Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue 2004-05: a Profile
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IPCS Special Report 12 February 2006 INDO-PAK COMPOSITE DIALOGUE 2004-05 A PROFILE KS Manjunath, Seema Sridhar & Beryl Anand Research Officers Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies The India -Pakistan Composite respective foreign secretaries on 27-28 Dialogue, borne out of the 6 January December 2004, they decided to, 2004 joint statement given by Atal “Build upon the existing contacts Behari Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf between DGMOs … promote regular laid the ground for the formulation of contacts at local level at designated the eight-point agenda that were places and explore further CBMs detailed by the respective foreign along the international boundary and secretaries in February 2004. The the LoC … discussed and narrowed following issues constitute the eight- further their differences on the draft point Composite Dialogue: Peace and agreement on pre-notification of flight Security including CBMs, Jammu and testing of ballistic missiles, and agreed Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar to work towards its early finalization.” Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, At the next expert-level meeting on 5-6 Economic and Commercial August 2005, an understanding on the Cooperation and Promotion of proposed Agreement on Pre- Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields. Notification of Flight Testing of Detailed exposition in the progress Ballistic Missiles, “committing both made in the aforementioned issues sides to pre-notify in a structured follows. format flight-testing of ballistic missiles, with the objective of I enhancing mutual confidence and Peace & Security CBMs engendering predictability and transparency of intent.” Also, “in pursuance of the MoU of 21 February Nuclear CBMs 1999 which inter alia provided for The nuclear and conventional CBMs undertaking national measures to between India and Pakistan are based reduce the risks of accidental or on the framework of the Lahore MoU unauthorized use of nuclear weapons (1999) and the Joint Statement made under their respective control, the on 20 June 2004. The Expert Level Indian side handed over a draft of talks were held in Islamabad on 14-15 such a proposed Agreement.” At the December 2004. This meeting’s agenda third round of talks between the was to prevent misunderstanding and respective foreign secretaries on 17-18 reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues, January 2006, the experts meetings on an early operationalisation and of the nuclear and conventional CBMs were upgradation of the hotline between the mandated to “continue consultations DGMOs and the establishment of a on security concepts and nuclear secure hotline between the two doctrines.” Also, an agreement to Foreign Secretaries was sought. prevent incidents at sea and air by During further meetings between the IPCS Special Report 12 February 2006 improving, and ensuring navigation Dialogue promised/promises to be facilities, is on the cards. On 1 January different from previous negotiations 2006, the two countries exchanged by virtue of not making J&K the only their lists of each other’s respective issue on the table, however, the nuclear facilities in terms of a 1988 centrality of J&K, and Siachen as an accord (in force since 1992) that adjunct is undisputable. Hence, prohibits attacking nuclear parleys conducted over these issues instillations and facilities. On 17 have been forever guided by the January 2006, Pakistan proposed “that history of the respective disputes, thus military strike formations on either formulating value judgements of the side should not be permanently respective interlocutors and the relocated to forward locations,” the resultant viewpoints they hold over aim being to avoid the possibility of an the issues. The complex history of the “eyeball-to-eyeball” confrontation region, coupled with the current status every time a strike corps formation is of the region and the flexibility of moved. The proposal is under review options available as solutions to the by India as it may undermine its post- sides is based on their respective Parakram emphasis on quick national (and local) political mandates. deployment of its armed forces. Another unique aspect of these issues is that their resolution has been sought Conventional CBMs at different levels - official diplomatic New Delhi hosted the second round of parleys, “back channel” diplomacy Expert Level Talks between India and conducted by specially appointed Pakistan on Conventional CBMs on 8 representatives or National Security August 2005. It was decided “to Advisors and Track-II diplomacy. implement the 1991 Agreement Therefore, to assess progress made in between Pakistan and India on Air these issues, it is necessary to glean Space Violations in letter and spirit; information from formal upgrade the existing hotline between pronouncements (at the level of the two DGMOs by end September official ministerial and diplomatic 2005; not to develop any new posts parleys), media utterances and and defence works along the LOC; reports, and internal debates in the hold monthly Flag Meetings, between respective countries. local commanders, at Kargil/Olding, Uri/Chakothi, Naushera/Sadabad Any durable solution to the J&K issue and Jammu/Sialkot sectors; speedy requires a multi-pronged approach, return of inadvertent Line crossers, none more important than a political and to work out a comprehensive settlement at the highest level between framework to that end, and the two representative governments, periodically review the existing with close consultations with local CBMs.” representatives of Jammu & Kashmir. At the outset, it must be noted that II Indian and Pakistani positions on the Jammu & Kashmir and causal link between J&K-centric CBMs and the final “solution” to the issue is Siachen different. Manmohan Singh has made it clear that India sees CBMs not as an Of all the marked issues in the end in themselves but as a step Composite Dialogue, Siachen and J&K towards the resolution of disputes. But are the most politically sensitive issues Pakistan’s fears remain over India’s for India and Pakistan. The Composite INDO-PAK COMPOSITE DIALOGUE: A PROFILE machinations to only pursue CBMs self-government” was proposed. and stave off any substantial Interestingly, in contrast with the movement towards settlement of the aforementioned Iftar proposals, dispute. Conceptual dissonance still “independence and religious basis are exists over this aspect and was on ruled out” this time around. display during the beginning of the Manmohan Singh had made India’s third round of the composite dialogue basic stand very clear as back as May in New Delhi on 16-18 January 2006. 2004 saying, “short of redrawing of Indian foreign secretary opined that boundaries the Indian establishment CBMs were part of the “final solution” can live with anything.” on Kashmir, the logic being that CBMs are integral to resolving his Pakistani In an interview to BBC on 21 October counterpart, Riaz Muhammad Khan 2005, Musharraf wanted the LoC to be curtly expressed Pakistan’s opinion made “irrelevant” to handle the that Saran’s comment was “just a groundswell of human misery point of view.” resulting from the aftermath of the Kashmir earthquake on 8 October Various possible solutions or ‘trial 2005. He put forth the idea to “identify balloons’ have been floated since the ‘what is Kashmir,' then demilitarise the inception of the dialogue. In October identified region, take all the soldiers 2004, during an Iftar party, Musharraf out and then give self-government to identified seven regions in J&K based the people in the region.” on “religious, ethnic and geographical Demilitarisation and self-governance terms [Ladakh (the Islamic part are “joint ideas”, i.e. they are mutually between the Himalayas and the exclusive according to Pakistan and Indus), Kargil/Dras (Muslim), Poonch hence just demilitarisation will not (Muslim, contiguous with Azad suffice, it must be followed up with Kashmir), Jammu (Muslim-majority self-governance. “Demilitarisation” districts) and the Valley (Muslim)]” and “self-governance” have been oft- and change their status. Change of repeated refrains emanating from the status of an area(s) would entail Pakistani establishment, especially in “demilitarisation & autonomy, joint the latter half of 2005. In a January control of the two countries, division 2006 interview, Musharraf clarified his between the two countries, and definition of self-governance by stating making the Kashmir Valley that, “We are working for something autonomous or placing it under UN between autonomy and independence. supervision.” India and the people of And I think self-governance fits in J&K itself shot down this balloon as well.” Another idea mooted by the idea of partitioning the state is Musharraf is joint management; which antithetical to its people and is against entails identification of a region, the one of the foundations of the demilitarise in that region, followed Indian Republic, secularism. Further, by self-governance and then joint Musharraf drew flak from within management. Under his own Pakistan for “doing a U-turn on admission, these “are the four things” Kashmir.” While visiting Delhi in he had proposed long time ago. The April 2005, Musharraf mentioned October 2004 Iftar proposals and the “self-governance” and on 20 May 2005 May 2005 “demilitarisation” proposals “demilitarisation” and “maximum had similar connotations; the only INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDES B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 91-11-5100 1900 (Tel); 91-11-5165 2560 (Fax) IPCS Special Report 12 February 2006 difference being that overt references wake of the October earthquake, the to religious and ethnic grounds for spate of attacks in Kashmir, the New identifying regions are absent in the Delhi bombings and the IISc shootout elucidation of this idea. It must be kept at Bangalore. Pakistan’s capability to in mind that Gilgit, Baltistan and combat terrorism has been one of the Northern Areas that are under cornerstones of this composite Pakistani control now must be part of dialogue as enshrined in the joint this joint management proposal for it to statement of 6 January 2004.