’simplicit sceptical argument of doubting the textual accuracy of kabbal- istic sources concerning their transmission since antiquity deconstructs Kabbalah’s presentation of itself as an ancient tradition. Later,inthe seventeenth century, this argument was elaborated into the philological method of textual criticism (e.g. Jean Morin and Richard Simon) and eventuallyinto ageneral scepticism con- cerningancientsources and the HolyScriptures.However,inmyview,Polqar did not intend this kind of general sceptical strategy regardingtextual reliability.Inad- dition,Iwould like to emphasise thatinPolqar’sview,Kabbalah is understood first and foremost as awritten text basedonancient written sources. This mayapplyfor kabbalistic works as the Sefer ha-Bahir attributed to Rabbi Neḥuniah ben ha-Qanah or the Sefer ha-Zohar attributed to Rabbi Shimʽon bar Yoḥai. However,hedoes not consider either the possibility of an oral transmission of kabbalistic lores viafiliation from master to student from ancienttimes or the recent or contemporary production of kabbalistic texts in his time. In the following,Polqar describes the peculiarities of kabbalistic writings:

And when aman reads the books found amongthese kabbalists,hewill find their words in two ways:

 Cf. Ezra7:6;2Esdras 14:44– 46;Babylonian Talmud, 21b.  Cf. , Hellenism in JewishPalestine (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1994), 20–37;Emanuel Tov, Textual Criticism of the HebrewBible (Minneapolis:Fortress Press, 2001). 58 Bill Rebiger

The first is strangewords(which) frightenthe listener(but) without signifying anymatter of in- ternal logic, and they areonlybabbling of the lips.And (the) wickedness of their hearts and (the) strength of their stupidity cause them to justify and believeinamatter beforeits percep- tion, somethingwhich it is forbidden (to do) according to the art of logic. Forthey know not, nei- ther will they understand; they walkonindarkness [Psalm 82:5]. And the secondisthat the majority of things (they write) which arepossible for man to contem- plateonany matter by internal logic will be found to be the oppositeofwhatthe intellect and the judgment³⁵ would approve.And others of them arecompleteheresy duetothe contradiction of the unity of God, blessed be He,and adenial of His real attributes.³⁶

As in the previous example, Polqar does not refer to the essentials of the (theosoph- ical) Kabbalah such as the concept of the Sefirot or the theurgical interpretation of the commandments. Instead, he focusses on the meaning of logic and intellectual approachesfrom aphilosophical or epistemological perspective.First,the aforemen- tioned ‘strangewords’ are aliteral translation of the Latin technical term nomina bar- bara,known as the divine, angelic, or demonicmagical names usedinadjurations. These names—usuallywithout asemantic meaning in the languageofthe magical text and its users—are nevertheless acknowledgedbymagicians and clients as the agents of magical efficacy.³⁷ As these names are often used in maleficent magic, they are frighteningfor the reader.Abroader interpretation of those ‘strange words’ emphasises the lack of internal logic and argument.Therefore, they are noth- ing but nonsense or ‘babblingofthe lips.’ Again, Polqar dogmaticallyadjudgesthe kabbalists as wicked and stupid. Secondly, accordingtoPolqar,kabbalistic texts contradict logical principles in most cases. Incidentally, the Hebrew phrase for ‘judgment’ that Polqar uses is shiqqul ha-da‘at or ‘balancing of the mind.’ Perhaps this phrase somehow recalls the scep- tical ability to balance out the persuasiveforceofarguments for and against anydis- puted claim (equipollence). Furthermore,Polqar asserts Kabbalah to be not onlynon- logical, but also heretical. Indictment of heresy is often used in polemics.³⁸ At the end of the quoted passage, Polqar is very probablyalludingtothe kabbalistic con- cept of the tenSefirot when he writes: ‘Othersofthem are completeheresy due to

 Literally ‘the balancingofthe mind’ or ‘common sense.’ כו יש רק הא דא בם פס יר הם מנ אצ םי המ קמ בו םיל : Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,156,line 25 to 157,line 6 אה הל מי אצ בד יר םה שב ינ נפ םי : אה תח למ תו רז תו במ יה ול את הל וש עמ לב ית ומ ור עת של םו נע ןי הב יג ןו פה ינ ימ או ני כם יכ םא ומ אצ פש ית בם דבל , זו וד לן םב תו קו סף לכ תו ים יב םא הל דצ קי לו אה ימ בן בד טר םר יצ ורו , המ הש או אנ רס מב אל תכ הה יג ןו , יכ אל די וע לו יא יב ונ חב כש יה הת כל ו . הו נש כי רי בו דה רב םי שא אר שפ לר תה וב ןנ הב הם דא שם םו נע ןי הב יג ןו פה ינ ימ י )!( מי אצ בו פה מך שה חי יי הב כש ול קש לו דה תע מו צק םת פכ רי גה ומ הר סמ ית תר חי דו אה בל ה״ הו חכ תש . את יר מאהו ית םי  On nomina barbara and the use of magical names in Jewish magic, cf. Trachtenberg, JewishMagic and Superstition,78–103;Idel, Language,Torah, and Hermeneutics in Abraham Abulafia,82–124; Daniel Abrams, “From GermanytoSpain: Numerology as aMystical Technique,” Journal of Jewish Studies 47 (1996): 43 – 63.  On indictment of heresy as asceptical strategy, cf. Rebiger, “Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luz- zatto’sPresentation of the Kabbalists in his Discorso,” 63 – 64. ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqar against Kabbalah 59

the contradiction of the unity of God, blessed be He, and adenial of His real attrib- utes.’ The concept of the tenSefirot contradicting the unity of God and, in doing so, the coreconcept of amonotheistic religion, is one of the major arguments levelled by the Jewish opponents of Kabbalah. Thus, it is no coincidencethat manyanti-kabbal- istic criticisms are embedded in the context of anti-Christian polemics against the concept of the Trinity.Accordingly, circa 1230 –1235,Meirben Simon ha-Me’ili of Nar- bonne,mostprobablythe first known opponent of Kabbalah, wroteabout the kab- balistsinhis anti-Christian polemicalwork Milḥemet Miṣwah (‘WarbyCommand- ment’)inapassagecomparingthe concept of the Trinitywith that of the Sefirot: ‘Do there exist in our time, even among the religions of the , deniers³⁹ of the unity of God,blessed be He, more (worthless) than these [i.e. kabbalists]?’⁴⁰ Some decades later,circa 1280,the ecstatic kabbalist Abraham Abulafia further ela- borated this line of argument in an epistle to his disciple entitled Ve-Zot le-Yehudah. In his letter, Abulafia sharplycriticised the even worse caseofthe concept of the ten Sefirot in the theosophic Kabbalah.⁴¹ The next lines of Polqar’sattack on the second group deal with the opposition between kabbalists and philosophers:

And those kabbaliststowhom Ispeak aresobrazen as to raise their voices to mock and despise those whomake efforts to read the books of philosophy. And they saytothem [i.e. the philos- ophers]: ‘Whydoyou wasteyour days in studyingthese books of foolishness, sinceman’sintel- lect is unable to attain hidden (matters), to performmiracles, and to change their ?’ And they [i.e. the kabbalists] aresopresumptuous in themselvesas(to claim that) they attain these matters without anyeffort and labour,but onlybycopyingthose books which arevenerated in

.suggested by Alon Goshen-Gottstein; cf וכ רפ םי books’)to ‘ ) פס םיר  Here Ifollow the conjecture of idem, “The Triune and the Decaune God: Christianityand Kabbalah as Objects of Jewish Polemics with Special ReferencetoMeir ben Simeon of Narbonne’s Milhemet Mitzva,” in Religious Polemics in Context,eds.Theo L. Hettema and Arie van der Kooij (Assen: Royal VanGorcum, 2004): 190 n. 76.  The Hebrew textisfound in the onlymanuscript attesting Milḥemet Miṣwah—that is, the Sephar- dic manuscript written around 1300,MSParma 2749 (De Rossi 155), fol. 231b—and was published in a slightlyabridgedform by Gershom Scholem, “Te‘udah ḥadašah le-rešit ha-qabbalah” [Hebrew], in Sefer Bialik,ed. Yaʽakov Fikhman (Tel Aviv:Hoṣa’at va’ad ha-yoveluve-hishtatfut hoṣa’at omanut, 1934): 146 – 149, reprinted in Gershom Scholem, Studies in Kabbalah,ed. Yosef ben Shelomo, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1998), 7–38;cf. the English translation of the whole passageinidem, Origins of the Kabbalah,398–400;cf. furthermoreHeinrich Gross, “Meïr b. Simon und seine Schrift Milche- meth Mizwa,” Monatsschriftfür Geschichte und Wissenschaftdes Judentums 30 (1881): 295–305,444– 452and 554–569; , “The Bahir and the Zohar,” JewishQuarterly Review 4(1892):357– 360.  Abraham Abulafia, Sefer Razei Ḥayyei ʽOlam ha-Ba (Jerusalem: Amnon Gross, 1999), 22ff.; cf. Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives,xii; idem, Studies in Ecstatic Kabbalah,139;Elliot R. Wolf- son, “The Doctrine of Sefirot in the Prophetic Kabbalah of Abraham Abulafia,” JewishStudies Quar- terly 2.4(1995): 341–343. 60 Bill Rebiger

their eyes (and) which wereconcealed and hidden in the houses of the glorious sagesuntil God deliveredtheir beingcopied into their hands.⁴²

In this passage, Polqar reflects the frontline between kabbalists and philosophers mockinglycalling one another as foolish and non-effective.When the kabbalist claims that the philosopher is not able to attain hidden matters,toperform , or to changenature, accordingtoPolqar he implicitlystatesthat he himself is able to do so. All threeabilities define the specific features of abiblical prophet.Incontrast, aphilosopher such as Polqar cannot understand how one could claim such an abil- ity without anyintellectual effort but relying onlyontransmitted texts. Here, the tex- tual criticism concerning the accuracy and reliability of the transmission of kabbal- istic texts alreadyimplicitlypresented in the previous section leads to the final subversive goal of his argument,which is specificallythe completeneglect of that which is essential to Kabbalah according to its abovementioned literalmeaning, i.e. its claim of being areliable tradition. The sentenceabout the books ‘which wereconcealedand hidden in the houses of the glorioussages’ probablyalludes to the pseudepigraphicalattributionofthe Sefer ha-Zohar to Rabbi Shimʽon bar Yoḥai, who livedinthe second century,and to the thirteenth-century kabbalists’ explanation as to whythis and similar texts had onlyappeared now aftercenturies of being hidden.So, for example, Mosesde Leon, who was, at least to acertain degree, engaged in the production of zoharic lit- erature, writesinhis Sefer Mishkan ha-ʽEdut:

Concerningthis matter,thereare hidden mysteries and secretthings which areunknown to men. Youwill now see that Iamrevealingdeep and secret mysteries which the holysagesregarded as sacredand hidden, profound matters which properlyspeakingare not fit for revelation so that they maynot become atargetfor the wit of every idle person. […]And they [the sages] have closed and locked the door behind their words and hidden all their mystical books,because they sawthat the time had not come to reveal and publish them.⁴³

In his second example, Polqar presents Kabbalah as first and foremost being practi- cal Kabbalah, although in this case it is actuallynon-kabbalistic magic. In Polqar’s

הו קמ בו יל הם לא אה רש נא מי בד ער המ ים יע וז נפ םהי : Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger, 157,lines 6–14 יו יר ומ וק םל הל על גי לו זב תו לא מה תש לד םי קל ור בא פס יר פה לי סו פו אי או מו יר אם יל םה , מל זה תה לב יו ימ םכ הב תוג פס יר הה לב םי לא אה רח שא אר ןי חכ של לכ אה םד הל יש הג ענ מל תו לו שע תו נה לפ וא ות של ונ הת עבט , מו נת אש םי עב מצ כם הי ים יש וג בד יר אם הל במ יל וש ים יג הע עו למ קר הב תע תק פס יר הם כנ דב םי עב ני םהי , שא הר וי נג זו םי נו תס יר בם תב הי כח ימ הם פמ או םיר , דע שא אר הנ אה הל םי יל םד עה קת םת..  Moses de Leon, Sefer Mishkan ha-ʽEdut,ed. Avishai BarAsher (: Press,2013), 118–119;English translation by Gershom Scholem, Major TrendsinJewishMysticism (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), 201–202; cf. Boaz Huss, TheZohar: Reception and Impact (Oxfordand Port- land, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2016), 42. ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqaragainst Kabbalah 61

view,magicians—as well as astrologers—believeonlyinaconcept of that is entirelyerroneous.⁴⁴ In continuing the passagequoted, he tells the following story:

And aman whoisacknowledgedamongour masses for (his) knowledge of Kabbalah and (his) performance , whose name is MaestreMarcus, told me that in his youth his onlyac- tivity was seekingfor wisdom. And he heardpeople sayingthat in aland far away from the is- lands of Ashkenaz (therelived) avery wise man, and he sought him out.And he went and trav- elled until he reached him in his land. And he dwelt with him for manydays, he workedinhis house and served him. When this man sawhis diligenceand the swiftness of his service, his work was highlyesteemed in his eyes, he greatlyhonoured him and provided him with hospital- ity.Heonlyavoided teaching him anything, lest he learn (it) and escape from him and return to his land. When he had been therealong time [Genesis 26:8], he was concerned that he was (over- ly)delayedand detained there, and he was sorry for him.⁴⁵

Polqar claims that acertain man called Maestre Marcus told him how he had re- ceivedesoteric or magical knowledge in his youth. The peculiar name ‘Marcus’ is also mentioned in other sources in the context of magical techniquesand practices, as well as their transmissions. Thus, in the collection of magical recipes in Ms Bib- liothèque de Genève, Comites Latentes 145, Rabbi Elijah Menaḥem ben Moses of Lon- don (c. 1220 –1284) is connected to acertain Marcus.⁴⁶ But if this Marcus is the same in both accounts, then the ‘very wise man’ could probablybeidentifiedasRabbi El- ijah of London. Rabbi Elijah is indeedknown for his use of divine names for protec- tive purposes and for transmitting magical adjurations.⁴⁷ In line with Rabbi Elijah and his relation to Marcus,the obscure ‘islands of Ashkenaz’ mentioned in Polqar’s text quoted abovemay quite probablybeidentified as . Alreadyinthe third chapter of his ʽEzer ha-Dat,Polqar mentions Ashkenaz—together with France—as places wheremagic dealingwith the namesofangels and is quite popular among the Jews.⁴⁸ However,itisnot entirely clear whether Polqar’sMarcus is aficti- tious or historicalcharacter and whether Polqar’saccount describes areal personal encounter with him.⁴⁹ Obviously, it is not quite plausible that Marcus had in fact told the story of his acquisition of esoteric knowledge to Polqar in such aself-effacing

 Cf. the fourth chapterinibidem,159 – 161. הו יג לד אי שי ומ זח בק מה ונינו יב יד תע קה לב וה מב שע נה לפ תוא , מש מו יא טש יר רמ שוק , : Ibidem,157,lines 14– 23 יכ נב רע תו לו הא תי מה אל תכ כו אי בם קב תש חה המכ , שו עמ וא רמ םי , יכ אב ץר חר קו מה יא אי כש זנ יא חש םכ דאמ , םשו גמ תמ או יל ו . יו ךל לה ךו נו וס עע הד יג וע אל צר ו , יו בש מע יו ימ רם יב ום עי וב בד יב ות יו מש הש ו . כו אר תו אה שי הה או רח צי ותו קו ול שת ומ וש קי הר אמ בד יע ינ עו וב תד וו רי כב וב וד מו אש את ור תח ו , קר דח מל מל וד בד פר ין מל וד בי חר ממ ונ יו וש אב לא . רא וצ . יו יה יכ רא וכ ול םש יה ימ ום די גא לע וב שש וו תה המ המ שו ום צי לר ול  Ms Bibliothèque de Genève, Comites Latentes 145(formerlyMsSassoon 290), pp. 379–381.  Cf. Ephraim Kanarfogel, “Peering through the Lattices”:Mystical, Magical, and Pietistic Dimensions in the Tosafist Period (Detroit: Wayne StateUniversity Press, 2000), 232–233.  See Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,115.  On Marcus and Rabbi Elijah of London, including Polqar’saccount,cf. Amos Goldreich, Automat- ic WritinginZoharicLiterature and Modernism [in Hebrew] (Los Angeles:Cherub Press,2010), 289– 298. 62 Bill Rebiger

way. Moreover,the Latin name Marcus sounds more Christian than Jewish. It is most likelythat Polqar wished to indicate some Christian influenceonthis Jeworthat he was aformer Jewwho had converted to Christianity, which is quite fitting regarding his adversary Abner,who called himself Alfonso of Valladolid. Acrucial point mentioned aboveisthatthe wise man ‘avoidedteaching him any- thing.’ Thus from the outset,Maestre Marcus was obviouslynot adignified student deserving of at least some of his master’sknowledge.His not beingworthyofthis acquisition willbecome clear as the story continues:

And he said to himself, ‘Sincethe man is not interested in teaching me, Iwill therefore turn aside [Exodus3:3]ifIcan take alook in his book and see it,then Iwill cast my eyeonitand copyit.’ And night fell, and he peeredinto the innermost part of his chamber and, behold, the man was recliningonhis bed, reading in arespected and fine⁵⁰ book. And when fatigue weighed heavily upon him and sleep overtook him, he placed the book under his head and fell asleep.And when he [i.e. MaestreMarcus] sawthat he was deeplyasleep, he came into the chamberand stealthily placed his hand under his head and stole the book, and then he hastened to the ink and parch- ment to writeitout.And when the sun rose, behold, he had finished copyingit, and then he returned it to the placewhereitwas takenfrom.⁵¹

It is explicit here that Maestre Marcus plannedtosteal the book for ashortperiod and to copy it while its owner was asleep. This was obviously the onlyway for him to obtain the secrets that his master had chosen to withhold from him. The plac- ing of asecret book under the head of someonewho is asleep probablyalludes to the magical practice of adream request (she’elat ḥalom in Hebrew).⁵² Therefore, in one magical fragment from the Genizah destinedfor this purpose,the following in- struction is preserved: ‘Write the entire issue and place it under your head.’⁵³ Here, it is clear from the context that ‘entire issue’ means divine names. And in fact,the se- cret book under the head contains divinenames, as mentioned in the continuation of

 The Hebrew na’eh should probablybecorrected to nora, ‘awesome.’ יו מא בר בל או רח שא אר ןי פח הץ יא לש מל נד י : Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger, 157,line 23 to 158, line 3 סא רו נה אא אם כו לל זח תו סב רפ וו רא הא ו , שא מי עה ני עי יל וו עא ית הק ו . יו יה לב לי וה שה יג בח דח יר דח ור הו הנ אה שי ומ בס לע טמ ות , וק אר פסב נר דבכ נו הא . כו כרשא דב עה יל הו יע פי תו או סנ הת הו יש הנ , םש סה רפ חת מת אר וש ית וו יי ןש , כו רשא אר תה קו שף תנ בו תא ךו חה רד יו אב די מו אר וש ית בו טל , יו נג בו סה רפ יו המ אר הל יד וו לא קה ףל יו תכ הב ו . יו יה עכ תול . שה רח הו הנ לכ מה עה ית וק , יו יש הב או הל קמ םו שא לר חק מו םש  On dream requests in medieval Jewish magic, cf., e.g., Trachtenberg, JewishMagic and Supersti- tion,241– 243; Moshe Idel, “On Še’elat Ḥalom in Ḥasidei Aškenaz: Sourcesand Influences,” Materia Giudaica 10 (2005): 99–109.  See the CairoGenizahfragment,PennsylvaniaUniversity H457,fol. 1a/10 (unpublished, my trans- lation). The same magical practicecan be found in another Genizah fragmentconcerning the recov- ery of lost ,cf. CUL T.-S.K1.96,fol. 2a/12–13,inMagische Texte aus der Kairoer Geniza,vol. 3, eds.Peter Schäfer and Shaul Shaked (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999): 369(No. 84). On this fragment and the placingofthe adjuration text under one’shead, see YuvalHarari, “ and the Treasure of Gold: NotesonaDream Inquiry Text from the CairoGenizah,” in Continuity and Innovation in the Magical Tradition,eds.Gideon Bohak, YuvalHarari, and Shaul Shaked (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011): 307–308. ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqar against Kabbalah 63

Polqar’sstory.Itisstriking thatinone of the magical adjurations transmitted by Rabbi Elijah of London, adream request is also intended.⁵⁴ However,the placing of the book under the head can also simplyservetoprotect it from thieves, even though—as we learn from Polqar’sstory—this precaution against theft was somewhat unsuccessful. The concluding part of the story of Maestre Marcus reads as follows:

And when he sawthat God had caused his waytosucceed,and that he had achieved his desire and yearning,heset out for his land, which was adistanceoffour months away.But the dis- tancewas shortened for him by the power of the adjuration of one of the (divine) names which were written in this book. And he came to his home before athirdofthe day(was over). Beliefs in such stories of foolishness and all types of nonsense are, on account of our sins,very prevalent amongmanyofthe people from the of our nation.⁵⁵

Here, awell-known magical technique is mentioned, the so-called ‘shortening of the path’ or ‘path jumping’ (qefiṣat ha-derekh in Hebrew). The goal of this technique is a miraculous journey between two distant places in ashort time.⁵⁶ Polqar describes Maestre Marcus’ return to his homeland using the technicalterminologyestablished in Jewishmagic. The use of magical names in an adjuration for this purpose is well attested in medieval Jewish magic.⁵⁷ The details in the story of Maestre Marcus that Polqar presents clearlyshow his familiarity with Jewish magical traditions, their fea- tures,and their technical language. In anycase, it is decisive that Polqar does not provide the reader either with adescription of the magical practice itself, including an adjuration, or with anymentionofthe effective name(s) of God.⁵⁸ Thus, the con- tinuous disseminationofthe content and essence of magic is not supported, at least by Polqar.Instead, he chooses another wayofdealingwith the challengeofmagical beliefs and practices performedbyJews. In fact,thosewho execute magical practices

 Cf. Kanarfogel, Peering through the Lattices,232. בו אר תו כו הי לצ חי אה אל דת כר ו , הו יש תג וא ות חו קש ו , : Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger, 158, lines 3–9 יו םש בל או אל צר או רש יה הת חר קו מה לה אך בר הע דח םיש , תו פק ץו ול אה ץר כב אח כז תר םש ןמ שה ומ הת תכ בו םי רפסב הה או , יו אב לא יב ות רט שם יל יש הת םוי . ומאו ונ סת ופ יר בה יל כם לא וה ימ ינ הה ות יל רם יב מם דא עב ונו ית ונ הב בר אה שנ םי . נמ בכ יד וא תמ וני  Cf. Mark Verman and Shulamit H. Adler, “Path Jumpinginthe Jewish Magical Tradition,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 1(1993/94): 131–148; Gedalyah Nigal, Magic,Mysticism and Hasidism: TheSuperna- tural in JewishThought (Northvale,NJ: Jason Aronson, 1994), 33– 49.  Cf., e.g., the magical fragments stemmingfromthe Cairo Genizah JTSL ENA2871,fol. 7b/7,in Magische Texte aus der Kairoer Geniza,vol. 2, eds.Peter Schäfer and Shaul Shaked (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997): 127(No. 28); CUL T.-S.K1.115,fol. 1b/9 – 12, in ibidem,155 (No. 31); CUL T.-S. AS 143.171, fol. 2b/1–2, in Magische Texte aus der Kairoer Geniza,vol. 3, eds.Peter Schäfer and Shaul Shaked (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999): 137 (No. 68).  In the last dialogueofthe second chapter,the traditionalist mentionsthe divine names of forty- two and seventy-twolettersamongthe secrets he has acquired; see Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger, 86.Onthese names,see Trachtenberg, JewishMagic and Superstition,94–97.Inthe section on magi- cians also included in the fourth chapter,Polqar actuallydescribestwo examples of magic—alove spell and aspell for winninggamesofdice. However,inboth cases,neither an incantation nor anymagical name is mentioned; see Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,160 –161. 64 Bill Rebiger

do not necessarilyclaim to have theoretical knowledge (scientia)concerning the rea- sons for the efficacy of magic, but usually the practitioner onlyhas practical skills (ars)for performing amagical act.Asepistemological scepticism would be directed against aknowledge claim but not against practical skills,Polqar chose another sceptical elementinhis polemic. Usually,the well-known topos of ‘stolen wisdom’ or ‘theft of wisdom’ dealswith knowledge transferbetween different nations, such as the Jews and the Greeks.⁵⁹ Here, Polqar uses this topos in aslightlydifferent waytodeconstruct the self-conception and self-imageofJewishkabbalists.For the purpose of his argument,Polqar does not doubtthe of wisdom with regard to kabbalistic claims, but rather the legitimation of their ownership of this wisdom. Therefore, his purpose is to delegitimise his opponents’ authority and reliability by using stories and acknowledgedbythe kabbalists.⁶⁰ The crucial point of his method is to avoid answering the question regarding the kabbalists’ claims that Kabbalah is knowledge or indeed even wisdom. At the end of this passage, Polqar once again presents his epistemological prem- ises on the possibilityofknowledge.Atthe same moment,heaims to define ‘true tradition’ as opposed to the self-imageofKabbalah:

And these ignorants⁶¹ do not know,nor do they understand, that we possess no faculty more honoured and moreelevated than the rational faculty,through which we can attain the hidden (matters). And the onlyway to attain this faculty is through seekingout the middle term and the construction of ademonstration. To be sure, the apprehension of the prophet is not (attained) through combiningthe premises and seekingout the demonstration, but throughawaymore honoured and elevated than them. However,the apprehension of the hearers of his words and (what) they receive [meqabbelim]fromhim cannot be comparedtoit[i.e.the prophet’sap- prehension] in anyway.And the topicofthe true tradition [qabbalah]and the measureofthe apprehension of those whoreceive [meqabbelim]itfromthe mouth of the prophet or from one who receives[meqabbel](it) fromanother whoreceived[mequbbal]itiswritten in the book Musar ha-Banim [‘The Instruction of the Sons’](written) by me.⁶²

Foraphilosopher such as Polqar,men are able to attain hidden thingswith the help of the rationalfaculty, which is onlypossible by following the principles of Aristote- lian . The prophet’sway of attaining hidden matters is not onlydifferent to this philosophical approach, but also ‘more honoured and elevated.’ Nevertheless,

 Cf. Abraham Melamed, TheMyth of the JewishOrigins of Science and Philosophy [in Hebrew] (Jer- usalem: Magnes Press, 2010), 178 – 219and now Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiryinto Jew- ishPhilosophyand Scepticism (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 21–42.  On delegitimation as asceptical strategy, cf. Rebiger, “Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto’s Presentation of the Kabbalists in his Discorso,” 64–66.  Literally ‘those who are lackingunderstanding,’ heremeaningthe kabbalists. חו רס די תע לא לה יא עד וו אל תי וב ננ כו אי ןי נב כו אח רח : Polgar, Ezer HaDat,ed. Levinger,158, lines 9–17 כנ דב מו וע הל ןמ הה גו אה רש וב ינ לכ הל יש הג ענ מל תו , חו גש הת חכ הזה יא הנ יכ םא בב שק גת וב אל צמ יע בו ינ מן תפו . ףא מא םנ שה תג נה יב אא ני הנ הב כר תב קה מד תו בו שק מת תפו , יכ םא דב ךר כנ דב מו וע הל ממ ונ , קר שח תג וש עמ די רב וי מו בק יל מם נמ או ני הנ וד המ לא הי שב םו נע ןי . עו קס קה לב הה מא תית שו עי רו שה תג מה בק יל אם תו מה יפ נה יב אא מו ימ . מש בק מל קמ בו אל רח , לה הא או תכ בו סב רפ ” ומ רס בה םינ “ שא לר יל ScepticalElements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqaragainst Kabbalah 65

neither the receiverofthe prophetic tradition nor the tradition itself share the same quality of apprehension. The assumption that the prophet and the receivers of his tradition are epistemologicallyequal is considered the kabbalists’ main mistake. Un- fortunately, the elaboration of the true Kabbalah in Polqar’s Musar ha-Banim (men- tioned above) is unknown as the book did not survive.

Conclusion

The Hebrew word ‘Kabbalah’ literallymeans ‘tradition.’ Polqar’sgoal in his attack on the kabbalists is to undermine the acceptance of kabbalistic opinions among his con- temporaries by implementing asceptical element which argues that Kabbalah is not areal tradition. In doing so, he attemptstoundermine the reliability of the claim that the Kabbalah possesses atradition that dates back to the time of the ancient proph- ets. Polqar’smain sceptical elements are the focus on doubts about the textual ac- curacy of kabbalistic sources and the question of whether the kabbalists acquired their knowledge honestly. Thus, Polqar deconstructs Kabbalah’sself-presentation as an ancient tradition continuouslytransmitted since antiquity on the one hand and the of kabbalistic authorities on the other.Inboth examples, Polqar does not deal with the specific content of kabbalistic claims, but with the general framework of tradition and its reception of them, thus emphasising the literalmean- ing of Kabbalah. The qal wa-ḥomer conclusion or argumentum afortiori usedinthe first example concerning the deficiencyofkabbalistic texts is not convincing when kabbalists claim that they copied and checked kabbalistic texts in the same way as the HolyScriptures. The weakness of Polqar’sargument in his second example im- plementingthe story of Maestre Marcus is found in the inductive reasoning: even if one accepts the veracity of Polqar’spersonal story of Maestre Marcus,itnonetheless provides onlyone example of the topos of stolen wisdom but cannot as such guar- antee its general validityfor all kabbalistic texts.Therefore, Iwould not call Polqar’s approach afully-fledgedsceptical strategy, but rather one which onlycontains ele- ments of scepticism which, in turn,are embedded in adogmatic stance.

Giuseppe Veltri Apologetic, Empiricism, and Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto

Introduction

Simone Luzzatto (?1583–1663)¹ is the first Jewofthe earlymodern period who, im- bued with political philosophical ideas and asceptical attitude, presented anew em- pirical concept of Judaism as an integralpart of society while alsoremainingascep- tic intellectual who critically engaged modern sciences and philosophy. He is philosophicallyinstep with the work of the rabbi, preacher,and philosopher (c. 1533–1590), who asserted the near perfection of mathematics against the weakness of the (new) sciences.² Forthe first time in the history of Jewish philosophy, ascholar proclaimed him- self asceptic following the New . Alreadyinhis first rather apologetic-po- litical work, the Discorso circa il stato degli Hebrei (1638), Luzzatto qualifies himself as new academician:

Political matters arefull of alterations and contingencies,and in this Discorso Ipromised I would follow the probable and the verisimilar,³ just as anew academician would, and in so doing [the academician] differs from the mathematicians that areused to followingthe - ly verifiable and undeniable.⁴

This article is achapter Ipublished in my recent book Alienated Wisdom. Enquiry into JewishPhilos- ophy and Scepticism (Boston and Berlin: De Gruyter,2018), 213–232, here reprinted forthe Year- book.

 Forabibliography of and on Luzzatto, see Simone Luzzatto, Scritti politici efilosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento,eds.Giuseppe Veltri in cooperation with Anna Lissa and Paola Fer- ruta (Milan: Bompiani, 2013), 465–499.Inthis volumethe Discorso as well as the Socrate are edited; all quotations of the original textare from this edition.  This was also atopic of the Italian , in which the studyofscienceand mathematicsto- gether with the liberal was both common and appreciated; see Michele Battagia, Delle accademie Veneziane dissertazione storica (:Orlandelli, 1826), 35.  Foradiscussiononthe term πιθανός as ‘verisimilar’,see PierreGassendiinSintagma (1658) I, De logicae fine,5,Opera 1, 79b;cf. Robert Pasnau, After Certainty:AHistoryofOur EpistemicIdeals and Illusions (Oxford: ,2017); on the second volume of the Exercitationes - icae adversus Aristoteleos II, VI,6(1659), cf. Delphine Bellis, “Nos in Diem Vivimus: Gassendi’sProb- abilism and Academic PhilosophyfromDay to Day,” in Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early ,eds.PlinioJunqueira Smith and Sébastien Charles (New York: Springer, 2016): 125–152; on probable and verisimilar,see ibidem,130 –131.  Luzzatto, Discorso,30r.

OpenAccess. ©2018 Giuseppe Veltri, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-005 68 Giuseppe Veltri

Being amathematician, as we can infer at least from some parts of his Socrate (1651),⁵ Luzzatto was acquainted with axiomatic systems, demonstrablyconsistent because of theirabsenceofcontradiction per definitionem. He was, however,of the opinion that axiomaticlogic does not work in the consideration of human affairs and political matters,and thatthe philosopher cannot reach ajudgment on them with the sole help of probable and verisimilarargumentations because contradiction is here more often the rule than the exception. The adoption of the categories of plau- sibility and verisimilitude occurred first in the Discorso, the first field of his sceptical training,while in Socrate he presents very detailed strategies against dogmatic thoughtinalmost every branch of human science and wisdom. To my knowledge, Socrate is the first extant treatise on scepticism writtenbyaJew. The main emphasis here will be, therefore, to evince some subtle sceptical strat- egies Luzzatto usedtosubstantiate the (right of)existenceofthe Jews despite and because of their differences in the face of the Venetian society and government; he weakened the arguments against Judaism and the Jews that were generated by their detractors and enemies. Although the Discorso and Socrate do have very different literarystructures and thereforebelong to different genres and address twodifferent types of audience, it is my conviction that both of them follow the samesceptic logic:tocounter dogmatic ideas and preconceptions with the intent to createatleast an equipollence of argu- ments and culminate politicallywith the pragmatic issue of how to integrate the Jews into Venetian society.Inthe Discorso,Luzzatto defends the integral role of the Jews in the Venetian society against the alleged reason of political and religious incompati- bilities between them and Christianity. In his philosophicalwork Socrate,heisinfa- vour of the for because of the impossibility of an impartial process and correspondent plausible judgment.Inthe first case, we have empiricism against dogmatism, in the second we observe the necessity of the epoché; all of them are sceptical strategies.Inthis essay, Iwill deal primarilywith the Discor- so.

1Apologyand Apologetic

Accordingtosome scholars, Luzzatto’s Discorso falls into the category of the apology or ‘modern’ apologetics of Judaism in Venice.⁶ Because of my special researchinter- est focussed on sceptical strategies, it is worthwhile to explain some conceptssur- roundingthe field of apology/apologia in modern (English) language.

 Cf. Luzzatto, Socrate,68.  Cf. Francesca Trivellato, “Jews and EarlyModern Economy,” in TheCambridgeHistoryofJudaism, vol. 7: TheEarly Modern World, 1500–1815, eds. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe (Cambridge:Cam- bridge University Press, 2018): 161. Apologetic, Empiricism,and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 69

The terms apology,apologia, and apologetics seem to philologicallyincludethe same concept,but philologydoes not playthe decisive role here. Todaythe English wordapology means ‘the act of declaring one’sregret,remorse, or sorrow for having insulted, failed, injured, harmed or wronged another.’⁷ Yet, apologia derives from the same Latin word apologia and means what the Greek coinage ἀπολογία in substance addresses: ‘verbaldefence, speech in defence.’ The first literaryand philosophical occurrenceknown to me is the Apologia of Socrates. By contrast, apologetics is systematic argumentative discourse in defence of a doctrine/ religion, as every dictionary confirms.⁸ The method of the defence of apol- ogetics maybesimilar to apologia but the goal is very different.Apologetics mayand could have amissionary objective to convert people to the ‘true’ religion, the ‘right’ doctrine, while an apologia is primarilyadefence designed to convince the judge of one’sinnocenceinoppositiontoaprosecutor’sarguments. The goal is to reach at least an equipollence of arguments. At anyrate,anapologia is by no means an apology;itisnot aremorseful speech or aterm acknowledging wrongful or offensive action and it must also be properlylocated in the realm of and in phil- osophical/rhetoric dialectic discussions. Further,itiswell-known that in an accusatorial process the task of the defendant is to try to abate every charge of the accusation by using an arsenal of rhetorical tools,adducingevidence,(accurate)testimony, and (alleged or consistent) proof: all strategies in order to undermine the claim and argument of the (state) prosecutor. Iwill come backtothis point laterinmydiscussion of rhetorical logic and the results of arabbinicdiscussion. At this point,Iwould like to confine myself onlytowritten apologias by emphasising that writings in defence of individual or (political,reli- gious, ethnic) groups against the chargesofthe majority or the ruling powers,are called ‘apologia’ because they are defending their own point of view,behaviour,or identity which are different from that of the majority. The strategies involved in apol- ogia and apologetics are similar: to produce evidence to counter the adversary,tore- duceanaccusation to aself-contradiction, and to disavowthe charges, removingall legitimacy and plausibilityfrom the construction of the prosecutor’sindictment. Luzzatto adopts this strategy for dismantlingthe accusation that the Jews are un- suitable to Christian society duetotheir identity as adifferent ethnic group and re- ligion. He does not repeat ancientand traditional arguments of antiquity and (mes- sianic) legitimacy in favour of the Jews, but he refers to the experiential, empirical argument of the socially cohesive nature and economic usefulnessofthe Jews of Ven- ice. It is of course well known that empiricism and scepticism are not the same phil- osophical movement;however,they use very similar strategies and base their argu- ments on pragmatic facts basedonexperience.

 Quoted fromMihaela Mihai, “Apology,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,http://www.iep.ut- m.edu/apology/(accessed 3May,2018).  See, for example, https://www.britannica.com/topic/apologetics (accessed3May, 2018). 70 Giuseppe Veltri

Afew words and notations should be addressed towardsthe topic of experience as a philosophoumenon both of the empiricism and scepticism.⁹ The question of sim- ilarity between the two Greek schools is very old and goes backtoSextus Empiricus. Nevertheless,thereismore. The discussion of whether Sextus, author of the main fonts of ancient scepticism, was an empiricist or not,assome ancient sources sug- gest,¹⁰ does not obscure the fact that ancient empiricism did not admit adogmatic vision of healing in its methods. Sextus recognises some validity to theirstrategies, when he affirms:

Some saythat the Sceptical philosophyisthe same as the Empiric school in medicine. But you must realize that if this form of Empiricism makes affirmations about the inapprehensibility of unclear matters, then it is not the same as Scepticism, nor would it be appropriate for Sceptics to take up with that school.¹¹

Although he seems to counter medical empiricism, he does seem to accept the med- ical method:

They might rather adopt,asitseems to me, what is called the Method; for this alone of the med- ical schools seems to practise no rashness in unclear matters and [the empiricist school] does not presume to saywhether they areapprehensible or inapprehensible, but it follows what is apparent,takingthence, in line with Sceptical practice, what seems to be expedient.¹²

Independent from the question of the goals and of the approach to medicine,Sextus cannot negate the fact that empiricism and scepticism adopt very similar tactics.¹³ Both of them back their strategies with experience (ἐμπειρία), amedicalattitude of general significance,asanexample of linguistic scepticism. To abatethe gram- marian’sdogmatic vision of the ‘natural significance’ of words, he bases his criticism on the experience with the ‘Barbarians’ and comments:

If nouns exist ‘by nature’ and are not significant in each instancebyreason of convention, then all men ought to understand the speech of all, Greeks that of barbarians and barbarians that of

 Cf. Emidio Spinelli, “L’esperienzascettica: Sesto Empiricofra metodologiascientifica escelte eti- che,” Quaestio 4(2004): 25–43.  Cf. Alan Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002), 93 – 99;cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, “Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism,” 8.3(1941): 371–384.  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of I:236; all English aretakenfrom Sextus Em- piricus, Outlines of Scepticism,eds.Julia and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge:Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2000).  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I:236–237.  It is not my intent heretodeal with every aspect this topicinvolves. Ireferthe reader to the de- tailed studyofEmidio Spinelli, “Sextus Empiricus,” in Dictionnairedes philosophes antiques,ed. Ri- chardGoulet (Paris:CNRS éditions,2016): 265–300;onempiricism, see ibidem,279 – 282. Apologetic, Empiricism, and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 71

Greeks and barbariansthat of (other)barbarians.But this is not the case; therefore, nouns are not ‘naturally’ significant.¹⁴

The argument used here is from experience (that of the Barbarians and the Greeks), not from the realm of logic or metaphysics.Also well-known is his argument about the moral(s) of society:every people have different moralstandards, ergo there is not acommon ‘by nature.’ Furthermore, the argumentation ‘by nature’ can be but treacherous for the dogmatic because of the experience of good and bad, or ac- cording to his words:

Forthose whohold the opinion that thingsare good or bad by natureare perpetually troubled. When they lack what they believetobegood, they take themselvestobepersecuted by natural […].¹⁵

Empiricism as aschool and as amedicalpractice is not confined to ancient philos- ophyand medicine,ithas along history in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and early modernperiod. Beginning with the schools of and in Middle Ages, its apexoccurred in the late Renaissance with Machiavelli and Guic- ciardini. Yet, from the De rerum naturaiuxta propria principia (On the Nature of ThingsAccording to theirOwn Principles)byBernardino Telesio in 1586 and ’s “On Experience”¹⁶ to onwards,empiricism experi- enced new modes of transmission and discussion. Luzzatto’sacquaintancewith it mayderive from his studyofPierre Gassendi, avery probable sourceofhis writing and perhaps afavourite reading.¹⁷ Additionally, Francis Bacon was one of the sour- ces of Luzzatto’sattitude towards the sciences,mostly plausiblyhis first address for the doctrine of the induction. Francis Baconisoften indirectlyquoted in the Discor- so,asIhave demonstrated elsewhere.¹⁸

 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors,I:VII, §144–145(Loeb, 1949, 86–87).  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I:27;see also I:30.Cf. Michael Frede, “The Sceptic’sBe- liefs,” in TheOriginal Sceptics:AControversy,eds.Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede(Indianapolis: Hackett,1997): 22.  Michel de Montaigne, “Of Experience,” ed. Patrick Madden, trans. Charles Cotton (1588;13Sep- tember,2006). http://essays.quotidiana.org/montaigne/experience/ (accessed 3May,2018).  Cf. Giuseppe Veltri, “Opere epensierodiSimone Luzzatto,” in Luzzatto,Scritti politici efilosofici: LXXX.  Giuseppe Veltri, “Economic and Social Arguments and the Doctrine of the in Si- mone Luzzatto’sPolitical Thought:Venetian Reverberations of Francis Bacon’sPhilosophy,” Frühneu- zeit-Info 23 (2011): 23–32. 72 Giuseppe Veltri

2Luzzatto’sStrategies and the Tropoi of Sextus

Concerningthe strategies of Luzzatto it is valuable to foreground some observations before we handle them in detail. In the Discorso,the rabbi usessome strategies to abatedogmatic principle (read: main, current,and influential opinions). The reader maybesceptical about my approach in this book on Luzzatto’slanguageofscepti- cism and relative strategies.While it is true that the tropoi are indirect,they are the basic elements of the Socrate,asMichela Torbidoni has demonstrated,¹⁹ and, in the Discorso,the Rabbi twice directlyquotesSextus Empiricus, on both occasions from the tropoi,which Iwould call strategies of scepticism. In the first quotation, he speaksofmoral scepticism, attacking Tacitus’scalumny ‘to defame the Jewish Nation,’ it as dissoluteinits carnal impulses: ‘and although as arace, they are prone to lust,they abstain from intercourse with foreign women; yetamong themselvesnothing is unlawful.’²⁰ He adds:²¹

But if this refers to the customsofthe Jews,itcould not be further from the truth, sincetherehas never been anation morerestricted regarding carnal relationships than the Jews.The Egyptians, whowerebynomeans barbarians,but in fact passed on manydoctrinestothe Greeks,tooktheir sisters for wives, and the Ptolemaic kings set an example [of this habit] to the common people. The Persians,who enjoyed dominion over Asia and the subjugation of Greece, passed to ahigher level of turpitude, permittingsons to wed their own mothers.Chrysippus,the propagator of Stoic philosophy, claimed that he was responsible for the reform of the human race.And yethere- mained indifferent in the faceofsuch adetestable practice; on the contrary,bymeans of some of his reasoning he sought toss describe it as almost honest,asone can read in the books of Sextus Empiricus.²²

The argumentation is here highlyimperative:Luzzatto’sdefence of Jewishcustom neither takes into consideration the (im)morality of an act commanded by the God of the Jews (to refrain from intercourse with foreign women), thereby avoiding are- turn to the argument of aheteronomous moralact,nor does he found it on morality based on ‘nature.’ He infers the from the discrepancy with the highes- teem in which other peoples in the world community (Egyptian and Greeks) were held despite theirincestuous and lascivious customs.With reference to the abovelist- ed sexual practices,Luzzatto states that the moral code of the Jews is more restrictive than that of Egyptian and Greeks,although they are judgedas‘barbarians’ despite their probity.This is not adogmatic argument,but astrategy taken from experience grounded in moralscepticism and . The Sextian argument against natural

 Michela Torbidoni, “Il metodo del dubbio nel Socrate,” in Filosofo eRabbinonella Venezia del Seicento.Studi su SimoneLuzzatto (ca.1583–1663). Conun’appendice di documenti inediti dall’Archivio di Stato,ed. Giuseppe Veltri (Rome: Aracne, 2015): 183–245.  Tacitus, Historiae V:5.  Luzzatto, Discorso,59v–60r.  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I:152 and 160. Apologetic, Empiricism,and ScepticalStrategies in SimoneLuzzatto 73

moralitywas very similar: he quotedseveral examples of different customs in deci- sive moral acts like sexuality,which differed among Romans, Greek, Indians etc., an argument rooted in amultifaceted approach to lawand custom.²³ Luzzatto emphasis- es aparticular element: the highesteem in which some cultures wereheld despite their even more radical differenceinmorality,e.g.the Egyptians enjoyour elevated culturalesteem despite their flagrant,accordingtoour standards,immorality. The second direct quotation is more complicated because he, speakingofthe phenomenon of the Kabbalah, associatesthe 10 principles (the Sefirot) and their flux to some ideas of the Platonic system of object and motion. It is not my intention here to analyse the strategies of the anti-kabbalistic essayofLuzzatto, alreadyexami- nated by Bill Rebiger in the Yearbook of 2017,²⁴ but onlyhis arsrelationis of the Se- firot,their relation and ’sworld of the ideas. Luzzatto writes:

Plato, however,adheringinpart to the said opinion, yetinacalmer manner,was not satisfied with entirelydenyingthe existenceand permanenceofthe beingofwhatever thing.For he con- jectured that beyond the apprehension of our senses thereweresome firm and fixed substances. [According to his view,] these substances need neither aconfrontation nor arelation to others, and thus could have astable and firm existenceinthemselves. Furthermore, these [substances] werethe origins of those apprehensions that we perceive and could be called shadows and un- substantial appearances. This is the doctrine he affirmsinhis Letters,²⁵ which involves agreat application of mind and agreat force of intellect to apprehend athingaspure, genuine, and baredofthe commingling of relation and motion. Forevery object is burdened and wrapped up in these. This is what Sextus Empiricus demonstrated,i.e.that every phenomenon and object is mixed and involved in five kinds of .Proceedinginhis examination,heevendemon- strated that it is almost impossible to grasp anythingabout objects other than their relation. This thing[the relation] would be so feeble and slight that the Stoics, and after them the Nominalists, negated its existence, [bysayingthat] it was chimerical and imaginary,orevenbetter, verbal.²⁶

The referencetoSextus in confirming aPlatonic view of the system of the ideas and their relationship is tricky because Sextus does negatethe existenceofall fixed and firm substances.Itisenough to refer here to Outlines of Pyrrhonism III:3:

Now,since some of the Dogmatists saythat godisabody, others that he is incorporeal, some that he is anthropomorphic, others not,some in space, others not—and of those who saythat he is in space, some saythat he is within the universe, others that he is outside it—how shall we be abletoacquire aconceptionofgod if we possess neither an agreed substancefor him nor aform nor aplaceinwhich he is?

 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism,I:152: ‘We oppose customtothe others—for example,to , when we saythat in Persia homosexual acts arecustomary,whileinRome they areforbidden by law.’  Bill Rebiger, “Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto’sPresentation of the Kabbalists in his Dis- corso,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2017): 51–69.  Luzzattoprobablyrefers to the 7th Epistle of Plato.  Luzzatto, Discorso,81v-82r. 74 GiuseppeVeltri

But that is onlyone sideofthe question because Luzzatto connects the theory of the Sefirot to Plato’sworld of substances.Besides the tradition of this theory,alreadyex- aminedbyMoshe Idel,²⁷ Luzzatto’sstrategic aspect cannot be concealed: fixed sub- stances have afirm existenceinthemselvesand thereforecannot be apprehended if not in their shadowyand unsubstantial appearances. AccordingtoLuzzatto’srendi- tion of Sextus ‘every phenomenon and object is mixed and involved in five kindsof relations.’ He concludes ‘that it is almost impossible to grasp anything about objects other than their relation.’ As Emidio Spinelli wrote to me in an epistolary communi- cation,Luzzatto maybereferringhere to the sceptic Agrippa. Sextus reported Agrip- pas’ tropoi,²⁸ among them that of relativity,inhis Outlines of Pyrrhonism.²⁹ The con- fusion has probablyresulted, Iimagine, because Agrippas’ five modes are quoted by Sextus, as mentioned before. Yet, as Spinelli comments,Sextus also speaks of the relativity in Outlines of Pyr- rhonism I:38–39 as ahierarchical submission of all tropoi to it.ExpresslyinOutlines of Pyrrhonism I:140, he affirms:

So, sincewehaveestablished in this waythat everythingisrelative,itisclear that we shall not be abletosay what each existingobject is likeinits own natureand purely, but onlywhat it appears to be likerelative to something. It follows that we must suspend about the natureofobjects.

Ancient authorsconveythat Pyrrhonians werealso relativists,³⁰ but an assimilation of their thoughts is not without problems,asAnnas and Barnes sustain.³¹ The pros ti of relations/relativity is alsoatopic of Stoic philosophy, as Luzzatto notes,which in- troduces or sustains the insubstantiality of relation in the cases of verbal definition, as ‘father’ is father so long as he has achild, as Simplicius, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories comments.³²

 That is, Isaac Abravanel; cf. Moshe Idel, “Jewish Kabbalah and ,” in Neoplatonismand JewishThought,ed. Lenn E. Goodman (Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press,1992):332–333. He speaks of the Sefirot as Platonic ideas and ‘separate universal forms.’ Yoḥanan Alemanno also speaks of the Sefirot as the primordial ideas of Plato.  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I:164–177: “The Five Modes.”  See Emidio Spinelli, Questioni scettiche. Lettureintroduttivealpirronismo antico (Rome: Lithos, 2005), 32–33.  Cf. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, TheModes of Scepticism: AncientTexts and Modern Inter- pretations (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997), 97.  Ibidem,98.  Cf. ibidem,134–135: ‘But when it is observed not in of an internal differencebut solelyin virtue of its relation to somethingelse, it will be athingsomehow in relation to something. Sons and people on the right require certain external thingsfor their subsistence. That is why, even if no change takesplaceinthemselves, aman maycease to be afather when his son dies and someone maycease to be on the right when whatwas next to him has changedposition.’ The interpretation of Annas and Barnes does not takeintoaccount the oral element of stoic discourse. Apologetic, Empiricism, and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 75

Luzzatto likes to demonstrate that aprecise analysis of relations results in the conclusion that we cannot grasp the object of anything.The goal of his sentence is the negation of the dogmatic assertion of the existenceofPlato’ssubstances and, in this way, the Sefirot.Fromgiven relations we cannot inferagivensubstance. It is important here to realise thatsceptical strategies are at work in the Discorso, especiallybecause Luzzatto considers himself in step with Sextus’ scepticism, al- though he defines himself aNew Academician and, therefore, not aPyrrhonian. In the following section Iwill present some sceptical strategies present in Luzzatto’s work, all of which are based on experience and achievedinhistory and society.Nev- ertheless, Isuppose that Luzzatto is alsousing the tropoi,orstrategy, of Sextus and Agrippa, using it as apolitical tool for describing,defending,and apologising for the Jews of Venice. Iwillselect the political strategies of relation/relativity,recess, and necessity,and end with the argument concerning the ‘nude truth.’

3The StrategyofRelation/Relativity

SextusEmpiricusand Agrippa³³ agree—as Idiscuss above—thatthingsare together by virtue of their relation and not due their nature. We will return to this idea with referencetousury.HereIwould like to stress that the ‘relationship’ between the el- ementsofsociety is the backboneofits political structure, as well as the commit- ment of Luzzatto to the apologia. The presenceofthe Jews in Venice is due to their integration into every part of its fabric and life. Integration is not the depriva- tion of theirfactuality as Jews (i.e. conversion) but the recognition of their very clear position in society.Thisparticipation is not substantial but relative to the ‘state of the Jews in Venice.’ But first something on the Discorso. Luzzatto’spolitical in the first part of the Discorso is simple and, at the same time, temerarious: Venice can put an end to its political decline,heargues, by offering to the Jews amonopolyonoverseas commercial activity. This proposal recommends itself because the Jews are ‘well suited for trade,’ far more so than oth- ers (such as ‘foreigners’). The Rabbi opens his argument by recalling that trade and usury are the onlyoccupations permitted to Jews. Within the confines of their histor- ical situation, the Venetian Jews became particularlyadept at trade with partners from the Orient.This talent could be put to the use by the Venetian government for maintaining—or,moreaccurately—recovering its political importance as an inter- mediary between the East and the West.Luzzatto wasthe first to define the role of the Jews on the basis of their economic and social functions, disregardingthe classic categorisation of Judaism’s(privileged?) religious status in worldhistory.

 APyrrhonian philosopher probably of the first century BCE and author of five tropoi,reported by Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I:164–169. 76 GiuseppeVeltri

Luzzatto prefaces his treatise with an “Introduction,”³⁴ ostensiblyintended to provide atheoretical outline of the political and economic aspectsofhis subject, areflection also of his vision of the customs and ways of life followed by the Jews of the Diaspora. In this introduction to the ‘whole’ tractate, he deals, in fact,with only one issue:the status of the Jews of Venice and theireconomic situation, which is, in turn, the topic to which the entire first part of the Discorso is devoted. Luzzatto clearly states his central thesis right from the outset: the ancient people of the Jews, present todayinthe illustrious city of Venice, are, in theirconstitution and wayoflife, a ‘fragment’ of the God’soriginal creation.³⁵ Nobody, he claims, can contest the that Venetian Jews are a ‘reward’ (emolumento)tothe city of Venice and that they constituteanintegralpart of the common populace.³⁶ The Rabbi of the Ghetto of Venice avails himself of the fragmentmetaphor: the Jewishcommunity of Venice is as aDemocritian atom in the MilkyWay of the Vene- res publica.³⁷ Although the Rabbi has serious doubts as to the cosmological of ’ philosophy, he seems to accept its usefulness as asourceof :

And if this opinion was rightlycondemned, what occurredtothose men was morearesultofthe casual coupling of small bodies,which those philosophers proposed, rather than aresult of the absurdity of the construction.³⁸

The purpose of his treatise is not primarilytocelebrate the antiquity of the Jews but rather to present some of the advantagesthey bring to the State. He considers the Jewishpeople as an integralpart of city of Venice or,better,ofthe entire world. The function of the Jews, he claims, is similar to that of the atoms of Democritus that populate the ‘Lower World,’ which,inturn, feeds with its vapour the sun, the moon,and the other stars: astoicidea. In this sense, every kingdom on the earth is comparable to the galaxy.³⁹ The he usestodescribe the composition of society servetodrawat- tention to two specific points: that every element of society,and in particularthat of

 Luzzatto, Discorso,7r–8r.  Ibidem,6v: ‘because the commonconsensus amongmen agrees that therewas atime when this People took their form of governmentand social institutions from the Highest Artist.’  Ibidem,7v.  Ibidem,7r.  Ibidem. Luzzattoseems heretorefer to acriticism of atomistic theory,which was introduced into European intellectual circles by Gassendi. Luzzattohimself was afollower of sceptical theory.OnGas- sendi and scepticism, see RichardH.Popkin, TheHistoryofSkepticism from to Spinoza (Ber- keley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).  Cf. Francis Bacon, EssaysXIX:OfEmpire: ‘Princes areliketoheavenlybodies,which cause good or times;and which have much veneration, but no rest.All precepts concerning kings,are in ef- fect comprehended in those tworemembrances:mementoquod es homo; and mementoquod es Deus,orvice Dei; the one bridleth their power,and the other their will.’ On the classical origin of the idea, see A. I. Ellis, “Some Notes,” TheClassical Review 23 (1909): 246–247. Apologetic, Empiricism, and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 77

Venice, should be fullyintegratedasaprerequisite to their contribution to the wel- fare of the whole. That is also the logic of the human bodyasLuzzatto expresslyin- dicates,citing indirectlythe fable of Menenius Agrippa:⁴⁰

[…]Sotoo when our stomach suffers from lack of food, it livesonsuitable with great and distress of other limbs.⁴¹ But when the oppositeoccurs,and thereisanabundanceof nourishment,thereisrespite from the plundering, and this relief spreads to other parts of the body. Similarly, the preponderance of and passagetaxes not onlyfrees the populace from the burden of taxes and contributions—which they would be obligedtopay in emergencies and for the needs of —but also itself profits of this abundanceofpublic money with not little advantage.⁴²

In sixteenth century, the metaphor of the stomach becomes more specific: in 1612 Francis Bacon writes in his Of Empire 11:

Fortheir merchants,they are vena porta; and if they flourish not,akingdom mayhavegood limbs,but will have empty veins,and nourish little. Taxesand imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king’srevenue; for that that wins in the hundred, he leeseth in the shire; the par- ticular ratesbeingincreased, but the total bulk of trading,rather decreased.⁴³

Luzzatto substantiallyagrees with Bacon. Taxesonimports and exports are lethal for an economybecause they lead to adecrease in tradevolume. In the end, the state treasury will end up with little more than usual.Inaddition, there is amoral aspect that should be also taken into consideration: the state should avoid imitating the an- cient Romans who ‘ultimatelyimposed taxes on human excrement […]and even dis- graceful and obscene operations such as these helped enrich the treasury.’⁴⁴ In con- trast to this depravity on the part of the ruling power,the of Venice ‘has the custom of imposing taxes onlyonthe industry of men, and not on their lives; to pun- ish theirvices,and not to profit from them.’⁴⁵ We have here, then, the principal in- gredients of Luzzatto’spolitical theory:1)the Jews of Venice are an integralpart of the Republic; 2) their function in commerce is vitaland can be of true benefit only if the taxes imposed remain limited,since the taxes on imports and exports have alethal effect on the general economy; 3) the Republic of Venice was founded on pragmatic ideas.

 Livius, Ad urbe condita,II32.  thought that blood was produced in the liverfromthe food the stomach transported there via the portal vein. On the state of medicineatthis time, based largely Galen, see Rudolph E. Siegel, Galen’sSystem of and Medicine: An Analysis of his Doctrines and Observations on Blood- flow,Respiration, Humors and Internal Diseases (Urbana: University of IllinoisPress, 1993).  Luzzatto, Discorso,7v.  TheWorks of Francis Bacon, vol. 6, eds.James Spedding et alii (London: Longman and co., 1857– 1874;reprint 2011), 422.  Luzzatto, Discorso,8r.  Ibidem. 78 Giuseppe Veltri

We can add that Luzzatto—if using the sceptic topos of relativity—argues that the relation of the Jews to the Serenissima is aprofitable one and that changes to this relation (i.e. their expulsion from Venice) would alsochangethe ‘state’ of the Jews in Venice, and perhaps alsoVenice itself. Another application of the political strategy of relation/relativity can be found in chapter 12 of the Discorso in which Luzzatto addresses the criticism of the Jewish presenceasvoiced by threedifferent groups:religious zealots, politicians and states- men, and the common people. The religious zealots claim that toleration of areligion that differsfrom the official faith is contemptuous; politicians arguethat there is no utility to toleratingadiversity of religions in the samecity,both because of the pos- sibility of sacrilegeand because of bad example that one group mayprovide to the remainder of the population; and the common people simply believeand repeat any calumnyand false slander invented out of hatredfor the Jewishnation. In response to the religious zealots, Luzzatto notes thatthe Pope himself admit- ted Jews into the city of his ownresidence, and that they have been living there for over 800 years. To the politicians he offers avery detailed response, stressing the physical separation between Jews and Christians, which is reinforcedbyJewish law, according to which contact and sexual relations with non-Jews are prohib- ited, as is proselytism. As for the of usury practicedbythe Jews—he adds that it is onlytoleratedbytheirlawsrather thanexpresslypermitted, referringindirectly to Francis Bacon. As for the denunciations of the common people, Luzzatto responds:

Truth alone is harsh, and not very pleasing, whereas falsity is admired and delightful. The for- mer is subjected to the occurrence of events; the latter free and wandering. The former is pro- duced by the action of the object that impressed it in our mind, whilethe latter depends upon human judgments,and likeour offspring, one brings them lovingaffection.⁴⁶

He then deals more specificallywith the calumnyofthe Jews having been unfaithful, and with theirpurported friendship with pirates. Contrarytowhat his opponents maintain, Luzzatto describes the Jews as aharmonious part of society,living in re- ciprocal sympathywith theirneighboursinkeepingwith the will of God,who ‘de- that all humanityshould conform together in unanimous amity,each man con- sidering himself acitizenofone commonwealth.’⁴⁷ Religious differences, as he points out in chapter 14 and as we have analysed in the second part of my book Alien- ated Wisdom,are by no means agood reason for war.⁴⁸ The perspicacious reader recognises here atypicalstrategyofreferring to the successfulintegration of Jews into the Venetian city and their utility under the sky

 Ibidem,44r.  Ibidem.  Ibidem,51v.Cf. Isaac Abravanel, Perushalnevi’im aaronim (Tel Aviv,n.d.): 9; and Johann Maier, Kriegsrecht und Friedensordnung in jüdischer Tradition (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,2000), 403. Apologetic, Empiricism,and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 79

of the Serenissima. The reason givenisnot adogmatic reference to the Revelation on Sinai, but rather the activity of the Jews, originating in historical necessity.Their suc- cess is dependent on the conservation of their status as Jews as well as theirutility for Venice;⁴⁹ that is, the key for the Jews’ integration into Venetian society is to fill and to continue to fulfil the social position they alreadyhold, akind of political re- cess ad infinitum.

4StrategyofNecessity,or, How to Explain recess ad infinitum Politically

Luzzatto usesatypicalpolitical-economic category, ‘necessity’. Necessitas as acate- gory must not be confused with the Aristotelian logical concept of necessitas,⁵⁰ and it also occurs in sceptical philosophy: necessity is the reason, accordingtothe scepti- cal philosophyofSextus, to suspend every judgment.⁵¹ The context of Sextus’ use is totallydifferent,but Luzzatto’slogical use of necessity is very similar: to search for the major cause of necessity would regress to an analysis of animals, which do not possess reason. Luzzatto indirectlyrefers to regress to the causesofthe situation of the Jews, because necessity is the situation into which humans are born and to which man can positively react,or, accordingtoLuzzatto’swording:

The majority of men claim that naturehas thrust upon them and vexedthem with obligations and necessities in greater abundancethan other animals which aredeprivedofreason. But these men [the majority] complain of ,because poverty and need arethe true stimuli and incentivesthat resultinthe inventions and discoveries of the most worthyand excellent arts, which so ennoble the human race.⁵²

The mater artium necessitas, ‘necessity is the mother of invention,’ has a long tradition. In the Middle Ages, it was an operative concept of the political tradi- tion, used in conjunction with other political terms such as virtus and fortuna.⁵³ There is of course acommon use of the proverb which probablyfirst appearedin print in 1519 in the Vulgaria of William Horman, ‘abook of for the boys

 On both categories during the Renaissance, see Paul-Erik Korvela, TheMachiavellian Reforma- tion: An Essay in Political Theory (PhD dissertation, University of Jyvaskyla, 2016), 119–120.  LambertMarie de Rijk, Aristotle: and .Philosophia Antiqua,vol. 91,no. 1(Lei- den: Brill, 2002), 569; NathanaelStein, “Causal Necessity in Aristotle,” BritishJournal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2012): 855 – 879.  For Outlines of Pyrrhonism I:175 – 176, see Casey Perin, TheDemands of Reason: An Essay on Pyr- rhonian Scepticism (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2010).  Luzzatto, Discorso,18r.  On the triad, cf. Felix Gilbert’schapter “Fortune, Necessity,and Virtù” in idem, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: and History in Sixteenth-CenturyFlorence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965): 191–200. 80 GiuseppeVeltri

of the schools to learn by heart.’⁵⁴ Yetnumerous and were acquainted with this proverb and its inherent political-philosophical meaning. One such person was Leonardo da Vinci.⁵⁵ The category of necessity,however,did not be- come apolitical category with clear-cut criteria until Machiavelli’sopus,⁵⁶ to which Luzzatto most likelyrefers. Accordingtothe Rabbi of Veniceand in agreement with the generallyaccepted history of the Jews since the Middle Ages, trade and money-lending were the only occupations permitted to the Jews. This historicalnecessity engenderedinthe Vene- tian Jews ahighlydeveloped capacity for these occupations.Consequently, they were considered by Luzzatto potentiallycapable of assisting the Venetian government in maintaining,or, to be historicallymore accurate, recovering,aposition of political equilibrium between the East and the West.Toput this brieflywith respect to a very intriguing aspect of the political life of the Jews in Venice: the Discorso was pub- lished in 1638 in aperiod in which the political power of Venice was beginning to wane. His philosophicalwork Socrate,published in 1651,expresslyrefers to the Turk- ish threat against Creteand to the war in which Venice wasinvolved. Hence, Luzzatto tried to offer the Governor of the Serenissima apolitical-economic prescription to re- storethe vital trade of Venice by offering the Jews more economic and social free- dom. Bacon’sconviction was that ‘It is against nature for money to beget money,’⁵⁷ echoing an Aristotelian-Thomistic conviction.⁵⁸ However,thatisonlyasuperficial read of Bacon’sanalysis,vision, and inferences.

 It is very difficulttolocate the origin of the proverb. Recent works refer it to Curtius Rufus’s His- toria Alexandri Magni,4,3,24: ‘Efficacior omni arteimminens necessitas;’ see Hubertus Kudla, ed., Lexikon der lateinischen Zitate. 3500 Originale mit Übersetzungen und Belegstellen,3rd edition (Mu- nich: Beck, 2007), n. 1439.Ithink that there is no precise Latin quote, but for aLatin sapiential tra- dition of it,see all the proverbs on ‘necessity’ quoted by the Hoyt’sNew Cyclopedia of Practical Quo- tations (New York: Funk &Wagnalls, 1922),559; see also the collection of examples of this phrase at http://www.phrases.org.uk./meanings/necessity-is-the-mother-of-invention.html(accessed3May, 2018).  Cf. Scritti letterari di Leonardo da Vinci,ed. AugustoMarinoni (Milan: Rizzoli, 1974), 7: ‘La neces- sità ètema einventricedella natura, efreno eregola eterna.’ See the very interesting philosophical evaluation of the maxim in Herr vonPrantl, “LeonardodaVinci in philosophischer Beziehung,” Sit- zungsberichte der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München. Philosophisch- philologische Classe. Jahrgang1885(Munich: Akademische Buchdruckerei, 1886), 17.  On the use of ‘necessitas’ in Machiavelli, see Machiavellism: TheDoctrine of Raison D’Aetat and Its Place in Modern History,trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).  Francis Bacon, “Of Usury,” in idem, Essays (1625); see , TheMerchant of Ven- ice,I,3:‘Antonio. Or is your gold and silverEues and Rams?Shylock. Icannot tell, Imake it breede as fast.’ See Francis Bacon, TheEssaysorCounsels,Civil and Moral,ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 94.  , ,trans.Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: R. T. Washburne,Ltd., 1918), 330 – 340,reprinted in Roy C. Cave and Herbert H. Coulson, ASource Book for Medieval EconomicHistory (Milwaukee: The BrucePublishingCo., 1936;reprinted, New Apologetic, Empiricism,and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 81

An in-depth studyofBacon’sconception of usury reveals amore complex atti- tude which, as we shall see, is similar to that of the Rabbi of Venice. Bacon is ada- mant in his opposition to usury,and it should be borne in mind that this activity as perceivedbyLuzzatto and Bacon was not onlythe act or practice of lending money at an exorbitant rate of interest,but rather simply the practice of lending money at any rate of interest at all.⁵⁹ However,the LordofVerulam was well aware of the advan- tages of such activities. In his “EssayonUsury,” he enumeratedthe advantagesand disadvantagesofusury, includingthe danger of capitalisation:

The fourth [disadvantageofusury is], that it bringeth the treasureofarealm, or state,intoafew hands.For the usurer beingatcertainties,and others at uncertainties,atthe end of the game, most of the money will be in the box; and ever astateflourisheth, when wealth is moreequally spread.⁶⁰

Luzzatto also refers to an ideal situation of greater equality, always desired but never attained. He states:

[T]he aspiration to arigorousreduction of one’spossessions to amoderate size has been con- sideredadesirableundertakingtothis day, but it is hardly ever practiced, especiallywith regard to the equal distribution of moveable assets and cash. Whenever this was attempted with real estate, the result was for the most part unsuccessful.⁶¹

Bacon’sposition is in fact very pragmatic: whoever thinks that one can lend money without profitbelongs ipso dicto to the realm of utopian dreamers:

It is avanity to conceive,that therewould be ordinary borrowing without profit; and it is impos- sible to conceive,the number of inconveniences that will ensue, if borrowingbecramped. There- fore, to speak of the abolishingofusury is idle. All states have ever had it,inone kind or rate, or other.Soasthat opinion must be sent to .⁶²

York: Biblo &Tannen, 1965), 182. Walter S. H. Lim, “Surety and Spiritual Commercialism in TheMer- chant of Venice,” Studies in EnglishLiterature 50.2 (2010): 371.  Cf. Benjamin Ravid, “Money LendinginSeventeenth-Century Jewish Vernacular Apologetica,” in JewishThought in the Seventeenth Century,eds.IsadoreTwersky and Bernard Septimus (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1987): 262.  See aboven.58for the reference.  Luzzatto, Discorso,25v: ‘Ma il volere conrigore ridure li haveri asegno di moderata proporzione, fu impresa sin oradesiderata, ma non giamai praticata, emassime l’uguaglianza de beni mobili, e danari contanti, esefualcuna voltaattentata nelli beni stabili riuscì semprecon infelicesuccesso’ (English translation by Ariella Lang).  Bacon, TheWorks,vol. 14,416.Cf. TheEnglishRenaissance: An Anthology of Sources and Docu- ments,ed. Kate Aughterson (London: Routledge,1998), 548;Robert Appelbaum, Literatureand Uto- pian Politics in Seventeenth-CenturyEngland (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4. 82 GiuseppeVeltri

Luzzatto also refers to ’s Utopia as concretisation of the ‘machinate re- pubbliche’ (‘ingenious ’)ofSocrates and Plato, wherethe distribution of was the chief element of their political thought.⁶³ Bacon sums up his opinion on the re-integration of usury,statingthatitshould be reserved for asmall group under government control: For ‘it is better to mitigate usury,bydeclaration, than to suffer it to rage,byconnivance.’⁶⁴ In his response to some criticisms of money lending,made both by philosophersand statesmen, Luzzatto uses the sameargu- ment as advanced by Bacon, focussing on the stimulus generatedbythe moneylend- ers:

[…]usury is asin constantlycondemned, but in every time and placepracticed. Fortwo stimuli of our fragility,contribute to it: the necessity of those whoneed the money and thereforegivethe interest,and the avidity of the moneylender.When such atransgression was not committed by a Jew, therewas perhaps no lack of others, whowith greater extortion of the poor and needy would practicesuch acontemptible profession, reducingthe number of usurers. And Idonot saythis to defend such actions,but merelytodemonstratethat such enormity,like some others, is not an essential property of the Jews,asmanypresume to assert; rather it is an accidental result that comes from the strictness of the life and conditions of the time.⁶⁵

The reader acquainted with sceptical strategies will have alreadyrecognised here the argument against an essential property of the Jews (that is, ‘is not an essential prop- erty of the Jews;’ also see Sextus’ usageof‘by nature’)and the recurrence of the strat- egy of infiniteregress as factual relation used in political discourse: If agent A1 does not do apractise P, therewill be an A2 which will do P. The argumentation does not presuppose adirect causality between A1 viz. An and P, but it implies the experienced fact Pwhich requited anon-essentialbut accidental relation to P. The onlyexperi- enced fact is P, the agent Awhich/who produces Pisonlyaccidental and therefore theoreticallyinfinite. The relation from PtoAisnot essential, thereforeitleadstoAn.

 Luzzatto, Discorso,22r–v: ‘La massa degli huominimentrenon fosse stata dalla prudente diligen- za di legislatori, eformatori di governi civili, distinta in variiordini, edifferenti classi rassembrarebbe maggior diformitàche l’antico, edecantatocahos all’imaginatione de poeti giamai rappresentasse. Socrate, ePlatone, nelle loro machinate republiche poserotal distribuitione, come principale elemen- to delle loropolitie, el’istesso osservòilmoderno inventore della Utopia, et il simile ancoraeseguir- ono tutti li praticanti,comeparimenteAristotile nel primo della Politica, ch’impiegòognisuo spi|rito in riordinare,ecorregereledivisionifattedaquelli doi gran maestri dell’umanità.’  Bacon,OnUsury,XLI.  Luzzatto, Discorso, 42r–v: ‘[…]usura, peccato continuamentedannato, ma in ogni tempo eloco essercitato,concorrendovi duestimoli maggiori, ch’habbia la nostra fragilità,lanecessità del mutuar- io che contribuiscel’usura, el’avidità insaziabile del mutuante, che la riceve, equando non fusse commessa dall’hebreo tal transgressione, non vi mancarebbeno forsi altri, che con maggior estor- sione dell’indigente,ebisogno, essercitasserotal prava professione, riducendosi aminor numero gl’usurarii’ (English translation by Ariella Lang). Apologetic, Empiricism,and Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto 83

5MoralScepticism, or,Stoic Teaching in Sceptical Dress: The Charakteres

Chapter 11 of the Discorso marks the beginning of its second part.Luzzatto begins by observing, with Socrates,thatthe human being is nothing but ‘amultiplicity of dif- ferent animals, wrapped and entangled within themselves.’⁶⁶ Luzzatto refers to letter CXIII by Seneca ad Lucilium in which he purposelymentions the stoic doctrine of the multiple or animal soul in human , because can onlybeanimal in na- ture: virtutes esse animalia.⁶⁷ The statement virtutes esse animalia goes back, accord- ing to the Stoic fragments,probablytoChrysippus.⁶⁸ Luzzatto wishestofind aphil- osophical connection to affirm thatthe human soul is amixture. He indirectlycites the theory of omomerie (όμοιομέρειαι)byAnaxagoras,that is to sayofthe principles or roots of cosmological anthropological compositions forming amixture in the body:

And if Anaxagoras,who denied that natural things aregenerated and because of this he intro- duced acertain confused mass composed of all things,and whojudged that in all thingsthereis another one annexed and attached, an opinion consideredasabsurd, had asimilar thingpro- posed about human soul, maybehis opinion would have been receivedwith moreapplause by the learned, because if one considered attentively the movements of the soul, it would appear as auniversal mixtureofinfinite things.⁶⁹

Luzzatto’smain objectiveisnot so much contemplation about the composition of human ,but rather discussion of the theme of virtue and vice in human beings. What follows is in fact along passageonvirtues and their obverse as individual characteristics in different moments and different locations:

 Ibidem,35v: ‘[Socrate] pronunziò non sapere se egli fosse un solo animale, overo una moltiplicità di diversi in se stessi anodati,edinvilupati, talmentetrovava in se medesimo confuse le virtù, eli vizii, li eccessi,ele moderazioni.’  Seneca, ad Luciulium espistolae morales, liber XIX, CXIII,3: [2] ‘Animum constatanimal esse, cum ipse efficiat ut simus animalia, cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens; ergo animal est.Deinde virtus agit aliquid; agi autem nihil sine impetu potest; si impetum habet, qui nulli est nisi animali, animal est.[3] “Si animal est” inquit “virtus,habet ipsa virtutem.” Quidni habeat se ipsam?quomodo sapiens omnia per virtutem gerit,sic virtus per se. “Ergo” inquit “et omnes artes animalia sunt et omnia quae cogitamusquaeque mente conplectimur.Sequitur ut multa millia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia autmulta habeamus animalia.” Quaeris quid adversus istud respondeatur?Unaquae- que ex istis res animal erit: multa animalia non erunt.Quare? dicam, si mihi accommodaveris sub- tilitatem et intentionem tuam. [4] Singula animalia singulas habere debent substantias; ista omnia unum animum habent; itaque singula esse possunt,multa esse non possunt.’  Stoicorum veterum fragmenta,vol. 3, ed. Hans F. vonArnim (Stuttgart: Teubner,1964), 75;Stobaeus Ecl. 64,18and 65,1;see also Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, Senecan Drama and Stoic (Berkeley: University of California Press,1989), 96.  Luzzatto, Discorso,36r. 84 GiuseppeVeltri

The courageoflivinganadventurous life often derivesfromthe fear one has of vulgar whispers and gossips,asonthe contrary Fabius,cowardlyinattackingHannibal but intrepid scorner of the tongue of the plebeians, the greediness of prolonging life and enjoyingits pleasures putting the weakbut durable avidities beforethe vehement and short ones,makes us temperedand moderate: whereasSocrates followingPlato whodiscovered in his Phaedo this great arcane called morality that the moderates, ‘intemperantia quadam temperantessint,ecosi timiditate fortesint,’ and in Ecclesiastes c. 4said, ‘et contemplatus sum omnem laborem, et omnem rectitudinem operum, et ecceipsa esse invidia hominis de socio suo,’ as in Hebrew; that is to saythat the vulgar virtues areenvy, competition and emulation keepingmen close to one another,confusinginthe wayvirtues and vices. [36v] Pleasure, the principal and most attractive object of our soul, is always mixed together with pain, its contrary,asPlato demonstrates in Philebus,hungerand thirst arethe major condi- ments for out ,tragic representationsmoveusand produce in us indignation against ty- rants,neverthelesswefeel acertain hidden pleasurable itch and irritation, which amuses and נע ה which derivesfromthe verb עת ונ ג capturesus; the Jews express pleasurewith the word which also means affliction and therefore confirms the abovementioned mixture. The impulsive agitation of rage was commended by Homerasfull of pleasantness and sweet- ness, in the same wayinthe fervour of lovejealousy gets generated and therefore hate, as Tac- itus said about Mount Lebanonmirum dictu tantos interardores opacum fidumque niuibus. Alexander,famous for his victories not less than for the virtues of his soul, so compassionate towardDarius and his women, was afterwards so inhuman against Parmenion and Clitus, whohad put the dominion of the world in his hands,and also so cruel with Callisthenes, his master.,ferocious and inhuman in Pharsalia but clementwith Marcellus and indul- gent with Brutus,his assassin. Nero, amonster for all times,sometimeswas displeasedbythe fact that he was able to write, especiallywhen he had to sentence criminals to death, even though he did not hesitateinapplyingitagainst his own mother [37r] and against Seneca, his master; he was afriend of virtue and doctrine but he hated those characters in others, and for that the most humorous of the poets whoeverexisted, Lucan, lost his life. At the time of the cruel proscription orderedbythe triumvirate, where faith, charity and gratitude wereexiled fromthe most eminent and well composed spirits of the republic, because these vir- tues could not be found in fathers,children and sibling, they took refuge amongthe abjections of the serfs and the obscenity of the harlots;among many, one of them suffered the last torments in order not to reveal the names of her dishonest friends.Socrates in the height of his wisdom found ignorance, and was thereforejudgedbythe very wise oracle. Little irritated meekness be- comes untamed haughtiness,and this, with masterful dexterity,converts itself in meek and flex- ible pleasantness.⁷⁰

The careful reader has probablyrecognised part of the catalogue of the second book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric: pleasure-pain, rage-meekness, friendship-hate, fear-, shame-shamelessness, compassion-disdain, envy-emulation. This list has aparticu- lar purpose: to demonstrate the multifaceted dimensions of the human soul. In the words of our character:

The internal imageofour soul is composed of amosaic which apparentlyforms asingle idea, but onceitapproaches,itshows how it is accompanied by various fragments and vile little and precious stones connected and committed together.Inthe same way, our soul is mostlycom-

 Ibidem,36r-37r. Apologetic, Empiricism,and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 85

posed by different and divergent pieces;invarious occasions each one of them shows itself with adifferent appearance. Therefore, describingthe nature and condition of asingle man is very hard and difficult, and even moresoisthe will to refer his actions and ideas to asingle . This explains whysomanyauthors can be found [37v]who have written on the natureofhorses, dogs and falcons, and whohavedevised with such an exactitude their customs and conditions, while very few have wanted to deal with men, and even so onlyinpassing. The one whotalked about them betterwas ,Aristotle’sdisciple, whoreserved the enterprise for the last years of his life as he was alreadyeighty years old, and compiled ahistorical treatise about it with observations on the characters of the human soul; afragment of his work made it all the waydown to us,the rest was destroyed by the inclemencyoftimes.⁷¹

Luzzatto refers here to Theophrastus of Eresos,author of Charakteres,aseries of characterisations of the human soul. Angelo Ambrogini, nicknamedPoliziano, trans- lated the first fifteen characters into Latin. These characters were published in in 1532byAndreas Cratander and did not feature Poliziano as the translator.⁷² They werepublishedagain, this time with Poliziano’sname, in Paris in 1583byFrédéric Morel. Alreadyin1552 an edition of these works by Aldo Manuzio,with eight more characters added, had appeared thanks to the efforts of Giovanni Battista Camozza. In 1599,asecond edition, titled Caratteri, was publishedinLeiden, includingfive more characters (21–28). This edition was discovered by Isaac Casaubon and copied once more by MarquardFreher.In1620, Ansaldo Cebà⁷³ published an Italian version of the first fifteen characters,probablywithout taking into consideration Manuzio’s edition, possiblybecause, as Romizi , he was tooyoungtoknow of it.Inany case, he does not utilise the 1552 edition. Cebà’sbook was, however,present in Ven- ice, as the ancient catalogue of the Marciana Library reveals. Thispublication most likelycirculated even in the Venetian Ghetto because at that time Cebà, apriest,had an epistolary loveaffair with afamouspoet of Jewishorigins,SaraCopio Sullam, who we have previouslydiscussed.⁷⁴ The Venetian Rabbi’sobjective is now evident: referringnot onlytoAristotelian rhetoric or to Theophrastus’ composition, he underlines avery popularrhetoricalde- vice of that time: the use of typicalcharacters of seventeenth-century .⁷⁵ This representation of the affects of the human soul, and of its different characters,was a sign of distinctioninacentury of and tragediesperformed and sung on the stage. It will be exactlythe abovementioned Cebà who publishesadetailed com- mentary to accompany Theophrastus’ text.Something which does not escape the at- tentive reader is that emphasising the theatrical character of human soul also means

 Ibidem, 37r-v.  Ireferthe readertomysource for this paragraph, Andreas Cratander, Icaratteri Morali di Teofras- to,ed. AugustoRomiti (Florence: Sansoni, 1899), which is the critical edition of the Greeek text with Italian translation and notes.  Ansaldo Cebà, ICharatteri morali di Theofrasto interpretati per AnsaldoCebà,ed. Cardinale Fed- erigo Borromeo (: Pavoni, 1620).  Cf. Giuseppe Veltri, Renaissance,226–247.  Cf. Silvia Carandini, Teatro espettacolo nel Seicento (Rome: Laterza, 1990). 86 Giuseppe Veltri

negatingobjective responsibility:everyone is an actor on the theatrum mundi stage, always playing at apassion/affection or its reverse.

Conclusion: Reluctant and Nude Truth

At the end of this section of which the intent was to illustrate onlysome aspects of the Discorso,Iwould like to conclude with acentral concept of Luzzatto’sapologia of Jewishlife in Venice: the ‘reluctant and nude truth.’ Just at the beginning of the small treatise, the Rabbi ventures to present an image of Judaism that goes beyond prejudices and atavistic hatred. It is specificallyad- dressed to the ‘cultori dell’invita verità.’ Exactlywhat is meant by this expression, which was usedinthe dedication, is not clear at first sight.Earlier translators have preferred to consider it as amisprint and to amend the text to ‘invicta verità’ (‘unconquerable truth’). There is, however,noneed to changethe wording of the text,which in translation sounds.

Idaretobringthis work, neglected and stripped of ornatediction, to your noble attention, while indeed beingawarethat lovers of reluctant Truth appreciatesimplicity.For [this reluctant truth] takesthe greatest delight in [its] very nakedness. Idonot claim [3v] undeserved favour,nor ex- torted applause fromyou, as Irecognize how unworthyand unmerited it would be; but Iplead for the most candid and honest judgment of the issues discussed.⁷⁶

The concept of ‘reluctant truth’ fits very well into the system of Luzzatto’spolitical. Lovers of the ‘reluctant/unwilling’ truth accept it,regardless of the form in which it maybepropagated. In Luzzatto’sown words:

Therefore, with aminimum of talent that divine majesty granted me, Iproposed to compose a concise but truthful account of this nation’sprincipal ritesand most commonlyshared opinions, which arenot dissonant or discrepant from the universal ones.Inwritingthis text,Itried with all of my powers (even though Iamfromthe same nation) to abstain from anyemotionality or pas- sion that could makemedeviatefromthe truth. Thus Ihope to meet discreet readers,who, void of anyanticipationortroubled judgment,are not about to follow the vulgar custom of onlyap- provingand favouringhappy and adventurous individuals,and always damning those whoare disheartened and afflicted. Rather,with upright judgment they will balancetheir opinions on the subject,which my imperfection dictated to me, and in sayingthis Iwill omit an extended reflection on the antiquity of this race, on its unmixed blood, which has existed for such a long period of time, on the tenacity of this nation’sritesand , and on its inflexibility during times of oppressions.Iwill onlyadd to my aforementioned proposal adiscussionofsome of the profits that the Jewish nation that livesinVenice brings to this illustrious city.With this, Idonot intend to offer anyambitiousapparatus of profits and gains;rather Ionlywish to demonstrate that this nation is anythingbut auseless member of the general populationofthis city.⁷⁷

 Luzzatto, Discorso,3r-v. Asimilar parallel appears in Francis Bacon, TheNew , 14: ‘Fora naked mind is the companion of innocenceand simplicity,asonceupon atime the naked bodywas.’  Luzzatto, Discorso,5r–v. Apologetic, Empiricism,and ScepticalStrategies in Simone Luzzatto 87

The author’scommitment to his truth should not hide the fact that Luzzatto is not speakingofthe Aristotelianprinciple of non-contradiction, but of the political per- ception of thatcondition. His intention is to provide as neutral aportrait of the Jews as possible, describing their presenceinVenice and the (economic) advantages they bring. Although himself amemberofthe Jewish ‘nation’,aparsincausa,hewill nevertheless maintain his impartiality. In return for his unbiased presentation of the argument,heexpects his readers to form their opinion on the subjectwithoutprej- udice. The expression ‘nudityofthe truth’ is very intriguing.The reader of Luzzatto was acquainted with the concept of nuda veritas since Horace,⁷⁸ but also of its contradic- tory nature. Forthe nudity was, obviously, tantamount to purity and simplicity but also implied alack of defences. The Florentine painter Sergio Botticelli recreated the Calumny of ,alost painting of the Greek painterApelles, the story of which has been reported or perhaps invented by .⁷⁹ Aslander,arival of Apelles, accused the painter of revolt in front of KingMidas:

On the right sits aman with long ears almost of the Midas , stretching out ahand to Slan- der,who is still some wayoff, but coming. About him aretwo females whom Itakefor Ignorance and Assumption. Slander,approachingfromthe left,isanextraordinarilybeautiful woman, but with aheated, excitable air that suggests delusion and impulsiveness;inher left hand is alight- ed torch, and with her right she is holding ayouth by the hair; he holds up hands to heavenand calls the to witness his innocence. ShowingSlander the wayisaman with piercingeyes, but pale, deformed, and shrunken as from long illness;one mayeasilyguess him to be Envy. Twofemale attendants encourageSlander,actingastire-women, and addingtouches to her ;according to the cicerone, one of these is Malice, and the other Deceit.Followingbehind in mourningguise, black-robed and with torn hair,comes (I think he named her). She looks tearfullybehind her,awaitingshame-faced the approach of Truth. That was how Apelles translatedhis peril into paint.⁸⁰

In the depiction of Botticelli, the Truth is naked, anakedness which can have three possiblemeanings:1)purity and simplicity,which causes or it is caused by inno- cence; 2) lack of defence; and 3) extreme difficulty in catchinganadversary (e.g. in the Olympic games). While the first and the second possibilities are expressions of weakness and literary ‘imbecility’ (incapability of fighting and defending oneself),

 Horace, Odes and Epodes,eds.PaulShoreyand Gordon J. Laing(Chicago:Benj.H.Sanborn & Company, 1919), 1.24: cui Pudor et Iustitiae soror incorrupta Fides nudaque Veritas quando ullum inveniet parem?  Cf. Rudolph Altrocchi, “The CalumnyofApelles in the Literature of the Quattrocento,” Modern Language Association 36.3 (1921): 454– 491.  TheWorks of Lucian of Samosata,vol. 4, eds. Henri W. Fowler and Francis G. Fowler (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,1905), 2–3. 88 GiuseppeVeltri

the third one is almost the reverse, revealing the ‘sceptic’ attitude of abodilydescrip- tion. Back to the picture: avery similar ‘translation’ of aprocess of judgment into a piece of theatre has been presented by Luzzatto in his Socrate,wherethe theatrical figures of Defamation, Suspicion, Ignorance, Fame, and Custom (as ministers of Au- thority/Slander)appear.⁸¹ In another passageofthe Socrate,hecomes back to the comparison between truth and nudity.⁸² Hereheisdealingwith the consequences of his attitude to his enquiry ‘concerning the of the truth, convincedtosus- pend and withhold [my] assent.’ His hesitation and perplexity lead him ‘to consider whether it was aprofitable decision to publiclydiscredit our alleged knowledge.’ Dis- closing the truth, he maintains, does not always fulfilour interest, like the nudityof our body, although ‘the members were masterlyconstructed by the supreme Nature it often turns out to be indecent that the truth should appeartovulgar men without any ornament.’ The truth of cognition is likenudity,appreciatedbylovers but also likelyconsid- ered indecent by common people. The indirect referenceisobviously to Genesis 3 and the creation of the feeling of shame in seeing nudityafter the primordial sin. ForLuzzatto, this indecencyisafeeling of vulgarmen, provoked by the nudity of the truth. This indecencycan alsoprompt scepticism concerning the effectiveness of the decision to ‘publiclydiscredit our alleged knowledge.’ That is an extreme as- pect of sceptical attitude: to be sceptical about one’sown scepticism.

 Luzzatto, Socrate,6–7: ‘Yet, as soon as the traitor [i.e. Authority] had achieved so noble arank and become impudent through the simple obedience and easy credulity of the stupid folk, it began conspiring against me. Felonywent so far that it chased me out of my royal seat and brought and relegated me to adark and lonelyprison. Hence, as Ihaveindeed lost my freedom, it was forbidden to have intercourse with my favourites and thus Ibecame infertile and sterile […]Indeed, it came so far onlybymeans of sumptuouscloths,authoritative bearings,frowning, intimidatingglances, fur- rowing its brows, concise and ambiguous words,brief and reluctant conversations,contemptuous and delusory manners,obstinateand Custom, both of them promoters of its acclaims and commen- dations.’ Also ibidem,65: ‘retinenza di giuditio, tantodamiei adversarii calunniata, et al Vostro spet- tabile tribunale acramentehoraaccusata;’ cf. ibidem 74,77, and 299 (of the Italian original).  Ibidem,256 (of the Italian original). Oded Schechter Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics

Introduction

An old riddle, which was first formulatedbyLeo Strauss,¹ has resurfaced in the last decade, capturingthe imagination of several prominent scholars:² is Spinoza’sinter- pretation of miracles consistent with his literal sense hermeneutics?Areview of the rhetoric used by several scholars when depicting this problem provides sufficient evidence in order to indicate the fundamentality of the philosophical beliefs that this puzzlement undermines. Thus, Warren Zev Harvey speaks about it in terms of ‘enigmatic statements,’³ stating that ‘Spinoza is playing agame—but what?’⁴ Steven Nadler speaks about ‘the perplexity generated by these anomalous passages,’⁵ con- cludinghis paper discussing the question in terms of mystery:

It is still a mystery whySpinoza believes, as he argues in chaptersix, that as amatter of fact Scriptureitself—or,rather,its prophetic authors—when properlyinterpreted does in fact ascribe natural causes to all events,eventhose it presents as miracles.⁶

Criticalhermeneutics requires the reader to look for the meaning of prophecyand bib- lical teaching within onlythe biblical text.How can one derive the meaning of the biblical prophecyfrom the Bible itself?The first stage, accordingtoSpinoza, is ach-

Iamgreatly thankful to the anonymous reader,Racheli Haliva,Zev Harvey,Ilil Hoz, Yitzhak Melamed, Amanda Parris, and StephanSchmid, fortheir helpful comments.

 Cf. Steven Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProbleminSpinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 74.4 (2013): 639, n. 40: ‘Foralongtime, and as far as Icould tell, onlyLeo Strauss took the incongruity of these passageswith Spinoza’s “whole principle of interpre- tation, that objective truth maynot be used as the keyfor interpreting Scripture” seriously. But Strauss onlyconcluded that all this shows is “how little Spinozafinds himself at ease in [his] critique of miracles.”’  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 623 – 642; Carlos Fraenkel, “SpinozaonMiracles and the Truth of the Bible,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 74.4 (2013): 643–658; Michah Gottlieb, “Spinoza’sMethod(s) of Biblical Interpretation Reconsidered,” JewishStudies Quarterly 14 (2007): 286–317; Warren Zev Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” Jour- nal of the HistoryofIdeas 74.4 (2013): 659 – 675.  Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” 659,673 and 675.  Ibidem,667 (myitalics).  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 623(my ital- ics).  Ibidem,641– 642(my italics).

OpenAccess. ©2018 Oded Schechter,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-006 90 Oded Schechter

ieved by using his literal sense method, i.e. deciphering the meaning of biblical prophecyrequires us to studythe prophetic statement taking its linguistic use as a starting point.Ifweknow how aparticularlanguagewas usedatthe specific time of the prophecy,wecan reconstruct the its meaning.Spinoza posits his critical her- meneutics in stark contrast to dogmatic hermeneutics, which he defines as anyinter- pretation which deciphers meaning accordingtothe interpreter’sown alreadyestab- lished philosophical opinions rather thanderiving it from the biblical text itself.⁷ Spinoza’shermeneutics is compatible with his separation thesis; theologyand philosophyare two distinct domainsthat should not be conflated. Thus, aprophet’s claim should not be explicated by means of aphilosophicalclaim, and aphilosoph- ical claim should not be addressed in atheological manner.Accordingtothe sepa- ration thesis,regardlessofwhatever philosophicalthesis the prophet holds (even an entirelyfalse one), it does not implythathis prophecy contradictsorconflicts with the true philosophical view;the prophet’sopinion is as little apart of the theological aspect of his prophecy as, for instance, the length of his hair; the onlyprophetic teachingistheological, and theological teaching has nothing to do with philosoph- ical teaching. Now,here is the question that puzzlesscholars: when analysed philosophically, Spinoza argues, miracles are absurd and impossible; we would not have expected him to formulate it anydifferently. However,strangelyenough, Spinoza claims that because miracles are impossible, we have to interpret the biblical miracles in such away thatthe biblical text does not implyanything which is not in accordance with reason. Moreover,Spinoza claims that miracles are, in fact,aphilosophical issue, and hence that we should explain the meaning of aprophetic statement in away which would not resultinacontradiction between the philosophical view of miracles and the prophet’sview of miracles. Hence, the riddle that Spinoza’sreader is faced with is this: what reason could Spinoza have that would explain his deviation from critical hermeneutics, namely what reason could he have for applying dogmatic hermeneutics to the biblical mira- cles?Although the riddle focussesonmiracles, Harvey claims, in aStraussian spirit, that Spinoza deliberatelypresented this contradiction in order to teach the reader how the TTP should be read as awhole. Harvey compares Spinoza’smanner of com- posing acontradictory text to thatofMaimonidesinhis Guide. Other scholars have offered other resolutions,⁸ but they all agree that 1) Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles is

 Iskip the important discussion concerning Spinoza’shermeneutics, as it is not essential for the purpose of this paper. Forthe sake of the main argument in this paper,Idistinguish between literal sense method and critical hermeneutics as follows: literal sense method concerns the meaning of spe- cific phrase or passage,whereas critical hermeneutics ascertains the prophetic/philosophic natureof the biblical expression or passage.  Foraninterestingdiscussion of the different approaches,see Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Mira- cles,” 672ff.; Harvey names three types of resolution: the biographical (Strauss and Fraenkel), the harmonizing (Nadler), and the dialecticalone (Harvey). Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics 91

dogmatic to some extent,and 2) the dogmatic interpretationofmiracles stands in contrast to his critical hermeneutics, which requires us to studythe prophet’sview in light of the literal sense rule. In contrast to this widelyshared agreement,Iwould like to suggest an alternative interpretation which consists of the following theses: 1. Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles is, in fact,anexpression of his anti-dogmatic com- mitments. 2. Spinoza’sclaim that the prophets were, in fact,committed to the same Spinozian view of miracles is the result of his critical hermeneutics. 3. Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles can contributetoanunderstanding of the biblical conception of miracles.

This alternative interpretation willhelp in resolving the puzzle. Theorder of presen- tation Iwill take in this paper will be: 1. The puzzle: Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles as aviolation of his critical hermeneu- tics. 2. Miracles as aproblem for Spinoza’shermeneutics. 3. ShowingSpinoza’sway out—Spinoza’shermeneutics actuallyinformsour under- standing of biblical miracles. 4. Claiming thatSpinoza’sanalysis of miracles is, in fact,aclear expression of his commitment to anti-dogmatic hermeneutics.

The Puzzle: Spinoza’sAnalysisofMiracles as aViolation of his Critical Hermeneutics

Forthe sake of clarity,Iwill brieflypresent the link between Spinoza’s separation the- sis and his literal sense method. Then, Iwillpresent the puzzling deviation of Spino- za’sanalysis of miracles from his critical hermeneutics.

Critical hermeneutics and the separation thesis

Spinoza’scritical hermeneutics can be crudelyexplained as consistingoftwo parts: 1. Application of the separation thesis—theologyand philosophyare two distinct domains, distinguishedinthe following way: I) Each has its own sourceofknowledge:the sourceoftheological knowledge is prophetic revelation, whereas the sourceofphilosophical knowledge is the natural light of reason. II) Theology’smedium for thinking the world is imagination, whereas philoso- phy’sisreason. III) The aim of philosophyistruth, whereas the aim of theologyisobedience and piety. 92 Oded Schechter

According to the separation thesis,the prophetic aspect of the Bible should consist of teachingsinwhich the medium of thinkingisimagination. The kind of teachingorknowledge thatprophecyconveys has to do with piety and obedience.⁹ 2. Literal sense method—the literal sense method enables the reader to separate the theological content of the prophet’sexpression from its philosophical con- tent.Thus, the critical reader is not bothered by the truth or falsityofthe proph- et’sexpressions;the philosophical value of the prophet’sopinion does not affect the theological value of prophetic expression,e.g., the prophet’sview of God maybeinvalid philosophically, but entirelyvalid theologically.

Miracles: aDeviation from Critical Hermeneutics

Iwill now focus on two central discussions: the first is Nadler’sdiscussion of Spino- za’sdeviation and the second is Harvey’sdiscussion of Spinoza’s apology. Letmejust brieflyelaborate on them.

Nadler’sQuestion: Spinoza’sDogmatic Deviation

Nadler’sdiscussion bringsthe reader directlytothe heart of the problem. Summaris- ing it,hesays:

The issue is whySpinoza believes that Scripture’sauthenticallyprophetic authors cannot pos- siblyassert anythingabout miracles that is ‘contrary to reason.’¹⁰

Let us now examine Spinoza’sdogmatic thesis, the argument he provides to support it,and Nadler’squestion. Concerningthe biblical view of miracles, Spinoza says:

If anythingshould be found [in scripture] which can be conclusively demonstrated to be contra- ry to the of nature, or to have been unable to follow from them,wemust believewithout reservation that it has been added to the Sacred Texts by sacrilegious men. Forwhatever is con- trarytonatureiscontrarytoreason; and what is contrarytoreason is absurd,and thereforeto be rejected. (TTP,6[51]; my italics)

Spinoza’sconclusionhere is that anypassagefound in the Bible which conveys the opinion that something happens which is ‘contrary to the laws of nature’ must be

 Iwill skip the discussionastohow the mind’spossession of revealed knowledge and the person’s disposition to obey this knowledge areactuallyone and the same according to Spinoza. Spinoza does have an argument in store in favour of this equation, but it is beyond the scopeofthis paper.  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 639. Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism,and CriticalHermeneutics 93

considered acorrupt passage. He supports this claim by arguingthat ‘whatever is contrary to nature is contrary to reason; and what is contrary to reason is absurd.’ Now,does the argument support the thesis?Itseems that according to Spinoza’s own objection to dogmatic interpretation, his argument does not support his conclu- sion, since the fact that from the perspective of reason nothing can be contrary to nature does not necessarilyentail thatthe prophet cannot believethat this is exactly the case. Nadler puts this question very convincingly,saying:

Giveneverythingthat Spinoza has said about the natureofprophecy,the content of the prophet- ic writings,and the interpretation of Scripture, it is very surprising to see him saywhat he does in passage C.¹¹ In fact,itwould seem to be preciselywhatheshould not say, sinceitisincon- sistent with his overall accountofthe interpretation of Scripture. His remarks in this passageare somethingthat we might expect from MaimonidesorMeijer,but not from Spinoza.According to Spinoza’sconsideredaccount of Scripture, it is perfectlyreasonabletoexpect the Bible’suntu- tored authors to regardevents as havingsupernatural causes and thus sincerely to narratethem in such away that they ‘contravene the laws of Nature,’ or to possess an understanding of things that is ‘contrary to reason’ and, from reason’sperspective, ‘absurd’.But the prophets werenot intellectuallygifted individuals,much less Spinozist philosophers who identify God with Nature. Thus,there is no reason to expect,asamatter of principle, that the prophets believed that every event has anatural cause or can be explained throughthe laws of nature. Why, then, should it not at least be possible to find ‘somethinginScripturecontrary to the light of Nature’ without suspectingthe piety of its author?AsSpinoza himself says,inhis objections to Maimonides’s view that ‘thereisnothinginScripturewhich contradicts reason,’‘Iinsist that Scriptureexpress- ly affirms and teaches that God is jealous [. ..]this is contrary to reason.’¹²

Spinoza’sthesis here is apparentlyadogmatic one; however,his argument does not seem to support his thesis. Moreover,the reason for his deviation is quite puzzling: what could have been his reason for introducing such adogmatic thesis that explic- itlycontradicts his own critical hermeneutics and possiblyjeopardizes the aim of the TTP,namelythe separation thesis?

Harvey’sQuestioning of Spinoza’s Apology

In apassagethatHarvey describes as Spinoza’s apology,Spinoza explicitlyaddresses our question. YetHarvey claims that instead of offering an answer,Spinoza’s apology onlyexpands the question. AccordingtoHarvey,Spinoza’s apology is so puzzling that we must assume that Spinoza was playing agame which needs to be explained in adifferent way. Letusfollow Spinoza’s apology and Harvey’squestion. Spinoza’s apology reads:

 Referringtothe passageIhave just quoted above.  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 637. 94 Oded Schechter

BeforeIend this chapter, there’ssomethingelse Iwant to note.I’ve proceeded regarding mira- cles according to amethod completely different from the one Ifollowed regarding Prophecy. ConcerningProphecyIaffirmed nothingbut what Icould infer from foundations revealed in the SacredTexts.But here I’ve elicited the main points onlyfromprinciples known to the natural light.Idid this deliberately. ForsinceProphecysurpasses man’spower of understanding, and is apurelyTheological question, Icould affirm nothingabout it,nor even know in what it chiefly consisted,except from the foundations which have been revealed. Iwas compelled to put to- gether ahistory of Prophecy, and to formulatecertain doctrines from it,which would teach me the natureand properties of Prophecy,asfar as this can be done. [66] But concerning mira- cles what we areaskingiscompletelyphilosophical:can we grant that somethinghappens in naturecontrary to its laws,orsomethingwhich couldn’tfollow fromthem?SoIdidn’tneed any- thinglikethat.(TTP,6[65–6])

Spinoza is thus completelyaware that in his analysis of miracles, he deviates from the critical hermeneutics which he used for the analysis of prophecy.Harvey boldly questions Spinoza’sdistinction between miracles and prophecy, saying:

The apologiabegins with Spinoza’sadmission that he has treatedthe subject of biblical miracles completelydifferentlyfromthat of biblical prophecy.Heexplains that in discussing prophecyin chapterone he had based himself on ‘foundations revealed in Sacred Writ,’ for prophecy is a ‘purelytheological’ subject,but in discussing miracles he has based himself on ‘foundations known by means of the lumen naturale,’ for the subject of miracles is ‘plainlyphilosophical.’ The petitio principii hereissoflagrant that it must be supposed to be intentional. Spinoza is playingagame—but what?One would have thought that the subjects of prophecy and miracles arefor Spinoza very similar.Prophecy maybeunderstood as beingrational and natural (e.g., the natural knowledgeofthe intelligent individual) or imaginary and (e.g., the visions of the biblical prophets which aresaid to be ‘beyond the limits’ of natural knowledge and inexplicable by ‘the laws of ’); and so toomiracles maybeunder- stood as beingrational and natural (e.g.,the extra light at Gibeon was caused by the hail) or imaginary and supernatural (e.g., the light was caused by the sun’sstandingstill in the heav- ens). Spinoza claims that the subject of prophecyis‘theological’ because it ‘surpasses human knowledge’ (captum humanum superat), whereas that of miracles is ‘philosophical’ because it involves the philosophical question of ‘whether we can concede that somethingmay happen in Naturethat contravenes its Laws.’ However,hemight just as easilyhavesaid: the subject of prophecy is ‘philosophical,’ for it involves the philosophical question of whether there can be suprarational knowledge,whereas that of miracles is ‘theological,’¹³

Harvey’spuzzlement assumes that Spinoza’scritical hermeneutics provides no rea- son to explicate miracles and prophecydifferently; if what is at stake is the difference between natural light and supernatural light (reason or imagination), then both prophecyand miracles can be addressed either philosophicallyortheologically. Spi- noza’sclaim that miracles are the object of philosophywhereas prophecyisthe ob- ject of theologyisasarbitraryasitgets. Ithink we are now in aposition to summarise the different aspects of the main problem, which is Spinoza’sinconsistency:despite his strongcommitment to his own

 Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” 666–667. Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics 95

critical hermeneutics, his analysis of miracles is committed to dogmatic hermeneu- tics. More specifically, there are two issues: 1. That the prophet’sunderstanding of miracles is compatible with the philosoph- ical one. Thus, in cases wherewecannot explain abiblical paragraph concern- ing miracles in aphilosophicalway,wehavetocensor this paragraph. 2. Spinoza’sdistinction between miracles and prophecy on the basis of reason and the prophetic kind of cognition does not make anysense.

Miracles as aProblem forSpinoza’sHermeneutics

In this part,Iwill suggest the following thesis: amiracle—when interpreted accord- ing to Spinoza’sliteralsense method—is apparentlyasignificant problem for Spino- za’scritical hermeneutics, if we suppose that the latter assumes thatthe literal sense method and the separation thesis are compatible. In his apology,Spinoza states: ‘Iaffirmednothing but what Icould infer from foundations revealedinthe Sacred Texts’ (TTP,6[65]). It might be helpful to review the lastparagraph of chapter 2, in which Spinoza summarises the thesis he infers from his analysis of prophecy:

Although onlythe thingswehavesaid about the Prophets and Prophecypertain particularlyto my purpose of separating PhilosophyfromTheology, nevertheless,because Ihavetreated Prophecygenerally, Iwant to ask now whether the gift of Prophecywas peculiar to the Hebrews or whether it was common to all nations.Wealso need to ask whatwemust maintain about the callingofthe Hebrews.That’sthe object of the followingchapter. (TTP,2[58])

Spinoza’sclaim is quite explicit: the literal sense analysis of prophecyisintended to support the separation thesis. Now,how does it achieve this?Spinoza brieflyexplains the separation thesis in the preface:

Havingshown the fundamentalsoffaith [in chapter14], Iconclude finallythat revealed knowl- edge has no object but obedience, and indeed that it is entirely distinct from natural knowledge, both in its object and in its foundation and means.Revealed knowledgehas nothing in common with natural knowledge,but each is in charge of its own domain, without anyconflict with the other.[In chapter15Ishow that] neither oughttobethe handmaid of the other.(TTP,preface [27]; my italics)

The separation thesis,then, stipulates that the distinction between revealedknowl- edge and natural knowledge (theologyand philosophy) is clear-cut: these are two completelydistinct domains of knowledge which have ‘nothing in common’ with each other and cannot conflict.The first twochapters on prophecy and the prophet are rich in content.However,accordingtoSpinoza’sclaim, all of the discussions con- cerningprophecyweredesigned to support his separation thesis. How do they sup- port it?Skipping adetailed analysis,Iwill point out two kinds of discussions which do so: 96 Oded Schechter

1. The analysis of prophecyshows that the foundationsofrevealed knowledge are different from the foundations of natural knowledge.Thus, since revealed knowl- edge is knowledge of the imagination, one should not takethe prophet’sphilosoph- ical opinions to have anytheological validity.For instance, regardingthe revelation to Cain, Spinoza says:

Forexample, the revelation to Cain [Genesis 4:6– 7] teaches us only that God warned him to lead atrue life, for that was the onlyintent and substanceofthe revelation, not teach the freedom of the will or Philosophic matters. So even though the freedom of the will is contained very clearly in the wordsand reasonings of that warning, we arepermitted to think the will is not free, since those words and reasonings wereonlyaccommodated to Cain’spower of understanding. (TTP,2 [53]; my italics)

2. Critical hermeneutics can disclose the meaninginwhich revealed knowledge is a domaininand of itself. Thus, for instance, by disclosing the manner in which arev- elation is validated, we see that revealed knowledge does not appeal to reason. One of Spinoza’smain discussions revolves around the sourceofcertainty.Liter- al sense hermeneutics,heargues, helps us to decipher the inner criteria for certainty with regards to revealedknowledge.Spinoza concludes the first chapter with the fol- lowing tellingpassage:

As aresult, we’re now forcedtoask how the Prophets could have come to be certain of things they perceivedonlythrough the imagination, and not from certain principles of the mind. But whatever we can sayabout this,wemust seek from Scripture. As we have alreadysaid, we do not have true ’knowledge of this matter,orwecannot explain it through its first causes. What Scrip- ture teaches concerning the certainty of the Prophets,Ishall show in the followingchapter, where Ihavedecided to treat of the Prophets. (TTP,1[48])

Certainty,accordingtoSpinoza, accompanies anypiece of knowledge which is de- duced by reason. [See TTP,2[4–6]] There is no need for anyfurther act of the mind in order to become certain of the truth of anypiece of knowledge which is de- rivedbyreason. In contrast, knowledge achieved by imagination requires an addi- tional element in order to be endowed with certainty. It is important to note here that Spinoza’scomment—‘we’re now forced to ask how the Prophets could have come to be certain of thingsthey perceivedonly through the imagination, and not from certain principles of the mind’ (TTP,1[48]) —turnsout to be very telling.Why are we forced to ask this when the certainty is com- ing from the imagination, but not when it comesfrom the principles of the mind?If we weretoderive this certaintyfrom our principles of reason, then the separation thesis could not be as strongasSpinoza claimeditwas,namelywecould not claim that ‘revealedknowledge has nothing in common with naturalknowledge, but each is in charge of its own domain, without anyconflict with the other’ (TTP, preface[27]). Thus, being committed to the strongversion of the separation thesis, Spinoza has to reject the premise that prophecy obtains its certaintyfrom certain Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics 97

principles of the mind. To summarize: Spinoza’sstrong separation thesis is intimately linked with his view thatthe certaintyofprophecy cannot originateinreason. Yettocome to our point now:Spinoza claims that in order to determine the sourceofcertaintywhen it comes to revealed knowledge,wemust read the Bible using his method.

Certainty and Revealed Knowledge

In the lastsection, we showed the significance of Spinoza’shermeneutics to his sep- aration thesis. Moreover,wehaveseen that Spinoza is committed to the strongver- sion of the separation thesis,namelythatrevealedknowledge should not be support- ed by means of reason. AccordingtoSpinoza, it is part of the task of chapter 2to show that the certainty which accompanies revealedknowledge is not being in- formedthrough reason. If we fail to make this distinction, we will not be able to abide by the strongversion of the separation thesis. So, what is it indeed that endows revealed knowledge with certainty?

But first Imust treat the certainty of the Prophets,both because it concernsthe theme of this chapter, but also because it will help in some measuretoget to the conclusionweintend to dem- onstrate. [4] Unlike aclear and distinct idea, asimple imagination does not,byits nature, in- volvecertainty.Sotobeable to be certain of things we imagine, we must add somethingto the imagination—viz., reasoning.Itfollows that,byitself, Prophecycannot involvecertainty. As we’ve shown, it depended onlyonthe imagination. So the Prophets were not certain about God’srevelation by the revelation itself, but by some sign. (TTP,2[3–4])

The certainty which accompanies revealedknowledge is not revelation, but asign. After giving different examples from the Bible, Spinoza concludes:

This shows that the Prophets always had some signbywhich they became certain of the things they imagined Prophetically. That’swhy Moses warns [the Jews] to seek asign from [anyone claimingtobe] aProphet,viz. the outcome of some future event (Deuteronomy18:22).[6] In this respect,then, Prophecyisinferior to natural knowledge,which needs no sign, but of its own nature involves certainty.(TTP,2[5–6])

Indeed, the certaintywhich accompanies revealed knowledge is inferior to the cer- tainty which accompanies natural knowledge.Yet Spinoza has successfullyshown that this certainty does not come from reason. The certaintytowhich the prophet as- pires is achieved through asign which is as imaginary as prophecyitself. To summarise: accordingtoour explication,the onlyway we can account for the certainty of revealed knowledge without violating the strongversion of the separa- tion thesis is by pointingour the exact role of the sign plays in endowing certainty to prophetic knowledge;wecan understand the role of the sign onlybycloselycrit- icallystudying the biblical text. 98 Oded Schechter

Signsand Miracles

But what is the kind of sign thatendow prophetic with certaintyaccord- ing to Spinoza?Interestingly enough, at least in certain cases, Spinoza identifies miracles as signs.For instance, in chapter 2, it reads:

Indeed, this Prophetic certainty was not mathematical, but onlymoral, as is evident from Scrip- ture itself. ForinDeuteronomy13[:2] Moses warns that anyProphet who wants to teach new Gods should be condemned to death, even though he confirms his teachingwith signs and mira- cles. ForasMoses himself goes on to say, God also uses signs and miracles to test the people. (TTP,2[7])¹⁴

Moreover,laterinthe chapter Spinoza says:

Similarly, the sign of the backwardmotion of the shadow was revealed to Isaiah according to his power of understanding, viz. as abackwardmotion of the sun [cf. 2Kings20:8 – 12 with Isaiah 38:7– 8]. Forhetoo thoughtthat the sun moves and that the earth is at rest.Asluck would have it,henever thought of parhelia,not even in adream. We arepermitted to maintain this without anyhesitation because the sign could reallyhappen, and be predicted to the kingbyIsaiah, even though the Prophet did not know its true cause. (TTP,2[28])

Spinoza notes that having to explicate ‘the backward motion of the sun’ in terms of imagination does not necessarilymean that it could not be explained by reason. However,inchapter 6, Spinoza refers to the sameevent,saying:

We ought not doubt that manythings arerelated as miracles in the Sacred Texts whose causes can easilybeexplained according to known principles of natural things.Wealreadyhinted at this in Ch. 2when we spokeabout the sun’sstandingstill in the time of Joshua, and its going backwardinthe time of Ahaz. But we’ll soon treat this morefully, when we discuss the interpretation of miracles,asI’ve promised to do in this chapter. (TTP,6[15])

Here, Spinoza discusses the same event,but in terms of . So, if miracles can be asign, Isuggest we turn now to discuss the place of miracles in revealed knowl- edge.

 Cf. TTP,6[31]: ‘Forhesaysthat (even if)asign and awonder he has predictedtoyou should happen, etc., do not (nevertheless) assent to the wordsofthis Prophet etc., because the Lord your God testsyou etc. (Therefore) let that Prophet be condemned to death etc.From this it clearlyfollows that even false Prophets can performmiracles,and that unless men arewell protectedbythetrue knowledge and loveofGod, miracles can lead them to embrace false Gods as easilyasthe True God. ForMoses adds sincethe Lordyour God is testing you, to know whether youlovehim with all your heart and all your soul.’ Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and CriticalHermeneutics 99

Miracles as Signs: the First Problem

Amiracle can serveasasign, but what is amiracle? Ithink we are now in aposition to see the difficulties thatmiracles createinSpinoza’sdual commitment,namelyto both literal sense hermeneutics and his separation thesis. If we return to the scholars previouslydiscussed, Ithink we can saythatamira- cle is an event perceivedbyboth the Bible and the prophet as violating the lawof nature. Now,ifwesay that asign is amiracle, how does it contributetotheology? To answer this question, we would have to explore how amiracle can endow the prophet’srevelation (or his audience) with certaintythat the sign is indeed amiracle. Amiracle shows thatprovidence can violate the natural order;providence’sinterfer- ence with the natural order is asign that adds certainty to the content of revelations. If we are correct in our interpretation of Spinoza as being committed to astrong version of the separation thesis,which requires (as we have suggested) arevelation to be explained without anyreference to reason, then amiracle qua sign willnot be very helpful. Afterall, the prophet’sentireconviction is based on an argument of rea- son which roughlyclaims: youhaveseen an event,and youknow that events gener- allyfollow the , the laws of reason. However,what youhaveseen here is a miracle, which means that providence can bend the laws of nature; this is asign tell- ing youthat prophetic revelation is true. If we accept this explicationofmiracle and sign, we see that miracles—when interpreted according to the literal sense method— present aserious difficulty to Spinoza: this kind of certaintywould be explicitlyin- formedbyanargument from reason. However,there is one good reason to reject my interpretation, because by adopt- ing dogmatic hermeneutics, Spinoza falls down yetanother pit.Let me elaborate: if we accept Spinoza’sposition on miracles, then the Bible and the prophet agree with him and miracles are not events which are bent by providence to violate laws of na- ture. So, what is the contribution of non-existent miracles to prophetic certainty? Let me suggest arevised version of this refuted interpretation of mine.

The Sceptic and the Dogmatic

Spinoza posits his critical hermeneutics in opposition to two hermeneutical schools. We have alreadydiscussed the opposition to dogmatic hermeneutics. In chapter 15, Spinoza posits critical hermeneutics against sceptical hermeneutics. Spinoza depicts the sceptic’sreadingofthe Bible in the following way:

Those who don’tknow how to separate PhilosophyfromTheology debatewhether Scripture should be the handmaid of reason, or reason should be the handmaid of Scripture—that is, whether the meaningofScriptureought to be accommodated to reason, or reason oughtto be accommodated to Scripture. The skeptics, whodenythe certainty of reason, defend the ac- commodation of reason to Scripture. (TTP,15[1]) 100 Oded Schechter

Spinoza is aware of the fact that the sceptic is following literal sense method to a certain extent.Inchapter 15,hemakesthe following comment on the sceptic:

Insofar as he wants to explain ScripturebyScripture, Ipraise him. But I’mamazed that aman endowed with reason should be so eager to destroy reason. It’scertainlytrue that Scripture oughttobeexplained by Scripture, so long as we’re onlyworkingout the meaningofthe state- ments and the Prophets’ intention. (TTP,15[8])

Before Iturntodiscuss Spinoza’sobjection to the sceptic, let me just point out that Spinoza’sadversary in his discussion of miracles is very likelyasceptic. Spinoza de- scribes the common people as those who have the tendency to claim that miracles are God’sactions thatviolate the natural order (TTP,6[2–5]). Spinoza explains the motivation driving them in the following manner:

So the common people call unusual works of nature miracles, or works of God. Partlyfromde- votion, partlyfromadesiretooppose those whocultivatethe natural sciences, they don’twant to know the natural causes of things.They long to hear onlythe thingsthey’re most ignorant of, which they’re most amazed by.(TTP,6[3])

The desire to ‘oppose those who cultivatethe natural sciences’ is quite similar to the depiction of the sceptic’smadness in chapter 15:

Who but someone desperate and mad would want to recklesslysay goodbyetoreason, or to scorn the arts and sciences, and denythe certainty of reason?(TTP,15[38])

In fact,the sceptic’sresemblancetothe miracle advocate comes up in acontext that is more significant to our discussion. In chapter 15,Spinoza says:

Who but someone desperate and mad would want to recklesslysay goodbyetoreason, or to scorn the arts and sciences, and denythe certainty of reason?[…]They want to call upon reason to repudiatereason,and by acertain reason make reason uncertain.While they’re tryingtoshow the truth and authority of Theology by mathematical demonstrations,and to take away the au- thority of reasonand the natural light,all they’re doingisdraggingTheologyunder the control of reason. They clearlyseem to suppose that Theologyhas no brillianceunless it’silluminated by the natural light.(TTP, 15 [38–9])

The sceptic in chapter 15 is actually the one who ‘calls upon reason to repudiaterea- son.’ If we return to Spinoza’smiracle adversary,wesee that he meets the sceptic’s criteria. In chapter 6, Spinoza depicts the miracle advocate:

Next,weknow that nothingagrees with nature (or is contrary to it) except whatwehaveshown to agreewith those principles (or to be contrary to them). So if we could conceive that by some power (whatever in the end it was) somethingcould happen in naturewhich was contrary to nature, that would be contrary to those first notions,and we would have to reject it as ab- surd—either that,orwewould have to doubt the first notions (as we have just shown) and con- sequently, doubt God and all things,however they might have been perceived. (TTP,6[18]) Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics 101

Thus, Spinoza states here that anyone who claims that miracles are events that vio- late the laws of nature (i.e. the miracle advocate) is actuallyclaiming that reason re- futes reason (i.e. the sceptic).We see, then, thataccording to Spinoza, when someone claims that miracles are contrary to the natural order,what he is saying is actuallya statement about knowledge.

Critical Hermeneuticsand the Sceptic’sArgument from Miracles

Is Spinoza’sthesis regarding the compatibility between literal sense hermeneutics and the separation thesis in danger,ifSpinoza’smiracle adversary is indeed the scep- tic?AsSpinoza grants, the sceptic’sapproach is quite similar to his own when it comes to the literal sense interpretation. (TTP,15[8]) So, let us reconstruct the scep- tic’sargument and review Spinoza’sanswer. Let us first acompareSpinoza’sanswer to the sceptic concerning prophecywith his answer concerning miracles. In the case of prophecy,the sceptic’sargument would be the following:the literal sense impliesthat prophecyistrue, and since pro- phetic knowledge is different from natural knowledge,accepting prophetic truth im- plies that naturalknowledge is subordinatetonatural knowledge.Spinoza’sanswer to this is thatcritical hermeneutics indeed confirms thatprophetic knowledge is valid. However,italso confirms that revealed knowledge is made valid by imagina- tion; hence it does not implyanything concerning reason. As long as we can keep the domains of theologyand philosophyseparate, namelyaslongasthey do not inform each other,then thereisnobasis for the sceptic’sposition, justasthere is no basis for the dogmatic one. What is the case for miracles?The sceptic’sargument would be that the certainty of the revelation is endowedbythe sign or the miracle. If we go back to Spinoza’s claim that amiracle is an action on the part of providence against the order of na- ture—which is tantamount to the claim that reason refutes reason—then the biblical teachingsupportsscepticism. Can Spinoza refute the sceptic’sargument by arguing from the separation thesis? In contrast to the case of prophecy,inthe case of miracles, the answer seems to be no. It seems to be the case that theological knowledge is informed by reason, and since certainty of revealedknowledge is dependentonthe insight that knowledge of reason is invalid, the separation thesis cannot hold. Now we can return to our original difficulties: does Spinoza have areason to adopt dogmatic hermeneutics in his interpretation of miracles?The answer is yes; if he does not adopt this kind of hermeneutics, the literal sense method is in support of the sceptic. — Does Spinoza have areason to claim that the prophets hold the sameviews as he does concerning miracles?Yes: if theologyadmits that miracles implyaninterrup- tion of the natural order,then the separation thesis is disproved (remember thatin 102 Oded Schechter

order to refute the separation thesis,weonlyneed to show that theologyisnot sup- ported by its own means). — Does Spinoza have agood reason to distinguish between miracles and prophe- cy,stating thatthe question of miracles is philosophical, whereas the question of prophecyisapurelytheological?Yes: prophetic knowledge can be entirelyexplained as proceeding from the foundations of theology, hence investigatingits teachingin accordancewith the literalsense method makessense; however,since miracles can- not explain theologywithout relying on natural knowledge,they cannotqualify as revealed knowledge. — Does Spinoza have agood reason to suggest applying censorship in case the Bible impliesthat miracles support theology? Yes, otherwise we would have to agree with the sceptic that biblical teaching is dependent on knowledge of reason.

Should We Accept that Spinoza’sAnalysisofMiracles is a Dogmatic One?

Our interpretation challenges the scholars’ claim thatSpinoza had no good reason to adopt adogmatic hermeneutics in his interpretationofmiracles.Incontrast,our in- terpretation shows that he had very good reasons for adopting dogmatic hermeneu- tics. Contrary to the scholars’ claim that the reason for adopting adogmatic herme- neutics has nothing to do with Spinoza’sown hermeneutics,wehaveseen that Spinoza’sreason for doing so was his own literalsense method. As appealing as our interpretation maybefor explaining Spinoza’sreason for his deviation from the literal sense method,itremains very weak: what kind of answer would that be on Spinoza’spart?Merelyclaiming thatthe literal sense method should not be usedinthat particularcase just because it violatesanother thesis is an interpretation which could perhaps sound convincing to certain of phi- losophy, but would Spinoza qua philosopher also be convinced? If we wish to interpret Spinoza qua philosopher,wehavetoaddress the follow- ing two challenges to our interpretation: 1. Can Spinoza’sexplication of biblical miracles be supported from his critical her- meneutics? 2. Does Spinoza have an answer to the sceptic’schallengefrom miracles which does not suspendthe literal sense method when it comes to miracles?

Spinoza’sExplication of Miracles Reconsidered

Up until now,wehaveaccepted the scholars’ premise thatSpinoza’sinterpretation of miracles is indeedadogmatic one. Yetour interpretation,which identifies Spinoza’s miracle adversary as the sceptic, can serveasthe pivotalpoint for turning our per- ception of Spinoza’sview of miracles upside down. Iwillargue that using our inter- Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism,and CriticalHermeneutics 103

pretation, we can show that Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles does not necessitate the suspension of the literal sense method;rather,Spinoza has agood answer to the sceptic which keeps the literal sense methodineffect. The philosophical challengethatSpinoza faces is how to show thatamiracle can support the certaintyofrevealedknowledge from its own domain. Another ques- tion is: how can miracles support theologyifwedonot assume that they violate the natural order?

Miracles and Certainty of Revealed Knowledge

Philosophicallyspeaking,our interpretation of Spinoza will be more solid if we show that miracles can be signs which endow prophetic knowledge with certainty. Now, even if we accept the common reading,namelythat Spinoza’sinterpretation of mira- cles is adogmatic one, we still have to explain how miracles qua signs createcertain- ty in the prophet’s(or the believer’s) mind. Now,evenifwedoaccept this view,weshould keep in mind Spinoza’sfirm the- ses that 1) the prophets themselvesbelieved that miracles werenot an interruption to the natural order,and 2) biblical teachingortheologyagrees with philosophyinre- jecting miracles (assuming that the meaningofthe latter is an action of providence which interruptsthe natural order). Yetwhat could amiracle be, if we reject the latter understanding of miracles?Can amiracle have anytheological meaning (in terms of imagination) which would not implyaviolation of the natural order? Spinoza suggests acertain mental affect caused by miracles.Inchapter 1, the text reads:

That’salso whythey called miracles works of God, i.e., works to be astonished at.For of course, all natural things areGod’sworks, and exist and act onlythrough the divine power.It’sinthis sense that the Psalmist calls the miracles of Egypt God’spowers, because in asituation of ex- treme dangerthey opened up the waytodeliverance for the Hebrews, whowere expectingnoth- ing likethem, and hencewere amazed by them. (TTP,1[30])

Thus, astonishment or amazement are affects that can be triggered by miracles. Yet the fact thatamiracle causesastonishment and amazement does not bring us much further: it is possible thatthe effect of amazement is actuallythe resultofrea- soning that providence is interferingwith the natural order.But if we can show that miracles can be understood to support theologywithout having to depend on reason, our interpretation will not violate the separation principle. In fact,Spinoza explicitlyclaims thatwhen we referto‘amazement’,weare not in violationofthe separation principle. In chapter 6, he says:

Though the voicethe heard[on Mount Sinai] could not give them anyphilosophical or mathematical certainty about God’sexistence, still, it was enough to makethem wonder at God, insofar as they had previouslyknown him, and to motivatethem to obedience. That was the pur- 104 Oded Schechter

pose of that manifestation. God did not want to teach the Israelites the absoluteattributes of his essence. (Hedid not reveal anyofthem at that time.) He wanted to break their stubborn heart and win them over to obedience. So he addressed them with the sound of trumpets,with thun- der,and with lightning, not with arguments. (TTP,14[36]; my italics)

Spinoza’sargument here givesusseveral clues which could be helpfulinour anal- ysis of miracles. He begins by noting thatweshould not assume that arguments play anyrole in the wayinwhich miracles are related to revealed knowledge.Inaccord- ance with the latter claim, Spinoza is using ‘amazement’ to mean ‘that which con- nects the imaginary mind to revealed knowledge.’ In addition, Spinoza explains the role of miracles on Mount Sinai in the following way: the people alreadyknew God, namelymiracles wereinnoway supposed to conveythe knowledge of God. However,the fact that they alreadyknew that God existed did not make them readytoaccept the knowledge revealedonMount Sinai or to follow it; the miracles on Mount Sinai, then, weresupposed to connect the people to the revealed knowl- edge.¹⁵ To recapitulate what we have just unpacked from chapter 6: we can keep the do- mains of philosophyand theologyentirely distinct if we understand miracles onlyin terms of imagination (the affect of wondering). Miracles connect aperson’smind to the content of the revelation by the affect of amazement(imagination). Now,let us see how the aforementioned insight can help us to understand the prophet’scertainty in revealed knowledge.Certainty,orthe prophet’sreadiness to commit himself to the knowledge revealed to him, is achieved through the amaze- ment which accompanies the miracle. We still have to account for two points: 1. What is it about the affect of amazement which accompanies miracles that con- nects the beholder to revealed knowledge? 2. Can we account for the role of miracles in achieving certaintywhen the prophet conceivesamiracle as merelyanatural event (as we explained with reference to Nadler,Spinoza states thatthe prophets agreed with him that miracles are nat- ural events).

Is the Mind CapableofPerceiving an Event as Both Natural and Miraculous?

Spinoza claims thatmiracles are events which cause us to be amazed, yetthe prophet can wonder at the event and simultaneouslyhold the view that it is entirelynatural. However,isthis not an emptyformula?Can we reallywonder at an event,see it as a sign, and the same time perceive it as being entirely natural?

 Spinoza’spreferencefor the term ‘sign’ over ‘miracle’ will also getclearer by our interpretation. Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism,and CriticalHermeneutics 105

In fact,Iwould arguethatSpinoza is referring to avery common state of mind. Think of the following two examples. In the first case, Iwin the lottery,Ifeel really fortunate, and Isay: ‘God reallyloves me. Iamblessed.’ Now consider the second case, which conveys an opposite view of myself: Iamanacademic and all my efforts over manyyears to obtain aprofessorship at the university have been futile. Iamun- employed and Isay: ‘Iamsounlucky,God reallyhates me, Iamcursed.’ Can Inot think, in the first case, both that my winning the lottery maybeexplained by the laws of causality which govern the lottery machine and yetatthe sametime feel that Iamlucky,that Iamblessed, and thatGod loves me? Consider now the second case: can Inot admit that the reason Idid not obtain aprofessorship is because—in accordancewith the natural order—onlythosewho are endowed with professorial wisdom obtain this position, and Iamnot one of them?And can Inot think at the same time that Iamunlucky,unfortunate, and cursed by God? Let us now apply thatstate of mind to the prophet: knowledge is revealedtothe prophet through imagination, but he still lacks certainty.Hethen wins the lottery;he sees it as asign that God is in direct contact with him, that God is interested in him, that God loves him, that he is very special to God, etc. If this is the prophet’sstate of mind, it is possiblefor him to consider the event as both something which does not violate the natural order and yetasasign thatGod has aspecial relationship with him.

Re-examination of Spinoza’sDogmatism

Let us now proceed to re-examine Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles in chapter 6inlight of our interpretation. Spinoza’stheses—1) that the prophets consider miracles to be natural events and 2) that the Bible must teach that miracles are natural events—are defendable if Spinoza is committed to the strongversion of the separation thesis;ac- cordingly,the contribution of miracles qua signs to the certainty of revealed knowl- edge can be accounted for onlyfrom the realm of imagination. Thus, if we account for the certaintyofprophecy by assumingthat amiraculous event provides evidence for the superiority of revealed knowledge over natural knowledge,weviolate the sep- aration thesis. The aforementioned theses are in perfect accordancewith Spinoza’sliteral sense method.Aswehaveseen, at the end of chapter 2, Spinoza claims thathis analysis of prophecyinchapters 1and 2supports the separation thesis. We therefore concluded that the separation thesis is derived from the biblical text in accordance with the lit- eral sense method.¹⁶ Forthat very reason, the certainty of the sign must be accounted

 This claim does not entail that aderivation of the separation thesis from reason is excluded ac- cording to Spinoza; our claim hereisonlythe following: the separation thesis can be derived—and Spinoza does in fact derive it—from theological principles, independentlyofits derivation from rea- son, and vice versa. 106 Oded Schechter

for from theological theses only. We have shown that Spinoza indeed accounts for the certainty asign lends to revealed knowledge exclusively from the principles derived from prophetic revelation. In his apology,Spinoza states that miracles are the object of philosophyalone and thatthereforethey should be addressed with reason alone. We reviewed two dif- ficulties: 1. Nadler’sobjection:—is thatthesis not aviolation of Spinoza’sliteral sense meth- od? 2. Harvey raised the following difficulty:

Spinoza claims that the subject of prophecy is ‘theological’ because it ‘surpasses human knowl- edge’ (captum humanum superat), whereas that of miracles is ‘philosophical’ because it involves the philosophical question of ‘whether we can concede that somethingmay happeninNature that contravenes its Laws.’ However,hemight just as easilyhavesaid: the subject of prophecyis ‘philosophical’,for it involves the philosophical question of whether therecan be suprarational knowledge,whereasthat of miracles is ‘theological’.¹⁷

Acareful examination of Spinoza’s apology in light of our interpretation resolves both Nadler’sand Harvey’squestions. It is worthwhile to quoteSpinoza’s apology once again:

I’ve proceeded regarding miracles according to amethod completely different from the one Ifol- lowed regarding Prophecy. ConcerningProphecyIaffirmed nothingbut what Icould infer from foundations revealed in the Sacred Texts.But hereI’ve elicited the main points onlyfromprin- ciples known to the natural light.Idid this deliberately. ForsinceProphecysurpasses man’s power of understanding,and is apurelyTheological question, Icould affirm nothingabout it,nor even know in what it chieflyconsisted, except from the foundations which have been re- vealed. Iwas compelled to put together ahistory of Prophecy, and to formulatecertain doctrines from it,which would teach me the natureand properties of Prophecy, as far as this can be done. [66] But concerningmiracles what we are askingiscompletely philosophical: can we grant that somethinghappens in nature contrary to its laws, or something which couldn’tfollow from them?SoIdidn’tneed anythinglikethat.Indeed, Ithought it wiser to unravel this question ac- cording to foundations known to the natural light,asthose which aremost known. Isay that I thought it wiser,for Icould easilyhaveresolveditsolelyfromthe doctrinesand foundations of Scripture. (TTP,6[65–6])

We have shown that 1) Spinoza’sclaim that amiracle is the result of providence’sin- terruption of the law of nature is actuallythe sceptical claim that natural knowledge is inferior and should therefore be corrected by revealedknowledge.Wehavealso claimed that2)the sceptic’sargument is to use reason to counter reason. Now,in the apology,Spinoza says: ‘But concerning miracles what we are asking is completely philosophical: can we grantthat something happens in nature contrarytoits laws,or something which couldn’tfollow from them?’ (TTP,6[66]; my italics). Thus, the thesis

 Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” 666–667. Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism,Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics 107

of Spinoza’sadversary regarding the ‘interruption of the natural order’ would indeed be the sceptic’sthesis. As we have shown, the sceptic’sthesis is one that is derived from reason, and hence Spinoza is entirelyjustified in claiming that such an under- standing of miracles—‘thatsomething happens in naturecontrary to its laws’— should in fact be approached and answered from reason. This is preciselywhat Spi- noza is doing when he examines the theses which are apparentlyderived from this understanding of miracles. Our interpretation ultimatelyresolves both Nadler’sand Harvey’sobjections: Spinoza does not violate the literal sense method,but rather refutes the sceptic’sthe- ses with philosophical arguments,and this approach is in fact the proper one, be- cause the sceptic’sunderstanding of miracles is derived ‘from reason.’ This would also explain whyhesaysthat in this respect,the issue of miracles is aphilosophical matter,whereas the issue of prophecyisatheological one. The interpretations we have reviewed and rejected consider Spinoza’sstance on miracles to be adogmatic one. Ithink we have explained our objections. As amatter of fact,our interpretation yields an interesting result: Spinoza’sexplication of mira- cles in chapter 6isanti-dogmatic. His argument against the sceptic shows that the sceptic’sexplication of miracles onlymakes sense if we assume that ‘something hap- pens in nature contrary to its laws,’ but in Spinoza’sterms, this would be aphilo- sophical claim. Thus, the sceptic is, in fact,the one who is committed to dogmatic hermeneutics. This might seem like apurelyformal claim, but Ithink that our inter- pretation proves that this is exactlythe case in terms of actual biblical interpretation. The sceptic’sdogmatic understanding of miracles actuallyimposes an anachronistic interpretation of the Bible. In other words, by adopting the dogmatic view that mira- cles are ‘something thathappens in nature contrary to its laws,’ the sceptic subjects the Bible to aphilosophical problematic which is mostlyamedieval one; from the critical point of view thereisnoreason to attribute such aviewtothe prophets.Con- versely, we have shown that Spinoza’sclaim that the prophets are in agreementwith the view that miracles are not an interruption of the natural order is what ultimately liberated him from the view that miracles should be regarded as biblical teaching. Once free from this view,weare able to grasp the differencebetween prophecy and miracles; onlythen is it possible to examine the role miracles playinthe Bible, to understand the differencebetween signs and revealedknowledge,etc.

DiegoLucci Political Scepticism, Moral Scepticism, and the Scope and Limits of Toleration in John Locke

1Introduction

In ALetterconcerning Toleration,written in late 1685and published in 1689,John Lockeargued for the separation between the state and religious organizations.¹ He advocated toleration of all those subscribing to organized religion, be they Christi- ans, Jews, , or pagans.Nevertheless, as Jonathan Israel has noted, in Locke’s Letter ‘thosewho subscribe to no organized religion, be they agnostics,Deists or in- differenti,inconfessional matters while not explicitlyexcluded are left in avague

This essay is one of the results of astudy period Ispent in HamburgfromFebruarytoJuly 2018, when Iwas aSenior ResearchFellow of the Maimonides Centrefor AdvancedStudies (MCAS) at the Uni- versityofHamburg. Before finalizingthis essay,Ipresented its thesis at the 2018 Conferenceof the International Society forIntellectual History (ISIH),which took placeatthe UniversityofStAn- drewsonJune10to13, 2018. Iwould like to express my deepest gratitude to the Directorofthe MCAS, Prof.Giuseppe Veltri, forhis support, friendship,and sincereinterestinmyresearch. I would also like to thank all the administrators,staff members,research associates, and research fel- lows of the MCAS fortheir assistance, encouragement, and attention to my scholarly activities.Con- cerning thisarticle, Iamvery grateful to Dr.BillRebiger,Dr. Raffaele Russo, Dr.JeffreyR.Wigels- worth, and an anonymous reviewer for their precious suggestions and assistance. Iwould finally like to thankProf. Peter Anstey, Prof.Teresa Castelao-Lawless, Prof.Mark Goldie, Prof.Michael Hunt- er,and Dr.Adam Sutcliffefor the feedback and advice they gave me at the 2018 ISIH Conference.

 [John Locke], Epistola de Tolerantia (Gouda: Justum ab Hoeve,1689). The Letter was promptly translated into English: [John Locke], ALetter concerning Toleration,[trans. William Popple] (London: Churchill, 1689). Afterpublishingthe Letter,Locke engagedinadebatewith the Oxfordchaplain Jonas Proast.InrespondingtoProast in threemoreletters written in 1690,1692, and 1704,Locke re- affirmed and further clarified his views on toleration. This article concentrates on Locke’sfirst letter, while referringtothe other letters when necessary.Onthe Locke–Proast controversy,see Mark Goldie, “John Locke,Jonas Proast,and Religious Toleration, 1688–1692,” in TheChurch of England, c.1689– c.1833: From Toleration to Tractarianism,eds.John Walsh, Colin Haydon, and Stephen Taylor(Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press,1993): 143 – 171; RichardVernon, TheCareer of Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast, and after (Montreal–Kingston: McGill–Queen’sUniversity Press, 1997); Locke on Toleration,ed. RichardVernon (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2010); Adam Wolfson, “Toleration and Relativism: The Locke–Proast Exchange,” TheReview of Politics 59 (1997): 213– 232; Adam Wolfson, Persecution or Toleration: An Explication of the Locke–Proast Quarrel, 1689– 1704 (Lanham: Lexington, 2010); John W. Tate, ,Toleration and Equality:JohnLocke, Jonas Proast and the Letters Concerning Toleration (New York: Routledge,2016).

OpenAccess. ©2018 Diego Lucci, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-007 110 DiegoLucci

limbo without anyclear status or guaranteed freedom.’² In the Letter,Locke’smain goal was indeed to prevent churches from gainingpower from the political rulersand oppressingother religious groups.Thus, far from advocatingcompletefreedom of , he simplydelineated the criteria regulating the relationships between political authorities and religious , as well as between different religious groups.This focus on merelythe separation between the state and religious organ- izations is asignificant shortcominginthe theory of toleration expounded in Locke’s Letter—atheory much lessinclusive than otherseventeenth-century views on the matter,such as Spinoza’sphilosophicaladvocacy of freedom of conscienceand Bayle’ssceptical justification of wide toleration. However,Locke’slaterwritingson religion implydifferent conclusions regardingtoleration. In TheReasonableness of Christianity (1695), atheological book with significant irenic implications, Lockefor- mulated amoralist soteriology based on what he took to be the fundamentals of Christianity—i.e. faith, repentance, and obedience, which he judgedtobeplainlyre- vealedinScripture, essential to moralityand salvation, and hence placed at the core of the Christian LawofFaith.³ As Lockeargued thatevery Christian had the right and duty to studyScripture by themselves, he admitted that more specific, non-funda- mental beliefs might arise from different interpretations of biblical texts not dealing with the fundamentals of Christianity.However,toLocke, non-fundamentals are ir- relevant to morality and salvation and,thus, must not hinder peace among Christi- ans. Briefly, Locke’sdoctrine of the fundamentals implies that all those who try to live by the Christian LawofFaith ought to tolerate each other,regardless of non-fun- damentals and confessional affiliation. Therefore, this position also allows for toler- ation of denominationallyuncommitted Christians;and this is certainlyastep be- yond Locke’sadvocacy,inthe Letter,ofmerelyaseparation between the state and religious societies. In this essay, Ireconsider the impact of Locke’smoral and soteriological con- cerns on his approach to religious toleration and, thus, on the scope and limits of Locke’sviews on toleration in their development from the Letter to the Reasonable- ness. In doing so, Icall attention to the sceptical dimension of Locke’sthought.Al- though Lockedevoted agood deal of Book IV of An Essay concerning Human Under- standing (1690) to demonstratingthathewas not asceptic, several contemporaries considered his wayofideas as liable to lead to scepticism. Among Locke’scritics who judgedhis epistemologytobeessentiallysceptic werethe latitudinarian Bishop Ed- ward Stillingfleet,the Catholicpriest John Sergeant,the Church of England divine

 Jonathan I. Israel, “Spinoza, Locke and the Enlightenment Battle for Toleration,” in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe,eds.Ole P. Grell and Roy Porter (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999): 103.  In this article, where not indicated otherwise, Irefertothe Clarendon edition of the Reasonable- ness: John Locke, TheReasonableness of Christianity,asDeliveredintheScriptures,ed. John C. Hig- gins-Biddle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). Political Scepticism,Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 111

Henry Lee, and such famousphilosophers as Leibniz and Berkeley.⁴ Sam Black,in- vestigatingthe sources of Locke’s ‘mitigated ’ in an article of 1998, con- tended that ‘Lockeisindebted for his ideas to the revival of New Academy skepti- cism.’⁵ In this respect,John Rogers has argued that, although Lockewas definitely not afull-blown Pyrrhonian sceptic, the earlymodern revival of sceptical consider- ations informed his epistemologyinatwofold sense.⁶ First,accordingtoLockewe cannot expect to getbehind ideas to thingsthemselves, namely to the substance of things, which he defined as an unknown substratum or support of the qualities we perceive.⁷ Second, to Lockewecannot hope to attain certainty in most areas of inquiry,inwhich we can onlyaspire to relyonprobabilities.⁸ While the sceptical aspects of Locke’sepistemologyare not the main subjectof this article, it is important to stressthatLocke’semphasis on the limits of knowledge significantlyconditioned his approach to religious and moral matters.Hebelieved that the amount of knowledge available to humankind in matters of religion and eth- ics was strictlylimited,and he had serious doubts about the prospects for enlarging this stock of knowledge through the operation of natural reason alone.⁹ Thisaware- ness of the narrow scope of knowledge in religious and moralmatters influenced Locke’sconception of .Inthis regard, some students of Locke—in- cluding, among others, Susan Mendus,David Wootton, and Richard Vernon—have contendedthat asort of political scepticism inspired his arguments to exclude ‘the Care of ’ from the magistrate’spurview.¹⁰ Locke’spolitical scepticism involved

 Edward Stillingfleet, ADiscourse in Vindicationofthe Doctrine of the Trinity (London: Mortlock, 1697); John Sergeant, Solid Philosophy Asserted, against the Fancies of the Ideists (London: Clavil, 1697); Henry Lee, Anti-Scepticism: or,Notes upon each Chapter of Mr.Locke’sEssay concerning Human Understanding (London: Clavel, 1702); GottfriedWilhelm vonLeibniz, New Essayson Human Understanding (1704), trans. and eds.Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge:Cam- bridge University Press, 1982); , ATreatise Concerning the PrinciplesofHuman Knowl- edge (Dublin: Pepyat,1710). Stillingfleet was one of the major representativesofthe English theolog- ical current known as latitudinarianism. Contra Calvinist ,the so-called ‘latitude-men’ upheld amoralist soteriology stressing the importance of human reason, , and morality. Moreover,they aimed to relax the terms of conformity in such amanner as to ‘comprehend’ at least the least radical Dissenters within the Church of England. See Martin I. J. Griffin,Jr., Latitudina- rianism in the Seventeenth-CenturyChurch of England (Leiden: Brill, 1992);William M. Spellman, The Latitudinarians and the Church of England, 1660–1700 (Athens,GA: University of Georgia Press,1993).  Sam Black, “Toleration and the Skeptical Inquirer in Locke,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1998): 475.  G. A. John Rogers, “John Locke and the Sceptics,” in TheReturn of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle,ed. Gianni Paganini (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003): 37–53.  John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding,ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), II.xxiii.1–6.  Ibidem,IV.xv.2,IV.xvi.6.  Black, “Toleration,” 478.  Susan Mendus, “Locke: Toleration, Morality and Rationality,” in John Locke: “ALetter concerning Toleration” in Focus,eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus (London: Routledge,1991): 147– 162; David Wootton, “Introduction,” in John Locke, PoliticalWritings,ed. David Wootton (London; Penguin, 112 DiegoLucci

not the existenceoftrue religion, but the human ability to comprehend and, above all, communicate religious truth. In Locke, the limits of knowledge,especiallyinre- ligious and moral matters, informthe scope of political power,asBlack has ex- plained:

[T]hereisabasic relationship between the grounds of stateaction and the limits of knowledge. This relationship is straightforwardinLocke’scase. The grounds of state action […]conform to the boundariesofmoral and religious knowledge.This implies,first,that the state is duty-bound to securethroughcoercive measures fundamental moral and religious truths.Second, the state is forbidden to pursue throughforce practical goals whose truth is inaccessible, at the expense of its citizens’ basic interests. […][O]ne importantreason whyLocke advocatestoleration is be- cause Locke is askepticabout most religious claims.Itisaconsequenceofhis mitigated skep- ticism that Lockeadvocatesaduty of religious toleration.¹¹

Although Lockecalled attention to the narrow scope of knowledge in religious and moral matters,his toleration did not extend beyond the boundaries of moral stand- ards that he considered beneficial, or at least harmless, to the commonwealth and its members’ civil interests. Surrenderingtomoral relativism, to Locke, would indeed be as dangerous as its opposite—namely,allowing religious fanaticism, enthusiasm, and dogmatism to influencecivil life.¹² As Lockewrote in the Letter: ‘No Opinions contrary to human Society,ortothose moralRules which are necessary to the pres- ervation of ,are to be tolerated by the Magistrate.’¹³ Forthis reason, the Letter expresslydenied toleration to atheists, whom Lockeconsidered devoid of mor- ality,and RomanCatholics, who, in his opinion, held some moralviews harmful to society.However, ALetter concerning Toleration and An Essay concerning Human Un- derstanding denote asort of moral scepticism thatLockebroughttoits logical con- clusions,and attempted to overcome, in his laterwritingsonreligion, especiallyin TheReasonableness of Christianity. Locke’smoral scepticism was not about the exis- tence, rationality, and demonstrability of moralityinitself; but he questioned the ac- tual ability of natural reason to demonstrate moral ideas and,thus, to establish a thorough,convincing,flawless system of ethics.¹⁴ Therefore, in his search for solid foundations for morality,Lockeeventuallyturned to Christian revelation, particular-

1993): 100 –106;Vernon, Career,35–51,124– 144; RichardVernon, “Introduction,” in LockeonToler- ation,xxiv–xxix; Black, “Toleration;” Alex Tuckness, “Rethinking the Intolerant Locke,” American Journal of Political Science 46 (2002):288–298;RichardH.Popkin, TheHistoryofScepticism: From SavonarolatoBayle (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2003), 257–261.  Black, “Toleration,” 474.  Jerome B. Schneewind, “Locke’sMoral Philosophy,” in TheCambridge Companion to Locke,ed. Vere Chappell (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994): 208; Wolfson, “Toleration,” 230; Wolf- son, Persecution,88–99.  John Locke, “ALetter concerning Toleration,” in John Locke, ALetter concerning Toleration and Other Writings,ed. Mark Goldie (Indianapolis:Liberty Fund, 2010): 49–50.  Locke, Essay,IV.iii.18–20;Locke, Reasonableness,148–150. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 113

ly to Christ’sassurance of otherworldlyrewards and —the onlyeffective incentive to act morally.¹⁵ Locke’sconviction that onlythe Christian LawofFaith can establish morality on solid grounds has controversial implications concerning the morality of believers who refuse this law—not onlyantinomians and deists, whom Lockeopenlycriticized, but also post-biblicalJews and heathens. Thisurgessome considerations regarding not onlythe salvation, but alsothe tolerability of non-Christian believers.However, whereas Locke’slaterreligious writingsdescribe eternal salvation as necessitating acceptance of the Christian LawofFaith, he never considered conversion to Christi- anity as arequirement for toleration, and he never proposed aChristian common- wealth as the proper waytodothe business of morality. To the author of the Reason- ableness,belief in adivine legislator and the consequent acceptance of and adherencetothe divinelygiven LawofNature weresufficient to make aperson tol- erable—even though unassisted reason in fact grasps the LawofNature onlypartially and imperfectly, and even though rejectingthe LawofFaith hinders the achievement of salvation. Yet, although the Reasonableness and Locke’sother theological writings implyatolerationism more inclusive than that of the Letter,Lockenever went so far as to advocate completefreedom of conscienceinmatters of religion, since his views on toleration werealwaysconditioned by amarkedlyreligious conception of human life and morality.

2Political Scepticismand the Struggle against Moral ScepticisminALetter concerning Toleration

Whereas adetailed reconstruction of the development of Locke’sapproach to toler- ation from his earlywritingsonthe subject to ALetter concerning Toleration is be- yond the scope of this article, it is worth pointing out that this issue attracted his at- tention since at least the early1660s.¹⁶ Locke’sfirst work on toleration, the manuscript TwoTractsonGovernment (1660 –1662),was occasioned by the publica- tion of EdwardBagshaw’s TheGreat Questionconcerning ThingsIndifferentinReli-

 John T. Moore, “Lockeonthe Moral Need for Christianity,” SouthwesternJournal of Philosophy 11 (1980): 61– 68;Takashi Kato, “The Reasonableness in the Historical Light of the Essay,” LockeNews- letter 12 (1981): 55–56;Schneewind, “Locke’sMoral Philosophy,” 217–219; , “Locke’sPhilosophyofReligion,” in CambridgeCompanion,185; Raffaele Russo, Ragione eascolto. L’ermeneuticadiJohnLocke (:Guida, 2001), 168–174; GregForster, John Locke’sPolitics of MoralConsensus (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2005), 40 –83;Victor Nuovo, John Locke: ThePhilosopher as Christian Virtuoso (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2017), 215–218.  John W. Gough, “The Development of Locke’sBelief in Toleration,” in John Locke: “ALetter con- cerning Toleration” in Focus,57–77. 114 DiegoLucci

gious Worship (1660).¹⁷ Bagshawargued, mainlyonscriptural grounds,that individ- uals should be allowed to observeordisregardreligious ceremonies (which he con- sidered ‘indifferent’ to salvation) accordingtotheir conscience. Refuting Bagshaw’s theory point by point, TwoTracts endorsed religious uniformity,thus expressinga position different to Locke’sviews in his laterwritings on this subject—starting with the manuscript An Essay concerning Toleration (1667), which advanced many of the arguments laterrefined and further developed in the Letter.¹⁸ Lockehighlight- ed the dangers of state-imposed religious uniformity and, on the otherhand,the ben- efits of toleration of different religious societies in other manuscripts written before the Letter—most prominentlyinhis Critical Notes (c.1681) on Stillingfleet’s TheMis- chief of Separation (1680) and TheUnreasonableness of Separation (1681).¹⁹ In this manuscript,Lockeadvocated aseparation between the state and religious societies, employing some of the arguments he laterused in the Letter and arguing that ‘ana- tional Church [that] tends to the support of anational Religion’ was unable to pro- mote true religion, preservecivil peace, and prevent dangerous errors.²⁰ Lockewas eventuallyprompted to write ALetter concerning Toleration by Louis XIV’srevocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685—an event that led manyFrench to flee to surroundingProtestant countries. Lockeattributed the causes of this and other intolerantpolicies to competition among churches aiming to gain power from the state. To Locke, the main cause of state-supported intolerance toward some religious groups wasthe rivalry among power-seeking churches themselves. In this regard, Lockealsodisapproved of the imprudence of civil magistrates whose willingness to favour asect over another reflected agrievous failureproperly to comprehend the origins,purpose, and limits of political authority.This is whythe Letter begins with aplea for ‘mutual toleration of Christians’²¹ and givesarguments against undesirable alliances between the civil magistrate and one or more religious societies. The Letter presents three arguments delineatingthe purview and aims of the commonwealth, which Lockedefines as ‘aSociety of Menconstituted onlyfor the

 EdwardBagshaw, TheGreat Question concerning Things Indifferent in Religious Worship (London: s.n., 1660); John Locke, TwoTracts on Government,ed. PhilipAbrams (Cambridge:Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1967).  John Locke, “An Essayconcerning Toleration,” in Locke, Political Writings,186–210.  EdwardStillingfleet, TheMischief of Separation (London: Mortlock, 1680); Edward Stillingfleet, TheUnreasonableness of Separation (London: Mortlock, 1681); John Locke, “Critical Notes upon Ed- wardStillingfleet’s Mischief and Unreasonableness of Separation—Extracts,” in John Locke, Writings on Religion,ed.VictorNuovo(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2002):73–79.The 170-page manuscript Critical Notes,still unpublishedinits entirety,isMSLocke c. 34 (Bodleian Library,University of Ox- ford). Several other manuscripts on toleration, written by Lockebetween the Essay of 1667and the Letter,havebeen published in John Locke, Political Essays,ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997).  Locke, “Critical Notes,” 77–78.  Locke, “Letter,” 7. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 115

procuring, preserving, and advancingoftheir own Civil Interests.’²² By civil interests, Lockemeans ‘Life, Liberty,Health, and Indolency of Body;and the Possessionofout- ward things, such as Money, Lands, Houses,Furniture, and the like.’²³ It follows that the civil ruler’spower does not extend to ‘the Care of Souls,’ as Lockeargues in the first of his arguments—the argument from the mandate of the state:

[T]he CareofSouls is not committed to the Civil Magistrate anymorethan to other Men. It is not committed untohim, Isay,byGod; because it appears not that God has ever givenany such Au- thority to one Man over another,astocompell anyone to his Religion. Nor can anysuch Power be vestedinthe Magistrate by the of the People; because no man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindlytoleave it to the of anyother,whether PrinceorSub- ject,toprescribe to him whatFaith or Worship he shall embrace.²⁴

Consequently, to Locke ‘there is absolutelynosuch thing,under the , as a Christian Commonwealth.’²⁵ Moreover,the political authorities cannot impose reli- gious uniformity because of the nature of the power they exercise, as Lockeexplains in his second argument—the argument from belief:

The care of Souls cannot belongtothe Civil Magistrate, because his Power consists onlyinout- wardforce: But true and savingReligion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind; without which nothingcan be acceptable to God. And such is the natureofthe Understanding, that it cannot be compell’dtothe belief of anythingbyoutwardForce.²⁶

Finally, Locke’sthird argument—the argument from error—states that,even ‘though the rigour of Laws and the forceofPenalties werecapable to convince and change Mens , yetwould not that help at all to the Salvation of their Souls.’²⁷ To Locke, there is onlyone true religion and manyfalse ones. Therefore, in most cases, imposingthe ‘Religion of the Court’ on the subjects would put them ‘under an Obligation of following their Princes in the ways that lead to Destruction.’²⁸ These arguments are farfrom being positive arguments in support of religious toleration. In the Letter,Lockesupplied onlyanegative justification of alimited tol- eration on the part of the state, as he criticized several arguments for the magistrate’s complete control of religious affairs.²⁹ Locke’snegative justification of toleration re- lied on asort of ‘political scepticism,’ which, nevertheless,was not about ‘truereli-

 Ibidem,12.  Ibidem.  Ibidem,13.  Ibidem,42.  Ibidem,13.  Ibidem,14.  Ibidem,15. See, also, John Locke, “AThird Letter for Toleration,” in LockeonToleration,123–124; Black, “Toleration,” 488–490.  David J. Lorenzo, “Tradition and PrudenceinLocke’sExceptions to Toleration,” American Journal of Political Science 47 (2003): 254. 116 Diego Lucci

gion’ in itself. Lockenever questioned the existenceoftrue religion, which he iden- tified with ‘the truth of the Gospel,’ containingall things ‘necessary to salvation.’³⁰ Therefore, accordingtoLocke, ‘all charitable Admonitions, and affectionate Endeav- ours to reduce Men from Errors […]are indeedthe greatest Duty of aChristian.’³¹ However,heargued that ‘all Forceand Compulsion are to be forborn’ when ‘one Man does not violate the Right of another,byhis Erroneous Opinions, and undue manner of Worship, nor is his Perdition anyprejudice to another Mans Affairs,’ giventhat ‘the care of each Mans Salvation belongsonlytohimself.’³² Locke’srejec- tion of ‘forceand compulsion’ in religious matters not affecting others’ civil interests is rooted in his scepticism about the human ability to correctlycomprehend and, aboveall, to effectivelycommunicatereligious truth. Lockerecognized that,although there can be but one true religion, differences in human understanding and the dif- ficulties of communication had produced aplethoraofdivergent dogmas and cere- monies. As aresult, ‘every one is Orthodoxtohimself’³³ and believes thatall others are .This happens because most religious doctrines are simplyamatter of opinion—not amatter of knowledge;but divergences in religious opinions should not hinder civil coexistence, as Lockeargued in An Essay concerning Human Under- standing:

Since, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatestpart of men, if not all, to have several opinions, without certain and indubitable proofs of their truth; and it carries toogreat an imputation of ignorance, ,orfollyfor men to quit and renounce their former tenets presentlyupon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediatelyanswer, and show the insufficiency of: it would, methinks, become all men to maintain peace,and the common offices of humanity, and friendship, in the diversity of opinions;sincewecannot reasonablyexpect that anyone should readily and obsequiouslyquit his own opinion, and embrace ours,with ablind resigna- tion to an authority which the understanding of man acknowledgesnot.For however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason,nor blindlysubmit to the will and dictates of another.[…]Weshould do welltocommiserateour mutual ignorance, and endeavour to re- moveitinall the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantlytreat others ill, as ob- stinateand perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and receive our opinions,orat least those we would force upon them, when it is morethan probable that we arenoless obsti- nate in not embracing some of theirs.³⁴

To facilitate coexistence between people holding different religious views, in the Let- ter Lockeadopted the distinction between thingsindifferent and thingsnecessary to salvation, and he maintainedthat toleration oughttoapplytothe latter.Neverthe- less, Lockewas aware that making acasefor toleration based on the concept of

 Locke, “Letter,” 66;John Locke, “ASecond Letter concerningToleration,” in Locke on Toleration, 79.  Locke, “Letter,” 46.  Ibidem,45–46.  Ibidem,7.  Locke, Essay,IV.xvi.4. Political Scepticism,Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 117

‘thingsindifferent,’ also called adiaphora,had two drawbacks. First,itwas difficult to reach consensus about the boundary between thingsindifferent and thingsneces- sary to salvation. Second, the very notion of ‘thingsindifferent’ could lead to an ar- gument for intolerance. Since some doctrines and wereindifferent to salva- tion, one might wish to impose them by authority,for the sake of decencyand good order.This was the position of several latitudinarian divines who, as Mark Goldie has remarked,

[…]wereinfact intolerant,for their intention was to embrace moderatenonconformists, by soft- ening the rigidities of the church’s ‘good order,’ beforepenalizingthe recalcitrant minority who refused to accept such revised terms.³⁵

Moreover,Locketoo, in his TwoTracts of the early1660s, had used the distinction between fundamenta and adiaphora to show, contra Bagshaw, the necessity of the magistrate’scompleteauthority over religion. However,by1667—the year when Lockewrote An Essay concerning Toleration—he had alreadymade a180-degree turn on this issue. This changeinperspective denotes Locke’sshift to agreater opti- mism regarding human nature in the Essay of 1667and in his later writingsonpolit- ical theory.Locke’spolitical scepticism—originating in his recognition of the ‘burden of incommunicability’ and, hence, of the limits of civil communication and the lim- ited scope of public reason—led him to conclude, in the Letter,that ‘indifferent’ be- liefs and practices ought to be tolerated, even when the civil magistrate or other citi- zens consider these beliefs and practices erroneous.³⁶ In the Letter and in the second of the TwoTreatises of Government (1690), the difficulties of communicative possibil- ities restrict the purview of political power to what can be publiclyconveyedand largely agreed upon. To Locke, what can be largely agreed upon depends on practical reasoning, which leadshuman beingstotakesteps for preservingthemselvesand the rest of humankind while avoiding principles destructive of human interests and, hence, of society.³⁷ Adopting principles detrimental to life, property,and freedom would be inconsistent with the criteria of the divinelygiven faculty of reason— more specifically, with practical reasoning,which is at the basis of public reason. The proper use of practical reasoningleads to consensus about the necessity to pro- cure, preserve, and advancethe civil interests of the members of the commonwealth. Political power can thus be rightfullyexercised for this purpose. Conversely, it is im- possibletoreach consensus on religious beliefs and practices that do not harm any- one’slife, property,orfreedom and that,therefore, are not relevant to worldlyinter- ests. Such beliefs and practices, which are indeed ‘thingsindifferent,’ are open to

 Mark Goldie, “Introduction,” in Locke, Letter,xvii–xviii.  Vernon, Career,35–51,124–144; Vernon, “Introduction,” xxiv–xxix.  John Locke, TwoTreatises of Government,ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1988), 285–302. 118 DiegoLucci

human choice.³⁸ Thus, Lockeconcludes thathuman beingscannot ‘stipulate’ about ‘their spiritual and eternal Interest,’ they cannot ‘submit this Interest to the Power of the Society,orany Soveraign they should set over them,’ and no one can undertake to provide salvation to another through authoritarian, paternalistic means.³⁹ In fact, truth does not need to be imposed, and true religion can onlybenefit from toleration. True religion

[…]isnot taught by Laws, nor has she anyneed of Forcetoprocureher entranceintothe minds of men. […][I]f Truth makesnot her wayinto the Understandingbyher own Light,she will be but the weakerfor anyborrowed force Violence can add to her.⁴⁰

By ‘truth,’ Lockemeans the Christian truth, which, in his opinion, would better spread without ‘forceand compulsion’ and, at the same time, without finding im- pediments:

[T]he Christian religion […]grew, and spread, and prevailed, without anyaid from force or the assistanceofthe powers in being; and if it be amark of the true religion that it will prevail by its own light and strength, but that false religions will not,but have need of force and foreign helps to support them, nothingcertainlycan be morefor the advantageoftrue religion, than to take away compulsion everywhere.⁴¹

Briefly, the Letter suggests that every individual, left to their own devices and suita- blyencouraged (but not pressured) by friendlyothers, has the ability and the right (and the duty,undernaturallaw)toseek religious truth for themselves. Therefore, neither the civil magistrate nor anyone else can impede the search for truth, which, if left free, might lead the searcher to find the true religion. Besides being use- less and even detrimental to salvation, the imposition of religious conformity by the political authorities proves destructive to human society,inthat it is likelytotrigger widespread discontent and harm the civil peace. Consequently, practical reasoning disposes human beingstoshun the imposition of religious uniformity as aprinciple destructive of their own interests, bothspiritual and civil, and of the public good. ConcerningLocke’snotion of the public good, Alex Tucknesshas correctlyobserved:

[T]he public good and the fundamentallaw of naturewhich commands that as much as possible mankind is to be preserved are, for Locke,moreorless interchangeable.When God issues such a commission, he takesintoaccount the fact that fallible personswill have to interpret and carry out the commission. God, as arational legislator,will not define the public good broadlyifa narrower conception that would be misapplied less often would better promotethe good.⁴²

 Wolfson, Persecution,21–38;Tate, Liberty,31–37.  Locke, “Letter,” 75.  Ibidem,45.  Locke, “Second Letter,” 69.See, also, Adam Drozdek, “Locke and Toleration,” Studia MinoraFac- ultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Brunensis 44 (1997): 25–32.  Tuckness, “Rethinking,” 291. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 119

However,Tuckness’sanalysis of human fallibilityinLocke’sthought focusses not on the perspective of citizens disputing about true religion, but on ‘the perspective of a legislator puttingforward aprinciple thatwill guide’ the disputants.⁴³ Pace Tuck- ness, Ibelievethat Locke’sconcept of legislator or magistrate in the Letter ought to be considered in the wider context of his political thought. In Locke’s Second Trea- tise of Civil Government,itisindeeduptothe community to delegatethe legislative function—‘the supreme power of the common-wealth’—to magistratesrepresenting the people and accountable to the people; thus, the magistrates’ powers flow from the citizens’ consent,naturallaw,and the tasks of government.⁴⁴ Moreover,when ad- vocatingtoleration of different opinions in the above-cited passagefrom An Essay concerning Human Understanding,Lockeconsidered relationships between individu- al citizensorpersons in general, not between citizens and the magistrate.⁴⁵ Briefly, Lockestressed not simply the magistrate’sfallibility,but something more basic—that is, human fallibilityingeneral. The tolerationist implications of Locke’spolitical scepticism denote several sim- ilaritieswith the Socinians’ discourse on religious freedom, especiallywith Johann Crell’s Vindiciae pro religionis libertate,written in late 1632,first published in 1637, and translated into English in 1646.⁴⁶ Accordingtothe anti-Trinitarian and anti-Cal- vinist theologian Faustus Socinus and his followers,salvation depends on the indi- vidual’sfreewill, which informs all human decisions and actions. Reaffirming Soci- nus’semphasis on freewill, Crell argued that human beingsvoluntarilyjoin in civil societies and establish political institutions for the sake of securityand peace. To Crell, political authority does not extend to matters pertainingtoeternal salvation. Therefore, the magistrate cannot forbid religious beliefs and practices that do not af- fect the civil interests or communal life. AccordingtoCrell, the magistrate has aduty to protect all citizens in their religious observances, which are an essential part of their liberty,exactlyasheprotects them in all otheraspects of life. Moreover,the magistrate’sduty to respect and protect the citizens’ religious liberty must be ratified in civil agreements, covenants, and pacts, which both the magistrate and the subjects are bound to complywith. Morethan half acentury before the publicationofLocke’s Letter concerning Toleration,Crell’s Vindiciae envisagedaclear separation between the state and religious organizations.⁴⁷ There is, nevertheless,asignificant point of

 Ibidem.  Locke, TwoTreatises,355–363; Lorenzo, “Tradition,” 254.  Locke, Essay,IV.xvi.4; Black, “Toleration,” 500.  [Johann Crell], Iuni Bruti Poloni Vindiciae pro religionis libertate (Eleutheropolis []: Typis Godfridi Philadelphi, 1637);[Johann Crell], ALearned and Exceeding Well-Compiled Vindication of Liberty of Religion,trans. N. Y. [John Dury] ([London]: s.n., 1646). The Polish-based Socinians’ fear that KingWladislawIVmight disregard the terms of the WarsawConfederation of 1573, adocument grantingreligious freedom in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, urgedCrell to writethis book.  Sarah Mortimer, “Freedom, Virtue and Socinian Heterodoxy,” in Freedom and the Construction of Europe,eds.Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, 2vols.(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2013), vol. 1, Religious and Constitutional : 84. 120 Diego Lucci

divergence between Socinian tolerationismand Locke’stoleration in the Letter. Soci- nus, Crell, and their followers considered human beingsprimarilyasindividuals.To the Socinians, salvation depends on the individual’sfree choice to accept the assis- tance of divinegrace and,thus, to have faith and behave accordingly. They claimed that every individual believer had the right to studyScripture and to choose their own waytosalvation. Therefore, although the Socinians acknowledgedthe individ- ual’sright to create and join religious organizations,they did not consider affiliation to areligious society as necessary to salvation and to toleration as well. Socinus him- self never officiallyjoined the Minor Reformed Church of , to which most of his disciples, the ‘Polish Brethren,’ belonged. Conversely, in the Letter,Locketalked of individual believers as members of religious societies. Concentrating exclusively on organized religion, he made adistinction between the civil commonwealth, which he envisioned as a general entity consistingofall citizens, and religious organ- izations, which he described as particular societies, each composed of people who had freelyjoined it for aprecise purpose. ‘The end of aReligious Society,’ Locke wrote,

[…]isthe Publick Worship of God, and by means thereof the acquisition of Eternal Life. All Dis- cipline oughtthereforetotend to that End, and all Ecclesiastical Laws to be thereuntoconfined. Nothingought,nor can be transacted in this Society,relating to the Possession of Civil and WorldlyGoods.⁴⁸

In this passage, Lockenot onlydelineated the ends of religious societies as distinct from the state’saims: he also suggested that salvation could be pursuedeffectively onlywithin the bosom of areligious society,bymeans of the public worship of God. However,toLocke, religious societies ought to be freeand voluntary.For this reason, he maintained:

[E]xcommunication neither does,nor can deprive the excommunicated Person of anyofthose Civil Goods that he formerlypossessed. All those things belongtothe Civil Government,and areunder the Magistrate’sProtection.⁴⁹

Moreover,heclarified in which relation religious organizations must stand to each other and to privatepersons:

No privatePerson has anyRight,inany manner,toprejudice another Person in his Civil Enjoy- ments,because he is of another Church or Religion. […]What Isay concerningthe mutual Tol- eration of private Persons differingfromone another in Religion, Iunderstand also of particular Churches;which stand as it wereinthe same relation to each other as privatePersons among themselves; nor has anyone of them anymanner of Jurisdiction over anyother,nonot even

 Locke, “Letter,” 18.  Ibidem,19. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 121

when the Civil Magistrate (as it sometimeshappens) comes to be of this or the other Commu- nion.⁵⁰

It is worthnotingthat, in this passage, by ‘privatepersons’ Lockemeans, in essence, members of religioussocieties. In fact, he argues that no one’scivil canbelimited ‘becauseheisofanother Church or Religion’—notbecause this person holdshetero- doxideas,for instance,ideas that cannot be attributedtoany church or religion. What counts,here, is only whetherone belongstoone or anotherreligious society —afactorthat, to Locke, must have no impact on civillife. Accordingly, Lockelimited theauthorityofecclesiasticalministers to theboundariesoftheir churches anddenied that such authoritycould ‘be extendedtoCivil Affairs.’⁵¹ To Locke, allthese conditions appliedtobothChristian andnon-Christianorganizations,asheexpressly advocated toleration of Jews,Muslims,and pagans.⁵² However, in the Letter,those subscribingto no organized religion—be they deists,agnostics, indifferenti,denominationallyuncom- mitted Christians,etc.—areleftinavaguelimbo.Onthe onehand, they arenot ex- presslyexcludedfromtoleration;but,onthe other, theirstatusremains undefined andtheyare notexplicitlyguaranteedany rights or freedoms.⁵³ Moreover,Locke open- ly denied toleration to RomanCatholics andatheists,and he didsofor moral reasons bearingsignificantpolitical implications. Locke’sbest-known argument against tolerating Catholics is of aprudential na- ture. He thought that the magistrate could not tolerate subjects who owed their pri- mary allegiance to aforeign prince, such as the pope,and who were, therefore, un- trustworthymembers of the commonwealth.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the Letter gave more reasons to exclude Catholics from toleration, repeatingand expanding some of the points that Lockehad made in An Essay concerning Toleration.⁵⁵ To Locke, some moral ideas thatProtestant polemicists commonlyascribed to Catholics and that he mentioned in the Letter (i.e. ‘that Faith is not to be kept with Hereticks,’‘that Kings excommunicated forfeit their Crowns and Kingdoms,’ and ‘[t]hat Dominion is founded in Grace’) wereharmful to civil society.⁵⁶ Moreover,Lockecertainlyhad the pope in mind when he stigmatized

 Ibidem,20.  Ibidem,24.  Ibidem,58–59.  Israel, “Spinoza,” 103.  Locke, “Letter,” 51–52.  Locke, “Essayconcerning Toleration,” 197, 202–203.  Locke, “Letter,” 50 –51.InAn Essay concerning Toleration,Locke had also deplored Catholic in- tolerance: see Locke, “EssayconcerningToleration,” 202. On representationsofCatholics in England in Locke’stime, see John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17– 93. 122 Diego Lucci

[…]the absoluteAuthority of the same Person;who has not onlypower to perswade the Mem- bers of his Churchtowhatsoever he lists, (either as purelyReligious,orasinorder thereunto) but can also enjoyn it them on pain of Eternal Fire.⁵⁷

This passageconfirms Mark Goldie’sthesis that Lockeintended to preclude not Ca- tholicismassuch, but the Catholics’‘antinomianism’—namely, the opinionthat a sort of divinelygiven ‘superiority’ can take priority over ordinary moral rules and di- rect the faithful’sconduct.⁵⁸ In the Letter,Lockeindeedexcluded Catholics from tol- eration not because of ceremonies and doctrines thatProtestants deemed absurd, such as the doctrine of , and that,nevertheless, did not harm any- one.⁵⁹ The use of political coercion against some members of the commonwealth be- cause of the (alleged) absurdity of their (indifferent) beliefs would indeed contradict Locke’spolitical scepticism. Therefore, Lockedid not exclude the theoretical possi- bility of tolerating Catholics, on condition thatthey discarded what rendered them undeserving of toleration—that is, morals destructive of society.Itisfinally worth noting thatLocke’sobjectionsagainst the Catholics’‘antinomianism’ can also applytoothers who, like various Calvinistic factions in seventeenth-century Eng- land, claimedtobedivinelyinspired to rule or exempt from ordinary moral norms. On this point,Iconcur with Goldie’sstatement that ‘[t]here are hints that Lockehad Puritan fanatics in mind as being also potentiallyintolerable.’⁶⁰ Locke’smoral concerns also led him to denytoleration to atheists. In An Essay concerning Toleration,hewrote:

[T]he belief of adeity is not to be reckoned amongst purelyspeculativeopinions,for it beingthe foundation of all morality,and that which influencethe whole life and actions of men, without which aman is to be considerednoother than one of the most dangerous sorts of wild beasts, and so incapable of all society.⁶¹

In the first of the two arguments against atheists in the Letter,Lockegavemore de- tails of whyatheists are so dangerous to society:

 Locke, “Letter,” 52.  Goldie, “Introduction,” xix–xx.  Locke, “Letter,” 44.  Goldie, “Introduction,” xix.  Locke, “EssayconcerningToleration,” 188. On belief in God as preferable to , see, also, John Locke, “Atheism,” in Locke, Political Essays,245 – 246 (a journal notewritten in 1676). On the social harmfulness of atheism, see, also, John Locke, “AVindicationofthe Reasonableness of Chris- tianity” (1695), in John Locke, TheReasonableness of Christianity,asDelivered in the Scriptures,ed. Victor Nuovo(Bristol: Thoemmes,1997): 162: ‘[A] beingacrime, which, for its madness as wellasguilt,ought to shut aman out of all sober and civil society.’ PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 123

Those arenot at all to be toleratedwho deny the Being of aGod. Promises, Covenants,and Oaths, which arethe Bonds of Humane Society,can have no hold upon an Atheist.The takingawayof God, though but even in thought, dissolvesall.⁶²

Locke’sdefinition of atheists as ‘those[…]who denythe Being of aGod’ was quite specific, in atime when the epithet ‘atheist’ was utilized to define various sorts of religious heterodoxy.Locke’sempiricist philosophyentailed aconsideration of dif- ferent ways of being an atheist,whereas most seventeenth-century English theolo- gians judgedthe idea of God innatetohuman nature, hence deeming it impossible to genuinelydenyGod’sexistenceand, thus, to be a ‘speculative atheist.’⁶³ In their opinion, therewereonly ‘practical atheists,’ whom the Cambridge scholar Richard Bentleydefined as ‘them that,believing[God’s] Existence, do yetseclude him from directingthe Affairs of the World, from observing and judging the Actions of Men.’⁶⁴ Locke’srejection of innate ideas created the space for what KeiNumao has termed ‘the “ignorant atheist,” an atheistwho has simplynot yetdeveloped the no- tion of aGod,’⁶⁵ and contributed to raise the conceptual problem of the ‘speculative atheist, […]one who “rationally” reached the wrongconclusion that God does not exist,and obstinatelyheld fast to this view.’⁶⁶ Lockeconsidered the latter as the ‘true’ atheist and the trulyintolerable one, not onlybecause of the inherent irration- ality of speculative atheism, but also because of its practical implications. Thus, Locke’sfirst argument against atheismought to be considered in light of his effort to overcome his moral scepticism. Formost of his life, starting with the manuscript Essays on the Law of Nature (1664),⁶⁷ Lockestruggled to find rational grounds for morality. He was not sceptical about the existence, rationality, and demonstrability of moralityinitself. In An Essay concerning Human Understanding,hedeemed it correct to ‘place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration.’⁶⁸ However,hedoubtedthat natural reason alone could actually demonstrate moral ideas and, thus, find solid grounds for mor- ality.This is why, in the Essay,hecalled attention to the difficulties that reason meets when trying to demonstrate moral ideas—difficulties like theirunfitness for sensible

 Locke, “Letter,” 52–53.  Marshall, John Locke, Toleration,256–263; David Berman, AHistoryofAtheism in Britain: From Hobbes to Russell,2nd edition (London: Routledge,2013), 1–47;J.Kei Numao, “LockeonAtheism,” HistoryofPolitical Thought 34 (2013): 252–272.  RichardBentley, EightSermons Preach’datthe Honourable Robert Boyle’sLecture (Cambridge: Crownfield, 1724),4–5.  Numao, “Locke,” 260.  Ibidem,267.  John Locke, Essaysonthe Law of Nature,trans. and ed. Wolfgangvon Leyden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). These eight essays were originallywritten in Latin. VonLeyden’sedition also includes Locke’svaledictory speech as censor of moral philosophyand some philosophical shorthand writings by Locke.  Locke, Essay,IV.iii.18. 124 Diego Lucci

representation and their complexity.⁶⁹ He argued that these difficulties ‘mayina good measure be remedied by , setting down thatcollection of simple ideas, which every term shallstand for: and then using the terms steadilyand con- stantlyfor that precise collection.’⁷⁰ Nevertheless,heobserved thatthe limits of human understanding and the weakness of human natureactuallyprevent us from demonstrating moral ideas in such an effective wayaswecan demonstrate, for instance, mathematical concepts.⁷¹ In fact,asLockeeventuallynoted in TheRea- sonableness of Christianity,unassisted reason had always proven unable to provide adequate foundations for morality.⁷² Briefly, as John Higgins-Biddle has observed, Locke’s

[…]whole analysisofhuman understandingwas designed to show how little proper knowledge man has and how ineffectual that knowledge is in most matters of morality and religion. […] Thus,hesought in the Essay to establish traditional revelation as the primaryguide in that prop- er scienceand business of mankind, morality and religion.⁷³

AccordingtoLocke, arevelation having the discernible marks of being from God must take priority over the uncertain conjectures of unassisted reason.⁷⁴ Lockebe- lieved that,despite the limits of knowledge in religious matters,human beings could demonstrate God’sexistencethrough the operation of natural reason. To Locke, although no idea, includingthe idea of God, is innate, natural reason is able to deducethe idea of God’sexistencefrom the observation of Creation:

[T]he visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainlyinall the works of the creation, that arational creature,who will but seriouslyreflect on them, cannot miss the discov- ery of adeity.⁷⁵

This meansthatatheism is irrational, because atheists do not accept a ‘discovery’ that ‘carriessuch aweightofthoughtand communication with it.’⁷⁶ Lockealso be- lieved that,since God is alawmaker,belief in God is crucial to establish morality: ‘[W]ithout anotion of alaw-maker,itisimpossibletohaveanotion of alaw,and

 Ibidem,IV.iii.19.  Ibidem,IV.iii.20.  Ibidem.  Locke, Reasonableness,148–150.  John C. Biddle, “Locke’sCritique of InnatePrinciples and Toland’sDeism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (1976): 417.Locke distinguished ‘traditional revelation’—including biblical revelation— from ‘original revelation’ in Essay IV.xviii.3.  Jonathan S. Marko, “The Promulgation of Right Morals: John Locke on the Church and the Chris- tian as the SalvationofSociety,” Journal of Markets &Morality 19 (2016): 51.  Locke, Essay,I.iv.9. See, also, Locke, Essaysonthe Law of Nature,109,147– 159; Locke, Essay,II.x- xiii.12, IV.x.1–6.  Ibidem,I.iv.9. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 125

an obligation to observeit.’⁷⁷ However, An Essay concerning Human Understanding neither provides athorough description of this law, nor explains whyhuman beings are obliged to observeit. In the Essay,Lockeindeed fails to identify the sourceof moral obligation in amanner consistent with his wayofideas, as he does not clarify which simple ideas are combined to form the mixed-mode idea of moral obligation.⁷⁸ When workingonthe Essay in the 1680s, Lockeactuallyattempted at asystem of ethics consistent with his wayofideas in the manuscript Of Ethick in General,written around 1686 and originallyintended as the final chapter of the Essay.⁷⁹ However,he eventuallydiscarded this project and left the manuscriptincomplete. Thus, the Essay does not explain how natural reason, albeit able to proveGod’sexistence, can find reasons to act morallybasedonself-evident principles. Instead, the Essay argues that human beingsshould avail themselvesofboth reason and revelation, when con- sidering matters of morality and religion:

Reason is natural Revelation, whereby the eternal Father of Lightand Fountain of all Knowl- edge,communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural Faculties: Revelation is natural Reason enlargedbyanew set of Discoveries com- municated by God immediately, which Reason vouches the Truth of, by the Testimonyand Proofs it gives, that they comefromGod.⁸⁰

To Locke, revelation comes in whereunassisted reason cannotreach:

There beingmanythings wherein we have very imperfectnotions,ornone at all; and other things,ofwhose past,present,orfutureexistence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all; these, as beingbeyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and abovereason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith.⁸¹

In such cases, reason can onlyrecognize the probability of arevealedthing.ToLocke, faith is, in fact,not amode of knowledge: faith is assent to merely probable matters of fact.Far from beinggrounded on the premises of some demonstration, such as- sent is givenbased on one’sbelief that God has revealedthese matters of fact:⁸²

Because the mind not beingcertain of the truth of that it does not evidentlyknow,but onlyyield- ing to the probability that appears in it,isbound to give up its assent to such atestimonywhich, it is satisfied, comesfromone whocannot err,and will not deceive. […]For where the principles of reason have not evidenced aproposition to be certainlytrue or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth and ground of assent,may determine; and so it maybematter of faith,

 Ibidem,I.iv.8.  Schneewind, “Locke’sMoral Philosophy,” 207.  John Locke, “Of Ethick in General,” in Locke, Writings,9–14.Onthis manuscript,see Nuovo, John Locke,193 – 197.  Locke, Essay,IV.xix.4.  Ibidem,IV.xviii.7. On Locke’sdistinction between things accordingtoreason, abovereason, and contrary to reason, see ibidem,IV.xvii.23.  Wolterstorff, “Locke’sPhilosophy,” 190. 126 DiegoLucci

and be also abovereason. Because reason, in that particular matter,beingable to reachnohigh- er than probability,faith gave the determination where reason came short; and revelation dis- coveredonwhich side the truth lay.⁸³

Revelation indeed includes several things ‘whose truth our mind, by its natural fac- ulties and notions, cannot judge’—thingsthat we,therefore, oughttoaccept as ‘abovereason.’⁸⁴ In the Essay,Lockegavethe existenceofanafterlife with reward and as an emblematic example of truth abovereason, unambiguously revealed in Scripture, in whose divine authority he firmlybelieved.⁸⁵ He alsohinted at an with rewards and sanctions as the onlyeffective incentive to act mo- rally:

For, sincenothingofpleasureand pain in this life can bear anyproportion to the endless hap- piness or exquisitemisery of an immortal soul hereafter, actions in his powerwill have their preference, not according to the transient pleasureorpain that accompanies or follows them here, but as they servetosecurethat perfect durable hereafter.⁸⁶

Moreover,inthe Essay,Lockestatedthat God ‘has power to enforce [the divine law] by rewardsand punishments of infiniteweight and durationinanother life […]. This is the onlytrue touchstone of moral rectitude.’⁸⁷ Later,inthe Reasonableness,Locke maintained that belief in reward and punishment in the afterlife, which he described as an essentialpart of faith (particularlyofthe Christian LawofFaith), provides a strongmotivation to behavemorally. Briefly, in his matureworks,Lockestressed the importance of otherworldlysanctions as effective incentivesfor moral conduct.⁸⁸ Atheists, however,donot believeinadivine creator and legislator.Thus, to Locke, they are inherentlyimmoral, in that theycan neither understand their duties towards their creator,nor accept anydivinelygiven law, nor appreciate otherworldlysanc- tions. In his other argument against toleration of atheists, Lockemaintained that ‘those that by their Atheism undermine and destroy all Religion, can have no pretence of Religion whereupon to challengethe PrivilegeofaToleration.’⁸⁹ The Letter indeed provides atheory of toleration for the benefit of those who have religion—namely, those who pursue eternal salvation and have voluntarilyjoined achurch ‘in order to the publick worshippingofGod, in such amanner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the Salvation of their Souls.’⁹⁰ However,atheists denyGod’sex-

 Locke, Essay,IV.xviii.8–9.  Ibidem,IV.xviii.9.  Ibidem,IV.xviii.7.  Ibidem,II.xxi.60.  Ibidem,II.xxviii.8.  Schneewind, “Locke’sMoral Philosophy,” 208.  Locke, “Letter,” 53.  Ibidem,15. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 127

istence. Thus, they do not pursue salvation and do not belong to anychurch. In other words, they have no religion. Therefore, they cannot ask for toleration, which, in Locke’s Letter,isa‘privilege’ to be granted onlytothose who have religion. Locke’sdenial of toleration to atheists is not an accidental deviation from the theoretical framework of the Letter. Locke’sintolerance of atheists is the logical con- sequence of his notion of toleration in the Letter and shows the limitations of this notion, which is conditioned by amarkedlyreligious conception of life and morality. Lockethoughtthat onlyfaith in adivine creator and legislator and, hence, in adi- vinelygiven moral lawcould enable human beingstobehave in morallyacceptable ways.Consequently, onlyfaith in God could enable aperson not onlytopursue sal- vation, which the Letter nominated ‘to be everyone’shighest priority,’⁹¹ but alsotobe agood member of society.This conclusion led Locketoexpectfrom the members of the commonwealth the care of their own souls (which, in the Letter,entails not only compliancewith amorality based on belief in God,but also membershipto, and wor- ship within,areligious society), if they wanted to enjoy the ‘privilege’ of toleration.

3Christian , the Pursuit of Salvation, and the Overcoming of MoralScepticisminThe Reasonableness of Christianity

Locke’smajor book of theology, TheReasonableness of Christianity,iswidelyconsid- ered awork aiming to find acommon ground for peace and toleration among Chris- . In this book, Lockepursuedthe so-called wayoffundamentals, thus adhering to an important tradition in Protestant irenicism. This tradition included, among oth- ers, the Socinians and the Arminians (i.e. the followers of the anti-Calvinist Dutch theologian Jacob Arminius, also known as Remonstrants) besides several English scholars, includingthe members of the Great TewCircle and various latitudinarian divines.⁹² Although Lockealways maintained that his theological ideas resulted ex- clusively from his ownreadingofScripture, his writingsonreligion present many points in common with Socinianism, , and othercurrents and thinkers pursuing the wayoffundamentals.⁹³ Accordingtothis tradition, Christianityconsists

 Marko, “Promulgation,” 54.  On Lockeand the ‘wayoffundamentals,’ see John C. Higgins-Biddle, “Introduction,” in Locke, Reasonableness,lxii–lxviii; Russo, Ragione,160 –165; Victor Nuovo, Christianity,Antiquity,and En- lightenment: Interpretations of Locke (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 94–98.  Although Locke always denied anyconnections with Socinianism, he referred to Socinian works in various manuscripts,heowned manySocinian books,and he was friends with several anti-Trini- tarians.See John R. Harrison and Peter Laslett, The LibraryofJohn Locke (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1965); RichardAshcraft, “John Locke’sLibrary:PortraitofanIntellectual,” Transactions of the CambridgeBibliographical Society 5(1969): 47– 60;Higgins-Biddle, “Introduction,” lviii–lx; John Mar- shall, “Locke, Socinianism, ‘Socinianism’,and Unitarianism,” in EnglishPhilosophy in the Age of 128 Diego Lucci

of few simple principles regardingGod’sexistenceand assisting grace, the divine au- thority of Scripture, the existenceofanafterlife with reward and punishment,and the necessity of morality to achievesalvation. Disparate dogmas and practices mayoriginatefrom different interpretations of Scripture,which every Christian is al- lowed to understand accordingtotheir intellectual capacities;but specific dogmas and practices are secondary in comparison with the fundamental tenetsofChristian- ity.Therefore, divergences on secondary,non-fundamental doctrinal, ceremonial, and ecclesiologicalissuesmust not hinder peace among Christians.Peaceful coexis- tenceamong Christians should be attained through either mutual toleration between different churches (as the Socinians proposed) or comprehension of all denomina- tions into one church admitting differences in secondary doctrines and practices (as most latitudinarians argued). Lockehimself made adistinction between funda- mental principles and secondary doctrines, as John Higgins-Biddle has noted:

[Locke] distinguish[ed] consistently between beliefs necessary to makeone aChristian and be- liefs that aChristian might subsequentlyhold. He maintained that the former weresosimple and readily discernible that all persons could discover and understand them, whatever their in- tellectual capacities.Atthe same time, by allowingChristianstopursue subsequent beliefs to the extent of their intellectual capacity and in the direction of their religious preference, he maintained the flexibility necessary for toleration, which was the goal of the wayoffundamen- tals.⁹⁴

Whereas Iagree with Higgins-Biddle that Locke’sdoctrine of the fundamentals had importantirenic implications, Ibelievethat it was mainlyLocke’spreoccupation with morality and salvation to shape his approach to the wayoffundamentals. Like Socinians, Arminians, and otherProtestant irenicists,Lockerefused the main tenets of Calvinist theologyand, instead, upheld amoralist soteriology.Herejected predestination, believed in the power of the human willtoaccept or resist saving grace, and highlighted the role of good works in the pursuit of salvation. Locke’sap- proach to saving belief, however,differs from the views of other representativesof the wayoffundamentals in asignificant respect.Arminian authors like Arminius himself and Locke’sfriend, the Dutch theologian , and Socini- an writers like Socinus and Crell limited the essence of the Christian religion to afew fundamental principles, while they left it to each Christian to infer non-fundamentals from their own readingofthe Bible. Nonetheless, Arminians and Socinians devel- oped complex systems of doctrineand, according to Locke, showed ‘zeal for theiror- thodoxy.’⁹⁵ Conversely, other Protestant irenicists,especiallyinEngland, avoided any

Locke,ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000): 111–182;Stephen D. Snobelen, “Socinian- ism, Heresy and John Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity,” Enlightenment and Dissent 20 (2001): 88–125.  Higgins-Biddle, “Introduction,” lxvi.  John Locke, “ASecond Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity” (1697), in Locke, Rea- sonableness,ed. Nuovo, 295. Political Scepticism,Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 129

attempt to detail even the fundamentals of Christianity. Forinstance,inTheReligion of Protestants (1638), the Great TewCircle member William Chillingworth wrote that Christians should ‘syncerelyendeavour to finde the true sense of [Scripture], and live accordingtoit.’⁹⁶ However,Chillingworth considered it undesirable, and actuallyim- possible, to createaunique list of fundamentals to be followed by all Christians. Un- like Chillingworth, Lockeembarked on identifying the fundamental articles of Chris- tianity,aswewill see below;but,unlike Arminians and Socinians, he refrained from endorsing aspecific system of doctrine. Lockedid not wish to endorse aparticular system of doctrine to others because, in his opinion,saving belief does not result from the acceptanceofsome theological system: saving belief is rooted in Scripture alone. Therefore, the faithful oughttostudyScripturetothe best of theirabilitiesin order to live the Christian life and pursue salvation. Lockeevenadmittedthe possi- bility of mistakes in interpreting Scripture, giventhe limits of human understanding. As John Marshall has pointed out,inthe Reasonableness and its two vindications (written against the attacksonLocke’stheologybythe Calvinistic divine John Ed- wards), Locke ‘was also accenting that much was not plain in Christianityand that the search for religious truth was more importantthanits maintenance,arguing that errorheld after sinceresearch was saving.’⁹⁷ Lockeindeedacknowledgedthat

[…]agreat manyofthe Truths revealed in the Gospel, every one does,and must confess, aman maybeignorant of; nay, disbelieve, without dangertohis Salvation: As is evident in those, who, allowingthe Authority,differ in the Interpretation and meaningofseveral Texts of Scripture, not thought Fundamental.⁹⁸

On the other hand, accordingtoLocke, ‘[s]ome of the truths delivered in the holywrit are very plain: it is impossible, Ithink, to mistake their meaning;and those certainly are all necessary to be explicitlybelieved.’⁹⁹ These ‘very plain’ truths are what Locke identifiedasthe three fundamentals of Christianity—namely, faith in as the ,who had delivered asalvific messagehitherto unknown to humankind, re- pentance for one’smisdeeds, and obedience to the divine law, which onlyChrist had revealed completelyand perfectly. Lockeconsidered the acceptance of these funda- mentals, which wereclearlydelivered in the Scriptures and had aprominentlymoral meaning,tobeall that one needed to become aChristian. AccordingtoLocke, how- ever,acceptingand living by these fundamentals was necessary but not sufficient to salvation, giventhat the faithfulalso had to studythe Bible conscientiouslythrough- out their life. And Lockebelieved thatdisregardingthe threefundamentals of Chris-

 William Chillingworth, TheReligion of Protestants aSafe WaytoSalvation (Oxford: Lichfield, 1638), 180.  Marshall, “Locke, Socinianism,” 172. See Locke, Reasonableness,168–171; Locke, “Vindication,” 164–165; Locke, “Second Vindication,” 198, 234–235, 356–359, 376–377,421–424.  Locke, Reasonableness,168.  Locke, “Second Vindication,” 356. 130 DiegoLucci

tianity,when readingthe Bible, was likelytolead to either one of twoequallyex- treme, albeit diametricallyopposed, outcomes—antinomianism and . In the Second Vindication,Lockedeclared that the antinomian controversy among Dissenters had prompted him to write the Reasonableness.¹⁰⁰ Thiscontrover- sy between Independent and Presbyterian ministers was occasioned by the republi- cation,in1690, of the Civil-WarIndependent divine Tobias Crisp’s Christ Alone Exalt- ed (1643) by his son Samuel.¹⁰¹ To Locke, an incorrect,partial reading of Scripture was likelytolead to aradicallypredestinarian, antinomian soteriology,which he ab- horred because all forms of antinomianism dismissed the importance of moral con- duct for salvation. However,Locke’sdislike of predestination denotes that he actual- ly sawpredestinarianism in itself—and not simply the extreme views endorsed by Crisp and his followers—as fundamentallyantinomian and, hence, detrimental to the pursuit of salvation. AccordingtoLocke, the very concept of predestination—a concept essentiallybased on the doctrine of original sin, which he rejected¹⁰²—was incompatible with God’sjusticeand goodness. Moreover,the shortcomings of predes- tinarianismhad led others to reach the opposite extreme in their reaction:

Forwhilst some Men would have all Adam’sPosterity doomed to Eternal InfinitePunishment, for the Transgression of Adam,whomMillions had never heardof, and no one had authorized to transact for him, or be his Representative;this seemed to others so little consistent with the JusticeorGoodness of the Great and Infinite God, that they thoughtthere was no Redemption necessary,and consequentlythat therewas none, rather than admit of it upon aSupposition so derogatory to the Honour and Attributes of that Infinite Being;and so made Jesus Christ nothing but the Restorerand Preacher of pureNatural Religion; thereby doingviolencetothe whole tenor of the .¹⁰³

To Locke, the opinion that Jesus was merelyamoral philosopher,who had solelyre- asserted aperfect LawofNature alreadyknown to natural reason, without adding anything to it,was typical of deism.¹⁰⁴ This opinionimpliedthat natural reason

 Ibidem,186–187. Whereas Locke referredtothis controversy,henever used the terms ‘antino- mian’ and ‘antinomianism’ in the Reasonableness and its vindications.  Tobias Crisp, Christ Alone Exalted,2nd edition (London: Marshal,1690).  Locke, Essay,II.xxvii.22, II.xxvii.26; John Locke, “Peccatumoriginale,” in Locke, Writings,229– 230; John Locke, “Homoante et post Lapsum,” in ibidem,231. Lockewrote the manuscripts Peccatum originale and Homoante et post lapsum,both of which denyoriginal sin, in 1692 and 1693 respective- ly.  Locke, Reasonableness,5.  Locke did not use terms like ‘deism’ or ‘deist’ in the Reasonableness,but he wrotethe words ‘deist’ or ‘deists’ onceinthe first vindication and eight times in the second. Higgins-Biddle has per- suasively argued that Locke’sdeist targets in these works were the heterodoxJewish intellectual Uriel Acostaand the Irish freethinkerJohn Toland. See Higgins-Biddle, “Introduction,” xxvii–xxxvii. Acos- ta had committed suicide in 1640,thus endinghis conflictual relationship with the Jewish community of Amsterdam.Locke’sfriend, Limborch, published Acosta’sbiography in 1687: see Philipp vanLim- borch, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, amica collatio cum erudito Judaeo;acced. Urielis Acosta Ex- emplar Humanae Vitae, cum Refutatione per Limborch (Gouda: Justum ab Hoeve,1687), 341–364.Ina PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 131

alone was asufficient guide to salvation. However,accordingtoLocke, unassisted reason was actuallyunable to comprehend the ultimatetruths in matters of religion and morality and, thus, to serveasaguide to salvation. Lockeevenargued thatmany ancient philosophers, relying on natural reason alone and showing an elitist atti- tude, had eventuallyfostered the spread of priestcraft:

The Rational and thinkingpart of Mankind, ‘tis true, when they soughtafter him, they found the One, Supream, Invisible God: But if they acknowledgedand worshipped him, it was onlyintheir own minds.They kept this Truth locked up in their own breasts as aSecret,nor ever durst ven- ture it amongst the People; much less amongst the ,those wary Guardians of their own and Profitable Inventions.Hence we see that Reason,speakingeversoclearlytothe Wise and Virtuous,had never Authority enough to prevail on the Multitude.¹⁰⁵

This is why ‘the Priests’ ruled ‘every where, to secure theirEmpire, having excluded Reason from having anything to do in Religion.’¹⁰⁶ This was an indirect attack on deism, as Mark Goldie has pointed out: ‘Contemporary deist claims for the great ca- pacity of reason, Lockeasserts, cannot be sustained in the face of history’sevidence to the contrary.’¹⁰⁷ To Locke, onlyJesus, revealing the divine lawinits entirety,had reconciled religion and morality, thus avoiding the defects of ‘[t]he livesofpure and pure reason [which] wereboth failed projects.’¹⁰⁸ Locke’ssceptical attitude towardsthe actual capabilities of unassisted reason in matters of morality was another point of similaritywith the Socinian tradition.¹⁰⁹ One of the main tenets of Socinianism is that God’sRevealed Word is superior to the LawofNature.This is asignificant differencebetween the Socinians and the Magisterial Reformers, whose position on this subject is detailed in Philip Melanch- thon’s Loci Communes (1521). AccordingtoMelanchthon, human beingshaveanin- nate knowledge of God and of the divine lawinits entirety—aknowledge not de-

manuscript noteof1695,Locke called Acosta ‘the father and patriarch of the Deists;’ see MS Locke d. 10, “Lemmata Ethica” (Bodleian Library,), 33.AstoToland, Lockefirst met him in 1693. In 1695,Toland sent some papers to Locke through the lawyer John Freke. These papers,which arelost,were probablythe drafts of some sections of Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious (1696). See the letterbyJohn FreketoJohn Locke, 28 March 1695,inTheCorrespondence of John Locke,ed. E. S. de Beer,8vols. (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1979 – 1989), vol. 5, no. 1868;letter by John Frekeand EdwardClarketoJohn Locke, 9April 1695,inibidem,no. 1874.  Locke, Reasonableness,144.  Ibidem,143.  Mark Goldie, “John Locke, the EarlyLockeans, and Priestcraft,” Intellectual HistoryReview 28 (2018): 132.  Ibidem.  On Socinian ethics and soteriology,see Faustus Socinus, “De Jesu Christo Servatore,” in Biblio- theca Fratrum Polonorum quos Unitariosvocant,9vols.(Irenopoli [Amsterdam]: Sumptibus Irenici Philalethii, post annum Domini 1656 [1665–1692]), vol. 2, Fausti Socini Senensis OperaOmnia in duos tomos distincta [1668], 115–246;Johann Crell, Ad librum Hugonis Grotii quem de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem scripsit (Racoviae: TipisSternacianis,1623). De Jesu Chris- to Servatore was written in 1576and first published in 1594. 132 DiegoLucci

pendent on revelation. Melanchthon and the other Magisterial Reformersidentified the divine lawwith aperfect LawofNature, which Christian revelation had simply reaffirmed and clarified.¹¹⁰ Socinus and his followers rejected this view.They main- tained that religious belief proper does not depend on anatural instinct innate to all human beingsand, thus, is unattainable by natural reason alone. Accordingtothe Socinians, faith resultsfrom one’sfree choice to accept the assistance of God’sgrace, which one can know of through biblical revelation. The acceptance of God’sassisting graceentails acommitment to respect Christ’sprecepts, which the Socinians consid- ered morecoherent,convincing,and rewarding thanthe LawofNature. To the Soci- nians, whereas the LawofNature inclines human beingstothe preservation of earth- ly goods, Christ’smoral teachings offer abetterprospect thanmerelyworldlybenefits —the prospect of eternal salvation. Thismeans that,priortoChristian revelation, human morality wasstillimperfect,devoid of effective incentivestoact morally, and flawed, in that it focussed on worldlyinterests alone.Itwas onlyafter Christ’s ministry on earth that humanity could complywith moral standards facilitating the pursuit of salvation and even clashing,insome cases, with the dictates of the LawofNature.¹¹¹ This position was at the origin of the Socinians’ radical and advocacy of non-resistance, which conflictedwith the natural right to self-de- fence. While admitting thatthe LawofNature disposes human beingstodefend their liveswhen harmed by others, the Socinians inferred from the New Testament that doing violence to another human being,evenfor reasons of self-defence, would prevent one from attaining the supreme good—eternal beatitude. Lockeshared the Socinians’ opinion that Christ’srevelation was superior to the LawofNature as discoverable, at least in theory,byunassistedreason. However, Lockedisagreed with the Socinian idea that God’sRevealedWord contradicted and invalidated some elements of the LawofNature,such as our right of self-pres- ervation and self-defence. To Locke, the LawofNature givesusthe right and duty to preservethe life thatGod has givenus, the goods produced and acquired through our work, and the freedom to make use of our persons and possessions while respecting others’ likerights.¹¹² AccordingtoLocke, Christ’sprecepts had neither nullified nor replaced anyelement of the LawofNature.Hethoughtthat Christian revelation had fullydisclosed, complemented, and completed the LawofNature. It follows that, ac- cording to Locke, we still have anatural right and duty to preserveour life, property, and freedom, even when this means to resist adespotic political power.¹¹³ To Locke, the LawofNature is indeedadivinelyestablished and, hence, eternallyvalid system

 Philipp Melanchthon, On Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes 1555,trans. and ed. ClydeL.Man- schrek (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1965), 51–53,73–75.  Sarah Mortimer, “Human Liberty and Human Natureinthe Works of Faustus Socinus and His Readers,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 70 (2009): 197.  Locke, TwoTreatises,269 – 272.  Ibidem,406–428. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 133

of morality.¹¹⁴ The LawofNature is alaw of convenience promotingutility, and most human beingsknow some of its elements in the form of prescriptions of civil lawor moral principles formulated by philosophers.¹¹⁵ However,Lockeargued that,before Christ’srevelation, unassisted reason had always failed to grasp the LawofNature in its entirety:

[‘T]is toohardatask for unassisted Reason to establish Morality in all its parts upon its true foundation; with aclear and convincinglight.[…][H]umane reason unassisted,failed Men in its great and Proper business of Morality.Itnever from unquestionable Principles,byclear de- ductions,made out an entirebodyofthe Law of Nature.¹¹⁶

Lockealso thought that ecclesiastical tradition, priestcraft, and power politics had negativelyaffected the human capacity to grasp and respect the LawofNature, be- cause the defects of human naturemake human beingsprone to being misled by both theirown mistakes and priestly frauds.¹¹⁷ Due to these problems,God reaf- firmed the LawofNature through the covenant of works,establishingthe Lawof Moses, which consisted of aceremonial part and amoral part—the LawofWorks, identical to the LawofNature.¹¹⁸ The main advantage of the LawofWorks over the LawofNature was that the formerwas available in the in terms comprehensible to everyone. Nevertheless, the LawofMoses was excessively rigorous and still did not offer effective incentivestoact morally. Thisiswhy a new covenant,the covenant of grace or covenant of faith, was necessary.With this new covenant,Christ made the divine lawknown completelyand perfectly, thus es- tablishingthe LawofFaith. To Locke, Christ revealed the LawofNature in its entirety and complemented it with the assurance of rewards and punishments in the afterlife, thus providingapowerful incentive to act morally.¹¹⁹ Lockeemphasized this incen- tive,which was one of the main tenetsofSocinian soteriology,not onlyinthe Rea- sonableness,but also throughout the posthumously published AParaphrase and

 Locke, Reasonableness,13–15.  Ibidem,151–154.  Ibidem,148–150.  Ibidem,161– 163. See, also, Locke, Essay,III.x.2, on the distortions of languagedeliberately made by ‘the several sects of philosophyand religion.’ ConcerningLocke’santiclericalism and views on priestcraft,see John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge:Cam- bridge University Press, 1994), 353–357,405–410; RichardAshcraft, “Anticlericalism and Authority in Lockean Political Thought,” in TheMargins of Orthodoxy:HeterodoxWriting and Cultural Response, 1660–1750,ed. RogerD.Lund (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995):73–96;Goldie, “John Locke, the EarlyLockeans;” James A. T. Lancaster, “From Matters of Faith to Matters of Fact: The Problem of Priestcraft in EarlyModern England,” Intellectual HistoryReview 28 (2018): 145 – 165.  Locke, Reasonableness,16–21.  Ibidem,21–25,110 –112, 132. See, also, John Locke, “Voluntas,” in Locke, Political Essays,321 (a manuscript note written in 1693 – 1694). 134 DiegoLucci

Notes on the Epistles of St Paul.¹²⁰ However,Lockedid not claim that accepting the LawofFaith and, thus, believing in an afterlife with rewardand punishment leads, necessarilyand unfailingly,toact morally. In An Essay concerning Human Un- derstanding,which Lockerevised multiple timesuntil his death in 1704,and in his theological works,heacknowledgedthateventhosewho believeinotherworldly sanctions are still liable to commit evil deeds, giventhe limits of human understand- ing and the weakness of human nature.¹²¹ Therefore, he shared another important tenet of Socinian soteriology—that is, belief in God’smercy. The Socinians thought that Christ had offered humanityaconcrete hope of salvation, despite the limits and imperfections of human nature.InDe Jesu Christo Servatore (1594), Socinus maintained that Christ had emphasized God’sforgiveness. Socinus and his disciples rejected the opinion that God necessarilyought to punish sinners. They argued that God is merciful and omnipotent and, thus, not boundbyany law—unlikehuman judges, who have to apply the laws of the state. To the Socinians, God could waive his right to punishment and,thus, forgive the sins of the repentant faithful who, dur- ing theirlife, had sincerelyendeavoured to obey the divinelaw.¹²² The importance that Lockeattachedtofaith as one of the fundamentals of Christianity was in line with the Socinians’ stressonGod’sforgiveness, as he wrotethat ‘by the Law of Faith, Faith is allowed to supplythe defect of full Obedience; and so the Believers are admitted to Life and as if they wereRighteous.’¹²³ To Locke, Christ ‘did not expect […]aPerfect Obediencevoid of all slips and falls: He knew our Make, and the weakness of our Constitution too well, and was sent with aSupply for that Defect.’¹²⁴ This supplywas faith. Nevertheless, Lockedid not believeinsal- vation by faith alone. To Locke, human beingsstill ought to respect the eternally valid principles of the divinelygiven LawofNature, which Christ,establishing the LawofFaith, had fullydisclosed and had complemented and completed with two significant ‘advantages’—apowerful incentive to act morally, in the form of an after- life with rewardand punishment,and an emphasis on God’sforgiveness. According to the LawofFaith, the believer’sfaith compensatesfor their failuretoperfectly com- plywith the divine law—afailurethat,given the weakness of human nature, is inevi- table, even when one is sincerelycommitted to obedience.¹²⁵ Thus, the faithful will receive ‘the Pardon and Forgiveness of Sins and Salvation’¹²⁶ thanks to theirfaith,

 David Wootton, “John Locke: Socinian or Natural LawTheorist?,” in Religion, and Political Thought: Thomas HobbestoJ.S.Mill,ed. James E. Crimmins (London: Routledge,1989): 49.  Locke, Essay,II.xxi.60 –73,II.xxviii.12; Locke, Reasonableness,19, 120, 130.  Socinus, “De Jesu,” 121–132; Crell, Ad librum,164–167; Sarah Mortimer, “Human and Divine Jus- tice in the Works of Grotius and the Socinians,” in TheIntellectual Consequences of Religious Hetero- doxy1600–1750,eds.John Robertson and Sarah Mortimer(Leiden: Brill, 2012): 75 – 94.  Locke, Reasonableness,19.  Ibidem,120.  Ibidem,130;Dewey D. Wallace, “Socinianism,Justification by Faith, and the Sources of John Locke’s TheReasonableness of Christianity,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 45 (1984): 53–54.  Locke, Reasonableness,133. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 135

but onlyoncondition that,intheirlife, they repent for theirmisdeeds and whole- heartedlyattempt to obey the divine law. It is in this sense that,inLocke’ssoteriol- ogy, faith ‘justifies.’ The justifying faith includes good works.Locke’sviews on justi- fication distinguish him, on the one hand, from predestinarians and antinomians of different stripes and,onthe other,from deists. Locke’sposition is actuallyinline with the Socinian and Arminian idea that human beingsare able to accept or reject assisting grace. However,Lockethoughtthat acceptingdivine assistance and, hence, adhering to the LawofFaith was the ‘reasonable,’ convenient option, giventhe above said advantagesofChrist’sComing. Briefly, to Locke, faith in Christ’sMessiahship, repentance for one’smisdeeds, and commitment to obey the divine law, along with asincereand constant effort to studyScripture, are all that is required to achieve salvation. All those committed to pursuing salvation by these means should tolerate each other,instead of showing hostility to one another because of divergences about non-fundamentals. Therefore, the views on morality and salvation expressed in TheReasonableness of Christianity have important irenic implications. Locke’smoralist soteriology even implies tolera- tion of denominationallyuncommitted Christians,although Lockelived and died a conformingmember of the Church of England and although he never aimedatdis- solving churches as formal associations with their specific doctrines, structures, norms, and ceremonies. In fact,Lockealways granted churches the right to be uni- formitarian. To Locke, there can be no forced church membership, but voluntary membership entails submission to the discipline of the religious society to which one has chosen to belong in order to perform the public worship of God. In the Rea- sonableness,Lockeaddressed public acts of worship, performed within religious so- cieties, in the section concerning Jesus’ attempt to reform the public worship among the Jews of his time. AccordingtoLocke, Christ had aimed at depriving ‘[t]he outward forms of Worshipping the ’ of ‘Stately Buildings,costlyOrnaments, peculiar and uncouth Habits,And anumerous huddle of pompous, phantastical,cumbersome Ceremonies,’ formerly, and mistakenly, ‘thought the principal part,ifnot the whole of Religion.’¹²⁷ Lockemaintainedthat Jesus had revealed the following:

To be Worshipped in Spirit and in Truth; with Application of Mind, and sincerity of Heart,was what God henceforth onlyrequired. […]Decency, Order,Edification, weretoregulateall their publick Acts of Worship. […]Praises and , humblyoffereduptothe Deity,werethe Wor- ship he now demanded;And in these every one was to look after his own Heart,And know that it was that alone which God had regardto, and accepted.¹²⁸

To me, it seems that, while endorsing the renovation of public acts of worship advo- cated by Jesus in the name of ‘Decency, Order,Edification,’ this section does not de- scribe public worship, and hence affiliation to achurch, as essential to morality and

 Ibidem,159.  Ibidem,160. 136 DiegoLucci

salvation. Here, Lockeindeedstresses that God requires only ‘Application of Mind, and sincerity of Heart’ from those who ‘humbly’ offer up ‘Praises and Prayer […]to the Deity’—aform of worship demanded by God and practicable, publiclyand collec- tively, by themembers of achurch, but not necessarilyconnected to public worship. Thus, in my opinion,the Reasonableness does not preclude the possibility of salva- tion to thosewho accept the LawofFaith but consider themselvesas‘mere Christi- ans’—as was,for instance, Locke’sfriend Benjamin Furlyafter renouncing Quaker- ism in the early1690s. Whether Locke, in his theological works,conceivedof unaffiliated Christians as simply ‘traveling’ in search of achurch with doctrines and rites they could approve, or as believers who could remain denominationallyun- committed throughout their lives, is not crucial to my argument.¹²⁹ It is true that Lockesuggests nowhereinthe Reasonableness,orinhis otherlaterwritingsonreli- gion, thatanindividual Christian might remain unaffiliated throughout their life. However,nowhereinthe Reasonableness,orinLocke’sotherworks written between the mid-1690s and his death in 1704,denominational affiliation is proposed as indis- pensable to moralconduct and the achievement of salvation.¹³⁰ As John Marshall has noted, Locke’slater writingsonreligion actuallyshow thathe‘was opposed to divid- ing and denominatingChristians on the basis of non-fundamentals, stressingthe ex- press words of Scripture and his status as aChristian, not the memberofany sect.’¹³¹ The Reasonableness and Locke’sotherlater works on religion indeed extend the pos- sibility of salvation to all thoseaccepting the LawofFaith, regardlessofnon-funda- mentalsand confessional affiliation. Consequently, this position also allows for tol- eration of denominationallyuncommitted Christians who adhere to the LawofFaith and the ethics it entails.

4Non-Christian BelieversinLocke’sLater Writings on Religion

Locke’slater theological works express the conviction that onlythe Christian Lawof Faith can establish acoherent system of ethics and lead to salvation. As Lockeput it in AParaphrase and Notes,specificallyincommenting on Ephesians 2:15:

 Locke’suse, in the Reasonableness,ofthe metaphor of the ‘travel’ is aimed at stressing the ne- cessity of divine revelation (as facilitating our journey) in moral and religious matters and, on the other hand, at stigmatizingthe unfortunate doctrinal conflicts amongChristians:see ibidem,156– 159,169 – 171.  Ibelievethat Locke’smanuscript Sacerdos (1698) does not require confessional affiliation as es- sential to salvation. In this manuscript,Locke statedthat Christ,reunitingreligion and morality,had reformed ‘outwardceremonie’ to fit with what ‘decency&order requirdinactions of publiqueassem- blys.’ Concerning ministers’ right to regulateand perform public worship and ‘to teachMen their dutys of Morality,’ Lockewas obviouslytalkingofaright limited to the boundariesoftheir churches, which he always considered as voluntary societies.See John Locke, “Sacerdos,” in Locke, Writings, 17– 18.  Marshall, “Locke, Socinianism,” 171. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 137

[T]he Subjects of [God’s] Kingdom whereof this is now the Law, can be at no doubt or less about their Duty,ifthey will but read and consider the Rules of Morality,which our Saviour and his Apostles have deliver’dinvery plain words in the holyScriptures of the New Testament.¹³²

In this regard, Victor Nuovohas observedthat Locke’sviews on moralityand salva- tion in his theological works implythat, ‘if moralityisthe chief business of mankind, then the best wayofpursuing it is to become aChristian’¹³³—namely,toaccept and live by the LawofFaith. Locke’smoralist soteriology indeed implies adenial of the possibilityofsalvation for thoserefusingthe LawofFaith and the ethics it entails— not onlyantinomians and deists, but also heathens, Muslims, and Jews unwilling to convert to Christianity. Concerningpagans, the Reasonableness extended the possibility of salvation to those who had ‘never heard of the Promise or News of aSaviour.’¹³⁴ Lockecould not accept that God, in His goodness and mercy, would damn thosepeople for not ac- ceptingarevelation they had never heard of. Therefore, he argued that God, ‘by the Light of Reason,’ had enabled them to grasp and respect the basic tenetsof the LawofNature and ‘to find also the waytoReconciliation and Forgiveness’ when they transgressed this law.¹³⁵ In Locke’swords:

[T]he Author of this Law, and God of Patienceand Consolation, whoisrich in Mercy,would for- give his frailOff-spring; if they acknowledgedtheir Faults, disapproved the Iniquity of their Transgressions,beg’dhis Pardon, and resolvedinearnest for the futuretoconformtheir Actions to this Rule, which they owned to be Just and Right.¹³⁶

Nevertheless,Lockeabstained from extendingthe possibilityofsalvation to people who, having heard of Christian revelation, still preferred to profess other religions. Moreover,inAParaphrase and Notes,Lockerefrained from making anyconcession to the heathen world, includingthose who had ‘never heard of the Promise or News of aSaviour.’¹³⁷ As regards Muslims, Lockementioned ‘the Mahometan Religion’ onlyonce in the Reasonableness,when he observedthatthis religion had ‘derivedand borrowed’ its from Christianity.¹³⁸ In the Second Vindication,hereferred to the Islamic religion onlyinresponding to John Edwards’scharge of holding anon-Trinitarian,

 John Locke, AParaphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul to the Galatians,1and 2Corinthi- ans,Romans,Ephesians,ed. Arthur W. Wainwright, 2vols.(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1987), vol. 2, 365.  Nuovo, John Locke,245.  Locke, Reasonableness,139.  Ibidem,139–140.  Ibidem,140.  Arthur W. Wainwright, “Introduction,” in Locke, Paraphrase,vol. 1, 41– 43;Marshall, John Locke: Resistance,447– 451.  Locke, Reasonableness,145. 138 DiegoLucci

‘Socinian,’‘Mahometan’ view of Jesus as merelyaprophet.¹³⁹ However,inhis theo- logical writings, Lockedid not sayanything about the possibility of salvation for Muslims. ConcerningJews who livedbefore Jesus, Lockestated in the Reasonableness:

[T]he Faith of those before Christ;(believingthat God would send the Messiah,tobeaPrince, and aSaviour to his People,ashehad promised) […]shall be accounted to them for Righteous- ness.¹⁴⁰

However,inrejectingantinomian ideas and salvaging the importance of good works for salvation in the Reasonableness,Lockeexpressed views typicalofsupersession- ism—thatis, the Christian doctrine, also called ‘replacement theology,’ accordingto which the Christian Church has succeeded the Jewish people as the definitive people of God. Moreover,inAParaphrase and Notes,heopenlydisparagedthe Jewishreli- gion. In order to counter antinomian readings of the New Testament,especiallyof Paul’sepistles, Lockedistinguished between the Christian concept of ‘works’ and the Mosaic notion of ‘works of the law.’ In the Reasonableness,Lockeargued that Paul had not opposed good works.AccordingtoLocke, when Paul spoke against ‘works,’ he meant the ‘works of the law,’ namelythe ceremonial part of the Lawof Moses, which had onlytemporaryvalidity,whereas its moral part,being identical to the LawofNature,was eternallyvalid:

[S]ome of God’sPositive Commands beingfor peculiar Ends,and suited to particular Circum- stances of Times,Places,and Persons, have alimited and onlytemporary Obligation by vertue of God’spositive Injunction; such as was that part of Moses’s Law, which concerned the outward Worship, or Political Constitution of the Jews,and is called the Ceremonial and Judaical law, in contradistinction to the Moral part of it; Which beingconformable to the Eternal LawofRight,is of Eternal Obligation, and therefore remains in force still under the Gospel; nor is abrogated by the Law of Faith.¹⁴¹

Locke’sviewofthe Mosaic Lawisemblematic of the ‘theory of condescension,’ ac- cording to which, as Eldon Eisenach has put it, ‘the Old Testament lawisconsigned to the dustbin of history.’¹⁴² Several seventeenth-centurylatitudinarian theologians, includingJohn Tillotson and EdwardStillingfleet,upheld this theory.Inthe early eighteenthcentury,the Newtonian scholarSamuel Clarke unambiguouslyformulated the basic tenet of this theory in asermon entitled TheEnd and Design of the Jewish Law: ‘The Jewish Lawwas an Institution of Religion adapted by God in great conde-

 Locke, “Second Vindication,” 185, 283, 360,362.  Locke, Reasonableness,139.  Ibidem,19.  Eldon J. Eisenach, “Religion and Locke’sTwo Treatises of Government,” in John Locke’sTwo Treatises of Government: New Interpretations,ed. EdwardJ.Harpham (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1992):73. See, also, Raffaele Russo, “Locke and the Jews:From Toleration to the Destruc- tion of the Temple,” LockeStudies 2(2002): 199–223. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 139

scension to the weak apprehension of that people.’¹⁴³ Locke’sremarks on Judaism in AParaphrase andNotes are even more demeaning than Clarke’swords and - strate whyLocke’stheological works do not contemplate the possibility of salvation for post-biblicalJews. In his paraphrase of Galatians 1:4, in which Paul states that Christ came to ‘deliverusfrom this present evil world,’ Lockemaintained thatby ‘evil world’ Paul means ‘the Jewishnation under the Mosaical constitution.’¹⁴⁴ Ac- cordingly,incommentingonGalatians 3:19–25,Lockeargued that Christ’sministry on earth had marked the end of the MosaicLaw,which he considered superseded by the LawofFaith.¹⁴⁵ To Locke, 2Corinthians 3:6(‘the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life’)indicates that ‘the New Testament or covenantwas also, though obscurely, held forth in the law[of Moses].’¹⁴⁶ However,the bulk of the Jewishpeople wereunable to discard their literalist,legalistic readingofthe Scriptures,and to accept Jesus as the Messiah,because asort of hermeneutic ‘veil’ conditioned their biblical exegesis. Lockeexpressed this opinion in his paraphrase of 2Corinthians 3:15 (‘But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the vail is upon theirheart’): in Locke’swords, ‘even until now when the writings of Moses are read, the veil remains upon their hearts, they see not the spiritual and evangelical truths contained in them.’¹⁴⁷ Even the Jews who converted to Christianityshortlyafter Christ’sComing wereun- willing to abandon the ‘works of the law,’ thus causing tensions and divisions among the earlyChristians.¹⁴⁸ When talking of these Jewish converts to Christianity, Lockewrote in anote to 1Corinthians 2:6 (‘Howbeit we speak wisdom amongst them that are perfect: yetnot the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought’):

St.Paulhere tells the Corinthians that the wisdom and learningofthe Jewish nation led them not into the knowledge of the wisdom of God, i.e. the Gospel revealed in the Old Testament, evident in this,that it was their rulers and rabbies,who, stifflyadheringtothe notions and prej- udices of their nation, had crucified Jesus, the Lord of glory,and werenow themselves, with their state and religion, upon the point to be swept away and abolished.¹⁴⁹

In this passage, Lockeclaimed that Paul had foreseen the imminent destruction of the Jewish nation, state, and religion as adeserved punishment for having crucified Jesus. Lockeevenjustified this ‘destruction’ in anote to Romans 3:8, in which Paul maintained thatthe ‘damnation’ of ‘some’ who had slandered him was ‘just.’ Locke thoughtthat,by‘some,’ Paul meant the Jews:

 Samuel Clarke, “The End and Design of the Jewish Law,” in Samuel Clarke, Works,4vols.(Lon- don: Knapton,1738), vol. 2, 313.  Locke, Paraphrase,vol. 1, 121.  Ibidem,vol. 1, 138.  Ibidem,vol. 1, 278.  Ibidem,vol. 1, 280.  Ibidem,vol. 2, 483.  Ibidem,vol. 1, 174. 140 DiegoLucci

‘Some.’ It is past doubt that these werethe Jews.But St.Paul, always tender towards his own nation, forbears to name them, when he pronounces this sentence, that their casting-off and de- struction now at hand, for this scandal and their opposition to the Christian religion, was just.¹⁵⁰

Briefly, Locke’slater writingsonreligion depict the Jews as bound to their supersed- ed lawand hence incapable of pursuing salvation, like all thoserefusing the Chris- tian LawofFaith. When focussing his attention on heathens and Jews in his theolog- ical works,Lockeobviouslyhad the issue of salvation in mind. On the other hand, explicit political considerations, concerning whether the religious and moral ideas of heathens and Jews make them tolerable or intolerable in acivil commonwealth, are absent from Locke’stheological writings, although his moralist soteriologyhas powerful political implications, as Eisenach has noted:

Onlywhen the truth of morality is seen as part of asystem of divine rewards and punishments will it attain both psychological force and historical reality.Onlyunder these conditions will morality provide the basis for acivil lawwith teeth in it.¹⁵¹

In this regard,Victor Nuovohas observed that ‘Locke’stheologyisapolitical the- ologyatleast in this respect,thatthe sovereign legislatorofthe morallaw is God, or his viceregent Christ.’¹⁵² However,Nuovohas correctlypointed out that Lockedid ‘not propose aChristian commonwealth as the proper waytodothe business of mor- ality.’¹⁵³ Lockeactuallylaboured to ensurethat the Second Treatise,with its advocacy of a civil commonwealth, would become part of his philosophicallegacy. Moreover, he always opposed the institutionalization of Christianity as anational religion, which in practice, accordingtoLocke,had done as much to disturb as to reinforce civil society and moral conduct.AccordingtoNuovo, Lockenever endorsed aChris- tian commonwealth for two main reasons—namely, his Christian view of history and the concept of the LawofNature he had expressed in the Second Treatise:

[A]ccording to the Scriptures, it was not God’sintention to establish his kingdom or the kingdom of Christ—they arethe same thing—until the history of redemption had run its course, until the resurrection and the last judgment. In the meantime, whether in astate of nature or in acivil state, the lawofnature is the onlyproper rule to govern human behavior and civil institutions to safeguard human life and property.¹⁵⁴

In the Second Treatise,Lockeindeed described human beings as boundtothe God- givenLaw of Nature, in that they are God’sworkmanship and, thus, they belong to

 Ibidem,vol. 2, 506.  Eldon J. Eisenach, TwoWorlds of : Religion and Politics in Hobbes, Locke, and Mill (Chi- cago:The University of ChicagoPress, 1981),85.  Nuovo, John Locke,246.  Ibidem.  Ibidem. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 141

God.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, Locke’sposition on the LawofNature in the Reasonableness makes thingsquite problematic, giventhat,inthis book, Lockemaintained that un- assisted reason had never ‘made out an entire bodyofthe Law of Nature.’¹⁵⁶ More- over,accordingtoLocke, even when the LawofNature became easilyaccessible through the Old Testament,given that the moral part of the LawofMoses (i.e. the LawofWorks) was identical to the LawofNature,the LawofMoses was still ineffec- tive to establish morality on solid grounds.Lockeeventuallyconcluded that only Christ had revealed, perfectly and completely, the divine law, which comprises the LawofNature in its entirety,besides the assurance of otherworldlyrewards and pun- ishments and an emphasis on God’sforgiveness. Therefore, in order to achieveflaw- less, thorough, certain knowledge of the LawofNature—‘the onlyproper rule to gov- ern human behavior and civil institutions,’ in Nuovo’swords—one needs to accept the LawofFaith revealedbyChrist. However,inthe Reasonableness and his other theological writings, Lockedid not invoke the civil power against pagans, Muslims, and Jews because of theirweak, de- fective,imperfect morality. He actuallyruled out anysuch use of the civil power in the TwoTreatises of Government,inall his letters on toleration, and throughout his mature manuscripts, includingthosewritten between the mid-1690s and his death. Conversely, in ALetter concerning Toleration,heexpresslyexcluded atheists and Roman Catholics from toleration, and he did so mainlyfor moralreasons,asI have explained above. So, whydid he not denytoleration to heathens, Jews, and Muslims too for moral reasons?Wecan answer this question if we consider Locke’s views on the different moralities of atheists, RomanCatholics,and non-Christian be- lievers. Lockejudgedatheists intrinsicallyimmoral, and hence socially dangerous, because of their failure to acknowledge the existenceofadivine creator and legisla- tor and their consequent failuretoappreciate any(divinelygiven) moral law. Con- cerningRomanCatholics, Lockeconsidered them intolerable onlybecause of some of their moral ideas, which he judgedharmful to society.Therefore, he did not ex- clude the theoretical possibility of tolerating Catholics, on condition that the latter renouncetheir antisocial ideas. When it comes to pagans, Jews, and Muslims, things are different,because they do believeinadivine creator and legislator.Thus, they are able to appreciate and grasp, albeit partiallyand imperfectly, the divine lawand their duties towardstheir creator.For this reason, they are not intrinsicallyimmoral and, thus, they are not comparable to atheists. Heathens of different stripes can indeed comprehend, by the light of reason, at least some basic elements of the LawofNa- ture. Jews can also know the LawofNature in the form of the LawofWorks acces- sible through their Scriptures.Briefly, the religious and moralviews of non-Christian believers, although defective and imperfect,still enable them to meet at least mini- mallydecent moral standards.Their failuretoaccept the Christian LawofFaith, with

 Locke, TwoTreatises,271.  Locke, Reasonableness,148–150. 142 DiegoLucci

the ethics it entails, certainlyprevents them from achieving the salvation of their souls. However,asLockeargues in ALetter concerning Toleration, ‘the Care of Souls’ falls outside of the purviewofpolitical authority,aslong as areligious opin- ion or practice is not destructive of the civil interests or communal life. Therefore, Locke’smoreorless explicitdenial of the possibility of salvation to non-Christian believers in his theological works does not invalidatewhat the Letter states in this regard, namely that ‘neither Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Jew, oughttobeexcluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because of his Religion.’¹⁵⁷ Finally, we need to consider the caseofdeists and antinomians—Locke’smain polemicaltargets in his later works on religion. Although Lockequestions the actual ability of unassisted reason to comprehend the LawofNature entirelyand perfectly, the deists’ commitment to live by the LawofNature, or at least by its basic tenets, should be enough to make them tolerable in acivil commonwealth. However,it might be argued thatdeistsdonot belong to any ‘deistic church’ and thus, given Locke’sexclusive focus on organized religion in the Letter,they do not meet an essen- tial requirement for being considered, and tolerated, as people who have ‘religion.’ In the Letter,deistsare indeedleft in a ‘vaguelimbo,’ as theirstatus remains unde- fined. Nevertheless, Locke’sirenicism in the Reasonableness does not require confes- sional affiliation as anecessary condition for salvation, and for toleration as well, when it comes to Christian believers. Ibelievethat the scarceimportance that Lockeattaches to church membership in the Reasonableness,combined with his stress,inhis political writings, on the LawofNature as the onlyproper rule to govern human behavior in astate of nature or in acivil commonwealth, allows for toleration of deists too, although Lockecriticized their reliance on natural reason alone as in- effective to salvation. As regards antinomians, Locke’sexclusion of Roman Catholics from toleration because of their ‘antinomian’ moral ideas implies that other,ifnot all, forms of antinomianism are intolerable, at least in principle. Yet, whereas Lockeopposed Calvinistic antinomianism as detrimental to salvation, he abstained from explicitlydeclaring Protestant antinomians ‘intolerable’ in anyofhis writings. Ibelievethat LockejudgedProtestant antinomianism to be not as sociallydangerous as Roman Catholics’‘antinomian’ moral ideas. In the Letter,heindeedattacked some specific antisocial ideas,commonlyattributed to RomanCatholics,and he connected Catholic morals with the obedience that Catholics owed to their indisputable reli- gious leader,the pope, who was also aforeign prince. Concerning Calvinistic antino- mians, Lockewas probablyaware of their potential intolerability,asMark Goldie has argued, giventhattheirclaims of divine inspiration could possiblylead them to act against ordinary moral rules and even against the civil commonwealth.¹⁵⁸ Neverthe- less, this theoretical possibility,unlike the Catholics’ antisocial convictions, was not

 Locke, “Letter,” 58–59.  Goldie, “Introduction,” xix. PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism … in John Locke 143

enough to make Protestant antinomians actually intolerable—as long as they did not engageinimmoral, antisocial,illegal conduct.

5Conclusion

Lockealways argued for toleration within the boundaries of amorality that onlyre- ligious belief could ground. His arguments in the Letter revolve around the separa- tion between the state and religious societies. While Locke’spolitical scepticism en- abled him to effectivelydelineate the civil magistrate’spurview, his preoccupation with the need for morality to construct adecent,stable society led him to expressly advocate toleration for onlythose who believed in God and pursued salvation within the bosom of achurch (except Roman Catholics, as long as they held antisocial mo- rals). In TheReasonableness of Christianity and other theological writings, Locke turned to Scripture with the purpose of overcominghis own moral scepticism and finding strongfoundations for morality. He formulated an original doctrine of the fundamentals, extendingthe possibility of salvation and toleration to all thoseac- ceptingthe LawofFaith revealedbyChrist,regardless of non-fundamentals and con- fessional affiliation. His conviction thatthe LawofFaith alone could establish a sound system of ethics and make salvation possibledid not lead him to endorse a Christian commonwealth, or to recant his advocacy of toleration of pagans, Jews, and Muslims. In fact,although non-Christian believers refuse the LawofFaith and are hence unable to achievesalvation, they do believeinadivinecreator and legis- lator.Therefore, they are able to appreciate and grasp, even if onlypartiallyand im- perfectly, at least the divinelygiven LawofNature and to behave accordingly. In con- clusion, Locke’sdeveloping approach to toleration, from the Letter to his later theological writings, was always conditioned by his religious conception of life and morality. This enabled him to advancepersuasivearguments against the civil magistrate’scompletecontrol of religious affairs and to playasignificant role in the irenic Protestant tradition of the wayoffundamentals. On the other hand, his re- ligious conception of life and morality always prevented him from advocating proper freedom of conscienceand, instead, led him to arguefor onlylimited forms of reli- gious toleration.

Guido Bartolucci JewishScepticisminChristian Eyes: Jacob F. Reimmann and the Transformation of Jewish Philosophy

Introduction

Christian interest in the Jewish tradition in the modernage has long been recognised as an important field of research for understanding the history of European erudi- tion, along with the studyofGreek and Latin. Less investigated, however,isthe re- lationship between this interest and the construction of definitions of Jewishtradi- tion, cultureand history that,built within the Christian field,ended up also becomingheritageofthe field that had been the subject of these investigations, namelyJudaism iseitself.¹ Aparticular caseconcerns the definition of ‘Jewish philos- ophy.’ This concept,infact, has engaged scholars at least in the last century in at- tempts to reconstruct its history and to find adefinition that would at last capture its ‘essence’,inacontinuous oscillation between two extreme : the rejection of the existenceofaJewish philosophyatall and instead its centralityinunderstand- ing the history of Judaism itself.² Thus, in the introduction to an important volume on Jewishphilosophy, the editor DanielFrank writes:

This article is just apreliminaryresult of aresearch on Jewish scepticism and Jewish philosophy in the Lutheran world of the undertaken during my fellowship at the Maimonides Centrefor AdvancedStudies, Universität Hamburg.

 On Christian Hebraism and the history of erudition, see François Secret, Les kabbalistes chrétiens de la Renaissance (Paris:Dunod, 1964); Jerome Friedman, The Most Ancient testimony:Sixteenth-Cen- turyChristian-Hebraica in the Age of Renaissance Nostalgia (Athens:Ohio University Press, 1983); Frank E. Manuel, TheBroken Staff:Judaism through Christian Eyes (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniver- sity Press, 1992);Saverio Campanini, “Die Geburt der Judaistik ausdem Geist der Chrislichen Kabba- lah,” in Gottes Sprache in der philologischen Werkstatt: Hebraistik vom 15. bis zum 19.Jahrhundert,ed. Giuseppe Veltri and Gerold Necker (Leiden: Brill, 2004): 135–241; AnthonyGrafton and Joanna Wein- berg, “Ihavealways lovedthe Holy Tongue”:Isaac Casaubon, the Jews,and aforgotten chapter in Ren- aissance scholarship (Cambridge,MA: The Belknap Press of HarvardUniversity Press, 2011); Theodor Dunkelgrün, “The Christian StudyofJudaism in EarlyModern Europe,” in TheCambridge Historyof Judaism,vol. 7: TheEarly Modern World, 1500–1815 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2017): 316–348. Foracomprehensive bibliography,see Stephen G. Burnett, Christian Hebraism in the Ref- ormation Era(1500–1660):Authors, Books, and the TransmissionofJewishLearning (Leiden: Brill, 2012).  On this debate, see, e.g., in the present volume Dirk Westerkamp, “Quaestio sceptica disputata de philosophiajudaeorum: Is there aJewish Philosophy?,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Ad- vanced Studies 2018,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2018): 3–14.

OpenAccess. ©2018 Guido Bartolucci, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-008 146 Guido Bartolucci

Much the most important part of anyanswer we give to our initial query into the natureofJewish philosophyisthat Jewish philosophyisanacademic discipline. It is an invention, for reasons importanttoponder,ofnineteenth-century historians, intent on bringing together certain think- ers, while simultaneouslyexcluding others.Beforethe invention of Jewish philosophyasanaca- demic discipline no one askedorwondered about the natureofJewish philosophy, quitesimply because the subjectdid not exist.[…]Noone in premodern, indeed, in much of modern times understood Jewish philosophyasasubdiscipline of philosophy, as away of philosophizing.No one feltthe need to ascertain the essenceofJewish philosophy[…]distinguishingitfromevery other kind of philosophyormode of theological interpretation.³

All these assertions could probablybeapplied to the Jewishworld, starting at the beginning of the Wissenschaft des Judentums.⁴ The Christian tradition, however, did not wait for the nineteenth century in order to reflect on Jewish philosophy. Its interest had begun farearlier,atthe very least by the fifteenth century.⁵ The question of Jewishphilosophyinthe history of Christian thought developedinacompletely different waythan what took place in the Jewish milieu. Jewishauthors, such as Si- mone Luzzatto and Moses Mendelssohn,for example, envisaged their own philo- sophical thinking as something autonomous from religious tradition, whereas Chris- tian authors attempted quite the opposite. ManyChristian scholars wereinterested in Jewishphilosophyfor its alleged holiness, as we will see forthwith. But the history of this encounter is particularlysignificant in understand the interpretation of the meaning of Jewish Scepticism, because it was the Christian milieu (not the Jewish one) that first maintained the Jewish thought could be regarded as asceptic philos- ophy.⁶

 Daniel H. Frank, “What is Jewish philosophy,” in HistoryofJewishPhilosophy,eds.Daniel H. Frank and OliverLeaman (London and New York: Routledge,1997): 2–4.  On Jewish philosophy, see TheCambridge HistoryofJewishPhilosophy: From Antiquity through the Seventeenth Century,eds.StevenH.Nadler and Tamar M. Rudavsky (Cambridge:Cambridge Univer- sity Press,2009); TheCambridge Companion to Medieval JewishPhilosophy,eds.Daniel H. Frank and OliverLeaman (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2003); TheCambridgeCompanion to Modern JewishPhilosophy,eds.Michael L. Morgan and Peter Eli Gordon (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2007); Giuseppe Veltri, Sapienza Alienata (Rome: Aracne, 2015); Josef Stern, “What is Jewish Philosophy? AView from the Middle Ages,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Stud- ies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2017): 185–204; Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom. Enquiryinto JewishPhilosophy and Scepticism (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2018).  On Jewish philosophyinChristian debate, see Dirk Westerkamp, Die philonische Unterscheidung. Aufklärung,Orientalismus und Konstruktion der Philosophie (München: Wilhelm Frank, 2009); idem, “The Philonic Distinction: German Enlightement HistoriographyofJewish Thought,” Historyand Theory 47 (2008): 533– 559; Haim Mahlev, “APhilosophyofthe Patriarchs?The Agenda Behind Chris- toph August Heumann’sActa Philosophorum,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 76.4 (2015): 517– 539.  On Jewish scepticism, see Giuseppe Veltri, “Principles of Jewish Skeptical Thought. The Case of Judah Moscatoand Simone Luzzatto,” in Rabbi Judah Moscato and the JewishIntellectual Worldof Mantua in 16th-17th Centuries,eds.Giuseppe Veltri and Gianfranco Miletto(Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2012): 15–36;idem, “Maharal against Azaria de Rossi: The Other Side of Skepticism,” in Rab- binic Theology and JewishIntellectual History: TheGreat Rabbi Loew of Prague,ed. Meir Seidel (Ox- Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes 147

Jacob Friedrich Reimmann (1668–1743), aLutheranscholar,published ashort essayin1704arguing under the provocative title “An Salomon fuerit scepticus?” (“WasSolomon aSceptic?”)thatthe essence of Jewish philosophyisscepticism.⁷ To understand this fundamental passage, so decisive for the history of the reception of Jewish thoughtinthe Christian cultureofthe earlymodernage,itis, however,nec- essary to carry out twopreliminary steps:the first is to reconstruct the history of Christian interest in Jewish philosophy, the second is to understand the role played by the Lutheran world in this history.

1Christian Discovery of JewishTradition

In the fifteenthcentury aphenomenon emergedinEuropean culture—later to be de- fined as Christian Hebraism—this was the attempt to apply philological techniques, developedfrom the studyofLatinand Greek texts,tothe Hebrew text of the Bible and from there proceed to other sources of the Jewish tradition. This new approach profoundlychanged the wayofthinking about Judaism, widening the boundaries within which it had previouslybeen understood. Thenew sources, studied in the original language, as far as this was possibleatthe time, not onlyhelped to rethink the Christian tradition, but alsogaveaccess to previouslyunknown new texts and traditions. The use of philological instrumentssimilar to those impemented for Greek and Latin sources also brought with it the need to use interpretative categories capable of bringingthe Jewish tradition to the level of other Classical traditions. Until that time, the Hebrew tradition was not regarded comparable to the Greek and Latin cultures.⁸ During this period anew instrument was introduced to interpret the Jewish tradition and legitimise its use. At the beginning of the fifteenthcentury,several au- thors borrowed ascheme from the works of the Greek , thatdivided the history of the Jews into two periods: the ancient,pure and primeval Hebraism of the patriarchs,and amodern Judaism corrupted by aliteral interpretationofMo- saic law. This two-stagescheme was especiallyimportant in the second half of fif- teenth century,for the development of anew idea of Hebraica veritas.⁹ Several au-

ford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2012): 65– 76;idem, “Do/Did the Jews BelieveinGod?The Skeptical Ambivalence of Jewish PhilosophyofReligion,” in Envisioning Judaism: Studies in Honor of Peter Schäfer on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday,vol. 2, eds. Ra’anan Boustan et alii (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013): 717– 733; see also Veltri, Alienated Wisdom.  See note 32.  Cf. Jonathan Friedman, “The of Jewish Antiquity:New Christians and Christian-Hebraica in EarlyModern Europe,” in JewishChristians and Christian Jews:FromRenaissance to the Enlighten- ment,eds.RichardH.Popkin and Gordon M. Weiner (Dordrecht,Boston and London: KluwerAca- demic Publishers,1994): 35–55.  Cf. Riccardo Fubini, Storiografia dell’Umanesimo in Italia. Da ad Annio da Viterbo (Rome: Edizioni di Storia eLetteratura, 2003), 290 –333; Jean Sirinelli, “Introduction générale,” in Eu- 148 Guido Bartolucci

thors, such as and Pico della Mirandola, justified their own interest in the Jewishtradition by maintaining that,for example, the Kabbalah was part of orig- inal Jewish wisdom, and not linked to modern Judaism.¹⁰ This new attitude toward Judaism, which will not be analysed in depth here, contributed to the ‘Judaisation’ of European culture itself.¹¹ In using the term Judaisation Iintend to refer to aprocess of increasingincorporation of Jewish works and authors into the myth of asingle original ancient wisdom, wherethe Bible and (i.e. the part of it con- sidered to be more ancient) came to be seen as sources thatmaintained their validity for all mankind. This introduction was necessary to understand how the birth of interest in Jewish philosophyofthe second half of the sixteenth century links to aChristian Hebraism that,insome aspects, was influenced by the prisca theologia,applying its approach to various fields of interest,within the framework of agenealogical construction of human knowledge rooted in ancient Jewishwisdom.¹² There are, however,different traditions that take the name prisca theologia: 1) one which sawinthe Jewish tradi- tion the onlytrue pre-Christian revelation which reached the gentilesthrough the Egyptians who wereinstructed by Moses 2) aseries of other pre-Christian revelations different and independent from the Jewish one. While the first was considered more orthodox, being approved by the fathersofthe Church and maintaining alink with the Old Testament, the second was considered moredangerous as it impliedthat

sebius of Caesarea, La préparation évangélique,vol. 1, eds.Jean Sirinelli and Edouarddes Places (Paris:Cerf, 1974), 7–62.  See Guido Bartolucci, Vera religio.Marsilio Ficino elatradizione ebraica (: Paideia, 2017); , Sermo de passione Domini,ed. Chaim Wirszubski (Jerusalem: AcademyofSci- ence, 1963).  On this idea, see, e.g., Robert Dan, “‘Judaizare’:the Career of aTerm,” in Antitrinitarianism in the Second Halfofthe 16th Century,eds.Robert Dan and Antal Pirnat (Budapest and Leiden: Akademiai Kiado and Brill, 1982): 25–34.  See, e.g.,Cesare Vasoli, “Il mito dei ‘prisci theologi’ come ‘ideologia’ della ‘renovatio’,” in idem, Quasi sit Deus.Studi su Marsilio Ficino (Lecce: Conte, 1999): 11–50.Onprisca theologia,cf. Maria Muc- cillo, Platonismo,Ermetismo e ‘prisca theologia’.Ricerche di storiografia filosofica rinascimentale (Flor- ence: Olschki, 1996); Francis A. Yates, and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Rout- ledge,1964); Daniel P. Walker, TheAncient Theology:Studies in ChristianPlatonism fromthe Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1972); Eugenio Garin, Erme- tismo del Rinascimento (Rome: Editori riuniti, 1988); Charles B. Schmitt, “Prisca theologia ephiloso- phia perennis,” in Il pensieroitaliano del rinascimento eilnostrotempo,Atti del Vconvegno interna- zionale del centro di studi umanistici Montepulciano, Palazzo Tarugi, 8–13 agosto1968, ed. Giovannangiola Tarugi (Florence: Olschki, 1970): 211–236; Martin Mulsow, “ of the Prisca Sapientia in LateRenaissance Humanism,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 65 (2004): 1–13;Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia Perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Sprirituality in Ancient, Me- dieval and Early Modern Thought (Dordrecht: Springer,2004); Moshe Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Mar- silio Ficino and in some Jewish Treatments,” in Marsilio Ficino:his Theology,his Philosophy,his Leg- acy,eds.Michael Allen and Valery Rees (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2002): 137–158. JewishScepticism in Christian Eyes 149

some pagan philosophers had acquired knowledge of the truth equal to that of re- vealedreligions. In the history of prisca theologia these distinctions have acircumscribed value, since the different traditions intertwine and overlap each other, often preventing a clear distinctionbetween ortodoxy and heresy or merelymarking the differences be- tween the various Christian confessions.However,itisimportant to note that such traditions succeeded in consideringJewishthought readable and interpretable with the tools of classical tradition. Also, in one of his most important works,Mar- silio Ficino, one of the initiators of the prisca theologia,the De Christiana religione, maintained bothpositions, quoting the chain of wisdom thathehad inherited from Gemisto Plethon on the one hand and introducing ’ vision of aJewish origin of Greek philosophicaltradition on the other.¹³ Iwill reportbelowsome passages that best exemplifywhat we want to maintain here. One of the best known examples of this tradition is the debate on the origin of languages Guillaume Postel (1510 –1581), hebraist,philosopher and self-acclaimed prophet,presented in his work De originibus seu de Hebraismiantiquitate,linguarum affinitate. Here he advocated the antiquity of the , using this argu- ment to reconstruct the chain of human wisdomfrom the Jews to the Greeks.¹⁴ The influenceofthis idea on sixteenthcentury culture is not limited to languagebut ex- tends to other fields of knowledge,identifying,for instance, Moses as the inventor of ,anassumption thatthe first humanists, for reasons mentioned earlier,re- fused absolutely. The work of the French hebraist Gilbert Génébrard (1535–1597) is useful in understanding how the ideologyofpriscatheologia was able to takediffer- ent forms. In fact,inhis main work, the Chronographia,Génébrard refused the antiq- uity and the authority of Hermes Trismegistus, while, at the sametime,usedexcerpts

 Marsilio Ficino, Operaquae hactenus extitereetquae in lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia (Basel: Officina Henricpetrina, 1576), 25: ‘Prisca gentilium theologia in qua ZoroasterMercurius Orpheus Aglaophemus Pythagorasconsenserunt tota in Platonis nostri voluminibus continetur;’ ibidem,30: ‘Ex quibus apparet quod Clemens AlexandrinusetAtticus Platonicus et Eusebius et Aristoboluspro- bant gentiles videlicet,siqua habuerunt egregia dogmataetmisteria, aIudeis usurpavisse. […]. Plato usqueadeoIudeos imitatus est,utNumenius Pytagoricus dixerit Platonem nihil aliud fuisse quiquam Moysen actica lingua loquentem. Addit in librodebono Pythagoramquoque iudaica dogmata secta- tum fuisse. […]Clearcus Peripateticus scribit Aristotelem fuisse Iudeum, Calanos quoque phyloso- phus apudIndos Iudeos fuisse. Megastenes insuper brachmanas Indiae phylosophos aIudeis asserit descendisse. Ambrosius recte memini PythagorampatreIudeo natum ostendit.’  Guillaume Postel, De originibus seu de Hebraismi antiquitate, linguarum affinitate (Paris:Dyoni- sius Lescuier,1538), Aiiiir-v: ‘Primam [linguam] fuisse Chaldaeam seu Hebraeam constat et authori- bus prophanis et sacris,utethnicis fiat fides Deo electis christianis amplificetur.Praeter illa antiquis- sima Graecorum de hac re testimonia, quae tam insignis author Iosephus,cui in civitate eloquentissima ob insignem peritiam, eruditionem, et in scrivendo candorem, statua donata est, quem veritatis odio supprimunt sui Iudei, in libris AntiquitatumIudaicarum et contraAppionem Grammaticum adfert.Praeteretiam illa quae amplissimaadducit Eusebius Caesariensis de Evangel- ico apparato, cognosces hic non levibus argumentis,hanc Hebraicam linguam sua vocabula insignor- ibus orbis terrarum provinciis olim per filios Noachidedisse.’ 150 Guido Bartolucci

from the Fathers of the Church, Eusebiusin particular,tomaintain the dependence of Greek wisdom on the Jews. He identifiesMosesasthe first poet and initiator of this discipline.¹⁵ Beyond the specific meaning of these statements,which certainlyhad polemicalintent within the world of Humanae litterae in the second half of the six- teenth century,itisimportant to stresshere the ‘disciplinary’ legitimation acquired by the Jewishtradition, to the point that in some milieus it challenges and sometimes exceeds the Greek and Latin traditions. Génébrard’sshortdiscussion of Jewish poetry is valid not onlyinitself, but it is also evidence of apeculiarinterest in the Jewish tradition. Similarly, Henri Estienne (1528/31– 1598), aCalvinist printer and editor of the first edition of the Orphic fragments, published an anonymous ancient tractate in 1580,the Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum,which developed aparallel between Mosaic laws and the laws of the twelve tables.Although the French lawyer François Pithou (1543–1621)had alreadypublished this work, Estiennewrote an in- troduction of particular salience to this discussion.¹⁶ As alreadyemphasised in the title of his work, Estiennewanted to distinguishbetween sources and rivers of the law, trying to reach the first ones. He identifiedthese sources as the laws givenby God to Moses, which the Egyptians then imitated and subsequentlyimpartedto the Greeks.¹⁷ The introduction of the Calvinist editor helps us see how the idea that Jewish laws werethe sourceofRoman and Greek laws circulated in the Europe- an cultureofthe second half of the Sixteenth century,using preciselythe patterns characteristic of the earlier prisca theologia. In the sameway,acentury later,anidentical scheme was used to build ageneal- ogythat could legitimise scientifictheories, which otherwise would have been hardly

 Gilbert Génébrard, Cronographiae libri quatuor (Paris:MartinusIuvenis,1578), 78: ‘Moses poëtis omnibus praeluxit.Nam Iobihistoriam spondaicis versibus repraesentavit et Cantica seorsum illud Deut.32elegiacocarmine, ut versus alternatim senis et quinis constent pedibus.(Eus.Lib. 11 Praep. Cap. 3; Hieron. Ex Iosepho). Ad quos modos tria extant cantica apud Esaiam, vincae scilicet, urbis Sion et Ezechiae.(Isidor.) Quod aemulati Graeci veteres,hexametris suas cantiones et odas con- ficiebant.’  PierrePithou, “Collatio legum MosaicarumetRomanarum,” in Observationes ad Codicem et Nov- ellas Iustiniani Imperatoris,eds.Pierreand François Pithou (Paris,1689): 33.Petrus Pithou, aFrench jurist and adisciple of the jurist Jacques Cujas,published an edition of this anonymous workwritten around the fourth century which systematicallycompares the laws found in the Old Testament with those described by some ancient jurists in order to find common points between them. On the tradi- tion of the Mosaic law, see Guido Bartolucci, La repubblica ebraica di CarloSigonio (Florence: Olschki, 2007), 177– 184.  Henri Estienne, Iuris civilis fonte set rivi, Iurisconsultorum veterumquidam loci, ex integris eorum voluminibus ante Iustinianiaetatem excerpti (Basel, 1580), 1r: ‘Atque hoc appello nomine rivoseos qui ex primariis potius rivis quam ex ipsis fontibus manasse videri queunt.Ita enim mea fert opinio, sicut primos legislatores Aegyptios ex Mosaica Politiapleraque (praesertimque ea quae legi naturae con- sentanea videbantur)ita Graecos ex Aegiptiis multa sumpsisse. […]Quod si mihi de quapiam meorum etiam maiorum legementionem licet facere,nullam post Mosaicam(quae Deum ipsum autorem ha- buit not homines) inveniemus,quae peregrinos aeque commendatos habeat ac Celtica.’ Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes 151

sustainable. One of these attemptsformulated the coincidencebetween the Epicur- ean theory of atoms and the Book of Genesis:

We have also good historical probability for this Opinion, that this Philosophywas athing of much greater Antiquity than either Democritus or Leucippus;and first,because Posidonius, an ancient and learned philosopher, did (as both Empiricus and Strabo tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the first Inventour of this Atomical Philosophywas one Moschus,aPhoe- nician, who, as Strabo also notes, livedbeforethe TrojanWar.[…]and Mr.Selden approves of the conjecture of Arcerius,the publisher of Iamblicus, that this Monchus was no other than the cele- brated Moses of the Jews,with whose successors,the Jewish philosophers,priests,and prophets, Pythagorasconversed at Sidon.¹⁸

In this passageRalph Cudworth (1617– 1688), one of the most important Cambridge Platonists,uses themes and authorscharacteristic of the prisca theologia,clearly showing that,inmid-seventeenth century,this ideologystillhad apolitical and cul- tural implication. To infuse the atomistic theory with amosaic aurea (without any philological and historical basis) gave him the opportunity to legitimise theories that were distant to anyrecognised orthodoxy. These three cases are merelyanexample of the tranformation of the Christian perception of Jewish tradition. Theframework developed by the humanists of the prisca theologia gave the European scholars an opportunity to think Judaism out of the traditional theological path. They now had the tools to interpret as part of the history of language, poetry or law. Thus, this use of the sources of prisca theologia and of the interpretation of the Fathers of the Church and alsogavethem the chance to insert Judaism within the history of philosophy.

2The JewishTradition in Germany in the Seventeenth Century and the History of Philosophy

At the same period in Germany, within the Lutheran world, we witness the diffusion of works whose main topic was the philosophicaland political tradition of the Jews. Some of these treatises,published at the end of the seventeenth century,aimed to demonstrate not onlythat aJewishphilosophyexisted, but also that it had influ- enced the Western philosophical tradition. The formulas and the sources usedby these authorsdemonstrate their familiarity with the idea just outlined. On the other hand,other works,maintainedthe completeirrelevance of the Jewish tradition

 Danton B. Sailor, “Moses and ,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 25.1 (1964): 11. Cf. Ralph Cudworth, TheTrue Intellectual System of the Universe, wherein all the Reason and PhilosophyofAthe- ism is Confuted, and its Impossibility Demonstrated (London: RichardRoyston, 1678), 12–13.Onphi- losophia perennis and the history of philosophyinEnglandinthis period, see Dmitri Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories of Philosophy in England, c. 1640–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2015). 152 Guido Bartolucci

for the development of Greek and European philosophy, for its closeness to theolo- gy.¹⁹ The question of Jewishphilosophyand its connection to the other philosophical traditions also became important for the first historians of philosophywho published their works in the second half of the seventeenth century.The Protestant world in particularwas interested in the history of pagan philosophy: these authorswere not attemptingtotrace an erudite history of human knowledge,but sought to imple- ment this history in apolemical manner.From the second half of the seventeenth century,the Lutheranuniversities of the German States began to produce an ever-in- creasingnumber of small and large treatises concernedwith both the history of phi- losophyand the .²⁰ From its foundation on, the had recognised the common path of these two disciplines, by composingeither philo- sophical histories of theology(i.e. Christianity) or theological histories of philosophy (both Greek and ‘Barbaric’).²¹ At the outset (i.e. from the sixteenth century), Greek philosophywas recognised as one of the sources of the corruption of original Christianity. Soon, however,the confrontation with other confessions (Calvinism and Catholicism), forced Lutheran- ism to embracephilosophyand Aristotelian thought²² in particular.The relationship between philosophyand theologywas subjected to increasinglyinsistent and target- ed attacks duringthe seventeenth century,when new methodsofphilosophy

 Cf. Valerio Marchetti, “Sulla degiudaizzazione della politica. In margine alla relazione di Horst Dreitzel,” in Aristotelismo politico eragion di stato,Attidel convegno internazionale di Torino 11–12 Febbraio 1993, ed. Artemio Enzo Baldini (Florence: Olschki, 1995): 349–358;idem, “An Pytha- gorasproselytus factus sit,” Dimensionieproblemi della ricerca storica 2(1996): 111–121; idem, “Ar- istoteles utrum fuerit Iudaeus.Sulla degiudaizzazione della filosofia europea in età moderna,” in Anima epaura. Studi in onore di Michele Ranchetti,ed. Anna Scattigno (Macerata: Quodlibet, 1998): 249–266; Giuseppe Veltri, “Academic Debates on the Jews in Wittenberg. The Protestant Liter- ature on Rituals,the Dissertationes and the Writings of the Hebraists Theodor Dassow and Andreas Sennert,” European Journal of JewishStudies 6(2012): 123–146; Guido Bartolucci, “Jewish Thought vs. Lutheran Aristotelism: Johann Frischmuth (1619–1687) and Jewish Scepticism,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2017): 95–106.  Cf., e.g., JacobThomasius, Origines Historiaephilosophicae et Ecclesiasticae (Halle and Magde- burg: Johann Gottfred Renger, 1699).  Forthese pagesIrefertoLuciano Malusa, “RenaissanceAntecedents to the Historiography of Phi- losophy,” in Models of the HistoryofPhilosophy,vol. 1: From Its Origins in the Renaissance to the ‘His- toria Philosophica’,eds.Giovanni Santiello et alii (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,1993): 53 – 58;Giovanni Santiello, “The ‘Historia Philosophica’ in German Scholastic Thought,” in ibidem, 373–442.  Cf., e.g.,Delio Cantimori, “Umanesimo eluteranesimo di fronte alla scolastica: Caspar Peucer,” Rivista di studi germanici 2(1937):417– 438. Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes 153

emerged, inside and outside the Reformation, creatingnew conceptions of the histo- ry of and new theological challenges.²³ The history of philosophy, thus, acquired an important role in polemicaldebate within the Lutheran World. Studying the history of the different schools of philoso- phers involved reflectingonthe different philosophical methods useful in under- standing not onlythe history of thought,but also the history of the Church, and the history of the relationship between the twofields. From this perspective some au- thors of the period such as Christian Thomasius (1655–1728)—and later,aswill be demonstrated, Johann Franz Budde(1667–1729)—developedanew waytostudy the history of philosophy. From the 1660s, particularlyafter the foundation of the university in 1694,the city of Halle had been alocation where oppositiontoLutheran orthodoxy was grow- ing.The presenceofThomasius and Budde (who moved to in 1705), at the uni- versityand the Pietist community,inparticularAugust Hermann Francke (1663– 1727), in religious circlesthere, created an environment highlycritical of the Lutheran tradition and promoted anew idea of religion and culture. The central point bonding men and perspectivesoftenincompatible with one other wasthe need to rethinkthe Lutheran tradition, both from atheological and philosophicalpoint of view.Atthe center of their reflection was the need to rethinkChristianityand its relationship to pagan culturaltradition, through acareful studyofthe history of both the Church and philosophy. Studying the origins of philosophyand the various philosophical schools, alsobecame ameans to rethink the role of Lutheran theologyand its rela- tionship to the philosophicaltradition, in particularthe Aristotelian. In this new phase, the production of Lutheran , both within theological and philo- sophical faculties, focussed its attention preciselyonthese issues. The waythe pro- fessors reflected on the various open questions took on different forms, literarygen- res and themes. In this debate the history of pagan philosophyand the role playedby Jewishtradition in the transmission of human wisdom became the subjects for sev- eral works.Thomasius, for example, examined different philosophical methodolo- gies, to find the best tool for challengingthe dogmatism of Lutheran orthodoxy. By excluding sectarian, sceptical and syncretistic methodologyhedecided eclecti- cism was the best waytofind an empirical methodfor his purposes. AccordingtoThomasius, the history of philosophy, gave scholars access to the different opinionsofthe philosophersofthe past,stimulatingthe possibilityto find the best solution to the problem of the present.²⁴ Despite his refusal of scepti-

 See Francesco Bottin and Mario Longo, “The History of Philosophyfrom Eclecticism to ,” in Models of the HistoryofPhilosophy,vol. 2: From the Cartesian Age to Brucker,eds.Gregorio Piaia and Giovanni Santiello (Dordrecht,Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer,2011): 302–385. See also Valerio Marchetti, Saggi di storia della Chiesa evangelica tedesca. TraXVII eXVIII secolo (- logna: Cisec, 1999).  Christian Thomasius, Cautelae circapraecognita iurisprudentia (Halle: Officina Libraria rengeri- ana, 1710), 57–58: ‘1. Historia et philosophiasunt duooculi sapientiae, quorum uno, qui caret,mon- 154 Guido Bartolucci

cism in the interpretation of the history of philosophy, Thomasius was not insensitive to the contribution of scepticism to the struggle against dogmatism. He held history to be knowledge of the opinions of others, and thus morebased on probability than certainty,and concluded thusly:

Even if, when studyingphilosophy, one is reallyfurther from sceptical doubt than from the in- fallibility of the dogmatics,yet where historical matters areconcerned, especiallyinpolitical questions,one should not believeeventhe half of what is said. But one does not doubt without agood reason for doubting.²⁵

But scepticism, according to Thomasius, was not confined to the realm of history,in his work on Philosophia aulica,hemaintained scepticism wasnot aphilosophical school similar to that of the past; but was the main antagonist to dogmatism.²⁶ The of his statement mirrors the complexity of the debate in Germany to- ward scepticism. This Greek philosophy, in fact,was one of the topics on which sev- eral authors published short and long tractates,bydefending or attackinghis role within the history of pagan and Christian philosophy.²⁷ JohannFranz Budde, student and then colleagueofThomasius, participatedin the debate on the history of philosophy. Born in Anklam in 1667, he studied oriental languages, theologyand philosophyatthe University of Wittenberg. In 1693 he moved to Halle, wherehemet August Hermann Francke and Christian Thomasius.

oculus est ob summam utriusque connexionem […]9.Historia est de sensionibus alienis.Philosophia ratiocinatur de sensionibus propriis et alienis.10. Utiles vero quam maxime sunt sensiones alienae ad studium sapientiae, quia partim adiuvant imperfectionem et insufficientiam propriam, partim quia multum prosunt ad emendationem.’  Ibidem,68: ‘Utitamen in studio philosophico adubio sceptico proprius abest,quam ab infallibi- litatedogmaticorum, ita etiam circahistorias, potissimumpublicas,vix dimidiam partemcredit.In- terim tamen nunquam dubitat sine iuxta ratione dubitandi.’ The English translation is in Mario Longo, “Christian Thomasius (1655–1728),” in Models of the HistoryofPhilosophy,vol. 2, 317.  Christian Thomasius, Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam (Halle: Officina Libraria rengeriana, 1702), 17– 18: ‘Pyrrhonii vero ne illud quidem comprehendi dicerent, quod aiebant, unde non tam sec- tam philosophorum constituerunt Sceptici, quam hostes communes omnis philosophiae, quae ab ali- qua determinatione incipit (et propterea aphilosophis dogmatica ad differentia sceptica dici solet) fuerunt.’ On the use of scepticism in the debateonhistorical methodology,see Markus Völkel, “Pyr- rhonismus historicus” und “fides historica”:die Entwicklung der deutschen historischen Methodologie unter dem Gesichtspunkt der historischen Skepsis (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1987).  Ilist just few works on this topic: Heinrich Askan Engelken, Johann E. Udam (risp.), Dissertatio de Scepticismi ortu et progressu (Rostock: NicolasSchwiegerovius, 1702); Johann Christian Wolff, Pro- gramma de hodierno Scepticismo philosophicoeiusdem causis (Wittenberg: Christian Gerdesil, 1710); Johann Brucker, “De Pyrrhoneascepticismi universalis macula absolvendo,” in MiscellaneaLipsien- sia ad incrementum reilitterariae edita,vol. 5(Leipzig:Haeredes Lanckisianorum, 1716); Sextus Em- piricus, Opera … Graeca ex Mss. Codicibus castigavit, versiones emendavit supplevitque et toti operi notas addit J. Albertus Fabricius (Leipzig:Johann Friderick Gleditsch,1718). The historyofscepticism in Germanyinthe seventeenth and eighteenth century has not receivedsufficient attention in the field of studies. Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes 155

Budde was involved in the work of Thomasius and the Halle milieu in transforming Lutheran cultureand published several tractates on different topics.Among the var- ious works he wroteinthis period, one is particular important for this analysis,the Introduction to JewishPhilosophy. ²⁸ The treatise was part of awider project on the general history of philosophy, its origin and link to the .He had alreadydiscussed the topic in other works:Firstly, in two short essays published in ajournal edited in Halle from 1700 to 1704,and then in atractate on the philos- ophyofSpinoza.²⁹ Budde developed anew idea of the history of human wisdom, by maintaining it to be possible to identify acommon origin of the history of philosophy and theology. He discovers this in the first steps of the history of Hebrew wisdom, which Budde defines as philosophia mystica or theosophia,and then as Kabbalah. Budde’smain task was to find acommon origin of the twohistories (philosophy and theology), for the purpose of reconsidering the relationship between Aristotelism and Lutheranism. By using the Jewish tradition, and inserting it in the wider history of ancient wisdom (prisca theologia)hewas able to weaken the role playedbyAris- totlean philosophyand reinforcethe effort of his group to reform Lutheran tradi- tion.³⁰

 Johann F. Budde, IntroductioadHistoriam Philosophiae Ebraeorum (Halle and Magdeburg: Orpha- notrophius,1702).OnBudde’sview of Jewish philosophy, see Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, “Die His- torisierungder ‘Philosophia Hebraeorum’ im frühen 18. Jahrhundert.Eine philosophisch-philologi- sche Demontage,” in Historicization—Historisierung,ed. Glenn W. Most (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht,2001): 104–128; idem, Geschichte der christlichen Kabbala,vol. 3(Stuttgart: BadCannstatt, 2013), 243–270; Valerio Marchetti, “Il teologo Johann Franz Budde (1667–1729)elafilosofia ebraica,” in L’interculturalità dell’ebraismo,ed. Mauro Perani (Ravenna: Longo, 2008): 299–314; Haim Mahlev, “Kabbalah as Philosophia Perennis?: The Image of Judaism in the German EarlyEnlightenment: Three Studies,” JewishQuarterly Review 104.2 (2014): 234–257. On the debateonKabbalah and Jewish Phi- losophy, especiallybetween Budde and Johann GeorgWachter, see Schmidt-Biggemann, Geschichte der christlichen Kabbala,vol. 3, 214–242.  Johann F. Budde, “Observatio I. Origines philosophiae Mysticae, sive Cabbalae Veterum Ebraeo- rum brevis delineatio,” Observationum selectarum ad remlitterariam spectatium 1(1700): 1–26;idem, “Defensio Cabbalae Ebraeorum contraauctores quosdam modernos,” ibidem,207– 231; idem, Disser- tatio philosophica de SpinozismoanteSpinozam […]submittit Ioannes Fridericus Werder (Halle: Ch. Henckel, 1706). This last work, adissertation discussed at the University of Halle, was aresponse to Johann GeorgWachter, Der SpinozismusimJüdenthumb (Amsterdam:Wolters, 1699). The debate on Spinoza’sphilosophywas of course linked to the discussion on Jewish philosophy; see, e.g., David Bell, Spinoza in Germany from 1670toAge of Goethe (London: InstituteofGermanic Studies, University of London, 1984); Winfried Schröder, Spinoza in der deutschen Frühaufklärung (Würzburg: Könighausen &Neuman, 1987).  The inclusion of Jewish tradition within the history of philosophywas also present in the work of ascholar close to the Pietist milieu, Johan Wilhelm Zierold (1669–1731); see Mario Longo, “Johan Wil- helm Zierold (1669–1731),” in Models of the History of Philosophy,vol. 2: 323–331. On the links be- tween history of philosophyand Pietism, see Martin Gierl, Pietismus und Auklärung.Theologische Po- lemik und die Kommunikationsreform der WissenschaftamEnde des 17.Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,1997); Jean-Marie Carré, “Le piétisme de Halle et la philosophie des Lumi- ères(1690 –1750),” Revue de synthèse historique 37.3,n.81(1913): 279–308. 156 Guido Bartolucci

As has been observed, the first attempt to analyse Jewish philosophywas pub- lished in the journal Observationesselectae edited in Halle by Budde and Thomasius. All the works in this collection appeared anonymouslyand encapsulated the thought of the school of Halle. The school was based on the principles alreadymentioned: anti-Aristotelism, anti-dogmatism both in the cultural and religious domain, and a harsh criticism of Lutheran orthodoxy.³¹

3JacobReimmann and JewishScepticism

In the eighth volume of this journal, another work on the history of Jewish philoso- phywas published.Its author was Jacob Friedrich Reimmann, and the essaybore the provocative title: “WasSalomon aSceptic?”.³² Reimmann was borninGröningennear Halberstadt in 1668, and studied theol- ogyand philosophyfor twoyears at the University of Jena.Hethen became director of the school of Halberstadt,and continued to work in the school system of his town. He was also involved in religious life: he became adeacon in 1714 and preacher at Halberstadt,and went on to become superintendent of the churches at Hildesheim. He died in the sametown in 1743.Throughout his life, he remained in contact with the most eminent figures of the time, such as Thomasius and Gottfried Wilhelm Leib- niz (1646–1716) and published several works on avariety of subjects both in Latin and in German. Influenced by Halle’smilieu, he sawhis main task to be combining rational thought and Lutheranism, which incurred goingbeyond traditionalGerman .³³ He dealt with the Jewish tradition and its theologyand philosophyinvarious works,both in Latin and German. He published along and articulate treatise entitled Versuch einer Enleitung in die Historie der Theologie insgemein und Juedischen Theo- logie ins besondere (Attempt at an Introduction to the HistoryofTheology in General

 On the authorship of the different essays published in this collection, see Christoph August Heu- mann, “Revelatio auctorumObservationum Halensium Latinarum,” MiscellaneaLipsensia Nova 1 (1742):292 – 318. In addition to Budde’sessays published in the first volumethereisalso Christian Thomasius, “Observatio II. Scholae quid?EtQuomodo ab Academiisdifferant?,” Observationum se- lectarum 1(1700): 26–35.  JacobF.Reimmann, “An Salomon fuerit Scepticus,” Observationum selectarum 8(1704): 327–367.  On Reimmann,see Theodor Günther, Jacob FriedrichReimmann (1668–1743). Mühsal und Frucht (Köln: Günther,1974); Ralph Häfner, “Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philologie,” in Philologie und Er- kenntnis.Beiträge zu Begriff und Problem frühneuzeitlicher Philologie,ed. Ralph Häfner (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2001): 93 – 128; Martin Mulsow and Helmut Zedelmaier,eds., Skepsis, Providenz, Poly- historie. JakobFriedrichReimmann (1668–1743) (Tübingen: Max NiemeyerVerlag,1998); Winfried Schröder, “Einleitung,” in Jacob F. Reimmann, Historia Universalis atheismi et atheorum falso et mer- ito suspectorum,ed. Winfried Schröder (Stuttgart and BadCannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1992): 7–37. Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes 157

and JewishTheology in Particular), published in Magdeburgin1717. ³ ⁴ Reimmann dedi- cated an entire work to the studyofatheism, atopic very much en vogue at the time, with achapter specificallydevoted to the atheism of the Jews, leading,inevitably,to adiscussion of Jewish philosophyitself.³⁵ But in other short tractates,such as the essaydedicated to the four elements, he always made reference to the Jewish tradi- tion.³⁶ Reimmann was, therefore, well aware of the importance of the discussion on Jew- ish tradition for the debate on the history of philosophyand for the history of theol- ogy, however,hedevelopedhis idea of Jewishphilosophythrough acompletelydif- ferent approch. He decided to combine this topic with another theme discussed in that period; scepticism and in so doing combined them in an original way. Reim- mann chose the figure of Solomon primarily because traditionally, and especially in the book of Ecclesiastes, the Jewish king had expressed doubts about the ability of the human mind to know.ClearlyReimmann is to use his figure to support his model of philosophy, as will be demonstrated. It is interesting to note that from now on the figureofSolomon becomes important for the debate on scepticism in Germany.³⁷ Reimmann divided his essayonSolomoninto two parts. In the first he discusses the ‘nature’ of Jewish philosophy, and its link to sceptical tradition. In the second he defends his statement against the critique of his opponents, in particularfrom the accusations of Protestant theologian Joachim Lange(1670 – 1744). From the very beginning,Reimmann criticised the uses several scholars had made of the Jewishphilosophical tradition. He underlined threeaspectsinparticu- lar: 1) Manyscholars, especiallythe historians of philosophy, have maintainedthat all the patriarchs,leaders and kingsofthe Jews have been philosophers (even in

 JacobF.Reimmann, Versuch einer Enleitung in die Historie der Theologie insgemein und Juedischen Theologie ins besondere (Magdeburg: Christoph Seidel, 1717). In this work, for example, he discussed the interpretation of Kabbalah in Budde’swork; cf. ibidem,333 – 459onkabbalistic theology and 350 –351onBudde’sinterpretation. On Reimmann’sinterpretation of Kabbalah, see Mahlev, “Kabba- lah as Philosophia Perennis?,” 249–255.  Cf. Jacob F. Reimmann, Historia Universalis atheismi et atheorum falso et merito suspectorum (Hil- desheim: L. Schröder,1725), 24–50.  See, e.g., Jacob F. Reimmann, “Observatio III. NescirePhilosophos adhuc quid sit aer,” in Obser- vationum selectarum 5(1700): 85: ‘Etenim ut ab Hebraeis quorum philosophiaprocul dubio est anti- quissima faciamus initium, hi aeris naturam usque adeo ignorarunt,utnenomen quidem habuerit cognitum;’ idem, “Observatio IV.NescirePhilosophos quid sit aqua, in Observationum selectarum,” ibidem,109: ‘Etenim si Hebraeorum Cryptas philosophicas, qua fas est diligentia perreptamus,dedi- visione quidem aquarum hinc atquehinc quaedam vestigia deprehendimus,sed de definitione ear- undem, ne gru quidem. Et ipsae quoque divisiones sic comparatae sunt,utnobis ignorantiam nos- tram exprobrarevideantur. Ut enim de divisione rabbinica et kabbalistica nil dicam in praesenti, qua aquas in masculas et foeminas disponereconsueverunt.’  On Salomon and scepticism, see, e.g., Stuart Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (New York: T&T Clark International, 2012). 158 Guido Bartolucci

the absenceofany evidence).³⁸ 2) The Hebrew patriarchs were often seen as dogmat- ic philosophers.³⁹ 3) Their philosophyhad been interpreted in different ways accord- ing to the thought of their interpreters.(e.g. Reimmann noted, Moses was seen at the same time as aCartesian philosopher,anAristotelian, and so on).⁴⁰ The first critique was addressed to all the previous traditions that,asseen above, have used Jewish wisdomtolegitimise differing philosophical ideas. He probablyhad Budde’swork in mind too for,asalreadymentioned, Budde presented Judaism as the space whereitwould be possible to find the common origin of philosophyand theology. Reimmann distances himself from previous tradition on the one hand,but on the other,hedecided to follow the strategyofthe historians of philosophyinusing Jew- ish wisdom to legitimise his philosophicalideas. He maintains that after Job, King Solomon was the onlyJewish man possible to be considered atrue philosopher.⁴¹ Re- immann analyses Solomon’sthought by using different sources, and outlines the

 Reimmann, “An Salomon,” 328–329: ‘Cummulti omnino sint qui magno conatu nihil agere,et, uti Latinorum habet proverbium, “Tellenas conduplicare tricas,” soleant.Tum illi cumprimis ad hanc ϰατηγορίαν referri merentur,qui antiquorum Hebraeorum Antistites, Patriarchas videlicet Ducesque et Judices, imo etiam Reges, Pontificesaliosque etc. ad Philosophorum Dogmaticorum censum revo- care eosque volentes nolentesque Magistros totius Encyclopaediae Philosophicae salutare consuever- unt.Etenim ut non dicam, eos interdum ne per somnum quidem de iis scientiis ac discipliniscogi- tasse, quas didicisse solicite, et posteros suos docuisse anobis creduntur. Quam imbecillia ea sunt argumenta, quibus ὁι ἐξ ἐναντίας causam sua colorare, et Hebraeorum Principes Doctores Philoso- phiae creare annituntur?’  Ibidem,330 –331: ‘Nam licet omnes,qui historiam Philosophicam contexuere adhuc, eosdem fe- cerint Dogmaticos, tamen recogitandum est,hoc factum esse aDogmaticis, adeoque exinde non con- sequi reverafuisse tales.Siquidem hic mos est eorum qui partibus addicti sunt,utdescribant ho- mines,non ut fuerunt,sed ut fuisse cupiunt,fingantque sibi interdum et suo ingenio assentatores quosdam,quo sectam suam antiquiorem caeteris augustioremque efficiant.’  Ibidem,331: ‘Plane sicut experientia edocti sumus, Mosen jam Cartesianum, jam Aristotelicum, moxAtomisticum et Eclecticum factum esse, prout lectorem huic velisti haeresi addictumindeptus fuerit.’  Ibidem,332–333: ‘Sed quid, ais, ille omnium Hebraeorum sapientum sapientissimusRex Salomo istane ἀϰαταληψίᾳ Sceptica, quam tu laudibus tantopereeffers,excelluit?Anputas enim fuisse Apor- eticum, qui etiam in rebusnaturalibus fuit ϑεοδίδαϰτος?Qui sua sibi δενδρολογίᾳ et ζωολογίᾳ tan- tam lucem circumfudit?Qui prosa juxta et versa oratione in totoorbe inclaruit,nihilque ignoravit eorum, quae ad dogmaticum eruditionis circulum requiruntur?Equidem fateor,haec non sine magno colorenobis objici posse aDogmaticis;sed an pari soliditateobjiciantur,adhuc animi vehe- menter pendeo. Nam primum nulla prorsus est consequentia, “Salomoninrebus naturalibus fuit ϑεοδίδαϰτος,equidem fuit Dogmaticus.” Siquidem et in rebusnaturalibus potest esse ϑεοδίδαϰτος qui aDeo edoctus est, “nos in rebusnaturalibus nil scire,” adeoque nil affirmarecerto de iis nec neg- areposse. TumetScepticus sibi δενδρολογίᾳ et ζωολογίᾳ potest famam acquirere, si ostendat; Dog- maticos in his scientiae naturalis partibus eneptivisse adhuc, et nil nisi fumos suis discipulis vendi- disse. Ac tandem in prosa juxta et versa oratione potest Scepticus inclarescere, nosseque omnia quae in Scholis Dogmaticorum proponuntur,non quidem ut pro veris certisque ea habeat,sed ut falsitatem et incertitudinem penitius cognoscat,eamque suis adversariis ostendat.’ JewishScepticism in Christian Eyes 159

king’sphilosophyasanti-dogmatic thoughtlinked to the sceptical tradition.⁴² He de- scribes three qualities of Solomon’sphilosophy, and compares it with the philosophy of his own time. According to him, Solomon’sthought had its origin in divine reve- lation,and not in natural illumination.⁴³ Itsobject was the distinction between good and bad, and not,like the philosophyofReimmann’stime,between true and false,⁴⁴ and it was apractical philosophyand not atheoretical one.⁴⁵ He seems to adopt a traditional(conservative)attitude towardthe new rationalistic philosophyofhis day, by comparing,for example, divine and naturalefficient cause.⁴⁶ Indeed, throughout the history of its discovery duringthe earlymodern age, scepticism was often usedasatool against pagan philosophy, for example, in the work of Gio- vanfrancescoPico della Mirandola.⁴⁷ Reimmann, however,had adifferent plan in mind. When he describes the nature of Solomon’swisdom he underlines that the Jewishking was taught by God him- self.⁴⁸ This statement,hemaintains, could be seen as evidence of the dogmatic na- ture of his thought, while it is the opposite. Reimmann writes:

First of all thereisabsolutelynoconsequentiality here: ‘Solomon was taught by God in natural causes, therefore he was adogmatic.’ Forevenwith regardtonatural causes it can happen that the person whohas been taught by God has been instructed by God that we know nothingabout natural causes, or even that nothingcertain can be affirmed or denied about them.⁴⁹

 Ibidem,334: ‘Plane sicur Rex sapientissimusSalomo c. Iv.17scribit,seadjecisse animum non sed etiam ad perspiciendam( דל תע כח המ ) solum ad cognoscendam (Scepticorum) sapientiam ’.Conf. cap. VII v. 26 דל תע לה תל שו לכ תו omnem (Dogmaticorum) insaniam et stoliditatem  Ibidem,334–335: ‘Posteavero suspiriis devotis aDeo indeptum quidem sapientiam et Philoso- phiam, sed toto coelo anostra, qua mundus hodie decipitur,diversam.Etenim quod ad ejuscausam efficientem attinet,non alumine naturae, nec ab institutione, nec ab exercitatione eadem manaverat, siquidem haec tria principia (φύσις, μάϑησις, ἄσϰησις)peccati originalis diritateita corrupta sunt,ut non nisi eruditio superficiaria et falsa ab iis exspectari possit,sed alumine supernaturali et divino duxerat originem.’  Ibidem,336: ‘Quamobrem mirandum etiam non est,quod nostra Philosophia aSolomonaea ob- jectoetiam differat.Cum enim illa in veritateetfalsitatererumeruenda occupetur cumprimis,haec in bonitateetmalitia detegenda solummodo districta est,utpatet ex 1 Reg. III v. 9ubi petit siti Salomo sapientiam non quidem ad discernendum verum afalso, sed tantum bonum amalo.’  Ibidem,337: ‘Porro quod ad formam Philosophiae Salomonaeae est,consistit illa tantum in praxi, i.e. ut Proverb. IX v. 6dicitur, “in omittendis stultorum vitiis et perpetrandis prudentum virtutibus,” quo nomine non parum anostra philosophandi ratione distat.Nam licetnos in disciplinis practicis eundem cum eo finem habere videri discupiamus;revera tamen longeabeoabsumus,quia nostrae disciplinae non re, sed nomine tantum sunt practicae, dumaprincipio ad finem usque otiosis specu- lationibusdevirtutum definitionibus,divisionibus, axiomatis, etc.refertae sunt et constipatae.’  See note 39.  On fideistic scepticism, see, e.g., RichardPopkin, TheHistoryofScepticism: From Savonarolato Bayle (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2003): 20–24.  Reimmann uses the Greek word ϑεοδίδαϰτος.  Reimmann, “An Salomon,” 333: ‘Nam primumnulla prorsus est consequentia, “Salomon in rebus naturalibus fuit ϑεοδίδαϰτος,equidem, fuit Dogmaticus.” Siquidem et in rebus naturalibus potest 160 Guido Bartolucci

Thus, he seems to strengthen the definition of fideistic scepticism, but,onthe other hand he goes further and presents this divine scepticism as the onlyuseful critical tool of dogmatic thought in the philosophicaldebate of his time. In the confrontation between the old philosophyofSalomon and the thoughtofhis time, anew philos- ophyemergesusing Aristotelian categories, but entirelydifferent to the scholastic thoughtinthe Lutheran Universities. Reimmann discusses Aristotle’sdefinition of the intellect and his distinction between theoretical and practical intellect.Aristotle himself and his commentators considered theoretical intellect to be superior to the practical, but Reimmann overturns this hierarchy: he uses scepticism to attack Aris- totelian theoretical intellect,and exalt the practical.⁵⁰ He shows that Jewishtradition could be usedinacompletelydifferent way. In his view,Jewishphilosophywas not a tool to legitimise aphilosophical system, but astrategyorinstrument to criticise the other dogmatic . In the second part of his tractate, Reimmann defends his interpretation from the critique of theologian Jacob Lange. It has been recorded that Reimmanntold Lange of his interpretationofSolomon’sphilosophyduring aprivateconversation in 1704, and the latter went on to attack him in his book Medicina mentis,published the same year in Berlin.⁵¹ Langewas one of the most important Pietist theologians of the time, he grew up in the Halle milieu, together with Francke and Thomasius, and then lived in Berlin contemporary to Spener.⁵² Lange’stractate attempted to rethink the history of philosophyinthe light of the Pietistic critique of the traditionalorthodoxLuther- anism. Thus, Reimmann’sidea that the holyphilosophyofSolomoncorresponded to scepticism was unacceptable and, for Lange, clear evidence of atheism.⁵³ Reimmann,

esse ϑεοδίδαϰτος qui aDeo edoctus est, “nos in rebus naturalibus nil scire,” adeoque nil affirmare certo de iis nec negare posse.’  On this topic, as well as the Jewish philosophical debateinthe Middle Ages, see Shlomo Pines, “Truth and Falsehood versus : AStudyinJewish and Genral PhilosophyinConnection with the Guide of the Perplexed I, 2,” in Studies in Maimonides,ed. IsadoreTwersky (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1990): 95–127. Iamgrateful to Daniel Davis for drawingmyattention to this article.  Joachim Lange, Medicina mentis,qua praeposteraphilosophandimethodo ostensa ac reiecta, se- cundum sanioris philosophiae principia, aegrae mentis sanatio ac sanatae usus in verirectique inves- tigatione ac communicatione (Berlin: Wessel, 1704). On the debatebetween Reimmann and Lange,see Martin Mulsow, “Die Paradoxien der Vernunft.Rekonstruktioneiner verleugneten Phase in Reim- manns Denken,” in Skepsis, Providenz, Polyhistorie. JakobFriedrich Reimmann (1668–1743),eds.Mar- tin Mulsow and Helmut Zedelmaier, 26–32. Cf. Reimmann, “An Salomon,” 344: ‘Et quia Auctorihuic, quem alias ob pietatem et eruditionem magni facio, paneque ita rationem duco, eum non malo animo hunc paragraphum Historiae suae inseruisse; Itacollubuit hanc nostram sententiam, quam eidem privatimcommunicaveramus, publicererejicere, eamque ceuimpiam et praeposteramcon- demnare, fas erit,opinor,adhaec ejusdubia jam publicerespondisse.’  On Lange’sbiography,see Jendris Alwast, “Lange,Joachim,” Neue DeutscheBiographie 13 (1982): 548f. [Online-Version]; URL: https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118569376.html#ndbcontent.  Lange, Medicina Mentis,393: ‘Videtur laudatae sapientiae Salomonaeae hominisque sapientis of- ficio obstarequae ejus tradit Ecclesiastes?Ita quidem judicant,qui citra Salomonaeum principium, Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes 161

thus, spends the lastpart of his tractate defending not onlyhis interpretation of So- lomon’sphilosophy, but largely scepticism itself. At the end of his work he openly quotes Sextus Empiricustomake clear to his adversaries scepticism was not aphi- losophywhich ‘did not doubtall beliefs generally,’ rather it ‘doubted onlyuncertain or dubious things, which wereinvestigated and disputed by the sciences of the dog- matics.’⁵⁴ Finally, he concludes that scepticism was not addressed to theological wis- dom:

[…]so, far be it from me to placeall of Solomon’sdoctrine within the frameworkofakatalepsia; rather,Iwill distinguish as carefullyaspossible theological questions fromphilosophical ones, theory from praxis, dogmas about the existenceofthings from dogmas about the essenceof things.⁵⁵

SurelyReimmann was influenced by Halle’sEnlightment.But his idea of scepticism cannot be traced exclusively to the ‘rationalistic’ use of scepticism at the time. The sources he uses refer,onthe one hand, to the French tradition: two long quotations taken from the philosopher François de La Mothe Le Vayer(1588–1672).⁵⁶ While on the other,mystic and anti-Cartesian Pierre Poiret (1646–1719) is mentioned at the end of the treatise.⁵⁷ The referencetohis work, which had been re-edited onlya

quod ille in timoreDei collocat,eSalomone impie et praepostere philosophantur.Exhorum numero sunt,qui ad hujus libri ductum non dubitant,eSalomone alterum quasi Pyrrhonem seu Scepticum facere ejusque doctrinam ἐν ἀϰαταληψιᾳ seu ignorantia et fluctuatione Sceptica ponere. Qui ubi prin- cipium suum: “Nos scire nihil,” in hoc libroinveniant,etquid enihilo suo derivari velint,equidem non deprehendo. Si quis vero principia et indolem Philosophiae Salomonaeae ex hoc praecipuelibro eruerevoluerint,interalia secreta meditatione excutiat sequentia loca, in quibus simul caeterorum clavis est c. 1v.2;c.VII v. 13,20, 30;VIII 12, 13;IXv.18; XI v. 9, 10;XII v. 7, 13,14.’  Reimann, “An Salomon,” 361–362: ‘Etenim ut ipsi olim Sceptici non generatim de omnibus du- bitabant dogmatis et v. g. calefacti velfrigefacti non dicebant,putomenon calefieri velfrigefieri; sed, ut expresse habetSextus Empiricus l. 1hypothes.Pyrrhon.c.VII p. m. 12 de iis tantum,quae erant de rebus incertis ac dubiis, de quibus in Dogmaticorum scientiis quaeritur,etambigitur.’  Ibidem,362: ‘Itatantum abest,utomnem doctrinam Salomonis ἐν ἀϰαταληψίᾳ reponamus,utpo- tius Theologica aPhilosophicis,theoretica apracticis, et dogmata de rerum existentia adogmatis de rerumessentia, quam solicitissime distinguamus.’  See Reimmann, “An Salomon,” 348–350 and 353–360.Both arequotations from François La Mothe Le Vayer, De la Vertu des Payens,inidem, Oevres (Paris:Augustin Courbe, 1662):662.OnLa Mothe Le Vayer, see René Pintard, Le Libertinageérudit dans la première moitié du XVIIesiècle (Gen- eve: Slatkine, 1983), 505–538; Popkin, TheHistoryofSkepticism,82–87.AsMartin Mulsow has point- ed out,the history of Pyrrhonism and of scepticism in general has opened the door to the reception of the Libertinageérudite in Germanyduring the first Enlightenment; see Mulsow, “Die Paradoxien der Vernunft. Rekonstruktion einer verleugneten Phase in ReimmannsDenken,” 32; idem, “Appunti sulla fortuna di Gabriel Naudé nella Germania del primo illuminismo,” Studi filosofici 14/15(1991–1992): 145 – 156.  See Reimmann, “An Salomon,” 366: ‘Unicum tantummodo locum de commodis Philosophiae scepticae adjiciam,quem habetCl. Auctoris nostri duxetCoryphaeusPetrus Poiretus in praefat. Tom. 1deOeconomia divina Edit.Amestelod. in 12mo 1687. Ubi ita infit: “Cette sentence peut assi servir auxbonnes ames pour les porter àl’admiration des grandeurs adorables de Dieu àlarecherche 162 Guido Bartolucci

few years earlier by Thomasius, shows us the complexity of the sources of his thought, which certainlyrequirefurther inverstigation.⁵⁸

Conclusion

Reimmann’sinvolvement in Thomasiusand Budde’s Observationesselectae project shows that he agreed with the attempt the Halle school made to attack dogmatism, and re-think Lutheran orthodoxy.However,hebelieved that Thomasiusand Budde’s tools,and particularlyeclectic philosophy, wereinsufficient.⁵⁹ Reimmann argues that Solomonwas the best example of the Jewishphilosoph- ical tradition, and as the Jewishking livedcenturies before Pyrrhon,itwould be fair to claim him as founder of scepticism.⁶⁰ The relationship between scepticism and the Jewish tradition, for Reimmann, served to strengthenthe main characteristic of that kind of Greek philosophy—thatbeing its acknowledgement of human igno- rance and doubt. Reimmann, however,uses fideistic garb to legitimise the sceptic strategyagainst dogmatism and traditionalknowledge. In so doing,hetransforms the idea of Jewishphilosophyinthe eyes of Christi- ans. As we have seen, from the beginning of the earlymodern age, used the Jewishtradition for the purpose of legitimising particular philosophical sys- tems—e.g. Platonism, Atomism, or Cartesian thought—and alsotogivethem aholy veneer. This scheme established astrong relationship between the Jewishtradition and pagan philosophy: it regarded the formeraspossessingaphilosophicalsystem and attributed an aura of holiness to the latter. Reimmann went further in establishingaconnection between the pagan tradi- tion and the Jewish one, but he refused to attribute agiven philosophical system to Jewish philosophy. Accordingtohim, thanks to their unique relationship with de son amour,etenmeme tems mettre àfond leurs coeurs en repos sur une infinitédedifficultes dont on se tourmentel’Esprit sur autreschoses.”’ Cf. PierrePoiret, L’Oeconomie Divin ou Systeme Uni- versel et Demontré des Oeuvres et des DesseinsdeDieu envers les Hommes (Amsterdam:Henry Wet- stein,1687). On Poiret,see Marjolaine Chevallier, PierrePoiret (1646–1719). Du protestatisme àlamys- tique (Geneve: Labor et Fides,1994).  See PierrePoiret, De eruditionetriplici, solida superficiaria et falsa libri tres […]accedit Christiani Thomasiinovapraefatio (Frankfurt and Leipzig:Johann Friedrich Zeitler,1708).  Martin Mulsow, “Eclecticism or Skepticism?AProblem of the EarlyEnlightenment,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 58.3(1997): 468. See this article also for the influence that the workofGeorgStruve had on Reimmann’sthought; cf. Burcard Gotthelff Struve, Johann Christoph Dorn (resp.), Dissertatio de doctis impostoribus (Jena: Litteris Mullerianis,1703).  Reimmann, “An Salomon,” 361: ‘Tertio nec illud bene dicitur,quod ait,hos homineseSalomone alterum quasi Pyrrhonem velScepticum facere.Qui enim illi alterumeSalomone possent facere Pyr- rhonem, cum alter ratione ordinis priori sit posterior,etSalomon Pyrrhonem fere octingentosannos antecesserit?Equidem ex Pyrrhone facere Salomonem alterum,quoad in ἀϰαταληψίᾳ conveniunt, non prorsus esset impossibile; Sed enim ex Salomonefingere Pyrrhonem alterum tam est ἀδύνατον, quam ipsum archetypumexectypo exprimere.’ Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes 163

God, the Jewishphilosophers(Joband Solomon),werethe onlyones aware of the weakness of the human mind. The German scholar,therefore, used the Jewish tradi- tion to legitimise not so much aphilosophical system, as aphilosophical strategy that was to underminetraditionalknowledge.Jewishphilosophy, for Reimmann’sin- tentions,had to lose its legitimising role and transform itself into its opposite, that is to say, into an instrument for criticising all dogmatic philosophical systems. Reimmann’sidea of Jewishphilosophywas not developedany further,nor did it influencesubsequent reflections on the topic. On the contrary, it provoked several opposing reactions. Largely he was accused of wanting to transform Solomon into an atheist.⁶¹ Despite this, however,the recognition of Jewish philosophyasascepti- cal philosophy, and the justification of sceptical doubt as the onlytool for philosoph- ical knowledge,was bound to have significant consequences, not onlyfor the history of Jewishphilosophyinthe Lutheranworld, but aboveall, for the history of philos- ophyingeneral. After Reimmann, Jewishphilosophybegan to be seen in adifferent waybyChris- tian eyes: it became less important as ameans to defend specific philosophicalsys- tems,ortounderstand the relationship between philosophyand theology. It was ‘normalised’ and became equal to all other non-Greek philosophical traditions. Re- immann’swork maynot have playedarole in this process, but it almost certainly stands as evidence of this transformation.

 ReinhardH.Roll, Salomo Scepticismi crimine contrainiustam observatoris Halensis imputationem (Rostock: Impensis Wepplingianis,1710); Johann CristophOrtlob, GeorgStisser (resp.), Dissertatio processum Salomonis contraSimei (Leipzig: Literis Immanuelis Titii, 1719).

Lukas Lang Reidian Common Sense: An Antidoteto Scepticism?

1Common Sense and Scepticism

Scepticism is in most cases disliked. Much of contemporary can be con- strued as aresponsetothe modern incarnationofscepticism, i.e. the view that jus- tification is impossible or that nothing is known, either in general or about acertain area of discourse (say, unperceivable objects).¹ In contrast to this, its ancientrelative did not preach theory or relyondubitable premises.The Pyrrhonists² wereconcerned with away of life, the aim of which was ataraxia—tranquility of mind—and its meth- od epoché—suspensionofjudgement. Whereas it had much influenceinthe early modernperiod (due to translations that made the works of Sextus Empiricus, the Pyrrhonist’schief author,available to scholars at the time), it had not been taken se- riouslybycontemporary scholars of ancient philosophyuntil afew decades ago, ‘be- cause it was regarded as apatentlyabsurdorfar-fetched form of skepticism,’³ and the attention it receivedoutside the ancient philosophyclassroom was practically non-existent. One reason for the neglect of Pyrrhonian scepticism is the apraxia objection,⁴ which states in its evidentialmode that sceptical life is impossibleand in its prag- matic mode that sceptical life is impractical. The pragmatic mode presupposes that sceptical life (i.e., life without opinionorbeliefs) is possible, but argues that

This article waswritten during my time as aJunior Fellow at the Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies. Iamespeciallythankful forthe comments to versions of this paper presented at the Internal Workshopand at the Reading Evening on Common Sense and Scepticism.Many thanksalso to Máté Veres, whose feedback wasvery helpful.

 Cf. Peter Klein, “Skepticism,” TheStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), ed. EdwardN.Zalta, URL =.  Ancient Scepticism encompasses twobroad traditions,each of which was subject to transforma- tions and different proponents with varyingviews on scepticism. Forthe first tradition, Academic Scepticism, see DiegoMachuca, “Ancient Skepticism. The Skeptical Academy,” PhilosophyCompass 6(2011): 259–266. Forthe secondtradition, Pyrrhonian Scepticism, see idem, “Ancient Skepticism. Pyrrhonism,” Philosophy Compass 6(2011): 246–258. Iwill use ‘Pyrrhonian scepticism’ and ‘scepti- cism’ interchangeablyonmost occasions.Context makes clear where Iintend to distinguish - nian scepticism from the modern versions of scepticism.  DiegoMachuca, “Ancient Skepticism. Pyrrhonism,” 248.  Cf. Katja M. Vogt, “Scepticism and Action,” CambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. Ri- chardBett (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press):165 – 180,and Gisela Striker, “Sceptical Strat- egies,” Doubt and Dogmatism,eds.Malcom Schofield, Myles F. Burnyeat and Jonathan Barnes (Ox- ford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1980): 54–83.

OpenAccess. ©2018 LukasLang, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-009 166 Lukas Lang

we should not be sceptics,onthe grounds that it would be imprudent,dangerous,or bad to be so. Accordingtothe evidential mode, sceptical life is impossible. It claims that in order to act,weneed beliefs. Forexample, the action of reachingfor my mug requires belief in it beingthere, or,toecho acommon accusation, alludingtofellow philosophers requires the belief thatthey exist.The idea is that addressing, quoting, or meetingpeople requires belief in their existence, theirqualities, and so on.⁵ Given that the self-proclaimed sceptic does drink his coffee and does arguewith otherphi- losophers, the evidential mode concludes that we arenot and that we cannot be sceptics.⁶ As readersofSextus’ works will know,this objectionmisses its targetby miles. Giventhatwewill discuss his replyindetail below,avery short summary of the Pyrrhonian replytothe apraxia objection is adequate.AccordingtoSextus, the sceptic acts in line with thoseappearances that forcetheirassent upon him. That is, he drinks because he is thirsty, but suspends anyopinion as to whether the mugisreally there, or whether it is justanidea, an illusion and so on. In this paper,Idiscuss Thomas Reid’s(1710 –1796)common-sense-based version of the apraxia objection, because it appears to be immune to Sextus’ replyand so still has achance to succeed. It is much more radical, in that it is not based on ac- tion, but on life and the human condition. Thus, it is not onlybyactingthat the scep- tic betrayshis philosophy, but in fact merelybybeing human. Basing his objection on common sense, Reid makes his objection far more threatening by comparison with other attackson(ancient and modern) scepticism. Most philosophical arguments against scepticism make use of heavy-weight assump- tions which are easy for the sceptic to avoid.⁷ The common-sense strategypurports to overcome this by shifting the discussion to apre-theoretical point.Aswith the scep- tic, the common-sense-based attack depends on no theoretical assumptions, and so it appears the sceptic is forced to agree. If scepticism is ruled out by something thatis apreconditionfor the discussion, for action in general, or even more broadly, life, and we onlyneed common sense to see this, there appears to be no wayout for scep- ticism.⁸ And while this seems like the version of the apraxia objection we justdis-

 This polemic accusation is made by George E. Mooreinhis discussionofphilosophers whodisa- greewith his list of common sense .Healso mentionsthat their use of ‘we’ betrays their position, because clearlysuch usage implies the existenceofother human beings.Cf. George E. Moore, “ADefenceofCommonSense,” in Philosophical Papers,Muirhead Library of Philosophy, ed. George.E.Moore(London: George Allen &Unwin Ltd., 1958):40–41.  Cf. Suzanna Obdrzalek, “From Skepticism to Paralysis,” Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012): 370.  Afittingexample for apopular heavy-weight defenceagainst scepticism is externalism, both in its semantic form or as aclaim aboutmental content.For , see Hilary Putnam, “The Meaningof‘Meaning’,” Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science 7(1975): 131–193. Forexter- nalism about mental content, see Colin McGinn “Charity,interpretation, and belief,” Journal of Phi- losophy 74 (1977): 521– 535.  The similaritiestoWittgenstein and contemporary hinge-epistemology are no surprise,given Reid’s influenceonMoore, and Moore’sinfluence on Wittgenstein. Forthe presenceofReid in the circles of Reidian Common Sense: An AntidotetoScepticism? 167

carded, it has to be observed that it did not fail for structural reasons,but for making an assumption Sextus did not share. As Reid’sversion is grounded on common sense, the idea is that thereisnoassumption involved that Sextus cannot share. So, if we find something that reallyisaprecondition for discussion, action or life (and accordingtoSextus thereappear to be such things: without appearances that forceour assent we would be inactive, see section 3), thatcontradictssomething to which Sextus is committed, the apraxia objection would be successful. However,the shift to apre-theoretical point is faced with adilemma.Either the ability to engagewith the sceptic is lost,orthe strategyrisks forfeitingits advantage. If the sceptic refusestoacknowledge thatwhich is impossiblenot to acknowledge (accordingtocommon sense), there is no common ground left between the dispu- tants. Historically, this leads either to ignorance towards or ridicule of the sceptic. On the other hand, anybit of theory that is endorsed can be used by the sceptic again. Later in the paper (section 4) we will see aversion of this dilemma, and how it endangers Reid’sargument against the sceptic. Another reason for discussingReid in this context is thatcommon-sense-based arguments are still being performed to this day. The following passagefrom Kit Fine’s article “The Question of Realism” published in 2001 is avivid example of the relevan- cy of common sense as astrategyagainst scepticism:

However,inthis ageofpost-Moorean modesty,manyofusare inclined to doubt that philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinelyservetounderminewhatweordinarilybe- lieve. It mayperhaps be concededthat the arguments of the skeptic appear to be utterlycom- pelling; but the Mooreans amonguswill hold that the very plausibility of our ordinary beliefs is reason enough for supposingthat theremust be somethingwrong in the skeptic’sarguments, even if we areunable to saywhat it is. Insofar,then, as the pretensions of philosophytoprovide aworld-view rest upon its claim to be in possession of the epistemological highground, those pretensions had better be givenup.⁹

AccordingtoFine (who echoes what has become dogma in some circlesofphiloso- phy),¹⁰ no matter how good or convincing the sceptic’sargument is, we should retain all our ordinary beliefs in response, even if we are unable to find anyfault in the sceptic’sarguments due to the highplausibility of our ordinary beliefs.The term ‘common sense’ does not appear in Fine’sproclamation, but both his talk of ordinary beliefs and his reference to George E. Moore (1873 – 1958)—who famouslyattempted

Mooreand Russell, see Ronald Beanblossom, “Russell’sIndebtedness to Reid,” TheMonist 61 (1978): 192–204.  Kit Fine, “The Question of Realism,” Philosopher’sImprint 1(2001): 2.  Other contemporary examples include David M. Armstrong, “ANaturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 77–89; David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549–567, and Jona- than Schaffer, “On What Grounds What,” Metametaphysics. New Essaysonthe FoundationsofOntol- ogy,eds.David Chalmers,David Manley,and Ryan Wasserman (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2009): 347–383. 168 Lukas Lang

to refuteidealismbymerelyholding up his hands, and wrotethe DefenceofCommon Sense in 1925—suffices for us to takethis as an instance of aclassic appeal to com- mon sense. Reid, in contradistinction to Moore, developed atheory that attempts to put this attack on firm ground. In other words, Reid attempted to movethe appeal to com- mon sense away from arhetoricaldevice (used as alast resort in the face of glaring objections) to asensible and philosophicallysound method. The paper proceeds as follows. Iwill show in section 2that we can plausiblyas- sume that Reid did in fact put forward acommon-sense-based apraxia objection in the evidentialmode against Pyrrhonian scepticism (and one that goes beyond mere polemics). Section3explores the relationship between Reid’snotion of belief and Sextus’ notion of assent and finds that they are closelyconnected. Giventhis close connection, in the fourth section, after dealingwith two objections, Iwillargue that Reid’s apraxia objection is either not threateningPyrrhonian scepticism or not sharing enough common ground with Pyrrhonian scepticism to be successful. In section 5, Iconclude that Reid’scommon-sense-based apraxia objection fails.

2Reid’sAttack on Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Most of Reid’swork is directed against the wayofideas and its proponents,such as Hume, Locke, Berkeley or Descartes.Accordingtothe wayofideas, the direct objects of perception are ideas, rather than external objects. From this point on it is but a short step before one descends into sceptical concerns that knowledge of external objects is impossibleifideas are our onlysourceofinformation. According to Reid, Hume deservescredit for having exposedthe scepticism that was alreadyim- plicit in the wayofideas’ first formulations. Both Berkeley and Reid found this scep- ticism to be unacceptable. But whereBerkeley preserved the wayofideas, and in- stead rejected the external objects, Reid preserved the external objects and rejected the wayofideas. Nevertheless,Ishall arguethat we can also find arguments in Reid against other forms of scepticism, such as Pyrrhonian scepticism. Although Idothink that Reid was aware of Pyrrhonian scepticism and that he aimedatrefuting it on some occa- sions, Idon’twant to relyonahistoricalargument,nor do Iaim for apurelyhistor- ical claim.¹¹ Rather, Ithink that Reid appears to have atheory thatsustains his argu- ment against Pyrrhonian scepticism, and so we should read it as such (even though

 Hume scholars have long sincesoughttofind out which editions,ifany,ofSextus’ writingwere available to scholars in the earlymodern period and to Hume in particular.Agood summary of these findings arepresentedinPeter S. Fosl, “Skepticism and the Possibility of Nature,” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and ,ed. DiegoE.Machuca (Dordrecht: Springer,2011): 145 – 170. Reidian Common Sense: An AntidotetoScepticism? 169

he ignored, or perhaps wasnot aware,ofsome of the subtleties of Pyrrhonian scep- ticism). Forus, the most relevant discussion of Reid’santi-sceptical arguments is thatof Philip de Bary.DeBary claims the four arguments he discusses (labelled A-Dbelow) are mere polemics, however,IfeelAand Bare serious and threatening,while onlyC and Dcan be termed polemics. The four arguments are as follows:¹²

A. Inever heardthat anysceptic run his head against apost,orstepped intoakennel, because he did not believehis eyes. (EIP 234a)

B. If aman pretends to be asceptic with regardtothe informationsofsense, and yetprudently keepsout of harm’sway as other men do, he must excuse my suspicion, that he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes upon himself. (IHM 170)

C. Pyrrho the Elean, the father of this philosophy, seems to have carried it to greater perfection than anyofhis successors […]And therefore,ifacart run against him, or adog attacked him, or if he came upon aprecipice,hewould not stir afoot to avoid the danger, givingnocredit to his senses.But his attendants,who, happilyfor him, werenot so great sceptics, took careto keep him out of harm’sway;sothat he livedtill he was ninety years of age. (IHM 20)¹³

D. If asceptic should build his scepticism upon this foundation, that all our reasoningand judg- ing powers arefallacious in their nature, or should resolve at least to withhold assent until it be proved that they arenot,itwould be impossible by argument to beat him out of this stronghold. And he must even be left to enjoy his scepticism. (EIP 447b)

De Bary argues thatall these should be read as mere polemics, because (i) Reid’s chief aim is Hume,and (ii) these arguments mischaracterise Hume. Additionally, (iii) it is implausible that Reid is serious here, giventhatelsewherehegives acorrect picture of Hume.¹⁴ From the viewpoint of de Bary,Reid is either inconsistent or the arguments are polemics, and so he chooses the latter option. Iagree with the second and third claim, the arguments do mischaracterise Hume and Reid is aware of this.For example, right before the first argument (A) Reid ac-

 The passages from Reid’sInquiry arecitedfromThomas Reid, An Inquiryintothe Human Mind on the PrinciplesofCommon Sense,The Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid, ed. DerekR.Brookes (Edin- burgh: EdinburghUniversity Press,1997) =(IHM). The rest of Reid’swork is cited fromthe eighth ed- ition of the Hamilton edition: Thomas Reid, Essaysonthe Intellectual Powers of Man,ed. Sir William Hamilton(Hildesheim: GeorgOlms,1983) =(EIP), Thomas Reid, Essaysonthe ActivePowers of the Human Mind,ed. Sir William Hamilton (Hildesheim: GeorgOlms,1983) =(EAP), Thomas Reid, Reid’sLetters,ed. Sir William Hamilton (Hildesheim: GeorgOlms,1983) =(Letters). With regards to Sextus‘ works,I’musingSextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism,Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, eds.Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2000) =(PH).  Brookes identifies this as aquotation from Laertius, LivesofEminent Philosophers, trans. Robert D. Hicks,Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1979): 475 (DL IX.62.). See the ExplanatoryNotes in Brookes’ edition of Reid’sInquiry (p.222).  See PhilipdeBary, Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response,Routledge Studies in Eighteenth-Century Philosophy3(London: Routledge,2002),7–19. 170 Lukas Lang

knowledgesthat Hume agrees that doubt with regard to the senses cannot be upheld (EIP 234a).But with regard to the first claim, Idisagree with de Bary.AsLouis Loeb pointed out,when Reid discusses the figures of the wayofideas, the chapter on Hume is the shortest.¹⁵ Loeb also shows that onlysome passages of Hume are quoted by Reid (throughout his works) and that Reid ignored manyfeatures of Hume’stheo- ry,acknowledgement of which would have broughtReid—too close for comfort—to Hume. In place of viewing Reid mainlyasanopponent of Hume, we should instead read him as an opponent of the wayofideas. Thisissupported by Reid’sown self- perception, gained from sources such as the following letter from Reid to Dr.James Gregory (date unknown), in which he sums up his philosophicalachievement as workingagainst the wayofideas:

The merit of what youare pleased to call my philosophy, ,Ithink, chiefly, in havingcalled into question the commontheory of ideas, or images of things in the mind, beingthe onlyob- jects of thought.[…]Ithink thereishardlyanythingthat can be called mine in the philosophyof mind, which does not follow with ease fromthe detection of this prejudice.(Letters 88b)

If we take de Bary’sclaim that the arguments misrepresent Hume along with Loeb’s findingsthat Hume is not acentral figure in Reid’swritings, we are no longer re- quired to see these arguments to be directed against Hume. As aresult, Iamrejecting de Bary’sfirst claim that Hume is the primarytarget, and instead propose that the primary targetisthe alleged Pyrrhonian sceptic, for the following two reasons.¹⁶ Firstly, arguments A, Band Care instances of the apraxia objection (A and Bof the evidential, Cofthe pragmatic mode), which Pyrrhonian scepticism has been con- fronted with from its inception. The apraxia objection and its twomodes has already been discussed, so we can content ourselveswith this rough reconstruction of the evidential apraxia objection (to be referred to later): (1) If youare asceptic, youhavenobeliefs. (2)Ifyou have no beliefs,you cannot act. (3) Youcan act. (4) It is not the case that youhavenobeliefs. (5) It is not the case that youare asceptic.

The first premise sums up the sceptic’sclaim that he liveswithout beliefs (PH I8), while the second premise is the coreofthe apraxia charge,namely, thatbeliefs are necessary for action. Coupled with the observation that sceptics do act and con- duct their livesinanorderlyfashion (3), we can reason via modus tollens and con- clude that the sceptic must have beliefs (4) and is thereforenot asceptic at all (5).

 See Louis E. Loeb, “The Naturalisms of Hume and Reid,” Proceedings and Addresses of the Amer- ican Philosophical Association 81 (2007): 66.  Forifthe argument is successful, thereare no Pyrrhonian sceptics. Reidian Common Sense: An AntidotetoScepticism? 171

Secondly, there is an inconsistency between the four arguments and between some of the arguments and Reid’sbroader work. The last argument (D) recommends not to engagewith the sceptic, while the first three (A-C)doengagewith the sceptic. The story about Pyrrho suggests sceptical life is possible, while arguments Aand B suggest that scepticism is actuallyimpossible and every self-proclaimed sceptic a fraud. This could be takenasevidence for the claim that his attitude is merelypolem- ical, but the other inconsistency is, Ithink, more important,i.e.that between argu- ments Cand Dand Reid’sphilosophyofmind. Giventhis inconsistency,Isuggest that onlyarguments Cand Dare polemics and that Aand Bremain as serious attacks on alleged Pyrrhonian sceptics. If we take Reid’swriting at face value it seems thathedeniesthe actual and pos- sible existenceofPyrrhonian sceptics.With regard to the modality in play, Iassume Reid would saythat God could have constituted us in such amanner that we are able to live without beliefs, but he has not and therefore such sceptics cannot exist.Pyr- rhonian sceptics live without beliefs,but accordingtoReid’sphilosophyofmind there are at least two sources of beliefs we cannot resist: Immediate beliefs caused by our constitution and beliefs that arise from the workings of our mental faculties. In terms of the first category,Reid postulates that our constitution forces some beliefs upon us e.g. the belief that we are conscious:

Can anyman provethat his consciousness can’tdeceive him?Noman can: nor can we give a betterreason for trustingtoit, than that every man, while his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to it,and to laughat, or the man whodoubts its testimony. (IHM 17)

An example for the other sourceisperception, whereReid holds that:

[W]e shall find in [perception] these three things:First,Some conception of notion of the object perceived; Secondly, astrong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; and, Thirdly,That this conviction and belief areimmediate, and not the effect of reasoning.(EIP 258a)

Both our mind and the employmentofour senses alreadyforcebeliefs upon us. This, Itake it,rules out the Pyrrhonian life without beliefs, as does the conclusion of the evidential apraxia objection. Thus, it makes no sense for Reid to engagewith the sceptic by using arguments thatpresuppose thatthe sceptic can act (as do arguments Cand D). The ‘stronghold’ of argument Disapaper castle at best,because as soon as the sceptic becomes hungry,hehas to crawlout.All thatisleft to Reid is to engage with those who still claim to be sceptic and rub it into their faces how life involves immediate beliefs forced upon us by nature (and Reid rarelymisses out on such an opportunity). 172 Lukas Lang

3Reidian Belief and Pyrrhonian Assent

Thus far,wehaveseen that Reid’sengagement with scepticism can be taken serious- ly by his formulating an instance of the apraxia objectioninthe evidentialmode that is anchored in his theory of the mind (which, in turn, is based on his methodologyof common sense). In this section, Iwish to consider the potentiallyunderminingpar- allels between Reidian belief and Pyrrhonian assent.¹⁷ Reid’s apraxia objection does not functionwhen Pyrrhonian assentistaken as the keymental state. But it is not clear whether there reallyisasubstantial difference between Pyrrhonian assent and Reidian belief. Both Reid and Sextus characterise their mental state phenomeno- logicallyand functionally. By showing how these characterisations are almost iden- tical, Ihope to cast doubtonthe idea that Reidian belief differs (sufficientlyenough) from Pyrrhonian assent. Reid’sphilosophyofmind is revolutionary in manyways, and it is what trulydis- tinguisheshis attack on the wayofideas. Instead of merelyconcluding thatthe way of ideas is wrong(giventhat it leads to scepticism), he puts something in its place that,accordingtoReid, comprises less flaws and greater explanatory power.The first notable feature of Reid’sphilosophyofmind is his faculty . Instead of trying to reduce all mental activities to asingle source, Reid finds, basedonhis own introspection, manymental faculties that exist independently, although closely connected with each other.Belief is mostlyassociated with the facultyofjudge- ment,¹⁸ but accompanies manymental processes. On the Reidian philosophyofmind, belief is simple and cannot be defined any further.¹⁹ Although there is no systematic discussion of belief, giventhat it plays an importantrole in perception and in his replytothe sceptic, we can still reconstruct his theory of belief from the relevant passages. The feature he givesthe most credit to is its irresistibility.For example, Reid citesthis feature in response to the sceptic who advises suspending judgement on the existenceofthe external world, for objects can exist without perception, just as perception can exist without the object.Reid replies:

[I]t is not in my power [to getrid of my belief in external objects]: whythen should Imake avain attempt?Itwould be agreeable to flytothe moon, and to makeavisit to Jupiter and Saturn; but when Iknow that Naturehas bound me down by the lawofgravitation to this planet which I inhabit,Irest contented, and quietlysuffer myself to be carried alonginits orbit.Mybelief is carried alongbyperception, as irresistiblyasmybodybythe earth. And the greatest sceptic will find himself to be in the same condition. (IHM 169)

 Forthe time being, I’monlyfocussingonSextus’ notion of forcedassent.AsKatja M. Vogt points out,there is also ‘akind of assent […]that is not necessitated but is yetsufficientlypassive in order to differ fromassentorjudgement as the dogmatists envisage it.Involuntaryand non-doxastic assent playthis role;’ see Katja M. Vogt, “Appearances and Assent: Sceptical Belief Reconsidered,” Classical Quarterly 62 (2012): 661.  See EIP 414b.  See IHM 28. Reidian Common Sense: An AntidotetoScepticism? 173

Turning to how belief originates, Reid alternates between belief being suggested by sensation or being created by naturalsigns.The reason whybelief arisesinthese cases is unknown to us, or it happens ‘by anaturalkind of magic.’²⁰ Alternatively, and this has both aphenomenological and an abductive reading,itisaresult of our constitution or of nature.²¹ It might be thatthese are stillexpressions of the irre- sistibilityofbelief, in the sense that it feels as if nature, or our constitution, forces the belief upon us. If thatisnot the case, however,these expressionscould also be inferences toward the best explanation. It maybealawofhuman nature that when we perceive an apple, abelief thatthe apple exists, as we see it,iscreated alongside the perception. This law, togetherwith the information that asubject per- ceivesanapple, permits us to deducethat the subject also has the corresponding be- lief. Athird optionhere is Reid distinguishing speculation from proper science.²² All that can be said is that it is caused by our constitution, and nothing more can, or should, be said. This line of interpretation is supported by the following passage in which Reid talks about the information that is suggested by vision,namelycolour and position, and nothing else:

Now,this material impression, made upon aparticular point of the retina, by the laws of our constitution, suggests two things to the mind, namely, the colour,and the position of some ex- ternal object.Noman can give areason, whythat same material impression might not have sug- gested sound, or smell, or either of these along with the positionofthe object.That it should suggest colourand position, and nothingelse, we can resolveonlyinto our constitution, or the will of our Maker.(IHM 100)

The next feature of Reidian belief is its immediacy.Belief is often not aresult of rea- soning but occurs immediately:

When Ihear acertain sound, Iconclude immediately, without reasoning,that acoachpasses by. There arenopremises from which this conclusion is inferred by anyrules of logic. It is the effect of aprinciple of nature, commontouswith the brutes. (IHM50)

Howasensation should instantlymake us conceive and believethe existenceofanexternal thingaltogether unliketoit, Idonot pretend to know;and when Isay that the one suggests the other,Imean not to explain the manner of their connection, but to express afact,which every one maybeconscious of; namely, that by alaw of our nature, such aconception and belief constantlyand immediatelyfollow the sensation.(IHM 74)

Iknow moreover,that this belief [in aperceivedobject’spresent existence] is not the effect of argumentationand reasoning; it is the immediateeffect of my constitution. (IHM 168)

 See IHM 36.  See IHM 70.  Ryan Nichols, Thomas Reid’sTheoryofPerception (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press: 2007), 26. 174 Lukas Lang

Finally, Reid maintains that belief plays apivotal role in guiding action. Further to the point that we cannot suspend judgement,headds that even if we could suspend judgment,weshould not:

Iresolve not to believemysenses.Ibreakmynose against apost that comesinmyway;Istep into adirty kennel; and, after twenty such wise and rational actions,Iam takenupand clapt into amad-house. Now,Iconfess Iwould rather make one of the credulous fools whom Nature imposes upon, than of those wise and rational philosophers whoresolve to with-hold assent at all this expence. (IHM 170)

Besides this being an instance of the pragmatic mode of the objection, we can see what role belief plays in action. Belief keeps us out of harm’sway and it guides our actions. In his Essays on the Active Power of Man,Reid distinguishesbetween three kinds of action: voluntary,involuntary and mixed actions. There are three classes of principles of action, which belong to the three kinds of action. Mechanical principles determine the involuntary actions, animal principles determine the mixed actions, and rational principles determine the voluntary actions.²³ In contemporary parlance, we would onlycall the voluntary actionsproper actions (whereinvoluntary sneezing,sleep-walking and breathingare not considered actions at all). Belief is essentialfor voluntary actions(that are guided by the rational princi- ples), but even the animal principles require associated beliefs. Without the beliefs that are formedinperception (that the perceivedobject is like it seems to be) we can- not explain whysomeone moves towards the perceivedobject.IfIknow that there is merelythe illusion of an apple in front of me, Iwould not,despite my hunger,at- tempt to eat it (and here we can also arguethat it is my belief that the apple is an illusion that forms part of my refusal to grab the apple). But if Ibelievethatitisa real apple, Iwould reach for it,and so we see that belief plays an important role for action. Before turningtoSextus’ account of assent,Iwill summarise the findings. On the phenomenological side of the Reidian account of belief, belief is irresistible and im- mediate. On the functional side of his account,belief is anecessary constituent of action.The samethree features are present in the following passages from Sextus, in which he repliestoaccusations not dissimilar to those Reid has voiced against him in his apraxia objection:

Those whosay that the Sceptics reject what is apparent have not,Ithink, listened to what we say. As we said before, we do not overturn anythingwhich leads us,without our willingit, to assent in accordance with apassive appearance—and these things are preciselywhatisappa- rent. When we investigatewhether existingthings aresuch as they appear,wegrant that they appear,and what we investigateisnot whatisapparent but what is said about what is appa- rent—and this is different from investigatingwhatisapparent itself. (PH I19)

 EAP 543. Reidian Common Sense: An AntidotetoScepticism? 175

Thus, we find thatSextus’ key mental state is assent to the appearance, which we can neither control nor resist.Although not expressed verbally, the assent is alsoimme- diate, rather than the product of reasoning. Sextus’ entire point is that suspensionof judgement is not exercised over the appearances.Ifassent to them werethe product of reasoning,one would be able to reason against them to reach epoché again. I thereforeconclude thatPyrrhonian assent is bothirresistible and immediate.²⁴ Does it thus also playarole similar to Reidian belief with regard to action?

Thus,attendingtowhat is apparent,welive in accordance with everydayobservances, without holdingopinions—for we arenot able to be utterlyinactive.These everydayobservancesseem to be fourfold, and to consist in guidancebynature, necessitation by feelings,handingdown of laws and customs, and teachingofkinds of expertise. By nature’sguidanceweare naturallyca- pable of perceivingand thinking. By the necessitation of feelings,hunger conducts us to food and thirst to drink. By the handingdown of customs and laws, we accept,fromaneveryday point of view,that piety is good and that impiety is bad. By teaching of kinds of expertise we arenot inactive in those which we accept.And we sayall this without holdingany opinions. (PH I23, 24)

Itakethe answer to be ‘Yes’.This, in effect,fits neatlywith Reid’saccount of action, and even goes beyond the mere minimum by includingthe acknowledgement of cus- tom, laws and expertise. It can be concluded that all three features which character- ise Reid’smental state, that he calls ‘belief’,namelyirresistibility,immediacy and its role in action, are also true of Sextus’ mental state, which he calls ‘assent’.²⁵ Now turning to the apraxia objection and applying it to Sextus’ notion of assent in the place of Reidian belief, it is clear Sextuswould disagree with (1): Being asceptic does not mean resistingassenting to the appearances that are forced upon us. But he would agree with (2): If we wereable to resist assenting,wewould have no guid- ance for our actions. Something crucial would be missing for living life, sceptical or otherwise. Sextusalso agrees with (3), naturally, because he thinks that he can act. The first conclusion, that it is not the case that we do not assent,follows. Onlythe second conclusion, which hingesonthe first premise (the one Sextus disagrees with), does not follow,for in Sextus’ account the sceptic does assent to the appearances. In order not to equivocate, the otheroptionistoread the argument in such away that (1) is true on Sextus’ account,and as aconsequencethe rest of the argument fails—(2), (4) and (5) would be rendered false. On the other hand, if we want (2)to be true, apart of the argument can function, namely (2)to(4), but that only

 An objector might cite PH I9,inwhich Sextus says that the sceptic opposes what appears to be both with what appears to be and what is thoughtof, but PH I19makes clear that the arguments against the appearances servethe aim to ‘displaythe rashness of the dogmatics,’ and not to suspend judgement about the appearances.  This is also supported by the other passages in which Sextus discusses assent,see PH I113,193, 230, 233and PH II 10,251– 2. 176 Lukas Lang

shows how important the mental state is that Sextus calls ‘assent’.Itdoes not dem- onstrate that scepticism is impossible.

4Two objections

Before moving to the conclusion and determining wherethese parallels leave Reid’s apraxia objection, twoobjections are to be considered. Both of which depend on fea- tures of Reid’saccount of belief which have hitherto not been touched upon. The first feature is that ‘[b]elief admits of all degrees,from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance.’²⁶ At the same time, Sextus appears to directlynegatethe corresponding thesis of degrees of assent,whenhesays ‘that appearancesare equal in convincingness or lack of convincingness’ (PH I227). Although this is far from afull answer (which would requireanentire paper in itself), Idonot think this to be Sextus’ final position on this matter.The passagethatmost clearlyspeaks against this is the very last section of the Outlines titled “WhydoSceptics sometimes propound arguments that are of feeble plausibility?” Here, Sextus, comparingthe sceptic with adoctor,states that,for philanthropic reasons,the sceptic will use weighty arguments for some ‘patients’,but weak arguments for others, for everyone to reach ataraxia. That is, this section presupposes that arguments differ in convinc- ingness.Having established that adifferenceinconvincingness is possible at all, the next stepwould be to subsume arguments under appearances to conclude that at least some appearances differ with respect to convincingness. Asecond line of de- fence can be basedon(at least,my) psychological reality.Ifassentistobeastate that does not allow for degrees,Ihavenoidea what Sextus’ assent is. The onlynotion one can be aware of introspectivelythatcomes close to Sextus’ assent is forced upon one with various degrees of strength, depending on the phenomena, time, place, and so on. Thirdly, if all thingsare equallystrong with regard to forcingassent to them, it trivialises the ability of the sceptic Sextus is talking about in the fourth section of the first Book, i.e. the ability to ‘set out oppositions of thingswhich appear and are thoughtofinany way’ (PH I8). He himself says that by ‘ability’ he means nothing fancy,but still, it seems it would make thingsmuch tooeasy.The worst counterex- ample could endanger belief in the best theory,for ‘worst’ and ‘best’ are alreadycat- egoriesthat presuppose thatsome thingsare more convincing than others. As this is far from sufficient as an argument,Ichoose to read PH I8asspeaking of the ability to have,evenfor belief in very convincing theories, the right countermeasure. The second feature of Reidian belief thatismissing from Pyrrhonian assent is the content of Reidian beliefs. While Sextus’ assent is supposed to be non-committal in every conceivable sense,Reidian beliefs are,among other things, beliefs that the per- ceivedobjects are in reality as they seem to be, existing mind-independentlyand ex-

 EIP 327b. Reidian Common Sense: An AntidotetoScepticism? 177

ternallyfrom us, and so on.²⁷ This goes far beyond Sextus’ account of assent and also seems to contradict it.Doesthis mean that Reid’s apraxia objection is successful after all? Although we have seen that there is adifferencebetween Reidian belief and Pyr- rhonian assent in terms of its alleged content,Sextus could actuallybetoo close to Reid for the objectiontobesuccessful. Consider the situation from the point of view of Sextus. He hears of this mental state that feels acertain way, it is forced upon us, we cannot resist it,itoccurs immediately, it guides our actions, it helps us crossing the street. ‘All this,’ Sextus maysay, ‘Ifind, too, when Iintrospectively observethe goingsonofmymind. Surely, he must speak about that assent that is forced upon us by the appearances.’ Onlyatthis point does Reid say: ‘No, because this belief is abelief in the mind-independent existenceofthe external objects of our percep- tion.’ It is onlythis laststep that Sextus cannot take. But Sextus is not constituted differently. Hence, the dilemma from the introduction appears again. Either Sextus agrees to everythingthat is found in introspection or not.Ifhedoes, then thereis no belief in the external existenceofthe objects of perception, for this does not ap- pear to Sextus, and we have to read Reid differently. Perhaps it is not actuallythe content of the beliefs, but an expression of how the appearances feel. Surelythe ap- pearances are such thatthingsappear to be independent of our minds and in acer- tain distance from us (i.e., they seem to be external). In this case, Reid’s apraxia ob- jection fails, as in this interpretation it does not contradict Pyrrhonian scepticism. A successful apraxia objection requires atheory of belief that goes beyond what we find in introspection. According to the other horn of the dilemma,Sextus and Reid disagree about what is found in introspection. In this casethere is no more room for debate. The common ground the apraxia objection requires does not exist. Thus, Reid, in this reading,thinksscepticism is wrong,but there is no waytoever communicatethis to the sceptic successfully. Additionally, we all have the power of introspection, and Ipersonallydonot find my perceptual beliefs to be committed to mind-independent objects. We also would have to explain the attractiveness of non-realist philosophies, when everyone always believes, as part of how perception works,thatthese non-realist philosophies are wrong. Be that as it may, both options have their problems, and so this qualifies as atrue dilemma:Either one is forced to perform mental gymnastics in our interpretation of Reid,orweare left with an im- plausible and problem-burdened view of beliefs.

 Reid’sfirst principle number five captures this: ‘That those things do reallyexist which we dis- tinctlyperceive by our senses,and arewhat we perceive them to be’ (EIP 445). 178 Lukas Lang

5Conclusion

If Reid baseshis apraxia argument merelyonintrospection, it does not succeed.The onlyroutetosuccess would be to claim that Sextus is confused or lying,orthat Sex- tus and Reid are constituted differently. Both these routes are not particularlyprom- ising.Ifhegoes beyond introspection, Sextus is not obliged to follow.For every rea- son Reid adds as apremise to his case, Sextus can find areason that speaksagainst it.This is especiallyeasy giventhat the other big common-sense philosopher,Moore, embraces the wayofideas as part of his common sense philosophy:

Ihold it to be quitecertain that Idonot directlyperceive my hand; and that when Iamsaid […] to ‘perceive’ it,that I ‘perceive’ (in adifferent and morefundamentalsense) somethingwhich is (in asuitable sense) representative of it.²⁸

Iconclude, therefore, that no matter what routeReid is taking,hecannot beat the Pyrrhonian sceptic with his version of the apraxia objection.

 Moore, “ADefenceofCommon Sense,” 55. Ze’ev Strauss The Ground Floor of Judaism: Scepticismand Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem

Introduction

One of the central themes that Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalemoder über religiöse Machtund Judentum (Jerusalem or on Religious Power and Judaism)ispredicated upon is the notion of doubt.Yet in Jerusalem, Mendelssohn seems to employ not just one type, but rather awide array of varyingmodes of doubt. The following paper will set out to exploreMendelssohn’sequivocalapplication of doubtinJerusa- lem,and in so doing endeavour to demonstrate that he, despite his rather unfavour- able view of scepticism as a ‘disease of the soul’ (‘Krankheit der Seele’),¹ nonetheless drawsheavilyonit. Indeed, this is by no meansaforeign topic to Jewish thought: Alreadyinthe first century CE, the JewishPlatonist Philo of Alexandria resorted to Neo-Pyrrhonian and New Academicscepticism to substantiatethe ultimatemeta- physical truth of Jewish Scripture.² Similarly, we also find references to philosophical scepticism in the work of the medieval Jewish thinker (1075 – 1141)and the Venetian Rabbi Simone Luzzatto (?1582–1663).³ Furthermore, the Jewish intellec- tual tradition can be understood as aconstant interplaybetween scepticism and dog-

 Moses Mendelssohn, JerusalemoronReligious Powerand Judaism,trans. Allan Arkus,Introduction and Commentary by Alexander Altmann (New England: University Press of New England, 1983): 66–67;idem, Jerusalemoder über religiöse Macht und Judentum,in, idem, Gesammelte Schriften. Ju- biläumsausgabe (JubA), vol. 8, eds.Ismar Elbogen, Julius Guttmann,Eugen Mittwoch, Alexander Alt- mann, EvaJ.Engel and Daniel Krochmalnik (Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1983): 134.Gideon Freudenthal has alreadypointed this out in his No Religion without Idolatry (Indiana: University of NotreDame Press, 2012): 22, 41– 42.Cf. also Jeremy Fogel, “Scepticism of Scepticism: On Mendels- sohn’sPhilosophyofCommon Sense,” Melilah 12 (2015): 61. Mendelssohn doesn’trefertoscepticism as ‘Seelenkrankheit’ onlyinhis Jerusalem,but also in his Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voß, 1785): 144(JubA 3.2, 72): ‘Atheismus und Aberglaube, Zweifelsucht und Schwärmerey,sind beides Krankheiten der Seele, die ihr den sittlichenTod andro- hen.’  Foradetailed analysis of Philo’sscepticism, see Carlos Lévy, “La conversion du scepticisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy,ed. Francesca Alesse (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008): 103–120.  ForLuzzatto’suse of sceptical strategies,see Bill Rebiger, “Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzat- to’sPresentation of the Kabbalists in his Discorso,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Ad- vanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2017): 51– 69;Giuseppe Veltri, in JewishGarb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009): 33– 36,107– 108;David B. Ruderman, “Scienceand Skepticism. Si- mone LuzzattoonPerceivingthe Natural World,” in idem, JewishThoughtand Scientific Discoveryin Early Modern Europe (Detroit: Wayne StateUniversity Press, 1995): 153–184 (5th Chapter).

OpenAccess. ©2018 Ze’ev Strauss, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-010 180 Ze’ev Strauss

matism. However,the ideaofphilosophical doubt has led Mendelssohn—in contrast to the aforementioned Jewish thinkers—in acompletelydifferent direction: to an out- right repudiation of the pivotalpremise of Jewish philosophy, which claims that the HolyScriptures of Judaism entail eternal philosophical truths (‘ewigeVernunftwahr- heiten’):

Judaism boasts of no exclusive revelation of eternal truths that areindispensable to salvation, of no revealed religion in the sense in which that term is usuallyunderstood. Revealed religion [‘geoffenbarte Religion’]isone thing, revealed legislation [‘geoffenbarteGesetzgebung’], anoth- er.The voice which let itself be heardonSinai on that great daydid not proclaim, ‘Iamthe Eter- nal, your God, the necessary,independent being, omnipotent and omniscient,that recompenses men in afuture life according to their deeds.’ This is the universal religion of mankind, not Ju- daism; […].⁴

In the following article, Iwish to argue, both systematicallyund historically-philolo- gically, thatMendelssohn’sbasic motivation for resortingtosceptical stances is es- sentiallytwofold: He attempts to isolate the coreofJewish belief from philosophical doubt and at the same time expose the conceptual vulnerability of the dogmas of Christianity. The main assertion Iwillthus develop is that Mendelssohn’sexploita- tion of sceptical concepts comesfrom the general apologetic impulse for writing Je- rusalem. As is known, Mendelssohn formulatedthis treatise as areaction against the polemicalultimatum posed anonymouslybyAugust F. Cranz (1737– 1801) in Das For- schen nach Lichtund Recht⁵ to either convert to Christianity or to account for his stay- ing loyal to his Jewish faith while taking his ‘enlightened’ viewpoint of natural reli- gion into account.⁶ In light of this apologetic and interreligious discourse within which Jerusalem is situated, Iwill maintain that Mendelssohn endeavours to delin- eate the crucial differencesbetween Judaism and Christianity through the idea of scepticism. In the process, Iwill set out to answer two questions: (1) To what aim does Mendelssohn utilise sceptical strategies in Jerusalem for his fundamental un- derstandingofreligion and philosophy, revelation and reason?(2) What kind of dif-

 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,97(JubA 8, 165).  August F. Cranz, Das Forschen nach Licht und Rechtineinem Schreiben an Herrn Moses Mendels- sohnauf Veranlassung seiner merkwürdigen Vorrede zu Ben Israel (Berlin, 1782): 9–11.  Ibidem,41: ‘So lange Sie diesen Schritt nicht thun, nachdem Sie iezt den erstengethan haben, steht das Publikum in der allergerechtesten Erwartung, entweder eine Rechtfertigungvon Ihnen zu lesen, wie Sie eine so wichtige Abweichungmit der Religion Ihrer Vätervereinbaren wollen, oder—Gründe, die Sie einem öffentlichen Uebergang zu dem Glauben der Christen und dem eigentlichen Christen- tum selbst entgegenzusetzen haben.’ Cf. ibidem,9.Mendelssohnhimself addresses this point explic- itly; see his Jerusalem,86–87 (JubA 8, 152–153). Foramoredetailed discussion, see Micha Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn’sTheological-Political Thought (Oxfordand New York: Oxford University Pres,2011): 34 and 51;Shmuel Feiner, Moses Mendelssohn: Sage of Modernity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010): 150 and 159–176; Elias Sacks, Moses Mendelssohn’sLiving Script: Philosophy,Practice, History, Judaism (Bloomington and Indianapolis:Indiana University Press, 2017): 25–28,98and 176 – 178. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 181

ferent sceptical stances does Mendelssohn make use of in Jerusalem? The answer to these questions will unfold in three essential stages. In the first part,Iwill elaborate on Mendelssohn’sunderstanding of what ‘the spirit of true Judaism’⁷ is as it pertains to his harsh critique (if not sceptical undermining) of Maimonides’ dogmatic and philosophical distortion of its ‘ancient,original’ meaning.⁸ In the second part—draw- ing on the perceptiveand innovative research conducted by Gideon Freudenthal in his No Religion without Idolatry (2012)—Iwill suggest that Mendelssohn entertains sceptical doubt concerning the nature of languageasan effective epistemic vehicle to emphasise the merits of ‘the old Judaism’ (‘das alte Judentum’), which is primarily construed as asystem of ceremonial laws (‘Zeremonialgesetze’). In this part,light will be shed on anumber of theological and philosophical sources that constitute points of departure for Mendelssohn’sown stances and discussions. Several of these sources are by no means sceptical in nature, but they still share one unifying feature: They all entail critical inclinations in one wayoranother towards language and signs.Exactlythis common thread seemed to have been cleverlyexploited by Mendelssohn and incorporatedinto his systematic sceptical stance towards language in Jerusalem. In the concluding part,Iturn to his employmentofasceptical view- point in the framework of his critical analysis of ecclesiastical law(‘Kirchenrecht’) in the Kingdom of and the intolerance of the lawtowardsthe Jewishpopu- lation.Iwill show that Mendelssohn’sdescription relies,inthis instance, not so much on ancient scepticism, nor on the Jewish philosophicalaccount of ancient scepticism, but rather specificallyonJohann M. Schröckh’sfourth volume of his Christliche Kirchengeschichte (1777).⁹

1The Non-Speculative NatureofAncient Judaism

In one of the central sections of the second part of Jerusalem,Mendelssohn seems to grapple with Cranz’ssupposition that Judaism has determinedarticles of faith (‘Glaubensartikel der jüdischenReligion’).¹⁰ The wayheproceeds is not by straight- forwardlycriticizingCranz, but rather by disputing Maimonides’ dogmatic under- standing of Judaism. The specific notion he casts doubt on is Maimonides’ contention

 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,100 (JubA 8, 167): ‘Geist […]des ächten Judentums.’  JubA 8, 168: ‘d[as] alte, ursprüngliche […]Judentum […].’  Johann M. Schröckh, ChristlicheKirchengeschichte,vol. 4(Leipzig: Engelhart Benjamin Schwickert, 1777).  In this context, Cranz refers to the negativearticle of belief that keeps God’schosen people away from gentiles so their holiness would not be desecrated: ‘ist ein Glaubensartikel der jüdischen Reli- gion, nach welchem alle andere Völker,wie eine Art unreiner Geschöpfe angesehen werden,durch derennähern Umgang das Volk Gottesentheiliget würde;’ see idem, Das Forschen nach Licht und Recht,36. Cranz also alludes to the principles of the Jewish ‘church’: ‘Grundsätze […]der Kirche;’ see ibidem,13. 182 Ze’ev Strauss

לש שו ) that Jewish faith can at bottom be summed up in thirteen simple principles :( שע הר קע יר ם

Maimonides was the first to conceive of the idea of reducingthe religion of his fathers to acer- tain number of principles,inorder that,asheexplains, religion, likeall other sciences, would have its fundamental conceptions,fromwhich all the others arededuced. This merelyaccidental idea gave rise to the thirteen articles of the Jewish , to which we owe the morninghymn ,aswell as some good writings by Chasdai, Albo, and Abrabanel. These areall the results they have had up to now.Thank God, they have not yetbeen forgedinto shacklesoffaith. Chas- dai disputes them and proposes changes; Albo limits their number and wants to recognize only threebasic principles which correspond rather closelytothose which Herbert of Cherbury,ata later date,proposed for the catechism; […].¹¹

The tone of Mendelssohn in the quotedpassagetowards the most celebrated rabbinic authority and Jewishphilosopher of the Middle Ages is remarkablycritical:Heaccus- es him of advocating nothing short of areductionist and completelyfalsified account of Judaism as aset of theoretical beliefs.¹² Mendelssohn suggests that the historical repudiation of the Maimonidean preceptsoffaith by major medieval Jewish thinkers, such as ḤasdaiCrescas (c. 1340 –1410), (1380 –1440) and Isaac Abraba- nel (1437– 1508), strongly attest to their inauthentic core. With reference to this very passage, Warren Zev Harvey has insightfullypointed out the similaritybetween Men- delssohn and these medieval anti-Maimonidean thinkers,first and foremost Ḥasdai Crescas,with respect to their undogmatic conception of Judaism.¹³ Aspeculative mindset that poses an even greater threat to authentic Judaism is the kabbalistic one, which, accordingtoMendelssohn, reduces the entire Scriptureto‘fundamental doctrines’ (‘Fundamentallehren’)ofanutterlyspeculative nature.¹⁴ However,myreadingofthis central passageemphasises another aspect: These importantthinkers demonstratedtoMendelssohn exactlyhow ametaphysical under- standing of HolyScripture not onlyfailstounderpin the absolutetruth of Jewish be- lief, but has the quite counterproductive effect of making Judaism susceptible to phil- osophical doubt and thus jeopardizingthe whole conceptual construct of its

 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,101 (JubA 8, 167). Foramoredetailed analysis,see Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom,34–56.  Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry,153 – 154.  WarrenZev Harvey, “Ḥasdai Crescas and Moses Mendelssohn on Beliefs and Commandments,” in Moses Mendelssohn: Enlightenment, Religion, Politics,Nationalism,ed. Micha Gottlieb and Charles H. Manekin (Bethesda: University of Maryland Press, 2015): 79 – 89.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,101 (JubA 8, 167). See Harvey, “Ḥasdai Crescas and Moses Mendelssohn on Beliefs and Commandments,” 85.Onanti-Kabbalistic tendencies in the and preceding, see Bill Rebiger, “The EarlyOpponents of the Kabbalah and the Role of Sceptical Argumentations:An Outline,” in Yearbookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2016,eds.Giuseppe Veltriand Bill Rebiger(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016): 39–57;Christoph Schulte, “Kabbala in Salomon Maimons Le- bensgeschichte”,inKabbala und die Literatur der Romantik: Zwischen Magie und Trope,eds.Eveline Goodman-Thau, Gert Mattenklott and Christoph Schulte (Tübingen: Max NiemeyerVerlag, 1999): 33 – 66. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 183

tradition. This readingisstronglyreinforced when we take, for example, Mendels- sohn’sown reiteration of the main thesis of Jerusalem into consideration—Judaism is not arevealed religion (‘geoffenbarteReligion’), but rather revealedlegislation (‘geoffenbarte Gesetzgebung’)—¹⁵ in An die Freunde Lessings (1786), which he empha- sises in conjunction with scepticism and common sense:

When Italk of rational conviction, however,and Iwant to presuppose this as undoubted in Ju- daism, the talk is not about metaphysical argumentation as we areused to carryingitonin books,not about pedanticdemonstrations that all meet the test of the subtlest skepticism, but about the claims and judgments of asimple, sound commonsense, which looks things right in the eyeand reflects calmly.¹⁶

Mendelssohn makes it abundantlyclear that he wishestoestablish the Jewish reli- gion as aposition that is beyond doubt (‘unbezweifelt’); i.e. astance that,incontrast to metaphysical reasoning(‘metaphysische Argumentation’), does not have to with- stand the penetrating attacks of philosophical scepticism.¹⁷ Spinoza’sunrelentinglyharsh critique in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) of Maimonides’ unscientificexegetical method might also have had an effect on this view held by Mendelssohn.¹⁸ Moreover,the scientific approach applied to biblical ex- egesisadvocated by Spinoza in the TTP—to attempt,through newlydevelopedphi-

 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,97(JubA 8, 157).  Iused the English translation found here: Leo Strauss on Moses Mendelssohn,trans. and ed. Mar- tin D. Yaffe (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2012): 117. Moses Mendelssohn an die Freunde Lessings (Berlin, 1786): 30 (JubA 3.2, 197): ‘Wenn ich aber vonvernunftmäßigerUeberzeugung rede,und solche im Judenthumals unbezweifelt voraus setzen will; so ist die Rede nicht vonmeta- physischer Argumentation, wie wir sie in Büchern zu führengewohntsind; nicht vonschulgerechten Demonstrationen, die alle Proben des subtilsten Zweifelmuths bestanden sind; sondern vonden Aus- sprüchen und Urtheilen eines schlichten gesunden Menschenverstandes,der die Dinge gerade ins Augefaßt und ruhigüberlegt.’ To the best of my knowledge,Leo Strauss, in his Einleitung zu ‘Mor- genstunden’ und ‘An die Freunde Lessings’,isthe first to point this out with referencetothis specific passage (JubA 3.2, LXVII): ‘The connection between his increased inclination toward the philosophy of sound commonsenseand his defense of Judaism becomes fullydistinct in the followingstatement in To the Friends of Lessing: […]. [Der Zusammenhang zwischen seiner verstärkten Neigung zur Phi- losophie des gesunden Menschenverstandes und seiner Verteidigungdes Judentums wirdvollends deutlich in folgender Äußerungindem Schreiben “An die Freunde Lessings”];’ see Leo Strauss on Moses Mendelssohn,117;the original German, see LeoStrauss, Gesammelte Schriften,vol. 2: Philoso- phie und Gesetz – Frühe Schriften,ed. Heinrich Meier (Stuttgart and :J.B.Metzler, 22013): 579. Cf. Freudenthal, whodevelops this point much further and was the first to link it to Mendelssohn’s scepticism regarding language; see idem, No Religion without Idolatry,28–29.  Freudenthal elucidates this importantaspect of Mendelssohn’sthoughtinavery systematicman- ner: No Religion without Idolatry,21–64 (Ch. 1. Mendelssohn: Common Sense, Rational Metaphysics, and Skepticism).  Foramoredetailed analysis, see Julius Guttmann, “MendelssohnsJerusalem and Spinozas The- ologisch-Politischer Traktat,” in Achtundvierzigster Berichtder Hochschule fürdie Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin N. 24,Artilleriestraße 14 (Berlin: 1931): 31–67;Micha Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom, 9–12 and 24–54. 184 Ze’ev Strauss

lological tools,tounearth the original meaning of Scripture, unfiltered by theological premises—gained astrongfoothold in the intellectual Protestant circlesinthe Ger- man-speakingworld of the eighteenth century and wasfurther cultivated. Protestant philologists of ,such as JohannW.Meiner (1723–1789), Robert Lowth (1710 – 1787), Johann D. Michalis (1717– 1791), Johann G. Herder (1744 – 1803) and Jo- hann G. Eichhorn (1752 – 1827), seem to have had agreat impact on Mendelssohn’s perception of the Hebrew Bible as an aestheticpiece of writing.¹⁹ The in the field of Biblical Hebrew could have facilitated Mendelssohn’suncovering of the philological shortcomingsofthe presuppositions upon which much of Jewish philosophyisgrounded. Mendelssohn was not onlyfamiliar with Spinoza’scritique of Maimonides, but also with that of Protestant authors. If we take, for example, the first volume of Heinrich Corrodi’s Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus (1781), abook Mendelssohn was familiar with,²⁰ we find afiercecritique of Maimonides’ as nothing less than a ‘fraudulent’ Aristotelian exegesis of JewishScripture:

Maimonides deceives himself, insofar as he does not derive his philosophyfromJewish Scrip- tures, but from Aristotle; this was also done by those, who solelyrecognised areasonablesystem of philosophyand not that of the sinister kabbalistic webofdreams. Forthey didn’tfind what they were lookingfor in the philosophyoftheir nation.²¹

The attitude of these theologians of the German-speaking world towards the exeget- ical rabbinic tradition as awhole was very deprecatory,since it made speculative as- sumptions superimposed on JewishScripture. In the section “Talmud und Rabbinen” (III. §341: “Schriften der Rabbinen”)ofEichhorn’spioneering three-volume Einlei- tung ins Alte Testament (1780 – 1783), which Mendelssohn possessed in its entirety in his library,²² he assesses their Scriptural interpretation as unscientific. Forthis rea- son, he emphasises that his analysis of the Biblical corpus will not depend on their uncritical judgments.²³ It is, of course, plausible that the ‘nervensaftverzehrende’ Kri-

 See Verzeichniß der auserlesenen Büchersammlung des seeligen Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (Berlin: 1786): 13 (Nº 198), 14 (nºs 215–216, 219–231),25(Nº 81), 27 (nºs 166–168), 30 (Nº 227), 33 (Nº 272),36 (Nº 321), 33 (Nº 272),44–45 (nºs 501–511,530).  See Verzeichniß,23(nºs 97– 99).  Heinrich Corrodi, Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus,vol. 1(Frankfurt and Leipzig,1781): 26–27 (fn. *; my translation): ‘Maimonides straft sich auch dadurch selbst Lügen, daß er seine Philosophie nicht ausden jüdischen Schriften, sondern ausAristoteles schöpft,auch habendas alle gethan, die ein erträgliches System der Philosophie und nicht das finsterekabbalistische Geweb vonTräumerey- en allein kannten. Denn sie fanden in der Philosophie ihrerNation nicht was sie suchten.’ Corrodi characterisesthe exegetical method of Philo of Alexandria, ‘der platonisierende Jude,’ in analogous terms; see ibidem,42: ‘Philo […]hat ein System,das offenbar ausdem Platonischen entstanden ist.’  Verzeichniß,27(nºs 166–168).  Johann G. Eichhorn, Einleitung ins Alte Testament,vol. 2(Leipzig: WeidmannsErben und Reich, 1781): 8: ‘Nicht aufihreUrtheile bauen wir unsre Vorstellungenvon der jetzigenBeschaffenheit des Hebräischen Textes, sondern aufdas,was Erfahrung und kritische Untersuchung desselben uns ge- lehrt hat.’ Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 185

tik der reinen Vernunft (KrV)²⁴ ‘des alles zermalmenden Kants,’²⁵ published onlytwo years prior to Jerusalem in 1781,illustrated to Mendelssohn the striking epistemolog- ical limitations of speculative metaphysics and the implications this insight might have on a Judaism that is strongly premised on theoretical notions.²⁶

2Scepticismand the Non-Verbality of Mosaic Law

Subsequently,Mendelssohn considerablywidens the scope of the problem concern- ing theological dogmatism within the framework of Judaism: He proceedstodoubt entirelythe capacity of the fixed written and spoken wordasasymbol for mediating the true lively essence of Judaism and metaphysical truth. The immediate reason for his addressing this issue seems to be rooted in the following statement Cranz made in the opening of Das Forschen nach Lichtund Recht:

This figurative expression [i.e. of Moses coveringhis radiant face] probablysignifies nothing morethan that therewas atime when the eyes of as-yet-unenlightenednations werestill unable to bear the truth pure and whole, and that therecame another time when people dared to take a longer glimpse at the bright sun and considered themselvesstrong enough to throwawaythe veil, and, speakingfrankly, to teach in an unconcealed manner what had otherwise only been cloaked in hieroglyphics and morethan halfwayveiled in figurative expressions.²⁷

In this quotation, Cranz attempts to describe the conceptual progression Christianity has made with respect to Judaism, the belief system it evolvedfrom: ‘In the period of the so-called New Testament,the Christians boasted of seeing Moses with his face uncovered.’²⁸ This passagerevolvesaround the New Testament metaphoric (‘bildli-

 JubA 13,100.  Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden,IV. Fogelalso alludes to this specific characterisation of Kant by Mendelssohn: “Scepticism of Scepticism: On Mendelssohn’sPhilosophyofCommon Sense,” 62.It should be notedthat Mendelssohn did not possess the KrV in his library,but the Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaftwirdauftreten können,which was published like Jerusalem in 1783.See Verzeichniß: 29,Nº205; seealso ibidem,nºs 38–41,nºs 353–355).  Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry,32and 38–40.  August F. Cranz, “The Search for Light and Right in aLetter to Mr.Moses Mendelssohn,onthe Occasion of his Remarkable Preface to Menassehben Israel,” in Moses Mendelssohn: Writings on Ju- daism, Christianity &the Bible,ed. Micha Gottlieb (Waltham: Brandeis University Press 2011): 55–56; Cranz, Das Forschen nach Licht und Recht,5–6. Attention has alreadybeen drawntothis important link by several researchers,cf. JeffreyS.Librett, TheRhetoric of Cultural Dialoge:Jews and Germans from Moses Mendelssohn to RichardWagner and Beyond (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2000): 48–50;Christiane Frey, “Gramma Hieroglyphe und jüdisch-hebräische Kultur (Herder,Dohm, Men- delssohn),” in Die Ordnung der Kulturen: zurKonstruktion ethnischer, nationaler und zivilisatorischer Differenzen 1750–1850,eds.HansjörgBay and KaiMerten (Würzburg: Königshausen &Neumann, 2006): 149 – 151.  Cranz, “The Searchfor Light and Right in aLetter to Mr.Moses Mendelssohn,” 55;idem, Das For- schen nach Licht und Recht,5. 186 Ze’ev Strauss

che Vorstellungsart’)in2Corinthians 3:13–18, which is in turn an allusion to the ra- diant face of the Jewishlawgiverdepicted in Exodus 34:29 – 35 – the point being that Jewishbelief has onlyanoblique access to the Godlymysteries, in contrast to the Christian faith, which gains unmediated insight into these revealedtruths.²⁹ Cranz seems to explicate this metaphor,which he regards as an insinuation of the spiritual backwardness of Judaism, which can grasp God onlyinhis concealment (Deus ab- sconditus), in terms of the semiotic notion conveyedin2Corinthians 3:6: Forthe letter kills, but the Spirit gives life (τὸ γὰργράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ).³⁰ Cranz impliesthatJewish faith is by definition reliant upon the intermediation of signs in the form of the figurative Biblical Hebrew language(‘in Hieroglyphen klei- dete, und in figürlichen Vorstellungsarten’). It is quite apparent that Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem directlyquarrels with Cranz’sChristocentric apprehension of Judaism as conveyedinthe above-mentionedpassageonthe veiled face of the Jewishlawgiver. Tworeasons present themselvesfor this claim: (1) Mendelssohn also alludes to hier- oglyphs in juxtaposition with Biblical Hebrew as an epistemological obstacle to the original unmediated truths of the Sinaitic revelation.³¹ (2)Heemploys the Pauline of dead letter (‘toter Buchstabe’)and lively spirit (‘lebendiger Geist’)in2 Corinthians 3:6atthe centre of his depiction of the true nonverbal, spiritual nature of Judaism as ceremonial law(‘Zeremonialgesetz’).³² It seems, however,tobeabit perplexingthat Cranz juxtaposes the Biblical He- brew,spoken by the veiled Moses to the Israelites,with hieroglyphs. Apossible ex- planationcan be traced back to De vita Moysis I23ofPhilo of Alexandria, which de- scribes how Moses in his adolescencewas instructed by knowledgeable Egyptians in the philosophyexpressed in symbols (ἡ διὰ συμβόλων φιλοσοφία), as exhibited in the pictorial characters commonlyreferred to as hieroglyphs (ἱερὰ γράμματα). Cranz, atrained theologian from the University of Halle,³³ was surelyacquainted to some extent with the bodyofthought of the Jewish Alexandrian. Moreover,in 1778,just four years prior to Cranz’sresponsetoMendelssohn’s Preface to Menasseh

 Cf. Librett, TheRhetoric of Cultural Dialoge,48–50;Frey, “Gramma Hieroglyphe und jüdisch-he- bräische Kultur (Herder,Dohm,Mendelssohn),” 149 – 151.  See Daniel Krochmalnik, “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache: Moses MendelssohnsApologie des Judentums im Rahmen der aufklärerischen Semiotik,” in Fremde Vernunft. Zeichen und Interpre- tationen,vol. 4, eds. and (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998): 274– 275and 278; Librett, TheRhetoric of Cultural Dialoge,49; Frey, “Gramma Hieroglyphe und jüdisch-he- bräische Kultur (Herder,Dohm,Mendelssohn),” 150.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,108–111 (JubA 8, 184–185). See Freudenthal, No Religion without Idola- try,105–134 (Ch. 5: Idolatry: Egyptian and Jewish); Veltri, Renaissance Philosophy in JewishGarb,169 – 194 (Ch. 8Ceremonial Law: History of aPhilosophical-Political Concept); Sacks, Living Script,11–12 and 22–60.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,108 (JubA 8, 184).  See Dieter Reichelt, August FriedrichCranz: Ein Kgl. Preußischer Kriegsrath als Schriftsteller von Profession. Zeugnisseaus seinem merkwürdigen Leben und Wirken in Berlin (Bargfeld: Luttertaler Hän- dedruck 1996): 60. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 187

BenIsrael (Vorrede zu Manasse ben Israel: Rettung der Juden), De vita Moysis I-II (Mos.)was published anonymouslyinaGerman translation underthe title Philo vom Leben Moses,³⁴ wherehecould have encountered this passage, which reads as follows:

These [i.e. the learned Egyptians] further instructed him [i.e. Moses] in the philosophyconveyed in symbols,asdisplayedinthe so-called holyinscriptions and in the regardpaid to animals,to which they even paydivine honours.³⁵

This suggestion doesn’tseemfarfetched at all if, for example, we take into consider- ation that this topic, with referencetothis very Philonic account of Moses’ intellec- tual formation, was mentioned in Schiller’s Die SendungMoses from 1790.³⁶

 Philo vom Leben Moses, das ist: von der Gottesgelahrheit und dem prophetischen Geiste (Dresden: Waltherische Hofbuchhandlung, 1778).  Philo.InTen Volumes (PLCL), vol. 6, trans. Francis H. Colson (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 51984): 287–289. Forthis passage in the German translation used by Mendelssohn, see: ‘Es brachten ihm aber die AegyptischenGelehrten […]die symbolischeWeltweisheit,welche in den so- genanten heiligen Schriften durch Bilder gewisser vorzüglicher Thiere,welche sie auch göttlich ver- ehren, gelehrt wird.’ (Gottesgelahrheit,12–13)  Friedrich vonSchiller, Sämmtliche Werke,vol. 7(Stuttgartand Tübingen: J. G. Cotta‘sche Verlags- buchhandlung, 1819), 70: ‘Der Geschichtschreiber Philo sagt,Moses sei vonden ägyptischenPriestern in der Philosophie der Symbolen und Hieroglyphen wie auch in den Geheimnissen der heiligen Tiere eingeweiht worden. Eben dieses Zeugnis bestätigenmehrere, und wenn man erst einen Blick aufdas, was man ägyptische Mysterien nannte, geworfen hat,sowirdsich zwischen diesen Mysterien und dem, was Moses nachher getan und verordnet hat,eine merkwürdigeAehnlichkeit ergeben.’ For an analysis of this motif in Schiller’s Die Sendung Moses, see Frey, “Gramma Hieroglyphe und jü- disch-hebräische Kultur (Herder,Dohm, Mendelssohn),” 151 and 157–158. Cf. William Warburton, Die göttliche Sendung Mosis, aus den Grundsätzen der Deisten bewiesen,vol. 3(Frankfurt and Leipzig: Johann Gottlieb Vierling, 1753): 104 (fn. i): ‘Philo führet in seiner Lebensbeschreibung Mosis,die Egyptischen Priester ein, und lasset sie nach Platonischen Grundsätzen vonder Seele, welche den Leib Mosis belebt,sich bei sprechen; welches eben so kluggeurtheilet heißt, als wenn ein neuer Scri- bent,welcher das Leben des Ptolomäus,des Sternsehers,schriebe, ihn die Grundsätze des Herrn Isaac Newtons erklären ließe.’ Mendelssohn mentionsthe German translation of TheDivine Legation of Moses Demonstrated in his recension of Joseph Warton’s An Essay on the Writing and Genius of Pope;see JubA 4, 323. Forthe significanceofWarburton, see Freudenthal, No Religion without Idola- try,94–95,106,116–117, 121–124, 250, 273–275, and 278–279; cf. Krochmalnik, “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache,” 263and 279–284. Cf. Paul E. Jablonski’s Pantheon Aegyptiorum,awork Mendels- sohn was wellfamiliar with; see JubA 5.2, 113.Jablonski mentionsPhilo’sunderstanding of the sin of the golden calf in Mos.2.161– 162asaregression to Egyptian idolatry;see idem, Pantheon Aegyp- tiorum, Sive de Diis Eorum Commentarius: Cum Prolegomenis de Religione Et Theologia Aegyptiorum, vol. 1(Frankfurt an der Oder:1750), 180: ‘[…]ubi de idolotaria israelitarum, vitulum aureum in deserto adorantium […]: ζηλωταὶ τῶναἰγυπτιακῶνγίνονται πλασμάτων. εἶτα χρυσοῦνταῦρον κατασκευα- σάμενοι, μίμημα τοῦ κατὰ τὴνχώραν ἱερωτάτου ζῴου δοκοῦντος εἶναι, θυσίας ἀθύτους ἀνῆγον.’ Cf. Mendelssohn’sdepictioninJerusalem: ‘Schon in den ersten Tagender so wundervollen Gesetzge- bungfiel die Nation in den sündlichenWahn der Aegyptier zurück, und verlangte ein Thierbild’ (em- phasis in original). 188 Ze’ev Strauss

With respect to Mendelssohn, we can easilyestablish his well-founded familiar- ity with this specific Philonic writing:Henot onlypossessed the German translation פס נר ית וב ת) in his library³⁷ but even alludes, in three significant instances,inhis Bi’ur tothemesdirectlystemmingfrom Mos.³⁸ In his introduction to the Bi’ur, he( שה ול ם twice refers to Philo’sdepiction of the Greek translation of Hebrew Scripture:

And also Yedidia ha-Alexandroni, whoiscalled Philo, [together with Josephus Flavius] describe this event in accordancewith the abovementionedaccount of Aristeas, with some slight modi- fications and amoresuccinct description, in such amanner indicatingthat what they said was from this Greek book [i.e. Letter of Aristeas][…]. […]: it would thus appear that we mustn’tdeny the testimony of the ancients in regardtothis,inparticularthe testimony of Philo,who wasone of the citizens of Alexandria itself,the city in which the elderly completed this translation work three hundred years beforehim, and the testimony of several Christianscholars that lived at the times of the first , for they all agreeabout the entire storyofAristeas,[…].³⁹

In his commentary to Exodus 25:4,hementionsthe understanding of the ‘wise Philo’ -as πορφύρα in Mos.2.84– 88: ‘And also Josephus in his Antiq רא מג ן of the colour (!) uities [i.e. Antiquitates Judaicae]and the wise Philo in his book TheLife of Moses refer to it as purple-red […].’⁴⁰ Mendelssohn could have alsobeen confronted with the significanceofPhilo’sdepiction, in Mos.1.23, of Moses’ Egyptian educational for-

 Verzeichniß,34(Nº 275).  Foramoredetailed analysis of the reception of Philo of Alexandria in the Haskalah, see Ze’ev Strauss, Rabbi Jedidjah ha-Alexandri. Die Wiederentdeckungder Religionsphilosophie des Philon von Alexandria in der osteuropäischen Haskala (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,forthcoming2019). כו ין ידיד הה לא סכ דנ ור ינ , מה וכ ינ יפ ול ן ,“ :( JubA 15.1,36(German translation: JubA 9.1, 49)(my translation פס ור תא מה וא ער הה או דכ רב אי יר טס אי הה ל״נ , שב ונ מי טע קו וצ הר בד םיר , דע כש יפ נה אר לה חק או רת בו בד יר םה לעמ סה רפ יה נו הי אוה [ … .] פו טר דע תו די ידי שה יה מה ות בש אי כל נס רד אי עה המצ , עה רי שא בר נה שע מה אל תכ הה תע הקי הה או , חא יר זה נק םי הה כם שלש אמ שת הנ , עו וד כת המ כח ימ ונ רצ םי הש וי יב ימ הם נת יא הם אר וש םינ , כש םל ” סמ יכ ימ בם לכ ול הת פס רו לש רא סי האיט [, … .]  JubA 16,240 (mytranslation). Mendelssohn’stranslation reads accordingly as follows: ‘Auch him- melblauen, purpurrorthe und hochrothe Wolle, und Leinengarn und Ziegenhaare.’ (myemphasis) He ״ אְבּ רֵ ֲח רָפ וּ ָה)also referstoPhilo’s Mos.1.256–257inhis allegorical interpretation of Numbers 21:18 .Prague: Verlag des S)( פס נר ית וב שת ול ום וה חא וב כר לו חל שמ חה מו יש ות הר ( מב רבד ,see idem ;( רׂ ָש יִ ״ם הו הנ ידי יד הה כמ נו פה לי ןו סב רפ חו יי שמ כה בת הש צו אי מו כל הי רא הץ יה וא וי בש הי וה תאצ “ :Freund, 1860): 121 בר תו חל ופ אר הת אב הר איה , יהו תא כו רה ףוצ בא ינ ום וה בא ינ מן ופ רא יו רק דע אמ דו ומ הר לע וע רש בכ דו מה כל םי -Itisalso worth men. ” םהה , יו כת זלען לה רמא , רד מך יל תצ שה רי חש רפ הו רש םי רכ הו דנ בי עי בם חמ קק מב עש ונ םת . tioningthat Johann B. Kölbele, in his polemic lettertoMendelssohn(1770), implicitlyendeavours to identify Mendelssohnwith Philo: ‘Die Gottheit Christi und die damit genauverbundeneLehre vonder Heiligen Dreyeinigkeit solten wenigstens einen Platonisierenden, Philonisierenden, und Kabalisti- schen Juden nicht sehr befremden […];’ see idem, “ZweitesSchreiben an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn insonderheit über den ehemaligenMendelssohnischen Deismus,über das Mendelssohnische Kenn- zeichen einer Offenbarung,und kürzlich über die Glaubwürdigkeit der Evangelischen Geschichte,” in Carl Bonnet, Philosophische Untersuchung der Beweise fürdas Christenthum. Samt desselben Ideenvon der künftigen Glückseligkeit des Menschen,Teil 2: Sammlungderer Briefe, welche bey Gele- genheit der Bonnetschen philosophischen Untersuchung der Beweise fürdas Christenthum, zwischen Hrn. Lavater,Moses Mendelssohn, und Hrn. Dr.Kölbele gewechselt worden (Frankfurt am Main: Jo- hannes Bayrhoffer,1774): 131. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 189

mationinJohn Spencer’s De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus et Earum Rationibus Libri Quatuor (1732), aworkhepossessed in folio format in his library.⁴¹ Spencer took it upon himself, in the words of JanAssmann, to provethe ‘Egyptian origin of the ritual laws of the Hebrews.’⁴² Assmann regards this short Philonic passage as decisive for Spencer’sEgyptian portrayal of Moses:

Moses certainlyknew hieroglyphic writing, which Spencer takes to be asecret codebywhich the Egyptian priests transmitted their wisdom to the initiated. His sources include Philo of Alexan- dria, De Vita Mosis,book 1, where we read that Moses learned from his Egyptian masters, among other subjects, tendia symbolon philosophian.⁴³

Our proposed readingissubstantiated even further if we account for the fact that Cranz probablyreacted not onlytoMendelssohn’s Vorrede,the German translation of Menasseh BenIsrael’s Vindicia Judaeorum (1656),but also to the contents of the translated essayitself. This is duetothe fact that Philo occupies acrucial position in Rettung der Juden, written by Spinoza’sAmsterdam rabbi, which makes numerous references to the historical descriptions of the Jewish Alexandrian to illustrate the hardships Jews endured under the rule of the Roman Empire.⁴⁴ Forpreciselythis rea- son, Mendelssohn makesthe following observation regardingBen Israel’sdrawing on Philo (and Josephus Flavius):

 Verzeichniß,4(Nº 58).  JanAssmann, Moses the Egyptian: TheMemoryofEgypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge,MA and London: HarvardUniversity Press, 1997): 56.  Ibidem,73. See also ibidem,56: ‘ForSpencer’sproject,this short sentence [i.e. that,according to St.Stephanus, ‘Moses was well versed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians’]was absolutelycrucial. It was the one foundation on which he could build his entireedifice, and it was the one testimonythat could save him frombeingaccused of heresy.Servingasleitmotifs throughout the whole line of the Moses debate, which startedwith Spencer […], arethis sentence and ashort passage from Philo of Alexandria in De Vita Mosis in which he says that Moses was initiated into the “symbolic” philosophy of the ancient Egyptians.’ Spencer’sreliance upon Philo is very striking; in this work, the Jewish Pla- tonist seems to hold the most important position by far amongst Jewish thinkers. Another book that is worth drawingattention to in this contextisRalph Cudworth, TheTrue Intellectual System of the Uni- verse: Wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted and its Impossibility Demonstrated with aDiscourse concerning the True Notion of the LordsSupper (New York: Gould &Newman, 1837), which Mendelssohn possessed in folio and in Mosheim’sLatin translation (Verzeichniß,4:nºs 67– 68); see ibidem,416: ‘Forwhich cause, we can by no means give credit to that of Philo, in the life of Moses,that besides the Egyptian priests,learned men weresent by Pharaoh’sdaughter out of Greecetoinstruct Moses.’ Cf. Ludwig Holberg, Jüdische Geschichte: von Erschaffungder Welt bis auf gegenwärtige Zeiten,vol. 1(Altona and Flensburg: Verlagder Gebrüder Korte, 1747): 109: ‘Moses wirdandem ägyptischen Hofe erzogen: Nach einigen Jahrenlies die Fürstin Mosen zu sich kommen, und nahm denselben nicht ausnur als ihr eignes Kind auf, sondern sie lies ihn auch in allen ägyp- tischen Künsten und Wissenschaften aufs sorgfältigsteunterrichten. Das beste aber,nämlich die Er- kenntnis des wahren Gottes hatteerbereits durch den Unterricht seiner Eltern gefaßt.’  Mendelssohn, . Rettungder Juden: Ausdem Englischen übersetzt nebst einer Vorrede von Moses Mendelssohn (Berlin and Stettin: Friedrich Nicolai 1782): 36–39 and 47. 190 Ze’ev Strauss

If in this passage we should understand by empire of honour acertain empireinthe world, then the onlypossible thingthat could be meant is the reign of the Roman Empire, under which the Jews in those days livedand during which this prayerwas introduced. How can this, however,be reconciled with the assertion of our Rabbi [i.e. Menasseh BenIsrael], which demonstrates this from passages of Josephus and Philo, namelythat the Jews sacrificed and prayedfor the well- beingofthe Roman emperor?Indeed, according to the dictum of the rabbis the sin altogether, but not the sinner,should be anathematised⁴⁵.⁴⁶

Mendelssohn does not merelyreaffirm Cranz’stheological critique concerning the metaphorical languageofancient Hebrew,but further develops this line of thought into awell-thought-out sceptical stance in regardtothe epistemic statusoflanguage altogether:

Doctrines and laws,convictions and actions.The twoformer werenot connected to words or written characters which always remainthe same, for all men and all times,amid all the revo- lutions of language, morals, manners,and conditions,wordsand characters which invariably present the same rigid forms,intowhich we cannot forceour concepts without disfiguring them. […]The ceremonial lawitself is akind of livingscript,rousing the mind and heart,full of meaning, never ceasing to inspire contemplation and to provide the occasion and opportunity for oral instruction. […]Weteach and instruct one another onlythroughwritings;welearn to know natureand man onlyfrom writings.Wework and relax,edify and amuse ourselvesthrough overmuch writing. […]Everythingisdead letter[‘toter Buchstabe’]; the spirit of livingconversa- tion has vanished. […]Inaword, we are literati, men of letters [‘Buchstabenmenschen’]. Our whole beingdependsonletters; and we can scarcelycomprehend how amortal man can edu- cate and perfect himself without a book.⁴⁷

Gideon Freudenthal has convincingly shown that this sceptical position towards lan- guageadvocatedfor by Mendelssohn is not onlyunique to his Jerusalem but consti- tutes asystematic philosophical viewpoint of his later years which also correlates with his common-sense tendency:

 See Babylonian Talmud, 10a. Cf. Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,124– 125(JubA 8, 190): ‘And if this is the case, Icannot fear such acondition; nor can Iwish for arevelation [assuringme] that I shall never be placed in this condition of magnanimous benevolencewhich brings felicity to my fel- low creatures and myself. What Ihavetofear is sin itself.’  Ibidem,30–31 (fn. *; my translation and emphasis). Cf. JubA 8, 48: ‘Wenn in dieser Stelle unter Reiche des Stoltzesein gewisses Reich aufErdenverstanden werden soll; so kannwohlkeinanderes, als das Römische gemeinet seyn, unterdessen Druckedie Juden damals lebten, als dieses Gebet ein- geführet worden. Wieräumt sich dieses aber mit dem, was unser Rabbi in der Folgebehauptet,und durchStellen aus dem Josephus und Philo beweiset,daß nehmlich die Juden für das Wohl der römi- schen Kaiser und des Reichs geopfert und Gebeteangestellet?Ja, nach dem Ausspruch der Rabinen überhaupt soll der Sünde, aber nicht dem Sünder geflucht werden’ (myemphasis).  Mendelssohn Jerusalem,102– 104 (original emphasis) (JubA 8, 169–170). Cf. Julius Guttmann, Die Philosophie des Judentums (Wiesbaden: Fourier Verlag,1985): 314. Krochmalnik, “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache,” 270–274; Ulrich Ricken, “Mendelssohn und die Sprachtheorien der Aufklärung,” in Moses Mendelssohn im Spannungsfeld der Aufklärung,eds. Michael Albrecht and Eva J. Engel(Stutt- gart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2000): 228–229. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 191

And yetreaders cannot ignore his repeated advocacyofcommon sense or sound reason and his reservations concerningmetaphysicsassuch. Scholars wished to attenuatethis inconsistency and suggestedthat at first Mendelssohnwas aWolffian metaphysician but that he grewever moresceptical regarding metaphysicsand moreinclined to commonsense.⁴⁸

As Freudenthal argues, Mendelssohn is to be regarded as ‘acommon-sense philoso- pher and sceptic in metaphysics,’⁴⁹ who became increasingly doubtful of ‘the ability of languagetoadequately represent and to help generate truth transcendingcom- mon-sense knowledge of the empirical world.’⁵⁰ Mendelssohn’sapprehension of Ju- daism is nothing shortofpuzzling:Hebrew Scripture, when taken for the absolute truth, leads to idolatry.⁵¹ Iwould like to make five observations regarding the quota- tion at hand: 1) Mendelssohn’ssceptical evaluation of language, in all likelihood, drawsupon Plato’s Schriftkritik in the Phaedrus (274b-278e), wherePlato puts the following state- ment into the mouth of Socrates:

Writing, Phaedrus,has this strange quality,and is very like painting; for the creaturesofpaint- ing stand likelivingbeings,but if one asks them aquestion, they preserveasolemn silence. And so it is with written words; youmight think they spokeasifthey had , but if you question them, wishingtoknow about their sayings,they always sayonlyone and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about,alikeamongthose who under- stand and those who have no interest in it,and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustlyreviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself. (Phdr. 275d4-e5)⁵²

 Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry,13. Fogelalso follows this line of interpretation: “Scep- ticism of Scepticism: On Mendelssohn’sPhilosophyofCommon Sense,” 54 and 58–67.  Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry,17.  Ibidem,16.  In this context,Mendelssohnrefers explicitlytoChristoph Meiners’ Versuch über die Religionsge- schichte der ältesten Völker,besonders der Egyptier (Göttingen: Johann Christian Dietrich, 1775): ‘Mr. Meiners’sremark would accordingly be asort of confirmation of my hypothesisthat the need for writ- tencharacters was the first cause of idolatry.Injudgingthe religious ideas of anation that is other- wise;’ see Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,113 (JubA 8, 179); see Alexander Altmann’scommentary, Jerusa- lem,27. IbelieveMendelssohn is alluding to another passage of Meiners than the one suggested by Alexander Altmann: ‘[…]: dringtman aber tiefer ein, so findet man den vollständigsten Stammbaum der Abgötterey, eine ununterbrochene Folge, und leicht begreiflich Zeugung aller Artenvon Irrthü- mern, die so wie sie sind, nothwendig auseinander entstehen mußten. Die Grundbegriffe dieser gan- zen Irr-Theorie gründeten sich in der Lage und Beschaffenheit des Landes,inder Lebensart der Ein- wohner.[…]: diese verbunden mit den Hieroglyphen konnten keinenandern, als einen solchen Zustand der Gelehrsamkeit erzeugen;’ see Meiners, Versuch über die Religionsgeschichte der ältesten Völker,62.  Plato, Euthyphro,Apology,,Phaedo,Phaedrus,trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge,MAand London: HarvardUniversity Press,2005): 565–567. MendelssohnreferstoPlato’sdistinction of earth- ly and heavenly ἔρως and exploits it for his own differentiation between worldlyand otherworldly politics;see Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,131 (JubA 8, 196). 192 Ze’ev Strauss

The main similarityinthis respect between Mendelssohn and Plato is grounded on the almostidentical dichotomybetween the living word(spoken) and the inanimate one (written), which both equate with an image. In Phdr. 276a, we read: ‘Youmean the living and breathingword[λόγον … ζῶντα καὶἔμψυχον]ofhim who knows, of which the written wordmay justlybecalled the image[εἴδωλον].’⁵³ In an analogous manner,Mendelssohn juxtaposes written languageas‘permanent signs’ (‘fort- dauernde Zeichen’)with the notion of an image:

We have seen how difficultitistopreservethe abstract ideas of religion amongmen by means of permanentsigns. Imagesand hieroglyphics [‘Bilder und Bilderschrift’]lead to superstition and idolatry,and our alphabetical script makes man too speculative.Itdisplays the symbolic knowl- edge of things and their relations too openlyonthe surface; it spares us the effort of penetrating and searching, and creates too wide adivision betwe[e]n doctrine and life.⁵⁴

Mendelssohn’sexplicit and overtlyapprovingreferences,inthis very section, to Meiners’ Versuch über die Religionsgeschichte der ältesten Völker,besondersder Egyptier (1775)⁵⁵ solidifies our hypothesis further,since the author makes recourse in this work to Plato’scritique of written language. The philosopher and historian Christoph Meiners (1747– 1810) partiallytranslatesand then comments on Socrates’ portrayal of Thamus’ condemnation of Theuth’sinvention of letters (γράμματα)(Phdr. 274c5–275b2).⁵⁶ 2) Mendelssohn’sinnovative solution to this problem, the ceremonial lawper- ceivedas‘living script,’ could also be linked to the Platonic Schriftkritik in the Phaed- rus: If our earlier suspicion is correct as to the impact Philo’s De vita Moysis had on Mendelssohn’sperception of Judaism, then one should at this juncturebear in mind Philo’sPlatonic depiction of Mosaic law, which is unequivocallypredicated on Plato’s

 Plato, Euthyphro, Apology,Crito,Phaedo,Phaedrus,567.Cf. Krochmalnik, “Das Zeremoniell als Zei- chensprache,” 274–275; Grit Schorch, Moses Mendelssohns Sprachpolitik (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2012): 228, n. 52.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,118 (JubA 8, 184).  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,112–113 and 121(JubA 8, 177– 179and 186). The influenceofthis docu- ment on Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem has been alreadypointed out by Alexander Altmann in the com- mentary to the English translation:223–224. See also the insightful remarks on the subjectinFreu- denthal, No Religion without Idolatry,106 and 273.  Meiners, Versuch über die Religionsgeschichte der ältesten Völker,208–209: ‘Ichhabe voneinem alten GotteinNaukraties [Ναύκρατιν]gehört,dessen (δαιμονος)Nahme Theuth heist,daß er nicht nur die Kunst zu zählen, sondern auch die Kunst zu rechnen, die Geometrie, Astronomie, Schriftzei- chen, nebst vielen Arten vonSpielen erfunden habe. Er soll zu den Zeitendes in Theben wohnenden, und über ganzEgyptenherschenden Königs Thamus gelebt,und ihm in einer Unterredung, ausser seinen übrigenKünsten, die Kunstzuschreiben, als eine der heilsamstenHülfsmittel und Unterstützun- gendes Gedächtnisses,empfohlen haben, gegen welcheletztereder König aber mehrereEinwürfe machte. Sokrates rückt die des Theuths und Thamus,und die Gründe vonbeyden Seiten ein; es ist sonderbar,was man in diesen beyden Stellen alles übersehen hat’ (myemphasis). Fora moredetailed discussion, see Thomas A. Szlezák, Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie: Inter- pretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1985). Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 193

λόγος ζῶνκαὶἔμψυχος (Phdr. 276a8). In Mos.1.162,Philo designates the JewishLaw- giverasthe of the rationaland living law(νόμος ἔμψυχόςτεκαὶ λογικὸς).⁵⁷ The ideal figure of Moses serves the JewishPlatonist as the prime exam- ple, through which he illustrates this aspect:

They know this wellwho readthe sacredbooks,which, unless he was such as we have said, he would never have composed under God’sguidanceand handed on for the use of those who are worthytouse them, to be their fairest possession, likenesses and copies of the patterns enshrined in the soul, as also are the laws set beforeusinthese books, which shew so clearly the said virtues. (Mos. 2.11)⁵⁸

Philo applies Plato’scritical analysis of literallanguagetohis spiritual conception of Jewishlaw.This motif is quite acommon one in Philo’sJewish Platonism. According- ly,the biblical patriarchs, Abraham, Isaacand Jacob, alsodidn’trequirethe written laws (νόμων γραφή), since they all embodied the ἔμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι in their souls.⁵⁹ We find asimilar explanation in Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem:

And now Iamable to explain moreclearlymysurmise about the purpose of the ceremonial law in Judaism. The forefathers of our nation, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, remained faithful to the Eternal, and soughttopreserveamongtheir families and descendants pureconcepts of religion, far removed from all idolatry.⁶⁰

Philo strives ipso facto to accentuate the aliveness of the Godly unwritten law(ἄγρα- φος νόμος), in order to unearth its rational and undoubtable coreasrational content intrinsic to the human soul. This is very similar to the conceptual movemade by Mendelssohn in Jerusalem with regard to the spiritual and dynamic Zeremonialgeset- ze. In his important article “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache,” Daniel Krochmal-

 The German translation of Mendelssohn’sedition of De vita Moysis reads as follows: ‘Vielleicht aber hat auch die göttliche VorsehungMosen lange vorher zu einem lebendigen und vernünftigen Ge- setze gemacht,weil er einst ein Gesetzgeber werden sollte, und ihn im Voraus, ehe er es sich noch selbst in die Gedanken kommen ließ, dazu bestimmte;’ see Gottesgelahrheit,70–71 (myemphasis). Cf. Mos.2.4 (νόμον ἔμψυχον)translated in Gottesgelahrheit,146: ‘ein lebendigesGesetz.’  PLCL 6.455 – 457(my emphasis). Forthe German translation of this passage read by Mendelssohn, see: ‘Es wissen aber diejenigen, welche die heiligen Bücher lesen, daß er diese nicht durch göttlichen Eingebungwürde haben schreiben, noch denen, die sich dergleichen Güter zu bedienen wissen, das schönsteBild des vollkommensten Wesens, das jemals eine Seele gezieret hat, von welchem die be- kanntgemachten Gesetze Abrisse und Nachahmungen sind, in denen man die vorher genannten Tugen- den deutlich erblicket,hinterlassen können, wenn er nicht ein so vollkommener Mann gewesenwäre.’ (Gottesgelahrheit,149–150;myemphasis). Cf. Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,128 (JubA 8, 191): ‘Das aller- höchsteWesen hat sie [i.e. ewigeWahrheiten] allen vernünftigen Geschöpfen durch Sache und Begriff geoffenbaret, mit einer Schrift in die Seele geschrieben,die zu allen Zeitenund an allen Orten leserlich und verständlich ist’ (myemphasis). Cf. Krochmalnik, “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache,” 267– 273.  Abr.5–6; Decal. 1.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,117– 118 (JubA 8, 183). 194 Ze’ev Strauss

nik stresses the rationality at the bottom of Mendelssohn’sidea of ceremoniallaw as adistinct type of sign languageofthe religion of reason (‘besondere Zeichensprache der Vernunftreligion’):⁶¹

Mendelssohnspricht dem Judentum einen religiösen Lehrgehalt nicht ab;nur daß es sich dabei nicht um eine besondereDoktrin handelt, sondern um eine vernünftige Weisung, die durch be- sondereZeremonien und die an sie anknüpfendemaieutische Unterweisungvermittelt wird. Das Judentum zeichnet sich nicht durch eine besondereLehre,sondern durch ein besonderes Medi- um der Vernunft aus.⁶²

Thus, this Platonic rationalisation of Mosaic lawunderlying Mendelssohn’sZeremo- nialgesetz resembles, in its objective,that of Philo. Freudenthal aptlyelucidates this aim as it pertains to Mendelssohn: ‘The ceremonies of Judaism have apractical func- tion similar to philosophy: they help buttress truths of reason against doubts.’⁶³ 3) As previouslymentioned, Mendelssohn’semployment of the dichotomybe- tween the inanimate word(‘toter Buchstabe’)and the living spirit (‘lebendiger Geist’)not onlycorresponds to Plato, but also and afortiori to Paul accordingto2 Corinthians 3:6.⁶⁴ This can be demonstrated by juxtaposing apassagebyMendels- sohn with an excerpt from Lessing’sGermantranslation of Juan Huarte de San Juan’s TheExamination of Men’sWits (Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften; 1752),awork that Mendelssohn apparentlyusedfor his own depiction:

Wir lehren undunterrichteneinander nur in Wir schämen unswollen sie sagen, unsre En- Schriften; lernen die Naturund die Menschen tscheidung oder unsern Rath ohne Anführung kennen, nuraus Schriften; […]Alles ist toter eines Gesetzes zu geben, welches das waswir

 Krochmalnik, “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache,” 242.  Ibidem,272; Guttmann, Philosophie des Judentums,314– 135.See Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,118– 119 and 127–128(JubA 8, 166 and 184).  Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry,149.  See further Christiane Frey, “Geist und Buchstabe: Ideologeme der Darstellbarkeit bei Hamann, Mendelssohnund Kleist,” in Darstellbarkeit: Zu einem ästhetisch-philosophischem Problem um 1800,eds.Claudia Albes and Christiane Frey (Würzburg: Königshausen &Neumann, 2003): 143 – 156.  JubA 8, 170(my emphasis).  Johann Huart (= Juan Huarte), Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften: Worinne er die verschie- denen Fähigkeiten die in den Menschen liegen zeigt einer jeden den Theil der Gelehrsamkeit bestimmt der fürsie eigentlich gehöret und endlich den Aeltern Anschläge ertheilt wie sie fähigeund zu den Wis- senschaften aufgelegte Söhne erhalten können. Ausdem Spanischen übersetzt von Gotthold Ephraim Leßing (Zerbst: Zimmermannische Buchhandlung, 1752): 203–204(my emphasis). It is noteworthy that Huartemakes use of Plato’sunderstanding of the solicitor in this context; see ibidem,206– 207and 212–213. Cf. further Stephanie Catani, “Prüfungder Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften: Lessings Huarte-ÜbersetzungimKontext poetologischer und anthropologischer Diskurse der Aufklärung,” in ’ihrem Originale nachzudenken’:ZuLessings Übersetzungen,ed. Helmut Berthold (Tübingen: Niemey- er,2008): 29–46.Cf. Gotthold E. Lessing, Lessing:Philosophical and Theological Writing,ed. Hugh B. Nisbet (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63: ‘In short,the letterisnot the spirit,and the Bible is not religion. Consequently, objectionstothe letter,and to the Bible, need not also be objec- tions to the spirit and to religion. Forthe Bible obviously contains more.’ Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 195

Buchstabe;nirgend Geist der lebendigen Unter- entscheiden oder rathen ausdrücklich bestimmt. haltung. […] Wir brauchen des erfahrenen Man- Dieser Bedeutung nachkönnen die Gottesge- nes nicht, wirbrauchen nur seine Schriften. Mit lehrten keine Litterati heissen, weil in der h. einem Wort,wir sind litterati, Buchstabenmen- Schrift ([II] Cor. III) der Buchstabe tödtet,der schen. Vom Buchstaben hängt unser ganzes Geist aber lebendig macht. Ihr Buchstabe ist Wesen ab, und wir können kaum begreifen,wie geheimnißvoll, voller Figuren undBilder,dunkel ein Erdensohn sich bilden, und vervollkommnen undnicht einem jedenverständlich. Auch die kann, ohne Buch.⁶⁵ Aertze habenkeinen Buchstaben dem sie sich unterwerfen müßten. […]; weil in der Medicin Vernunft und Erfahrung vonweit grösserm Ge- wichte sind als das Ansehen.⁶⁶

It seems almostbeyond doubtthat Mendelssohn relies,inthese central passages out of Jerusalem, on Lessing’stranslation of Huarte’scharacterisation of the solicitor (‘Rechtsgelehrter’)inthe eleventh section of his book.⁶⁷ The main feature of the so- licitor is his strongdependency on the literal letters of the law. These ‘Rechtsgelehr- ten’ as literalists (Litterati)are then contrasted by Huarte to biblical exegetes (‘Gottes- gelehrten’), who have the livelyspirit as the guiding principle of their enquiry.Huarte goes on to make adistinction between incompetent legal scholars and competent ones, the former more reliant on the faculty of memory (‘Gedächtnis’), the latter pre- dominantlyonthe faculty of reason (‘Verstand’).⁶⁸ He then turns to implicitly equate the incompetent ‘Gottesgelehrten’ thatconstrain their whole being to the prosaic let- ters of the lawwith the negative mindset of Jews as aprime example of Litterati:

All which breedeth an alteration in the decision of the law, and if the judge or pleader be not endowed with discourse, to gather out of the law, or to take away or adjoine that which the lawselfe doth not expresse in words,heshall commit manie errors in followingthe letter:for it hath been said that the words of the laware not to be takenafter the Jewish manner,that is, to construe onelythe letter,and so takethe sense.⁶⁹

Stumblingupon such apassagewritten by none other than his close friend Lessing, who, accordingtohis ownaccount,revered Huarte’sscientific method of exploration

 The title of this section, Huarte, Prüfung der Köpfe,200,reads as follows: ‘Worinne erwiesen wird, daß der theoretische Theil der Rechtsgelahrsamkeit dem Gedächtnisse, der practische Theil, das Amt nämlich der Advocaten und Richter,dem Verstande, die Regierung, aber des Staats der Einbildungs- kraft zugehöre.’  Ibidem,210 –211and 213.  Juan Huarte de San Juan, TheExamination of Mens Wits,trans.RichardCarew (London: Adam F. Slip, for RichardWatkins,1594):157–158 (myemphasis). Forthe German translation Mendelssohn used, see: ‘thereof verba legis non suntcapienda iudaice. Das ist: die Wortedes Gesetzesmüssen nicht aufjüdische Art erklärt werden. Diese jüdische Art aber bestehet darinne, daß man eine gram- matikalische Zergliederungdamit anstellt und den buchstäblichen Sinne herauszieht;’ see Huarte, Prü- fung der Köpfe,211 (myemphasis). 196 Ze’ev Strauss

by means of unbiased freethoughtalone,⁷⁰ must have left adeep impression on Mendelssohn as he sawhow his Jewish faith was being misrepresented. Certainly, this was not the first time Mendelssohn encountered such acritical evaluation of Ju- daism with respect to the Pauline distinction between the dead letter and the living spirit.For example, in Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus of Corrodi, arenowned Leibniz-Wolffian adherent to the enlightened ‘Vernunftreligion’,wefind asimilar negative assessment regarding Judaism as solelyaspiritless ‘Zeremonialreligion’:

The Jewish rights,and constitutions do not,however,conveyusafavourable opinion of this na- tion. We marvel at the appearance of legal scholars whoconstantlyignore the spirit of the law, and solelywant to acknowledge its letter;who treat seriouslyand extensively the frivolities and wretched trifles,for which no lawgiver in the whole world cares; whoissue prescriptions about unendingimprobable cases,ofwhich no reasonablehuman beingwould conceive.Weare sur- prised to find moral teachers which they follow whoconstantlyignore the eternal laws of nature, and decrees and constitutions of avery arbitrary essence, which seem to have no influencewhat- soever on human happiness,and which have neither real morality nor immorality;werethere ever teachers of religion, whotook customs and ceremonies to be the sole essenceofthat religion, and were used to takingthe outershell and shadow of the virtue for the virtue itself, and per- ceivingthe externality of religion for the interiority thereof […]such teachers are the Jews.⁷¹

Mendelssohn’smanner of dealing with these Christian prejudices is innovative.He inverts the Christocentric readingof2Corinthians 3:6completelyand givesitaJew- ish twist: Henceforth,itisJudaism in its ancientoriginal meaning that is the undog- matic religion of spirit,which does not rest on inanimate letters.Mendelssohn also does not retreat from the notion of Mosaic law. On the contrary:The dynamic nature of Mosaic ‘Zeremonialgesetze’ is preciselywhat givesJudaism its aliveness and frees it from being dependent upon the literal sense of Hebrew Scripture.⁷² In the closing

 Gotthold E. Lessing, “Vorrede des Uebersetzers,” in Huarte, Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissen- schaften,[6b]: ‘[…]erbeurtheiltund treibtalles aufeine besondereArt,erentdecket alle seine Ge- danken frey und ist sich selbst sein eignerFührer.’ Cf. Catani, “Prüfungder Köpfe zu den Wissen- schaften,” 31–32.  Corrodi, Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus,92–93 (mytranslation): ‘Die jüdischen Rechte, und Satzungenbringenuns indeß keine günstigere Meinungvom Charakter dieser Nation bey.Wir wun- dern uns, Rechtsgelehrtezusehen, die den Geist des Gesetzes beständig ausden Augen setzen, und seinen Buchstaben allein gehalten wissen wollen, die Frivolitäten, und nichtswürdige Kleinigkeiten, um die sich kein Gesetzgeber in der Welt bekümmert,ernsthaft und weitläuftig abhandeln, die über unendlichunwahrscheinliche Fälle, an die kein vernünftigerMensch denken wird,Verordnungen ma- chen. Wirwundern uns Sittenlehrer zu finden, die die ewigenNaturgesetze unaufhörlich ausden Augen setzen, und Verordnungen, und Satzungen, die ganz willkürlich sind, und vonganzkeinem Einfluß aufdie menschliche Glückseligkeit scheinen,keine würkliche Sittlichkeit,oder Unsittlichkeit haben, an ihreStelle setzen; gabesjemals Lehrerder Religion, welche Gebräuche und Ceremonien für das Wesen derselben nehmen,und sich gewohnthaben, die Schaale und den Schatten der Tugend für die Tugend selbst,und die äußere Seitefür das Innwendigeder Religion anzusehen,[…]; so sind die Juden solche Lehrer’ (myemphasis).  Forthe influence of Wolffian philosophyonMendelssohn’sconception of the ceremonial law, see Krochmalnik, “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache,” 255–259. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 197

part of Jerusalem,Mendelssohn places Jesus of Nazareth in the Jewish tradition of ,for he ‘is in completeagreement not onlywith Scripture, but also with the tradition.’⁷³ Mendelssohn would scarcelyhaveaproblem making the same con- ceptual move with the founding figure of Christianity,Paul, who does not speak of the abolition of Mosaic law, but rather,like Jesus (Matthew 5:17: πληρῶσαι), of its spi- ritual fulfilment (Romans13:10: πλήρωμα … νόμου). In sum, Mendelssohn attempts to break the reductionist equation of Jewishreligion (spirit)with its Scriptural texts (letters), astance he wasalreadyfamiliar with from Lessing’sfamoustheological axiom for Christianity (1778): ‘The letter is not the spirit,and the Bible is not reli- gion.’⁷⁴ 4) Johann G. Herder has not been paid sufficient attention to his influenceon Mendelssohn’sgrowingscepticism towards languageand its innate shortcomings.⁷⁵ As Freudenthal has persuasivelyshown, Mendelssohn’sgrowingdoubt concerning the aptness of languagefor articulating metaphysical truths is not merelyatransi- tional position we accidentallycome across in Jerusalem,but rather constitutes asys- tematic philosophicalstance of his lateryears that is also elaborated on in his Mor- genstunden oder Vorlesungen über das DaseynGottes (1785).⁷⁶ Herder’sspecial appeal to Mendelssohn in this regardprobablystems from the fact thathenot onlydealt with the pure theoretical elements of language, but also with an aesthetic analysis of Biblical Hebrew.⁷⁷ He even personallyreviewed in avery favourable mannerHer- der’swork on languagetheory, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (1772), in Friedrich Nikolai’s Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek 19.2 (1773).⁷⁸ In Herder’s Abhand- lung über den Ursprung der Sprache,whereheevaluates languageasaprofane

 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,134 (JubA 8, 199). See Alexander Altmann’scommentary: Jerusalem,239. Cf. Oswald Bayer, “Der Mensch als Pflichtträger der Natur Naturrecht und Gesellschaftsvertrag in der Kontroverse zwischen Hamann und Mendelssohn,” in Mendelssohn und die Kreiseseiner Wirksamkeit, eds.Michael Albrecht,Eva J. Engel and Norbert Hinske(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag,1994): 184– 189.  Lessing, Lessing:Philosophical and TheologicalWriting,63and 127.  Cf. Ricken, “Mendelssohn und die Sprachtheorien der Aufklärung,” 213and 224–225.  Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry,38–45.  Mendelssohnpossessed, in his library,both Herder’s Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voß, 1772)aswell as his VomGeist der Ebräischen Poesie. Eine Anleitung fürdie Liebhaber derselben und der ältesten Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes (Dessau: Verlags- kasseand Buchhandlungder Gelehrten und Künstler,1782); see Verzeichniß,22(nºs 81–82), 53 (Nº 655). Cf. Eva J. Engel, “‘Die Freyheit der Untersuchung’:Die Literaturbriefe72–75 (13.und 20.Dezem- ber 1759),” in Mendelssohn und die Kreise seiner Wirksamkeit,eds. Michael Albrecht,Eva J. Engeland Norbert Hinske(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag,1994): 252and 268.  JubA 5.2, 176: ‘Ueberhaupt unterscheidet sich das philosophische Genie des Herrn Herders durch die Geschicklichkeit,alles was ihm seine ausgebreitete Kenntniß in der Philosophie, Naturkunde und der ganzenLitteratur darbot,zuseinem Vortheil anzuwenden, daher ist er auch vermögend, seine Materie in ein helleres Licht zu setzen, sie vonmehrern Seiten zu betrachten, und mehr darinn zu entdecken, als es dem andern Verf. [i.e. D. Tiedemann] möglich war.[…]Herrn Herders Schreibart ist freylich stärker,aber auch geschmückter und glänzender;[…].’ 198 Ze’ev Strauss

and animalistic product of human spirit (‘überall Spuren vomGangedes menschli- chen Geistes!’),⁷⁹ he voices considerable doubt regarding the adequacy of artificial philosophical language, givenits arbitrariness, for conveying absolute truths.⁸⁰ The animalistic origin (‘tierischer Ursprung’)oflanguagealso pertains, as Herder ar- gues, to the so-called GodlylanguageofBiblical Hebrew.The writing of this an- cient languageintuitivelyindicatesthis very fact,since it entirelycontradictsthe de- mands of common sense:

This manner of writingissocontrary to the course of sound reason—of writingthe nonessential and omittingthe essential—that it would be incomprehensible to the grammarians,ifthe gram- marians wereaccustomed to comprehend.⁸¹

This sceptical attitude towards Biblical Hebrew as alanguagecould account for Herder’sshifting to explore the aesthetic dimensions of Hebrew Scripture. In his po- etological analysis of the Hebrew Bible in VomGeist der Ebräischen Poesie (1782), he constantlyhighlights sublimeness as akey feature of biblical poetic language(‘Erha- benheit der Poesie’). This line of interpretation seems to mainlybearesultofthe pre- liminarystudy De sacrapoesi hebraeorum praelectiones academicae oxonii habitae (1753), conducted by Robert Lowth, and of the extensive reception in the Enlighten- ment of Pseudo-Longinus’ ancientpoetological essay On the (περὶὕψους).⁸² Very similar observations werealreadymadebyMendelssohn between 1757 and 1758 in his review articles Betrachtungen ueberdas Erhabene und Naive in den schönen Wissenschaften (1758)⁸³ and De sacrapoesi Hebraeorum, praelectiones academicae Oxonii habitae, aRoberto Lowth (1757),⁸⁴ in which he favourablyevaluatesboth Pseu-

 Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache,133.Cf. to Karl W. essay: “Daß die Sprache dem erstenMenschen durch Wunder nicht mitgetheiltseyn kann,” in PhilosophischeAufsät- ze,ed. Gotthold E. Lessing(Braunschweig:Buchhandlungdes Fürstlichen Waisenhauses, 1776): 1–12. See Verzeichniß,51(Nº 635).  Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache,43–44.See also ibidem,60–61,93and 124– 125: ‘Man weiß, aufwelchen Wegendie meisten Abstraktionen “in unsrewissenschaftliche Sprache” gekommen sind, in Theologie und Rechtsgelehrsamkeit,inPhilosophie und andre. Man weiß, wie oft die Scholastiker und Polemiker nicht einmal mit Worten ihrerSprache streiten konntenund als Streit- gewehr(Hypostasis und Substanz, ὁμοούσιος und ὁμοιούσιος)aus denen Sprachen herüberholen mußten, in denen die Begriffe abstrahirt,indenen das Streitgewehrgeschärft war!,’ as well as 133–134 and 140.  On the Origin of Language:Jean-Jacques Rousseau Essay on the Origin of Languages, Johann Gott- fried HerderEssay on the Origin of Language,trans. John H. Moran and Alexander Gode (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,1986): 95;Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, 17;cf. ibidem,111.  See Martin Fritz, VomErhabenen: der Traktat “Peri Hypsous” und seine ästhetisch-religiöse Renais- sance im 18. Jahrhundert (Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen, 2011); Schorch, Moses Mendelssohns Sprachpolitik, 106–109;LiberaPisano, “Judentum, Entfremdung,Sprache. Der vergessene Zusammenhang zwi- schen Mendelssohn und Hegel,” Judaica 4(2016): 482–483.  JubA 1, 191–218.  JubA 4, 20–62. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 199

do-Longinus’ On the Sublime as well as Lowth’sLatin lectures on the poetical nature of Scriptural Hebrew.⁸⁵ Having said that, Herder’sstance towardslanguageingeneral and Biblical Hebrew in particular could have still helpedform some of Mendels- sohn’scritical tendencies in Jerusalem: LikeHerder,hewas critical of language and sawanunbridgeable gapbetween arbitrary linguistic signs and that which they aim to signify.⁸⁶ Herder’streatment of Biblical Hebrew as adeficient language with clear limitations and amere derivative of the human spirit could have also led him to rule out the possibility of HolyScripture entailing absolutephilosophical truths. Mendelssohn also considered languageinall its relativity as acriterion for evaluatingthe varying Bildungsniveaus of nations:

The Greeks had both culture and enlightenment.They were an educated nation just as their lan- guageisaneducated language. – Generally, the languageofapeople is the best indication of its education, of its culture as well as its enlightenment,interms of both its extent and its strength.⁸⁷

It is therefore hardlysurprising that Mendelssohn juxtaposes the sublime poetical languageofBiblical Hebrew with the classic literature of ancient Greek and Roman poetsofthe stature of and Virgil and implies the moralsuperiority of the former.⁸⁸ The aesthetic approach is the manner in which Mendelssohn at- tempted to exhaust much of the lost meaningofthe Hebrew Bible without resorting to unsubstantiated presuppositions of wishful thinking.⁸⁹ 5) Mendelssohn’ssceptical analysis of mayvery well alsobedirectly influenced by the Neo-Pyrrhonian critique of the Stoic theory of signs,which

 Schorch, Moses Mendelssohns Sprachpolitik,112–114; Pisano, “Judentum, Entfremdung, Sprache,” 482–483.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,108–112 (JubA 8, 173 – 177). See Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache,211.  Moses Mendelssohn, “On the Question:What Does ‘to Enlighten’ Mean?,” in idem, Philosophical Writings,trans. and ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997): 314; Moses Mendelssohn, “Über die Frage: was heißtaufklären,” in Wasist Aufklärung? Thesen und De- finition,ed. EhrhardBahr (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004): 5(JubA 6.1, 116).  Mendelssohn, De sacrapoesi Hebraeorum,171 (JubA 4, 20): ‘Man liest den Homer,Virgil und die übrigenSchriften der Alten; man zergliedert alle Schönheiten, die darin enthaltensind, mit der größ- tenSorgfalt, und giebt sich alle Mühe, unsern Geschmack nach ihremMuster zu bilden; aber selten bekümmert man sich um die Regeln der Kunst,nach welchen jene göttlichen Dichter unterden alten Hebräern die erhabenstenEmpfindungeninuns regemachen,und unmittelbar den Wegnach un- serm Herzen zu treffend wissen. Der feine attische Geschmack, den wir ausden Schriften der alten Griechen und Römer schöpfen, kann sehr leicht in Weichlichkeit ausarten; aber der ächte orientali- sche Geschmack, der in den Schriften der heiligenDichter herrscht, ist allzu männlich,allzu edel, als daß er uns je zu unwürdigenGesinnungenverleiten könnte.’  Foramoredetailed discussion of Mendelssohn’saesthetic approach, see Daniel Krochmalnik, “Zeichen der Kunst,Zeichen der Moral, Zeichen der Religion,” in Zur Religionsästhetik und -semiotik der Aufklärung,inZeichen-Kunst. Zeichen und Interpretation,ed. Werner Stegmaier (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999): 101–111. 200 Ze’ev Strauss

makes up acentral part of the second book of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhon- ism (PH II 97– 133).⁹⁰ In these two following chapters xand xi of book II, Sextus pres- ents the Stoic distinctionbetween the recollective sign (σημεῖον ὑπομνηστικόν)and the indicative sign (σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικόν), casting doubtonthe provability of the ex- istenceofthe latter as amental representation of the inherentlyambiguous object of knowledge beingsignified (σημαινόμενον):⁹¹ ‘Thus, since such plausible arguments are adduced both for there being signs and for there not being,weshould no more saythat there are signs than thatthere are not.’⁹² Indicative signs here are also stronglylinked with discursive thoughtasthey are defined as asort of preposition (λεκτόν), which is ‘apre-antecedent statement in asoundconditional, revelatory of the consequent.’⁹³ Mendelssohn’scritical account of signs as irreal and arbitrary abstractions of human reason resembles Sextus’ sceptical evaluation of Stoic semi- otics:

[…]; for without the aid of signs,man can scarcelyremovehimself one step from the sensual. In the same wayinwhich the first stepstowardrational knowledge must have been taken, the sci- ences arestill beingexpanded and enriched by inventions;this is whythe invention of anew scientific term is, at times,anevent of great importance. The man whofirst inventedthe word naturedoes not seem to have made avery great discovery.Nevertheless,his contempora- ries were indebted to him for enabling them to confound the conjurerwho showed them an ap- parition in the air,and to tell him that his trick was nothingsupernatural, but an effect of na- ture.⁹⁴

Three facts immediatelysuggest thatMendelssohn was acquainted with this specific section of Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism: (i) Mendelssohn possessed the 1718 folio edition of Sextus’ writingsinhis library, edited by Johann A. Fabricius on the basis of the original commentated edition of Henry Etienne from 1562.⁹⁵ (ii) In addi- tion, we alsoknow that Mendelssohn was well familiar with Johann J. Bruckers His- toria critica philosophiae,afive-volume work thathehad its first edition (1742 – 1744) in his library⁹⁶ and also reviewed its supplemented appendixpublishedin1767inthe Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek 11.1(1770).⁹⁷ In Brucker’sportrayal of the history of

 Cf. Fogel, “Scepticism of Scepticism: On Mendelssohn’sPhilosophyofCommon Sense,” 58–60.  PH II 99–101.  The translation used is Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism,eds.and trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2000), 101 (PH II 133).  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism,93(PH II 101).  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,105–106 (emphasis in original; JubA 8, 171).  Verzeichniß,3(Nº 35): Sextus Empiricus:Operagraece &latine (Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Gle- ditsch und Sohn, 1718): 88–96 (PH II 10 –11).  Verzeichniß,8(nºs 59–64). Mendelssohn apparentlyhad six volumes of this work, which might suggest that he also possessed the additional appendix (1767) of the second edition. Johann J. Bruck- er, Historia critica philosophiae,5vols.(Leipzig: BernhardChristoph Breitkopf, 1742– 1744).  JubA 5.2, 113–116. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 201

philosophySextus’ critique of Stoic semiotics is discussed.⁹⁸ (iii) Mendelssohn also had in his possessionDietrich Tiedemann’s System der stoischen Philosophie,⁹⁹ whereattention, in the section ‘Vonden Worten, und Ausdrücken der Gedanken’ (143 – 172),isdrawn to SextusEmpiricus’ sceptical account of Stoic semiotics and conception of language.¹⁰⁰

3Doubting Pythagoras’ Golden Thigh

Let us now turn to an important passagefrom the first part of Jerusalem, concerning scepticism, that is generallyoverlooked:

But should therebeanend to all disputeonaccountofthis?Must one never doubt principles?If so, men of the Pythagoreanschool could disputeforever how their teacher happened to come by his golden hip (‘güldene Hüfte’), and no one would dare to ask: Did Pythagorasactuallyhavea golden hip?Every game has its laws, every contest its rules, according to which the umpirede- cides.Ifyou want to win the stakeorcarry away the prize, youmust submit to the principles.But whoever wishes to reflect on the theory of games maycertainlyexamine the fundamentals. Just as in acourt of law.¹⁰¹

In this citation, Mendelssohn grapples with the vicious prejudiced critique of the re- viewer of his Vorrede to Menasseh BenIsrael’sRettung der Juden in Göttingische An- zeigen von gelehrten Sachen, published on the 14th of September 1782.The central point of the dispute, from the perspective of the reviewer,was that Mendelssohn calls into question the right to applyPrussian ecclesiastical law, predicated on Chris- tian doctrines,¹⁰² to Jewish communities.¹⁰³ The reviewer does not refrain from exhib- iting his negative sentimentstowards the Jewishpeople,¹⁰⁴ which he tries to validate with reference to anti-Judaic works such as JohannA.Eisenmenger’s Entdecktes Ju- denthum.¹⁰⁵ Thesudden dogmatic conclusion of the reviewer (‘all this is new and harsh. First principles are negated, and all dispute comes to an end’)¹⁰⁶ is exactly the point of departure for Mendelssohn. ‘Die ersten Grundsätze’ of the ecclesiastical

 Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae,1.1338 – 1339.  Verzeichniß,48(nºs 578–581); Dietrich Tiedemann, System der stoischen Philosophie,3vols. (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1776).  Ibidem,vol. 1, 167–169.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,81(JubA 8, 148 – 149).  GöttingischeAnzeigen von gelehrten Sachen (III. Stück)(14.09. 1782): 893: ‘Recht […], das mit Lehrmeinungenzusammenhängt und aufdemselben beruht.’  Ibidem: ‘AusdieserInsinuation mußten wirnothwendigschliessen, daßman demkönigl. Preuss. Justizdepartementeigentlich begreiflichmachenwollte, kein christl. Justizcollegiumkönne dieJuden richten; dies seydie Sacheder Rabbiners; […].’  Ibidem,892: ‘die gemeinschädlichen Grundsätze der Juden […]Unarten ihrer Väter’ etc.  Mendelssohnwas familiar with this work; see Verzeichniß,18(Nº 301); JubA 13,49–50.  Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,81(JubA 8, 148). 202 Ze’ev Strauss

authority by definition, as Mendelssohn argues, cannot be proven. He then goes on to implicitlyidentify this attitude with the dogmatism of the Pythagorean school. Similarly,inthe fourth part of Judah Halevi’s , the Pythagorean school of thoughtisreferred to in the context of the impossibility for philosophytoreach a final verdict on metaphysical principles:

Neither do two philosophers agreeonthis point, unless they be disciples of the same teacher. But , Pythagoras,Aristotle, Plato, and manyothers entirelydisagreewith each other.¹⁰⁷

Like Mendelssohn, Halevi points to the dogmatic and tribal natureofdifferent phil- osophical schools, whose disciples agree solelywith their own philosophicalmas- ters.Mendelssohn wasalso well acquainted with Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives and Opin- ions of EminentPhilosophers,¹⁰⁸ wherethe myth of Pythagoras’ golden thighis mentioned.¹⁰⁹ With thatsaid, Iwant to advancethe argument thatMendelssohn’sde- piction is actuallyderived from Johann M. Schröckh’sfourth volume of his monu- mental work Christliche Kirchengeschichte (1777),wherewefind the following de- scription:

These arerumors and tales of the later Pythagoreans; manyofthem unreasonable and suspi- cious,manyofthem cannot even be traced back, with certainty,toaspecific time, and the seem- ing imitationofthe evangelical history takesawayits entirefull worth and true usage.[…]He [i.e. Pythagoras] cured diseases of the bodyand the soul with magical sayings and was regarded because of his golden thigh to be . Had the Christians propagated similar tales,with so little believability,about the founders of their religion: then they would have been rightlyridi- culed. Apart from that,they were not yetentitled to designate Pythagorasasadeceiver, insofar as one cannot longer establish anythinginregards to this otherwise wise and virtuous man other than, at the utmost,the fact that he concealed agreat deal of his doctrinesand employed them against the large heap of artificial conceptions,which he might have perceivedasneces- sary.But the Christianscould have then even further advancedtheir accusation of the credulity against his adorers.¹¹⁰

 Judah Halevi, TheKuzari. An Argument for the Faith of Israel,trans. HartwigHirschfeld (New York: P. Shalom, 1969): 239(my emphasis;the Hebrewtranslation used by Mendelssohnreads as fol- יא שן ינ מם הן יפ ול וס יפ מם כס מי םי הז םע הז , םא אל הש בם ינ יס הע חא הת וס כמ עת מל רס שת בק ול פמ פי לי ףוסו ‘ :lows דחא : מא יפ וד לק אס פו תי וג סר , רא סי וט וא פא טל ןו , וא חא מד אש הר יפ ול וס םיפ , אש הף אם ןי חא מד םה סמ יכ לם תעד -Cf. Sacks,who quotes the very same passageofHalevi with referencetoMendelssohn’s Jer .( ’ . בח ור usalem. But he does this in order to show that ‘Mendelssohn […]divergessignificantlyfrom Halevi regarding philosophical change,’ see Sacks, Living Script,207– 208. Forthe influence of Simone Luz- zattoonMendelssohn’s Jerusalem, see Veltri, Renaissance Philosophy in JewishGarb,221.  See Verzeichniß,26(Nº 149).  Diogenes Laërtius, TheLivesand Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (London: Bohn’sClassical Li- brary,1853): 342: ‘He is said to have been aman of the most dignified appearance, and his disciples adopted an opinion respectinghim, that he was Apollo whohad come from the Hyperboreans;and it is said, that once when he was stripped naked, he was seen to have agolden thigh[τὸνμηρὸν ὀφθῆ- ναι χρυσοῦν].’  My translation of Johann M. Schröckh, Christliche Kirchengeschichte,vol. 4(Leipzig: Engelhart Benjamin Schwickert,1777), 348–349: ‘Es sind Gerüchteund Erzählungen der spätern Pythagoräer; Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 203

The parallels to Mendelssohn’saccount are striking:Both descriptions exploit the myth of Pythagoras’ thigh(‘güldene Hüfte’)toexemplifythe problems of dogmatism. Schröckh tries to delineate the substantial differencebetween these implausible tales (‘Erzählungen’)about Pythagoras, passed on by the anti-Christian ,and the written transmission regardingthe figure of Jesus. He claims that if the Christians propagated such farfetched rumoursabout the founders of their religion, they would have deserved much ridicule.Mendelssohn, on the other hand,attempts to show that this is already, to some degree, the caseconcerning ecclesiastical authority (‘Kirchenmacht’)inthe Prussian Kingdom, since its ‘fundamental principles’ are ad- hered to dogmaticallybythe majorityofthe Christian population without asking whether they are adequate and rational. If Mendelssohn reallybases his passage on Schröckh’sunfavourable characterisation of Pythagoreans,then his implicit state- ment against Prussian Christians is quite critical:They warrant mockery for theirgul- libility (‘Leichtgläubigkeit’). The wayMendelssohn illustrates the ludicrousness of the assessment of his reviewer is through the sceptical metaphor of agame in which rules can be arbitrarilymade up. It should be noted that the correlation be- tween sceptical doubt and the of the predeterminedrules of agame is not foreign to Jewish thought. AlreadyinSimone Luzzatto’streatise Socrates or on Human Knowledge (1651) we find avery similar sceptical observation with re- course to the arbitrarilydefined ‘first positions’ of achess game:

Hence,Ilikewise started to suspectthat as human beings we areindeed not endowed with suf- ficient organs and faculties to apprehend and acknowledge the truth. Besides,the earlybases and foundations from which the edificeofhuman knowledge rises areindeed not fixed and sta- ble, but arbitrary and laid at our whim, as is usuallythe case with games, especiallywith chess, where similarly, while deductions and consequences arenecessary,the first positions are indeed contingent and voluntary.¹¹¹

viel Ungereimtesund Verdächtiges, vieles das nicht einmal aufeine sichereZeitrechnungzurück ge- führt werden kann, und die augenscheinliche Nachahmung der evangelischen Geschichte benimmt ihrenvollends allen Werth und wahren Gebrauch. […]Krankheiten des Leibes und der Seele heilte er durch Zaubersprüche, und wurde wegen seiner güldenen Hüfte vorden Apollo gehalten. Hätten die Christen solche Erzählungen,und mit so geringer Glaubwürdigkeit,von den Stiftern ihrerReligion ausgebreitet: so würden sie mit Recht verspottet worden seyn. Im übrigenwaren sie zwar dadurch noch nicht berechtigt, den Pythagoraseinen Betrügerzunennen, weil man vondiesem sonst weisen und tugendhaften Manne höchstens nicht mehr beweisen kann, als daß er viele seiner Lehrsätze ver- heimlicht,und gegenden großen Hauffen Kunstbegriffe, die er vielleicht vornothwendig hielt, ange- wandthabe. Aber seinen Bewunderern konntendie Christendestomehr eine unwürdige Leichtgläu- bigkeit vorwerfen’ (myemphasis). The fifth volume was, for example, reviewed in Friedrich Nicolai’s journal Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek 40.1 (1780): 536–540,where Mendelssohn reviewed numerous works between 1765 and 1784;see JubA 5.2. Cf. AdB 23 (1774), 375: ‘Aristoteles, der in seinen exoter- ischen Schriften gemeinnützige Materien fürden Bürgergemeinnützig vortrug, war ein weiser Mann; aber der Pythagoras, der eine goldene Hüftevorgab, ausder Hölle zurückkam und sich die Rüstung des Euphorbus zueignete, war ein Charlatan.’  The translation of this passage used hereistaken from Giuseppe Veltri, “Negotiatingthe Prin- ciple of (Non)-Contradiction: Johann Frischmuth on the Rabbinic DialecticDiscussion,” in Yearbook 204 Ze’ev Strauss

To aPrussian Jewsuch as Mendelssohn, looking at mainstream Christian society from the outside, these rules are extraneous and can be randomlymodified. And it seems quite evident that he is not onlyinterested in tackling the ecclesiastical laws (‘Kirchenrechte’), but also that which is at their core: Christian doctrines (‘Lehr- meinungen’). With this example, one can see how sceptical thought patterns also en- tered Mendelssohn’spractical Weltanschauung.

Summary

In conclusion, it can be said that Mendelssohn’sperspective underlying the main apologetic contentions of his Jerusalem is aphilosophical, sceptical one: He assumes that religion cannot withstandthe scrutinizing assaults of philosophyand for that reason attempts to secure his ownJewish belief as anon-theoretical religion based primarilyonthe practical notion of ceremonial law. In order to ward off these threats,Mendelssohn has to compromise on avery central and common prem- ise of traditional Jewishbelief: Theviewthat the Hebrew Bible manifests absolute truth. Hebrew Scripture can, at most,facilitatethe attainment of common-sense knowledge regardingnatural religion. But Mendelssohn did not seem much discour- aged by this fact,ashealso appreciated the aesthetic dimensions of poetical Biblical Hebrew,afield thatwas rapidlygaining ground in the second half of the eighteenth century in German-speakingEurope. At the same time,the critical analysis of Bibli- cal textswas emerging as avery promisingmethod;itcertainlyalsohad an effect on Mendelssohn’sunconditioned refutation of bothMaimonidean as well as kabbalistic understanding of Scripture as speculative texts. Ithen turned to uncovering Mendelssohn’sintricate usageofnumerous philo- sophical and theological sources, which he seems to utilise for his sceptical account of language. It was demonstrated that Mendelssohn’scritical discussion takes for its starting point Cranz’semployment of Pauline metaphor (2 Corinthians 3), through which he distinctively demarcates Judaism from Christianity by highlightingthe me- diatory role of symboliclanguagetaken at face value. Mendelssohn then proceeds to philosophicallydevelop his sceptical attitude towards language, drawingupon the Platonic Schriftkritik in the Phaedrus. Subsequently,Iwent on to suggest that Men- delssohn’spreferred solution for the problem of dependency upon Hebrew Scripture, the ceremonial law, can also be linked to Plato’scritical analysis of the written word. As shown above, Mendelssohn had first-hand knowledge of Philo’s De vita Moysis,to which he refers anumber of times in his Bi’ur. In this allegorical exegesis, Philo in- corporatedPlato’s Schriftkritik and appraisal of the dynamic aliveness of spokenlan- of the Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2017): 114. Iwould liketothank Giuseppe Veltri for drawing my attention to this insightful passage of Simone Luzzatto. The first English translation of Socrates,aproject undertaken both by Giuseppe Vel- tri and Michela Torbidoni, is expected to be published soon. Scepticism and Certainty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 205

guage(λόγον … ζῶντα καὶἔμψυχον, Phdr. 276a8)into his ownunderstanding of Mo- saic lawand accordinglyconceptualises it as not being confined to inanimate written language, but rather as animate and rational (νόμος ἔμψυχόςτεκαὶλογικὸς, Mos.1.162). Additionally, it was shownthat Mendelssohn, within the context of his critique of language, elaborates on ‘das echte Judentum,’ based on the idea of cere- monial law, by apologeticallyappropriating the well-known Pauline dichotomyoflet- ter and spirit.However,hedoes not do so directly, but through the mediation of Les- sing’sGerman translation of Juan Huarte de San Juan’s TheExamination of Men’s Wits,wherelegal scholars and Jewish exegetes of the Bible are both depicted as Lit- terati. Mendelssohn simply semanticallyinverts this anti-Judaic understandingofthe Pauline dichotomyofthe inanimate letter and the animate spirit: Judaism in its ‘an- cient,original’ sense orients itself by the lively spirit of the ceremonial acts (‘Zeremo- nialhandlungen’)ofMosaic law; it is Christianity as arevelatory religion (‘geoffen- barte Religion’)that relies heavilyonthe inanimate letters of its various speculative ‘Heilswahrheiten’ and is to be regarded as ‘ayokeinspirit and in truth’¹¹² for its followers.Moreover,Iattempted to point to the plausible impact that both Herder’sphilosophyoflanguageaswellasthe Neo-Pyrrhonian scepticism of Sextus Empiricusmight have had on Mendelssohn’scritical attitude towards signs and language. Lastly, Iillustratedhow Mendelssohn uses sceptical strategies to call the eccle- siastical laws and the Christian doctrines upon which they are grounded into ques- tion. He challenges them by presentingthe distinctive example of the myth of Pytha- goras’sgolden thigh, which the Greek philosopher’sdogmatic devotees don’tdareto doubt.Insodoing,Mendelssohn wishestoreveal the vulnerability of Christian dog- matism to philosophicalscepticism. Analogous to the rules of agame,the starting points, the fundamental Principles(‘die ersten Grundsätze’), are selectedarbitrarily and can for that very reason be supersededand substituted at anytime.Ipointed out the possibleinfluencethe fourth part of Judah Halevi’s Kuzari might have had on Mendelssohn at this point,since he portraysPythagoras’ adherents as dogmatic within the wider context of metaphysical abeyance between the various philosoph- ical schools. Iultimatelypresented the fourth volume of Schröckh’s Christliche Kirchengeschichte as amore plausible sourcefor this particular passage, since it also mentions Pythagoras’ golden thighinconjunction with both unfounded dogma- tism and the question of the authenticity of Christian doctrines. Mendelssohn’smetaphorical portrayal of the asymmetrical relation between Ju- daism and Christianity as asomewhat unstable, multi-story buildingisquite illustra- tive for our theme at hand.¹¹³ In this simile,Judaism is placed on the solid ground floor,while speculative Christianity inhabits one of the upperfloors of the same

 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,248 (Appendix: Draft of Jerusalem).  This simile is, of course, an allusion to Cranz: Das Forschen nach Licht und Recht,23–24.See Alexander Altmann’sintroduction for commentary on this simile: Jerusalem,10, 203–204. 206 Ze’ev Strauss

building.The advantageofundogmatic Judaism resides in its secure position and, as aresult,its protection from attacks by sceptical philosophy.¹¹⁴ The chief aim of Men- delssohn’s Jerusalem can be derived from this particular point of view:itisanat- tempt to conceptuallyfortify the Jewish Religionsgebäude¹¹⁵ against persistent scep- tical doubt.But one should not be so mistaken as to believeJesus or Paul occupy the upper floor.

 Cf. Mendelssohn, Jerusalem,248 (Appendix: Draft of Jerusalem).  Cranz, Das Forschen nach Licht und Recht,26. Andreas Brämer Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums?

Die Wissenschaft des Judentums brachte sich seit den 1820er Jahren zunächstvor allem im deutschsprachigen Raum in Stellung, wo sie mit autoritativemAnspruchals neues Deutungsmodell jüdischerReligion, Geschichte und Kultur auftrat,die sie mit dem methodischen Rüstzeugder Philologie, Historiographie und Philosophie zu er- schließensuchte.¹ Die Geneseund Entwicklung einer an akademischen Standards ausgerichteten jüdischen Forschung bezeichnete einen Paradigmenwechsel gegen- über den Auslegungstraditionen der Vormoderne, in denensich das Judentum als sinnvermittelndes Handlungssystem präsentiert hatte, das aufder Grundlageeiner ewig gültigengöttlichen Selbstmitteilungfußte. In einem programmatischen Aufsatz hatte (1794– 1886), profilierter Wegbereiter einer kritischen jüdischen Gelehrsamkeit,bereits 1818 die Parole ausgegeben, dass

die ganze Litteratur der Juden, in ihremgrößten Umfang, als Gegenstand der Forschungaufge- stellt [werden solle], ohne uns darum zu kümmern ob sämmtlicher Inhaltauch Norm für unser eigenes Urtheilen sein soll oder kann.²

Die Wissenschaft des Judentums solltealso über etwaigesakrale Geltungsansprüche der Texte hinwegsehen, denenvielmehr als Zeugnissen geistiger Produktivität Auf- merksamkeit zuteil wurde. Vondieser Perspektive ausbetrachtet,konnteGott weder Gegenstand der wissenschaftlichenUntersuchung sein noch ihm die Urheberschaft

Dieser Aufsatz präsentiert Ergebnisse vonForschungen, die ich 2014–2015 als Charles W. and Sally Rothfield Fellow am Herbert D. Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, und 2017–2018 als Fellow am Maimonides Centre forAdvancedStudies—Jewish Scepticism an der Universität Hamburgdurchführen konnte. Füreine kritische Durchsicht des Textes dankeich Michael A. Meyer,Cincinnati.

 ZurWissenschaft des Judentums vgl. z.B. die Sammelbände: Kurt Wilhelm, Hrsg., Wissenschaft des Judentums im deutschen Sprachbereich. Ein Querschnitt,2Bde. (Tübingen: Mohr,1967); Julius Carle- bach, Hrsg., Wissenschaft des Judentums. Anfängeder Judaistik in Europa (Darmstadt: Wissenschaft- liche Buchgesellschaft,1992);Ismar Schorsch, From Text to Context: TheTurn to HistoryinModern Judaism (Hanover und London: Brandeis University Press, 1994); Michael Brenner und Stefan Rohr- bacher,Hrsg., Wissenschaftvom Judentum. Annäherungen nach dem Holocaust (Göttingen: Vanden- hoeck &Ruprecht,2000); Thomas Meyer und Andreas Kilcher,Hrsg., Die „Wissenschaft des Juden- tums“.Eine Bestandsaufnahme (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink,2015).  Leopold Zunz, Etwasüber die rabbinischeLiteratur,nebst Nachrichten über ein altes bis jetzt unge- drucktes hebräisches Werk (Berlin: In der Maurerschen Buchhandlung, 1818), 5.

OpenAccess. ©2018 AndreasBrämer,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-011 208 AndreasBrämer

des kulturellen Erbes zugeschrieben werden, das vielmehr als menschlich Gestaltetes und sich in der sowie durch die Geschichte Veränderndeszum Vorschein trat.³ Unbeschadet ihrer betont überlieferungskritischen Ambitionen entwickelte sich die jüdische Forschung aber durchaus nicht als „unabhängig vonjüdischen Bin- dungenzubetreibende, säkulareDisziplin“,sondern entfaltete sich im Laufe des zweiten Jahrhundertdrittels vornehmlich als bekenntnisgebundene Wissenschaft,in der das ergebnisoffene Erkenntnisstreben in einem konstanten Spannungsverhältnis zu den systematisch-normativenAnsprüchen der Religionsgemeinschaft verblieb.⁴ Insofern die jüdische Religion sowohl den objektivenals auch den subjektivenRe- ferenzrahmender Wissenschaft des Judentumsbezeichnete, beabsichtigte diese keine antiquarische Vermessung der Vergangenheit,sondern definierte sich als interes- sengeleitete „jüdische Theologie“,als positive Wissenschaft des jüdischen Glaubens in Geschichte und Gegenwart,die an die religiöse Orientierungskriseeiner zuneh- mend mit den Herausforderungender Moderne konfrontiertenMinderheit anknüpfte. Zeugte die jüdische Wissenschaft⁵ vonder produktivenTeilhabe vonJuden an den allgemeinenWissenschaftsbestrebungen, die sich freilich weitgehend außerhalb der Hochschulen unter staatlicher Aufsicht entfalten musste, so zieltedie Wissenspro- duktion nichtzuletzt auch aufeine defensive Modernisierung jüdischer Religion, die als bürgerliche Konfession ihren Platz in der Gesellschafteinforderte.⁶ Keine Geschichte der Wandlungender Wissenschaft des Judentums im 19.Jahr- hundertließe sich erzählen, ohne hierin Abraham Geiger (1810 –1874)einen promi- nenten Platz einzuräumen. Dass Geiger,Rabbiner zunächstinWiesbaden, dannin Breslau, Frankfurt am Main und Berlin, zum Namenspatron des 1999 eröffneten Potsdamer Rabbinerkollegs avancierte, lässt erahnen, welches Ansehen er als Schrittmacher und Meisterdenker einer progressivenTheologie des Judentums noch

 Vgl. dazu z.B. Leon Wieseltier, „Etwas über die jüdische Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography“,inHistoryand Theory 20 (1981): 135–149; RichardS.Sarason, „Rab- binic Literature, Rabbinic History,and ScholarlyThinking: Wissenschaft and Beyond“,inModern Ju- daism and Historical Consciousness:Identities-Encounters-Perspectives,hrsg. vonAndreas Gotzmann und ChristianWiese (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 93;NilsRoemer, JewishScholarship and CultureinNineteenth- CenturyGermany:Between Historyand Faith (Madison, Wis.:University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 24; Christoph Schulte, „Kritik und ‚Aufhebung‘ der rabbinischen Literatur in der frühen Wissenschaft des Judentums“,in„Im Vollen Licht der Geschichte“.Die Wissenschaft des Judentums und die Anfängeder kritischen Koranforschung,hrsg. vonDirk Hartwig, Walter Homolka, Michael Marx und Angelika Neuwirth (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2008), 102.  Vgl. Christian Wiese, Wissenschaft des Judentums und protestantische Theologie im wilhelminischen Deutschland. Ein Schrei ins Leere? (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), XI.  Der in der Literatur des 19.Jahrhunderts weit verbreitete Terminus „jüdische Wissenschaft“ wirdin diesem Aufsatz synonym zum Begriff „Wissenschaft des Judentums“ verwendet.  Vgl. auch Michael A. Meyer, „TwoPersistent Tensions in Wissenschaft des Judentums“,inModern Judaism 24.2 (2004): 105–110.Zum Begriff der bürgerlichen Konfession(alität) vgl. Andreas Gotzmann, „Zwischen Nation und Religion: Die deutschen Juden aufder Suche nach einer bürgerlichen Konfes- sionalität“,inJuden, Bürger,Deutsche. Zur Geschichte von Vielfalt und Differenz 1800–1933,hrsg. von Andreas Gotzmann, Rainer Liedtke und Till vanRahden (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001): 241–261. Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 209

heute bzw.heute wieder genießt.⁷ Aber bereits liberale Zeitgenossen und die ältere Historiographie erkannten Geiger als Speerspitze einer gelehrten Avantgarde, deren Forschung nicht nur die Vergangenheit abbildete, sondern auch aufeine Neugestal- tung der Gegenwart und Zukunft zielte.⁸ DieserAufsatz will Abraham Geigers Be- deutung als Pionier einer jüdischen Theologie aufwissenschaftlicher Basis nicht grundsätzlich neu bewerten, nimmt dessen Werk aber vorallem im Kontext der Suche nach einer systematischen Theologie in den Blick. Die zeitgenössischeSehnsucht nach einermethodisch reflektiertenDarstellung des Glaubensinhalts des Judentums durchzieht die deutsch-jüdische Publizistik des 19.und frühen 20.Jahrhunderts.⁹ Die Untersuchung unternimmt es deshalb vorallem, danach zu fragen, inwieweit und in welcher Form Geigers Schriften diesem Bedürfnis nach Orientierung im Glauben Rechnung trugen. Wieunscharf sich das Bild in dieser Hinsicht bislang präsentiert,veranschaulicht wiederum eine Durchsicht der älteren Geschichtsschreibung. 1910 erschien die als Sammelband konzipierteBiographie Geigers, die sein Sohn Ludwig(1848–1919)unter Mitwirkungnamhafter liberaler Rabbiner anlässlich des 100.Geburtstagsdes Vaters herausgab.Hier unternahm es Heinemann Vogelstein (1841–1911), langjährigerVor- sitzenderder Vereinigung der liberalen Rabbiner,ineinem mehr als dreißigseitigen Beitrag,Abraham Geiger nicht nur als den „wissenschaftliche[n] Theologe[n] des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts“ zu bestätigen, sondern ihm auch als dem „Begründer der systematischen Theologie“ ein Denkmal zu setzen. Dass Kaufmann Kohler (1843– 1926), Präsident des Hebrew Union CollegeinCincinnati(Ohio), wenige Monate zuvor seinen Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage publiziert hatte, die Vogelstein zudem als erste „zusammenhängende, von einem jüdischenGelehrtenbearbeiteteDarstellungdes Glaubensinhaltes der jüdi- schen Religion“ würdigte, liefert aber bereits Anhaltspunkte, dass Geigers Beitrag zur

 Informationen zum Abraham Geiger Kolleg an der Universität Potsdam: http://www.abraham-gei ger-kolleg.de (Datum);siehe auch JakobJ.Petuchowski,Hrsg., New Perspectives on Abraham Geiger,An HUC-JIR Symposium (New York: Ktav PublishingHouse, 1975); Christian Wiese, Walter Homolka und Thomas Brechenmacher,Hrsg., Jüdische Existenz in der Moderne. Abraham Geiger und die Wissenschaft des Judentums (Berlin und Boston: de Gruyter,2013).  Sigismund Stern, Geschichte des Judenthums von Mendelssohn bis auf die Gegenwart. Nebst einer einleitenden Überschau der älteren Religions-und Kulturgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Rütter,1857), 232; Leopold Löw, „Literarische Anzeige zu Geigers Urschrift“,inBenChananja 1(1858): 93 f.; Emanuel Schreiber, Abraham Geiger als Reformator des Judenthums (Loebau: R. Skrezeczek, 1879); „Rede des DozentenDr. Ismar Elbogen“,aus „Reden bei der Abraham Geiger-Feier der Lehranstaltfür die Wis- senschaft des Judentums am 22. Mai1910“,inNeunundzwanzigsterBericht der Lehranstalt fürdie Lehranstalt fürdie Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin (Berlin: H. Itzkowski, 1911): 54;Caesar Selig- mann, Geschichte der jüdischenReformbewegung von Mendelssohn bis zur Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main: Kauffmann, 1922),91–94;vgl. außerdem Wiese, Hrsg., Jüdische Existenz in der Moderne;Imke Stallmann, AbrahamGeigers Wissenschaftsverständnis. Eine Studie zurjüdischenRezeption von Friedrich SchleiermachersTheologiebegriff (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2013).  Vgl. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Jüdischer Glaube in dieser Zeit. Prolegomena zurGrundlegungeiner systematischen Theologie des Judentums (Berlin: Philo Verlag, 1932). 210 Andreas Brämer

systematischen Theologie sich einer pauschalisierendenEinordnungentzog.¹⁰ Dass es eben nicht möglich war,Texte zu benennen, in denenschon Geiger eine umfas- sende Glaubens- und Sittenlehredes Judentums in geordneter Form präsentiert hätte, musste auch Vogelstein einräumen.¹¹ Auch ein Blick aufseinen Sohn, Rabbiner Hermann Vogelstein (1870 – 1942),be- stätigt diese Wahrnehmung einer Uneindeutigkeit: Bekräftigteerals Mitarbeiteran der Sammelbiographie noch die Sicht seines Vaters,indem er den Theologen Geiger ebenfalls als Systematiker vorstellte, so fielsein Urteil 1927 nachdenklicher aus. Mit der Einschätzung,dass eine jüdische Theologie immer noch ein dringendesDeside- ratum der Gegenwart bezeichne, gaberjetzt der ÜberzeugungAusdruck, dass Geiger mit dem Prinzipder geschichtlichen Entwicklunglediglich die methodischen Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Theologie entwickelt, er aber „so recht eigent- lich nicht die theologischen Inhalte“ herausgearbeitet habe.¹² Seither hat die Geig- erforschung diesen Faden nicht wieder aufgenommen. Es lohnt sich aber,der Am- bivalenz in Geigers Oeuvrenachzuspüren, zumal, wenn man vermutet,dass sie nicht dem Zufall geschuldet ist,sondern sich ausdem religiösen Weltbild herleiten lässt und als spezifische Antwort des Theologen Geiger aufdie Moderne zu verstehen ist.¹³ Es gilt mithin sowohl danach zu fragen, welche Funktion und Bedeutung Abraham Geiger der systematischenTheologie zumaß, als auch zu untersuchen, welchen Platz diese Disziplin in seiner eigenen Forschungsagenda einnahm, um „die jüdische Welt sich selbst vorstelligzumachen“ (EduardGans).

 Heynemann[sic] Vogelstein, „Systematische Theologie“,inAbraham Geiger.Leben und Lebens- werk,hrsg. vonLudwigGeiger (Berlin: Reimer,1910), 243–276; vgl. Kaufmann Kohler, Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage (Leipzig:Fock, 1910); englisch: JewishTheology.Systematicallyand Historically Considered (New York: Macmillan, 1918).  Dass es Rabbiner Ludwig Philippson (1811–1889) war,der anknüpfend an die Offenbarungstexte sowie aufder Grundlage der GeschichteGlaube und Ethik des Judentums für ein gebildetes bürger- liches Publikum systematisch zusammenfasste,ist in der jüdischen Geschichtsschreibung bislang noch nicht ausreichend gewürdigt worden; siehe LudwigPhilippson, Jüdische Religionslehre, 3Bde. (Leipzig: Baumgärtner,1861–1865); vgl. „Rede des DozentenDr. I. Elbogen bei der LudwigPhilippson- Feier der Lehranstaltfür die Wissenschaft des Judentums am 8. Januar 1912“,inDreissigster Bericht der Lehranstaltfür die Wissenschaft des Judentums (Berlin: H. Itzkowski, 1912), 63;Andreas Brämer, „Überlegungen zur Gebietsmarkierungder Wissenschaft des Judentums—Das Beispiel Ludwig Phi- lippson als zentrale Randfigur(1811–1889)“,inJudaica 74.1– 2(2018): 1–22.  Hermann Vogelstein, „Der Theologe.Einleitung“,inAbraham Geiger,hrsg. vonGeiger,235;idem, „Gotteserkenntnis.Eine theologische Skizze“,inFestschrift zum70. Geburtstagevon MoritzSchaefer. Zum 21.Mai 1927herausgegeben von Freunden und Schülern (Berlin: Philo-Verlag,1927): 258. Es sei an dieser Stelle auch angemerkt,dass der Religionshistoriker Hans-Joachim Schoeps (1909–1980) in seiner Dissertation Jüdischer Glaube in dieser Zeit Abraham Geigerunerwähnt lässt.  Vgl. Michael A. Meyer, Antwort auf die Moderne. Geschichte der Reformbewegung im Judentum (Wien, Köln und Weimar:Böhlau, 2000); ZurVernachlässigung der Metaphysikdurch die Wissenschaft des Judentums vgl. Zeev Falk, „Jüdisches Lernen und die Wissenschaft des Judentums“,inJudentum im deutschen Sprachraum,hrsg. vonKarl E. Grözinger (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991): 350. Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 211

I

Die zeitgenössischen Benennungen Wissenschaft des Judentums¹⁴ oder jüdischeWis- senschaft suggerieren zunächsteine homogene Geschlossenheit,die dem methodi- schen und konzeptuellen Facettenreichtum der Disziplin nicht ausreichend Rechnung trägt.Das verdeutlichen die Entwicklungeninsbesondere im zweiten Drittel des 19.Jahrhunderts, als sich die jüdische Forschungslandschaft signifikant vervielfältigte und nicht zuletzt Rabbiner mit Universitätsbildung mit wichtigen philologischen, historischen und philosophischen Arbeiten aufden Plan traten. Abraham Geiger beanspruchte bereitsinjungen Jahren einen Platz in der ersten Reihe dieser neuen Gelehrtengeneration, den er zeitlebens mit intellektueller Brillanz ebenso wie mit großem Selbstbewusstsein zu verteidigenwusste.¹⁵ Gegen den Begriff „Wissenschaft des Judentums“ brachte Geiger keine grundsätzlichenEinwände vor, doch bevorzugte er im Grunde das Etikett „jüdische Theologie“,umdie eigene Forschung schlag- wortartigzubeschreiben.¹⁶ Nähert man sich Geigers Leitbild einer wissenschaftlichen Theologie in Abgren- zung vonanderen Lesarten jüdischer Wissenschaft,dann ist es zunächst hilfreich, dessenzum Teil sachliche, zum Teil aber auch polemische Auseinandersetzungmit dem zeitgenössischen Schrifttum zu beleuchten. Denn Geiger kommentierte die jü- dische Literatur seiner Gegenwart mit spitzer Feder, die auch vorFreunden und Ver- trauten nicht Halt machte,wenn es galt, sein Plädoyerfür ein Forschungsethos aufder Höhe der Zeit zu untermauern. Besonders aufschlussreich ist seine ambivalente HaltungzuLeopold Zunz, dessen kompromissloses Wissenschaftsideal ja ebenfalls schulbildend wirkte und Generationen vonGelehrtenals Inspiration diente. Geiger war mit Zunz erstmalig als 20jähriger Student in Kontakt getreten, der sich dann über Jahrzehnte fortsetzen sollteund neben dem brieflichen Austausch auch persönliche Besuche einschloss. Unbeschadet seiner Wertschätzung für Zunz, der ihm ja die Er-

 Der Begriff „Wissenschaft des Judenthums“ war erstmals im Kreis des 1819 gegründeten Berliner „Vereins für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden“ aufgetaucht,der 1822–23 auch die vonLeopold Zunz redigierte Zeitschrift fürdie Wissenschaft des Judenthums herausgab;siehe dazu z.B. Ismar Schorsch, „Breakthrough into the Past: The Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden“,inLeo Baeck Institute Year Book 33 (1988): 3–28; Ucko, „GeistesgeschichtlicheGrundlagender Wissenschaft des Judentums (Motive des Kulturvereins vomJahre1819)“,inZeitschrift fürdie Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 5(1935):1–34.  Vgl. Wiese, Homolka und Brechenmacher,Hrsg., Jüdische Existenz in der Moderne.  Vgl. etwa Abraham Geiger, „Einleitungindas Studium der jüdischen Theologie (1849)“,inAbra- ham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. vonLudwigGeiger,Bd. 2(Berlin: Gerschel, 1875), 1–32; idem, „Allgemeine Einleitungindie Wissenschaft des Judenthums“,inibidem,33–245; vgl. außerdem Ismar Elbogen, Ein Jahrhundert Wissenschaftdes Judentums (Berlin: Philo Verlag,1922),40f.; Stall- mann, AbrahamGeigers Wissenschaftsverständnis;Ismar Elbogen, „Abraham Geiger“,inJahrbuch für Jüdische Geschichte und Literatur Nr.14(1911): 75;Karl Erich Grözinger, Jüdisches Denken. Theologie— Philosophie—Mystik, Bd.3:Von der Religionskritik der Renaissance zu Orthodoxie und Reform im 19.Jahrhundert (Frankfurt und New York: Campus-Verlag,2009), 578–616. 212 Andreas Brämer

fahrung einesVierteljahrhunderts voraushatte, betrachteteerdessen umfangreiches Werk bereitsfrüh mit einer kritischen Distanz, die aufden unterschiedlichen For- schungsperspektivengründete. Seine eigene Forschung schlug eine neue Richtung ein, die Abhilfe versprach gegenjeneUnzulänglichkeiten, die Geiger der bisherigen Forschung anlastete.¹⁷ Im Zentrum der Kritik an Zunz stand dessendezidiertes Desinteresse an theolo- gischen Inhalten. Waswar darunter zu verstehen?Wie Geiger bereits 1836 in einem Privatschreiben an den Mathematiker Moritz Abraham Stern (1807–1894) bemängelte, vertrat Zunz eine Gelehrsamkeit,die der inneren Entwicklungdes jüdischen Glaubens zu wenigAufmerksamkeit schenkte.¹⁸ Damit zusammen hing auch seine Beobach- tung,dass Zunz dasjüdische Schrifttum nicht als eine religiöse, sondern als eine Volksliteratur präsentierte. Zunz’ Version einer Wissenschaft des Judentumsbe- schränke sich demnach aufeine bloße Altertumswissenschaft,die zwar die Erschei- nungen der Zeiteninden Blick rücke, jedoch weder ein Verständnis der Vergangenheit selbst schaffe noch die Fragenach deren Bedeutung in ihrem Bezugzur Gegenwart stelle. Vondiesem Blickwinkel ausbetrachtet liefertenZunz und seinesgleichen le- diglich akribisch gefertigte Bausteine zu einer Geschichte des Judentums, deren lei- tende Ideensie aber außer Acht ließen.¹⁹ Vehementen Einspruch erhob Geiger vorallem gegendas viel diskutierteBuch Zur Geschichte und Literatur,eine Sammlungvon Abhandlungenzur jüdischen Ge- schichte, Literaturgeschichte und Bibliographie, die Zunz 1845imDruck vorlegte.In dem radikalen Reformblatt Der Israelit des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,das der säch- sisch-weimarische LandrabbinerMendel Hess (1807–1871)herausgab,platzierte Geiger eine mehrteilige Besprechungder Veröffentlichung.Wer Geigers Nichteinver- ständnismit Zunz’ Wissenschaftsideal verstehen will, muss sich auch in Erinnerung rufen, dass Zunz ausdrücklich die Maxime ausgegeben hatte, die jüdische Wissen- schaft müsse sich „zunächstvon der Theologie emanzipiren und zur geschichtlichen Anschauungerheben“,d.h.von einerreligiösen Verwertungder Forschung absehen, die er insbesondere dem Reformjudentum anlastete.²⁰ Dass sich Geiger am Schluss dieser Rezension als Zunz’„treu aufhorchenden und begierig lauschenden Schüler“

 Geiger, Abraham Geiger,16f.; Ismar Schorsch, Leopold Zunz: in Adversity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), passim; Michael A. Meyer, „Jewish Religious Reform and Wissenschaft des Judentums.The Positions of Zunz, Geiger and Frankel“,inLeo Baeck Institute Year Book 16 (1971): 19–32.  „Abraham Geiger an Leopold Zunz, 31. März 1836“,inAbraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. von Ludwig Geiger (Berlin: Gerschel, 1878): 90.  Abraham Geiger, „Literarisch-kritische Uebersicht“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 6(1847): 95;vgl. auch idem, „Jüdische Zeitschriften“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für jüdische Theologie 4(1839): 288f.; idem, „Einleitungindas Studium der jüdischen Theologie“,27; idem, „Jüdische Geschichte von1830bis zur Gegenwart (Vorlesungengehalten zu Breslau,Winter 1849/ 50)“,inAbraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. vonGeiger,Bd. 2, 261.  Dass auch Leopold Zunz eine Forschungbetrieb, die vonreligiösen Interessen geleitet wurde, kann hier nur angedeutet,aber nicht ausführlich erläutert werden;siehe dazu Schorsch,Leopold Zunz. Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 213

bekannte, mochte sich aufdessenphilologische Sorgfalt beziehen. Als Anschau- ungsobjekt diente ihm die vonZunz dargebotene Forschung aber zugleich, um sie als radikales wissenschaftliches Gegenmodell zu entwerten: In ihrer positivistischen Fi- xierung produzierte sie zwar überprüfbares Wissen,die den Phänomenen der jüdi- schen Vergangenheitals solchen bereits vonvornherein Bedeutung zumaß, ohne die Fakten auch kritisch aufihre religiöseGegenwartsrelevanz hin zu befragen.²¹

II

Es bleibt unklar,warumdie Rezension nichtinder Wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift für jüdischeTheologie abgedruckt wurde, die Geiger seit 1835 („in Verbindungmit einem Vereine jüdischer Gelehrter“)herausgab und idealerweise als Forum einer vonzeit- genössischen religiösen Erkenntnisinteressen geleiteten Forschung dienensollte.²² Das Periodikum, das – teilweise unregelmäßig – bis 1847erschien, brachte insbe- sondere Studien zu historischen und philosophischen Themenfeldern sowie zeitge- nössische Reflexionen. Beiträgezueiner Glaubenslehre des Judentums sind in den insgesamt sechs Jahrgängenallerdings fast gar nicht zu finden. Immerhin gelang es dem Pädagogen Michael Creizenach (1789 – 1842) sowie dem Orientalisten Joseph Dernburg(Dérenbourg, 1811–1895), mit Geigers Billigungzaghafte Versuche einer systematischen Annäherung an die Grundlehren der jüdischen Religion unterzu- bringen.²³ Doch im Allgemeinenging es in dem Periodikum nicht darum, Aussagen

 Abraham Geiger „Recension. ZurGeschichte und Literatur.Von Dr.Zunz. Erster Band. Berlin,Veit & Comp. 1845. VIII u. 607S.gr. 8., S.“;inLiteraturblatt zumIsraeliten des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts 1 (1846): 82; vgl. „Geiger an Zunz, 26.Dezember1845“,inAbraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. von Geiger,186;Leopold Zunz, „ZurGeschichteund Literatur“,inidem, Gesammelte Schriften,Bd. 1(Berlin: Gerschel, 1875): 57;Michael A. Meyer, „Abraham Geiger’sHistorical Judaism“,inNew Perspectives on Abraham Geiger,hrsg. vonPetuchowski, 10f.; Kerstin vonder Krone, Wissenschaft in Öffentlichkeit. Die Wissenschaft des Judentums und ihreZeitschriften (Berlin u.a.: de Gruyter, 2012), 173, Anm. 33; Ismar Schorsch, „ and History in the AgeofEmancipation“,inidem, From Text to Context,276 – 278; und vorallem idem, Leopold Zunz,131–141.  BarbaraSuchy, „Diejüdischen wissenschaftlichen ZeitschrifteninDeutschland vonden Anfängen biszum Ersten Weltkrieg. EinÜberblick“,inWissenschaft desJudentums,hrsg. vonCarlebach,184–186; vonder Krone, Wissenschaft in Öffentlichkeit,58–61.MöglicherweisefürchteteGeiger, Zunz alsMitar- beiter an der WissenschaftlichenZeitschrift fürjüdischeTheologie zu verlieren. Dieser hatteaberbis dahin ohnehinnur Analektenund kürzereBeiträgegeliefert;siehe dieBibliographie desLeopold Zunz Archivs in http://www.jewish-archives.org/nav/classification/11214(29.Mai 2018); sowieSchorsch, LeopoldZunz, 92 – 94.  Michael Creizenach, „Grundlehren der israelitischen Religion“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für jüdische Theologie 1(1835):39–51 und 327–339sowie in Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 2(1836): 68–77 und 436 – 445; Joseph Dernburg, „Das Wesen des Judenthums nach seinen allgemeinsten Grundzügen“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 4(1839): 12–18;vgl. auch den Brief vonA.Geiger an J. Dernburg,vom 10.April 1837,inLudwig Geiger,Hrsg., „Abraham Geigers Briefe an J. Dérenbourg(1833 – 1842)“,inAllgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums 60 (1896): 190. 214 AndreasBrämer

über Gott oder über jüdische Gotteserfahrungen zu machen. In zahlreichen Aufsätzen unter die Lupe genommenwurden die Religionspraxis und derenReform („Ueber die synagogische Zulässigkeit und Einrichtung der Confirmation“; „Ueber die Abschaf- fung bestehender Gebräuche“; „Ueber Trauungeninder Synagoge“; „Ueber die jü- dischen Trauergebräuche“; „Ueber die Leviratsehe und die Ceremonie des Schuh- ausziehens“; „Ueber das Entbehren lederner Schuhe am Versöhnungstage“; „Ueber die jüdischenFasttage“; „Noch ein Wort über das Haartragen der Frauen“; „Ueber religiöse Trauung“; „Materialien zu einemCommissionsbericht über die Speisege- setze“). Die Stoßrichtung dieser Texte war offensichtlich: „Das Bewußtsein des guten Rechts der Reform“,soGeiger im letzten Jahrgang der Wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift, „soll nun auch in die Lebensverhältnisse eindringen und den religiösen Boden um- pflügen.“²⁴ WichtigeEinblickeinseine Agenda gabAbraham Geiger auch in seiner Einleitung in das Studium der jüdischen Theologie,die LudwigGeiger postum edierte. Das Buch beruhte aufdem Manuskript einerVorlesung,die der Vater 1849inBreslauvor jüdi- schen Studenten gehalten hatte. Die „Theologie als jüdische“,sostelltedieser hier klar,drehe sich um „die Erkenntnis der religiösen Wahrheiten und des ihnen ent- sprechenden Lebens nach der Lehredes Judenthums“.²⁵ Der Text erlaubt Rück- schlüsse, welche Anregungender Autor (1768 – 1834) ver- dankte, der sich ja wie Geiger gegendie Dichotomie vonReligion und Wissenschaft ausgesprochen hatte. Die Theologie bezeichnete demnach eine handlungsleitende Disziplin, die ihre funktionale Einheit ausdem Bezugauf das Betätigungsfeld der religiösen Leitungbezog.Wenn Geiger der jüdischenTheologie mit Philosophie, Ge- schichte und Praxis drei verbundene Gebiete zuwies, übertrugerwiederum Überle- gungen des protestantischenKirchenlehrers, dessen Kurze Darstellung des theologi- schen Studiums ihm unzweifelhaft vertrautwar.²⁶

 Abraham Geiger, „Die religiösen Thaten der Gegenwart im Judenthume“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 6(1847): 1.  Geiger, „Einleitungindas Studium der jüdischen Theologie“,4.  Vgl. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen. Zweite, umgearbeitete Ausgabe (Berlin: Reimer,1830); Christoph Schwöbel, Art. „Theo- logie“,inReligion in Geschichte und Gegenwart,hrsg. vonHans DieterBetz, Bd. 8, 4. Aufl. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008): 265und 302f.; Zu Geiger und Schleiermacher siehe z.B. Stallmann, Abraham Geigers Wissenschaftsverständnis;Carsten Wilke, „Abraham Geigers Bildungsutopie einer jüdisch- theologischen Fakultät“,inJüdische Existenz in der Moderne,hrsg. vonWiese, Homolka und Bre- chenmacher, 380;Grözinger, Jüdisches Denken,589f.; sowie Ulrich Steuer, SchleiermachersReligi- onsphilosophie in ihrer systematischen und historischen Bedeutung fürdie jüdische Religionsphilosophie (Köln: Typoskript Dissertation, 1969), 122–131;Vermutungenüber den Einfluss Schleiermachers auf Geiger hattebereits 1843der preußische Kultusminister Johann Albrecht Friedrich vonEichhorn ge- äußert,als er in dem Streit um die BerufungGeigers nach Breslaudiesem eine Audienz gewährte; vgl. Abraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. vonGeiger,121f.; Emanuel Schreiber, Abraham Geiger als Reformator des Judenthums (Loebau/Westpreußen: RichardSkrzeczek, 1879), 105. Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 215

Den Vorwurf, Schleiermacher auch inhaltlich kopiert und aufdiese Weise quasi christliche Ideen aufdas Judentum übertragen zu haben, wusste Geiger freilich weit vonsich zu weisen.²⁷ Im Zusammenhang mit der zentralen Fragestellungdieses Aufsatzes ist jedenfalls eine Beobachtungfrappierend:Während Schleiermacher seine Stellung als wichtigster evangelischer Theologedes 19.Jahrhunderts auch durch eine zweibändige Glaubenslehre des evangelischen Christentums untermauerte, liegt von Geiger eben keine Darstellungder jüdischen Glaubensinhalteinzusammenhängender Form vor.²⁸ Auch seine Einleitung sparte dieses Themenfeld komplett aus.²⁹

III

Die privateKorrespondenz, deren vertrauliche Diktion ja im Regelfallnicht aufein öffentlichesPublikum zielte, liefert erste Anhaltspunkteüber Gründe einer skepti- schen Zurückhaltung, mit der sich Geiger über das eigene religiöse Weltbildausließ. Ausseinen Briefen an den frühen Weggefährten Joseph Dernburgentsteht das Bild eines nochjungenRabbiners,der seit1832inWiesbaden bereits die Verantwortungfür eine eigene Gemeinde trug, der aber im Angesicht einerdesorientierendenModerne den eigenen Glauben erst selbst noch befestigen musste. Kritisierte er 1833 daszeit- genössische Judentum zunächstals abstrakte Religion, der es an erbaulichen Ideen mangele und in der Gott den Menschen zu fern stehe, wusste er sich drei Jahre später mit jenem versöhnt.Enthusiastisch berichteteer, inzwischen ein Judentumgefunden zu haben, das ihn befriedige,

einen Glauben, dessen Grundlagendas Vertrauen aufeinen Weltenlenker und die an uns gestellte Anforderungder Gerechtigkeit und Milde ist,der sich in Werken die diesem Anspruche genügen, ausspricht und mit erhebenden Formen zur Erweckungdieser Gesinnungenumgiebt.³⁰

 Vgl. Abraham Geiger, „Offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn Professor Dr.H.A. Holtzmann“,inidem, Das Judenthum und seine Geschichte von der Zerstörung des zweiten Tempels bis zum Ende des zwölften Jahrhunderts (Breslau: Schletter,1865):190 –193; idem, „Allgemeine Einleitungindie Wissenschaft des Judenthums“,63.  Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhangedargestellt,2Bde., 2. Ausgabe(Berlin: Reimer,1830/31).  Geiger erwähnt allerdings Metaphysik und Ethik als Disziplinen einer Religionsphilosophie, die der jüdische Theologe nicht völlig voraussetzungslosbetreiben kann; siehe Geiger, „Einleitungindas Studium der jüdischen Theologie“,7f.; siehe außerdem Geigers kritische Zeilen zur Schleiermacher- rezeption in Jüdische Zeitschrift fürWissenschaft und Leben 7(1869): 211–215; dort bezieht sich Geiger auch aufSchleiermachers kritischesVerhältnis zum Judentum; siehe dazu auch Matthias Blum, „Ich wäreein Judenfeind“.Zum Antijudaismus in Friedrich Schleiermachers Theologie und Pädagogik (Köln, Weimar und Wien: Böhlau, 2010).  „A. Geiger an J. Dernburg,23. Februar 1836“,inGeiger, „Abraham Geigers Briefe“,115;vgl. „A. Geiger an J. Dernburg, 15.Juli 1833“,inibidem,91; vgl. Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube,§4. 216 AndreasBrämer

Auch in späteren Bekenntnissen, in denen der ethische Monotheismus als Gewissheit ausder Innerlichkeit des Individuumshervorging,machte Schleiermacher seinen Einfluss geltend. Gegenüber MoritzAbraham Stern distanziertesich Geiger 1843 ausdrücklich vonden Ideen des Pantheismus, um stattdessen – in deutlicher An- lehnung an SchleiermachersDeutung der Frömmigkeit als Gefühl der „schlechthin- nigen Abhängigkeit“–zu bekräftigen,

dass ich einen Ueberschuss über die Immanenz statuire, dass ich ein Unbegreifliches über uns anerkenne, dass ich dem Gefühle, das sich zum Abhängigkeitsbewusstsein steigert,sein Recht einräume und nicht verkümmert wissen will, dass ich die Leugnungder Religion als einen Irr- thum, als einen gefährlichen Irrthum verwerfe.³¹

Unbeschadet solcher Konfessionen widerstrebteesGeiger aber selbst im Austausch mit engen Vertrauten, ausführlichere Auskünfteüber seinCredo zu erteilen. Dass Stern Geiger auch in späteren Jahren hartnäckig über dessen Glauben befragte, il- lustriert zunächst, dass er in Geigers Schriften keinen hinreichenden Aufschluss über diesen Gegenstand zu finden glaubte. Gegenüber seinem Freund bekannte sich Geiger im Sommer 1858 zu einem Theismus, für den er aber als Privatmeinungnicht öf- fentlichParteiergreifen wollte.Stern freilich gabsich mit dieser Antwort noch nicht zufrieden, möglicherweise, weil Geiger es zu vermeiden gewusst hatte,Gott als sol- chen konkretzubenennen. Ungehalten über Sterns Beharrlichkeit,zögerteGeiger monatelang, bis er endlich doch eine weitere Antwort verfasste, in der er nun auch einem personifizierten Gottesgedanken Platz einräumte:

Es ist die unerquickliche Discussion über Gott,auf der Du beharrst.Ich trageseine Ahnunginmir; mein eigner Geist,dessen volle selbständige,vom Körper unabhängige, wenn auch gegenwärtig mit ihm verbundenePersönlichkeit mir eine gewisse Thatsacheinnerer Erfahrung ist,bürgt mir für die Existenz eines gleichfalls persönlichen Allgeistes, eines Gottes, der wie es das Bedürfniss, das höchsteBedürfniss des Geistes, liebend überströmt.Indieser Ahnungliegt freilich nicht der volle, mit aller Klarheit umschriebeneGedanke, es liegt eine gewisse, sehr wohlthuende Poesie darin, eine Poesie jedoch, derenberaubt die Welt nicht minder als ich selber garnüchtern würde. […]Dass bei solcher vollen Anerkennung eines persönlichenGottes und seines eingreifenden Waltens, aber als eines Geistes, der die vorigen, auch in unserem Geistesich offenbarenden Gesetze des Geistes in sich trägt,dass es dabei – sage ich – an einzelnen vermenschlichenden Ausdrücken nicht fehlen wird – zumal in Stimmungen, wo eine tiefereAnregungdas Herz durchwühltund dieses seinen Ausdruck verlangt –,will ich nicht in Abrede stellen; es wirdjedoch kaum einer Nachsicht dazu bedürfen, solche Ausdrückeentschuldbar zu finden. Lass uns daher über diese philosophische Discussion hinwegkommen. Soweit ich vordringenkann,thue ich es mit aller Unbefangenheit; über meinen eigenen Geist hinaus und garüber die Wurzel hinaus,aus der er Nahrungzieht,kannich nicht,daglaube ich es beim freudigenBewusstsein vondem einen, bei der Verehrung der andern wohl bewenden lassen zu dürfen.³²

 „A. Geiger an M.A. Stern, 25.August 1843“,inAbraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. vonGeiger, 167f.; sowie anonym in Zur Judenfrage in Deutschland 2(1844): 114f.  „A. Geiger an M.A. Stern, 28.Dezember1858“,inAbraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. von Geiger,229f.; auch in Geiger, Abraham Geiger,226;Vogelstein, Systematische Theologie,248f.; vgl. auch Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 217

Geigers Widerstreben, detaillierte Angaben über die persönliche religiöse Weltan- schauung zu machen,hing folglich wenigermit eigenen Zweifeln zusammen, sondern gründete aufder Einsicht des Unvermögens, Glaubensüberzeugungen als überprüf- bare Gewissheiten zu präsentieren. Hier spielte auch eine Rolle, dass Geiger in der Erkenntnis der religiösen Wahrheiten des Judentums als positive Religion nicht eine „Aufgabe des Denkens,der philosophischen Betrachtung“ erkennen wollte, sondern sie der Historiographie zuwies, also vornehmlich empirisch ausder Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheitermitteln zu können glaubte.³³ Als Schriftsteller und Rabbiner sah sich Geiger aber zugleich vordie Aufgabe gestellt,geistliche Orientierung in einer Epoche zu ermöglichen, die eben auch durch eine Vervielfältigung jüdischer religiöser Selbstpositionierungen bestimmt war. Seine Schriften sowohl zur theoretischen als auch zur praktischen Theologie spiegeln dieses Dilemma wider.

IV

Geigers Theologie fußte aufeinem romantischen Begriff der Religion, der diese nicht objektiv, also als ein gegebenes System vonWahrheiten, sondern subjektiv, vomIn- dividuum her erklärte. Als anthropologische Konstante bezeichnete Religion ein so- wohl ubiquitäresals auch unvergängliches Phänomen. Dem Menscheneigen war demnach eine Doppelnatur,die das Bewusstsein einer höheren Weltordnungund das enthusiastische Streben zur sittlichenSelbstvervollkommnung mit der demütigen Einsicht der eigenen Unvollkommenheit verknüpfte.Das universale Sehnen des Menschennach dem Unendlichen trotz der Unfähigkeit,das Endliche und Begrenzte zu überwinden,galt Geiger zugleich als Bürgschaft für die Wirklichkeit dieses Stre- bens, das in den verschiedenen Religionen zugleich unterschiedliche Formen an- nahm.³⁴ So wurde der Gottesbeweis quasi ausder Geschichte abgeleitet.Auf die jü- dische Religion schauend, bemerkte er:

„A. GeigeranM.A. Stern 9. August 1858“,inAbraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. vonGeiger,227f.; siehe außerdem Arnulf vonScheliha, „Schleiermachers Deutungvon Judentum und Christentum in der fünftenRede ‚Über die Religion‘ und ihre Rezeption bei Abraham Geiger“,inChristentum und Juden- tum. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses der Schleiermacher-Gesellschaft in Halle, März 2009,hrsg. vonRoderich Barth, Ulrich Barth, Claus-DieterOsthövener (Berlin und Boston: De Gruyter,2009): 223.  Geiger, „Einleitungindas Studium der jüdischen Theologie“,4.  Abraham Geiger, Das Judentum und seine Geschichte. In vierunddreißig Vorlesungen (Breslau: Ja- cobsohn, 1910), 9–11;vgl. idem, „Der MangelanGlaubensinnigkeit in der jetzigenJudenheit.Be- denken eines Laien (1835)“,inAbraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. vonGeiger,Bd. 1, 457; Abraham Geiger, „Abhandlungen ausden Programmen der jüdischen Religionsunterrichtsanstalt in Breslau1844–1863“,inibidem,349; siehe auch Karl E. Grözinger, „Abraham Geigers theologische Wende vordem Hintergrund der neuzeitlichen DebatteumReligion und Vernunft“,inJüdische Existenz in der Moderne,hrsg. vonWiese, Homolka und Brechenmacher,32f. 218 Andreas Brämer

Das Judenthum wirdeine […]kritische Prüfungauch nicht zu scheuen haben, denn wenn wir auch nicht den Schleiermacher’schen Grundsatzinseiner vollen Ausdrucksweise annehmen können, dass eine vorhandene einflussreiche Stiftungfür die Dignität des Stifters oder garfür den un- mittelbaren göttlichen Ursprungzeugt,somüssen wir doch eingestehen, dass die Thatsacheeiner weltgeschichtlichen Institution, die ihren Einfluss gebieterisch ausübt,die Bürgschaft gibt für die Macht des Gedankens,der in ihr waltet,für die Wahrheit der Idee,die sie trägt und Geschichte und Sageerzeugt hat.³⁵

Die Pluralisierungder religiösen Ideologien im deutschen Judentum des 19.Jahrhun- derts lässt sich nicht zuletzt auch als Konsequenzder Suche nach zeitgemäßen Ausdrucksformen gelebter Frömmigkeit sowohl im Kultus als auch im Alltagsleben der Gläubigen beschreiben. Die Vielfalt im Glaubengründete aber auch aufunter- schiedlichen Auslegungen vonOffenbarung und Tradition als konstituierenden Fak- toren des Judentums. Abraham Geiger hatte bereits 1835,imersten Jahrgangseiner Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie,angemahnt,dass die jüdische Literatur sich dringend diesenHauptfragenzuwenden müsse, um sie sowohl histo- risch als auch philosophisch zu erörtern. Geigers Theologie ist denn auch ohne seine eigene Deutung des Offenbarungsgeschehens gar nicht zu verstehen. Dabei solltees ihm gelingen, das Judentum als positive Religion zu präsentieren, in der das allge- meinmenschliche „Ahnen“ einer höheren Macht in einen spezifischenreligionshis- torischen Kontext gestelltwurde, ohne sich jedoch aufein konkretes Bild vonGottes eingreifendemWalten zu beziehen.³⁶ Geiger konnteund wollte keine voraussetzungslose jüdische Wissenschaft be- treiben, die ja die Religion sowohl zum ausschließlichen Gegenstandder Forschung machte als auch eine religiöseAgenda zur Gestaltungder Gegenwart und Zukunft verfolgte. Der Offenbarungsglaube, den er als conditio sine qua non der theologischen Forschung formulierte, unterschiedsich freilich signifikant vontraditionellen Aus- legungen, indem er das Offenbarungsgeschehen wenigerals göttlicheIntervention, herablassende Zuwendung,und Übergabe vonWeisungen und Belehrungen schil- derte, die mit einersinnlichen Wahrnehmung der Empfänger einhergingen, sondern es als einen inneren Vorgang plötzlicher Einsicht ewiger Wahrheiten beschrieb, die also letztlich vomMenschen selbst ausging.³⁷ Die besondere weltgeschichtliche

 Abraham Geiger, „Allgemeine Einleitungindie Wissenschaft des Judenthums“,62.  Abraham Geiger, „Heuchelei, die erste Anforderunganden jungenRabbiner unserer Zeit“,in Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 1(1835):299;vgl. Nathan Rotenstreich, Tradition and Reality:The Impact of HistoryonModern JewishThought (New York: Random House, 1972), 7–18; Gershom Scholem, Über einigeGrundbegriffe des Judentums (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970), 90 – 105;Michael A. Meyer, „Ob Schrift?ObGeist?—Die Offenbarungsfrageimdeutschen Judentum des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts“,inOffenbarung im jüdischen und christlichen Glaubensverständnis,hrsg. vonJacob J. Petuchowski und Walter Strolz (Freiburg, Basel und Wien: Herder,1981): 175 – 179; Grö- zinger, Jüdisches Denken,Bd. 3, 593–604.  Allerdingsdeutete Geiger mehrfach an, dass sein Offenbarungsglaube partiell an die jüdische Philosophie des Mittelalters anknüpfe, also etwa bei Jehuda Halevi und Moses ben Maimon; vgl. Geiger, Das Judentum und seine Geschichte,37und 319f. Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 219

Stellung des Judentums hing nun mit dem religiösen Genie der Juden zusammen, denen als Volk die besondere Befähigung eigen war,neue intellektuelle Anschau- ungen im Sinne einerOffenbarung zu gewinnen. Bezeichnete dieses Genie zunächst eine kollektive geistigeAnlageinForm einer besonderenEmpfänglichkeit,soblieben der Gesamtheit dennoch konkrete Offenbarungserfahrungen verwehrt.Individuelle Träger und Verkünder der „höheren Erleuchtung“ waren vielmehr die Propheten, deren geläutertes religiöses Bewusstseinmit einer klareren sittlichenAnschauung einherging und sich, verdichtet zur Lehredes Judentums, allmählich im Volk Geltung verschaffte.³⁸ Wusste Geiger bereits die Offenbarung als dynamisches menschlich-geistiges Schöpfungswerk, wenngleich göttlicherAbstammung,auch in einen geschichtlichen Bezugsrahmen zu stellen, so endete diese formative Epoche mit der Rückkehr der Juden ausdem babylonischen Exil. Der in der Offenbarung sich ausprägende Geist sei aber,soGeiger,inveränderter Form auch in der Tradition weiter wirksam. Analog zur Natur,wodie gestaltende Kraft Gottesnach Vollendungdes Schöpfungswerks sowohl erhaltend als auch als nachwirke, entfaltesich im Geistesleben die Tradition ebenfalls als Kraft der Entwicklung. Als Ausfluss des göttlichenGeistes wirke sie in der Gesamtheit,erwählesich aber wiederum besondere Träger,die das Judentum in ihre jeweilige Gegenwart übersetzten und aufdiese Weise dessenLebensfähigkeit be- wahrten. Nach Geigerscher Lesart war die jüdische Wissenschaft der Gegenwart nicht nur vordie Aufgabe gestellt, in der Überlieferung die religiöse Wahrheit in ihrer je- weils historischen Fassung und Entwicklungzuerkennen, sondern ausdiesem Wissen und der Erkenntnis der Gegenwart auch Konsequenzen für die Fortbildungdes Ju- dentums zu ziehen. Als Fortsetzung der Tradition erhielt die wissenschaftliche Theologie damit eine zusätzlichereligiöseAufladung.³⁹

V

Signifikant für Geigers Theologie war deren konfrontativerGestus, der ausdem Wi- dersprucherwuchs und diesen sowohl ausdrücklich als auch implizit formulierte. In der Auseinandersetzung mit der Altertumswissenschaft und protestantischenTheo-

 Wiegenaunun sich diese „Berührungder menschlichen Vernunft mit dem tiefen Urgrund aller Dinge“ vollzogenhatte, wussteauch Geiger nicht völlig konsistent zu erklären; siehe Geiger, „Einlei- tung in das Studium der jüdischen Theologie“,6;idem, „Literaturbriefe ausdem Jahre 1853“,in Abraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. vonGeiger, Bd. 2, 331; idem, Das Judentum und seine Geschichte,36–38;vgl. Harvey Hill, „The ScienceofReform: Abraham Geiger and the Wissenschaft des Judentum (sic)“,inModern Judaism 27.3 (2007): 332; Vogelstein, Systematische Theologie,251– 253.  Abraham Geiger, „Der Boden zur Aussaat“,inJüdische Zeitschrift fürWissenschaftund Leben 1 (1862):6f.; idem, „Nothwendigkeit und Maass einer Reform des jüdischen Gottesdienstes. Ein Wort zur Verständigung“,inAbraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. von Geiger,Bd. 1, 203; idem, Das Judentum und seine Geschichte,75f. 220 AndreasBrämer

logie konzipierteerseinereligionshistorischen Forschungen als counter history,die er dazu benutzte,umdie Deutungshoheit über wichtigeKapitel der jüdischenVergan- genheit zurückzugewinnen.⁴⁰ Seine wissenschaftliche Arbeit richtetesich aber noch mehr gegenden Hegemonialanspruch konservativerStrömungendes zeitgenössi- schen Judentums, deren theologische Gewissheiten er mit der und durch die Ge- schichte zu erschüttern suchte. Im Zentrum dieser teilweise auch polemischausge- fochtenen Konflikte stand die Widerlegung des sakralen Statusanspruchszentraler jüdischer Texte. An Dernburgschrieb Geiger im November 1836 die kämpferischen Zeilen:

Der Talmud muß weg,die Bibel, jener Komplex vonmeistens so schönen und erhabenen, viel- leicht den erhabendsten menschlichenBüchern, muß als Göttliches weg. […]UmHimmelswillen, wie kann diese Lügenhaftigkeit fortdauern, immer und ewig aufden Kanzeln die Geschichten der Bibel als wahreBegebenheiten zu erklären, und an sie als an die höchsten Weltereignisse, an sie, die wir für uns in das Reich der Sageversetzt haben, Lehrenanzuknüpfenund, wenn auch weiter gar nichts,Texteaus ihr zu entlehnen?Wie lange noch soll jene Verdrehungdes kindlichen Geistes mit jenen Geschichten, die den natürlichen Sinn des zarten Menschenkindes entstellen, fortdauern?Wie dies wohl zu ändern?Jenun, eben durch das Hintreiben in die Enge, so daß es nicht mehr stattfindenkann, dadurch, daß man sich und anderen diesen Widerspruch aufdeckt, dadurch, daß man in alle Schlupfwinkel den Ausflüchte Suchenden verfolgt und so endlich den großartigenEinsturz mit bewirkt,der eine alte Welt unter seinen Trümmern begräbt, und eine neue uns öffnet.⁴¹

Die supranaturalistische Auffassung,dass es sich bei der schriftlichenund mündli- chen Tora um Zeugnisse einer göttlichenOffenbarung ohne Verfallsdatum handelte, konnteineiner Theologie, die dasEntwicklungsprinzip zur oberstenMaxime erhob, keinen Platz haben. Die hebräische Bibel bezeichnete also die „Schriften der heiligen Gemeinschaft,der Heiligkeit oder des Heiligthums“,aberebenkeine heiligen Schriften. Geiger wollte Texte mit regulativemAnspruchdurchaus als Urkundenan- erkennen, die für den Geist des Judentums in der Zeit ihrer Entstehung und Bear- beitung zeugten. Aufgabe der Theologie sei es freilich, anknüpfend an die Erkenntnis eines ewigen Gehalts des Judentums, dessenAusprägungsich im Zeitenlauf verän-

 Susannah Heschel, Der jüdische Jesus und das Christentum. Abraham Geigers Herausforderung an die christliche Theologie (Berlin: Jüdische Verl.-Anst., 2001), 25–54;Amos Funkenstein, Jüdische Ge- schichte und ihreDeutungen (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag, 1995), 38f.  „Geiger an Dernburg, 8. November 1836“,in„Abraham Geigers Briefe“,165;vgl. auch „Geiger an JakobAuerbach, 13.Januar 1846“,inAbraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. vonGeiger,188;erste Zweifel am orthodoxenGlauben, so wusstesich Geiger in seinem Tagebuch zu erinnern, waren ihm im Alter vonelf Jahrengekommen, ausgelöst durch die Lektürevon Beckers Handbuch der Weltge- schichte; vgl. Geiger,Hrsg., Abraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,7;siehe auch Michael A. Meyer, „Abraham Geiger—Der Mensch“,inJüdischeExistenz in der Moderne,hrsg. vonWiese, Homolka und Brechenmacher,5. Es ist viel über den Einfluss vonDavid Friedrich Strauss’ und der TübingerSchule aufGeiger geschrieben worden; siehe dazu Heschel, Der jüdische Jesus,184–189;Meyer, Antwort auf die Moderne, 142f. Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 221

dere, dasreligiöse Bewusstsein der Gegenwart zur Geltungzubringen, „den religiösen Wahrheitenihren Ausdruckzugeben, wie er der Zeit angemessenist.“⁴² Hinzu trat die Erkenntnis,dass auch die Bücher der Bibel selbst in der vorliegenden hebräischen Fassung sowie in den Übersetzungenals das Ergebnis eines Tradierungsprozesses betrachtet werden müssen, in dem sich die inneren Wandlungendes Judentums in der Epoche seit der Rückkehr ausdem babylonischen Exil bis zum Abschluss des Talmud widerspiegelten. Sein Hauptwerk Urschrift,das Geiger 1857 herausbrachte, widmete sich dieser Überlieferungsgeschichte, die dem Glaubendes gesetzestreuen Judentums an einen göttlichen Ursprung des masoretischen Textes also eine doppelteAbsage erteilte, ohne aber damitauch dessen Bedeutung als Urkunde abzustreiten, in der sich die religiösen Lehren und Wahrheitendes Judentums als ethischerMonotheismus abbildeten.⁴³ Welche Verachtungerfür den „niedrigste[n] Standpunkt der Unmittelbarkeit“ empfand,ließ Geiger auch in scharfen Besprechungen, so etwa in der Auseinander- setzung mit dem Vordenker der Neo-Orthodoxie Samson RaphaelHirsch (1808– 1888), durchblicken.⁴⁴ Auch gegendie „Hirnlosigkeit“ der Annahme, dass die mündliche LehreunmittelbareTradition sei,⁴⁵ schrieb Geiger in seiner Urschrift an, indem er dasjüdische Sakralrecht ausjeglichem Offenbarungszusammenhang im Sinne einer göttlichenInspiration herauslöste und ihm stattdessen einen Evoluti- onsprozesszumaß, den er im Wesentlichen ausdem Konfliktzwischen Pharisäern und Sadduzäern herleitete. Mit dem Abschluss des Talmud sei das Judentum dann in eine Epoche der „starren Gesetzlichkeit“ eingetreten, in der das noch für die Offen- barung und Tradition gültige Entwicklungsprinzip ausgehebelt worden sei.Erst in der Gegenwart verschaffe sich mit der Kritik ein neues Zeitalter Geltung. Um das Judentum ausseiner vierzehn Jahrhunderte dauernden Umklammerung durch den Talmud zu befreien, gelteesnun, diesen nicht mehr als göttlichenBefehlskatalog vonunbe- fristeter Validität zu betrachten, sondern als religionshistorisches Dokument menschlichen Ursprungs:

 Vgl. Geiger, „Einleitungindas Studium der jüdischen Theologie“,passim; idem, „Einleitungindie biblischen Schriften“,inAbraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. vonGeiger,Bd. 4, 12; idem, „Jüdische Geschichtevon 1830“,266.  Abraham Geiger, Urschrift und Uebersetzungen der Bibel in ihrerAbhängigkeit von der innern Ent- wicklung des Judenthums (Breslau: Hainauer,1857); vgl. idem, „Einleitung in die biblischen Schriften“, 132.  Abraham Geiger, „Recensionen“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 4(1839): 355–381,idem, „Das Verhältniß des natürlichen Schriftsinnes zur thalmudischen Schriftdeutung. Eine Skizze“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 4(1839): 53 f.; zu Hirsch siehe z.B. Ro- land Tasch, . Jüdische Erfahrungswelten im historischen Kontext (Berlin: De Gruyter,2010).  Vgl. Abraham Geiger, „Die letzten zweiJahre. Sendschreiben an einen befreundeten Rabbiner (1840)“,inAbraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. von Geiger, Bd. 1, 31. 222 AndreasBrämer

Das Thalmudstudium muss vonnun an, wenn es den Anspruch aufWissenschaftlichkeit erheben will, sich ganz anders mit den Quellen befassen als bisher,esmuss die arghintangesetzten Werke zu Ehren bringen und die hoch überschätzte babylonische aufdie Stufe versetzen, die ihr gebührt als dem jüngsten nach bestimmten Voraussetzungen umgewandelten Producte,als ei- nem neuen Werke, das mit Unrecht den Anspruch erhebt,der treue Mund des grauestenAl- terthums zu sein. […]Die Erstarrung, der Todeines jeden wahren religiösen Lebens,sich stützend aufdie angebliche Abgeschlossenheit,welche einmüthigbezeugt werde,muss der Erkenntniss der geschichtlichen Bewegung weichen.⁴⁶

VI

Werdie religiösen Auseinandersetzungen im deutschen Judentum im 19.Jahrhundert unter die Lupe nimmt, wird feststellen können, dass mit den unterschiedlichen Vor- stellungenzeitgemäßerreligiöser Lebensführungauch eine Konfessionalisierung einherging,die sich allerdings nicht als intrakonfessionelle Konsolidierung mit Ten- denzender Uniformierung, Klerikalisierung,Zentralisierung und Sozialreglementie- rung gestaltete. Konfessionalisierung im jüdischen Kontext beschriebimGegenteil eine innere Pluralisierung, d.h. die Entstehung vonreligiösen Bekenntnissen, deren Exklusivität sich an signifikanten theologischen Unterscheidungsmerkmalen fest- machte.⁴⁷ Die zunehmende Vielfalt des jüdischen Glaubens befeuerte zudem eine Diskussion überdie Existenz verbindlicher Glaubenslehren, in die auch Geiger ein- griff, um seinem historisch-kritischenStandpunkt Gehör zu verschaffen.⁴⁸ Dass er sich so dezidiert gegendie Existenz jüdischer Dogmen aussprach, magzum einen mit der apologetisch-polemischen Bemühung zusammenhängen, die Eigenheitund Vorzüge des Reformjudentums auch an grundsätzlichen Unterschiedenzum christlichen Glauben festzumachen, in dem die Dogmatik ihren festen Platz in der Theologie be-

 A. Geiger, Urschrift,IIIf.; vgl. idem, „Allgemeine Einleitungindie Wissenschaft des Judenthums“, 127etpassim; siehe auch Ismar Schorsch, „Scholarship in the ServiceofReform“,inidem, From Text to Context,318f.  ZurKonfessionalisierungimJudentum vgl. Olaf Blaschke, „Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit im Spannungsfeld des neuen Konfessionalismus vonden 1830er Jahrenbis zu den 1930er Jahren“,in Juden, Bürger,Deutsche. Zur Geschichte von Vielfalt und Differenz 1800–1933,hrsg. vonAndreas Gotzmann, Rainer Liedtkeund Till van Rahden(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001): 33– 66;Jacob Toury, „Die Revolution von1848 als innerjüdischer Wendepunkt“,inDas Judentum in der deutschen Umwelt 1800 –1850,hrsg. vonHans Liebeschütz und Arnold Paucker (Tübingen: Mohr,1977): 373; David Sorkin, „Religious Reformsand Secular Trends in German-Jewish Life. An Agenda for Research“,inLeo Baeck Institute Year Book 40 (1995): 174.  Vgl. Schoeps, Jüdischer Glaube in dieser Zeit,33; vonder Krone, Wissenschaft in Öffentlichkeit,427– 429; dies., „Jüdische Wissenschaft und modernes Judentum: Eine Dogmendebatte“,inDie „Wissen- schaft des Judentums“,hrsg. vonMeyer und Kilcher,119f.; siehe außerdem Leopold Löw, Jüdische Dogmen. Offenes Sendschreiben an den Herrn Dr.Ignatz Hirschler,Eigenthümer des „Izraelita Közlöny“ (Pest: Aigner,1871). AbrahamGeiger—skeptischerPionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 223

hauptete.⁴⁹ Zieht man seine Anstrengungen zur Dekonstruktion grundlegender Überzeugungender Orthodoxie in Betracht,dann lässt sich Geigers Position aber zugleich in seinem innerjüdischen Bezugsrahmeneinordnen. Geiger suchte seine progressive Theologie auch in Abgrenzung vonanderen, konservativeren Strömungen zu definieren, denenereinen „unjüdischen“ Dogmatismus nachweisenzukönnen glaubte. Anlasszueiner klärenden Positionsbestimmung bot eine Kontroverse mitManuel Joël (1826–1890), der 1864 als Breslauer Gemeinderabbiner Abraham Geiger ersetzt hatte, nachdem dieser einem Rufnach Frankfurt am Main gefolgt war.Joël lebte be- reits seit 1854 in Breslau, wo er vorseiner Wahl zum Rabbiner als Dozent am Jüdisch- Theologischen Seminarunterrichtet hatte – einemRabbinerseminar,das unter der LeitungZachariasFrankels (1801–1875)für eine moderate Modernisierung des Ju- dentums eintrat.⁵⁰ Vondem Wunsch,einen Ausgleich zwischen reformkritischen und progressivenPositionen zu erzielen, zeugten vorallem Joëls Eingriffe in die Liturgie der Gemeinde. 1872 erschien seine tendenziell konservativere Revision jenes , den Geiger 1854 mit deutlicher Reformabsicht publiziert hatte. An Hinweisen, wie sehr Geiger mit der Überarbeitung haderte, mangeltesnicht. Bereits 1869hatte er ein liturgisches Manifest Joëls zum Gegenstand einer scharf- züngigenAbrechnung gemacht.⁵¹ Seine Einlassungen gegenJoël liefern auch weitere Hinweise zu Geigers Skepsis gegenüber einer systematischen Theologie des Juden- tums. In seiner Broschüre Zur Orientirung in der Cultusfrage hatte Joël die Auffassung vertreten, dass das Judentum durchaus überDogmen im Sinne vonnormativen Glaubensvorstellungenverfüge,zudenen sich auch der freisinnigeTheologe apriori bekennen müsse, weil ihm andernfalls die innere Berufung für seinAmt fehle. Geiger glaubte, in der Festlegung eines verpflichtenden Glaubensbestandes vorallem das Bemühen der Orthodoxie sowieder „Vermittlungstheologie“ erkennen zu können, ihre progressivenGegner zu delegitimieren und auszugrenzen. Für das Judentum re-

 Vgl. Geiger, „Die letzten zweiJahre“,27; idem, „Das Verhaltender Kirche gegendas Judenthum in der neueren Zeit“,inidem, Das Judenthum und seine Geschichte. Dritte Abtheilung:Vom Anfangedes dreizehnten bis zum Ende des sechszehnten Jahrhunderts (Breslau: Schletter,1871), 172.  Zu Manuel Joël vgl. Caesar Seligmann, „Rabbiner Dr.Manuel Joël zu seinem hundertjährigen Ge- burtstage 19.Oktober 1926.Sein Leben und seine Persönlichkeit“,inMonatsschriftfür Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 70 (1926): 305–315;Michael A. Meyer, „The Career of aMediator.Manuel Joël, Conservative Liberal“,inTransversal 14.2 (2016): 56–64.Zum Seminar vgl. Andreas Brämer, „Die Anfangsjahre des Jüdisch-Theologischen Seminars—ZumWandel des Rabbinerberufs im 19.Jahrhun- dert“,inIn Breslau zu Hause? Juden in einer mitteleuropäischen Metropole der Neuzeit,hrsg. von Hettling,Andreas Reinke und Norbert Conrads (Hamburg: Döllingund Galitz, 2003): 99–112.  Manuel Joël, Zur Orientirung in der Cultusfrage (Breslau: Schletter’sche Buchhandlung,1869); Abraham Geiger, Etwas über Glauben und Beten. Zu Schutz und Trutz (Breslau: Schletter’sche Buch- handlung, 1869); vgl. Max Freudenthal, „ManuelJoël und die Kultusfrage“,inMonatsschriftfür Ge- schichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 70 (1926): 330 – 347; David Ellenson, „The IsraelitischeGe- betbücher of Abraham Geiger and Manuel Joël“,inLeo Baeck Institute Year Book 44 (1999): 143 – 164. 224 AndreasBrämer

klamierte er eine Freiheit,inder sowohl das Wissen um die geschichtliche Entwick- lungals auch das persönliche Bewusstsein zur Geltungkam.⁵² Dass Geiger seinem Breslauer Nachfolgersovehement widersprach, überrascht allerdings insofern, als Joël durchaus keinen radikalen Gegenstandpunktvertrat, sondern ebenfalls eine historisierende Anschauungpräsentierte, in die er auch die Dogmen einbezog.Diese erfuhren nämlich, so Joël, zu keinemZeitpunkteine end- gültige Fixierung, sondern seien in der Vergangenheit Gegenstand unterschiedlicher und sich verändernder Auslegungen gewesen, deren Schranken indes vomreligiösen Schriftenkanon gesetzt wurden. Geiger war vondieser Position gar nicht so weit entfernt: Bereits in den 1840er Jahren hatte er die Ansicht verkündet,dassdas Ju- dentumzwar keine unveränderlichenDogmen enthalte, deren AnerkennungVor- aussetzungder Zugehörigkeit zur Glaubensgemeinschaft sei, dass es aber durchaus über einen Bestand vonwesenhaften Grundsätzen verfüge,aus denensich der Maß- stab des jüdischenHandelns ableite. JederGläubigestehe in der Pflicht,solche grundlegenden Wahrheiten des jüdischen Glaubens in sich zu befestigen, „und diese Wahrheitengestalten sich ihm natürlich zu Grund- und Glaubenssätzen.“⁵³ Wiezuzahlreichen anderen Gelegenheiten präsentierteGeiger auch in der Aus- einandersetzung mit Joël das Konzept der „religiösen Idee“,die er dem Dogmenbegriff entgegenstellte. Gegen den Aufklärungsphilosophen Moses Mendelssohn (1729– 1786), der ja das Judentum als offenbartes Religionsgesetz charakterisiert hatte, das die Wahrheitender Vernunftreligion lediglich voraussetze, aber nicht enthalte, ar- gumentierte Geiger,dass das positive Judentummit neuen religiösen Ideen in die Geschichte eingetreten sei. Im Kern überzeitlich und unwandelbar,manifestierten sich diese Ideen aber im geschichtlichen Verlauf in unterschiedlicher Form und Ge- stalt.Geiger postulierte eine wissenschaftliche Theologie ohne Denkverbote, die ihm auch als Voraussetzung galt, um die religiösen Ideen im Judentum in noch reinerer Form zur Geltungzubringen. Der religiöse Fortschritt, der sich insbesondere gegen den hegemonialen Anspruch des Religionsgesetzesrichtete, beschrieb somit auch eine fortwährende und niemals abgeschlossene Annäherung der subjektivenWahr- heit an eine objektive Wahrheit,die aber letztendlich keine ausschließlich jüdischen Adressaten hatte,sondern universale Geltungbeanspruchte.⁵⁴

 Geiger, Etwasüber Glauben und Beten,25und 29 et passim.  Geiger, „Abhandlungenaus den Programmen der jüdischen Religionsunterrichtsanstalt“,322f.; vgl. idem, Etwasüber Glauben und Beten,2–10;Joël, Zur Orientirung in der Cultusfrage,10–12; siehe auch idem, Zum Schutz gegen „Trutz“.Eine nothgedrungene Ergänzung der Schrift: „Zur Orientirung in der Cultusfrage“ (Breslau: Schletter,1869); sowie KenKoltun-Fromm, Abraham Geiger’sLiberal Juda- ism. Personal Meaning and Religious Authority (Bloomington und Indianapolis:Indiana Univ.Press, 2006), 122 f.  Geiger, Etwasüber Glauben und Beten,8und 10 et passim; vgl. auch idem, „Die zweiverschiedenen Betrachtungsweisen. Der Schriftsteller und der Rabbiner“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 4(1839): 321–333; idem, „Jüdische Zeitschriften“,inWissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 5(1844): 374f.ZuMoses Mendelssohnvgl. z.B. Julius Guttmann, Die Philosophie des Ju- Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 225

Geigers vehemente Opposition gegenJoël hing wesentlich mitder zentralen Be- deutung des synagogalen Kultus zusammen, die er auch in Darlegungen zur Gebet- buchreform hervorhob. Andersals bei allen übrigen religiösen Handlungen, die er als Ausdruckeiner individuellen Überzeugungindie Selbstverantwortungdes Gläubigen stellte, wollte Geiger das gemeinschaftliche Gebet als kollektivesGlaubensbekenntnis in den Mittelpunkt der Frömmigkeitspraxis platziert wissen, dem die Reform ihr be- sonderes Augenmerkzuwidmen habe. Dabei ging es weniger um die Einhaltungeines Gebots, die ErfüllungeinerPflicht gegenüber Gott,sondern vielmehr darum, den re- ligiösen Gefühlen und Bedürfnissen der Betenden ein Ventil zu verschaffen. Beider Umgestaltungdes Gottesdienstes, der als reinsteAusprägung des Gesamtbewusst- seins den religiösen und ästhetischen Zeitgeistzum Ausdruck bringen sollte, sah sich Geiger aber mit bedeutenden Hindernissen konfrontiert.Hier kam wiederum zum Tragen, dass sich die Anschauungendes Glaubens als bloße Ahnungeneiner exakten intellektuellen Erkenntnis entzogen. In einer Zeit,inder sich der Wunsch zur Um- gestaltungder Liturgie langsam Bahn brach, aber noch auch aufbedeutenden Wi- derstand stieß,war die Suche nach einerGebetsordnung, die formal und inhaltlich die Zustimmung der Gesamtheitder Gläubigen fand, ohnehin eine Illusion. Diese Erfah- rung hatte Geiger bereits als Rabbiner in Breslaumachen müssen.⁵⁵ Seinen Widerspruch gegenJoëls Bekenntnis zum Dogma untermauerteGeiger vor allem mitHinweisen aufsolche Glaubensüberzeugungen, die zwar in der Geschichte des Judentums einst einen wichtigen Platz eingenommenhatten, aber im Zeitalter der Verbürgerlichung bei den Gläubigen keine Andacht mehr erzeugten. Zeigtesich Geiger in Fragen der Gebetsprache sowie der Gottesdienstdauer vermittlungsbereit,lehnte er in Angelegenheiten des Gebetsinhalts Kompromisse kategorisch ab.Der Reform wies er die Aufgabe zu, überholtereligiöse Vorstellungenaus den Gebetstexten zu strei- chen, bzw.Formulierungen zu finden, die nicht im Widerspruch zu einer geläuterten Auffassung standen. Überlieferten Auffassungen, die in religiöser oder ästhetischer Hinsicht Empörungauslösten, wollte Geiger im Gebetdienst keinen Platz mehr ein- geräumt wissen.⁵⁶

dentums (München: Reinhardt,1933), 312; vgl. auch Max Wiener, Jüdische Religion im Zeitalter der Emanzipation (Berlin: Philo Verlag, 1933), 175 – 257.  Abraham Geiger, Unser Gottesdienst. Eine Frage, die dringendLösung verlangt (Breslau: Schletter, 1868), 1–3; idem, Das Judentum und seine Geschichte,176;vgl. auch idem, Grundzüge und Plan zu einem neuen Gebetbuche (Breslau: Leopold Freund, 1849). Zu GeigerinBreslausiehe z.B. Andreas Brämer, „Ist Breslau „in vielfacher BeziehungVorort und Muster für Schlesien“?Religiöse Entwicklungen in den jüdischen Gemeinden einer preußischen Provinz im 19.Jahrhundert“,inJüdisches Leben zwischen Ostund West. Neue Beiträge zur jüdischenGeschichte in Schlesien,hrsg. vonAndreas Brämer,Arno Herzig und KrzysztofRuchniewicz(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), 217–258.  Abraham Geiger, Plan zu einem neuen Gebetbuche nebst Begründungen (Breslau: Schletter’sche Buchhandlung,1870), 5; Israelitisches Gebetbuch fürden öffentlichen Gottesdienst im ganzen Jahre.Im Einverständnisse mit der Gemeinde-Verwaltung in Frankfurt am Main, Erster Theil (Berlin: Gerschel, 1870), VII; Geiger, Etwasüber Glauben und Beten,46. 226 Andreas Brämer

Wo Bedarf zur Umgestaltung bestand,wusste Geiger insbesondere in seinem Plan für ein neues Gebetbuch in Frankfurt am Main (1870)konkret zu benennen. Seine Leitlinien zur Reform des zielten aufverschönernde Maßnahmen, nahmen aber vorallem theologische Revisionender Liturgie vor, die sich vornehmlich aufdie jüdische Gottesidee sowie das Verhältnis Gottes sowohl zu Israel als auch zur übrigen Menschheit bezog.Anthropomorphismen, die sich namentlichinden liturgischen Dichtungen des Mittelalters (Piyyuṭim)fanden, galt es ebenso zu beseitigen wie an- gelologische Vorstellungen sowie Erinnerungen an den Opfer-und Priesterkult.Der Glaube an die Unsterblichkeit solltematerielle Vorstellungen einer leiblichenAufer- stehungder Toten in den Hintergrund rücken, um stattdessen die Idee einerunver- gänglichen Seele hervorzuheben. Mit der Suche nach einer bürgerlichen jüdischen Konfessionalität ging zudemeine universale Umdeutungdes Auserwähltseins Israels einher,das Geiger wenigerals göttliche Bevorzugung und Absonderung eines Volkes denn als weltgeschichtlichen Auftrag an eine Religionsgemeinschaft zur Bezeugung, Verkündungund Verbreitungdes Gottesglaubens auslegte. Göttliche Gnadenerwei- sungen durften sich somit nicht aufdie Juden beschränken, sondern schlossen die gesamte Menschheit ein. Erteilte Geiger jeglichem Partikularismus der Juden eine Absage, dann mussten auch alle ethnisch-religiösen Zukunftshoffnungen in den Hintergrund rücken. Dazu zählten der Glaube an einen persönlichen Messias, das Heilsversprechen einer Sammlungder Zerstreuten in Zion oder die Hoffnung aufdie Neuerrichtung des Tempels als Nationalheiligtum. So gesehen, bezeichneten Gebete für die WiederherstellungJerusalems, als „eine[r] durchaus gleichgültige[n] Stadt“, keine religiöse Tat, sondern vielmehr „eine Gotteslästerung“.⁵⁷

Resümee

1854,kurze Zeit vorseiner Emigration nach Baltimore, veröffentlichteReformrabbiner David Einhorn(1809 –1879) seineSchrift Princip des Mosaismus,die er als Beitragzu einer systematischen Darstellung des jüdischen Glaubensverstandenwissen wollte. Im Kontext dieses Aufsatzes aufschlussreich ist insbesondere das Vorwort des Buches, in dem der Autorseine Unzufriedenheit mit der jüdisch-theologischen Literatur seiner

 Geiger, Etwasüber Glauben und Beten,53etpassim; idem, Plan zu einem neuen Gebetbuche,5–7; vgl. auch idem, „Nothwendigkeit und Maass“,207– 209; Klaus Herrmann, „Liberale Gebetbücher von ‚Die Deutsche Synagoge‘ bis zum ‚Einheitsgebetbuch‘“,inLiturgie als Theologie.Das Gebet als Zentrum im jüdischenDenken,hrsg.vonWalter Homolka (Berlin: Frank &Timme, 2005): 84f.; K. Koltun-Fromm, „Historical Memory in Abraham Geiger’sAccount of Modern Jewish Identity“,inJewishSocial Studies 7.1(2000): 121–123; Jakob J. Petuchowski, PrayerbookReform in Europe. The Liturgy of European Liberal and Reform Judaism (New York: World Union for Progressive Judaism, 1968), passim; allgemein zum jüdischen Messianismusinder Neuzeit: George Y. Kohler,Hrsg., Der jüdische Messianismus im Zeitalter der Emanzipation. Reinterpretationen zwischen davidischem Königtum und endzeitlichem Sozialismus (Berlin und Boston: de Gruyter, 2014). Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 227

Gegenwart zum Ausdruck brachte. Einhorn glaubte eine grundsätzliche Fehlent- wicklungder wissenschaftlichen Kritik zu erkennen, die nämlich „eine einseitigeund rein negative Stellung“ einnehme, indem sie

sich die Aufgabe gestellt[habe], zu zeigen, was das Judenthum nicht ist,und in dieser Hinsicht allerdings höchst beachtenswerte Materialien geliefert; aufdie Frageaber,was das Judenthum ja sei, ist sie die Antwort bis aufdie Stunde schuldiggeblieben.⁵⁸

Darüber,obEinhornauch Abraham Geiger in den Tadel einschloss,lässt sich nur mutmaßen. Immerhin fußte seine Beurteilungauf Beobachtungen, die auch aufsei- nen Kollegen und langjährigenWeggenossen zutrafen.⁵⁹ Gewinnt maneine Anschauungdavon, wie nachhaltigseine religionsgeschicht- lichen Forschungen die traditionelle jüdische Glaubenswelt erschütterten, dann mag Geigers Argument überraschen, dass Fragen der systematischen Theologie im Streit der Gegenwartumdie Modernisierung des Judentums allenfalls eine Nebenrolle spielten:

Nicht ob die Welt ausNichts geschaffen,nicht ob unmittelbareoder mittelbareOffenbarung anzunehmen sei, nicht ob Wunder geschehen oder nicht,obGlaubenssätzeinihrer Strengean- zunehmensind oder nicht,ist der wesentliche Differenzpunkt, wenn dieser auch manchmal auf der einen oder andern Seitemit hineinspielenmag.⁶⁰

In das Zentrum seiner Kritik am gesetzestreuen Judentum stellte er dessenOrtho- praxie, der er eine genuine Frömmigkeit des progressivenJudentums gegenüberstellte. „Legalität“ und „Formglauben“ beschrieben demnach eine konservativereligiöse Praxis, der er zum Vorwurf machte, die Gültigkeit des jüdischen Regelkatalogsaus der normativenKraft der Vergangenheit abzuleiten, ohne die Gebote aufihr religiöses Moment hin zu befragen. Die „Gesetzlichen“ huldigten also einertheonomenWillkür und forderten eine blindeUnterwerfung, die mit der Vorstellungder Vollkommenheit Gottes im Widerspruch stehe. Echter Gottesgehorsam hingegen bezeichne eine Geis- teshaltung,die das sittliche Bewusstsein als Göttliches im Menschen zum Maßstab des Handelns erhob. Ausdieser Sicht besaßdie Geschichte auch die Macht, der

 David Einhorn, Princip des Mosaismus und dessen Verhältniß zumHeidenthum und rabbinischen Schriftthum, Erster Theil (Leipzig: Verlag vonE.L.Fritzsche, 1854), 6f.; weitere Teile sind nicht er- schienen.  Zu Geigerund Einhorn siehe Christian Wiese, „Heros,Ikone, Gegenbild: Abraham Geiger ausder Perspektive der Reformbewegung in Amerika“,inJüdische Existenz in der Moderne,hrsg. vonWiese, Homolka und Brechenmacher,213–242; sowie Michael A. Meyer, „German-Jewish Identity in Ninete- enth-Century America“,inidem, Judaism within Modernity:EssaysonJewishHistoryand Religion (Detroit: Wayne StateUniv. Press,2001): 335– 337.  Geiger, „Die letzten zwei Jahre“,28. 228 AndreasBrämer

Subjektivität jedes Zeitalters durch Veränderungen der religiösen Form Rechnung zu tragen.⁶¹ Paradigmatisch für Geigers ethischen Monotheismus stand dessen Auslegungder biblischenErzählungvon der ʽAqeda,der BindungIsaaks, in der er die Erkenntnisder Unstatthaftigkeit des Menschenopfers nicht auseiner situativenZuwendungGottes, sondern ausder tieferen religiösen Einsicht Abrahamsableitete. Das Verdienst des biblischenPatriarchen wollte er gerade nicht in dessen Bereitschaft erkennen, einem göttlichenBefehl Folgezuleisten und den eigenen Sohn darzubringen. Der religiöse FortschrittliegeimGegenteil darin begründet, dass der biblische Patriarch diese Versuchung,dem Beispiel der götzendienerischen Umwelt zu folgen, überwunden habe – in der geläuterten Einsicht,dass Gott ein solches Opfer niemals verlangen würde.⁶² 1839 publizierte Geiger seinen Aufsatz über „Die zwei Betrachtungsweisen“,in dem er die theoretische Arbeit des theologischen Schriftstellers und die praktische Wirksamkeit des Rabbiners gegenüberstellte. Dabei beschrieb er den Schriftsteller als unbequemen Mahner,dessenscheinbare Lust an der Zerstörung aber der Aufgabe geschuldet sei,die religiösen Ideengegen das Übergewicht der Religionspraxis zur Geltungzubringen.⁶³ Es mag daher nicht überraschen, dass solche Textpassagen, in denen Geiger positive Auskünftezuden theologischen Grundlagen des jüdischen Glaubens erteilte,vorallem in dessenpraktische Theologie eingebettet sind,inder die zeitgenössische Auffassung der religiösen Ideen zum Ausdruck kommen konnte. Es ist freilich bedauerlich, dass der talentierte Kanzelrednerseine Predigten in der Regel nicht im Druckveröffentlichte.⁶⁴ Knappe, aber prägnanteAussagen zu den wesen- haften Grundlagen des jüdischen Glaubens in der Gegenwart finden sich in den Jahresberichten der jüdischenReligionsschule in Breslau, als deren Leiter Geiger 1846 die religiösen Prinzipien erläuterte, vondenen sein Unterricht ausging:

[…]und zwar 1. vondem Glauben an den einzigenheiligen Gott; 2. vondem Glauben, dass der Mensch eine höhereWürde, einen denkenden Geist,der ihn belebt,eine unsterbliche Seele be- sitzt,d.h.indem Ebenbilde Gottesgeschaffen ist,und endlich, 3. dass ein jeder einzelne Mensch in Verbindung mit allen übrigenzudem hohen Ziele der Vervollkommnungder Gesammt- menschheit mitzuwirken habe,dass die Menschheit berufensei, dem Ideale der gegenseitigen Verbrüderung,der Herrschaft der Gerechtigkeit,der Liebe und des Friedens immer entgegenzu-

 Idem, „Die Rabbinerzusammenkunft.Sendschreiben an einen befreundeten jüdischen Geistli- chen“,inWissenschaftlicheZeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 3(1837):317 f.; idem, „Der Formglaube in seinem Unwerthe und seinen Folgen (aus der Wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift fürjüdische Theologie 1839)“,inAbraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. vonGeiger,Bd. 1, 483–487; siehe auch „Geiger an Dernburg, 23.Februar 1836“,in„Abraham Geigers Briefe“,115.  Geiger, Etwasüber Glauben und Beten,41–43;Vogelstein, Systematische Theologie,272–274.  Abraham Geiger, „Die zweiverschiedenen Betrachtungsweisen“,323–332.  Vgl. „A. Geiger an M.A. Levy,2.September 1870“,inAbraham Geiger’sLeben in Briefen,hrsg. von Geiger,332;siehe aber idem, „Gottesdienstlicher Vortrag gehalten in der grossenSynagogezuBreslau am SabbatheMatthot Massé 5598 (21. Juli 1838)“,inAbraham Geiger’sNachgelassene Schriften,hrsg. vonGeiger,Bd. 1, bes. 364. Abraham Geiger—skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums? 229

streben, was der wahrhafteGedankenkern des richtig verstandenenMessiasglaubens ist.Aus diesen Sätzen, der Einheit Gottes, der Gottähnlichkeit des Menschen,der Hoffnung aufdie in Liebe vereinteMenschheit, welche überall in der heiligenSchrift wiederhallen, ergeben sich auf ganzeinfache Weise die Pflichten gegenGott,gegen uns selbst und gegendie Mitmenschen; sie sind die unerschütterlichen Grundlagen, welche das ganze Gebäude des religiösen und sittlichen Lebens tragen.⁶⁵

Der systematische Ertrag dieser Erläuterungen ist zugegebenermaßen gering.Die wissenschaftliche jüdische Theologie, zu der sich Geiger enthusiastisch bekannte, konnteimGrunde nur religionsgeschichtliche Erkenntnisse zu Tage führen, musste aber die Antwort aufabsolute religiöse Wahrheiten weitgehend schuldig bleiben.In seinen populären Vorträgen zur Frühgeschichtedes Judentums, die er in den 1860er Jahren zunächst voreinemgebildeten Frankfurter jüdischenPublikum hielt,brachte Geiger auch begeisterteBeschreibungen der jüdischen Glaubenswelt, die er allerdings nicht als systematische Darstellungder geltenden Lehre präsentierte, sondern eben als historische Schilderungen einesethischen Monotheismus, der in der Auseinan- dersetzung mit seiner heidnischen Umgebung in die Welt trat.⁶⁶ Gegenüber seinem Sohn LudwigräumteAbraham Geiger 1866 freimütigein, dass für die Grundlagen des Judentums („Gott,unsterblicher Menschengeist,Willensfreiheit,sittliche Anforderung und Veredlung“)kein Beweis erbracht werden könne, diese aber dem menschlichen Bedürfnis nach Transzendenz Rechnung trugenund auch in der Zukunft universale Anerkennungbeanspruchten. Seine Skepsis bezogsich also nicht allein aufdie reli- giösen Wahrheiten selbst,sondern damit einher ging eine Zurückhaltung, die eigene KonfessioninWort und Schrift nach außen zu tragen. Belehrung über Glaubens- inhaltemochte in der Kindererziehung probates Mittel sein, um die Grundlagen einer religiösen Identität der Heranwachsendenzubefestigen. Aufgabe und Freiheitjeder/ jedes erwachsenen Gläubigen war es aber,inder Kenntnis der jüdischen Religions- geschichte die Bestätigung und konkreteForm der religiösen Ideeninsich selbst zu finden. Seiner Generation schrieb Geiger zugleich das Verdienst zu, diese Freiheit einer liberalen Anschauung des Judentums mühevoll errungenzuhaben. Voneiner solchen subjektivenWarte ausbetrachtet,hatte die jüdische Theologie eine Gegen- geschichte präsentiert und mitdieser die wissenschaftlichen Waffen für einen Be- freiungskampf bereitgestellt, in dessen Verlauf die Orthodoxie ihren Hegemonialan- spruchaufgeben musste. Das Reformjudentum trugeinen Sieg davon, den Geiger aber durchausnicht als Gelegenheit verstandenwissen wollte, eine progressiveFassung des jüdischen Glaubens aufDauer normativfestzulegen.⁶⁷

 Geiger, „Abhandlungen ausden Programmen der jüdischen Religionsunterrichtsanstalt“,323f.  Abraham Geiger, Das Judenthum und seine Geschichte bis zurZerstörung des zweiten Tempels.In zwölf Vorlesungen, 2. Aufl. (Breslau: Schletter,1865), 20–23.  „A. Geiger an LudwigGeiger,14. Januar 1866“,inAbraham Geiger,hrsg. von Geiger, 179f.

Asher Salah AreKaraites Sceptics? The JewishPerception of KaraisminNineteenth CenturyItaly

In anote written by SabatoMorais (1823–1897), arabbi native of and the founderofthe JewishTheological Seminary in the United States,and accompanying the text of ’s Autobiography,¹ we find this hagiographicalpor- trait of aman whom he considered his spiritual mentor:

Nobodyismorecourageous than Luzzattoinexpressinghis opinions,somuch courageous that sometimes he aroused against him aruthless opposition.Inall his writings Luzzatto, the believ- er,appears with asharp sword to defend historical Judaism; piercingwith his right hand the enemies of the traditions,repelling with his left hand the heretics whophilosophize.²

While Morais is contributing to the transformation of Samuel David Luzzatto (1800 – 1865), also known by his Hebrew acronym ShaDaL,into aJewishicon, making him a sort of archetypal Italian Jew,³ it is less clear to whom he is referringwhen he men- tions the ‘enemies of the tradition’ and the ‘heretics who philosophise.’ Ihaveclaim- ed elsewherethat the so called ‘heretics who philosophise’ should be identified with the advocates of JewishReform, who, in theirwritingsand in their deeds, challenged the status of revelation, the power of the rabbis,and the observanceoflegal pre- cepts.⁴ Forquestioning the textual , religious authority,and shared practice of Judaism, orthodoxantagonists, e.g. Luzzatto and to some extent also SabatoMor- ais, considered these reformers to be athreat underminingthe legal, political,and social pact upon which Jewish life had relied for the previous two millennia,and werethereforeaccused of having been led astray by the ‘sceptic spirit of the centu-

 Samuel David Luzzatto, Autobiografia di Samuel David Luzzatto preceduta da alcune notizie storico- letterarie sulla famiglia Luzzatto apartiredal secolo decimosesto esusseguita da varie appendici (Padua: Crescini, 1882).The editorofthis posthumous autobiographywas Samuel David Luzzatto’s son, the notary Isaia (1836–1898) with the collaboration of friends and pupils,such as SabatoMorais from Philadelphia and Samuel Vita Zelman (1808–1885) fromMelbourne.  Luzzatto, Autobiografia,70: ‘Nessuno èpiù coraggioso di Luzzattonell’espressione delle sue opin- ioni, coraggioso atal segno ch’egli provocò talfiata controdise’un’opposizionespietata. In tutti i suoi scritti il credente [S.D.Luzzatto] apparisce con una spada tagliente, per difendereilGiudaismo storico;passando da parte apartecolla sua mano destra inemici delle tradizioni, respingendo colla sinistra gli eretici che filosofeggiano.’  ParaphrasingAlexander Altmann, “Moses Mendelssohn the Archetypal German Jew,” in TheJew- ishResponse to German Culture: From the Enlightenment to the Second WorldWar,eds.Jehuda Rein- harz and Walter Schatzberg(Hanover,NH: University Press of New England, 1991): 17– 30.  Asher Salah, “Jewish Reform in Italy,” in Wissenschaft des Judentums in Europe: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives,eds.Christian Wiese and Mirjam Thulin (Berlin: De Gruyter,forthcoming).

OpenAccess. ©2018 Asher Salah, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-012 232 Asher Salah

ry.’⁵ To counter the spread of reformiststances within Italian Judaism, intense and unprecedented activities dedicated to dogmatic interpretations of Judaism werecar- ried out via, for instance, the printing of countless ,⁶ the composition of treatises under the heading Dogmatic ,⁷ and attemptingtoascertain what constitutes the essence of Judaism. The term essence became extremelypopular subsequently, particularlyinthe German speakingstates at the turn of , attracting both Reformersand the Orthodox,who producedcountless booksand booklets bearing the title of Das Wesendes Judentums.⁸ The so-called ‘enemies of the traditions’ were actuallythe great majority of the Jews in Italyafter the Emancipation, now having become, allegedly, ‘indifferent’ to- ward religious questions in general and abandoning anybond with the Jewishcom- munity.Togetherwith ‘scepticism’, ‘indifferentism’ was arecurringcomplaint regis- tered in the writingsofrabbis whose and schools had been deserted by their members and pupils. Conservative and liberal figures of the Italian rabbinate naturallyproposed differing remedies to this situation but all shared asimilar diag- nose of the situation. In Mantua, one of the most important Jewishcommunities of Northern Italy, Rabbi Salomone Nissim (1781– 1864), astaunch orthodox, described what he deemed the greatest danger for his coreligionistsinthese terms: ‘another plague of the cen- tury,thathas its root in the ignorance, is the cold indifference.’⁹ His direct superior,

 The expression ‘spiritoscettico del secolo’ and similar ones are very common in Christian and Jew- ish works concerning religious and philosophical issues;cf., for instance, , Palestina: descrizione storica, geografica earcheologica (Venice: Stabilimento nazionale,1853),1.Itisimportant to stress that the term ‘scepticism’ does not referonlytoanepistemology but concerns ageneral strat- egytoundermineauthority and tradition and in some instances can be interpreted as atheism, ag- nosticism or even .  Cf. Gadi LuzzattoVoghera, “Icatechismi ebraici tra SetteeOttocento,” in Le religioni eilmondo moderno,II. Ebraismo,ed. Davide Bidussa (Turin: Einaudi, 2008): 437– 455.  The most important ones arewritten by Samuel David Luzzatto, Lezioni di teologia dogmatica (Trieste: Coen, 1863) and , Teologia dogmatica ed apologetica (Livorno:Francesco Vigo,1877).  While in Germanythis kind of literaturewas triggered mainlyasareaction to Adolf vonHarnack, Wesen des Christentums (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs,1900)—cf. the works of Isaac Breuer, Lehre, Gesetz und Nation. Eine historisch—kritische Untersuchung über das Wesen des Judentums (Frankfurt am Main: Verlagd.Israelit,1914); Simon Mandel, Das Wesen des Judentums (Frankfurt am Main, 1904); Leo Baeck, Das Wesen des Judentums (Berlin: Nathansenund Lamm, 1905); Jacob Fromer, Das Wesen des Judentums (Leipzig: Hüpeden &Merzyn, 1905); Hermann L. Strack, Das Wesen des Judentums. Vortrag gehalten auf der Internationalen Konferenz der Judenmission zu Amsterdam (Leipzig:J.C.Hin- richs,1906) –,inItalyitwas popularised by Samuel David Luzzattowho titled the central chapterof his Il giudaismo illustrato nella sua teorica, nella sua storia enella sua letteratura (Padua: Bianchi, 1848) as “Essenza del Giudaismo.”  Salomone Nissim,Appello di un rabbino nell’anno settuaginesimo nono di sua età agli amati suoi correligionari (Siena: Moschini, 1860): ‘Altrapiaga del secolo, che nell’ignoranza stessa ha radice, si èlafredda indifferenza.’ On Nissim, see Mauro Perani and Gioia Liccardo, “Il testamentospirituale AreKaraites Sceptics?The Jewish Perception of Karaism in Nineteenth CenturyItaly 233

the chief rabbi of Mantua, MarcoMortara(1815–1894),who unlike Nissim was fa- vourable to the possibilityofintroducing certain reforms to Jewishpractice, differed in his explanation of the phenomenon though was in agreement with the facts. In a letter to the Leghorn Jewishcommunity,hewrites: ‘it is not because of the lack of the religious sentiment that people make transgressions, but to excuse the transgres- sions they affect religious indifference.’¹⁰ But in the theological debate in the nineteenth century there is athird category of Jews, related to the previous two, i.e. the Karaites,areligious movement founded in the eighth century in , who stirred considerable interest and preoccupa- tion among as ambivalent objectsofattractionand repulsion.¹¹ Thisar- ticle is dedicated to the attempt to understand who these Karaites are and whydid they become apolemicaltargetinthe theological debate of the nineteenth century.

Karaites in the Early Modern Religious Debate

Obviously, Karaites have been atargetofJewishreligious polemic not just in Italy and not onlyinthe nineteenth century.From the earlyMiddle Ages, Jewishauthors occupied themselvesagreat deal with Karaism and wereusuallydirected by an an- tagonistic mindset toward them. The Karaites were, accused of scripturalism,i.e.ofa literal readingofthe Hebrew Bible. between Rabbanites and Karaites has been particularlyfierceinEastern Europe and Islamic lands wherethe two com- munitieslived at close quarters with one an another and became intimatelyac- quainted with one another’slawsand regulations. In Western Europe underChristi- an rulers, the presenceofKaraites was extremelyscant and sporadic, hence debates concerning this minority faith primarilycame about in two different historical set- tings. The first from the sixteenthtothe beginning of the eighteenthcentury, the sec- ond in the nineteenth century when the studyofKaraism emergedasafully-fledged field of academic scholarship.

del rabbino mantovano SalomoneNissim,” in Nuovi studi in onorediMarco Mortaranel secondo cen- tenario della nascita,eds.Mauro Perani and ErmannoFinzi (Florence: La Giuntina, 2016): 98–112.  See the letter of June 4, 1867, editedinAsherSalah, L’epistolario di Marco Mortara(1815–1894), un rabbino italiano traRiforma eOrtodossia (Florence: La Giuntina, 2012), 211: ‘Non èper mancanza di sentimento religioso che si trascorrealle trasgressioni, ma si’ per iscusareletrasgressioni che si affetta l’indifferenza religiosa.’ Already in his youth, Mortara had alertedagainst the dangers of ‘re- ligious indifferentism’ in his sermon Dell’indifferenza in fatto di religione (Mantua, 1839), considering it aproblem coming from France. He was probablyinfluenced by the essayofthe abbé Hugues-Fé- licitéRobert de Lamennais, Essai sur l’indifférence en matièredereligion (Paris,1817), translated into Italian by the countess Ferdinanda Montanari Riccini, and published in Modena in 1824.  Foracomprehensive bibliography on the subject,see Barry Dov Walfish and Mikhail Kizilov, Bib- liographia Karaitica:AnAnnotated Bibliography of Karaites and Karaism: Karaite Texts and Studies (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010). 234 Asher Salah

In the last two decades,much scholarlyattention has been devoted to the instru- mental role of the figure of the Karaite in earlymodern and modern European reli- gious controversy.¹² From these studies emergesthe importance of Protestant Hebra- ists in introducing Karaism within the rangeofEuropean erudition in the early modernera.The considerable curiosity concerning Karaites among Christian schol- ars, particularlyProtestants, wasostensiblydue to the analogybetween Karaism and Reformed Christianityonthe one hand,and and Catholicism on the other.This correlation recurs in the writingsofLeiden university professors, such as the Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540 –1609),the exegete Johannes Drusius(1550 –1616), the theologian JohannesHoornbeek (1617– 1666), or Jacobus Trigland the Younger (1652–1705).¹³ Karaism also became acentral concern in mil- lenarian circles all over Northern Europe, as in the works by the Scottish irenicist John Dury (1596–1680),correspondent of the Amsterdam rabbi Menasseh BenIsrael (1604–1657), and whose knowledge about the Karaites came mainlyfrom the Chris- tian kabbalist Johann Stephan Rittangel (1606–1652).¹⁴ Missions were send to the Karaites residinginthe Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth for the purpose of gather- ing information concerning their customs and writings, and probablyalso for con- verting them to Christianity,such as the mission organised by the Christian Oriental- ist GustavPeringer (1651–1710) from Uppsala, under the aegis of king Charles XI of . In the second period of revival of interest for the Karaites, in the nineteenth cen- tury,Karaism wasinvoked by some scholars of the incipient Wissenschaft des Juden- tums,such as Abraham Geiger (1810 –1874), Isaak Markus Jost (1793–1860), Samuel Holdheim (1806–1860) or Isaac Hirsch Weiss(1815–1905), as the prototype of the

 Cf. JakobPetuchowski, “Karaite Tendencies in an EarlyReform Haggada,” HebrewUnion College Annual 31 (1960): 223–249; Johannesvan den Berg, “Proto-Protestants?The Image of the Karaites as a Mirror of the Catholic-Protestant Controversy in the Seventeenth Century,” in idem, Religious Currents and Cross-Currents: EssaysonEarly Modern and the Protestant Enlightenment,eds. Jan de Bruijn, Pieter Holtrop, and Ernestine van der Wall (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1999): 43 – 64;Daniel Lasker, “Ha-Qarai ke-Aḥer Yehudi” [Hebrew], Peamim 89 (2001): 96–106;idem, “Karaism and Chris- tian Hebraism: aNew Document,” Renaissance Quarterly 59.4 (2006): 1089–1116;Valerio Marchetti, “The Lutheran Discovery of Karaite Hermeneutics,” in Una Mannabuona per Mantova. Studi in onore di VittoreColorni per il suo 92°compleanno, ed. Mauro Perani (Florence: Olschki, 2004): 433 – 459; Marina Rustow, “Karaites Real and Imagined: Three Cases of Jewish Heresy,” Past and Present 197 (2007): 35–74;Golda Akhiezer, Historical Consciousness,Haskalah, and Nationalism among Eastern European Karaites [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 2016).  Cf. Berg, “Proto-Protestants?The Image of the Karaites,” 43 – 64;Akhiezer, Historical Conscious- ness,106–116.Iwould liketothank Hanan Gafni for sharingwith me his observations on these sour- cesinhis forthcoming she-be-ʽal-Peh, Devarim she-bi-Khtav: ʽAl Tefisat ha-Torahshe-be-ʽal- Peh ve-Toldoteahba-Meḥqar ha-Yehudi ha-Moderni [Hebrew] (Forthcoming).  Cf. RichardPopkin, “The Lost Tribes,the Karaites, and the English Millenarians,” Journal of Jewish Studies 37.2 (1986): 213–228. Are Karaites Sceptics?The JewishPerception of Karaism in Nineteenth CenturyItaly 235

JewishReform they wanted to promote.¹⁵ FormanyJews, extolling Karaism became a means to stress the existence of an historical and allegedlymorerational alternative to talmudic Judaism. While this periodisation is undoubtedlycorrect,itsuffers from its excessively Germano-centric and Protestant-centricperspective,inasmuch as aproblem that concerns much of the scholarship regardingthe Haskalah and the Wissenschaft des Judentums too, which conflates JewishEuropean modernity with the German model.¹⁶ This has caused some scholars to underrate Catholicand Jewishinterest in Karaites.¹⁷ However,Catholic scholars, such as Guillaume Postel (1510 –1581), were the first to pave the wayfor greater European interest in the Karaites by other Christians and Jews. Later on, French Catholic intellectuals such as the Jesuit Nicolaus Serarius (1555–1609), the biblical scholarJean Morin (1591–1659), Jacques Gaffarel (1601– 1681)¹⁸,and lastbut not least,Richard Simon (1638–1712), author of an important appendix on the Karaites,¹⁹ published alongside his translation of Leon Modena’s Riti Hebraici,admired the Karaites for theirpurportedlymorecritical approach to atradition deemed to having been corrupted by rabbinic teachings.InCatholic po- lemicsagainst Protestants it is not unusual to see the appropriation of the term Kar- aite by Catholics, attemptingtodemonstrate that Reform represented adeviate and later additiontothe original evangelical message. ²⁰ Finally, at the times of the , the Abbé Grégoire (1750 – 1831), the revolutionary leader and

 Cf. RichardPopkin, “Lescaraïtes et l’émancipation des juifs,” Dix-huitième siècle 13 (1981): 137– 147.  Forrecentstudies of Wissenschaft that aim at expandingonthe Germano-centric narrative of the history of the academicstudyofJudaism and Jewish history beyond German lands,see the forthcom- ing volume, Wissenschaft des Judentums in Europe: Comparativeand Transnational Perspectives,eds. Christian Wiese and Mirjam Thulin (Berlin: De Gruyter,2019); Louise Hecht, “The BeginningofMod- ern Jewish Historiography:Prague: ACenter on the Periphery,” JewishHistory 19 (2005): 347–373; Nils Roemer, “Outside and Inside the Nations:ChangingBorders in the Studyofthe Jewish Past during the Nineteenth Century,” in Modern Judaism and Historical Consciousness:Identities,Encounters, Per- spectives,eds.Andreas Gotzmann and Christian Wiese (Leiden and Boston: Brill: 2007): 28–53.  Forinstance, in her fundamental work on Karaite historiographyGolda Akhiezer stresses that with the exception of Protestant Hebraists in the seventeenth and eighteenth century,the Karaite movement did not have anysignificant impact upon earlymodern Jewish literatureuntil the begin- ningofthe ScienceofJudaism in the nineteenth century;see Akhiezer, Historical Consciousness,25.  On these scholars relationships with Italian Jews,see Avner BenZaken, Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1560–1660 (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), in particular chapterthree “TranscendingTimeinthe Scribal East.”  The author of this appendix was not Leon Modena as erroneouslyattributed in BenZaken, Cross- Cultural Scientific Exchanges,98.  Alater example of acatholic scholar presentingthe Karaites has the true representativesofthe original spirit of Judaism preserved intact by Roman Catholicism but altered and adulterated ‘dallo spiritoprogressivo riformatore’ (‘the progressive reformist spirit’)ofrabbinism; see Niccolò C. Maris- cotti, Il clerocattolico elaciviltà,vol. 2(Florence: Galli, 1866), 150.Mariscotti mentions amongthe threemain sects of Judaism at the times of Jesus the ,the Karaites,and the kabbalists. 236 Asher Salah

Roman Catholic prelate, took the Karaites as amodel of what he deemed modern Ju- daism should be.²¹ The second claim regarding the lack of attention to the Karaite phenomenon within Jewishcommunities before the nineteenth century,cannot be taken at face value, in the knowledge of the deepdoctrinal stir caused the Karaism accusations addressed to heterodoxmembers within the Sephardic communities of Amsterdam, Hamburg and London in the seventeenth and eighteenth century,stud- ied by YosefKaplan and Shalom Rosenberg.²² Oddlyenough, contemporary scholarship seems to have overlooked the fact that, aside from the NorthernEuropean Sephardic communities,another important centre existed in the earlymodern erathat produced awide array of texts on the Karaites: Italy. In their appraisal of Karaism, Italian Jews, especiallythosegathered in Venice, differed from the Christian hebraists of their time and from Sephardic intellectuals living in the . Not onlywas the first Karaite prayer book printed in Venice by CorneliusAdelkind in the Bombergpresses with the collaboration of local rabban- ite Jews in 1528–1529,²³ but the Karaites alsoelicited much interest among the Vene- tian Jewishintellectual elite, such as Leon Modena (1571–1648), who wroteanentire tractate (now lost) on the Karaites,²⁴ Joseph SolomonDelmedigo(1591–1655) whose occupation with Karaism is attestedbyhis Sefer Elim (Amsterdam, 1629),²⁵ and Si- mone Luzzatto (1580 –1663), who devoted afew but significant paragraphs to Kara- ism in his Discorso circa il stato degli Hebrei (Venice: Giovanni Calleoni, 1638).²⁶

 Cf. Popkin, “Lescaraïtesetl’émancipation des Juifs,” 137–147.  Yosef Kaplan, “Karaites in the EarlyEighteenth Century,” in idem, An AlternativePath to Modern- ity:The Sephardi Diaspora in Western Europe (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000): 234–279; Shalom Rosenberg, “Emunat Hakhamim,” in JewishThought in Seventeenth Century,eds.IsadoreTwersky and Bernard Septimus (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1987): 285–295.  Cf. Giovanni Bernardo De Rossi, Dizionario storico degli autori ebrei edelle loro opere,vol. 1 (Parma: Dalla reale stamperia,1802),3,sayswithout givinghis source that the Karaites tried to print anew edition of this liturgic workinVenice in 1713.  Cf. Johann Christoph Wolf, Bibliotheca Hebraea,vol. 3(Hamburg: Christophorus Felginer,1727), 1150,who mentions this tractate, whose existencehas been challengedbysome modern scholars al- though it is substantiated by aletterofModena himself; see Leon Modena, Sheʼelot u-Teshuvot Ziqnei Yehudah [Hebrew],ed. Shlomo Simonsohn (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-RavKook, 1956), 16:letter37. To this lost work we should add the possibilityofModena beingthe author of the provocative libel against rabbinic culture and associated by Modena himself to Karaite arguments,asclaimed by TalyaFishman, Shaking the Pillars of Exile: ‘Voice of aFool,’ an Early Modern JewishCritique of Rab- binic Culture (Stanford: Press,1997). OmeroProietti defends the attribution of this pamphlet to in his La città divisa: Flavio Giuseppe, Spinoza eifarisei (Rome: Il Calamo, 2003).  Cf. Ben-Zaken, Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges,98–102. On Delmedigo‘spersonal acquaint- ancewith Lithuanian Karaites, see Stefan Schreiner, “Josef Shelomo DelmedigosAufenthalt in Polen-Litauen,” in An der Schwelle zurModerne. Juden in der Renaissance,eds.Giuseppe Veltri and Annette Winkelmann (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003): 207–232.  The Discorso is included in the edition of Luzzatto’stwo main Italian works; see Simone Luzzatto, Scritti politici efilosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento,ed. Giuseppe Veltri (Milan: Bompiani, 2013), 3–106. Are Karaites Sceptics?The JewishPerception of Karaism in Nineteenth CenturyItaly 237

While in NorthernEuropean Diasporathe label of ‘Karaite’ and the terms ‘Sad- ducee’ or ‘Boethusian,’ wereused by rabbis such as ImmanuelAboab(1555–1628), (1617– 1687), Moshe Hagiz (1671– 1750), or (1654– 1728), to discredit those doubting the validity of the Oral Law, the Venetian rabbis appeared to have shared alessbiased attitude towards Karaism.²⁷ While ridiculing its practices and contradictions, Modena, Delmedigo, and Luzzatto are sensitiveto the critical attitude and intellectual integrity of Karaism, and wereprone to consid- ering this group afull-fledgedcomponent of the Jewish nation and not necessarilyits antagonist.Inthe famous sixteenth “Consideratione” of his Discorso,Luzzatto lists the Karaites as the fourth classofJews, after the talmudists, the philosophers(‘teo- logi filosofanti’), and the kabbalists. He deems the Karaites,despite their small num- ber and their rejection of tradition, to be praiseworthyfor their piety and for their grammatical expertise. In particular, Luzzatto recognises that in comparison to an- cient sects within Judaism they were closertothe fundamental principles of faith of the rabbanite Jews for believing in the immortalityand immateriality of the soul and accepting the existenceofthe .²⁸ This mayexplain why, in the context of the controversy regardingSabbateanism, Italian Jews, such as Samson Morpurgo (1681–1740), aphysician and rabbi in Anco- na, appear to have been reluctant to endorse the equation between the heresy of Shabbatai Zevi (1626–1676)and Karaism, as prompted by Moshe Hagiz of Amster- dam.²⁹ It seems as if this ambiguous, and not entirelyderogatory,appraisal of Kara- ism, so peculiartothe aforementioned Italian Jews, wasdue to their perception of the Karaites as asort of sceptical sect that was wrong in its practical conclusions but correct in its intellectual challenges casting doubt on the conceit of reason. Cer- tainly, much work remains to be done to ascertain the role of Italian Jews as interme- diaries of information in earlymodernEuropean debates of Karaism, exemplified by the case of the tobacco dealer and Sabbatean JewJonas Salvador of Pinerolo in Pied-

 The imageofKaraism in Italyseems to present some substantial differences from the wayMarina Rustow describesthe Sephardic diaspora in NorthernEurope; see Rustow, “KaraitesReal and Imag- ined,” 36: ‘morethan anyother type of deviation fromrabbinic norms,Karaism came to represent the denial of rabbinic authority.This was true even in its absence: the label of Karaism served as acat- egory into which rabbinic and communal authorities placed all manner of biblicizingerror and of resistance to rabbinic authority.’  Luzzatto, Discorso,84v-85r: ‘sono più corretti che li antichi Saducei, admettendo essi l’incorpor- alità et immortalità dell’anima, come ancoassentiscono che vi siano angioli immateriali.’ Avery sim- ilar description of the Karaites, though moreattentive to the present condition of the Karaitesinthe diaspora can be found in Leon Modena, Historia de gli riti hebraici (Paris,1637),fifth part,chapter one. Were the anonymous work QolSakhal (‘The Voiceofthe Fool’)tobeattributed to Modena we would find amuch moreenthusiastic appraisal of Karaism consideredtobethe onlyone that pre- served the correct revelation of Moses and did not fall intodecline.  Cf. ElishevaCarlebach, ThePursuit of Heresy: Rabbi Moses Hagiz and the Sabbatian Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 136,149,195. 238 Asher Salah

mont,who in 1670 became acquainted with Richard Simon in Paris, participated with him in an intense exchangeofviews on the Karaites.³⁰ But whereinItaly, acountry wherereal Karaites have been absentatleast since the vanishingofthe last colonies in Sicilyinthe eleventh century,did Jews gettheir information from on Karaism?³¹ The question is particularlyrelevant in understand- ing the position, both imaginary and real occupied by the Karaites in the writing of importantrepresentativesofthe Science of Judaism in Italyinthe nineteenth century.

Italian Jews’ KnowledgeonKaraisminthe Nineteenth Century

Among the sources from which Italian Jews obtainedtheir information on the ‘Kar- aite question,’ two wereparticularlypopularinthe nineteenth century, the Kuzari by Judah Halevi (c. 1075—1141)and the Maṭṭeh Dan ve-ha-Kuzari ha-Sheni (‘The Staff of Dan and the Second Kuzari’)byDavid Nieto. Judah Halevi deals with the Karaites in the third chapter of his philosophical dia- logue devoted to the refutation of the teachingsofKaraism and to the history of the development of the oral tradition.³² Not onlythe first editions of the Hebrew version of the Kuzari by Judah IbnTibbon wereprinted in Italy,³³ but also one of the most influential commentaries of JudahHalevi’swork, the QolYehudah by Italian rabbi Judah Moscato (1530 –1593), published posthumously in Venice in 1594 and since then frequentlyreprinted to accompanyeditions of the Kuzari.³⁴ Without doubt,Ital- ian Jews werenot the onlyreaders of the Kuzari which was widelystudied and de- bated by intellectual circles across Europe. In the earlymodern era, the Kuzari was, in fact,usedasamajor sourceand standard reference for the discussions of Jewish sects among Christians and Jews.

 Gershom Scholem, Sabbatai Ṣevi: TheMystical Messiah 1626–1676 (Princeton:Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1973), 827–828.  According to Shmuel Spector, “The Karaites in Nazi-Occupied Europe as Reflected in German Documents” [in Hebrew], Pe’amim 29 (1986): 90 –108, some Karaites areattested to have been in Italyinthe first half of the twentieth century,mainlytravelers passingthrough its ports e.g. the fifty LithuanianKaraites mentioned by S. Zarhi, “Ha-ʽOlim ha-Rishonim mi-Polin higiʼuArṣah be- ʼOniyyah” [Hebrew], Davar,December 2(1949): 1, and the thirty-six refugees fleeingfromEgypt in 1957 recorded in the Londonian JewishChronicle’sarticle “1000 Jewish Refugees arrive in Italy,” on January 11, 1957.  On the possibility that the Kuzari was originallycomposed as aresponse to aKaraite,see Daniel Lasker, “Judah Halevi and Karaism,” in From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism: Intellect in Quest of Understanding.EssaysinHonorofMarvin Fox,eds.Jacob Neusner,Nahum Sarna, and Ernst Frerichs (Atlanta: Scholars Press,1989): 111–126.  See Fano, 1506,Venice 1547, and Venice1594containingMoscato’s QolYehudah.  On Moscatointellectual background, see Giuseppe Veltri and Gianfranco Miletto, eds., Rabbi Judah Moscato and the JewishIntellectual WorldofMantua in the 16th-17th Centuries (Leidenand Bos- ton: Brill, 2012). AreKaraites Sceptics? The Jewish Perception of KaraisminNineteenth CenturyItaly 239

After aperiod of relative neglect in the eighteenth century for its anti-rationalist stances,the Kuzari benefited from aresurge in interest in the following century. Adam Shear in his work on the Rezeptionsgeschichte of the Kuzari stresses ‘the wide appeal of the book to all sides of the increasingly fragmented Jewishbodypo- litic’ all over Europe in the ageofthe Wissenschaft des Judentums.³⁵ Mainlyfocussing on the Central and Northern European context,Shear’sbook sporadicallyrefers to Italian Jews, but his observations concerning the importance of Halevi and the Kuzari in maśkil literature and among scholars of Judaism can be extended to Italyaswell. Aside from some rather marginal mentions of the Kuzari by the Mantuan maśkil and traveller Samuele Romanelli (1757– 1814),³⁶ Judah Halevi became standard read- ing for educated Italian Jews, as demonstratedbythe inclusion of the Kuzari in the educational programme for advanced studentselaborated by Elia Morpurgo (c. 1731/ 40 –1801) of Gradisca and published in the Berlin journal, Ha-Meassef,in1786under the title Mikhtav mi-Eliyyahu.³⁷ In the official curriculum of the Collegio Rabbinico, the rabbinic seminary of Padua, onlythe Kuzari with commentary by Moscato is fea- tured as compulsory reading for students in theologyclasses, although the original programme made up by Isaac SamuelReggio in the 1820s also referred to Maimo- nides’ Guide of the Perplexed,later eliminated allegedlycontaining ‘principles of Greek philosophy, now rejected.’³⁸ Accordingtothe 1867program of studies of the rabbinical collegeofLeghorn, arival institution to the seminar in Padua and more oriented toward mysticalstudies thantothe spirit of the Wissenschaft des Judentums, studentsintheologyweregiven the choice to be tested either on the Kuzari,oron JosefAlbo’s Sefer ha-ʽIqqarim and Saadiah Gaon’s Sefer ha-Emunot ve-ha-Deʽot.³⁹

 Adam Shear, The Kuzari and the Shaping of JewishIdentity,1167–1900 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,2008), 249.  Samuele Romanelli, Masa be-Arav [Hebrew] (Berlin: Hinukh Nearim, 1792), thirteenth chapter, mentions the second essay, paragraph 26,ofthe Kuzari on ; idem, Grammatica ragionata ebraica con trattato ed esempjdipoesia (Trieste: Stamperia Governiale, 1799), where he quotes exten- sively from Halevi’spoetry.Shear, TheKuzari,244,also mentions the possibility of Romanellihaving served as one of the proofreaders of Joseph Hrashantsky’seditonofthe Kuzari (Vienna, 1795).OnRo- manelli and Haskalah, see my introduction to the Italian edition of Samuele Romanelli, Visioni d’Or- iente (Florence: La Giuntina, 2006).  Cf. AsherSalah, “‘Bein Ghevule Ashkenaz VeItalia’:Elia Morpurgo nel contestodelle riforme sco- lastiche nelle Unite ConteediGradisca eGorizia tra Sette eOttocento,” in Culturaebraica nel Gorizia- no,ed. MarcoGrusovin (Gorizia: IstitutodiStoria Sociale eReligiosa, 2007): 101–123.  ‘Principi di filosofia greca in essa introdotti epresentementeobbliterati.’ Cf. Nikolaus Vielmetti, “Das Collegio Rabbinicovon Padua,” in Wissenschaft des Judentums:Anfänge der Judaistik in Europa, ed. Julius Carlebach(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,1992):12–13,54–57,and Mad- dalena Del BiancoCotrozzi, Il collegiorabbinico di Padova. Un’istituzione religiosa dell’ebraismo sulla via dell’emancipazione (Florence: Olschki, 1995),153.  Cf. Alfredo S. Toaff, “Il collegio rabbinicodiLivorno,” La Rassegna Mensile di Israel 12 (1938): 188. 240 Asher Salah

The popularity of the Kuzari is attested to by at least two Italian translations, one by the chief rabbi of Florence, David Maroni (1810 –1888),⁴⁰ the second by Cesare Foa` (1833 – 1907) in 1872.⁴¹ Added to these two literary achievementsare the numer- ous renditions of Halevi’spoetry into Italian in the nineteenth century by towering figures of Italian Jewish intellectual life e.g. Cesare Rovighi (1820 –1890),⁴² Salvatore De Benedetti (1818–1891),⁴³ or Giuseppe Barzilai (1824–1902).⁴⁴ The most important representative of this Halevian revival is undoubtedlySamuelDavid Luzzatto whose affection for Halevi’spoetry appears throughout his oeuvre, from the publication of a poetic anthologyofJudahHalevi, with notes and an introduction, under the title of Betulat Bat Yehudah (Prague, 1840), to the vocalised and corrected edition of the Di- wan’seighty-six religious poems, with aphilosophicalcommentary and introduction, publishedinLyckin1864.⁴⁵ Erudite correspondencesofItalian Jewishscholars shed light upon their obses- sive search and interestfor anyextant commentary of the book, such as JudahMo- scato’s, QolYehudah,Nathanel Caspi’s ʽEdut le-Yiśrael,orSalomondeLunel’salias Salomon Vivas, Ḥesheq Shelomo.⁴⁶ The fact thatpersonalities with radicallydifferent approachestoJudaism, such as the mystical Elijah Benamozegh(1822–1900) and the

 This manuscript translation is mentioned in Maroni’stestament published in Lionella Viterbo, Spigolando nell’archivio della comunità ebraica di Firenze (Florence: La Giuntina, 1997), 132.  Il Cosarì: operascritta in arabico da Giuda Levita, spagnuolo;recata in ebraico da Giuda ben Tib- bón, evolgarizzata da Cesare Foa` (Casalmaggiore: Aroldi, 1872).  CesareRovighi’stranslation of ahymn by Halevi fromamanuscript belongingtothe Paduan Giu- seppe Almanzi was published in Rivista Israelitica 1.5 (1846): 285–287.  Salvatore De Benedetti, CanzoniereSacrodiGiuda Levita (Pisa: Nistri, 1871). As agift for the wed- ding Zabban-Pardo Roques,DeBenedetti published Un epitalamio ebraico di Giuda Levita (Pisa: Nis- tri, 1891). Alater version of selected poems was conducted by the rabbi of Soragna,Aldo Sorani, Giuda Levita, poesie scelte,preface by Hayim N. Bialik (Reggio:Riccardo Bondavalli, 1913).  At the end of his translation of the Lamentations of Jeremiah, Itreni di Geremia, traduzione let- terale dal testo ebraico in versi italiani con note originali (Trieste:Coen, 1867), Barzilai included also his poetic version of the Sioneide, encouraged by Lelio della Torre whohad alreadypublished his own version of this elegybyHalevi (Abul Hassan), now collected in the posthumous Scritti Sparsi, vol. 1(Padua: Prosperini, 1908), 375–390.  Cf. Irene Kajon, “The Problem of Divine JusticeinSamuel David LuzzattoCommentary to the Diwan of Jehuda Ha-Levy,” in JewishStudies at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: Judaism from the Renaissance to Modern Times,eds.Judit Targarona Borrás and AngelSáenz-Badillos (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1999): 48–53.  See, for instance, MarcoMortara’sletterstoSamuel David Luzzatto, June 27,1855, July 15,1855, August 6, 1856,and December 29,1856, and to Moritz SteinschneiderofSeptember 8, 1859 and againMay 7, 1862and August 24,1865, concerningthe project of printingthese two commentaries from the collection of the chief rabbi of Mantua; editedinSalah, L’epistolario di Marco Mortara, 95–98, 147– 150.Luzzattocorresponded intensively with Gideon Brecher (1797– 1873)onhis works about the Kuzari published in Prague in 1838–1840. AreKaraites Sceptics?The Jewish Perception of Karaism in Nineteenth CenturyItaly 241

anti-kabbalistic SamuelDavid Luzzatto,⁴⁷ shared an unblemished fondness for Judah Halevi’soeuvre, can be explainedasasurvival of acharacteristic Italian desire from the late Renaissance on to harmonise amoderate Maimonidism with afideistic ap- proach to religion influenced by Halevi.⁴⁸ However,Halevi’ssuccess among Italian Jews cannot be separated from his de- fence of the foundational value of the Oral Lawand the traditional building of Jewish faith. This alsoexplains the strong engagement of Italian Jewishscholars with the Maṭṭeh Dan written by David NietoaVenetian rabbi, living in London.⁴⁹ This book was published simultaneouslyinHebrew and Spanish in London in 1714,along with aseparate edition in Hebrew and another exclusively in Spanish. While the first Kuzari was adefence of the Written Law, David Nieto’ssecond Kuzari sets out to offer arguments in favour of the authenticity of the rabbinical tradition, against the attacksofthe Karaites.Needless to say, these imaginary Karaites have little or nothing to do with the real Karaite communities living in Lithuania, Crimeaand dif- ferent parts of the Ottoman empire during thattime. The Karaites David Nietotargets are none other than religious dissidents,mostlyofConverso origin, influenced by a critical approach towardthe Oral Law(torah she-be-‘al-peh)ofthinkers such as Uriel da Costa(c. 1585–1640), Juan (Daniel) de Prado (c. 1612—c. 1670), and most famously (1632–1677). It is noteworthythat, although neither Spinozism nor Karaite communities in the East wereapparentlyofgreat concern for Italian Jews in the following century,the Maṭṭeh Dan,which had been alreadypartiallytranslated by Aviad Sar Shalom Basilea (c. 1680—1743/9), rabbi of Mantua, in the first half of the eighteenthcentury,⁵⁰ was rendered into Italian in at least two integraltranslations; one by the aforementioned rabbi David Maroni in Florence, the other carried out be- tween 1843and 1845under the title Dissertazione edifesa della legge orale (‘Disser- tation and Defence of the Oral Law’)1846 by Eliseo Pontremoli (1778–1851), at that

 Luzzatto’scritical comments to the first volumeofGideon Brecher’s1838edition of the Kuzari weredeemed important enough by the editortobeincluded in the second volume published the next year.  Elijah Benamozeghexplicitlyreminds the commonground of Maimonides’ and Halevi’spercep- tion of Christianityand Islam in his Teologiadogmatica ed apologetica (Livorno:Vigo, 1877), 272, and Israele el’umanita. Il mio credo (Pisa: ETS, 2002), 160: ‘Credo comeinsegnano Giuda Levita eMaimo- nide che il cristianesimo el’islamismosieno grandi avviamenti all’organamentodefinitivo religioso dell’umanità, la quale sarà perfetta solo quando accetterà dalle mani dell’anticoIsraele la semplice religione laicale erazionale detta Noahide,’ and see also his Israël et l’Humanité (Paris:Leroux,1914), 176: ‘Lesrabbins,entreautresMaimonide et Juda Halevi, en ont jugé ainsi et ils disent qu’il ex- isteàchaque epoque une aspiration messianique correspondant àlatendence universalistequi ne cesse de travailler au sein de l’humanité.’  The popularity of the book in the nineteenth century,outside Italy, is attestedalso by the versions into other European languages: in English by Louis Loewe, The Rod of Judgment (London: Wertheim- er,1842) and the manuscript version by Elias Hiam Lindo (1783 – 1865) made in 1853 and now pre- served in the manuscripts Ms HUC JIR Cincinnati and Ms Montefiore 307. In the Jewish Theological Seminary,New York, therecan be found atranslation in ; see Ms New York, JTSL,2390.  Aversion of it is extant in aCambridge manuscript. 242 Asher Salah

time chief rabbi of Niceinthe Kingdom of Piedmont.⁵¹ Both translations circulated in manuscripts. In 1819 the rabbiAvtalion Lampronti of Ferrarawroteaphilosophical treaty and commentary of the Maṭṭeh Dan titled Wikkuaḥ ʽal ʽOlam ha-Levanah ve- Shaʽar Kokhvei ha-Lekhet (‘Discussion on the Lunar World and on the other Planets’), devoted to the discussion of the relationship between science and faith, taking its cue from the fourth chapter of Nieto’swork.⁵² Aside from the work’sstatus as areference guide to Jewishthought, it is clear that the interest manifested by Italian Jews concerning Halevi and Nieto does not de- rive so much from the factual information concerning the Karaites in theiroeuvre, but from the possibility of providinganapology of rabbinic Judaism. However,the malleability of the figureofthe Karaite, cut off from anyconcrete referencetothe real representativesofthis community,allowed its appropriation and instrumental use in different historical contexts. In the nineteenth century,inacontext of civil emancipation of the Jews and their progressive integration within society as a whole, Karaism reappears in the writingsofItalian Jews attemptingtodefine the characteristics and the role of Judaism in modernity.But while in the earlymodern eraJews tended to associate Karaism with deistic postures within the Jewishcom- munity and rationalist attacksagainst tradition, in the nineteenth century Karaites wereincreasingly singled out as aspecular imageofcontemporary Jewishreform. Hence, Karaites are placed in the hot seat for the novelty of theirdoctrines and igno- rance of Judaism, rather than for their alleged challenges against the Oral Law.

The Italian Wissenschaft des Judentums,the Reform and the Karaites

In the nineteenth century,the Karaites return to the fore in Jewish intellectual debate in acompletelynew context dominatedbythe oppositionbetween Reform and Or- thodoxy.Michael Meyer has noted that ‘by reviving interest in , Helleniz- ers, Essenes, , and Karaites,Reformed Jews wereable to challengethe as- sociation of Judaism with Pharisaism, whose extension was the rabbinism that reigned at the time.’⁵³ Thereforeitisnosurprise that the most often quoted works favourable to the Karaites are to be found among Reformers. Abraham Geiger,for in- stance, explicitlyreferred to the Karaites as the prototype of the Reformed Jew. Con- versely, in the orthodoxcamps, Karaites are accused of all the evils of modernity,ir- religiosity and assimilation. TheGalician rabbiand scholarSolomon Judah Rapoport

 See Ms Paris,Library of the AllianceIsraélite Universelle, 254. On Pontremoli, see AsherSalah, “Judaism as aMoral Theology: the Work and the Figure of Elisha Pontremoli,” Zakhor,nuovaserie 1(2017): 101–129.  Ms Valmadonna 156.  Michael Meyer, Judaism Within Modernity:EssaysonJewishHistoryand Religion (Detroit: Wayne StateUniversity Press, 2001), 50. AreKaraites Sceptics? The Jewish Perception of KaraisminNineteenth CenturyItaly 243

(1786 – 1867) compared the strife and animosity of the Jewish reformers with the rift introduced within Judaism by Karaism and Sabbateanism.⁵⁴ AzrielHildesheimer (1820 –1899) reintroduced the use of writing the name of the followers of Karaism in Hebrew as Qaraʽim with an ‘Ayin insteadofwith an Alef,insisting by such of a device on the divisive nature of this sect within Judaism (the Hebrew root Q.R.A means ‘to rip’). Examples of this attitude against and in favour of ‘Karaism’ are wide- spread to such an extent that the Karaites became what DanielLasker called the ‘Jewishother’ par excellence.⁵⁵ Sometimes, the term ‘Karaite’ could be used by Reformed Jews as adouble-edged polemicalweapon against conservative rabbis.Therefore, reformers such as Joseph Aub(1804–1880) or the aforementioned Abraham Geiger,inwhose writingsthe word ‘Karaite’ is avery ambivalent concept and depends on his polemicaltargets, sometimesaccuse their orthodoxcounterparts of being Karaites for not being able to adapttothe changingsituation of Jewish life and sticking to the letter of the Tal- mud.⁵⁶ What all these usesofthe word ‘Karaite’,pejorative or sympathetic, have in com- mon, is thatthe Karaitehas become the figureofafracturedJudaism in two opposite camps. It is worth quoting Marcus Jost’sexemplary imageofthe Karaites: ‘Die Kara- iten […]behaupten […]gegen die übrigen Juden dieselbe Stellung, wie die Protestant- en gegendie Katholiken, und die Schiiten gegendie Sunniten.’⁵⁷ In the Germancul- tural domain, the Jewishworld is thereforeperceivedtobeasirremediablydivided as Christianityand Islam, torn by an inner war of religions. Without insisting or believinginanItalian Sonderweg,the Karaite question in Italyisposited in aquite different form than in German lands. At the turn of the nine- teenth century, even prior to the mobilisation of the first and second Kuzari by the nascent Orthodoxy and Reformers in German speaking landsand in England,⁵⁸ Kar- aites elicited agood deal of curiosity among Italian Jews. Thiscould well have been the background for the rumours widelycirculated in Europe claiming Italian Jews weretrying to implementsubstantial reformsofthe Jewish lawinspired by the spirit of Karaism. The rumours reached Abbé Henry Grégoire, and Italian rabbis werecom- pelled to issue blunt disclaimers dismissing such allegations.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Gré-

 Solomon Judah Rapoport, Tokhaḥat Megulla [Hebrew] (Frankfurt am Main, 1845), 1.  Daniel Lasker, “Ha-Qarai ke-Aḥer Yehudi” [Hebrew], Peamim 89 (2001): 96–106.  Geiger defended himself against the chargesofKaraism addressed to him by some Orthodoxau- thors by labellingthem as ‘Talmud-Karaites’.  Marcus Jost, “Neue Berichteüber die Karaiten und deren Geschichte,” Israelitische Annalen 28 (1839): 217.  Forthese culturalareas the phenomenon has been analysedbyShear, TheKuzari,257–261.  They were first published in the Staats-und Gelehrte Zeitung des Hamburgischen unparteiischen Correspondenten 57 (1796). On this episode, cf. Ulrich Wyrwa, Juden in Toskanaund in Preußen im Ver- gleich. Aufklärungund Emanzipation in Florenz, Livorno,Berlin und Königsbergi.Pr. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 84.Cf. also JacobKatz, Out of the Ghetto:The Social Background of JewishEmancipa- tion, 1770–1870 (Syracuse, NY:Syracuse University Press, 1973), 153;Renzo De Felice, “Per una storia 244 Asher Salah

goire’swork praising the allegedly ‘Karaitebent’ of Italian Jews was translated into Italian by the Piedmontese JewSalomon Isaac Luzzati titled Osservazioni sullo stato degli ebrei in Francia eGermania (Casale Monferrato:Zanotti Bianco, 1806),⁶⁰ and the Jewishpress of the period reviewed it favourably.⁶¹ At around the sametime Abraham Vita de Cologna (1755 – 1832), vice-president of the Napoleonic Sanhedrin in 1808 and Great Rabbi of France, apost he was to hold until 1826, wroteaself-defined ‘anti-Karaite’ treatise, that survivedonlyina1820 translation from French into Hebrew,titled the Qeraha-Gever (‘The Cockcrow’), by Elisha Pontremoli.⁶² Posing as ahistory of the Karaites and their literature,which to alarge degreeitis, the Qeraha-Gever contains manyanti-Christian remarks and constitutes alate offspring of akind of apologetic literature in defenceofthe Oral Lawagainst the criticism of Christian and Jewish sceptics.Inchoosing to translate this work into Hebrew clearlyreveals Pontremoli’sinvolvement in religious polemics, asubjecttowhich he devoted ashort text, Wikkuaḥ Socrati be-‘Inyanei ha-Emunah (‘Socratic Dialogue on Faith’), and his engagement in Jewish apologetics against those inclined to reform Judaism in the name of arestoration of the biblical purity, which the orthodoxcamp perceivedasmodernmanifestations of Karaism. It is no coincidencethatPontremoli defines the despised Voltaireas‘amodern Sadducee.’ Despite this polemicalattempt at disqualifying Karaism’sclaims to be the au- thentic representative of Judaism, Cologna’swork in Pontremoli’stranslation makes aclear distinction between Karaism, as asect of Judaism in the times of Geo- nim and contemporary Karaites,described in the eight chapter as ‘much less distinct from rabbaniteJews todaythan they wereinthe past,’ expressing the hope of arec- onciliation with them in the near future, countering Christian attempts to increase the gapbetween the twoJewish groups.Cologna’streatise demonstrates agreater ac- curacy and deeper knowledge of real Karaism and the Karaitediaspora, and along with the traditional attacks to theirfaith present detailed description of theirlitera- ture, their beliefs and their customs. This is neither the first nor the onlyinstance of an academic and less biased at- titude concerning Karaism and Karaites. An earlier example of the curiosity attracted

del problema ebraico in Italia alla fine del XVIII eall’inizio del XIX. La prima emancipazione,” Mo- vimento Operaio 5(1955):681–727; Attilio Milano, Storia degli ebrei in Italia (Turin: Einaudi, 1963), 345; LoisC.Dubin, “Triest and Berlin: The Italian Role in the Cultural Politics of the Haskalah,” in TowardModernity:the European JewishModel,ed. JacobKatz (New York: Routledge,1997): 207– 208. See also the correspondencebetween Ricciand GrégoireinMauriceVaussard, Correspondence Scipione de Ricci—HenryGrégoire (Florence: Sansoni, 1963).  Luzzati whoalso translated of into Italian, such as the Tofteh Arukh by Moshe Zacut, L’inferno preparato (Turin, 1819), later convertedtoCatholicismtook the name Amedeo Luzzati Valperga and published aperiodical against the Talmud, Osservatoretalmudico:giornale pe- riodico (Turin: C. SylvaTipografo, 1827).  As lateasin1880 we find positive reviews of this work. See, e.g. the Italian Jewish journal printed in Corfu but emanatingfromthe Rabbinical CollegeinPadua, Mosé 3(1880): 297.  Ms Moscow,Russian StateLibrary,Guenzburg1440. AreKaraites Sceptics? The Jewish Perception of KaraisminNineteenth CenturyItaly 245

by this religious group is evidenced in the biblical studies inspired by the new meth- ods of philologyand textual criticism is inarguablythe precious collection of Karaite manuscripts collected by the Venetian rabbi JacobRaphaelSaraval (1708 – 1782)in the course of his numerous travels throughout Europe.⁶³ Saraval provided the abbot Giovanni Bernardo De Rossi (1742 – 1831), professor of Oriental languages at the University of Parma, with the main bodyofinformation of Karaism thatappeared in his encyclopaedic work on the history of Jewishliterature. De Rossi was able to correct and add new sources to the classical textbooks on Karaism written by Jacobus Trigland,Johann Gottfried Schupart(1677–1730), GustavPeringer and Johann Chris- toph Wolf (1683–1739) thanks to Saraval’seruditecooperation, from whose collec- tion he purchased several Karaitemanuscriptsfor the Palatine library in Parma.⁶⁴ Another bibliophile and book collector,Moise Beniamin Foà(1730 –1822), an impor- tant Jewishscholar and merchant from Reggio wellconnected to the European aca- demic networks, wasable to bring part of Saraval’sKaraitecollection into the library holdingsofthe DuchyofModena.⁶⁵ Avery positive assessment of Karaism can be found in the chapters thirteen and fourteen of the reform project designed by Aron Fernandez (1761– 1828)(or Fernando —as he signed all of his works to Italianize his Iberian patronym) Progetto filosofico d’una completa riforma del culto edella educazionepolitico-morale del popolo ebreo (Tibériade, 1810; vere Florence: Marenigh, 1813) from Leghorn. Fernandezwas con- vinced that ‘Karaites agree with the rest of the Jews in what concerns the fundamen- tal points of religion.’⁶⁶ He admired theirfaith unburdenedofuseless practices and dangerous that had entered into Judaism over centuries of wanderings among idolatrous cultures, but criticised Karaism for its ‘austerity that makes it in manyparts almost impracticable.’⁶⁷ Despite acurrent imagethat is to be proven incorrect by recent Karaism scholar- ship, Fernandez was among the first scholars to understand thatKaraites,werenot adepts of apure literal readingofthe Bible for they accepted parts of the Masoretic interpretation of the Scriptures,and thereforecould not be assimilated, basedonthe principle of , into Protestant hermeneutics.Fernandez is fullyaware that Karaism is far from being adeistic and rational form of Judaism unlike the ver-

 Adescription of his traveltothe Netherlandscan be found in the seven letters included in Jacob Raphael Saraval, Viaggi in Olanda (Venice:Zatta, 1807).  Cf. Giovanni Bernardo De Rossi, Dizionario storico degli autori ebrei edelle loro opere (Parma: Dalla reale stamperia, 1802),121.  Cf. Giovanni Bernardo De Rossi, Annales hebraeo-typographici ab anno MDI ad MDXL digessit no- tisque hist.-criticis ab auctoreinstructi (Parma: Carmignani, 1799), 34.  Aron Fernandez, Progetto filosofico d’una completa riforma del culto edella educazionepolitico- morale del popolo ebreo (Tibériade, 1810;vereFlorence:Marenigh, 1813), 184: ‘Icaraiti convergono in quantoriguardaipunti fondamentali della religione con gli altri ebrei.’  Ibidem,198: ‘Austerità che la rende in moltissime parti pressoché impraticabile.’ 246 Asher Salah

sion of it he wishestospread among his contemporaries and warns against an exces- sive idealisation of Karaism.⁶⁸ Fernandez found an admirer of his radical project of reform in the otherwise moderate and observant rabbi of Gorizia, IsaacSamuelReggio (1784– 1855), a main figure of the Wissenschaft des Judentums in Italyand one of the founders of the rabbinicalcollegeofPadua. In 1852, Reggio published,under the title Beḥinat ha-Qabbalah (‘Examination of the Tradition’), the work that he attributedtoLeon Modena,the Qol Sakhal (‘The Voice of the Fool’), atext thatmentionsthe Karaites in highlyfavourable terms.AccordingtoHanan Gafni, that very particular kind of Karaism found in Reggio’swritingsconcerns the legal authority of the Talmud, con- sidered by Reggio as purelytheoretical, bearingnoconsequences for establishingthe Halakhah.⁶⁹ The onlybindingtext for Reggio wasthe Mishnah, thus relativizing the reverencethe Talmud was givenbyJews in the Middle Ages in the Diaspora. Forthis reason Solomon Judah Rapoport attacked Reggio dubbing him a ‘Karaite’.⁷⁰ Besides Reggio, another central figure of Italian Judaism in the nineteenth cen- tury,Samuel DavidLuzzatto, displayedanintense interest for Karaitescholarship and history.Like Reggio, Luzzatto corresponded with the Russian KaraiteAbraham Leonowicz (1780 – 1851).⁷¹ Luzzatto dealslengthilyonthe origins of the Karaites in his lessons of Jewishhistory,originallydelivered duringthe academic year 1830 –31 at the rabbinical collegeinPadua but publishedonlytwo decades later.⁷² His main goal is to demonstrate, against the Kuzari author’sopinion and the seven- teenth century Dutch reform theologian JacobTrigland, that Karaism is posterior to the constitution of rabbinic Judaism. The question is not onlyascholarlydiatribe, but alsowho is to be considered the representative of the authentic and original Ju- daism and who is but alater,corrupted, reformed version of it.Luzzatto writes:

[…]that the Karaites, not the Rabbanites, aretobeidentified with the new and reformed Jews. […]The Karaitesanswerthat the talmudists have often mentioned their sects, but that in their hatredthey have confused it with the Sadducees.Consequently, some contemporary Rabbanites, influenced by their ignoranceorbytheir hatred, still confuse the Karaites with the Sadducees.⁷³

 Ibidem,196: ‘Bisogna non lasciarsi trascinaredall’eccesso condannabile di deferireciecamente a suoi errori nella ghisa medesima che approvateabbiamo le sue massime.’  Hanan Gafni, Pshuṭah shel Mishnah. ʽIyyunim be-Ḥeqer Sifrut Ḥazal be-ʽEt ha-Ḥadashah (“The Mis- hnah’sPlain Sense. AStudyofModern Talmudic Scholarship”)[Hebrew] (Tel Aviv:Hakibbutz Ha- meuchad, 2011), 104–118.  Cf. David Malkiel, “The Reggios of Gorizia:Modernization in Micro,” in TheMediterranean and the Jews,ed. Elliott Horowitz (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press,2002):73.  Akhiezer, Historical Consciousness,222.  Samuel David Luzzatto, Lezioni di Storia Giudaica (Padua: Bianchi, 1852), 21,83, 145 – 155 and 166–173.  Ibidem,147: ‘Che sono Icaraiti, non già irabbaniti, quelli che si debbono direnuovi eriformati giudei. […]Rispondono iCaraiti che iTalmudisti hanno soventi voltementovata la loro setta, ma che per odio l’hanno confusa con quella dei Sadducei. Conche alcuni Rabbaniti moderni, spinti odal- l’ignoranza, odall’odio, hanno confusi iCaraiti coiSadducei.’ AreKaraites Sceptics?The Jewish Perception of Karaism in Nineteenth CenturyItaly 247

In demonstrating his claim, Luzzatto puts forward four arguments. Firstly, that the Karaites are not mentioned in talmudic literature, secondly, the Karaites do not men- tion anyscholaroftheir schoolbefore Anan in the eighth century,thirdlythey have adopted the vocalic system of the rabbanitetradition of the Bible which Luzzatto be- lieved was developed after the fifth centuryofthe , and lastlythey ob- servestricter rules than rabbaniteJews in their matrimoniallaw. However,without sharing the of Fernandez and Reggio towards the Karaites,Luzzatto insists thatKaraism does not necessarilycontrast with what he deems the fundamental principles of faith of Judaism, to which he devotes his book Lezioni di Teologica dogmatica (Trieste: Coen, 1863). In line with his Italian predecessor,Luzzatto attemptstodrawanhistorical portrayal of Judaism which in contradistinction to Christianity, has not been affected by religious schisms. Thus, he dismisses the Samaritans considering them as belongingtothe Moabitenation and not to be Jews. Of the Sadducees and the Luzzatto insists their weight in Judaism has been almost completelyirrelevant.Writing of these sects, ac- tive in the period he states they were ‘always numericallyfeeble and did not have anypublic impact.’⁷⁴ And as for the last and still existingJewish sect, the Karaites, after having demolished their claim to antiquity and allegedlysuperior adherencetothe original meaning of the Scriptures,heconcludes:

[A]lthough they negate the rabbinical traditions,they do not do it in an absolute manner,since their opposition to the sacred text of the lawisonlyapparent.Inreality they admit the immor- tality of the soul, and in practice they arethe most rigid observers of the Lawand of the Moral.⁷⁵

RabbaniteJews and Karaites are united in theirbasicbelief in acommon faith and both reject the sceptic attitude of modernity against religion, which is Luzzatto’s main polemicaltarget.⁷⁶ In the writingsofAronFernando, Isaac SamuelReggio, Samuel David Luzzatto, and others, the Karaite is not the figure of the classical schismatic, as say, the Prot- estant in the eyes of the Catholic, or the Reformed Jewinthose of the Orthodox. In a country such as Italy, that had not experiencedthe religious divides of other Europe- an regions,the Karaites represented instead the fear of the possibilityofsuch adi- vision. Within Italian Judaism thatwas moving towardsamore carefullydefined dox- ology, the doctrinal differences between Karaism and Rabbinical Judaism had to be neutralized. Jews in Italy, reformist leaning or not,wishedtomaintain afaçade of unity.Inthe words of one of the main political leaders of Italian Jews in the nine-

 Luzzatto, Il giudaismo illustrato,37: ‘Furono sempredebolidinumeroedi credito pubblico.’  Ibidem: ‘Icaraiti poi negano essi le tradizioni rabbiniche, ma non assolutamente, ma in quanto sembrano opporsi al sacro testodella legge;ammettono poi l’immortalità dell’anima, esono nella pratica ipiù rigidi osservatori della Leggeedella Morale.’  Luzzattoconsiders scepticism and not Karaism the main menacetothe unity of the Jewish people and devotes different sections (24to27) of his Lezioni di Teologica dogmatica to undermining the spread of this dangerousattitude amonghis fellow Jews. 248 Asher Salah

teenth century,SalvatoreAnau(1807–1874): ‘The world shall be Catholicfor the uni- versality of brotherlylove!’⁷⁷ Giuseppe Levi, founderand director of the influential Jewishpaper l’EducatoreIsraelita,gavevoice to the same wish most preciselyina long article on the Karaites:

Luckilyenough in the bosom of Judaism […]the word of God remained always one and uniform. […]Therefore, Judaism in our times walks united, and the different opinions that strife within it, did not become, and we hope, will never become, asect,distinct and opposed to it.⁷⁸

Therefore, after summarizing its history and doctrines, Levi insists Karaism does not represent aschism within Judaism. On the contrary, ‘not the principles, but only some rituals separate between us. […]itwould be and useful that the represen- tativesofthe great principle of God’sunity,should all be united in beautiful harmo- ny.’⁷⁹ This alsoexplains areticenceinusing the word ‘reform’ which at the time was highlycontroversial. In Italy, even the most far-reachingJewishreformers avoidedit when describingtheir intended plans. Moderate or radical reformers,such as Mor- tara, Salomone Olper (1811–1877), Lelio Cantoni (1802–1857), and manyothers, pre- ferred to designatethemselvesasprogressives, or as moderate conservatives, and even as orthodox, inventing the category of ultra-orthodoxtodifferentiatetheir views from the traditionalists they intended to disqualify. Undoubtedly,for Jews liv- ing in aCatholic environment,the word ‘reform’ evoked the schisms provoked within ChristianitybyProtestantism. It is certainlyworth noting that also in neighbouring Catholic France, the reform movement founded in 1907adopted the name of Union Libérale and not UnionRefor- mée. Therefore, for Italian Jews, Karaites became the imageofthe threat to the Cath- olic, i.e. universalist,vocation of Judaism. To minimise their role in the historical de-

 Salvatore Anau, Della emancipazione degli Ebrei (Florence, 1847), 15.  Giuseppe Levi, “Alcuni cenni popolari sui caraiti,” L’EducatoreIsraelita 7(1859):290 –291: ‘For- tunatamente però nel seno proprio del Giudaismo […]laparola di Dio rimase quasi sempreuniforme esola. […]Così il giudaismo ai nostri tempi cammina quasi uniforme ed unito, elevarieopinioni che si combattono oranel suo seno non hanno pero ancoradatoluogo e, speriamo, non lo daranno mai ad una setta pienamente distintaecontraria.’ The main source of information concerning Karaism seems to be Samuel David Luzzatto, with some additionssuch as the possibilityofthe Karaites beingthe descendants of the lost tribes of Israel. He asks his young readers to imagine asynagogue and Karaite quarter and concludesthat nobodywould be able to tell the difference in Italian Jewish life, aside fromthe fact that Karaites areperhapsmorerigid in their observance of the lawthan the descendants of Talmudic Jews,i.e.contemporary Italian Jews.  Ibidem, L’EducatoreIsraelita 8(1860): 10: ‘Non sono principi, ma sono solo alcuni riti che ci sep- arano. […]sarebbebello ed utile che irappresentanti ed eredi del grande principio della Unità di Dio, fosserotutti uniti in bella armonia.’ The same conclusion could be found in Fernandez, Progetto,184: ‘the Karaites agree with the other Jews in everythingconcerning the fundamental principlesofreli- gion’ (‘icaraiti convergono in quantoriguardaipunti fondamentali della religione con gli altri ebrei’). Are Karaites Sceptics? The Jewish Perception of Karaism in Nineteenth Century Italy 249

velopment of Judaism, stressing that the coreofthe dogmatic structure of Judaism, was shared by Karaites and Rabbanites,permitted Jews in Italytofind acommon ground in fighting what Morais,inhis literary portrait of Luzzatto, labelled ‘the cor- rosive effects of indifferentism and scepticism.’ This tooexplains the transformation of Samuel David Luzzatto into aconsensual Jewishicon for all emancipated Jews, notwithstanding their personal positions in the spectrum of attitudes toward religion, tradition, and practice.The strongdrive to give adogmatic foundation to Judaism, one of the majorgoals of Luzzatto’sintellectual endeavour,resulted in avision of the Jewishpolitical and religious bodyasfunda- mentally unified and impermeable to change. In the process, the Karaites’ differen- ces to normative Judaism could be domesticated and transformtheir imagefrom schismatics waiving the banner of scepticism against theirfideistic antagonists (as was the case among Jews and Christians alike in areligiouslydivided Central and NorthernEurope) into abranch of the people of Israel, exotic but innocuous, con- firming the universality and of the Jewishfaith.

LiberaPisano Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticism and Revolution in Gustav Landauer

Even for the anarchist, language is the rope of the law bound aroundhis neck; even the most free philosopher thinks with the wordsofphilosophical language.¹

GustavLandauer (1870 – 1919), aGerman-Jewish anarchist and aradical thinker,was brutallymurdered by the Freikorps in Munich. He was an almost forgotten figure for along time, even though his ideas exerted acrucial influenceonthe development of twentieth century Jewishthoughtand philosophy, particularlyregarding the rehabil- itation of utopian, messianic, anarchical and mystical elements. Landauer was one of very few Jewish authorspermitting the word ‘scepticism’ to be included in the title of one of his works—namely Skepsisund Mystik²—in my view this very termis the fil rouge running through all his political and philosophicalthought.However, this feature has not receivedthe proper attention by scholars, which focus mainly on Landauer’ssingular account of anarchism and mysticism, alongside his concep- tion of revolution and community. In this essay, Iwill attempt to shed light on the connection between Fritz Mauth- ner’s(1849–1923)linguistic critique and Landauer’sanarchy, showing the political implications of sceptical thought. To this end, Iwill focus on the sceptical features of Landauer’sanarchist by analysingthe connection between scepticism and mysticism, the role playedbyscepticism in his thought of community and in his account of revolution, history and time, and the definition of his anti-political at- titude as sceptical Lebensform.

1Anarchy as (Anti)political Epoché

There is an affinitybetween anarchism and scepticism, even if this binomial has not yetreceivedproper attention. One can define anarchism as an (anti)political attitude whose main features are aradical critique towards authorities and achallengetothe system of representations, while scepticism could be broadlydefined as amethod as well as an attitude, which criticizes dogmatic assumptions and leads to asuspension of judgment. If anarchism could be interpreted as arejection of political representa- tion, it is possibletoextend these particular critiques to anygeneral forms of label-

 Cf. , Beiträgezueiner Kritik der Sprache,2nd edition, vol. 1(Stuttgart and Berlin: J.G. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung,1913), 221: ‘Die Sprache legt auch dem Anarchisten den Strick des Gesetzes um den Hals und auch der freiestePhilosoph denkt mit den Worten der philosophischen Sprache.’  GustavLandauer, Skepsis und Mystik. Versuche im Anschluss an MauthnersSprachkritik,inidem, Ausgewählte Schriften,vol. 7, ed. Siegbert Wolf (Lich/Hessen: Edition ,2011).

OpenAccess. ©2018 Libera Pisano, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-013 252 Libera Pisano

ling representation or to anydogmatic systems of rule.³ Anarchyand scepticism share this ongoingcriticism the aim of which is not aconcrete systematisation trans- forming them into their contraries with anarchybecominganinstitutionalframework and scepticism turning into dogmatism. Indeed, the transformation of these terms into their contrariesis, in both cases, aslipperyslope. Is it possible to define athink- er,inthe midstofanongoing criticism not accepting anyassumption, as beingadog- matic sceptic?Conversely, are we to define an anarchist,embedded in his criticism towards the state and the system, as representativeofanother form of authority and power?These open questions mayhelp us to shedlight on the special and con- troversial affinities between scepticism and anarchy. As is well known, the etymologyof‘anarchy’ is ‘absenceofgovernment’ or ‘of leader’ (archos), but at the same time it is alack of ‘’,which is one of the key words of Greek ancient philosophy. ‘Arche’ has adouble meaning:onthe one hand, it means ‘origin’, ‘beginning’ and ‘principle of action’,onthe other, ‘power’, ‘command’, ‘authorities’.Ifthe word ‘arche’ connects atemporal dimension to the authority,one can saythat an anarchic thought par excellence has to take into ac- count time and power,asLandauer did. Anarchyisnot just an overthrowingof the ‘arche’,but starts with aprocess of doubting and calling into question the status quo. As anarchydeniesall forms of systematisation, it is akind of suspension of au- thority,which, in my view,seems to be aform of (anti)political epoché.

2Gustav Landauer at the Crossroad of Several Paths

As apolitical activist and writer,journalist and translator,Landauer was one of the most important thinkers combiningJewish with anarchy, politics with mysticism, and aromantic philosophyofhistory with abelief in the urgency of change. His works comprises manyarticles, translations, fragments,reviews,and anumber of discourses; important milestones are DieRevolution and Aufruf zumSo- zialismus,but his onlycompletephilosophicalstudy, on which he worked for two years following his release from prison earlyin1900,isSkepsisund Mystik. The complicated intrigue of Landauer’sanarchyconcerns the conjunction of two levels: the mystical experience and the political action. The weave of these elements positions his thoughtatacrossroads of several paths, something quite unique in the history of philosophy. At least threereasons demonstrate how he is to be considered acomplex thinker:firstly, his works are unsystematic; secondly, he mixes up differ- ent and—apparently—opposite elements; and thirdlyhegives asingular definition to some key concepts. Scholars have usedmanyadjectives in attemptingtodefine his political socialist anarchism: mystical, anarchical, regressive, Gemeindesozialismus

 See Jesse S. Cohn, Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation: Hermeneutics,,Politics (Se- linsgrove: SusquehannaUniversity Press,2006). Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticismand Revolution in Gustav Landauer 253

to name but afew.His particularidea of socialism is based on an anarchic opposi- tion towardany form of authority including political,social, ethical, and religious articulation of power.Itisatthe same time aproject of liberation from all the forms of enslavement,interior and external, and ashowing of the path required to take one from isolation to community—from theory to praxis. At this point,Ifeelitpertinent to consider Landauer’sbiography. Born, 7th April, 1870,toasecular Jewishfamily in Karlsruhe,southern Germany, he studied German and ,philosophyand art history in Heidelberg, Strasbourgand Ber- lin. However,hecompleted none of these studies as his political militancy had him banned from all German universities. Stirner,Nietzsche, Ibsen, Spinoza and Schopenhauerare just afew of the manyphilosophershewas impressed by in that time. His first political commitments sawhim rise to the top of German anarchist circles duringthe 1890s.⁴ This political activity and anarchist commitment,led to his acquaintancewith prominent activists such as , Max Nettlau, and Er- rico Malatesta.⁵ His biographer Ruth Link-Salinger tells us this period was devoted ‘to asystematic definition of what anarchism was to be and was not to be,’⁶ and this was arrivedatalso duetohis collaboration with Fritz Mauthner. In the first decade of 1900,Landauer withdrew almost entirelyfrom public activ- ity to engageinprivatestudy. He wastofavour amore inner,philosophical and mys- tical idea of anarchism to the political manifestations of the time. This introspection was spurred by his translation of in prison and adeep affinity with the Mauthner’s Sprachskepsis.⁷ This new vein of Landauer’sthoughtissourced his “Durch Absonderung zur Gemeinschaft,” aspeech givenatameetingofthe newly foundedcircle Neue Gemeinschaft—wherehemet and Erich Mühsam —and later wastoserve as thefirst chapter of his Skepsis und Mystik. During these years Landauer and his second wife (the poet and translator,HedwigLachmann, whom he married in 1903) were extremelyactive translatingPeter Kropotkin, Oscar Wilde, Walt Whitman, and .

 In the 1893heparticipated in the Zurich congress of the second International as an anarchist del- egate. The congress, dominated by German social democrats, expelled him along with the other an- archists.August Bebel—the leader of the social democrats—accused him of beingapoliceinformer. When Landauer returned to Berlin, he spent almost one year in prison for the writings he published in Der Sozialist. ForLandauer’slife, cf. Charles B. Maurer, Call to Revolution: TheMystical Anarchism of Gustav Landauer (Detroit: Wayne StateUniversity Press, 1971); Eugene Lunn, Prophet of Community: TheRomantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,1973); Ruth Link- Salinger, Gustav Landauer:Philosopher of Utopia (Indianapolis: Hackett PublishingCo., 1977): 74 – 76.  He travelled as aanarchist delegatetoasecond international congress in London wherethe anar- chists were—oncemore—excluded and organised for themselvesanother conference.Landauer pre- pared areport for the occasion FromZurich to London, which became his most translatedpieceatthat time.  Link-Salinger, Gustav Landauer:Philosopher of Utopia,48.  Between 1893and 1900 he spent atotal of 18 months in prison on various chargesoflibel and def- amation. 254 Libera Pisano

In 1906,Buber became editor in chief of abook seriescalled Die Gesellschaft and asked his friend Landauer to write abook on the intriguingtopic of revolution. Lan- dauer’sessaywas publishedin1907and this year marked his return to political ac- tivism; in fact,hepublished “30 Socialist theses”⁸ that anticipate his Call to Social- ism,of1911, which represents the peak of his political contribution. In May1908, Landauer initiated the Sozialistischer Bund whose goal was to form small, independ- ent communities or settlements as amaterial foundation for anew form of society and an embodiment of his notion of socialism. With the outbreak of war,Landauer and HedwigLachmann wereisolated, being among the few pacifistic voices in Ger- manyatthat time.The majority of anarchists and leftist thinkers welcomed the war as an opportunity of political renovation.⁹ Landauer was convinced the war was nothing but the extreme outcome of nationalism and imperialism. In 1917heand his wife decided to move to Krumbach, southern Germany. In 1918 Hedwigdiedof and his enormous loss has been interpreted by manybiographers and friends as apoint of no return in Landauer’slife and justification for his ‘’ or ‘martyrdom’ to the Munich Soviet Republic; in fact,inNovember 1918 he joined the Bavarian Revolution as one of its intellectual leaders. He was brutallymurdered by the Freikorps (Free corps)onthe 2nd of Mayin1919. Landauer’smilieu was fin-de-siècle and pre-World WarI.His generation, born in the nineteenth century living up to the outbreak of the war werefaced with agreat loss of structure and order and experienced great alienation that led manytoarejec- tion of traditions. Twovitalcoordinateshelp understand Landauer’scontribution: the Sprachkrise and the Neue Mystik. German Jews playedapivotal role in these par- ticular Germanphenomena emerging at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁰

 His essayentitled “Volk and Land: 30 Socialist theses”—published in Die Zukunft in January 1907— focussed on the problem of the state and voluntary cooperation and was simultaneouslyapro- gramme for new,concrete organisation.  See Ulrich Sieg, Jüdische IntellektuelleimErsten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,2008): 145 – 150.EvenBuber followedthe general trend of .In1916,inthe editorial “Die Lo- sung” of the first issue of Der Jude,Buber took an ambiguous stand: on the one hand, he emphasised that Judaism had no connection with war,onthe other he praised the individual commitment to the war as an effort to discovery community.Furthermore, in his essay “The spirit of the Orient and Ju- daism,” Buber celebrated Germanyfor its spiritual affinity to the Eastern peoplesand strong cultural interaction with Judaism, by defendingthe superiority of German spirit compared with other nations. Landauer was angry and disappointed by such arguments,rejecting the Kriegsbuber and his mere and formalism. Community cannot be discoveredinthe midst of war and murder. Under Landauer’spressure,Buber later became hostile to the war.Landauer called his friend ‘War Buber’ in the letter of May12, 1916.See GreteSchaeder, ed., Martin Buber.Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahrzehnten,vol. 1(Heidelberg: LambertSchneider,1972),433.This letterdoesn’tappear in the volume of Landauer’sletter editedbyBuber,GustavLandauer, Sein Lebensgang in Briefen,2vols., ed. Martin Buber (Frankfurt am Main: Rütten &Loening,1929).  Cf. Rolf Kauffeldt, “Anarchie und Romantik,” in Gustav Landauer im Gespräch. Symposium zum 125. Geburtstag,eds.Hanna Delf and Gert Mattenklott (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer,1997): 45;Adam Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticismand Revolution in GustavLandauer 255

The so-called Sprachkrise was acomplex critique of languagediscussed by poets and intellectuals in philosophicaland literary debate during the years leading up to World WarI(von Hofmannsthal, Schnitzler,Kraus, all the Jung-Wien members, etc.).¹¹ Itsauthors werebeginning to doubt the role of languagefrom manyperspec- tives; the gapbetween languageand reality renders the former into adefective tool presentinganinsurmountable obstacle of grasping reality and revealing the truth. Even to this daythe phenomenonofSprachkrise has not been sufficientlyfocussed on in philosophical research, as it has been interpreted as aliteral and cultural movement and not subject matter appropriate to the discourse of philosophy. How- ever,inmyview,itmarks aturning point in the history of contemporary philosophy, as this sceptical-linguistic attitude, focussed special attention among German Jewish thinkers on language, anticipating the so-called ‘’.Inthis constellation Mauthner and Landauer were crucial, with the former (in the wake of this sceptical approach) building abridgebetween philosophyand literature, and the latter donat- ing apolitical connotation. The second coordinate, the Neue Mystik,was areinterpretation by poets and writ- ers of mysticism in Germanyatthe turn of the twentieth century.¹² This new kind of mysticism does not deal with the traditionalidea of amystical union between God and soul, but rather with afeeling of awarenessofconnection between individual and community,present and past.This kind of secularised mysticism combines aes- thetic-linguistic aspects—it is no coincidencemost involved werewriters and poets— sharing apolitical and social idea of the regeneration of humankind.¹³ Landauer plays an active role in manypolitical attempts to rethink community on asocial and mystical basis;¹⁴ furthermore, his brilliant translation of Meister Eckhart’s works significantlycontributed to this new conception of mysticism.

M. Weisberger, TheJewishEthic and the Spirit of Socialism (New York and Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang, 1997): 163.  See Gert Mattenklott, “GustavLandauer.Ein Portrait,” in Gustav Landauer Werkausgabe,eds.Gert Mattenklott and Hanna Delf, vol. 3(Berlin: Akademie, 1997): XVII: ‘Mauthner,Hugovon Hofmanns- thal, Buber,Kraus oder Landauer die ihreSkepsis in ihrer Literatur oder—wie im Falle vonBuber und Landauer—auch ihrenÜbersetzungenzugleich produktivumzusetzen suchten—das Phänomen Sprachkrise zu beschreiben und erklären.’  Forinstance, Julius and Heinrich Hart,Wilhelm Bölsche, WillyPastor,,Alfred Mombert,Bruno Wille etc.  Cf. Walther Hoffmann, “Neue Mystik,” in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart,eds.Friedrich Michael Schiele and Leopold Scharnack, vol. 1(Tübingen: Mohr,1913): 608–611; UweSpörl, Gottlose Mystik in der deutschen Literatur um die Jahrhundertwende (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997); Martina -Egelhaaf, Mystik der Moderne. Die visionäreÄsthetik der deutschen Literatur im 20.Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Metzler,1989); Anna Wolkowicz, Mystiker der Revolution. Der utopische Diskurs um die Jahr- hundertwende (Warsaw: WUW,2007).  The connection between anew idea of community and aparticular idea of languagewas also ex- perienced at that time by the organisation Neue Gemeinschaft,formed by agroup of artists and writ- ers whoshared the idea of the brothers Heinrich and Julius Hart known for their . Their attempt was to offer arevitalisation of society in accordancewith areformofliteratureand 256 LiberaPisano

3Linguistic Scepticismand Anarchist Thought: Mauthner and Landauer

Fritz Mauthnerand GustavLandauer werebound by adeep, lifelong intellectual friendship, evidencedbyahuge epistolary.¹⁵ The former’slinguistic scepticism was used by Landauer as the tool for unmasking and smashing the oppressive idols hid- den in languageand its supposed truths.¹⁶ Mauthner’streatment of languageasade- ceptive tool for human knowledge is at the root of Landauer’sthoughtofanarchy. He used alinguistic-sceptical strategy to dismantle the power of the state and lead to a community based on anew idea of . While Mauthner focussed attention on the metaphorical and illusory value of languageand human knowledge mediated by words, Landauer implemented linguistic scepticism to develop another political model.¹⁷ Fritz Mauthner was aphilosopher and sceptic of language; he is an almostfor- gotten figure, who, nevertheless, produced ahugebodyofwork: three volumes of ContributionstowardaCritique of Language,aDictionary of Philosophy, Historyof

the spiritual guide was the metaphysical and religious idea of Julius Hart explained in his works as Der neue Gott and Die neue Welterkenntnis. However,this kind of mystical environment was incapable —according to Landauer wholeft the organisation one year later—to change society.Furthermore, during World WarI,hewas active in some anti-militaristic circles—e.g. Forte Kreis, Bund Neues Va- terland and Zentralstelle Völkerrechte—whose goals weretocreate an alternative community.  See GustavLandauer and Fritz Mauthner, Briefwechsel 1890–1919,eds.Hanna Delf and Julius H. Schoeps (München: Beck, 1994).  On linguistic scepticism, cf. Christian Mittermüller, Sprachskepsis und Poetologie. Goethes Romane ‘Die Wahlverwandschaften’ und ‘Wilhelm Meister Wanderjahre’ (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2008); Magdolna Oroszand Peter Plesner, “Sprache, Skepsis und Ich um 1900.Formen der belletristischen Ich-Dekon- struktion in der österreichischen und ungarischen Kultur der Jahrhundertwende,” in ‘…und die Worte rollen von Ihren Fäden fort…’:Sprache, Sprachlichkeit, Sprachproblem in der österreichischen und un- garischen Kultur und Literatur der Jahrhundertwende,eds.Magdolna Orosz, Amália Kerekes, and Ka- talin Teller (Budapest: ELTE, 2002): 355–368;Günter Saße, Sprache und Kritik:Untersuchung zur Sprachkritik der Moderne (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,1977); Martin Kurzreiter, Sprachkritik als Ideologiekritik bei Fritz Mauthner (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1993), 25–80;Gerald Hartung, Sprach-Kritik:Sprach- und Kulturtheoretische Reflexionen im deutsch-jüdischen Kontext (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2012).  The connection between anarchy and languagestemsfromProudhon whoconsidered the ques- tion of languageconnectedtothe idea of collective being. See PierreJoseph Proudhon, “An Anar- chist’sView of ,” trans. Robert Hoffmann and S.Valerie Hoffman, in Anarchism,ed. Robert Hoffman (New York: Atherton Press, 1970): 52: ‘Whereand when have youheardthe People? With what mouths,inwhat languagedothey express themselves?’ Accordingtohim, nature and language produce associationsand divisions through an ongoing articulation. Language is, on the one hand, a dispositive of power,onthe other,the milieu in which socialism could happen as languageavoids privateproperty.However,itisatoolfor identifyingrepresentation and creating associations or boundaries, it is not by chancethat institutional power passes through language. Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticism and Revolution in Gustav Landauer 257

Atheism in the Western Society and numerous essays and novels.¹⁸ The three volumes ContributionstowardaCritique of Language are an example of thoroughgoing lin- guistic scepticism in the history of philosophy, coordinating linguistic doubt with epistemology.Mauthner’s Contributions were written in an attempt to demonstrate how languageisredundant as ameansfor the perception of reality and, insofar as knowledge is mediated by words, impossible. His originality lies in his anticipa- tion of the linguistic turn in arguingthat the philosophyoflanguagesheds critical light on all philosophical questions.¹⁹ Thanks to Mauthner’sintercession, Landauer translatedsome of Meister Eck- hart’smystical writingsinto modern German, and these wereused as materials aids for the writing of Contributions towardaCritique of Language. The twofriends’ cooperation in linguistic critique was deeplyrelevant; in prison Landauer edited Mauthner’s Contributions and after publication of the first volume reviewed it for Zu- kunft. The ongoingdiscussion and confrontation between them led to adiscussion on the limits of languageand an exploration of the political effects of mysticism. AccordingtoMauthner,languagedeletes the uniqueness of our experience by transforming it into aseries of tautologies and,although it can refer to reality only metaphorically, it is the onlymedium of human knowledge.Words exercise asocial and political power;eveniflanguageisacollection of illusions,itisadangerous weapon. Allmetaphysical abstractions are falsities, amere trick of the language, which forces us to believethat each noun corresponds to apre-existing substance. If the wordisnot representative of reality,the most importanttask of philosophy is the critique of language, i.e. the liberation from the superstitions and the tyranny of words (Wortfetischismus, Wortaberglauben, Worttyrannei). Mauthner’s -scepticism has manydifferent features:aradicalisation of em- piricism, the coincidencebetween thinking and speaking,the relevance of use and linguistic habits,the utopia of communication, the liberatingtask of philosophy, his controversialrelationship with Judaism and silent mysticism. In my view,the practical aim of Mauthner’sphilosophy, i.e., the liberation from the superstitions of words is in accordance with the therapeutic value of ancient scepticism and, more-

 Fritz Mauthner, Beiträgezueiner Kritik der Sprache;idem, Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Neue Bei- trägezueiner Kritik der Sprache,2nd edition, 3vols.(Leipzig:Meiner,1923); idem, Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande,4vols.(Stuttgart and Berlin: DVA, 1924).  On Mauthner’slinguistic scepticism, see Luisa Bertolini, La maledizione della parola di Fritz Mauthner (Palermo:Supplementa, Aestetica, 2008); Gerald Hartung, ed., An den Grenzen der Sprachk- ritik:Fritz MauthnersBeiträge zur Sprache- und Kulturtheorie (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neu- mann, 2003); Joachim Kühn, Gescheiterte Sprachkritik:Fritz Mauthners Leben und Werk (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1975); Elizabeth Bredeck, Metaphors of Knowledge: Language and Thought in Mauthner’sCritique (Detroit: Wayne StateUniversity Press, 1992). 258 Libera Pisano

over,his mystical silence,arising from his critique,isamodernachievement of an- cient ataraxia.²⁰ Landauer interpreted the curativevalue of Mauthner’slinguistic scepticism in a political way. In both perspectivesthere is an attempt at liberation from the tyranny of languageand the chainsofauthority;however,while Mauthnerdevelops aradical criticism, which leadshim to adismantlingoflanguageand solitary and elitist path of silence and mysticism, Landauer goes astep further and connects this introspec- tive tendency emanating from scepticism with aliberation from isolation to experi- ence atrue community.Mauthner’sattack on languageasmere wordsuperstitions, and in particular his questioning of belief in the empiricallyisolated self, provided Landauer with auseful basisfor defending his ownmysticism. He combined Mauth- ner’slinguistic scepticism with an anarchic critiqueofsociety,byadmitting the affin- ity between Sprachkritik and his account of anarchism and socialism.²¹

4Active Scepticismand Social Mysticism

Landauer’sphilosophical work, Skepsis und Mystik is based on Mauthner’scritique of language.²² Itsstructure is puzzling,comprisingofacollection of several essays, some of which appearedseparatelybefore the book. The first chapter, Das Individu- um als Welt was initiallyaspeech entitled DurchAbsonderung zurGemeinschaft,Lan- dauer gave in 1901 for the Neue Gemeinschaft;the second chapter is made up of an article published 23rd November 1901 in Zukunft and areview of Julius Hart’sbook Die neue Welterkenntnis written by Landauer in 1902; the third chapter—Die Sprache als Instrument—had not been publishedpreviously. In this book he recognises linguistic scepticism as the foundationfor new polit- ical action, for it being aradical critiqueofhuman illusions.Landauer compares mysticism and scepticism in terms of their common power of negation and destruc- tion of .²³ Accordingtohim, scepticism exposes the world in all its nullity and is thus shows how the deepestscepticism engenders the highest mysticism. The act of doubting our knowledge,language, representations of the world and political in-

 Cf. Libera Pisano, “MisunderstandingMetaphors:Linguistic Scepticism in Mauthner’sPhiloso- phy,” in Yearbook of the Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2016,eds.Giuseppe Veltri and Bill Rebiger(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2016): 95–122.  In alettertoMauthner of May17, 1911, Landauer wrote: ‘Gewiss ist Sprachkritik untrennbar zu dem gehörig, was ich meinen Anarchismus und Sozialismus nenne.’ Cf. Landauer, Sein Lebensgang in Briefen,vol. 1, 361.  Landauer, Skepsis und Mystik. Versuche im Anschluss an Mauthners Sprachkritik,inidem, Ausge- wählte Schriften,vol. 7, ed. Siegbert Wolf (Lich/Hessen: Edition AV,2011). See Maurer, Call to Revolu- tion,67: ‘Skepsis und Mystik might be called Landauer’sphilosophicmanifesto.’  See Landauer, Sein Lebensgang in Briefen,vol. 2, 245: ‘Die echte, klassische Mystik hat ja übrigens mit solchen egoistischen Wünschen nicht nur nichts zu tun, sondern zerstört sie so gründlichwie irgendein Skeptizismus.’ Anarchic Scepticism:Language, Mysticismand Revolution in GustavLandauer 259

stitutions is not amere theoretical exercise. Calling into question reality by doubting the power of languagecould lead to anew understanding and develop anew idea of community.²⁴ Thenceforth, he uses linguistic scepticism as apolitical strategyfor an antiauthoritariancritique and acomplex mystical thinkingofcommunity,inwhich the individual is indissolublybound to the entire past and present of humanity. Scepticism is not onlyunmasks the cult of the state, the very task of doubting leads to apolitical renewal of mankind. AccordingtoLandauer,mystical introspec- tion—deeplyconnected with scepticism—is aform of deep, individual connection to the world and the key to the passagefrom isolation to community.The real innova- tion of his political thought is the connection between atheoretical mysticism and a ‘terrestrial’²⁵ one. His singular account of mysticism does not deal with aseparation from the world, but rather with aform of individual deep connection to the inner world and to the past. In the introduction of Skepsisund Mystik,heunderlined Eckhart’ssignificance as the key to understanding his mystic anarchy.²⁶ Landauer emphasised that his meta- physical approach combiningChristian dogma and should become the model for apolitical interpretation of mysticism; Eckhart proposed an idea of con- nection between the single entity and the whole world by going beyond the limits of language.²⁷ In fact,his thought—accordingtoLandauer—was not onlyacontem- platio mundi,but wasalso rooted in an essential transformation of the relationship with the world: ‘his mysticism is scepticism, but alsovice versa.’²⁸ It is no coinci-

 The first philosopherwho emphasised this aspect was undoubtedlyFriedrich Nietzsche, whohad been wellstudied by Mauthner as wellasLandauer.AsPaulGoodman, Speaking and Language:De- fense of Poetry (New York: VintageBooks, 1971), 26,wrote: ‘One of the most powerful institutionsis the conventional languageitself. It is very close to the ideology and it shapes how people think, feel, and judge whatisfunctional.’ The attack on signification is akind of attack on an order that shaped human beings.  Lunn, Prophet of community,132.  Between 1893and 1900 Landauer spent almost 18 months in prison. Duringhis six-month impris- onment in TegelhetranslatedEckhart and wroteapart of his Skepsis und Mystik.  Cf. Thorsten Hinz, Mystikund Anarchie. Meister Eckhart und seine Bedeutung im Denken Gustav Landauer (Berlin: Kramer,2000); Christa Dericum, “RevolutionäreGeduld. GustavLandauer,” in Christentum und Anarchismus.Beiträgezueinem ungeklärten Verhältnis,ed. Jens Harms (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1988): 107: ‘Der mittelalterliche Mystiker Meister Eckhart,dessen Werk Landauer während der Gefangenschaft ins Deutsche übersetzte, lehrteihn, ganzzusich zu kommen und bei sich zu verweilen.’  GustavLandauer, “Vorwort,” in Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckharts Mystische Schriften (Berlin: Schnabel, 1903): 7. It is worth mentioningFritz Brupbacher’s(1874 – 1945) notehere. He statedthat amystic should also be asceptic and emphasised the relevance of Landauer’swork, especially how he articulated the relationship between languageand authority.This noteofBrupbacher is re- corded by Franz W. Seiwert, Schriften. Der Schritt, der einmal getan wurde, wirdnicht zurückgenom- men,eds. Uli Bohnen and Dirk Backes (Berlin: Kramer,1978), 36: “Wernicht zu wissen glaubt, wohin der Mensch zu gehen habe,wer skeptisch ist,obesüberhaupt einen für alle gültigenSinn des Lebens gäbe oder wervon diesem Sinn aussagt,dass er nur im Gewisseneines jeden Einzelnen liegeund nicht intellektuell formulierbarsei, weralso Mystiker ist,der muss Anarchist sein. Aufdiese 260 Libera Pisano

dence that Landauer held the major exponents of scepticism in the history of philos- ophytobemystics:from Dyonisius the Aeropagite to Boehme and Eckhart.Landauer offers asecularisation of mysticism by substituting ‘God’ with ‘humanity’, ‘’ with ‘Volk’ and by providing anew relation to the world. Community cannot be found initiallyinthe external worldbut must be discovered in the interiority of the individual soul. Landauer sees in mysticism the waytoovercome aviolent ac- count of anarchism and to think of anew form of community by crossing the atom- isation of the individuals.²⁹

5FromAbstractionstoCommunity: Spiritualisation of Social Bounds

Landauer’scontroversial conception of mysticism, which leads to action, deals with his notion of Geist. Spirit is an ambiguous concept because it is both connection and independence, Verbindung and Unabhängigkeit. The bindingpower of spirit,synon- ymous of life, is an inner worldlyfeeling between man and man, man and earth, man and history that forgesthe real community;itisnot an apriori principle, but rather its transcendence stems from men’saction.Thisunity is not aform of dialec-

nahe Beziehungvon Skepsis, Mystik und Anarchismus hat ja Landauer sehr klar hingewiesen.Esgibt gewiss viele Zwischenstufen zwischen Autoritäten und Anarchisten, Mischungender Prinzipien; aber der Grundunterschied liegt eben darin, dass der Anarchismus die Besonderheit des Individuums in den Vordergrund rückt,während der Autoritär das Gemeinsame alle Individuen betont,die Notwen- digkeit der Unterordnungdes Besonderen unter das Gemeinsame. In der Sprache der mittelalterli- chen Philosophie gesprochen: Der Autoritär ist Realist,der Anarchist Nominalist; der eine kennt ein ausden Produktionsverhältnissen zu bestimmendes allgemein gültiges Ziel, der andereerklärt alle solche allgemeinen Ziele für Schall und Rauch, das einmalige,irgendwohin wachsendeIndivi- duum ist ihm der Sinne des Lebens.”  Thanks to the important works of Reiner Schürmann whoreads Eckhart in an existential way, it is possible to define aform of mystic anarchy in Eckhart’sthought,concerningtwo aspects in partic- ular:the rethinkingoftime and the practical liberation fromthe concept of finality.Infact,inthe Mystische Schriften translated by Landauer thereisaredefinition of time, considered as an everlast- ing moment in which aspiritual union of the single and the whole takesplace. This openness of time marks the divide because it leads to liberation from utilitarian dependenceand seekingofGod as a foundation. The second aspect deals with atransfiguration of all the relationships between man and man, man and world, man and God, which operates not as afinal cause but as asuddenly irruption. These premises lead Eckhart to arethinking of the abandonment and isolation from the outside word —Abgeschiedenheit—as the beginningofanascetic exercise as an existential programme. In the Ser- mons the spiritual experienceisnot describedasanecstasy,but rather as arenewed and concrete form of arelationship with thingsand existencetoforge reality and humankind.This practical Bil- dung is the revolutionary attempt of Eckhart mysticism to step back fromcausality,finality and spa- tiality.Cf. Reiner Schürmann, MaitreEckhartetlajoie errante (Paris:Rivages, 1972). On Landauer and Meister Eckhart,see the interesting contribution of Yossef Schwartz,”GustavLandauer and Gershom Scholem: Anarchyand Utopia,” in Gustav Landauer:Anarchist and Jew,eds. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Anya Mali (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015): 172– 190. Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticism and Revolution in Gustav Landauer 261

tical recognition, but asocial mysticism which is at the coreofLandauer’spolitical thought. The heart of his idea of anarchist socialism is the attempt to render author- ity superfluous and unnecessary through anew kind of relationship and cooperation between men. His idea of an organic community and an authentic bond between in- dividuals was acompleterejection of modernatomisation and the state. In his For Socialism,Landauer defined spirit in the following way: ‘spirit is communal spirit, spirit is union and freedom, spirit is an association of men, soon we will see it even more clearly, spirit is comingovermen.’³⁰ If spirit arises from an association of man, isolationisanepiphenomenonofits absence. The main task of anarchyis to fill this separation’sgap among the individuals. Acritique towardany individualityseen as abstraction is at the coreofLandau- er’sthought.This could be paradoxical from an anarchic point of view,but his social mysticism is basedonanacknowledgment of every single person seen as an indis- soluble bond:

[I]t is time for the insight that thereisnoindividual, but onlyunities and communities.Itisnot true that collective names designate onlyasum of individuals: on the contrary,individuals are onlymanifestations and points of reference, electric sparks of somethinggrand and whole.³¹

Landauer’semphasis on isolation is due to his personal experience and his interest in mysticism developed in prison.³² Furthermore, according to him, the modern state is basedonisolation and is an artificial surrogate for the spirit of the community. ‘State’ is nothing more than awordone uses in the attempt to project what is essen- tiallyaninternal experience of dependence to aseparate material construct; thence, state is aphantom and an idol. It is ‘asocial relationship; acertain wayofpeople relatingtoone another.Itcan be destroyed by creatingnew social relationships; i.e., by people relating to one another differently.’³³ Aviolent overturning of the state is an illusion: ‘thosewho believethatthe state is alsoathing or afetishthat can be overturnedorsmashed are sophists and believers in the Word.’³⁴ Landauer’stheory of power is sophisticated in that he combines liberation from authority with the word’scapacity of hypostasiseabstractions taken from Mauthner’s linguistic scepticism. The word’ssuperstition—Wortaberglauben—is the ground for Landauer’sfetishist conception of state. In both perspectivesthereisanattempt of

 GustavLandauer, ForSocialism,trans.David J. Parent (St. Louis: ,1968), 30.  This passage takenbySkepsis und Mystik is translatedbyMaurer;see Maurer, Call to Revolution, 71.  See ibidem,10–11: ‘Formost of his life Landauer livedand workedinisolation from the main political currents of his time; but his efforts were, nonetheless,rooted in atradition of social philos- ophyestablished and perpetuated by some of the most original of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.’ See ibidem,48: ‘GustavLandauer began this century in prison.’  GustavLandauer, “Weak Statesman, weaker people,” in idem, Revolution and Other Writings:A political Reader,ed. and trans. Gabriel Kuhn (Oakland: PM Press,2010): 214.  Ibidem. 262 Libera Pisano

liberation from the tyrannyoflanguageand from the chains of authority.The famous sentenceofNietzsche—namely, ‘Where the state ends, onlytherebegins the human being who is not superfluous’³⁵—is used by Landauer to perform the anarchic tension against state,which is an artificial bond, afalse illusion and an absence of spirit. State is an irrationalfetishwhich produces social inequality through hierarchy and domination, but on the other hand his power depends on the community of human subjects. The switch from aconception of state seen as an abstraction or afetish into an idea of state seen as acondition is one of the most original aspects of Landauer’s political thought.This idea is deeplyrevolutionary,for it does not deal with aviolent destruction of the state, but rather with new behaviour and anew relationship. The waytosabotage the state is by means of the institution of authentic bondsamong people instead of the crystallisation of relationships. Landauer’sidea of power was deeplyinfluenced by Etienne de la Boétie and his Discourse on voluntaryservitude,quoted in the Revolution.³⁶ AccordingtolaBoétie, the tyrant’spower is granted by the subjugated individuals who onlyneed to refuse their support to overturn his power.Furthermore,itisworth noting that the de-tran- scendentalisation of the state in condition and relations anticipates Foucault’sanal- ysis of disseminated power and the following bio-political reflections of the twenti- eth century.³⁷ Landauer’ssceptical philosophyisnot onlyatheoretical exercise, but is the foundation and the strategyfor aparticular idea of anarchyasGemeinschaftsleben. At the outset of Skepsis und Mystik Landauer contends that scepticism has no value at all if it does not preparethe wayfor anewlycreated mysticism. Therefore, its func- tion is to clear the ground for anew mysticism bound with acall to action. This kind of contradictio in adjecto of activism and mysticism is just one of the theoretical ten- sions in Landauer’sthought.How could mysticism and scepticism—which generally lead to apraxia—be combined with apolitical action?How could athought of com- munity stem from amystical attitude which is deeplyelitist and individual?

 , ,eds.Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006), 36.  In Die Revolution,Landauer—quotingLaBoétie—admits: ‘Wheredoes the tremendous power of the tyrant derive from?Itdoes not comefromexternal power […]no, its power comes fromthe vol- untary servitude of men […]Itbecame ahabit to be complacent in servitude;and habit is stronger than nature[…]tyrannyisnot afire that has to be or can be extinguished. It is not an external evil. It is an internal flaw.’ This message from La Boétie is at the coreofLandauer’sanarchy: ‘human should not be united by domination, but as brother without domination: an-archy.’ But he adds ‘with spirit,’ spirit that ‘has to comeoverus.’ At the end of the Revolution,Landauer compares La Boétie’snotion of ‘le contr’un’ with his notion of ‘le contr’etat’:ifthe former is agroupofindivid- uals which recognise its servitude and rise aboveit, the secondone is ‘acommunity of people outside the state.’ Cf. Landauer, Revolution,151– 173.  On this affinity,see Jesse S. Cohn, Anarchismand the Crisis of Representation,69. Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticism and Revolution in Gustav Landauer 263

Landauer’sanswer is the spiritualisation of social relations as asynthesis be- tween mysticism and socialism. The creation of areal community passes through an individual mystical experience which results in dismissing the illusion and false bonds. The regeneration of humankind is in no wayanaïveand palingenetic exhortation, but presupposes akind of apersonal conversion. The wayone must sab- otagethe state is viathe creation of authentic bonds among people; however,the cre- ation of this bond stems from an individual awarenessand withdrawal that leads to a deeper and more authentic connection with the world and the past.Through these paths the spirit opens up and discloses the revolution as acathartic renewal of hu- mankind. Apersonal katabasis and asymbolic suicide are needed as aface to face with a weirdnegativity and aself-liberation:

So as not to be an isolate, lonelyand God-forsaken, Irecognise the world and sacrificemyego to it,but onlysothat Imight feel myself to be the world to which Ihaveopened myself. Just as a suicide hurls himself intothe water, so Icrash precipitouslyintothe world, but Ifind not death, rather life there. The egokills itself so that the world egomight live.³⁸

The social boundsare ‘the bridges of light’³⁹ that connect people. Revolution should lead to acommunity workingasareparation—thatwecan call tiqqun as in the Lurianic sense⁴⁰ of the fragments: ‘because the world has fragmented into pieces and is divided and different from itself,wemust flee into mystical seclusion to become one with the world.’⁴¹

6Anarchic Time and the Sceptical AccountofRevolution

In my view,itispossibletosee in Landauer’swork atripleidea of time connected deeplytohis anarchy: the first is the mystical transformationofspace in time arising from scepticism and as apremise for renewal of the community in Skepsis und Mys- tik;the second is his articulation of time in the Revolution,wherehistory is an open processofbecomingwhich resists anyattempt of dogmatisation; the third is his idea of revolution—inspired by the Jewish Jubilee—as an exercise of interruption of the present power relations in ForSocialism.

 Landauer, Skepsis und Mystik,48. This passage was translatedinto English by Weisberger, The JewishEthic and the Spirit of Socialism,168.  Landauer, Revolution,118.  On the Lurianic notion of tiqqun in contemporary Jewish thought, see LawrenceFine, “Tikkun: A Lurianic Motif in Contemporary Jewish Thought,” in From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism: Essaysin Honor of Marvin Fox,vol. 4, eds. JacobNeusner,Ernest S. Frerichs, and Nahum M. Sarna (Atlanta: Scholars Press,1989): 35–53.  Landauer, Skepsis und Mystik,18. This passagewas translatedinto English by Weisberger, The JewishEthic and the Spirit of Socialism,166. 264 Libera Pisano

The relevance of the concept of time and the connection of the individual with his past are two important features of Landauer’sthought. His idea of the regenera- tion of community—mainlyinhis Skepsis und Mystik—passes through an overcoming of the spatial and sensorial dimension to conceive aform of community basedona temporaldimension. In fact,according to Landauer,the spirit is not aspatial con- cept.⁴² In terms of the connection between time and politics, one can arguethat Lan- dauer interpreted the external world as amere sign of the internal one. Spatial de- velopment is nothing but amoment in the flow of time: ‘space must be transformed into time.’⁴³ In this task thereisthe need to find new metaphors,or new language, for an authentic community.His account of time stems from akind of mysticalvision: ‘Time is not merelyperceptual, but it is the form of our experience of self; therefore it is real for us, for the conception of the world that we must form from out of ourselves.’⁴⁴The effort of keepingtogether asocial and an individual level is basedonanew conception of time in which there is aperpetual bond between past,present and future generations.⁴⁵ In Skepsis und Mystik he argued that time and historical changewereactually rooted in internal experience, while in Die Revolution he developed what we should call asceptical idea of history. Die Revolution,written in 1907and republished post- humouslyin1919,isaunique and sophisticatedessaywhich embodies the spirit of the time and contains an attempt at asceptical-anarchistic philosophyofhistory. This book, however,isnot an easy read; mainlyfor Landauer’sambiguous usage of the word ‘revolution’,which has at least three meanings in the text:firstly, revo- lution is apermanent movementconnected to his philosophyofhistory whereitisto be interpreted as the threshold between topia and utopia; secondly, along historical period that begun with the modern eraand is the sum of different and partial revo- lutions or transformations;⁴⁶ thirdly, revolution is arealisation of the spirit which leads to the regeneration of the humankindand to the real community beyond state.

 GustavLandauer, “Die vereinigte Republiken Deutschlands und IhreVerfassung,25. November 1918,” in Gustav Landauer und die Revolutionszeit 1918/1919,ed. Ulrich Linse (Berlin: Kramer, 1974): 63: ‘Der Geist,meine Herren, ist keine Lokalitat, wo es am Platz ist,sich vorzudrängen; eher ist er so etwas wie magisch erfüllteZeit.’  Landauer, Skepsis und Mystik,87.  Ibidem,85.  According to him heredity is aforce and acontinuum which shapes ancestral life into anew form. This idea is also takenbythe third volume of Mauthner’s Sprachkritik,where there is adefinitionof heredity as aredefinition of Platonic eternal form. Cf. Mauthner, Beiträge,vol. 3, 71.  In these pages of Die Revolution,Landauer developed aphilosophyofhistory from Middle Ages to his day. Landauer sees Middle Ages as completelydifferent from the modern principle of centralism and statepower; while the millennium from500 to 1500 was marked by ordered multiplicity,and the erafrom1500 until now by alack of spirit,individualisation, state,violenceand so on, he adds: ‘This is the complexity in which we find ourselves, this is our transition, our disorientation, our search— our revolution’ (135).The development of duringthe Renaissance undermined the Geist which was completely defeated by the reformation and ’sdoctrine of salvation. The great in- dividualism and the atomization of the masses arrivedwith Luther,according to Landauer: ‘He rad- Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticism and Revolution in Gustav Landauer 265

Landauer’s Revolution begins by calling into doubt anydogmatic and scientific conception of history.Doubtingcontainsapolitical value and is aprelude to a new beginning connected to the formation of anew man and anew society;the rhythm of doubting is part of Landauer’sphilosophicalstyle. He commenced his essaybyadmitting that history is not ascience that requires scientific laws, because ‘our historical data consist of events and actions, of and relationships.’⁴⁷ At the outset of the book, Landauer adopted sceptical strategy to show the impossibility of ascientific definition of revolution; in fact,every scientific attempt cannot satisfy its understanding as aphenomenon. This is deeplyconnected to his idea of history as not fixed and unchanging, but in fact asum of forces whose influenceispermanent in our lives. In fact,whereas science creates theory and abstraction, history creates ‘forces of praxis’ in aprocess of Vergegenwärtigung,ofbecomingorofturningsome- thing into presence. However,Landauer tried to give atheoretical account of revolu- tion connected to his conception of history,without anydogmatic presumption. The entirety of history,accordingtohim, is asequence of topias—periods of order and fixed institutions—and ,which is moved by adesire for change, and ‘consists of two elements: the reaction against the environment from which it emerges, and the memory of all known earlier utopias.’⁴⁸ He rejects aprogressive idea of history.Infact,the past is not something finished,but always aprocess of . History is not something alreadydefined, everything is aresultaswell as apromise: ‘there is onlyway for us, there is onlyfuture. The past itself is future. It is never finished,italways becomes.Itchanges and modifies as we move ahead.’⁴⁹ This historicalbecomingisboth apassagefrom different phases as well as aperma- nent changingofthe past at every stageofhistory.There is somehow afuturability of the past,and revolution is the period between of the old topia and the comingofthe new one.⁵⁰ AccordingtoLandauer,revolution is not the telos—ultimateaim—of the history, but ameta-historical threshold, which needsasystematic negation of the topia on the waytoutopia. Topia is astabile combination of state, , school, art, and so on, acombination of all the spheres of commonality.However,this gradual

icallyseparated life from faith and substituted organized violencefor spirit’ (142). This eraismarked by an absence, alack of spirit,but it does not disappear entirely, but it appears sometimes in some individuals. The revolution in which we live has to bringtogether anew common spirit.Sincethat time therehas been along revolution regarded as astruggle for the reestablishment of Geist as prin- ciple of human life.  Ibidem,111.  Ibidem,121.  Ibidem.  On Landauer’sconcept of revolution as Zwischenzeit,cf. Norbert Altenhofer, “Tradition als Re- volution. GustavLandauer ‘geworden-werdendes’ Judentum,” in Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933: Theproblematic Symbiosis,ed. David Bronsen (Heidelberg: Carl WinterUniversitätsverlag, 1979): 183. 266 LiberaPisano

stability does not last for long.The changes are caused by utopia.⁵¹ Thoughitmay appear dead, it is always ahidden forceinhistory thatresurrects whenever a topia reaches its limits.Therefore:

Revolution is always alive,evenduringthe time of relatively stable utopias. It stays alive under- ground. It is always old and new.While it is underground, it creates acomplex unity of mem- ories,emotions and desires. This unity will then turn into arevolution that is not merely aboun- dary (or aspate of time), but aprinciple transcending all eras (topias).⁵²

As statedbyLandauer,anarchyis‘the expression for the liberation of man from the idols of the state, the churchand capital,’⁵³ whereas scepticism as asystematic neg- ation of every positive truth is the necessary strategyfor anarchy. This negation is the heart of his (anti)political theory,particularlysoinhis famous conception of revolu- tion. Revolution needsanegation of the topia on the waytoutopia and this power of negation is the political translation of the act of doubting of all truths: ‘Truth is, how- ever,acompletelynegative word, it is the negation in itself, and thereforeitisindeed the subjectand aim of all science,whose long-lastingresults are always of anegative nature.’⁵⁴ Scepticism and revolution have this need of negation in common which be- comes apositive result,acreation that results from criticism. In his conception of history Landauer challenged the very heart of the German- Hegelian conception of history as aself-realisation of the spirit,inasceptical man- ner.Herefusesany form of theorisation of history as adiscipline and aDarwinian account of progress seen as inexorable and dogmatic historical tendencies.Accord- ing to Landauer,adogmatic idea of history—such as —impedes revolution. As scepticism engenders political action, dogmatism in contradistinction is an obsta- cle to change. His accusations against Marxism are at various levels. First of all, its view of autopian project based on ascientific or rather aDarwinian idea of history, forwarding amechanistic and deterministic view of history as self-drivenprogress,

 It is fair to saythat Landauer’sinterpretation of utopia is one of the most debated elementsofhis thought.Buber celebrated his friend in Paths to Utopia and, morebroadly, Landauer has been de- fined as athinker of contemporary utopia. In Revolution utopia plays acrucial roleinhis , however utopia should not be interpreted as aclassic understanding of the term as a dream of aperfect society or as arational political project.According to Landauer,utopia is the driv- ing force of history seen as an alternation between topia and utopia, stabilisation and change.Inthe Revolution,Landauer deals with modern utopias, for instanceThomas More’swork. Even if modern utopia was arebellion and critique,itconcerned asurrogateform of communality,namelythe state. Furthermore, when Landauer speaks of Campanella’s City of the Sun,hestates: ‘In Campanella’suto- pian system, the statehas takencontrol of everything: love, family, property,education, religion. Campanella foresees the absolute democratic state, the statethat knows neither society nor societies; the state that we call social democratic;’ see Landauer, Revolution,162.Also, in his Aufruf,Landauer clearlystates that he does not offer anydepiction of autopian ideal.  Landauer, Revolution,116.  Landauer, “Ethische Kultur,” (March 7, 1896), reported by Lunn, Prophet of Community,200.  Landauer, Skepsis und Mystik,83. Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticism and Revolution in Gustav Landauer 267

postulatingthat capitalism will inevitably collapseand the will be inevi- table. This optimistic and dogmatic trust in inevitable collapse is at the root of Marx- ist determinism that impedes the action, whereas Landauer’swritingsplace astrong emphasis on the voluntary aspect and acall to action. Landauer reads the Marxist conception of history as anecessary development;⁵⁵ it is a ‘spiritless conception of history’⁵⁶determined by providence. Landauer criti- cised the Marxist injunction of waiting for the ‘supposed right moment,’ which has

postponed this goal further and further and pushed it into blurred darkness;trust in progress and development was the name of regression and this ‘development’ adaptedthe external and internal conditions moreand moretodegradation and made the great change ever more remote.⁵⁷

Since revolution pavesthe wayfor something yettocome, rather than waiting for divineintervention, Landauer transposed the axis of hope to human Tat (‘action’) and human communities.This passageneedsasceptical attitude towards politics and institutions in order to create adifferent bond between individuals.Healways emphasised the idea of beginning and underlined the need for action and the urgen- cy of society’sradical change, not to be postponedinto adistant future, but to take place now. Revolution can happen at anytime and open the gate for the spirit.Thisidea was stressed by Landauer in afascinating speech he gave as memberofthe work councils in Munich duringthe revolution: ‘So anyone can help the revolution, anyone can heartilyjoin it through anydoor,which is mostlyalreadyopened.’⁵⁸ The possibility of an overturning is possibleanytime, hencethere is acatastrophic—in the sense of the Greek word ‘katastrophè’ which means ‘overturn’—conception of history in

 Cf. Landauer, ForSocialism,60–63. Landauer refused to consider the proletarian as the predes- tined and privileged revolutionary agent.Inhis vision, it is not amatter of ,orperhaps more preciselyamatter of historicallyfavouredsocial groups,for the radical transformation required the development of cooperation amongall workingmembers.Furthermore, the Marxistdefinition of the proletariat is givenonlyasaneconomic factor not takinginto accountspiritual poverty, while the real change starts from aspiritual one. In the placeofadictatorship of the proletariat Lan- dauer called for ademocracy of the entireworking community.Moreover,Landauer also sawacon- nection between Marxism and technology,which he asserted to be responsible for the process of de- personalisation and dehumanisation of relationships.Landauer’saversion to technology has to be understood as aligned to his idea of spirit as authentic bond between man and man, man and nature, man and history.Capitalism,the modern state and technology areall part of the same constellation.  Ibidem,61.  Ibidem,109.  GustavLandauer, “ZurFrage der Deutschen Verfassung,” in Gustav Landauer und die - zeit,ed. Linse, 58. This passagerecalls Benjamin’snarrow gate through which the Messiah could enter in his “Theses on the PhilosophyofHistory;” see , “On the Concept of History,” in idem, Selected Writings,vol. 4, eds.Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings,trans. Edmund Jeph- cott et alii (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 2003): 389–400. 268 Libera Pisano

Landauer’sthought. There is atension between salvation and destruction at the very heart of his concept of revolution.⁵⁹ Against aprogressive and evolutionist concep- tion of history,Landauer formulated adifferent conception that we can define as an open and anti-dogmatic idea of history in which the messianic overturn can hap- pen anytime. The third and last aspect of Landauer’sanarchic conception of time deals with another account of revolution; in fact,atthe end of his ForSocialism,revolution is conceivedasapermanent interruption of the order.Inthis essayLandauer quotes apassagefrom Leviticus (25:8 – 24) to emphasises the necessity of arevolution as a permanent interruption—Durchbruch—in order to redeem the whole of history.Hein- terpreted this interruption on the basisofthe Mosaic law, when the dayofequalisa- tion will come and ‘every man is to regain what belongstohim.’ This theological as- sumption givesmore spiritual emphasis to Landauer’sarguments:

[T]he voiceofthe spirit is the trumpet that will sound againand again and again, as long as men aretogether.Injustice will always seek to perpetuateitself, and always as long as men aretruly alive,revolt against it will break out.Revolt as constitution; transformation and revolution as a rule established onceand for all; order through the spirit as intention; that was the great and sacredheart of the Mosaic social order.Weneed that onceagain: new regulations and spiritual upheaval, which will not make things and commandmentspermanentlyrigid, but which will proclaim its own permanence. The revolution must become an element of our social order,it must become the basic rule of our constitution.⁶⁰

AccordingtoLandauer,revolution must be apart of asocial order,asthe basis of the constitution and the permanent work of the spirit.This interruption is amessianic interval, but it could be compared to asceptical epoché,asuspension of the rhythm of the time and an overturning of authorities. Since revolution is anegation but also an interruption of authority and of power,itcould be defined as the sceptical heart of community. In contrast with aMarxist tradition positing revolution needs a ‘right moment’ to happen, Landauer place it as Grundregel—basic rule—of our constitution. In awon- derful mosaic he puts together the subversive features of Judaism and the socialistic- anarchistic tradition, as well as the restorative and utopian elements.⁶¹ Even though the relationship between Landauer and Judaism is controversial,⁶² Ithink that Lan-

 At the outset of the Revolution, thereisapassage fromMaximus Tyrus: ‘Here, now,you will see the road of passion, which youcall destruction,because youmakeyour judgment based on those whohavealreadypassed away on it—which I, however,call “salvation”,basing myself on the order of those yettocome;’ see Landauer, Revolution,176.  Landauer, ForSocialism,130.  On the connection between anarchism and Jewish tradition, cf. Martin Buber, Königtum Gottes (Heidelberg: Schneider,1956); Amedeo Bertolo, ed., L’anarchico el’ebreo.Storia di un incontro (Milan: Eleuthera, 2001).  This is also one of the most discussed topics in secondary literature. Forinstance, according to Linse and Link-Salinger,the Jewish element is onlyone factoralongside the socialist and romantic Anarchic Scepticism:Language, Mysticismand Revolution in GustavLandauer 269

dauer as aGerman Jew, who conceivedhis identity as acomplexity,⁶³ anticipated the feeling of the bifurcated soul of awhole generation of thinkers of the last century.⁶⁴ Thanks to his association with Martin Buber,Landauer became familiar with Jewish tradition and Jewish questions. Undoubtedlyinthe lastyears of his life, he was en- thusiasticfor Jewishnationalrenaissance. After his death, Buber spoke of Landauer as the ‘secret leader’ of the Zionistmovement and tried to translate his legacyfrom GermanytoIsrael.⁶⁵

traditions in Landauer’sthought; but Lunn points out that Jewish heritage playedapivotal rolein Landauer’sidea of redemption and the bindingpowerofspirit.Cf. Link-Salinger, Gustav Landauer: Philosopher of Utopia,74–76;Lunn, Prophet of community,247.Hanna Delf, “‘Prediger in der Wüstesein.’ GustavLandauer im Weltkrieg,” in GustavLandauer, Werksausgabe. Gustav Landauer. Dichter,Ketzer,Außenseiter,vol. 3, ed. Hanna Delf (Berlin: Akademie, 1997), XXIII-LI; Siegbert Wolf, “Einleitung,” in GustavLandauer, Ausgewählte Schriften. Philosophie und Judentum,vol. 5., ed. Siegbert Wolf (Lich/Hessen: Edition AV,2012): 9–85.  In one of his most important writingsonJudaism—Sind das Ketzergedanken?—published in the volume VomJudentum in 1913 and edited by the Zionist organisation in Prague BarKochba, Landauer wrote: ‘Iam, the Jew, aGerman. The expressions “German JeworRussian Jew” areasobtuse as would be the terms “Jewish German” or “Jewish Russian”.The relation is not one of dependencyand cannot be described by means of an adjective modifyinganoun. Iaccept my fate as it is. My Germanism and my Jewishness do each other no harm but much good. As two brothers, afirst-born and aBenjamin, areloved by mother—not in the same waybut with equal intensity—and as these twobrothers live in harmonywith each other whenever their paths proceed in common and also whenever each goes his own wayalone, even so do Iexperience this strangeand intimateunity in duality as somethingpre- cious;’ translated by Lunn, Prophet of community,270. The special callingfor humanitythat charac- terised Judaism is that all Jews bear ‘their neighbours in their own breasts;’ see ibidem,217.The Jew- ish Volk is free from the trap of the statewhich is also athreat to the integrity of Jewish identity.Inhis short lectureentitled “Judaism and Socialism” giventothe ZionistischeOrtsgruppe West Berlin on February 12, 1912,Landauer admitted the possibility of Jewish settlements but at the same time he supported the messianicfeelingofGalut amongthe nations as chanceofredemption for the human- kind: ‘The Galut, exile as an inner disposition of isolation and longing,will be that utmost calling that bonds them to Judaism and Socialism;’ translated by Paul Mendes-Flohr, “Introduction,” in Gus- tav Landauer:Anarchist and Jew,1–2. The redemptive mission and the commitment of Jewish people of increasingbrotherhood and justiceisakin to socialism. His provocative idea was that Galut linked Judaism to Socialism, since Jewish people wereparticularlyqualified for the task of helpingtobuild socialist communities.  See Paul Mendes-Flohr, German Jews:ADual Identity (New Havenand London: Yale University Press, 1999), 1–2.  See Martin Buber, “Der heimliche Führer,” in Gustav Landauer Gedenkheft,inDie Arbeit (1920): 35: ‘GustavLandauer was an awakener for us;hehas transformed our lives, and he has givenour —which he never mentioned by name—anew meaning, anew intensity,anew direction;’ see also Martin Buber, “Landauer und die Revolution,” Masken:Halbmonatsschrift des Düsseldorfer Schauspielhauses 14.18 – 19 (1919): 291;Bar Kochba, ed., VomJudentum (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff, 1913). 270 Libera Pisano

7ScepticismasAnti-Political Form of Life

Landauer’sidea of revolution deals with the power of negation, with his conception of history and with apoliticisation of time to provide aregeneration of humankind. As noted above, he proposed aqualitative conception of historical time:the revolu- tion is ameta-historicalelementthatcould happen in asudden eruption and histor- ical metamorphosis of an abrupt moment, Durchbruch. At the sametime, revolution is arenewal of humankindand aprocesstaking place in the individual’sinteriority. In his prefacetothe second edition of the Aufruf Landauer talks of the transformative feature of the revolution, stating that in the revolution ‘the incredible miracle is brought into the realm of possibility.’⁶⁶ This aesthetic and ethicrenovation of the spi- rit involves joy,love, transcendence, religion.⁶⁷ The conversion of the greatestdiffi- culty and necessity into the highest virtue,ofthe crisis into socialism is the hardest task of revolution. Thence, revolution is not just apolitical event,but rather it is a metànoia—acon- version, an exercise of becomingand an interior transformation in order to create new relationships between men. Ithink that this conception of revolution as conver- sion is also the keytounderstanding his initial participation in the Bavarian Soviet Republic; in fact,heenthusiasticallyparticipated in this revolution as aspiritual guide, following Eisner’ssuggestion to join it for a ‘transformation of the souls’ (‘Um- bildungder Seele’).⁶⁸

 Landauer, ForSocialism,21.  In the prefaceofhis ForSocialism,Landauer speaks of true socialism and social change as are- ligion of action and love. His religious and prophetical vein is also the element that his friends—after his death—will take to save his memory and celebrate Landauer as amartyr of revolution; see, ibi- dem,26: ‘Maythe revolution bringrebirth. May, sinceweneed nothingsomuch as new,uncorrupted men risingupout of the unknown darkness and depths,may these renewers,purifiers,saviours not be lackingtoour nation. Longlive the revolution, and mayitgrowand rise to new levels in hard, wonderful years. Maythe nations be imbued with the new,creative spirit out of their task, out of the new conditions,out of the primeval, eternal and unconditional depths,the new spirit that really does createnew conditions.May the revolution produce religion, areligion of action, life, love, that makes men happy,redeems them and overcomesimpossible situations.’ Furthermore, at the end of his Revolution,heunderlines this idea of joy and revolution as akind of divine or mystic ;see Landauer, Revolution,171– 172: ‘The joy of revolution is not onlyareaction against the former oppres- sion. It lies in the euphoria that comes with arich, intense, eventful life. What is essential for this joy is that humans no longer feel lonelythat they experience unity,connectedness,and collective strength.’  GustavLandauer, Sein Lebensgang in Briefen,vol. 2, 296 note1:‘Kurt Eisner hatteam14. November an Landauer geschrieben: “Kommen Sie, sobald es Ihre Gesundheit erlaubt.Was ich vonIhnen möchte, ist,daß Sie durch rednerische Betätigungander Umbildungder Seelen mitarbeiten.”’ In the Munich Revolution, Landauer sawaprophetical realisation of the spirit.Hewas deeplyconvinced of aspirituality transforming of revolution. It is worth notingthat in his speechesand writings during the Räterepublik,Landauer spokeorwrote as aspiritual guide or as aprophet of the spirit that is yet to come. Anarchic Scepticism: Language, Mysticism and Revolution in Gustav Landauer 271

AccordingtoLandauer,anarchyisbased on adeepscepticism towards political dogma, institutions and authority.Itisinnoway an abstract model or doctrine, but an ethic and spiritual form of life whose aim is the Bildung of anew man (‘der wer- dende Mensch’)and anew community basedonanauthentic social justice. In Lan- dauer’sview the libertarian approach is radicallyrethought in aholistic harmonyin which thereisakind of anarchic poiesis. One of the most innovative aspects in his thoughtisthe distinction between an idea of politics as artificial device of power—also to found in Marxism—and an anti- political approach. In his Anarchic Thoughts about Anarchism Landauer writes: ‘An- archyisnot amatter of the future; it is amatter of the present.Itisnot amatter of making demands; it is amatter of how one lives.’⁶⁹ Anarchyisseen in psychological terms and is described as aradical transformation of human being.This is also the reason whyhis revolutionary activity was akind of Lebensform,asitconcerns all di- mensions of life. Landauer’s Anti-Politik arisesfrom his criticism of modern political thought. He barelydistinguished his idea of socialism from politics in general: ‘socialism is acul- tural movement,astruggle for beauty,greatness,abundance of the peoples.’⁷⁰ Whereas the politician is interested onlyinapartial aspect of the human life, social- ist thinks holistically: ‘whether he is athinker or apoet,afighter or aprophet: the true socialist will always have avitalelement of the universalinhim.’⁷¹ Whereas so- cialism concerns all aspects of human life, politics is surrogateand adevice which deals with but partial aspects. Politics is atechnique related to state, representation and institution, while anti-politics could be interpreted as asceptical attitude against power;infact,asitisaGegenmacht (‘counter power’)that refuses to become power, it could be interpreted as asceptical stand which avoids dogmatic conclusion and ruling institutions. Anti-politics is astrategytodiscard doctrine or assumptions from the flux of life which is impossibletodefine in scientific terms.Inthe work and in the biographyof Landauer one can see alivelyexemplum of anarchyasasceptical refusal of political dogmatism. He usessceptical argumentations in his philosophical political thought and in his anti-political praxis as well. Scepticism has manydifferent features in his thought: it is aradical critique towards state, dogmatism and progress;the wayto follow in order to discover alivelyidea of community based on aparticularidea of time and history;acritique towards idols and authorities, and aliving praxis which is an ongoing challengetodogmatic power. In acompellingpuzzle of manyelements his thoughtprovides bothwarnings and the pathwayfor aradical challengetopolitics. His immolation as amartyr of community symbolised his radical attempt to connect an open revolution to ascep-

 GustavLandauer, “Anarchic Thoughts about Anarchism,” in idem, Revolutions and Other Writ- ings,87.  Landauer, ForSocialism,64.  Ibidem,45. 272 Libera Pisano

tical form of life; on the other hand, however,his death shows the controversial con- sequencesofananti-political attitude that laterbecame atragic constant in the his- tory of the last century.Landauer was amedieval mystic, an old-fashioned socialist- anarchist,alinguistic sceptic, and atormentedspirit from the beginning of the twen- tieth century. In this regard, he was the first thinker who combined athinking of community with the breakdown of certainty;asaresult, he demonstrated the ex- treme consequences of asceptical definition of politics and an anarchic conception of time. Ibelievethis to be the very heart of his legacythrough which it could be pos- sible—even to this day—to develop amorephilosophicalthinkingofcommunity as a bond between human beings, beyond dogmatic assumptions and technicalaccounts of politics. Part II Reports

Activities and Events

9November,2017 Openingofthe 3rd Academic Year

Katja Maria Vogt,Columbia University,New York/USA The Nature of Disagreement: Ancient Relativism and Scepticism

Pyrrhonian scepticism has roots in metaphysical discussions relevant to relativism. The lecture reconstructed these discussions in Plato’s Theaetetus and explored how different versions of Pyrrhonian scepticism—the scepticism of Pyrrho, Aeneside- mus, and Sextus Empiricus—comparetoProtagorean relativism. It began with a sketch of whyPlatointerprets ’‘Measure Doctrine’ as global relativism rather thanrelativism about aparticulardomain. Pyrrhonian scepticism, it was ar- gued, inherits this global scope. But Pyrrhonian responses to disagreementhaveim- portant differences from the responses envisagedbyProtagorean relativism. Scepti- cism suggests that, when encountering disagreement,itisrational to step back from one’sview and investigate,rather thansimplytoholdontoone’sview,asthe rela- tivist presumablydoes.The lecture defended scepticism’sresponse to disagreement as construed by Sextus Empiricus as being superior to earlier proposals.

Regular Events Dialectical Evenings

The Dialectical Evening is an informal meeting every four weeks (in fortnightlyrota- tion with the Reading Evening) for discussions and readings,which is designed to promotedialecticalcultureand sceptical thoughtwithin the research unit.Members of the Maimonides Centre and occasional guests convene to challenge, doubt,and explore theses in various subjectareas.

[DE 17] 21 November,2017 Giada Coppola and Michael Engel: On the Eternity of the Movement of Generation and Destruction

The Jewishthinker benJacob Sforno(c. 1475 – 1550) is considered to be the last Jewish scholastic author.Heisbest known for his biblical commentaries and ex- egetical activity,although he also wrote aphilosophical treatise entitled TheLightof

OpenAccess. ©2018 Bill Rebiger,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-Non Commerical-NoDerivs4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-015 276 Activitiesand Events

the Nations. The work was published in Hebrew in 1537with the title Or ‘Ammim. The author himself then translateditinto Latin, revisingitsignificantlyinorder to ad- dress its content to the Christian humanist audience (Lumen Gentium,1548). The text strivestoreproduce the classicalscholastic form of argument (summa)and at- tempts to refute Averroes’ by using the Aristotelian method to subvert and undermineits owndoctrines in order to elevatethe Jewishreligious dogmatic concepts. The opening quaestio of TheLightofthe Nations aimedtoconfute the eternity of the movement of generation and destruction (also known as the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be). Sforno presents three arguments in favour of the eternity of genera- tion and destruction (pro)and five (four in the Latin version) counterarguments (con- tra). As expected, the quaestio is solvedwith anegative answer: the movement of generation and destruction is not eternal, but Sforno’sconclusion givesrise to a new difficulty.

[DE18] 23 January, 2018 Friedhelm Hartenstein and Hanna Liss: The TorahasaMaterial and Verbal Medium of the

This Dialectical Evening asked how the ritual practicesofancientand modern Juda- ism reflect on the fundamental human need for images from twodifferent pointsof view (Protestant biblical exegesis and Jewishstudies). In the light of the explicit bib- lical prohibition of cultic images, it is interesting that the Torahscroll and its ritual readinginthe share some characteristics with the veneration of divine images or other symbols of the presenceofGod. The thesis Friedhelm Hartenstein and Hanna Liss discussed was that the interplaybetween visible objects and mental images of the divine is acommon elementofreligious practice in general: without ‘material anchors’ there are no religious symbols at all. If this is true, the explicit for- mulation of the biblical imageban by the exilic authors seems to presuppose agrow- ing insight into abasic condition of humanity:the need and desire for images. The authorsofthe biblical texts werewell aware of this need and of the dangers of human attention often being fixated onlyonthe object itself and thereby possibly getting lost in immanence (cf. Exodus 32). How did the Bible and later Jewish tradi- tions solve the unavoidable tension between the necessity of images and the confu- sion caused by treatingthem as idols?And how can exegetical insights contributeto Jewishstudies in this respect?Dothe categories of visual science (Bildwissenschaft) help to clarify the specific status of the Torahscroll in Jewishworship as a ‘non-idol- atric’ cultic artefact? And finally: what are the possibleimplications for the question of Jewish scepticism? Activities and Events 277

[DE19] 10 April, 2018 José María Sánchez de León Serrano and Ze’ev Strauss: Jewish Appropriations of Hegel’sPhilosophy of Religion

Hegel’sphilosophy, in particularhis philosophyofreligion, playedacrucial role in the waynineteenth century Jewishphilosophers conceivedtheir own religion. Think- ers like (1785 – 1840), Salomon Formstecher (1808–89), and Sa- muel Hirsch (1815–89) developed aphilosophyofJewish religion basedonHegelian premises and articulated through Hegelianconcepts. At the same time, they opposed Hegel’sdismissive view of Judaism as astageofreligious consciousness that would be—along with Greek and Romanpaganism—surpassed by Christianity. Thus, by pre- senting Judaism as the truereligion of the Absolute (instead of Christianity), they at- tempted to refuteHegel’sview of Judaism with Hegel’sown logic. In this Dialectical Evening,the convenors discussed the assumptions, limits and strengths of Jewish appropriations of Hegel.

[DE20] 8May,2018 Michael Engel and Yoav Meyrav: ElijahDel Medigo between Philosophy and Religion

Elijah Del Medigo (c. 1460 –93), aCretan Jewish author living and workinginNorth- ern Italy, wroteabout Aristotelian themesinHebrew and Latin and is considered a ‘JewishAverroist.’ Drawingonhis different works,contemporary scholars have at- tempted to discern Del Medigo’sgeneral attitude towardthe relation between philos- ophyand religion. In this evening,weasked whether acoherent approach to this re- lationship can indeed be extracted from Del Medigo’scorpus, or whether he adopted amore ad hoc approach, adaptinghis view in agiven context to his audience. The specific case of Del Medigowas then expanded to ageneral methodologicaldiscus- sion about scholars’ tendencytosearch for acohesive meta-philosophical approach within other medieval Jewishauthors.

[DE21]5June, 2018 Timothy Franz and José María Sánchez de León Serrano: The GeneralPattern of Solomon Maimon’sPhilosophy

The works of Solomon Maimon (c. 1753–1800) publishedinhis lifetime extend from 1789 to his death in 1800.Drawinglargely on the perspective of his Autobiography (1792–93)and arguments from the Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790), schol- ars have written commentaries on Maimon which interpret him as an aporetic think- er,asceptic, or asevere combination of rationalist dogmatist and empirical sceptic. Since Maimon combined his acute scepticism with ambitious and evolving theolog- 278 Activities and Events

ical speculations, we asked whether abroader view of his thought can be taken, also involving laterworks which have escaped the notice of tradition. And if this general pattern is found, what does this mean for Maimon as a Selbstdenker and for our phil- osophical and culturaltraditions?

[DE22] 24 July,2018 Stephan Schmid and Oded Schechter: Spinoza’sScepticism about Religion? The Question of in the TTP

Spinoza’s Theological Political Treatise (anonymouslypublished in 1670 as Tractatus Theologico-Politicus or TTP for short) is, next to Hobbes’ Leviathan,often described as the founding text of modern and secular . But in what does the secular moment of Spinoza’s TTP consist?Accordingtoaninfluential line of com- mentators—comprisingsuch famous scholars as Strauss and Nadler—Spinoza’ssec- ularism is identifiedinhis questioning of the authority and truth of the Bible. For among the main claims defendedinSpinoza’s TTP are those that the Bible is but ahistoricaldocument and no ‘Letter God has sent men from ’ (12.1), that prophecyisbut aform of imagination, thatmiracles are just unusual as opposed to super-natural events, and thatthe goal of Scripture consists in instilling obedi- ence, and not in conveying some super-natural truth. In this Dialectical Evening,Ste- phan Schmidand Oded Schechter wanted to present this secularist or sceptical read- ing of Spinoza’s TTP and explore the tenability of the opposing view.Accordingto this opposing view,far from discardingreligion and consideringitauseful means to control the superstitious masses, Spinoza takes revelation to be an integralele- ment of the modern state, which leavesroom for free political .

[DE23] 7August, 2018 BernardCooperman: CulturalPluralism Seen from the Ghetto or: Is Tolerance Possible in aReligious Society?

Bernard Cooperman presented aseries of texts by arangeofJewish writers dating from the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries. These texts,written originallyinHebrew,Italian, and Latin, seem to express quite radical positions about the relation between and the possi- bilities of Jews living within Christian society.The first three authors, all of whom livedinVenice at least for awhile, includeaPortuguese-trained physi- cian (Elijah Montalto) who became famous as aJewish polemicist,aJewishphysi- cian (David de’ Pomis) trainedatthe University of Perugia who lost his right to prac- tice medicine on Christians, and arabbi (Simone Luzzatto) who is well known as a defenderofthe Jewish presenceinhis city.All three men, not irrelevantly,authored significant works aimedatanon-Jewish audience, works devoted to medicalscience, Activities and Events 279

lexicography, and philosophical scepticism respectively. All three represent the type of (Jewish) intellectual whose career and writingselucidatethe transitional position of those who enter into another world of discourse and claim statuswithin it without abandoning theirclaims to independent status. Finally, Cooperman used their argu- ments to offer acontextualisation of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Tractate thatmay help to understand whythe Dutch author presented the relation between religion and the state as he did.

Reading Evenings

The Reading Evening is an informal meeting every four weeks (in fortnightlyrotation with the Dialectical Evening). Fellowsand researchers read and discuss primary texts that are specificallyrelevant to their respective projects.Each meeting,one fellow or research team member selects and presents atext of particular importance for her research. In reading together,the group benefits from the expertise of the individual researcher.

[RE16] 8August,2016 Máté Veres: Scepticism about TheologyinSextus Empiricus

Giventhe prevalence of religious diversity in the Graeco-Roman world and the dom- inance of theological tenets in the philosophyofthe time, it is hardly surprising that reflections concerning the rationality of religious belief came to the fore in the Hel- lenistic age. Importantly,both religious and anti-religious dogmatism proved to be a prime targetfor sceptical examination, as evidencedbySextus Empiricus, aPyrrho- nian sceptic and our primary sourcefor the earlyencounter between scepticism and dogmatic theology. The Reading Evening was focussed on some arguments concern- ing theologyasthey are presented by Sextusinhis Outlines of Pyrrhonism,Book III, and parts of his Against the Physicists,Book I.

[RE17] 5September,2017 Ehud Krinis: Judah Halevi’sUse of Sceptical Arguments

Articles11–25 in Book IofJudah Halevi’s Kuzari form the opening section of the dia- logue between the Khazar king and the Jewishsage(the ḥaver). It is in this section that Halevi presents his definition of Judaism vis-à-vis the dogmatic-rationalistic def- inition of religion. In this section, we can detect Halevi’smost elaborated use of some sceptical arguments. The Reading Evening was devoted to the examination of Hale- vi’suse of sceptical arguments in I, 11–25 as part of his elucidation of the uniqueness of the Jewish religion. 280 Activitiesand Events

[RE18] 24 October,2017 ThomasMeyer: The Quest for Certainty in Saadiah’sPhilosophy

Abraham Joshua Heschel’sarticle “The Quest for Certainty in Saadiah’sPhilosophy” is an important contribution to Jewish scepticism on at least threelevels: as aclose readingofSaadiah’sconcept of ‘certainty’,aspart of Heschel’sown theology(for ex- ample ‘’), and as an example of the use of medieval thinkers and their conceptsduring the Second World War. The aim of the Reading Evening was to understand how one and three are mixed and what that means for our inter- pretation of Jewish scepticism (keywords: , systematical vs. historical reading, persecution and the art of writing,etc.).

[RE19] 19 December,2017 Friedhelm Hartenstein: Is the BookofJob aWork of Sceptical Literature?

This Reading Evening raised the question whether the biblical book of Jobcould be characterised as awork of sceptical literature. Hartenstein considers the dissertation of Katherine J. Dell (supervised by John Barton, University of Oxford, 1988) as the onlymonograph which is explicitlydealing with the question in considerable length—taking into account aspects of content as well as of form. Dell follows a more open definition of scepticism with regard to Greek sceptics (cf. pp. 168–171). The discussion was based on chapter 4ofthis thesis as well as on various chapters of the book of Job(ch.1–7; 19;38and 42).

[RE20]16January, 2018 AndreasBrämer: Abraham Geiger—AReluctant Pioneer of Systematic Theology?

Andreas Brämer’sresearch at the Maimonides Centrewas dedicated to Rabbi Abra- ham Geiger (1810 –74), both an intellectual spearhead of liberal Judaism and an iconic figureofcritical Jewishscholarship in Germany during the eraofVerbürgerli- chung. Considering the fact thatGeiger, rabbi first in Wiesbaden, then in Breslau, Frankfurt and Berlin, was so eager to define ‘jüdische Wissenschaft’ as aJewish the- ology, it mayseem appropriate to enquire afterGeiger’scontributions to asystematic description of the Jewish belief system. TheReading Evening was basedonanumber of passages from Geiger’sprivatecorrespondence that have been published in Ger- man as well as in English translation in order to comprehend his rather reluctant stance when it comes to the presentation of doctrines of faith. Activities and Events 281

[RE21] 20 February, 2018 ZevHarvey: Ḥasdai Crescas’ Scepticism about Proofs of God

Medieval philosophers, like , Maimonides, or Thomas Aquinas,composed famous ‘proofsofGod.’ God, they held, is found not onlyinHolyScripture,but also in the physical or metaphysical demonstrations of philosophers. The Catalan Rabbi Ḥasdai Crescas (c. 1340 –1410 or 1411), in his Hebrew philosophical book TheLightofthe Lord (), was profoundlysceptical about such proofs.One mayproveafirst cause of our world, he allowed, but there maybemany worlds,per- haps an infinite number of them, and each world could have its own first cause, that is, each could have its own God. Reason, he concluded, has no wayoffreeingitself from doubt. Onlyprophecy,heargued, trulyproves the existenceofOne God. The aim of this Reading Evening was to understand the motives, spirit,and scope of Cres- cas’ scepticism.

[RE22]6March, 2018 David Ruderman: Defending the Integrity of Rabbinic Judaism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Creative Response of Isaac Baer Levinsohn to the MissionaryAssaults of his Day

Alexander McCaul (1799–1863) was one of the most prominent figures in TheLondon Society for promotingChristianity amongst Jews during the first half of the nine- teenth century. In 1837,hepublished aformidable attack against the Talmud entitled TheOld Paths, engendering considerable consternation and alarm among Jews when the work appeared in Hebrew translation two years later.His work evoked aseries of long responses from Jewish intellectuals attemptingtodefend traditionalJudaism from his stinging criticisms, especiallyseveral written by Eastern-European maśkilim (proponents of the Jewishenlightenment) who had previouslycondemned the rabbis and their restrictiveTalmudic laws in calling for radical religious and educational re- form. The ironyofthese same critics of RabbinicJudaism feeling obliged to defend their hallowed traditions is at the heart of Ruderman’sstudyofMcCaul’scritique and the Jewish response. David Ruderman examined in the Reading Evening the response of Isaac Baer Levinsohn (Ribal, 1788–1860), the most importantfigure in this group, and his bold attempt to articulate the relevanceofJewish civilisation for Christians and Jews alike. Armed with vast erudition in Rabbinic sources, knowledge of ancient and modernhistory,and broad exposure to contemporary scholarship, Ribal offered not merelyathorough answer to McCaul but athoughtful and nuanced articulation of how Judaism might retain its authentic character while reformingitself in the light of the new exigencies and challenges of the modern era. 282 Activitiesand Events

[RE23]24April, 2018 Diego Lucci: The Limits of Human Understanding in JohnLocke’sPhilosophy: PoliticalScepticism, Moral Scepticism, and Ontological Scepticism

John Locke(1632– 1704) is widelyknown as the founderofmodern empiricism and the father of liberalism. However,not manypeople are aware of the sceptical aspects of Locke’sphilosophical, political,moral, and religious thought.The sceptical di- mension of Locke’sthought manifests itself in different ways in his reflections on re- ligious toleration, the foundations of morality,and the scope of human knowledge. Locke’srejection of the imposition of ‘true religion’ in ALetter concerning Toleration (1689) mainlyrelies on asceptical argument—the argument from error.Moreover, Locke’smoralist soteriologyinTheReasonableness of Christianity (1695) largely re- sulted from his attempt to overcome his own moral scepticism. Furthermore, in An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), Lockedenied that we could getbe- hind ideas to thingsthemselves, in that he defined substance as an unknown sub- stratumorsupport of qualities—thus discarding the metaphysical concepts that un- derlie the trinitariandogma and other Christian beliefs, as EdwardStillingfleet and other contemporary critics noted. Nevertheless,Lockedid not call into question the existenceoftrue religion, the demonstrability of morality,orthe actualityofsubstan- ces.What he doubted was the human capacity to actuallycomprehend and commu- nicate religious truth, to find solid foundations for morality,and to know anysub- stance. Briefly, Locke’ssceptical attitude originated in his recognitionofthe limits of human understanding.

[RE24] 22 May,2018 LukasLang: Common Sense and Scepticism

There is atradition in philosophy, which began with Berkeley and Reid and contin- ues up until today, that opposes scepticism with common sense.Acommon-sense- based attack is especiallythreateningbecause it allegedlyrests on no assumptions or because it proceeds from apretheoretical point.Other attacks on scepticism do rest on assumptions, and this weakens theirposition in the sense that the sceptic can (try to) resist them.However,Lukas Lang wanted to arguethat acommon- sense-based attack requiresanobvious contradiction between common sense and scepticism. If they are not obviouslycontradictory,then the contradiction must be shown, presumablybyargument,and so acommon-sense-based attack would lose its chief advantage of ruling out scepticism prior to philosophical discussion. The problem is most obvious when we turn towardsMoore’slist of common sense truths (‘There exists at present aliving human body,’ and so on) and Berkeley’sas- sent to them. In Berkeley’stheory,all common sense propositions are rendered true. But then there is no contradiction, not even disagreement,for the attacker to use a common sense proposition against Berkeley.With this situation in mind, Lukas Lang Activities and Events 283

surveyed both sides of the debate: on the one hand, the common sense conception of Moore and Berkeley;onthe other hand, the conception of contemporary Mooreans such as David Lewis and Jonathan Schaffer.Additionally, he took alook at two at- tempts to reach acontradiction between common sense and scepticism, namely via atheory of meaning or via Reid’stheory of perception. Both, he argued, either fail because they are too weak or because they can claim no support from common sense and so gamble away the attack’smain advantage.

[RE25]19June, 2018 Guido Bartolucci: Jewish ScepticisminChristian Eyes

In 1704,the Lutheran scholarJakob Friedrich Reimmann (1668–1743)anonymously publishedatreatise on Solomon as asceptic philosopher.Hemaintained thatall the JewishPatriarchs could be interpreted as sceptic philosophers, and in order to dem- onstrate his statement,heexamined the figure of Solomon.The work is divided into two parts: in the first part,Reimmann shows the links between Solomon’sphiloso- phyand sceptic philosophy. In the second part,hedefends his statements from the accusation of one philosopher and theologian, Joachim Lange, by maintaining that scepticism is the onlytrue philosophybecause it is basedonthe idea that ‘man knows nothing.’ Reimmann maintains that after Adam’sfall the human mind could no longer attain true knowledge of the world: onlyGod could give men vera sapientia,true wisdom. By quoting passages from different books of the Old and the New Testament,Reimmann used the classicalfideistic instrumentsofscepticism in order to demonstrate the weakness of the human mind. He argues that Solomon was the best example of the Jewish philosophicaltradition, and he also adds that because the Jewish king livedcenturies before Pyrrho,hecould thereforebeseen as the real founder of scepticism. The relationship between scepticism and the Jewish tradition, accordingtoReimmann, was to strengthen the main characteristic of that kind of Greek philosophy, that is, its acknowledgement of human ignorance and doubt.Reimmann, however,uses the fideistic garb in order to legitimise the sceptical strategytowards dogmatism and traditional knowledge.During the Reading Eve- ning,the first part of the work (translated into English for the first time) was read and Reimmann’sinterpretation of scepticism was discussed.

[RE26]3July,2018 JürgenSarnowsky: Miracles and SaintsinDoubt

During the later Middle Ages, the number of pilgrim places increased, as did the number of saints and relics.People were looking for support in their dailylives or collected for the salvation of their souls and to further their . Even if manypeople believed in what they weretold by the clerics in these places 284 Activitiesand Events

of veneration, others, inside as well as outside the ecclesiastical sphere, doubted. This collection of sources for the Reading Evening offers examples from three cases: the ‘HolyBlood’ of Wilsnack, the canonisation process of Dorothea vonMon- tauatMarienwerder in Prussia (1404), and the pilgrim’sreportofArnold vonHarff (1496–98). While the events in Wilsnack weredoubted from the beginning and be- came the subject of atheological debate, the hearing of the witnesses for the canon- isation process at Marienwerder offers several examples for popular doubts in saints and miracles. Finally, the Rhenish nobleman Arnold vonHarff is included as acrit- ical pilgrim who had his own thoughts about the veneration of relics.

OccasionalEvents Workshops

Workshops are small conferences devoted to aspecific topic or aspect of scepticism, bringingtogetherdifferent expertstopresent on the topic in question. In most cases, we design our workshops to include ample time for discussion in order to foster an exchangeofideas and help presenters improvetheir ownresearch.The workshops are organisedbyMCAS fellows or team members. This allows them to present their distinctive field of studytoothermembers of MCAS workinginother disciplines or focussing on other topics. This encounter between different perspectivesinspires very often new cooperations such as future interdisciplinary reading groups and workshops.

7–8November,2017 Scepticism and Religion in Al-Ghazali, Maimonides, and Hume Convenors: Stephan Schmid, Universität Hamburg/Germany,JosefStern, University of Chicago/USA, and Máté Veres, Université de Genève/Switzerland

In ’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,Cleanthes challenges Demea: ‘Or how do youmystics,who maintain the absoluteincomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from sceptics or atheists, who assert,thatthe first cause of All is unknown and unintelligible?’ By the eighteenth century,wefind questions of religion and scepti- cism tightlyintertwined but this dialectic goes back to the ancientsceptics’ critique of the gods and, when the three revealed monotheistic encounter philosophy in the Middle Ages, it comes to embrace arich variety of classical epistemological and metaphysical questions reconfigured in light of the medieval philosophical/ theological context.Not onlydothinkers grapple with issues of how knowledge can be acquired—by direct intuition, human reasoning,and/or divine revelation— but alsowith the classicalquestion of the very possibilityofknowledge,atleast in the realms of metaphysicsand theology. And if knowledge cannot be possessed, Activities and Events 285

how should one act: by denying the claims as Academic sceptics are said to have ar- gued, by embracing them despite, or because of, their lack of rational justification as fideists recommend, or by simplysuspending judgment to free oneself from the con- flict between religion and philosophyasPyrrhonistswould have reacted? In this workshop, the participants proposed to explore parallels and discrepancies between three of the greatest philosophersinthe three faiths to have canvassed this rich and inadequatelystudied territory between religion and scepticism leading to an even wider rangeofquestions from atomism and causation to knowledge and the self: Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammadibn Muḥammad Al-Ghazali (ca. 1058–1111), Moses Maimo- nides (ca. 1135–1204), and David Hume (1711– 76). Although no claims of influence among these three thinkers are made, thereare striking and sometimes uncannymo- ments of convergence and divergenceintheir arguments and strategies,whose mu- tual investigation can servetoilluminatethe thought of each.

Programme

Stephan Schmid, Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘Welcome and Introductory Remarks’

Máté Veres,Université de Genève/Switzerland ‘“Philosophy’shappy escape?” Ancient Scepticism and the Project of Hume’s Natural ’

Andreas Lammer,Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München/Germany ‘Al-Ghazali’sCritical Theology’

Blake Dutton, Loyola University Chicago/USA ‘Al-Ghazali and Hume on Causal Connection and Scepticism’

JosefStern, University of Chicago/USA ‘Maimonides’ Guide and Hume’sDialogues: ATale of TwoSceptics’

Mark Steiner,Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel ‘David Hume: the First and Last “Kalamist”’

Ramona Winter,Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin/Germany ‘FictionalBeliefsabout the Self in Hume’sTreatise. In what Senseare Fictional BeliefsDefective?’

Paul Russell, University of British Columbia/Canada and Göteborgs Universitet/ Sweden ‘Hume’sScepticism and the Problem of Atheism’ 286 Activities and Events

14–16 November,2017 and Scepticism: Historical, Philosophical, andComparative Perspectives Convenor: Oren Hanner,Universität Hamburg/Germany,incooperation with the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies, Universität Hamburg/Germany

From their earliest stages, Buddhist traditions have displayedasceptical attitude to- wards various types of accepted knowledge.Buddhist thinkers,beginning from the historical Buddha, questioned metaphysical assumptions, the realistic view of the world, and the reliability of our sources of knowledge,and expressed doubtabout common social norms and religious views. In this way, philosophical scepticism playedapivotal role in the wayBuddhist thought evolved. It served both as amethod for arriving at areliable and liberating understanding of reality and, as some argue, as an aspect of spiritual practice. The workshop on Buddhism and Scepticism inves- tigatedthe place of scepticism in the development of classicalBuddhist thought from historical and philosophical perspectives. From ahistoricalstandpoint,the confer- ence explored the development of sceptical strategies in Buddhism and their relation to non-Buddhist systems of thoughtinEurope and Asia. From aphilosophicalpoint of view,itexplored the ways in which sceptical arguments are used in Buddhist phil- osophical works, and how they resemble, and differ from, sceptical methods in other,non-Buddhist philosophies.

Programme

Oren Hanner,Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘Welcome Addresses and Greetings’

Mark Siderits, Seoul National University/South Korea ‘Keynote: Some Sceptical Doubts about “Buddhist Scepticism”’

Ethan Mills, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga/USA ‘Nāgārjuna’sScepticism about Philosophy’

Georgios T. Halkias, University of HongKong/China ‘The Soteriology of Scepticism: Historicaland Philosophical Readings on Pyr- rhonism and Buddhism’

Adrian Kuzminski, Independent Scholar ‘The Evident and the Non-Evident: Buddhism through the Lens of Pyrrhonism’

Eli Franco, Universität Leipzig/Germany ‘WhyMadhyamaka PhilosophyIsNot Sceptical’ Activities and Events 287

Amber Carpenter,Yale-NUSCollege/Singapore ‘Ethics of Atomism and Scepticism’

Dong Xiuyuan, Shandong University/China ‘The Epistemological Foundation of the Debate between the Samaniyyaand the EarlyMutakallimūn’

Serena Saccone, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften/ ‘Abandoningthe Doubt through Doubting:cintāmayī prajñā in the *Vajracche- dikāṭīkā by Kamalaśīla’

Vincent Eltschinger,École pratiquedes hautes études, Paris/France ‘Between Faith and Scepticism: Probabilism as aPhilosophical Approach to ScriptureinDharmakīrti’sThought’

Gordon F. Davis, Carleton University,Ottawa/Canada ‘Buddhist Variations on Axiological Scepticism and Ethical Pluralism’

JamesMark Shields, Bucknell University,Lewisburg/USA ‘Sceptical Buddhism as Provenance and Project’

11–12 Dezember,2017 Visuelle Skepsis.Wie Bilder zweifeln (in German) Convenor: Margit Kern, MCAS undDepartment of ArtHistory, Universität Hamburg

Bilder als Erkenntnismedien spielen heute eine größereRolle denn je. Die Bilderflut, unter anderem in den Neuen Medien,lässt sie allerdings auch problematisch wer- den. Vordiesem Hintergrund erhältdie FragegrößereBedeutung,wie Bilder ihren eigenen Status als Erkenntnismedien problematisieren—zum einenausstellen und zum anderen in Zweifel ziehen—können. Bisher wurde die Auseinandersetzung mit Positionen des Skeptizismus in der Kunstgeschichtegeführt,indem man philo- sophische Strömungeneiner bestimmten Zeitauf die Ikonographie vonGemälden bezog.Die wenigenPublikationen, die sich mit Skepsis beschäftigen, fragen vor allem danach, wie philosophische Texte ihren Niederschlag in Gemäldenoder Druck- graphiken fanden. DieTagungwähltehier einen anderen Zugang. Es wurden explizit die Diskurse untersucht,die nichtdaraufzurückgehen, dass Texte des Skeptizismus in Bilder übersetzt wurden. Stattdessen wurde gefragt,wie Bilderaufgrund der ihnen eigenen medialen Struktur zum Ort vonperformativenProzessen werden, die mit den dialogischen Strategien des Skeptizismus vergleichbar sind.Eine Hauptthese des Workshops lautete, dass hier Widersprüche und Negationen auftreten müssen, die den Charakter einer medialen Selbstbefragung haben. 288 Activitiesand Events

Programm

Margit Kern, Universität Hamburg ‚Visuelle Skepsis—Eine Einführung‘

JürgenMüller, Technische Universität Dresden ‚Alle Kreter lügen. Überlegungen zu PieterBruegels “Misanthrop”‘

Janne Lenhart, Universität Hamburg ‚Zweifel am niederländischenTrompe-l’oeil: Cornelis Gijsbrechts’ Rückseite eines Gemäldes‘

Nicola Suthor,Yale University/USA ‚ScheinhafterRealismus und die Spaltung des Bildes: Zu Caravaggios “Kreuzi- gung Petri” und “Paulussturz” in der Cappella Cerasi‘

Karlheinz Lüdeking,Universität der Künste Berlin ‚Caravaggios skeptischerThomas (eine doppelteGewebeprobe)‘

Meinrad vonEngelberg, Technische Universität Darmstadt ‚Die Kunst des “als ob”:Skepsis als ästhetische Prämisse im 18. Jahrhundert‘

Werner Busch, Freie Universität Berlin ‚Goyas “Caprichos”.Der Zweifel an der Wirksamkeit aufklärerischer Moral‘

Gerd Blum, Kunstakademie Münster/Universität Wien ‚Isosthenie und skeptischer Selbstwiderspruch: Manets “Déjeuner sur l’herbe”‘

Kristin Drechsler,Leuphana Universität Lüneburg ‚Morandis Zweifel‘

Monika Wagner,Universität Hamburg ‚Hinter Glas. Visuelle Dialogemit einem transparenten Medium‘

WolfgangKemp, Universität Hamburg/Leuphana Universität Lüneburg ‚Skepsis vonGrund auf: Kurze Einblicke in werkgenetische Prozesse‘

AdiLouria-Hayon, TelAvivUniversity/Israel ‘The Dialectics of Failed Perception in Bruce Nauman’sArt’

Beate Pittnauer,HBK Braunschweig ‚Framing the real?Excludingthe inventive?Über fotografische Gewissheitenund medialeSelbstzweifel‘ Activitiesand Events 289

Margit im Schlaa, Berlin ‚Blanks‘

Sophia Kunze, Universität Hamburg ‚Momente visueller Skepsis im Video Game‘

Postersektion

Anne-Kathrin Hinz, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena ‚“Spur Andreas B.” ‒ Zweifel an der Darstellbarkeit vonGeschichte?‘

Constanze Fritzsch, Staatliche KunstsammlungenDresden ‚“Das Bild als Vorbild” A.R.Pencks Zweifel an der Sprache‘

LukasR.A. Wilde, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen ‚“Methodischer Zweifel” an Comic-und Manga-Bildern?Bildobjekte, referential meaning und der dritte Zeichenraum‘

27–28 March, 2018 ATouch of Doubt: On Haptic Scepticism Convenor: Rachel Aumiller,Universität Hamburg/Germany

Touch can serveasa‘reality check’ thatawakens an individual from her slumber.We pinch ourselvestoconfirm we are not dreaming. We slap acomrade across the cheek to bring him to his senses. In everydayspeech, the sceptic is often presented as a ‘Doubting Thomas’ with the compulsion to touchwhat others accept on faith alone. Philosophical scepticism, however,casts doubt on the certainty of touch: Per- haps Iamdreaming—dreamingevenofthe sensation of pinching myself awake. Is touch the guarantee of what is real?Oristhe real preciselythat which slips through the epistemologist’sgrasp?

Programme

RachelAumiller,Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘Introduction: Framing the Sceptic as the Compulsive Toucher’ 290 Activitiesand Events

Noli me tangere

Mirt Komel, Univerza vLjubljani/Slovenia ‘Touch Me (Not) and the Question of Sense Certainty’

LiberaPisano, Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘The ProfaningTouch thatChallenges Authority’

Religious Belief and the Imperative to Touch

Bill Rebiger,Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘AMagic Touch: The Imperative to Touch in Jewish Magic from the Hebrew Bible to the Middle Ages’

Robert Pfaller,Kunstuniversität Linz/Austria ‘When to Touch—And WhattoDoubt’

Haptic Cinema

RachelAumiller,Ana Jovanović,BaraKolenc,Mirt Komel, Goran Vranešević AScreeningand discussion of afilm project on touch and language

Questioning the ParadoxofTouch

Ana Jovanović,Univerza vLjubljani/Slovenia ‘Touched in the Head: The s(k)epsis of Reason’

Goran Vranešević,Univerza vLjubljani/Slovenia ‘An Atom of Touch’

Touchingthe Other |TouchingOneself

Bara Kolenc,Univerza vLjubljani/Slovenia ‘The (Un)Touchable Touch of Pyramus and Thisbe: Doubt and Desire’

Jacob Levi, Johns Hopkins University/USA ‘“Es wird Leib, es empfindet”:Hands and Auto-Affection in Husserl’sIdeen II’ Activities and Events 291

Blind-Touch

José María SánchezdeLeón Serrano, Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘Diderot’sLetter on the Blind: Metaphysical Sobriety and the Priority of Touch’

AdiLouria-Hayon, TelAvivUniversity/Israel ‘The Weak Relations of Touch and Sight through the PassageofLapsed Time’

Closing Discussion ‘Emerging Concepts of Haptic Scepticism’

4June, 2018 Early Modern (Anti‐)Scepticism Convenor: Stephan Schmid and LukasLang, MCAS, Universität Hamburg/Germany

The rise of scepticism in the earlymodernperiod led to new and innovative theories on both the sceptical and the anti-sceptical sides of the debate. This workshop aimed to investigate the sceptical and anti-sceptical elements in the philosophies of David Hume, Thomas Reid, and Baruch Spinoza. In particular, the questions,which were addressed, are first,inwhat respect these philosophersembraced scepticism or made use of sceptical strategies, and second, how,and by which means and at what cost,they resisted sceptical arguments.

Programme

Ramona Winter,Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin/Germany ‘Are Fictional Persons aProblem for Hume?’

LukasLang,Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘The Status of First Principles for Reid’

JamesVan Cleve, University of Southern California,Los Angeles/USA ‘TwoWaystoSkin aSceptic: Reid’sRealism and Kant’sIdealism’

José María SánchezdeLeón Serrano, Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘Spinoza on Adequacy and Common Notions’ 292 Activitiesand Events

LectureSeries ‘Feminism and Scepticism’

The Maimonides Centre established alecture series which focusses on feminist ap- proaches to and perspectivesonscepticism. The Centre invites researchers to give apublic lecture on this topic, and—following this lecture—to meet with the female researchers in order to share their experiencesand career paths in their academic systems. The femalefellows expressed the wish to learn more about academic career advancement opportunities in different countries.

7December,2017 Judith R. Baskin, University of Oregon, Eugene/USA Rabbinic Forensics: Distinguishing EggWhite from SemeninbGittin 57a

This lecture began with adiscussion of abrief passagewithin apassageinBabylo- nian Talmud, Gittin 57a thatdemonstrates how rabbinic knowledge of aforensic technique for distinguishing eggwhitefrom semen protected awoman from her hus- band’sfabricated accusation of adultery.Judith Baskin then went on to discuss how this investigative procedureiscited in medieval and earlymodern Jewishexegeses of the story of Joseph and Potiphar’swife (Genesis 39), wherethe sameforensic test is used to absolve aman who was falselyaccused of rape by awoman. Interestingly, this scientific test is also citedinamedieval Muslim source. Additionally, the lecture looked at the values these narratives attach to femalepassivity and agency,and es- tablishes,aswell, how the anecdoteabout the husband who was found guilty of falselyaccusinghis wife in the talmudic passageisalso part of alate ancient polemic against Christianity.

30 January,2018 TsippiKauffman, Bar-Ilan University,Ramat Gan/Israel Hasidism and Gender: Shades of Scepticism

Did the hasidic movement’srevolution of the Jewish world include women?The lec- ture examined the case of Temer’lSonenberg-Bergson, apatron of Polish ṣaddiqim. Usingfeminist studies, Tsippi Kauffman demonstrated the impli- cationsofthe patriarchal approach to setting the boundaries of religious phenomena —in this instance,the question of whether this extraordinary woman mayproperly be called a ḥasida. Areview of several hasidic stories showed how Temer’lexpressed her Hasidism and how she was viewed within hasidic circlesasasort of hermaph- rodite, with scepticism towards bothher femininity and her religiosity. Activities and Events 293

Maimonides Lectures on Scepticism

The Maimonides lectureswereestablished to invite international researchers to give atalkwithin the field of scepticism. The lecturesare recorded and published on the webpage of the Centre in order to make them available to alargeraudience.

21 February, 2018 , Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel Facing Uncertainty: Maimonides’ Concept of Law

Uncertainty is an essentialfeature of the human condition;itissimultaneouslya sourceofdeep anxiety and of thrill. Thepresent state of the world, its past,and what it holds for us in the futureare frequentlyunknowntous. This lecture exam- ined the moral and legal implications of uncertainty,exploring the subjectthrough Maimonides’ legal work as it faces the challenges of uncertainty in Jewish law. Jewish lawtakes akeen interest in this feature of the human condition, and it has vast and intense discussions which address the following question: ‘what are the norms that have to be applied in conditions in which we do not know the facts of the matter?’ The talmudic tradition also addresses situations in which we might have afull grasp of the facts of the matter,but deep uncertainty about the proper norms that have to be applied to these facts. In such cases, our uncertainty is not factual but normative, and while affirming our normative uncertainty,the Talmud attempts to formulate rules that will be applied in conditions of uncertainty about the rules.What we can learn from these attempts to regulate conditions of uncertaintyishow Maimo- nides understood its moraland legal significanceand how his attempts to regulate these conditions reflected his conception of Jewish law.

7May,2018 Christoph Schulte,Universität Potsdam/Germany Metaphysical Scepticism concerning the Philosophy of History: Mendelssohn’s Argumentsagainst the Progress of Humankind

In his seminal work Jerusalem (1783), Moses Mendelssohn explicitlyrefuses his close friend Lessing’sideas of asuccessive education of humankind and ageneral prog- ress in the development of human rationality and morality in world history.This scepticism towards the upcomingmodern philosophyofhistory and the idea of an infinite progressive evolution of humankind from the beginningsofworld history is basedonthe principles of Mendelssohn’smetaphysics,his anthropology,and his philosophyofnatural law. Thislecture discussed Mendelssohn’sarguments and theirphilosophical relevance in some philosophersofthe twentieth century. 294 Activitiesand Events

29 May,2018 Glenn Dynner,SarahLawrence College, Yonkers/USA ‘Ibegan to have doubts:’ Defection from Orthodoxy and the Traditionalist Jewish Response in Twentieth-Century Poland

The earlytwentieth century was aperiod of accelerated acculturation among Polish Jews. As manyyoung people discovered rationalist literature and joined modern po- litical movements, rabbinic and hasidic leaders evinced panic over youth defections and the ‘emptying-out’ of their study halls. However,secularising Jewish youths in the Second Polish Republic encountered formidable barriers to integration, including restrictions on university admissions and frequent physical assaults on campuses. Manyfound themselvesinastate of cultural limbo. At the sametime, hasidic and rabbinic leaders revitalised their institutions by appropriatingsecularist educational, political,and institutional modes—adefensive acculturation strategythat inadver- tentlytransformed Polish Jewish traditionalism itself. This lecture examined both Polish Jewish youth ‘defections’ and the innovative traditionalist responses to this perceivedcrisis.

12–15 March, 2018 International Conference: Abulafia and the Early Maimonideans: Trends, Approaches, and Sceptical Strategies

Convenor: RacheliHaliva, Universität Hamburg/Germany

The conference focussed on the different trends and sceptical attitudes Maimoni- deanismtook in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by examining various ap- proaches to major religious topics such as the natureofthe Torah, the command- ments, the Hebrew language, the people of Israel, and the . This comparative approach points to distinctivephilosophical trends—as represented by , Shem Tovibn Falquera, Joseph ibn Caspi, Levi ben Abraham,Isaac Al- balag,Moshe Narboni, Zerahyah Hen, and Hillel of Verona—focussing on major Jew- ish religious topics.Among these trends,the place of Abraham Abulafia and the earlywritingsofR.Joseph Gikatilla, who wrotesome forms of commentaries on Mai- monides’ Guide of the Perplexed standsout.The questions to be asked werewhether it is possibletodrawamap of radical versus conservative Maimonideanism and whether the two kabbalists are as radical as the philosopherswhen dealing with the same topics. Activities and Events 295

Programme

Life in Naples

David Abulafia, /UK ‘Naples as Mediterranean Crossroads’

Moshe Idel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel ‘Abulafia’sCommentariesonthe Guideofthe Perplexed’

Gitit Holzman, Levinsky CollegeTel Aviv/Israel ‘Commentaries on the Guideofthe Perplexed II’

Yossi Schwartz, TelAvivUniversity/Israel ‘Abulafia and Hillel of Verona on the Guide of the Perplexed’

Arje Krawczyk,Jewish HistoricalInstitute,Warsaw/Poland ‘Inner Speech (endophasia) in the ThoughtofMaimonidesand Abulafia’

Torah, TabletsofStone, and Mount Sinai’sRevelation

Steven Harvey,Bar-Ilan University,Ramat Gan/Israel ‘The LawofMoses in Maimonides, Abulafia, and Maimonideans’

Daniel Davies and Racheli Haliva, Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘Tablets of Stone—between Maimonides and Abulafia’

Adam Afterman, TelAvivUniversity/Israel ‘Kabbalistic Reading of Maimonides’ Concept of Revelation’

Fabrizio Lelli, Università del Salento/Italy ‘Translations and CommentariesofAbulafia’

Between Prophecy and Philosophy

Haim Kreisel, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,Beer-Sheva/Israel ‘Maimonidesand Abulafia on Prophecy’

Elke Morlok, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Germany ‘The Status of the Text and the UseofLanguageinMaimonides and Abulafia’ 296 Activities and Events

Ofer Elior,Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,Beer-Sheva and Hebrew Univer- sity of Jerusalem/Israel ‘The Account of the Chariot in Maimonides, Abulafia, and Provençal Thinkers’

The Land of Israel and the Hebrew Language

JosefStern, University of Chicago/USA ‘The Role of LanguageinMaimonidesand Abulafia’sThought’

Hanna Kasher,Bar-IlanUniversity,Ramat Gan/Israel ‘Maimonides, Abulafia, and Joseph ibn Kaspi on the Hebrew Language’

Zev Harvey,Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel ‘Maimonides, Abulafia, and Spinoza’

José María SánchezdeLeón Serrano, Universität Hamburg/Germany ‘Response’

LectureSeries ‘Reason and Revelation in JewishTradition’

Organised by the Institute for Jewish Philosophyand Religion, in cooperationwith MCAS Convenor: Lilian Türk, Institute for Jewish Philosophyand Religion, Universität Ham- burg/Germany

The lectures introducedJewishthought to the interested public and exposed the re- lationship between reason and revelation in specific Jewish writings. They revolved around the following questions: under which circumstances can we speak of reason within the framework of Judaism?Can we erroneously read reason into the sources of heavenlyrevelation?How can the presupposition of reason/ratio be justified by Jew- ish thinkers and deduced from traditional Jewishsources?Does reason concur with faith, or are they exclusive epistemological spheres?

Programme

16 March, 2018 GiuseppeVeltri, Universität Hamburg/Germany Glaubeund Vernunft im Judentum: Eine philosophisch-skeptische Einführung Activities and Events 297

25 March, 2018 Meir Buzaglo, Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel The One: Towards aTalmudic Approach

5May,2018 Bill Rebiger,Universität Hamburg/Germany Gershom Scholems Erforschung der Kabbala und die Fragenach Vernunftund Offenbarung im Judentum

7May,2018 [Maimonides Lecture] Christoph Schulte,Universität Potsdam/Germany Metaphysical Scepticism concerning the Philosophy of History: Mendelssohn’s Argumentsagainst the Progress of Humankind

14 May,2018 Ze’ev Strauss, Universität Hamburg/Germany Wenn die Offenbarung selbst die hypostasierte Vernunft Gottes ist: Der Offenbarungsbegriff des Philon von Alexandria

28 May,2018 Elchanan Reiner,Tel AvivUniversity/Israel The ‘TenQuestions’ of Eliezer of —Scepticism, Heresy or Exegesis?An AlternativeReading

4June, 2018 Daniel Davies, Universität Hamburg/Germany The JacobsAffair: Revelation and Schismatic Jewish Theology

6June, 2018 Lilian Türk, Universität Hamburg/Germany Offenbarungsverständnisund Vernunftkritikimjüdischen religiösen Sozialismus

11 June, 2018 Aryeh Botwinick, Temple University,Philadelphia/USA Negative Theology in the Context of as aRabbinic Precursor and Infinity as the Point of (Non‐)Contact 298 Activitiesand Events

13 June, 2018 Yair Lorberbaum, Bar-Ilan University,Ramat Gan/Israel The Rise of Halakhic Religiosity,ofMystery, and Transcendenceinthe Jewish Tradition

18 June, 2018 Michael Engel, Universität Hamburg/Germany Apologetic Tendencies vs. Apologetic Works: Evaluating the Historiography of MedievalJewish Thought

25 June, 2018 Rachel Aumiller,Universität Hamburg/Germany The Comic Slapstick of Resistanceand Revelation: Walter Benjamin and WWII PoliticalSatire

27 June, 2018 Libera Pisano, Universität Hamburg/Germany The ‘Speaking Language’ of Revelation beyond Reason: ’s GrammaticalThought

2July,2018 Daniel Boyarin, University of California, Berkeley/USA Kommentar innerhalbder Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft: The Philosophical Grounds of

9July,2018 MichelaTorbidoni, Universität Hamburg/Germany Challenging Religious Authorities: The Scientific Commitment of the Jews in Seventeenth Century Venice Activitiesand Events 299

29 July–3August, 2018 Second Summer School

Sceptical Strategies, Methods, and Approaches in the Middle Ages: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Traditions

The second Summer School was focussing on major sceptic concepts, strategies and key terms in ,Arabic, and Latin literature. Participants and instruc- tors focussed on sceptical and anti-sceptical enquiryofconcepts of truth and knowl- edge as well as sceptical methods of doubting and arguing.The Summer School of- fered aunique platformtodiscuss the tension between philosophyand faith, and between reason and revelation within medieval discourses.Participants wereengag- ed with primary Hebrew,Latin, and Arabic texts.The aim was to provide participants with the toolstoexamine scepticism and anti-scepticism within Jewish, Christian, and Islamic contexts in relation to attainingtrue knowledge. Courseleaders wereRacheli Haliva and Giuseppe Veltri.They weresupported by an international team of experts in scepticism from the fields of and religious studies: Elena Baltuta, Guido Bartolucci, Daniel Davies, Heidrun Eich- ner,Yehuda Halper,Elon Harvey,Steven Harvey,Gitit Holtzman, Henrik Lagerlund, Giovanni Licata, Ariel Malachi, Yoav Meyrav,and RonnyVollandt. The Summer School was attended by 15 participantsfrom Argentina, Austria, China, Germany, Israel, , the United Kingdom, and the United States.

MCAS ParticipationinExternalConferences (Selection)

6–10 August, 2017 17th World CongressofJewishStudies in Jerusalem/Israel

Panel: Scepticism and Anti-ScepticisminMedievalJewish Philosophy and Thought

GiuseppeVeltri Saadiah’sAnti-ScepticismamongSceptical Movementsinthe Middle Ages

In his introduction and first section of the Emunot ve-Deʽot,Saadiah makes agenuine attempt and devotes great effortstorebuttingand refuting sceptical movementsthat wereactive in his time. He argues thatmistakesand changes of opinion are part of the quest for the truth. These mistakes and changes of opinion are not to be taken, accordingtoSaadiah, as aproof thatnothing can be known. The fact that Saadiah 300 Activities and Events

devotes in his work long discussions to deal with sceptical problems should not be underestimated. Indeed, it is not apurelyintroductory question but rather ahistor- ical testimonyofanextent phenomenon of sceptical theories in his time. The lecture focussed mainlyonthe presenceofsceptical movements before and during Saa- diah’stime as reflected in his work(s). Moreover,the analysis of Saadiah’santi-scep- ticism was addressed through the lenses of modern studies on medieval scepticism.

Ariel Malachi ‘Our eyes saw, not astranger’s:’ ScepticalAspects in Epistemological ConceptionsofHalevi, Ibn Daud and Maimonides, through the Question of the Certainty of Tradition

What is scepticism, and what is the definition accordingtowhich one can be char- acterised as sceptic, is afascinating question. However,beour answer to this funda- mental enquiry wide or narrow,inclusive or exclusive,casting doubtisclearlyatits basis. Accordingtothe logical Islamic–Aristotelian tradition, the distinction between an argument whose conclusion is certain and an argument whose conclusion is un- certain, depends on the distinction between the value of ademonstrative argument and the value of adialectical or rhetorical arguments. In this context,itisnoteworthy to analyse in which mannerIslamic and Jewishthinkers faced the question of the certainty of tradition. In the talk, the following arguments wereaddressed: 1. With regard to this question, one can distinguish Al-Farabi’sposition from that of IbnSina’s; while Al-Farabi doubts tradition, and states that the epistemological status of prepositions which derivesfrom tradition is uncertain, IbnSina, on the other hand,argues that in case of consecutive tradition, the consecutiveness might unravel the doubt we attribute to these prepositions, and one mayaccept them as certain. 2. The analysis of relevant textsreveals thatthis distinction found its waytothe Jewishthought in the following surprising way: Halevi, much like Maimonides, sup- ports Al-Farabi’smore doubtful attitude, while IbnDaudemphasises the less scepti- cal approach of IbnSina.

Racheli Haliva The Esoteric Scepticismofthe RationalJewish Thinker: Isaac Polqar on the Talmud and the Commandments

The tension between revelation and reason, between tradition and intellectual inves- tigation, has occupied thinkers of all religions.These thinkers,who sought to recon- cile faith and philosophicalenquiry, wereobligated to their religious traditions on the one hand,and to philosophical principles on the other.Naturally, the tradition- alists weresceptical towards the rationalists, for,accordingtotheir view,the philos- Activities and Events 301

ophersshake the foundations of faith. At the sametime, the philosophers werescep- tical towards the traditionalists, arguingthat some aspects of tradition contradict philosophical principles and therefore must be re-interpreted. Isaac Polqar,the Jewishphilosopher from the fourteenth century,was intrigued by the relationship between philosophyand Judaism. Despite his attempt to exoteri- callyargue that thereisnocontradiction between philosophicalprinciples and the principles of Judaism, he esotericallychallenges the authority of basic religious foun- dations such as the Mosaic Law. In this lecture,itwas shown how Polqar’ssceptical approach towards some tra- ditional views strengthens his philosophical/natural point of view,asaresultof which philosophyisplaced in asuperior position than tradition, or more precisely, aspectsoftradition.

Bill Rebiger Sceptical Strategies Used by Simone Luzzattoand LeonModena in their Examination of Kabbalah

The Venetian rabbis Simone Luzzatto (1583–1663) and Leon Modena (1571– 1648) adopted acritical approach towards Kabbalah; and yettheircriticism was manifested in different ways.While Leon Modena devoted an entirebook written in Hebrew,his Ari Nohem (‘Roaring Lion’), to acomprehensive and sharp attack on Kabbalah, Si- mone Luzzatto included merelyafew pages in his Discorso circa il stato degli Hebrei et in particular dimoranti nell’inclita città di Venetia (‘Discourse Concerningthe Con- dition of the Jews, and in particular those living in the Fair City of Venice’)wherehe presented in Italian apparentlyonlyseveral basic concepts and historical data of Kabbalah. In the lecture, various sceptical strategies inherent in their examination of Kabbalah werecompared and discussed. Thus, the lecturer presented the complex relationship between the purpose of the writing,the choice of language, the ad- dressed audience, the modes of publication, and sceptical strategies.

5–8March, 2018 AnnualConference 2018, European Academy of Religion (EURARE) in /Italy

Panel: Jewish Philosophy: AControversialIssue between Judaism and Christianity (Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries) Guido Bartolucci, Libera Pisano, and Michela Torbidoni

The meaningofJewish philosophyhas been, is, and continues to be acontroversial issue within the broad field of Jewishstudies. It would be paradoxical to attempt to 302 Activities and Events

draw the boundaries of this category,since it is at the same time aconjunction and a disjunction of two different perspectives. In fact,the concept of Jewish philosophyon the one hand addresses the secular tendencies of Jewishthinking and its critical ap- proach to religion, and on the other hand necessarilyinvolvesthe results of the dia- logue between Jewish and Christian traditions. In this regard, the panel aims to ex- plore the blurred boundaries of such asignificant subjectbypresentingthe point of view of some Christian and Jewishauthors, such as Johann Franz Budde, Simone Luzzatto, and Moses Mendelssohn, and how they have developed aphilosophicalin- terpretation of Judaism from this.

15–19 July,2018 11th EAJS CongressinKrakow/Poland

Panel: Jewish Scepticism

GiuseppeVeltri Jewish Scepticism? Originsand Development of aDefinition

It is perhapsnosurprise that the period in which the main concept of a ‘Jewish phi- losophy’ was developed, i.e. earlymodernity,isalsothe origin of the idea of a ‘Jew- ish’ scepticism. In the lecture, Veltri dealt with the manyelements which created a Jewishsceptical tradition in the earlymodernperiod parallel to the discussion of a philosophia perennis that was developed in Christianity in an attempt to dogmatise the Jewishphilosophicaltradition by assumingagenealogyofwisdom as well as mystical or kabbalistic speculation to back it.The curious element which will be an- alysed is thatdiscussion of the sceptical ‘nature’ (or,touse asceptical category, ‘at- titude’)ofJudaism originated contemporaneouslyintwo different areas,innorthern Italy, particularlyinVenice, and in Germany.

Guido Bartolucci Simone Luzzatto’sPolitical Thought: Between Scepticism andReasonofState

Simone Luzzatto’spolitical thought has been interpreted by several scholars as being linked to the tradition of the Reason of State, to which the Venetian rabbi makes con- stant reference in his work, particularlyinthe Discorso. Upon analysingLuzzatto’s works in depth, however,itispossibletorecognise other fragments of apolitical re- flectionthat cannot be traced back to the tradition of Reason of Stateand which in some cases is contrary to it.Bycomparingthe different political positions expressed by Luzzatto in his works,anew political thought emerges, transformed by using the sceptical tradition. In fact,inboththe Discorso and the Socrates,Luzzatto recognises Activities and Events 303

the impossibility of formulating a ‘universal’ political theory,and identifiesthe scep- tical concept of the ‘probable’ as the onlyguide that man has for living in asocial community. The paper aimedtocompareLuzzatto’sdifferent positions and to recognise the sources of his most radical interpretation, the politics of the probable, which maybe useful in order to understand the influenceofscepticism in Jewish and Christian po- litical thought in seventeenth-century Europe more generally.

MichelaTorbidoni Challenging the AuthorityofAntiquity: The Influence of Francis Bacon on Simone Luzzatto’sSceptical Thought

The aim of the paper is to explorethe purposes underlying the sceptical enquiry led by Rabbi Simone Luzzatto in his works.Through his sceptical arguments,Luzzatto develops acriticism of human knowledge speciallyaimed to deconstruct the author- ity of ancient dogmatic wisdom. In this respect,Torbidoni argued that Luzzatto’s project was deeplyinfluenced by the readingofFrancis Bacon’sphilosophy, well- known for having promoted areformation of human learning by challenging the re- lationship between antiquity and modernity and thus the method wherebyknowl- edge is apprehended and passed on. The statement,which is based on relevant in- direct quotations of Bacon’sworks raised throughout Luzzatto’swritings, intends to disclose the crucial role playedbythis sourceinunderstanding the arguments and goals of Luzzatto’sscepticism. Bacon’sphilosophyfulfils adouble task in this regard: on the one hand,itprovides asignificant speculative pattern to be taken into account by readingsome of the main issues raised by Luzzatto, like thoseof time, dogma, free critical investigation, sinceretruth, and temporary suspension of judgement.Onthe other hand,this sourcenarrows the field of research upon the still-unknown intellectual interlocutors of Luzzatto. As no other Jewish reader of Ba- con’swritingsisknown so far,this sourcebuilds abridge between Luzzatto and those Venetian Christian intellectuals who werecloser to the Protestant world and highlycritical of both the Roman Church and the Scholastic tradition, such as Paolo Sarpi and his circle.

Libera Pisano Sprachkrise as Sceptical

The so-called Sprachkrise is acomplex phenomenonoflanguagecritique diffused in the philosophical and literary debate among poets and intellectuals before World WarI.The specific trait of the theoretical constellation that was characterised by the collapse of languageasan epistemological, logical, and ontological tool was to consider linguistic boundaries. In this contribution, Pisano investigatedthis phe- 304 Activities and Events

nomenon for two reasons: firstly, the Sprachkrise helps us to better understand how the critiqueoflanguagebecame the focus of philosophicalthought at the beginning of the last century long before the linguistic turn;secondly, this phenomenonpartic- ularlyacquired special attention among German-Jewishthinkers.Infact,since all these authors have adouble cultural background in common, or better,adouble be- longingboth to Jewish tradition and to , their sceptical attitudes or critical distance towards languagealsohavetheir premises in autobiographical factors.Thanks to the mediation of Fritz Mauthner,whose work was the trait d’union between literature and critical thought,the phenomenon of Sprachskepsis spread throughout the milieu of German-Jewishphilosophy; in fact,itinvolvesthe whole generation of thinkers whose elective affinities were analysed by LöwyinRedemp- tion and Utopia,i.e.Landauer,Benjamin, Buber,Scholem, Bloch, and others, who linked together language, messianism, libertarian utopias, and .

Bill Rebiger Sceptical Elements in aDogmatic Stance: Isaac Polqar against the Kabbalah

Despite the generallyaccepted opinion that the JewishAverroists were—at least ulti- mately—dogmatics or anti-sceptics, certain sceptical elements and strategies can not- withstanding be detected in their works.Rebiger presented acase studydevoted to the Jewish Averroistic philosopher and polemicistIsaac Polqar (second half of the thirteenth century—ca. 1330) and his attack on kabbalists included in his main work ‘Ezer ha-Dat (‘In Supportofthe Religion’). AccordingtoPolqar,the kabbalists are dangerous because they claim to have knowledge that does not accept the phil- osophical methods and logical rules of Aristotle. In contrast,the kabbalists’ sup- posed knowledge is supplied by an esoteric tradition reachingbacktothe time of the prophets,asthey claim. Therefore, following the epistemological criteria defined by Maimonides, Kabbalah cannot be accepted as acertain sourceofknowledge.Ac- cordingly,Polqar tried to underminethe authority and legitimation of the kabbalists’ claims about atraditionalknowledge by using various sceptical elements in his ar- gumentation.

Israel Netanel Rubin Omnipotence, Scepticism, and Logic: What Is Remaining When Everything Is Possible?

God is almighty,asevery child knows, at least since the time when monotheism con- quered the cultural world. However,can God reallydoeverything? Is He able to cre- ate asquare with adiagonal which has the same length as its side? Can God create another God like Himself?Can God commit suicide? Among the familyofsuch quaint heretical , the most famousisthat about God’sability to createa Activities and Events 305

stone that He is unable to lift.So, the principal question is whether God’somnipo- tence, which originallymeant His superiority over physical laws,also extends to the world of logic and mathematics. But it becomes clear that this question leads in fact to the basic question about the rationalityofreligion and even the issue of whether a rational religion is possible at all. One of the solutions to the problem, adopted both by philosophers like Descartes and by Jewish kabbalists and mystics in recent gen- erations, indeedprefers the totality of divine omnipotence over anyother consider- ation. This position leads to what the Americanphilosopher Alvin Plantingacalled ‘universalpossibilitism,’ since even the most basiclawsoflogic are declaredtobe contingent and determined by the arbitrary willofGod alone. The result of this is that everything is possible, that anything can be, and thatthere is no situation, sen- tence, or object whose existence, or non-existence, can be absolutelydetermined. Here, then, is the touchingpoint between the problem of divine omnipotence and the sceptical worldview.Each of them begins at adifferent point of origin, but even- tuallythey find themselvesdraining together into the impasse of philosophical nihil- ism that comesfrom unlimited possibilitism.

José María Sánchez de León Serrano Spinoza on the Cartesian Circle

The so-called ‘Cartesian circle’ designates apredicament in Descartes’ attempt to proveGod’sexistence and eliminate sceptical doubt. The predicament can be descri- bed as follows. Descartes argues thatwecannot be certain of anything—even of the most evidenttruths, such as mathematical truths—as long as we do not know if God exists. However,God’sexistenceisnot self-evident and requires ademonstration. Yet such ademonstration appears to be impossible, for ademonstration must be based on certain premises and we have just assumed that nothing is certain. In this paper, Sánchez de León focussed on Spinoza’sapproach to this predicament.Although Spi- noza wasstrongly influenced by Descartes,itisusually assumed that the just descri- bed problem plays no role in his philosophy, duetoSpinoza’sfull-fledgedrational- ism. The lecturer argued, on the contrary,that the Cartesian circle resurfaces in Spinoza’sphilosophy precisely because of its rationalistic character.Moreover,Sán- chez de León showed how Spinoza circumvents the difficulty through aproof of God’sexistence that is simultaneouslycosmologicaland ontological.

Ze’ev Strauss On the Boundarybetween Dogmatic Platonism and Academic Scepticism: Philo of Alexandria’sScepticalJudaism

It is by no means anew revelation within the scholarlywork done on Philo of Alex- andria thus far that his multi-layered bodyofthought has recoursetovarious ele- 306 Activities and Events

ments of the rich philosophicaltradition of academic scepticism. Theleading Philo scholarDavid T. Runia drawsour attentiontothis fact when he alludes to the ‘mix- ture of scepticism and dogmatism’ present in Philo’sJewish philosophy(1986,129). This view might come as asurprise to some, since Philo can be perceivedasadog- matist in the truest sense of the word: on the one hand adogmatic Platonist,and on the other hand and afortiori adogmatic Jewishthinker who strictlyadheres to the tenets of Mosaicfaith. In his paper,Strauss endeavoured to show thatPhilo cannot be easilycast aside as merelyadogmatic exegete of scripture who occasionally makes onlyeclectic references to Greek philosophy. Rather,heshould be considered aserious metaphysician, who quarrels with sceptical notions in order to delineate his own speculative understanding of Jewish philosophy. Strauss argued thatPhilo held the stance thatwithout the revealed truth of Judaism, we are forced to resort to arad- ical sceptical position, whereweare left to battle for our mere opinions without ever being able to attain basic metaphysical knowledge of reality.Healso aimed to con- cretelydemonstrate apoint touched on by Carlos Lévy (2010,94), namelyhow Philo sophisticatedlyutilises sceptical patterns of thought for the formulation of his apo- phatic theology. Yoav Meyrav Reportonthe International Conferenceon Abraham Abulafia and the Early Maimonideans: Trends, Approaches, and Sceptical Strategies (March 12–15, 2018)

The purpose of the conference organised by Racheli Haliva was to celebrate and dis- cuss Moshe Idel’snew book, Abraham Abulafia’sEsotericism:OnSecrets and Doubts. The book will be publishedbyDeGruyter (Berlin) during 2018–19 in the MCAS’s publication series Studies and Texts in Scepticism (STIS). The conference focussed on the different trends and sceptical attitudes Maimo- nideanismtook in the thirteenthand fourteenth centuries by examining various ap- proaches to major religious topics such as the natureofthe Torah, the command- ments, the Hebrew language, the people of Israel, and the land of Israel. This comparative approach points to distinctivephilosophical trends—as represented by , Shem-Tovibn Falaquera, Joseph ibn Kaspi, Levi ben Abraham, Isaac Albalag, Moshe Narboni, Zeraḥyah Ḥen, and Hillel of Verona—focussing on major Jewish religious topics.Among these trends, the place of Abraham Abulafia and the earlywritingsofJoseph Gikatilla, both of whom wrotecommentaries on Mai- monides’ Guide of the Perplexed, stands out.The questions asked here concern the possibilityofdrawing amap of radical versus conservative Maimonideanism and to discern whether or not the two kabbalists are as radical as the philosophers in treatingthe samesubjectmatter. The conference was comprised of Kabbalah and Jewish philosophyscholars, in- cludinginternationallyrenowned and established experts alongside new voices of a younger generation. All of the participants had receivedadvancecopies of Idel’s book and had explored its various themesand intersections with their ownrespec- tive researchfocusses. The conference combined formal lectureswith aworkshop for- mat,and aconsiderable amount of time was allocatedtofree discussion. The report here willprovide achronological talk-by-talk overview and conclude with ashort summary of anumber of recurringthemes that came up duringthe discussions, which can perhaps provide occasion for subsequent scholarship. The conferenceopenedwith David Abulafia (University of Cambridge/UK), whose presentation “Naples and Mediterranean Crossroads” outlined the complicat- ed history of the kingdoms of Sicilyand Naples, mainlyinthe thirteenth century,and provided historical context for the intellectual undertakingsexplored in the confer- ence. The presentation focussed on the reigns of Frederic II and his successor Charles IofAnjou, their politics and attitude to scholarship and non-Christian groups,and the condition of the Jewishcommunity under both monarchs’ rules. By the time Abraham Abulafia arrivedatCapua in 1279,Charles had alreadystabilised his regime

OpenAccess. ©2018 Yoav Meyrav,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-016 308 Yoav Meyrav

and had made attempts to convert the Jews, who until that period had been an inte- gral part of society,enjoying the court’sprotection. Ashorttime afterwards,aperiod of political and military turmoil begun, persisting for over 200years, bringingwith it rich apocalyptic literature. Moshe Idel (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel) outlinedthe conceptual framework of the subsequent presentations,describing “Abulafia’sCommentaries on the Guide of the Perplexed” in terms of structure, circumstances of composition, reception, and influence. Abulafia wrotethreecommentaries on Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed within aspan of nine years (significantlymore than anyother schol- ar): Sefer Geʾulah (‘Book of Redemption,’ 1273; probablywritten in Spain), Ḥayyei ha- Nefesh (‘Life of the Soul,’ 1278/9;writteninByzantium), and Sitrei Torah (‘Secrets of the Torah,’ 1280;written in Capua). Of these, Sitrei Torah was the most read and the most influential. In fact,itsurvivesinmore manuscriptsthanall other thirteenth- century commentaries on the Guide—by anyauthor—and was also translated into Latin. AccordingtoIdel, Abulafia was apassionate teacher of the Guide,which he taught in Barcelona, Castile, Byzantium, Capua, and . The three different com- mentariesarise from the fact thatAbulafia’swritingsatthe time addressed different audiences in different places.Idel claimed thatAbulafia’steachingsabout the Guide and his exposing its secrets would have been one of the reasons he was forced to movefrom place to place. The commentaries werewritten for specific students, to whom Abulafia assigned numbers, complainingthey werebad or poor students. His complaint was founded on his observation that whenever he progressed to a more advanced stageinunderstanding the Guide those students abandoned him. Idel noted that when exploring Abulafia’sworks on the Guide it is important to keep in mind thathewrotethem as akabbalist rather than aphilosopher.Indeed, Idel argued that, to acertain degree, Abulafia took the Guide to be the source of his Kabbalah. In so doing,heattempted to uncover the secrets of the Guide,which he deemed contained akabbalistic nature.Abulafia, for instance,isone of the few commentators who implementedgematria when reading the Guide,facilitating it in an ecstatic context.Moreover,the work is understood not onlyasaguide to knowing secrets, but alsoasaguide to an experience:this particularexperience being aMaimonidean prophetic experience. In discussingthe lasting influenceofAbulafia’scommentaries,Idel tentatively suggested consideringthe possibilitythat later commentaries on the Guide werewrit- ten as aform of reaction to Abulafia.Whether or not this is the case, the wide distri- bution of manuscripts, especiallyofSitrei Torah,isanextremelysignificant indicator of the dissemination and impact of Abulafia’scommentary.Idel presented along list of authors (Jewish as well as Christian) who have directlyquotedoralluded to Abu- lafia’scommentaries with or without proper attribution. Idel argued that Abulafia’sKabbalah is intertwined with Maimonidean influence, which Abulafia never marginalised, even long afterwriting the commentaries.This influenceisalso felt in the negative reaction with which other kabbalists received Report on the ConferenceonAbulafia and Early Maimonideans 309

Abulafia’scommentaries after Abulafia was compelled to leave Spain. Abulafia’sin- fluenceistied in with his unique blend of Kabbalah and philosophy. His Kabbalah is idiosyncratic, but not to anyextremes that would prevent his work from attracting audiences in significant circles.This form of ‘Maimonidean Kabbalah’ has interesting connections to Abulafia’sfiercecritique of rabbinic Jewry,his conception of Judaism as auniversal entity,and his opening of the Jewishexperience to non-Jews. Idel endedhis talk by musing about the transformation in the reception of Abu- lafia in Jewishorthodoxliterature;from being completelyoutcast to appearing fre- quentlyonthe shelvesofthe bookshopsofJerusalem’sultra-orthodoxneighbour- hood Meʾah Sheʿarim. Gitit Holtzman (Levinsky College, TelAviv/Israel) discussed “Esoteric Philoso- phy, Prophecy, and Mysticism: R. Moshe Narboni’scommentary on the Guide of the Perplexed as Revealed in the Commentary on al-Ghazali’s of the Philos- ophers.” Holtzmanargues thatMoshe Narboni’sdistinction between the exoteric and esoteric levels in Maimonides’ Guide is reflected by his distribution of information among his different commentaries on philosophicalworks.Most importantly, she stressed Narboni’srefusal to reveal the secrets of the Guide in his commentary on the work, referringhis reader to his commentaries on al-Ghazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers,Averroes’ Letter about the Possibility of Conjunction withthe Agent Intel- lect,and IbnTufail’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān. In other words, to understand Narboni’sviews about the esoteric level of the Guide,one should study texts other thanNarboni’s commentary on the Guide. Holtzman demonstrated this by analysingkey passages of Narboni’scommenta- ry on Al-Ghazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers,exploring the possibility that Narbo- ni used what he took to be Maimonides’ esoteric doctrine to explain al-Ghazali’stext. HereNarboni claims, for instance, that al-Ghazali livedinanera in which the teach- ing of philosophywas forbidden and his apparent ‘rejection’ of philosophyismerely aploy to communicatephilosophical knowledge.Inthis context,Narboni borrows an ideahefinds in Maimonidesonthe sages’ necessity to disperse the knowledge that emanates from them. Another esoteric element is introduced regarding al-Gha- zali’sclassifying fields of knowledge and theirsusceptibility to error,towhich meta- physics is most prone. By wayofexplanation, Narboni indicatesMaimonides’ iden- tical sentiment in the Guide. Other examples are giveninthe context of the need to accommodatepositions to adifferent time and place. In conclusion, Narboni appears to think that Maimonides based all of the secrets of the Guide on the imaginative fac- ulty. The final example dealt with Idel’scontention that,inacertain passage, Narboni is quoting Abulafia. Holtzman provided an alternativeexplanation, claiming them both to be drawing on Maimonides. Hereshe suggested Narboni is subtlycriticising Maimonides for placing too much emphasis on the imaginative faculty. In his presentation “SomeThoughts Regarding the 1270 – 1290 ‘Windows of Op- portunities’:Abulafia, Zeraḥyah, and Hillel on the Guide of the Perplexed,” Yossi Schwartz (Tel Aviv University/Israel) proposed widening the intellectual and geo- 310 Yoav Meyrav

graphical scope of Idel’snotion of the 20-year ‘window of opportunities’—aperiod of exceptional fertility in kabbalistic literature. The ‘window of opportunities,’ Schwartz argued, is wider than Castile and encompasses not onlyKabbalah but Maimonidean- ism as well. Schwartz’spresentation here pointed out the complex relation between Abulafia, Zeraḥyah ben Shaʾaltiʾel Ḥen, and Hillel of Verona, the latter twohaving been active in Italyduring the relevant time frame, aperiod in which Abulafia also spent much time there. Aside from offering revisions to some accepted views on the chronology of events concerning Hillel and Abulafia, Schwartz argues that Abulafia, Hillel, and Zer- aḥyah not onlypresent three versions of Maimonideanism, but also three versions of JewishAverroism. UnlikeAbulafia, Hillel and Zeraḥyah were late bloomers and were onlyacknowledgedfor their work at amuch laterstage. There are interesting paral- lels in Zeraḥyah and Hillel’sprojects regarding the texts they translated (or for which they commissioned translations) that seem to indicate they were engaged in some sort of competition. This might have been areflection of aprofessional dispute be- tween . Aryeh Krawczyk (Jewish HistoricalInstitute, Warsaw/Poland) discussed the no- tion of “Inner Speech (Endophasia)inthe ThoughtofMaimonides and Abulafia.” In- troducing amultidisciplinary approach, Krawczyk employed neuro-cognitive theo- ries of endophasia to shed interesting light on Maimonides’ and Abulafia’s respective approaches to the possibility of conjunction with the agent intellect. Krawczyk argued that inner speech plays an important role for both to achieve this effect. After acknowledging the methodological challenges associated with research of this nature and the necessary caution it requires, Krawczyk addressed the distinction between ordinary and acute cases of endophasia. In neuropsychology, ordinary en- dophasiaindicates anormal phenomenon such as talking to oneself, whereas acute cases indicate instances of hallucinations whereby the individual experiences voices speakingtothem from outside. Krawczyk suggested that although one can find ordi- nary endophasia in Maimonidesregarding the intellect and noetics by reference to sound and hearing in different chapters of the Guide of the Perplexed,Abulafia’swrit- ingscontain several techniquesand rituals that seem to be aiming at prompting acute cases of endophasia and heautoscopy (vision of oneself from the outside). To this end, Krawczyk analysed several examples from Abulafia’sworks like Sefer ha-Ḥesheq (‘TheBook of Desire’)and Sefer ha-Ot (‘Book of the Letter’). Steven Harvey (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat Gan/Israel) discussed “The Lawof Moses in Maimonides,Abulafia,and Maimonideans.” Prior to addressingthe main issue, Harvey expressed reservation concerning the scholarlytendency of shifting away from the idea of esotericism in the medieval period. He argued that the denial of the historical phenomenon of the persecution of philosophers is factuallyincor- rect and provided several counterexamples from the Islamic world. These examples are better suited to Plato’sopen reference to the danger of philosophy, as its opinions are in such contradistinction to thoseofthe multitude, that philosophersare compel- Reportonthe ConferenceonAbulafia and Early Maimonideans 311

led to conceal them. Plato’sposition set the tone for much subsequent philosophical literaturethat took heed of his warning. Having reinforced esotericism within the philosophical tradition, Harvey suggest- ed treatingAbulafia as amissing link in the history of Maimonideanism and setout to expressthis through his silent absorption of Maimonides’ conception of divine law in the Guide. The immediate context is Maimonides’ distinction between divine and conventional law, of which onlythe former interests Maimonides.The criterion for the of alaw is its reference to the welfareofthe bodyand to belief. Only with the existenceofthe two can alaw be divine. Another criterion is that the law- givershould be aprophet and denounce bodilypleasures.Byputtingforth these cri- teria, Maimonidesfollowed in the footsteps of al-Farabi, as did Falaqueraand Isaac Albalag,who nevertheless appropriate al-Farabi’sviews to neutralise his subordina- tion of religious practice to philosophical truth. An implicit difficulty in Maimonides’ view is that it is hard to see how his under- standing of divine law(accordingtothe aforementioned criteria) harmonises with the idea of the singularity of Mosaic Law. Harveyshowed that Averroes (who alsofol- lows al-Farabi’snotion of divine law) is open to the possibility of abetter religion emerging,which would alsobetter represent the philosophical ideal. This, in fact, is what we find in Abulafia. Abulafia never addresses Maimonides’ conception of the uniqueness of Mosaic Lawbut talks explicitlyabout a new Torah. Accordingto Harvey,Abulafia thinksthatMosaicLaw can be superseded, for anew prophet (he himself)has arrived. Daniel Davies and Racheli Haliva (Universität Hamburg/Germany) explored the idea of “Tablets of Stone—Between Maimonides and Abulafia.” Thebasic problem with which Davies and Haliva grappled was the ontological status of the tablets of stone. Although Maimonides insists that the tablets are ‘natural’ rather than ‘artifi- cial’,itisunclear whether this means that ‘natural’ contains the ‘miraculous’ or de- nies both the ‘artificial’ and the ‘miraculous’.Maimonides compares this issue to the notion of ‘divine speech’,which complicates matters further,asitisdifficult to un- derstand how the distinction between nature, miracle, and artifice applies to God’s speech and will, or more broadly, to the issue of causality as applied to God. In Abulafia this problem is translated into amulti-levelled understanding of the tablets and their significance. In Sefer ha-Melammed (‘Book of the Teacher’)Abulafia distinguishes—within the context of Mount Sinai—between tablets,letters,and writ- ing in the general sense. In Or ha-Śekhel (‘The Light of the Intellect’)three levels of understanding are identified: either exoteric, or esoteric, or both (in which the exo- teric is false). In referencetowhat is writtenonthe tablets,inShomer Miṣwah (‘Keep- er of the Commandment’)Abulafia tells us that the tablets have twosides—front and back—corresponding to God’sfront (face) and back(actions). Regarding speech and writing Abulafia distinguishesthreekinds of sounds, which emerge from different parts of the mouth, and threekinds of speech, corre- sponding to physical writing,the spoken word, and the mental conception. It ap- pears that Abulafia distinguishesdivinespeech from human speech on the basis 312 Yoav Meyrav

that divine speech is creative.The presenters asked whether Abulafia’selaborations and distinctions could be understood as an interpretation of Maimonides’ account of the tablets and the writing. Adam Afterman (Tel Aviv University/Israel) discussed “Kabbalistic Reading of Maimonides’ Concept of Revelation.” In his presentation, Afterman talked about mystical and noetic union in the Kabbalah and the Aristotelian tradition, with refer- ence to the Neo-Aristotelian background of the Kabbalah, eschatologicalunion in Maimonides, Abulafia, and other kabbalists. Afterman showed how Maimonides was used by various kabbalists to present different versions of eschatological union. The Aristotelianbackground of Abulafia and other kabbalists in the thirteenth century is relevant,particularlyconcerning the possibility of conjunction with the agent intellect,and even the First Cause.The basicformula is the equation between knowledge and union, apoint that has become increasingly important for several kabbalists who sought an ontological bridge between man and god. In this tradition, there is an importantNeoplatonic presence, which adds the notion of communion to the notion of union, as the formerinvolvesthe receipt of emanation(shefaʿ)from the agent intellect through the imaginative faculty.Maimonideslinks this to prophecy. The idea of aunion with God,with no mediation from imagination or emanation, is amore radical one. Within this framework, Afterman argued that Maimonides is relatively moderate. He does not permit aunion with the active intellect unless it is at the instant of death or after death. It is appropriate to medieval metaphysics to be free of the bodytoar- rive at the realm of unity.Thisisthe union of intellect-intellection-intelligible, liber- ation from plurality and individuality into something simple, unified, and eternal. Abulafia, in turn,uses this metaphysics to explain acute and immediate transfor- mationfrom man to angel, or son of God.Heproposes manytechniques, sometimes alongside the agent intellect.Abulafia deviates from Maimonides and permits this in this life. However,Afterman claimed that Abulafia sides with Maimonides by stating that this is rare and difficult to arrive at.Nevertheless, this is aradical reading of Mai- monides, and it is enabled by Abulafia’scontemporary philosophicalclimate. After Abulafia, other,different forms of Kabbalah emerge.Naḥmanides, for ex- ample,describes aprocessofpurification of the body, the soul, and the intellect. In otherwords, agradual integration into the Godhead.This differs from Abulafia, whose model is either/or.But for this different picture, Naḥmanides also uses Mai- monides. Naḥmanides refers to Maimonides’ discussion of posthumous unification when describinghis ownidea of an eschatological level in which man achieves unity with the Godhead at the end of the integration process. But Naḥmanides takes this to the next level, stating that thereare rare individuals who can fullyin- tegrate with the Godheadwhile still embodied, with no need to go through all of the steps.This recurs in various kabbalists, e.g.,Isaac of Acre,inhis book Oṣar Ḥayyim (‘TreasureofLife’). When one reachesthis stage, it is presented as being in accord- ance with the Maimonidean eschatological union. Report on the Conference on Abulafiaand Early Maimonideans 313

Fabrizio Lelli (Università del Salento, Lecce/Italy) talked about “Translations and Commentaries of Abulafia,” particularlyinto Latin during the fifteenth century. Start- ing from the discussion of humanist interests in Kabbalah, Lelli retraced Pico della Mirandola’sconnections with Jewish scholars by reference to Pico’ssearch for He- brew sources that can fit into his Christian fields of interest.Hebelieves that Pico’sviews on universalisation and the idea of unity with the agent intellect may be based, in part,upon Abulafia via some kind of mediation. Some of Abulafia’sworks weretranslated (or perhaps appropriated) into Latin at Pico’srequest by Mithridates, aSicilian convert from Judaism. In Sicilytherewas a continuous tradition of Kabbalah stemmingfrom Abulafia’sstudents. It is possible that Mithridates’ father—with whom Mithridates studied before his conversion— was part of this tradition. Mithridates’ translations featured manyadaptations that enabled an understanding of Abulafia in aChristian manner.Mithridates also adds several notes to provethat Maimonides was akabbalist,which had amajor im- pact on Pico. Lelli suggested the possibilitythatsubsequent Jewishinterest in Abu- lafia is an effect of the Christian interest in him and perhaps even an attempt to cor- rect Mithridates and recheck Abulafia. Haim Kreisel’s(Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,Beer-Sheva/Israel) “Maimo- nides and Abulafia on Prophecy” was premised on the assumption that Maimonides would not recognise himself as the person whose positions Abulafia presents. Ac- cording to Kreisel, it is strangetothink of Abulafia’scommentaries on the Guide as actual commentaries, as they are so different from what Maimonides writes. Al- though the order of ‘secrets’ in Abulafia’scommentaries is in accordance with the Guide,their discussion has little or nothing to do with the Guide itself. Instead, there is some kind of link to the content of the secrets with occasional reference to Maimonides’ text,which Kreisel labelled ‘impressionistic’.Inthis respect Kreisel shared the frustration of Abulafia’sstudents, who werealso unlikelytosee the con- nection between Abulafia’scommentary and Maimonides’ text.Kreisel suggested viewing Abulafia as drawinginspiration from Maimonides but focussing on the se- crets themselves, particularlyinletter combinations. Nevertheless, some influence is apparent,for instance, in the theory of prophecy. Kreisel characterised Maimonides’ theory of prophecyasunderstanding prophe- cy as a ‘natural’ phenomenon; thereare certain preliminary conditions and prepara- tions, which when met,renderprophecyinevitable or nearlyinevitable. This appears to be aradical departure from and mayhaveinspired Abulafia’s view on preparingoneself for prophecy. Accordingly, the definition of prophecyis not the reception of aspecific divine messageoraspecific revelation, but emana- tion—the question about the actual content of prophecyremains open. Kreisel no- ticed aslight shift between Maimonides’ legal writings, in which prophecyisdescri- bed as an intellectual phenomenon, and the Guide,inwhich the imaginative aspect is emphasised and thereisnoreference (in that context) to the Aristotelian vocabu- lary of the acquired intellect and the idea of conjunction. Instead, the intellect be- comes acquired in the perfection of the intellect and the culmination occurs when 314 Yoav Meyrav

prophecyisover, as prophecy is concerned with the body. Prophecy, as amessage, is completelynatural as an extension of the overflow.AccordingtoKreisel, Abulafia seems to have adopted aMaimonidean model—at least its theoretical framework— which Abulafia modified accordingtohis needs. Elke Morlok (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main/Germany) discussed “Gika- tilla on Languageand the Status of the Text—On the Transition between Abulafian Concepts and the Theosophic-Theurgic Matrix.” Morlok focussed on the difference of approach between the kabbalist Joseph Gikatilla, who was Abulafia’sstudent, and Abulafia himself. AccordingtoMorlok, after Gikatilla left Abulafia he turned to theosophic/theurgic Kabbalah, which is incompatible with Abulafia’snoetic-lin- guistic approach. Gikatilla wrote Ginnat Egoz (‘Garden of the Nut’), one of his most importantearlyworks,atthe ageof26, while he wasstill Abulafia’sstudent.After being exposedtonew currents,hemoved from an Aristotelian–Pythagorean ap- proach to the Neoplatoniccamp. Gikatilla also moved from Abulafia’sidea of univer- salisationand interiorisation to amoretraditional-liturgicaland less abstract narra- tive focussing on the priority of the Jewish tradition. Hence, accordingtothis sociological and epistemic criterion, onlyJews, who keep the Halakha, can access truth on the basis of acomplex mystical exegesis, into which one has to be initiated by akabbalistic teacher.Thisdiffers from Abulafia’sapproach, which alsopropagates initiation into highlymanipulative linguistic techniques,but simultaneouslytends to expand the Kabbalah to encompass auniversal application. In the earlyworks of Gikatilla, the fact that the is comprised of those consonants which can usuallyserveasvowels prescribes aspecial place for Hebrew vocalisation symbols (niqqud). ForGikatilla, the mystic operateswithin the sphere of the vowels,and becomes the middle point for the relation between the divine and human spheres.Hearrivesatthe centreofthe cosmos through lan- guage. Morlokalso referred to Gikatilla’snotes on Maimonides’ Guide in his Haśśagot (’Critiques’), an earlywork Gikatilla wrote while still very much under the influence of Abulafia. In the Haśśagot,Gikatilla interprets the ‘Account of the Chariot’ (maʿa- śeh merkavah)asthe secret of the causal chain of everything and their existencefrom one another,from the first emanation to the middle of earth (whichisnot found in Abulafia). The idea of order has aperformative aspect of languageand ontology—the human organbecomes the seat for the divine. In this respect,the ritualistic aspect is emphasised, as there is correspondence between the human and divine being,which is also dependent upon the ethics of human behavior,explaining the centrality of the commandments, as exemplified later in his Shaʻarei Orah (‘Gates of Light’). Ofer Elior’s(Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,Beer-Sheva/Israel and Hebrew UniversityofJerusalem/Israel) presentation focussedon“The Account of the Chariot in Maimonides, Abulafia,and Provençal Thinkers.” Elior discussed various interpre- tations of the ‘Account of the Chariot’ as amirror through which he would then ex- plore the thinkers’ approach to scientificenquiry,particularlyatjunctures whereten- sion arises between science and religion. The presentation did not focus on the entire Report on the Conference on Abulafiaand Early Maimonideans 315

account,but onlyonEzekiel 1:24– 25 (‘When they [i.e. the creatures] moved, Icould hear the soundoftheir wings likethe sound of mighty waters,like the sound of Shadday, atumult like the din of an army. When they stood still, they would let their wingsdroop. From abovethe expanse over their heads came asound. When they stood still, they would let their wingsdroop.’). In Maimonides’ exploration of this passageinthe Guide,herefers to the Pytha- gorean theory of celestial sound as an interpretationfor the sounds thatthe animals make. He notes that Aristotle disagrees with the Pythagoreans,but his criticism is not of this theory but of the basis of their explanations: acosmological picture in which the stars are self-moving and the spheres are fixed. Elior claimed the question here to be whether or not Maimonides agrees with Aristotle; if he does, this means that Mai- monides admits thataprophet was wrong. AccordingtoElior,manyscholars addressed this issue,but no one referred to Abulafia’stake on the matter.Before turning to Abulafia, Elior discussed several Pro- vençalthinkers and presented awide array of engagements with this problem, rang- ing from ascribingtoMaimonides arejection of Aristotle, to acknowledging that Eze- had in fact erred but dissociating this from his prophecy. Moving to Abulafia, Elior found difficulty in understandinghis position but believed that he basically ac- cepted the interpretationaccording to which Ezekiel was in fact wrong.Elior indicat- ed several points whereAbulafia refers to the interpretation of the Cherubim. In Sitrei Torah,for example, there is apassagewhereAbulafia— aside—seems to be directlydrawingfrom Maimonides’ interpretation. However,Abulafia does not seem to address the problem resulting from Maimonides’ understanding.Elior wonders whether Abulafia thinks thatthe problem of tension between science and faith is marginal. Gikatilla, for instance,directlyaddressed the contradiction between Aris- totle and Ezekiel, and stressed the importance of explaining the contradiction and its genesis. JosefStern (University of Chicago/USA) spoke about “The Role of Languagein Maimonides and Abulafia’sThought.” Unlike manymedieval philosophers and the- ologians,Maimonides denies the divinity of languageand the literal attribution of speech to God.Instead, he follows al-Farabiindistinguishingbetween things, utter- ances (or ‘outer speech’), and traces in the soul (or ‘inner speech’). ForMaimonides, the relationship between logic and the intellect is analogous to the relationship be- tween grammar and language. The traces in the soul comprise acompletesystem of interrelated concepts—alanguagewith structure and syntax—acompositeentity.On the background of the distinctionbetween internal and external speech, Maimonides severelycriticises external speech, limiting its function to communicating concepts to another person (this is whythe spheres onlyhaveinner speech). The mental rep- resentations are the primary language, which functions independentlyofexternal speech, although access is onlyattained through externalspeech. ForMaimonides,languages in the sense of external speech (and onlyinthat sense) are conventional rather than natural. The conventionalityisexpressed by the accidental relationship between the wordand the it re- 316 Yoav Meyrav

flects; conversely, the relationship between the mental representation and the exter- nal object is natural and universal (the samethought points to the same object). Ex- ternal speech is inferior to internal speech, just as the conventional is inferior to the natural. But despite this, Maimonidesmaintains that bothinner and outer speech have syntax, composition, and structures.This is conditioned upon the imagination, the faculty of representation, which cannot perceive anything immaterial, hence it is still not good enough to represent immaterial simple beings; syntax is the matter that prevents the intellect from apprehendingthe subjectmatter of metaphysics,hence, from being perfected. This is the point of friction with Abulafia,who sympathiseswith Maimonides’ insight,but drawsdifferent conclusions. Abulafia takes the 22 consonants to be the matter (i.e., the ‘linguistic potentiality’)ofthe words. There is anatural process that creates, from this matter,the combinations of consonants whose vast number is capable of constructingany language. At the same time,there is an ontological proc- ess of emanation of things. The consonants in languageare parallel to physical ele- ments. ForAbulafia, words are nothing but combinations of sounds, so that all lan- guages are equal and generatedinthe same manner.What elevates Hebrew is thatit offers the best phonetic articulation of the 22 consonants (the matter)—not that it is divine. As such, Hebrew becomes the representative of universal sound.The mission of the sage,then, is not to think the form of the words, but their matter—in precise opposition to Maimonides. At the end of his talk, Stern addressed Maimonides’ and Abulafia’sparables of the pearl, even though (as Idel observes) we have no explicit evidence that Abulafia based his parable on Maimonides’.Stern, however,argued that there is indirect evi- dence in that the tri-partitestructure of Abulafia’sparables (as analysed by Idel) par- allels the tri-partitesemantic levels of the Maimonidean parable,astructure not found elsewhere. However,for Maimonides this semantic structure reflects the ex- pressive functionofaparable, not political esotericism, for which Idel argues, in the case of Abulafia. Further research will be necessary to delineate the exactcon- tours of influencebetween the masterand his disciple. Hanna Kasher (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat Gan/Israel) discussed “Maimonides, Abulafia, and Joseph ibn Kaspi on The Hebrew Language.” Maimonides and ibn Kaspi offer twoopposing views on the status of Hebrew and the reason for its holi- ness, whereas Abulafia’sview is difficult to discern. Kasher showed that human language, for Maimonides, is conventional rather than natural. Accordingly, Hebrew is the holylanguagefor circumstantial reasons, namelybecause it is part of aperfect climate area. Accordingtothis climatology, the pronunciation of its words is balanced, afeature of similar languages, such as Greek, Hebrew,Persian, and Aramaic. As regards the script,Maimonides seems to contrast it with Arabic, whose script is connected and contains manyidentical let- ters.There was probablyaneed to respond to the ,who claimed Hebrew vo- cabulary to be lacking.Maimonides responds that the limited vocabulary in Hebrew Reportonthe ConferenceonAbulafia and Early Maimonideans 317

is an advantage,asall of the inferior things(reproductive organs, for instance) do not have theirown words, but are onlyalluded to. This is the mark of adivine language. Kasher noted that neither ibn Kaspi nor Abulafia refertoMaimonides’ attitude towardHebrew.Ibn Kaspi addresses the issue of the Hebrew languageinhis Com- mentaryonthe Torah in which he advances that Arabic and Hebrew words are de- rivedfrom reality,unlike Latin,whose words are random. Arguingwith aLatin schol- ar on the Latin translation of the Bible, ibn Kaspi says that all of the Hebrew words have an informative meaning.The authorsofthis languageunderstood this and made sure that each root has one meaning.Hence, the creators of languagewerephi- losophers, and Hebrew cannot be translated into other languages. Translation entails a ‘unification of tongues,’ whereasGod wanteda‘division of tongues.’ Abulafia, who wasactive before ibn Kaspi, openlyadvocated the unification of languages, saying thatthere are manynames to one being.Kasher wondered wheth- er Kaspi’saccount can be taken as includingacritique of Abulafia. She further noted Abulafia conceiveslanguageasnatural and is also interested in bi-lingual education of children. The idea of a ‘holylanguage’ as that which is developed on adesertis- land—acommonplaceidea since Herodotus—is for Abulafia nothing but anoble . In his talk “Maimonides,Abulafia, and Spinoza,” Zev Harvey (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel) addressed threepoints of striking similaritybetween Abulafia and Spinoza, which, in his opinion, would be difficult to explain without recourse to some historical connections. The first point is the identification of God and nature, well known from Spinoza’s formula Deus sive Natura (‘God or nature’). AccordingtoHarvey,Abulafia was the ( טה עב —and nature (ha-ṭevaʿ( לא םיה —first to note that the gematriaofGod ( is the same, namely86. This identification is frequent in Abulafia’scorpus, appear- ing ten times in his known works.Thisgematria was widelyquoted in Jewishand Christian literature,some of which wasfamiliar to Spinoza. Theidea thatGod is na- ture suits Maimonides’ thought as well. Abulafia returns frequentlytothis theme in the context of the tablets of the law. Thisisalsofrequent in other kabbalists and in Hebrew philosophical literature.According to Idel, Spinoza disentangled the linguis- tic/gematric mode and focussed on the content. The second point takes on the issue of the intellectual loveofGod. According to Harvey,Abulafia was the first to coin the term ahavah elohit śikhlit,ofwhich he main- tained that amorDei intellectualis is agood translation. The passageinwhich Abu- lafia coins the term is quoted in Narboniand in Abraham Shalom with no reference to Abulafia as its original author.The Maimonidean connection is established through the term or ha-śekhel (‘the light of the intellect’)which appears in the Guide. The third and final point is the reestablishment of the Jewishstate as anatural occurrence. In the Theologico-Political Treatise,Spinoza claims that laws are meant to be observed in acertain place and are irrelevant to other places.Hence, Jewishlaw belongstothe Jewish state, so it will become relevant again onlyifthe Jews return to their homeland. Harvey noted that Shlomo Pines had detected the similarity between this idea and Joseph ibn Kaspi’scontention that the possibilityofthe Jews returning 318 Yoav Meyrav

to their homeland is not irrational. Spinoza explains that the return to the land of Israel is natural rather than miraculous. This idea, too, goes back to Abulafia. In his Response,José María SánchezdeLeónSerrano (Universität Hamburg/Ger- many) focussed on the attempt to find precedents for Spinoza’sidentification be- tween God and nature, arguing that thinkingabout sources for Spinoza changes the wayweperceive him as an innovator.However,Sánchez de León attempted to stress the fundamental differences underlying the equivalenceinformula. Alluding to studiesthat attempt to bridgethe conceptual gapbetween Spinoza and his pred- ecessors in this respect,Sánchez de León noted severalareas in which the differen- ces seem to outweigh the similarities; such as the availability of the concept of God to the human intellect,the philosophical status of language, and the radical transfor- mationofthe concept of nature. Throughout the various discussions in the conference, afew recurringthemes came up, which can perhaps prompt further scholarship on Abulafia within aMai- monidean context: (1) The ambiguity of Abulafia’stheoretical framework: Idel has shown that for Abu- lafia the use of contemporary philosophical jargonisinstrumental rather than theoretical, namelytofacilitate acertain experience in terms with which his au- dience could relate. Nevertheless, the question whether and how acoherent met- aphysical backdrop can indeed be extracted from Abulafia—even if it has an ad hoc status—seems to warrant further study. (2)Invarious cases it seems as if akey differencebetween Maimonides and Abulafia is that although Maimonides’ Guide, in manycases, tries to address various phil- osophical topics (e.g. the structure of the cosmos,the phenomenon of prophecy, and the relation/tension between scripture and scientific truth), Abulafia is inter- ested in facilitatingchange (e.g. elevatingnature, becomingaprophet,altering the Bible). This distinction between static and dynamic undertakingsraises inter- esting questions when exploring the manner in which Abulafia appropriates themesfrom Maimonides. (3) The identification between God and natureinAbulafia and Maimonides can mean different thingsand can be employed (among other things) to assert tran- scendenceaswell as reinforce immanence.Furthermore,understood within the context of creativeness, the statusofthe artifice and the miraculous, derivatively, requireadditional clarification. The different options can be explored more fully, also concerning subsequent developments in the Kabbalah. (4) The status of gematria has raised some questions,especiallyassumingthat let- ters are the building blocks of the cosmos.The gematric equivalence of different expressions,Abulafia argues, is not accidental or random but seems to point to some logical connection between them. Hence, if gematria is not onlyatool for mystical experience but alsoanexpression of the of the world, it should be explained within ametaphysical framework. Moreover,and perhaps significantly, within the context of language, the question of the relationship be- tween ‘The HolyLanguage’ and Hebrew emergesatvarious junctures here. Silke Schaeper Reportonthe LibraryofJewishScepticism

One Person Library

The Library of JewishScepticism is aone person library (OPL), aspecial collection managed by asingle librarian. The librarian is responsible for all tasksinvolvedin setting up, developing,coordinating,and constantlyevaluatingthis highlyspecial- ised academic research collection. Since research at the Maimonides Centre for Ad- vanced Studies is broad in historical and linguistic scope, the librarypurchases books from agreat variety of sources, nationallyand internationally. The librarian undertakes detailed bibliographic research in Israel, negotiates with bookdealers and publishersabout prices and conditions for accesstoe-resources,and catalogues library materialstothe latest international standard (RDA),includingmaterials in non-Roman script (Hebrew,Judaeo-Arabic, Arabic, Cyrillic). The librarian liaises with all research projects at the Institute for Jewish Philosophy and Religion and en- gagesinin-depth bibliographic research. The librarian is responsible for the IT infra- structure of the library (hardware, software,backups) and for selecting and ordering books and e-resourcesfor current and planned research projects.She places orders with bookdealers, negotiates rebates, pays bills, keeps inventory records,and over- sees the work of student library assistants. She alsoprocesses international shipping and customs duties.

Student Assistants

Student assistants contribute to the dailyrunning of the library.MsNoraGutdeutsch, astudent of Protestant theologywith knowledge of Hebrew and bookkeeping, worked for us successfully. Now we are supported by Ms Vanessa Zerwas, astudent of sign language.

Subject Information ServiceinJewish Studies

The ‘Fachinformationsdienst Jüdische Studien’ (FID Jewish Studies) provides nation- al access to electronic resources in JewishStudies. In July 2018, the FID issued abeta version of its new web portal in Jewish Studies: www.jewishstudies.de Aconsiderable programming effort was undertaken in order to make older trans- literated cataloguingrecords from one of Germany’sleadingHebraica collections ac- cessible in original script (UniversityLibrary Frankfurt am Main). Another innovative IT project is under way: enriching the metadata of Frankfurt’sdigitised Hebraica col-

OpenAccess. ©2018 Silke Schaeper,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-017 320 Silke Schaeper

lections with ‘entities’,i.e.links to other web-based information (author’sbiogra- phies, geographic information, and similar). The librarian continues to manageaccess permissions to the subject information service for staff and fellows of the Centre.

FID subscriptions at our Centre in the academic year 2017/2018:

Staff 14 Fellows, Post Docs 4

Periodicals

We subscribe to the Jüdische Allgemeine,aGerman weekly. We wereinterested in sub- scribing to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz,which has online editions in Hebrew and in English. After lengthyand difficult negotiations, directlyand through abookdeal- er,wedecided not to buy an institutional access licence.

Faculty LibraryCommittee

The librarian has made purchasingsuggestions for 4campus-licences for electronic dictionaries and encyclopaedias in the field of Hebrew and Jewish Studies to the li- brary committee of the Faculty of Humanities in April 2018. The suggestions werenot followed up due to other priorities.

Association of Judaica Collections

The ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jüdische Sammlungen’ was founded in 1976,inCologne. Itsannual meetings are avaluable forum providinganexchangeofinformation for professionals workinginpublic and privatecollections, academic and public in- stitutions, libraries, and archivesinGerman-speakingcountries (Germany, Switzer- land and Austria). In September 2016,the librarian introduced the library of the Centre at the annu- al meeting in Berlin. In September 2017,the librarian attended the annual meeting in Würzburg. In September 2018, the librarian plans to give aprogress report at the an- nual meeting in Bamberg. Reportonthe LibraryofJewish Scepticism 321

Collaboration

The library cooperates nationallyand internationallywith otherspecial collections in the field in order to obtain or exchangebooksand theses. It collaborates success- fullywith the State and University Library of Hamburgand Faculty libraries and spe- cial collections in Hamburgfor the planning of e-resource provision. We have en- hanced the local version of the national web portal DBIS (‘Datenbankinformationssystem’)bycontributing 10 new records for e-resources in JewishStudies. It has been agreed thatthe Universität Hamburg’sPhilosophy Faculty Library will receive the collections of the Library of Jewish Scepticism once the research proj- ect of the MCAS has come to an end. From the beginning of the MCAS project,the librarian is thereforeinclose contact with the team of the Philosophy Faculty Library, ensuring professional sustainability.

Book Donations

We wish to thank for donations of books receivedfrom GiuseppeVeltri (Universität Hamburg), Moshe Goncharok (St. ), HanneloreWilke (Universität Ham- burg), Reuven Kiperwasser(Berlin), Michael Studemund-Halévy (Hamburg), Fried- helm Hartenstein (München), the National Library of Russia (St. Petersburg), Asher Salah (Jerusalem), Bill Rebiger (Universität Hamburg), and Ehud Krinis (Beer Sheva).

InterlibraryLoan and Document Delivery

From the founding of the CentreinOctober 2015,the libraryhas promptlymet more than 300 specialist interlibrary loan and document delivery requests, of which 85 weremade in the 2017/2018 academic year.

Statistics July 2017 to June 2018

Institute for Jewish Philosophy and Religion

Bibliographic units (editions) 190 Of which: Donation (editions)20 Of which: E-Book—campus licence7 Of which: E-Book—CD-ROM1 Periodical holdings reportedtoZDB 34 Volumes on shelf (print) 287 322 Silke Schaeper

Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies

Bibliographic units (editions) 229 Of which: Donation (editions)5 Of which: E-Book—campus licence29 Of which: E-Book—PDF 2 Of which: Repro—PDF on CD-ROM 9 Of which: E-Resource—encyclopaedia 3 Of which: E-Resource—dictionary1 Periodical subscription—print 2 Periodical subscription – online 1 Volumes on shelf (print) 219

Statistics October 2014toJuly 2018

MCAS cataloguing records 606 IJPR cataloguing records 866

By language(s)

English 694 Hebrew 278 German 218 Italian 60 French 36 Spanish 22 Arabic 21 Latin 9 Yiddish 8 Judaeo-Arabic 3

LibraryWebpages

In the Centre’sfirst year,when library IT and catalogues werenot yetupand run- ning,the librarian publishedanoccasional newsletterentitled ‘Library News,’ in order to keep staff and fellows informed about progress in library provision. This is no longer necessary.Information about local and international catalogues and other resources is now found on the webpages of the library.